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The New York Times
Current History

THE
EUROPEAN
WAR

VOLUME I.

AUGUST—DECEMBER, 1914

With Alphabetical and Analytical Index
Illustrations, Maps and Diagrams

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THE EUROPEAN WAR

Beginning to December, 1914

INTRODUCTION

By Albert Bushnell Hart, Ph. D., LL. D., Litt. D.

Harvard University

I.—ULTIMATE CAUSES OF THE WAR—FARAWAY CAUSES

WHERE, when, and why did the great European war begin? Was it on the northern boundary of Serbia? or between Prussian and Russian Poland? or on the Alsatian border? or just inside Belgium? Was it on July 23, when the Austrians served their ultimatum on Serbia? or when the ultimatum expired on the 25th? or when the Austrians declared war on Serbia on the 28th? or when the Russian mobilization became certain on the 29th? or when the German Army was mobilized on Aug. 1? or when the German forces invaded Belgium on the 4th? Was it because of the murder of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand? or the overweening ambitions of Serbia? or the French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine? or the unknown earlier conversations of British and Belgian officials? or the sea pride of Great Britain? or the German desire for a place in the sun? or the Russian conviction of the necessity of getting Constantinople? or the insolence of Prussian militarism?

Each of the dates mentioned marks a step in the rapid approach to formal war; on each of those frontiers forces were hurried in order to meet the shock when it should come; each of the suggested causes had its place in the international rivalries, jealousies, and hatreds which, during many years, had been driv-

ing wedges into the international confidence of Europe. Yet the beginning of the war in point of time is at least as far back as the humiliation of Germany by Napoleon from 1806 to 1813; and the territorial elements in the struggle are as widely distributed as the islands of the Pacific, the uplands of Central Africa, Mesopotamia, Constantinople, and the English Channel.

As for ultimate causes of the war, they are as numerous as the energies of nations. They include antipathies of language, race, religion, historical origin, and education. A list of the real and vital causes would include differences of real or supposed national interests, manufactures, trade, invention, commerce, shipping, colonization, control of inferior races, the military art, literature, religion, and philosophy. It has been a war not only of armies but of nations; not only between political principles but between habits of thought and systems of national organization; not only for immediate trade, advantage, and profits, but for colonies to furnish cargoes, merchant fleets to carry them, great navies to protect the merchant vessels, and chains of naval stations to harbor the navies.

Other wars have been fought between countries; this one is the titanic wrestling of two mighty groups of nations.

It is no longer planet against planet, but one solar system hurled upon another. The bottom cause is a complex of international envies which could no longer bear the terrific strain and torsion. The war may clear away some of these old troubles; but it prepares for a new world, with another series of difficulties and stresses. To understand the great war, therefore, one must know something of the divisions and ambitions of Europe, must have some notion of how the collective human mind works in building up nationalities. The causes of the war and the course of its outbreak are still entangled in details partly seen, partly guessed, and partly as yet unrevealed. Nations clamor and accuse each other in all the hundred languages of the world.

Writer and reader alike would be lost in this confusion of incident and motive were it not that, among all races of men, personal and national ambitions are reasonably simple. The individual man desires, first of all, food, which is the condition of existence; next, shelter, clothing, and other creature comforts which lengthen his life and make the family possible; after that, dominion over his fellow-men. In like manner, nations look first of all for the physical support of the population; then for protection from enemies, and then for an extension of territory and empire.

In searching for the remote causes and final results of the war spirit in Europe these simple elements of national life must be kept in mind. The war is partly a movement for assured food supplies sufficient to sustain rapidly growing populations; it is, in part, a desire to be wealthy while one's neighbors shall be poor; in still greater part, it is simply a revelation of that everlasting land hunger which has been the main reason for the upbuilding of all the empires of history. No one nation has had a monopoly of intense desire for larger trade, more profits, and consequent greater wealth. None is single in its lust for territory and dominion. Not one is the only offender in bending its energies to a military and naval preparation which will give it a

likelihood of attaining its ends through war.

Yet the outbreak of the great war brought into relief two main lines of collision and warfare, one in the west and one in the east, of which the basal motives are the rivalry for sea-power colonies and naval stations in which Germany and Great Britain are the leaders; and desire for control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, which Russia demands and Germany resists; a control which must extirpate Turkey and transfer the overland road to India.

Western European Rivalries

The western war has its roots in the naval struggles between England and various Continental countries, which began as far back as the destruction of the Invincible Armada in 1588. In the seventeenth century the English fought and weakened the maritime power of the Dutch. In the eighteenth they measured forces with the French and Spaniards and gained the supremacy of the seas. In the early nineteenth, after a long and terrific struggle with Napoleon, the English again asserted their position as the greatest sea power, and ever since have kept up the largest merchant marine and the most powerful fleet of the world.

Sea power has always been for England a means to an end. First of all, the protection of the Island Kingdom; then the conquest and defense of colonies scattered all over the earth. The British colonial power began in North America, then spread to India; and in the nineteenth century extended to a vast Asiatic territory, together with numerous islands of the sea, the Continent of Australia, and a great part of Africa. The foresight, daring, and insistence of England's agents and officials, the persistency of her merchants, the boldness of her little armies, have all helped to make and to hold the widest and the most populous empire ever known to man.

Where were the other European powers during these centuries? Spain and Portugal, earliest colonizers in America and on the coast of Asia, slowly declined as England rose. The Dutch and the French yielded up most of their Ameri-

can and Asiatic possessions to the rival power, except the Dutch islands south of the Asiatic coast. Austria had not the sea front necessary for an adventurous maritime country. Italy did not become a complete kingdom till 1870, and her immediate colonial ambitions were confined to Africa. The Turks lost their ability to conquer and to hold new territory. The Russians were busy in the East. The only active colonizing powers from 1880 to 1895 were Great Britain and France, who consolidated her North African territory, and thirty years ago seized wide Asiatic and African lands.

That left Germany as the one great European power possessed of a large sea front, a great tradition of seafaring, and a splendid merchant fleet, but lacking far-flung colonies. From the end of Napoleon's régime till 1890 the German energies were expended on gathering the units of their nation into a strong federation. To tranquilize Central Europe, Bismarck in 1872 brought about the Dreikaiserbund (the Three Emperors' League) between Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. A high point of German influence was reached when in 1878, in the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck won a diplomatic triumph over Russia, which had brought an army within sight of Constantinople. At the same time he set Austria-Hungary upon the policy of *drang nach osten*—"pressure eastward." Russia gradually sheered off from Germany, and in 1883 Bismarck arranged the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, which brought into one general line of policy the belt of Central Europe extending from the Baltic Sea to Sicily.

For the time there was no rival to this ostensibly defensive union. France was on bad terms both with Italy and Great Britain; and Russia and England strongly were locked in a territorial rivalry in Central Asia. Germany seemed intrenched in Central Europe, and had no positive enemy except France, which had neither forgotten nor forgiven the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Germany was now ready to enter upon a policy of world power, which was strongly opposed by Bismarck till the advent of

the young Emperor William II. caused the fall from power of the great statesman in 1890.

For a time there was no combination that could face the Triple Alliance, but about 1891 imperial Russia began to make friends with republican France and thus prepared the way for an eventual world combination against Germany and Austria-Hungary. On their side, the Germans began to build a powerful navy; and looked over the world for an opportunity to establish colonies and spheres of influence. Groups of Pacific islands were snapped up. In 1898 the Germans seized the bay of Kiao-Chau and exacted from China a treaty by which they remained in possession of that valuable harbor and a "hinterland" in the neighborhood.

The coming to power of Edward VII. as King of Great Britain in 1901 is a landmark in the history of Europe, for he set himself to the problem of taking England out of the "splendid isolation" in which the British Empire had stood for thirty years. The result of this new force was seen when, in 1905, the German Government insisted on rights of trade in Morocco. The French had been in possession of Algiers for about sixty years and of Tunis for ten years. The English had for about twenty-five years been masters of Egypt. The Germans thought themselves entitled at least to "the open door" in Morocco. The French for a time felt compelled to yield to this German demand, but a conference was arranged in Algeciras, in which England practically came to the rescue of France, and the Germans gave way. To this result the pressure of the United States through its representative in that conference greatly contributed. Thus was blocked the ambition of Germany to establish a footing in North Africa which might later become a colony. This is a turning point in the history of the approaches to the great war; for it went far to convince Germany that if she wanted colonies she must fight for them.

The next step in the gathering together of an anti-German combination was an understanding between Great Britain and Russia in 1907, by which

they agreed to divide instead of to contend for Persia and other territory in Southern Asia. Two years later followed a secret understanding between the British and French Cabinets by which England became virtually pledged to defend the French coast in case of an attack upon France. Great Britain, France, and Russia thus became involved in an understanding commonly called the "Triple Entente," which was expected to be a defense of all three countries against the Triple Alliance in case of need.

Throughout this period England and Germany faced each other with a growing feeling of distrust. The Germans built a powerful navy; partly to protect their scattered possessions; partly to show the German flag for the benefit of the German trade; but still more to complete the outfit of a world power. The German Navy soon rose to be second in the world, and was nearly or quite half as powerful as the British.

The population of the German Empire rapidly increased from 41,000,000 in 1871 to 65,000,000 in 1910. The country suddenly became a rich manufacturing region, and its trade reached throughout the world and competed with the British merchants even in their own colonies. Yet the Germans felt hampered and confined. The English, the French, and the Dutch held great areas in Asia, while the Germans had only Kiao-Chau. The French, the Portuguese, the Belgians, the English occupied most of Africa, leaving only three comparatively small areas to the Germans. The aspiration of the nation was expressed in the phrase, "Germany wants a place in the sun." Conditions ripened for a breach between Great Britain and Germany.

Statesmen and writers of each country have tried to fix the responsibility for this antagonism between two nations of kindred blood and culture upon the other nation. Manifestly, Great Britain desired peace, for the empire seemed to have reached the maximum of possible territory and prestige; and it was the plainly indicated national policy to keep the existing status of the world. Therefore, for Germany to seek colonies, to build a great navy, to push diplomatic and commercial

influence all over the globe; to gain a footing on the Chinese coast, to aspire to South American territory, seemed to English statesmen both an affront and a menace. Germany's overtures for an understanding by which she might have a share in sea power and world power were suspected. England's counterproposition that Germany accept the limitations of an inclosed Continental power and agree to limit her navy to a proportional size which need not cause apprehension in England was ignored.

This controversy was sharpened by the intense military spirit of Germany, which showed itself in the Court of the German Emperor. This spirit was infused into the civil population, was made a part of public education, was expressed in the art and literature of the growing empire. Colonization, foreign trade, sea power, military force sufficient to overawe or to destroy those who opposed the policy of Germany—these became the intense national aim of 65,000,000 Germans, welded into one prodigious force by an amazing completeness of civil and military organization.

Eastern European Rivalries

At the other extremity of Europe a similar national hostility was growing up between Russia and Germany, long traditional friends. For two centuries no serious hostilities had broken out between them; and Austria-Hungary, the ally of Germany, had passed 400 years without a Russian war. Indeed, those three powers a century ago amicably divided up the ancient Kingdom of Poland among themselves. The Russian dynasty of the Romanoffs was German in origin, and the Russian nobility contained a large German element. The international bitterness between Germany and Russia, which broke out in hostilities in 1914, was due partly to Russian protests against German control in Russian commerce, business, and even social life; in larger part to great rivalries with the German ally, Austria-Hungary, a composite State of many race elements, partly German, partly Hungarian, and partly Slav, which lay adjacent to the remnants of the Turkish Empire in the Balkans.

What interest had Germany in that

poor and distant mountain region, the scanty trade of which was chiefly absorbed by the Austrians? Why should the Germans have taken pains to plant one of their Princes as the King of Rumania and another as the King of Bulgaria, while the Queen of Greece was a sister of the German Emperor? Why did Germany insist in 1888 that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be turned over by Turkey in trust to Austria? Why was that interest quickened so that in 1909 the Austrians were encouraged to incorporate those two provinces into their empire?

The materials are not available for answering all these questions; but the main reasons for this interest in the Balkans are the same as those for two visits made in Turkey by the Emperor of Germany, and to an influence exercised by the German Ambassador at Constantinople after 1890, which gradually extinguished much of the former power of Great Britain and France in Turkish affairs. German statesmen hoped for colonies in Asia Minor, for influence on the Eastern Mediterranean coast, for a restoration of the twin valley of the Tigris and Euphrates to its ancient wealth under their guidance. They had visions of a Mesopotamian rival to Egypt, of a land highway extending from the German Ocean through Europe and Asia to the Persian Gulf, which should parallel both Russian railroads and the English sealine through the Suez Canal.

There were still dreams so long as the Turkish Empire continued; then came in 1908 the long-prophesied downfall of Sultan Abdul Hamid; and the revolution for the moment brought something like a popular Government in Turkey. This event released the powerful Moslem compression which had kept the Balkans so long in bondage and all but completed the process of freedom which, in the course of 200 years, had released the Hungarians, the Rumanians, the Croats, the Serbians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, the Bosnians, till the only remnants of European Turkey were Albania, Macedonia, and a part of Thrace inclosing Constantinople.

The signal for a readjustment of the

Balkans was a war against Turkey, undertaken in 1912 by Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece as allies. The Turkish armies, though officered by Germans, were defeated in every pitched battle; and every Turkish fortress that resisted was taken by siege. For a time the Turks had to defend Constantinople in the lines of Tchataldja, almost in sight of the imperial city. The allies quarreled, and in a short second war in 1913 Bulgaria was forced to give up Macedonian territory inhabited chiefly by Bulgarians. These wars called the attention of the world to the terrible rivalries in a region about as large as an average American State, in which there were six nations, six races, three religions, and six national languages, all overlapping each other. At the same time the Balkans lay between Russia, Austria, and Turkey, on the natural land road uniting Europe and Asia. If the Turks could be driven out of Macedonia, why not also out of Europe?

Doubtless the Germans would not object to that process, if the driving could be done under their direction and to their advantage; but at this point loomed up the interests, the claims, the ambitions, and the policy of the great Russian Empire. The world has been misled by Kipling's epigram that "the Russians are the most Western of Eastern nations instead of being the most Eastern of Western nations." Although numerous islands of Asiatic races are to be found in European Russia, the Russian race is as European as the Germans or the Latins. The Slavs were in the country bordering on the Black Sea when the first Greek historians began to write. They are close kindred to most of the Balkan peoples and to about half of Austria-Hungary; and a considerable part of East Prussia is inhabited by Slavs closely akin to the Russians.

That was the cause of the international discontent of Russia. Though a great people, twice as numerous as the inhabitants of the German Empire, with an additional population of \$30,000,000 in Asiatic possessions, they have ever been an inland folk. Their front on the Baltic Sea was secured only about 200 years

ago. Their footing on the Black Sea was still incomplete a century ago. Their northern and Pacific coasts are fringed with ice. The one waterway out of Russia, by which its chief products can reach the Western markets, lies through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Therefore, the Turkish Empire, which holds that route, is the national enemy of Russia; and at intervals during 150 years the two countries have fought on that issue. Our own John Paul Jones was Admiral of a Russian fleet in one of those wars, soon after the American Revolution. England and France long opposed the Russian desires, and threw themselves into the defense of Turkey in the Crimean war of 1854. Austria and Germany again interfered in 1878 when a Russian army was in sight of Constantinople. Again they jealously watched in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 lest Russia should somehow slip in and take advantage of the desperate condition of Turkey.

As a result of successes in those two wars the little Kingdom of Serbia, being the only Balkan State except Montenegro of pure Slav blood, came to consider itself a local champion of the Slav race, of which the most powerful exponent was Russia. The future historian may have access to records revealing the intrigues and cross-purposes of the Russian Minister and the Austrian Consul General in the Serbian capital city of Belgrade. Experienced diplomats began to realize that here was the storm centre of European politics, because just across the Austrian boundary from Serbia lived Slovaks and Croats and Bosnians who were of the same race, spoke the same language, and might be supposed to cherish the same ambitions as the Serbians for an independent Serb kingdom which should reunite these Slavic units separated only by the accidents of history.

Here steps upon the political scene the Magyar, descendant of those Hungarians who, just about a thousand years ago, rode down into the plains of the Middle Danube, found them to their liking, and there abode. A gallant, picturesque, and dashing race, these Hungarians; for a time overwhelmed by the wave of Turkish conquest; then pushing the Moslems

back; long combined with Austria, because the two kingdoms have the same personal sovereign. A determined and then defeated struggler for national independence in 1849, Hungary in 1867 bound herself to Austria as an equal joined by a federal bond. This Hungarian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire included not only the Kingdom of Hungary, but Transylvania, Croatia, and Slavonia. The 10,000,000 Hungarians have undertaken, "so far as is humanly possible, to rule 10,500,000 Germans, Rumanians, and Slavs."

Since the ambition of the Serbians and their kinsfolk in Austrian territory could only be gratified by prying a section off the Hungarian part of the Dual Empire, it needs no documentary evidence to lead to a conclusion as to the effect of the Slav agitation. The Magyar magnates undoubtedly laid their danger before their German associates in Vienna, and pointed out that if the Southern Slavs could revolt, the Galicians, Bohemians, and other Slavs in the Austrian section might do the same; and the Dual Empire would break up into postherds. It is safe to believe, also, that the imperial authorities of Austria carried their troubles to a hearing ear in Berlin and pointed out that the destruction of Austria would mean the aggrandizement of Russia and the isolation of Germany. If so, they doubtless received an assurance that the German Empire would stand by its ally to the uttermost, whenever that ally believed that the critical moment had come.

Here, then, was the end of the fuse which, once lighted, must bring about an explosion which would shatter Europe. By this devious method the permanent and intense desire of Russia for Constantinople became a part of the combination. For Constantinople is the spot commanding the water passage to the Aegean, is the most famous city east of Rome, is the capital of the declining Empire of Turkey, is the centre of the tension in South-eastern Europe. If Russia could not protect her co-religionists and fellow-Slavs in the Balkans, the German-Austrian combination would eventually force its way down through the peninsula to Con-

stantinople and beyond. Once more the opportunity of linking the great Russian Empire with the Western World by sea would be snatched away. Russia, therefore, stood quivering on guard in 1913 and 1914, anxiously watching the policy of Austria and, behind Austria, the purposes of Germany.

Sea Power and Asia

The question of Constantinople was only a part of the relation of the East to European peace. Ever since the Portuguese fleet appeared on the coast of India in 1496, the Europeans have been endeavoring to fulfill the dream of Alexander the Great by making Asia subject to Europe. Out of the conflicts of Portugal, Holland, France, and England for the territory and property of civilized Asiatic nations, England emerged possessor of the coveted prize of India. Japan resisted all efforts of the Western powers to get a foothold. China was first visited, then attacked; and after 1840 saw portions of her coast and islands occupied by the "foreign devils," among whom the English and French were the foremost. As late as 1867 the French seized Cochinchina, a near neighbor to China, and made it the colony of Indo-China. In 1895 the Japanese wrested Port Arthur, the southern point of Manchuria, from the Chinese; and, although obliged to give it up, ten years later retook it from the Russians. In this race for territory, as elsewhere in the world, Germany arrived late, and had to take second choices.

None of these European colonies were colonies in the sense in which the Romans colonized Spain and the English colonized North America. Neither Portugal, Holland, England, nor France sent out cohorts of settlers like those who have made Australia British. The so-called colonists were simply occupiers. A small European population of officials, commercial men, and soldiers, together with a scanty and despised Eurasian group of mixed bloods, the whole forming a foreign population of one-tenth of 1 per cent. in India, does not create a genuine colony. Such European settlements, whether in a well-

governed dependency like India or one feebly governed like Macao, were simply military stations holding down a native population always discontented and sometimes hostile.

All these powers reached Eastern Asia by sea, a journey of 10,000 or 12,000 miles, either around the Cape or through the Suez Canal, which came to be a British possession. Russia, however, the greatest of Asiatic colonizers, pushed east overland from the Ural Mountains, reached the Pacific, bore down upon China from the north, conquered Central Asia, and thus became the next neighbor to the English in India. Russia held a land route to the Pacific, and built a railroad from the Baltic to Vladivostok. The Russians were true colonizers, coming in hosts, man, woman, and child, settling down to conquer the forest and to till the prairie, intermarrying with the Princes of Asia, building up a Russian spirit among Moslem Turcomans. Their first serious check was in 1904, when the Japanese began to push against them in Manchuria.

The Germans perceived these two lines of colonization and political power and devised a third approach across Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. The ancient caravan road from Constantinople to Konieh, Aleppo, Bagdad, and the Persian Gulf is still discernible. Along the western stretch runs a railroad built with German capital and managed by Germans; and just before the war they secured from other nations a reluctant consent for an extension of this line to Bagdad and thence down the Mesopotamian Valley toward the head of the Persian Gulf. Here was a field for the German imagination. Parts of Asia Minor might well be occupied by colonists from Northern Europe. Mesopotamia was once as rich as Egypt, and could be made fruitful again. If the Germans could somehow open the road between Southern Hungary and Scutari, just across the Bosphorus from Constantinople, there would be a continuous German-Austrian railroad from Hamburg to or near the tidewater of the In-

dian Ocean, flanking Persia, dominating Arabia, and pointing like an arrow toward the vitals of India. If the Russians were, once lodged in Constantinople this route would be broken in two, strategically and commercially. Thus the Eastern interests of the German Empire and the Russian Empire crossed each other at right angles through the minarets of Istantoul.

Physical Causes of the War

Cogent and continuous as were the great issues of self-interest, of territorial expansion, and of world power, which have been described in the preceding survey, there were many subordinate and minor causes which are harder to estimate than the larger and broader causes. One of the supposedly self-evident and sufficient reasons for war to the knife was race antipathy. In fact, race has played a remarkably small part in the war. In the west the Teutonic English and the Latin French have joined against the partly Slavic and partly Teutonic North Germans, the Teutonic South Germans and Austrians, the Magyars and the Slavs of the Austrian Empire. In the east the Russian, Polish, Serbian, and Montenegrin Slavs, and the Rumanians, who are partly Slavs, have been warring with fellow-Slavs in the Austrian Empire and also with the Bulgarians, who are partly Asiatic but mostly Slav, and the Turks, who have a foundation of Asiatic blood with large admixtures of Greek, Slav, Armenian, and other subject races. The Russians have abundant room for expansion in Asia, and have never pushed for Germanic territory in the west, except the little duchies which long shut their country off from the Baltic. It is the Germans who have for centuries been penetrating Slav territory in Prussia, in Bohemia, in Transylvania, in the Alps. Whatever the ambitions of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, they have been compelled to fight alongside the Germans in the great war.

Nor was there serious danger of the Germanization of Central Europe. The Poles, the Bohemians, the Hungarians have all successfully resisted the at-

tempts to force upon them the German language and German point of view. The Germans have been unable to send more than a handful of their people to their colonies in Africa and the East, though a multitude of German colonists have gone to build up communities in South America and North America, quite outside the sphere of German government.

On the other hand, an undoubted reason for the war was a strong desire to force German conceptions of human motives, statecraft, and the theory of the State upon other parts of the world. Or, to speak more closely, to prove to the world that the Germans alone had discovered the secret of national greatness, and would demonstrate it to the ultimate conviction of mankind.

The bottom theories upon which the German State has been conducted since Prussia became the exponent of those principles, about the year 1700, were originally based on a sense of national weakness. The Germans were disunited and knew not how to give up small portions of power and independence in order to accomplish large national results. Frederick the Great's principle of action was substantially, "Strike while the iron is hot." The vigorous and impetuous use of small resources was the secret of his success and the foundation of the Prussian Kingdom.

Nevertheless, the great European generalizers and intellectual organizers of the eighteenth century were Germans and Dutchmen, who worked out systems of public and international law, made successful researches in philology, history, and science, recognized the weaknesses of the German people and pleaded for national unity. The Germans are the great classifiers, analyzers, systematizers.

To be sure, they were long caught in the intricacies of their own learning. The English far surpassed them in the capacity to get things done through government. The Americans were more inventive, the French clearer and more direct in their appeal to the understanding of men. The Germans slipped and stumbled through the first half of the

nineteenth century till the genius of Bismarck revealed to the nation its own possibilities. It was he who gave the opportunity to prove the political advantages of forethought, preparation, skillful massing and distribution of resources, and the terrific force of a nation in arms.

Unfortunately, during the last forty years, the Germans have come to make a god out of method, to worship force, and to look up to the State as created in order to give an enormous aggregation of force its theatre and opportunity. Not long before the great war Treitschke and Nietzsche—both of them Slavs—and Bernhardt—possibly descended from an Italian—made themselves apostles of a German theory that might makes right, because the natural development of the world brings out the qualities of force and directness which conduce to the continuance of the individual and the State. If a nation endures, they argued, it is because it has the qualities which fit with the conditions of the world. Organized force is right, in the same way that the trunk of the elephant and the tusks of the wild boar are right; because, if they were wrong, they could not have perpetuated themselves.

This is not very different from Machiavelli's reasoning: It denies that the object of the State is to forward the happiness of the members of the State and to induce humane feelings among men such as lead to common livelihood and unity of spirit. It is a materialistic philosophy, founded upon the idea that the world is a place to do things rather than to be things; and it divorces itself from chivalry, from consideration for the feeble, from troublesome obligations to national faith. It allows the powerful nation to dictate to weak neighbors; and, therefore, in the long run, it must admit the equal right of the powerful individual to exercise his will over men less strong. It exalts a high organization of the State, but an organization in which the superior always lays down the law for the inferior.

The German theory of government drives the world from the idea of groups of equals back into the mediaeval notion of a feudal society in which everybody

is the inferior of somebody else, until you reach the All Highest.

This theory in itself was not sufficient to bring about a war; but it made the whole German Nation ready to accept war or to make war upon small provocation; partly as the only power possessed of the talisman of complete devotion to the idea of nationality, partly from an Old Testament notion of the duty of smiting the ungodly, and partly because the German State idea encouraged a temper of ruthlessness which is very effective at short range, though it prepares the way for indefinite future harms to the nation that makes it a reliance.

Germany was not the only European power that believed in war for the sake of demonstrating the highest type of civilization. The English have been engaged in only one European contest since 1815, but have many times demonstrated to weak nations, civilized or uncivilized, the futility of opposing the will of Britain. They were accustomed to fight without much system, but with an entire belief in their ability to plant the fear of God in the minds of Sepoy or Zulu or Boer or Sudanese. The French and the Italians glorified their wars of conquest against Madagascar and Tripoli. Russia was the great conquering power of Asia. The Austrians had forty years' experience of persuading the Bosnians to admit the virtues of Austrian government. The doctrine that Providence is on the side of the strongest battalions did not originate in the mind of a German military philosopher. No European power was free from the intention and experience of determining questions of right and wrong by military force.

Two possible checks upon this general spirit of war as a proof of national virtues and of the righteousness of national ambitions were relied upon to prevent a general European war. The first was the influence of High Finance. The great capitalists, bankers, and money lenders of Europe were closely allied with each other and were supposed to have prevented or abridged some wars by holding up the necessary credits. The determination of Japan to make peace

with Russia in 1905 is supposed to have been due to a constriction of the purse-strings of Europe. When the crisis of 1914 came, High Finance did not delay the war a single day. The financier in every country was anxious to prove his devotion to his country's cause by adventuring his own fortune; though it does not seem probable that any of the great banking houses will come out of the war with a smaller aggregate of good securities than when they went in. Whatever the reason, neither the vessel owners who saw their property endangered, nor the great miners and manufacturers, nor even the small business men who stood to lose their all, put any effective pressure on any Government to stop the war.

The other surprise in measuring the forces for peace was the effect of The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, with their discussions, resolutions, conventions, and arbitral courts. They so clarified international law, so limited the ferocity of warfare, and so multiplied the opportunities of a mutually honorable settlement of disputes that the world took new hope that the combined sober judgment of civilized nations would hold back all the nations from the final alternative of war. All that paraphernalia did not stop or delay the Boer war of 1899, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, the war between Italy and Turkey in 1911, the first Balkan war of 1912, the second Balkan war of 1913; and, least of all, the great war of 1914.

It would be idle, therefore, to locate the ultimate cause of the war in the am-

bition or the greed or the military organization or the Governmental theories of any country or race or alliance. Every nation had its pet desire—England was determined to be left in possession of her extended empire; France wanted Alsace-Lorraine; Italy longed for the Trentino; Austria for Saloniki; Russia for Constantinople; Germany for Mesopotamia and for sea power. The world was overweighted. England, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey were suffering from severe internal race strains. No nation was satisfied. Every nation was willing to make great sacrifices for relatively small objects.

Yet it is impossible to account for the sudden breaking out of war on any other basis than the special desire and willingness of Germany to make war at almost any moment and for any convenient reason. England had for ten years been making efforts to come to some understanding on naval programs which would leave Germany at the proportion of one to two in naval power. Each felt that the other was its most determined and dangerous enemy. The Germans had been swiftly victorious in three wars, 1864 against Denmark, 1867 against Austria, and 1870 against France; and saw before them a vision of a like easy victory, their place in the sun, and, particularly, in the warm sun of the Orient. Above all, the whole nation was saturated with the doctrine of the superior right of the strongest nation and was convinced that that strongest nation was Germany.

II.—OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

Serbia, Austria, and Russia

The match was set to the fuse on June 28, 1914, when the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the imperial throne, and his wife were assassinated at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, by a boy who was of Serbian blood but a Bosnian subject of Austria. This was not the first assassination in the history of the imperial family, nor the first heir of the Emperor Francis Joseph who died an untimely death; but it was a dreadful crime, the more fierce and unreasoning in view of

the fact that Franz Ferdinand was known to be favorable to giving the Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the political status of a race element on equal terms with the Germans and Magyars.

The authorities made a formal inquiry of which the world heard little, until on the fateful day, July 23, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Government notified the world that it had served upon the Kingdom of Serbia an ultimatum demanding that the little kingdom confess to re-

sponsibility for the murder of the Archduke, punish certain Serbians who were held to have aided in the assassination, and accept the active aid of Austrian officials on Serbian soil in suppressing and punishing attacks of any kind upon the Austrian Government or policy.

The Serbians had a bad reputation for assassinations, inasmuch as King Peter owed his throne to personal friends and supporters who obliged him by assassinating his predecessor; but the Austrian Government has never brought forward satisfactory proof that the Serbian Government knew of or encouraged the plot against the Archduke. The Serbians, therefore, and many statesmen throughout Europe were convinced that the real purpose of the ultimatum was to make it impossible for Serbia to avoid war.

Consternation descended upon Europe. The great powers of the west, including Italy, which was nominally an ally of Austria, attempted to soften the tone of the Austrians. For Russia the incident was still more alarming, because it was a blow against a Slav State which was at the moment the only centre of Russian influence in the Balkans. To refuse support to Serbia in this hour of danger would be a fearful blow to the prestige of Russia in Southeastern Europe; to support Serbia meant to transfer the quarrel to Russia, which would probably bring on war, and such a war was likely to involve all Europe.

Time was pressing, for the ultimatum demanded a satisfactory answer within forty-eight hours, or else worse would come. The Entente Powers, including Russia, counseled a conciliatory reply; and on July 25 Serbia answered, denying the charge of being a party to the conspiracy but yielding to the demands of Austria. The only significant reservation that Serbia allowed herself was the guarded statement that an independent Government could not allow Austrian officials to sit in another country in judicial proceedings against supposed conspirators. Even that point, with all the rest of the ultimatum, Serbia offered to submit for arbitration to The Hague International Tribunal. This humble reply was contemptuously swept aside by Aus-

tria, and on July 28 war was formally declared.

Thus in five days Europe was swept from general peace into the presence of an actual war which raised issues far wider than the immediate controversy between Austria and Serbia. Before the ultimatum was published rumors were afloat that the intention was to "treat Serbia like another Poland." Under pressure from the powers, including Germany, Austria made a formal disavowal of any intention to acquire Serbian territory; and then under renewed pressure denied the purpose of destroying Serbian integrity. That was the furthest point of concession that the Austrians would reach. The Russians vainly asked for at least a brief delay. On the 27th Russia reached the decision to assure the Serbian Government formally "that in no case will Russia disinterest herself in regard to the fate of Serbia."

From that moment the vital controversy was between Austria and Russia; and all the European powers recognized that war would speedily come unless those two powers came to an understanding. Fate granted no such favor, for in three days after the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, Germany and Russia were at war. The atmosphere in Vienna was unfavorable to discussions of peace, but an attempt was made by Sazonoff, Foreign Minister of Russia, to come to an understanding with Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador to St. Petersburg. The Austrian assurance that it did not mean to extirpate Serbia had some effect; and the Russians were supposed to be unready for war, especially because their lines of transportation leading up to the frontier were not completed.

One thing was certain—whatever the issue, Russia could not defy the Austrians and their allies, the Germans, without support from the west. France and Russia were in close accord and their formal alliance looked forward to just such a contingency. The French, however, joined the English in an attempt to bring about some kind of mediation that would end the trouble, and up to the last day of July it seemed possible that peace would be maintained.

The stumbling block was military rather than diplomatic. The Austrians were calling out troops for the invasion of Serbia; and as early as July 26 the Russians also began to prepare for mobilization. The justification from first to last in their own minds seems to have been that the bulk of their forces were far from the frontier, and that they must start early in order to put them where they could be useful in case war should come. The Austrian contention was that their own levies were intended for a service in Serbia which did not necessarily concern Russia.

As a matter of fact, from the first issue of the ultimatum, it was out of the power of Austria and Russia to make a final decision, because both of them were tied up in military alliances. The question how far either side would go in pushing matters to the last issue depended upon the frame of mind of those allies—Germany with Austria; France and England with Russia.

Germany, France, and England

Nobody at the time or since has supposed that the Austrians took any step which might lead to European war without a previous understanding with Germany. The extreme ambitions of that power in the Near and Far East were probably not very clear in the German mind and must have been vague as stated to Austria. In any case, the territory of Austria-Hungary was an indispensable bridge to the Balkans and Constantinople. In the numerous collections of correspondence that have been published the Germans have never given to the world the significant correspondence between their Foreign Office and Austria just before and during this crisis. Nevertheless, Rohrbach, an unofficial but well-informed German writer, does not hesitate to say that after the murder of Serajevo the Austrian Government asked whether the Germans would stand by them "for life and death"; and that the promise was given.

When the moment arrived the Germans disclaimed any previous knowledge of the contents of the ultimatum. However, on the very date of that ultimatum

the German Chancellor notified the principal German Ambassadors that his Court approved the position of Austria; and that, unless "the dispute be localized," general war was likely. Pressure was undoubtedly put on Austria to give the guarantee against seizing Serbian territory. That Germany was carefully ignorant of the text of the document till it was issued seems probable; that there was anything in the document which the Austrians did not know would be backed up by Germany is incredible.

Russia at once recognized the decisive power of Germany over the whole controversy; and on the 26th asked that it might be exerted to moderate the Austrian position. On the other side Sir Edward Grey for Great Britain was trying to bring the Germans into an agreement for some form of mediation. The one thing certain is that the Germans never put upon Austria any effective pressure to withdraw from war with Serbia, or to come to an understanding with Russia. On the other hand, it is very doubtful whether Germany desired or expected war at that time. The Emperor was in Norway; the merchant fleet all over the globe was visibly taken by surprise when the war broke out. The numerous predictions of war during the previous six weeks were not different from similar but unverified predictions in 1909, 1912, and 1913.

Nevertheless, Germany was always prepared for war, expected war sooner or later, and was the first great power to accept the responsibility of a general war. The official German reason for this state of mind was that Russia secured a promise of aid from France and England which emboldened the Russian Empire to provoke war. This raises the question of the direct share of the west in the final negotiations and outbreak. If Russia should attack Austria it would be with the knowledge that Germany was by the Triple Alliance bound to defend her ally in a defensive war; hence, Russia would not venture to attack without a clear understanding that France would come in aid. Various attempts have been made to extract from the documents a

proof that the French made a positive pledge of support on the Serbian issue. The French did strongly protest against the action of Austria; and some effort was made by the German Ambassador in Paris to establish "solidarity," leaving Austria and Russia to fight it out alone if they chose; but the first positive assurance by France that she would support Russia in any event was made on July 29.

This was what the Germans and Austrians expected. They still hoped, however, that Great Britain would stand neutral. Efforts have recently been made to show that early in July, 1914, Great Britain made a formal treaty for common naval action with Russia. All the circumstances are against this view. The Russian Government pushed very hard for several days to secure an assurance of England's support. The standpoint of the British Foreign Office was that the whole difficulty could be adjusted by a European conference or arbitration. Grey's first proposition to that effect, made July 24, was that England, Germany, France, and Italy should sit as a sort of board to decide what Russia and Austria ought to do. Italy and France accepted; Germany declined on the ground that it would amount to an "arbitration."

Then followed the "conversations" between Austria and Russia at St. Petersburg from July 26 to the 31st, in which Russia declared a willingness "to accept the British plan, or any other proposal that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict." The Russian Foreign Minister even drew up a "formula" for an adjustment on the following basis: "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that the character of the question is of European interest, she admits that the great powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude." A second time England urged some kind of conference of the great powers. Emperor William consented to use his personal influence, and exchanged telegrams with the Czar,

while his brother telegraphed to King George of England. Great Britain desired peace, and no pledge which would encourage the Russians to plunge into war can be found in the correspondence. Such a pledge would have been contrary to the interests of England.

Throughout the period from July 23 to the outbreak of the war the British also declined to give any pledge to support France in case of war. Much has been made by German writers and the German Government of a report made by the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires under date of July 30 in which he says: "Today there is a firm conviction in St. Petersburg and even an assurance that England will support France." That writer, a minor representative of a small power, had no place in the official discussions and does not assume to give more than the gossip of the diplomatic lobbies. On the next day, the 31st, we know that Grey was still declining to give any positive assurance to France.

All the evidence shows that France and England throughout believed that the Austrian ultimatum was a dangerous step; that they sympathized with the Russian protests, and that they hoped to the end that Austria would make some concessions which might be the basis for negotiations and a peaceful settlement. Both of them tried to induce Germany to exercise pressure in that direction, without much effect. On the other hand, neither of them ever notified Russia that if worst came to worst she would have to stand without the support of the western powers; and France made a positive promise to fulfill the alliance by active aid to Russia. Great Britain, which had nothing to gain from war and some chance of heavy losses, honestly tried to prevent the catastrophe.

Eastern Lineup

During the momentous ten days from July 23 to Aug. 1 the public attention of the civilized world was fixed upon these negotiations, the outlines of which were given to the press from day to day. Every responsible nation concerned insisted that it stood for peace; even Austria insisted that destructive war on Serbia was necessary in order to

stop adventures which must lead to war. Yet every nation, in the heart of its statesmen, felt that peace would be too dear at the sacrifice of great national ambitions. Constantinople, the Suez Canal, India, the Pacific islands, expansion in Africa, the stimulation of trade, the growth of the merchant marine—all these aims of war were in the background. The immediate question was whether the pride of Austria, who could not brook the attacks upon the integrity of the empire, would give way to the pride of Russia, who could not accept the status of a cipher in a great Balkan question. In the end, even the question of prestige gave place to the insistent practical issue of the mobilization of Russian troops.

That question arose in the earliest negotiations with Austria; and came to a head in the final negotiations with Germany. On July 26 the German Chancellor wrote that he was informed that "Russia was about to summon several bodies of reservists immediately, which would be equivalent to mobilization against us." This was a fact; although on July 29 the Russian Chief of the General Staff gave his word of honor that the preparations were directed exclusively against Austria, who had also mobilized on the ground that the troops must proceed against Serbia. On the 28th formal mobilization was ordered in the southern districts of Russia.

Against this preparation, even though directed against Austria, the Emperor William strongly protested in a personal telegram to the Czar on July 30. The orders were made general, and on July 31 Germany demanded a disavowal within twelve hours, the alternative to be war. The Russians replied with a general order for mobilization of the whole army. Once more Emperor William demanded demobilization; and on Aug. 1 the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was directed to serve upon Russia a notice of a declaration of war unless a satisfactory answer was immediately made, and at 7:10 P. M., Aug. 1, 1914, the great European war began.

Who began the war? Serbia, by hesitating at the ultimatum on July 25?

Austria, by declaring war on Serbia on July 28? Russia, by the mobilization order of the 31st? Austria, by massing troops available against Russia? Germany, by a formal announcement of war? Or France and England, by allowing Russia to believe that they would give their support?

Nobody can disentangle the ultimate responsibility. Europe had long been in a condition where war was likely; and the Balkans, the storm centre of European dissensions, had been left in an unstable and temporary condition. The wonder was that Austria and Russia had not been at each other's throat any time after 1908. No one will ever know how far the responsible statesmen, Berchtold in Austria, Sazonoff in Russia, Bethmann Hollweg in Germany, Viviani in France, and Grey in England, were engaged in a game of international poker, in which each hoped that the other would lay down his cards and give up the game.

All that we know is that if the Russians had held off their mobilization the war would have been postponed at least for two or three days; that if Austria had foregone the military punishment of the Serbian people, that quarrel might have been adjusted for the time being. Back of it all lies the fact that if Germany had not given the Austrians *carte blanche* to create a situation in which Germany was bound to go to war in defense of her ally, the Russians would not have felt the necessity of mobilizing. No mediations or conversations or formulas could remove the fact that the unfavorable frame of mind of the Slavs in the Austrian Empire put that aggregation of races in danger of breaking up. That carries the controversy back to the question how far the Germans and the Magyars had a right to keep up a system of government by which the majority of the people in the empire felt themselves suppressed. No one can put his finger upon the nation which was ultimately responsible for allowing things to drift into a condition where war seemed the only remedy.

One thing, however, stands out with perfect clearness—the one nation which

was readiest to face a great war was Germany, which was the best organized, best equipped, best provided with military supplies, best armed, best trained, the nation which had most distinctly made it a principle of national life and education that national greatness, power, and dominion were the end and aim of national existence; a nation which saw with the greatest clearness the advantages that could be gained from victory. It appears to have been in the power of Germany so to modify the point of view of the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians that the Serbian ambitions would not have disturbed the Austrian Serbs. It was in the power of Germany to recognize that Austria had and must have a permanent interest in the Balkans. The fault was not that of the Emperor or any individual in the empire, but of a national consciousness which in the last analysis preferred the remedy of war to any remedy of peace.

Western Lineup

Under the terms of the Triple Alliance Germany was bound to aid Austria in any defensive war, and the German Emperor decided that this was defensive. Not for a moment, however, did the Germans suppose that it was to be a smashing war of the three great powers against Russia, slenderly aided by Serbia. The third power in the Alliance, Italy, hung back, condemned the action of Austria, and, when the pinch came, declined to take part in what she considered a war of German and Austrian aggression. This action had been discounted, for the coolness of Italy toward her two partners had long been manifest. Neutrality was as much as could be expected, and that lasted only a few months.

On the other hand, as soon as the war clouds darkened, France and Germany began to be active on the frontiers. The Germans demanded on July 31 a positive statement whether France intended to remain neutral. On Aug. 3 Germany formally declared war on France, who had for two days been mobilizing. Each side accused the other of being the first to prepare for hostilities, and the first to make war. However, it is not

necessary to inquire into the controversy whether German Uhlans or French airships were first over the boundary. France was already committed to war in behalf of Russia. For a time there was a confusion of declarations and counter-declarations among the many parties to the war.

The one significant question left undecided after the first shots were fired on the frontier between Germany and Russia was the situation of Great Britain. Early in the correspondence on the embroglio, Grey had stated plainly that it might not be possible for Great Britain to keep out of the general war; and he let fall a remark about the unwillingness of England to break up the main fleet, which happened to be engaged in manoeuvres. Nevertheless, he insisted that Great Britain was under no obligation to take part in the war.

This was hardly frank on Grey's part, because in November, 1912, he had accepted a written memorandum with the French, to the effect that Great Britain would thenceforth assume the protection of the Atlantic and Channel coast of France; and that in case of a crisis the military authorities of the two countries would consult together. This promise, though made in secret by a small group in a cabinet, which was only a small group delegated by the two Houses of Parliament, was held by the French, and later with some reluctance by the British, to be morally binding upon the whole British Nation. Nothing can be clearer than that within a few days Great Britain must have come out on the side of France, which was at the same time the side of Russia. The Germans made a last bid for British neutrality by urging (Aug. 1) that Germany would promise to respect the integrity of France and her colonies if the British would stand off. On the contrary, the next day Grey gave to France a written assurance that the British fleet would fight any German fleet which undertook to attack French coasts or shipping. The enormous sea power of Great Britain was rapidly drifting into the anti-German combination.

As the five great powers were thus grouping themselves into two hostile

camps the question of the small powers adjacent to the hostile territory became pressing. Switzerland settled the question once for all by mobilizing her well-trained and capable forces on her northern frontiers. The Swiss, ensconced in their difficult country like a garrison in a fortress, gave to the world an example of successful armed neutrality. The three Scandinavian powers and Holland had no direct interest in the rivalries of Austria and Russia and stood by neutrality; as did Spain, Portugal, (for the time being,) and the remaining Balkan States—Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.

Besides Switzerland, which had protected itself, the only small power that lay in the track of armies was Belgium. A highly industrious and prosperous country of 9,000,000, which was not only neutral in spirit but was specially protected by a treaty of neutrality of which the Empire of Germany was one of the guarantors. The Belgians felt their exposed position, lying as they did between Germany, France, and England. They had, therefore, fortified Liège, Antwerp, and some other places and were building up a citizen army. The Germans later discovered documents in the archives of Brussels which showed that the Belgians had for some time been nervous about their situation in case of a European war. They had held conferences with English officers and had talked over possibilities of the landing of British troops. No treaties or alliances were ever made in consequence of these suggestions; the Belgians were simply thinking out what might be done if there should come upon them the calamity which actually befell in 1914.

On Aug. 3 the German Government demanded free passage for their armies through Belgian territory; had it been promised, Belgium would have automatically become a party to the war as the ally of Germany. The Belgians peremptorily refused, and next day (Aug. 4) the Germans crossed the border, invaded the neutral territory of Belgium, and made war on the Belgian Army. The excuses officially put forth for this action included such allegations as that the Bel-

gians, by building forts on the German frontier, gave evidence of hostile feeling. The one crime of the Belgians was that they were the owners of a strip of land which could furnish a route into France, avoiding the strong fortifications of the eastern and northeastern frontiers.

The Belgians were the victims of a German plan of campaign. Even the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, in a public address, owned that the German invasion was "a breach of international law—he who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his all, can only consider the one and the best way to strike."

The attack on Belgium pushed England more rapidly in the direction in which that country was advancing. The British Minister Goschen made a last protest to the German Chancellor, who declared that "just for a word—'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation." On the same day formal war was declared between the two Governments, and England at once became the leader of the five allies, the three great powers, with Belgium and Serbia. Little Montenegro also came in as the ally of her sister Slav States.

The circumstances of England's entry into the war prove conclusively that it was neither the desire nor expectation of Germany to go to war with Great Britain and Russia at the same time. Little light is thrown upon the truth of the mutual indictment of each of those maritime nations by the other, that it was watching the opportunity to crush the colonies and trade of its rival. The German Chancellor at the last moment expressed his amazement that Great Britain had not met the Germans in a plan of common action—which would have meant in practice the joint dominion of the seas. To the German mind it was Great Britain who had fended Germany away from a place in the sun. Did not Great Britain check the Germans at Algeiras and in the Agadir incident? Was not Great Britain the one world-trade rival of Germany? Had the war originated in the

west instead of in the east, Great Britain and Germany would have been the leaders from the first. In the books of Bernhardt and other frank German writers, England was put forward as the marplot of German ambitions; the natural object of German hostility.

Yet the real war of 1914 was hardly begun when Germany was forced to realize that, for the first time in the history of the Federation, she was entering upon a war against great odds

by land and sea; that the Dual Alliance was beset by enemies on the east, on the west, and on the ocean. Almost by chance the war in the west had come at the same moment as the war in the east.

The German gains of twenty prosperous years in colonies and in foreign trade were endangered; and who could say whether any conquests could be made that would restore those losses and maintain German prestige?

III.—PROGRESS OF THE WAR TO SEPTEMBER, 1914

Eastern Beginnings

Notwithstanding the bitterness over premature mobilizations by the Austrians and Russians, war on a grand scale was slow in beginning. It was Aug. 6 before Austria was ready to declare formal war on Russia, Aug. 11 before the armies of the two great nations stood facing each other on the frontier, and Aug. 16 before the first heavy fighting occurred between the Russians and the Germans.

At the beginning of the war the military line was substantially the western boundary of Russian Poland and other Russian provinces as far south as the northern reach of Rumania, which covered the Russian left. The total distance was nearly 1,000 miles, about a fourth of which came up against the Austrian province of Galicia. The line between Austria and Serbia was the Danube and the lower courses of the Save and Drina Rivers. This whole country, except the western boundary of Serbia, is open and free from mountains, though considerable stretches of the Russian frontier are swampy.

As for military forces, the Russians could throw upon the frontier more men than could be placed opposite them by the Germans. On the other hand, the Austrians had almost as many available men as the Germans, who must cover both the eastern and western fronts. In the early campaigns some Austrian divisions were transferred to the frontier of France. All the four countries in the east were full of martial enthusiasm; the Germans exulted in a magnificent army, which, however, had seen no field service

since 1871; the Russians were taught by the hard experience of their war with the Japanese in 1905. The Serbians brought in something like 200,000 veterans from the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. The Austrians deployed a large army, which was made up of many unfriendly races, and was much inferior to the Germans in training and discipline.

Military operations began in Serbia, where, on July 29, the Austrians began to throw shells from their own territory across the river into Belgrade, the Serbian capital. With their vast superiority in men and means they expected an easy victory. The first serious campaign in the east was the Austrian invasion of Serbia from the west, beginning Aug. 12. The Austrians made their way into the mountains south of Belgrade in the neighborhood of Shabatz; and there, after ten days of hard fighting, the Austrians were defeated and driven back across the Drina. The defeat was a terrible setback for a nation having ten times the population and fifty times the resources of its enemy. This shame was increased when, on Sept. 6, the Serbians invaded Hungarian territory; but they were recalled by a second inroad of the Austrians, which took a far larger toll from the Serbian armies than the first one, and the Austrians found a lodgment on Serbian soil in which they remained till a third Austrian movement in November.

Further to the eastward Austria made the first attack. Part of the campaign plan was to arouse the Poles on the Rus-

sian side of the border by promising them freedom from Russia. The Russian Government forthwith countered with a public promise to add Prussian and Austrian Poland to the rest of the territory and to give to the new Poland "self-government." The Austrians under General Dankl were quickly checked, then thrown back, and the first Russian army broke into Galicia, and early in September occupied Lemberg, the provincial capital, and began to think of attacking Vienna.

This was the first large city that was taken by either side, and the Russians had great hopes of aid and comfort from the Slav inhabitants of the province. The great battles were fought on very extended fronts, varying from thirty to eighty miles, and involved new types of strategy, new methods of moving troops, and new uses of heavy artillery. Several powerful fortresses were taken by the Russians, and during September they prepared to invest and take the first-class fortified City of Przemyśl.

The fortunes of war were at first favorable to the Russians on the frontier of Prussia. The swift progress of the Russian arms is perhaps a proof that the Germans had reason to be alarmed at the Russian mobilization during the period of negotiation just before the war. The Russian General Rennenkampf was able to occupy a large district in the neighborhood of Königsberg. In this crisis the Germans called into service a retired General, von Hindenburg, to take command. The two armies thus fought desperately the battle of Allenstein in the swampy region of the Mazurian Lakes. On Aug. 31 the battle ended in a rout for the Russians.

Thus the campaigns in the three fields of eastern warfare during the first six weeks of the war left the four contending armies nearly on the same territorial footing as when the war broke out, except for the dashing advance of the Russians into Galicia. It was clearly seen that the Serbians, Austrians, and Russians were all far inferior in organization, discipline, and military skill to the Germans. Though the Austrians showed no ability to pierce Serbia or to resist the tremendous onset of the Russians; the

bloody campaign in East Prussia and the immense losses of material were demoralizing to the Russian hopes. If the German troops and commanding officers could be sent to the aid of the Austrians, without weakening the invasion of Poland, which the Germans were planning, the Central Powers might hope for victory on the eastern frontier.

Western Crisis

The wonderful fighting qualities of the Germans made themselves felt also beyond the western frontier of Germany, where the armies pushed their way almost to Paris, and the cause of the Allies was saved only by the most desperate resistance. Nobody doubted when the war broke out that the Germans would follow the same plan as in 1870, by striking for Paris by the easiest road. But in 1870 Belgium was neutral and the attack had to be made across the 120-mile boundary extending from the Rhine to Luxemburg; Paris was then reached from the eastward. That frontier was pushed back westward by the cession of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, which included the first-class fortresses of Strassburg and Metz; but the new French frontier was later heavily fortified and it would require time to force it; therefore, the Germans, while attacking with great vigor all along the line, chose the northern route for this main invasion.

That route, however, crossed Belgium. The ancient path of armies and theatre of decisive battles had seen no foe since, in 1830, by a civil war, it was separated from the remainder of the Kingdom of Holland. In 1815 and again in 1839 special treaties were made, affirming the perpetual neutrality of Belgium. In 1870 Bismarck took pains to announce the respect felt for that treaty by Prussia. The Second Hague Conference of 1907 adopted a general convention setting forth that the territory of neutrals could not be used for transportation of troops or supplies. When war broke out on Aug. 1, the Belgians expected to keep out of the fight, in which they had no immediate interest. They did not, like the great powers, desire to enlarge their colonies nor to occupy territory in Asia.

They were, therefore, thunderstruck

on the evening of Aug. 2 to receive notice that the Germans intended to cross their territory, because otherwise the French were likely to do the same. In spite of their protests and appeals to Germany and France as cosignatories of the treaty, in spite of the answer that they would defend themselves against any invasion, on Aug. 4 the Germans crossed the line and the first sharp battle in their war against the French was directed upon the Belgian fortress of Liège.

Against this attack the French could for the moment do nothing more than to hammer the German lines on the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine and capture two or three towns; but the Germans rallied and pushed across toward Nancy. Not a soldier was drawn from the northern army by the French movements elsewhere. The greatest campaign of the war, therefore, was fought across Belgium and Northern France, just where it was easiest to pour in the 120,000 men of the English territorial army; but where the French frontier was weakest and the transportation of the troops was the most difficult.

Belgians, French, and British all expected that the great modern fortress of Liège, with its chain of protective forts, would check the army. The defenses were badly planned and the Germans brought up heavy mobile siege guns of a type hitherto unknown, which smashed in the supposedly impregnable forts. Nevertheless, the struggle lasted from Aug. 5 to Aug. 14, when the last fort surrendered, and on the 17th the British Army was safe on the Continent.

Meanwhile the Germans overran Belgium, took Brussels, and on the 21st completed the capture of Namur, the only remaining obstacle to the southern march. On the same day the Germans began a conflict with the French, who had not been able to come up in time to save the Belgians; and thus began a series of battles in which more than 1,000,000 men were engaged on each side; and, for the first time since Napoleonic days, the English were part of a great Continental army. The French were beaten back at Charleroi, the British at Mons; there was nothing for it but to retreat.

Again, as in the August of 1870, the Germans pushed their enemies in front of them; again they aimed their march southward upon Paris. From Aug. 22 to Aug. 28 the French and the British with difficulty kept in touch with each other, and steadily went backward. At the same time the French at last gave way in the east at Longwy, and a German eastern army came up to join the northern force in a final onslaught on Paris. By Sept. 1 German troops were at Senlis, twenty-five miles from Paris; and two days later the civil Government of France was transferred to Bordeaux for safety.

At this supreme moment the initiative and the victory passed from the Germans to the Allies. The German front was too far in advance of the main army. General Joffre and General French combined their forces for a tremendous effort. Skillful strategy and the personal bravery of the troops, combined with a desperate sense of the last opportunity to save Paris and France, were at last effective. In the tremendous battle of the Marne, which was subdivided into many combats, General Foch found a joint in the German armor; and from Sept. 8 to 11 the Germans gave ground, sacrificed their hope of Paris, and retreated to a line of defense prepared beforehand and awaited further movements of the enemy. The new German line, which was destined to hold for nearly two years and a half, left Verdun to the French and was nowhere nearer than about seventy miles to Paris. For the first time since Napoleon a first-class German army was defeated and forced to retreat in the open field. Before this prodigious battle of the Marne ended, another battle of the nations began along the course of the River Aisne. The English again attacked, but were checked in the end at Laon by the heaviest guns that had ever been brought to the front of a marching army. From Sept. 12 to 18 the English and French strove to push the Germans further back; but their line held at last, backed up by the tremendous guns; and upon this line the trenches were dug on both sides in which the troops were to remain for many months.

Naval Warfare

Alongside these titanic combats on land went the fighting by sea, which consisted in part of commerce destroying, in part of picking up islands and stations in distant seas, and in part of the hammering of armed vessels upon each other. All the powers engaged except Serbia were maritime; but the cruisers and commerce destroyers of Austria and Russia operated in the contracted waters of the Aegean, Black, and Baltic Seas, and could not affect the naval results of the war. The French Navy, though large, was not effective, and by agreement with England was stationed wholly in the Mediterranean Sea. The Germans had a modern navy, including ships of the dreadnought and superdreadnought classes, and an abundance of the fast protected cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines. The English Navy was nearly twice as great as the German, and the English had the advantage of centuries of experience in watching, cruising, running, and fighting.

The moment the war began the English and the Germans sent out commerce destroyers, some of them swift cruisers and others converted merchant ships. The German ship *Emden* and some others kept the sea for months; and a German squadron cruised in the southern seas; otherwise, within a month nearly all the German merchant ships in existence were off the open sea. The Germans continued commerce with the Scandinavian powers across the Baltic, and did a little coasting on the North Sea; but from the very first the English were able to send such numbers of commerce destroyers to sea that vessels in neutral ports remained there, and those which had begun their voyages hurried back to neutral protection. The danger and difficulty of reaching the German ports were such that few of the German captures of hostile merchantmen could be sent to Germany under prize crews, and a policy was deliberately adopted of sinking such vessels, including some neutrals.

Two naval weapons now came into general use, both of them previously

known but neither of them employed with much success. The first was explosive mines. The great ports on both sides of the Channel were so protected by mine fields that no serious damage was done throughout the war to shipping in port or to wharves by hostile vessels. The mine could also be used offensively by planting it in the probable path of enemy vessels, whether merchantmen or ships of war. The first naval brush in the war was an attack upon and the destruction of a German vessel which was engaged in planting mines.

The other weapon was the submarine, which was invented as a sort of easily transportable gun that could discharge its projectile at warships. In the early days of the war, however, the submarines were treated rather as defenders of coasts and harbors than as a form of military weapon which might decide the fate of nations. Contrary to expectation, no great fleets of armed vessels appeared in the waters adjacent to Western Europe. For England the first consideration was to block the English Channel to enemies, and to make it safe for transportation of the army which helped to save France.

Both sides were able to safeguard their coasts to such a degree that for two years and a half no serious damage was done to the German, French, or English coast towns. Mine fields were merely distributed in exposed spots through which were left channels known only to special pilots. Later large mesh steel nets were invented which tangled up small submarines and transmitted a danger signal to the surface when touched by a hostile craft.

The ultimate defense of both coasts was, however, the powerful fleets which in the early months of the war were kept by both sides in safe harbors. The British had to provide for a ceaseless patrol of the North Sea and for commerce destroyers and trade protectors in the North and South Atlantic and the West Indies. When the Japanese came into the war, a little later, they took over most of the defensive and protective naval functions in the Pacific.

Atrocities

The early campaigns of the war in all fields gave rise to charges of deliberate cruelty practiced on wounded and prisoners, and also on noncombatants. The Balkans were far too much accustomed to the hideous side of warfare, and the Serbians in the campaign of 1912 and 1913 learned to use murder and rapine upon civilians of occupied lands. The Russians in Galicia were dealing with a civil population which they desired to keep friendly; but their brief occupation of Prussian territory left tales of horror which the Germans carefully placed upon record.

On those frontiers newspaper correspondents were few and residents had little contact with the outer world. It was otherwise in Belgium, which for a time was in direct mail and telegraphic communication with England, and from which thousands of refugees found their way to the allied countries. For the Belgians the sudden appearance of a German army on their soil was in itself an unspeakable crime and insult. To the German charges that the Belgians had intended to bring in English and French aid, the unassailable reply was that neutrality was a necessity for every commercial and political interest of Belgium. The new national army was not yet in form; Belgium, if belligerent, would be in great danger of losing the Belgian Congo, which was much coveted by Germany. To the charge that England or France meant to make Belgium a base for hostilities—against Germany—the answer is again that a neutral Belgium would be safer than she could possibly be in alliance with the western powers. To be sure, the Germans promised kind treatment if they were given a free road to the French frontier; but the Belgians were well aware that their port of Antwerp was almost essential for German export trade, and the Belgians had no reason to trust such assurances. Besides, to allow the use of their soil by Germany would have been looked upon, and would have been, an act of war against the Allies.

The rage of the Belgians was at once changed to fury and despair by the treat-

ment which they received from the invading and irresistible armies. The bombardment of their forts, the destruction of their armed men, the occupation of their capital, were at least acts of war; while the treatment of the noncombatants infuriated the whole country. To what effect the efforts of centuries to limit war to warlike operations and to persons who formed part of the warlike array? Only seven years earlier in The Hague Convention of 1907 elaborate treaties were drawn up which put the civilized powers of the earth upon their honor to respect private property and the persons of noncombatants.

These conventions contained such pledges as that "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended, is prohibited"; "Pillage is formally forbidden"; "No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible"; "The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly, and if they respect the laws and customs of war."

Belgium was a thickly populated country, and the troops at once discovered that they were in the midst of an intense enemy, where every man, woman, and child was hostile. They took the sternest and severest measures to overawe the population and to prevent interference with roads and means of communication. In some cases the people fired from hedges and houses—that is, they did precisely what German men and women and children would have done in Westphalia if the French had been able to cross the German border. Nevertheless, civilians who fire upon soldiers lose their immunity and are subject to be shot at sight.

Thousands of people were thus shot down for the offense, or suspicion, of

attacking the Germans or giving aid or information to the Allies. Then came a succession of acts which shocked the world outside the boundaries of the two Central Powers. The reports of survivors, the statements of correspondents, the diaries of German soldiers who took part in the slaughter, the undying memories of the people of Belgium, are proofs which cannot be set aside or diminished. Thus a German soldier recorded: "In this way we destroyed eight houses with their inmates. In one of them two men with their wives and a girl of eighteen were bayoneted. The little one almost unnerved me, so innocent was her expression. But it was impossible to check the crowd, so excited were they for at such moments you are no longer men, but wild beasts." Hundreds of thousands of people fled; houses, villages, and towns were looted; the whole industry, transportation, and civil life of the population was struck down.

Among these incidents the most striking was the frightful fate of the City of Louvain, an ancient town and seat of a world-famous university, which was occupied by the Germans on Aug. 19. As usual, the notables of the town were taken as hostages. On the evening of Aug. 25 shots were fired in the town, many witnesses say, fired by the German soldiers themselves. Certainly the people of the town had no intention of resisting their conquerors. The centre of the town was set on fire, the university with its priceless library was destroyed, numbers of the inhabitants were driven out of the houses which remained. Large numbers were killed in the streets. It was a reign of terror.

The Germans justified this cruelty, on the ground that a policy of "frightfulness" would put an end to resistance and quickly restore good order. The truth was that they were taken by surprise at the resistance of the Belgians, which caused a fatal delay in the plans of the conquest of France; and they were determined to crush the spirit and the organization of Belgium with an iron hand. Resistance by civilians was, to their mind, something worse than a breach of

the laws of war; it was an affront to the German Army, moral treason to German success. Hence the exaction of hostages, many of whom were remorselessly shot for offenses absolutely out of their power to prevent; hence the burning of farms, houses, and towns; hence the tyrannical orders of the Military Governors who were placed over the disorganized and helpless Belgian people.

Early Lessons From the War

By Sept. 15, 1914, most of the general features of the war were developed, except for the later coming in of Japan, Turkey, and Italy; and several misapprehensions were corrected by the events of the first six weeks.

The position of Russia as a military power was defined both in its strength and in its weakness. It was the one country possessing an almost unlimited supply of good material for soldiers; in the early armies appeared Siberians, Turcomans, Tartars, Finns, and Poles, besides the men of Russian race. The Russian commanders had dash and persistence. From the beginning there was great difficulty in transportation, since the strategic railroads reaching to and along the frontiers were few and inconvenient. In the first dash of a new campaign the lack of proper organization and honesty was less felt than later in the war. Russia's poor approaches by sea were revealed by the blocking of the Baltic, and a little later of the Black Sea; so that Archangel and other northern ports and Vladivostok were the only available outports.

The German military system was both intensive and extensive beyond any experience of mankind. The smallest details of supply, equipment, and communication were thought out beforehand. The immense accumulation of stores made possible the steady push forward which all but brought victory. At the same time the human forces were poured forth in prodigious numbers. A very few days showed that, had the war been solely eastern or solely western, Germany would have forced her enemies to an ignominious peace within three months.

On the other hand, the success of Ser-

bia against the disciplined regiments of Austria put a new premium upon the military capacity of the Balkan people. Still more astounding was the resistance of France, a country which by many observers had been thought decadent. Though caught only partially prepared, France poured forth her sons with prodigality, and those immense numbers, combined with the opportune coming of the little English army, saved the day for Paris and France, and, presumably, for London and Great Britain.

For that little British army of something over 100,000 men was consumed in the conflict like the stubble by fire. At the end of a few months hardly an officer or a man of that gallant force could be found. New levies had begun to drill in England, but who could say that they would be made ready, either to hold back the enemy from that grip upon the shores of the English Channel, which soon revealed itself as a main military object, or even to defend England from invasion? In this crisis, as in earlier times of stress, the tough fibre of the Briton and the Celt again saved the country. The Germans counted on a revolt in Ireland, the secession of Canada, Australia, and South Africa, the refusal of the working classes to keep up war; in all these things the Germans were disappointed. Alike during the sullen retreat before the German forces in France and in the pursuit of those Germans northward till they made their stand in the trenches, the British Government bent itself to the task of arming the people.

The sea warfare also was an unexpected setback for the Germans. They saw immediately the futility of risking their fleet in a sea engagement with a redoubtable naval power of far superior force; and they discovered that it was possible for the English almost alone,

while holding control of the North Sea, to detach swift cruisers all over the globe to hunt out the German merchant ships, and to stop neutral vessels bound to Germany with contraband of war, or carrying that contraband to other neutral ports from which it could reach Germany. From the beginning of the war the British began to tighten their ring of sea power around the inlets to the German Empire.

The war also revealed that new inventions and devices had made a fundamental change in the movements and combats of armies. Besides the railroads, which had long been used for military purposes, motor transport was called upon to distribute troops in the field by both sides. Motor omnibuses taken from the streets in London and Paris played an important part in the victory of the Marne.

The airship also came in as a new instrument for observation, which rapidly increased in number, speed, and range, so as to make surprises by large forces next to impossible; and both sides began to develop fighting airplanes and Zeppelins.

Perhaps the greatest change in modern warfare was the wholesale use of trenches. An old Roman method much employed in the later years of the American civil war, it was renewed in the Boer war, the Russo-Japanese war, and the two Balkan wars. The new enormous field guns could smash masonry and concrete, but could not destroy earth. Where the heaviest fortresses crumbled under the immense shells, a bank of dirt was a protection. After the battle of the Aisne, an amazing balance was established between airships, heavy guns, trenches, machine guns, and the bodies of men. On both sides the defensive was able to hold against the most terrific shocks. That meant a war of attrition, a war of watchfulness, a long, tedious, weary, indecisive war.



GEORGE BERNARD SHAW.



ARNOLD BENNETT

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JOHN GALSWORTHY

(Photo by E. O. Hoppe)

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RUDYARD KIPLING.

(Photo by E. O. Hoppe.)

See Page 106.



G. K. CHESTERTON.

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SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE

(Photo © by Arnold Genthe)

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CHRISTABEL PANKHURST

(Photo (C) by Underwood & Underwood.)

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JAMES M. BARRIE.

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WILHELM II.

German Emperor

(Photo from Charles L. Ritzmann).



AUGUSTA VICTORIA
German Empress
(Photo from M. E. Berner)



T. VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG,
German Imperial Chancellor.

(Photo from Brown Brothers.)



COUNT LEOPOLD BERCHTOLD
Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)



SIR EDWARD GREY

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)



W. L. SPENCER CHURCHILL,
British First Lord of the Admiralty.
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood.)



RENE VIVIANI,
French Premier.

(Photo from Bain News Service.)



STATE COUNCILOR SAZONOFF

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Photo © by American Press Assn.)



HIS HOLINESS THE LATE POPE PIUS X.
(From a Painting by A. Muller-Ury.)



WOODROW WILSON,
President of the United States of America.
(Photo (C) by Bradley Studio.)



ALBERT, KING OF THE BELGIANS



CARTON DE WIART,
Minister of Justice, Spokesman of the Royal Belgian
Commission to the United States.
(© by Graphic Photo Union.)



PHILIPP SCHEIDEMANN,
Chairman German Socialist Party and ex-Vice President
of the Reichstag.
(Photo from Paul Thompson.)



JULES GUESDE

French Cabinet Minister and Exponent of French Socialism
(Photo from Trans-Atlantic Company)



EMIL VAN DER VELDE

Belgian Minister of State and Chairman International Socialist Bureau
(Photo from Wiener Agency)



KEIR HARDIE, M. P.,
British Representative International Socialist Bureau.
(Photo © by American Press Assn.)



MAURICE MAETERLINCK

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EMILE BOUTROUX

(Photo from Bain News Service)

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GERHART HAUPTMANN

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LUDWIG FULDA.

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FREDERIC HARRISON.

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PAUL RENOUARD

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THEODORE NIEMEYER.

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PERIOD I.

Views of Eminent Writers on the War—Shaw's Bitter Attack on British Policy—Rejoinder of Arnold Bennett—The Fourth of August—Comments of Wells, Galsworthy, Jerome, and Doyle—If the Germans Raid England—Kipling and the "Truce of the Bear"—The Impending Crisis—Why England Came to be in It—English Artists Protest Against the Destruction of Monuments—An Anti-Christian War—Maeterlinck Speaks for Belgium—France Through English Eyes—The French Soldier of 1914—Germany's Civilized Barbarism—Appeal to the World by German Professors—The Reply From France—Teutonic Attitude on the Causes of the War.

"Common Sense About the War"

By George Bernard Shaw

I.

"Let a European war break out—the war, perhaps, between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, which so many journalists and politicians in England and Germany contemplate with criminal levity. If the combatants prove to be equally balanced, it may, after the first battles, smoulder on for thirty years. What will be the population of London, or Manchester, or Chemnitz, or Bremen, or Milan, at the end of it?" ("The Great Society," by Graham Wallas. June, 1914.)

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THE time has now come to pluck up courage and begin to talk and write soberly about the war. At first the mere horror of it stunned the more thoughtful of us; and even now only those who are not in actual contact with or bereaved relation to its heartbreaking wreckage can think sanely about it, or endure to hear others discuss it coolly. As to the thoughtless, well, not for a moment dare I suggest that for the first few weeks they were all scared out of their wits; for I know too well that the British civilian does not allow his perfect courage to be questioned; only experienced soldiers and foreigners are allowed the infirmity of fear. But they certainly were—shall I say a little upset? They

felt in that solemn hour that England was lost if only one single traitor in their midst let slip the truth about anything in the universe. It was a perilous time for me. I do not hold my tongue easily; and my inborn dramatic faculty and professional habit as a playwright prevent me from taking a one-sided view even when the most probable result of taking a many-sided one is prompt lynching. Besides, until Home Rule emerges from its present suspended animation, I shall retain my Irish capacity for criticising England with something of the detachment of a foreigner, and perhaps with a certain slightly malicious taste for taking the conceit out of her. Lord Kitchener made a mistake the other day in rebuking the Irish volunteers for not rallying faster to the defense of "their country." They do not regard it as their country yet. He should have asked them to come forward as usual and help poor old England through a stiff fight. Then it would have been all right.

Having thus frankly confessed my bias, which you can allow for as a rifleman allows for the wind, I give my views for what they are worth. They will be of some use; because, however

blinded I may be by prejudice or perversity, my prejudices in this matter are not those which blind the British patriot, and therefore I am fairly sure to see some things that have not yet struck him.

And first, I do not see this war as one which has welded Governments and peoples into complete and sympathetic solidarity as against the common enemy. I see the people of England united in a fierce detestation and defiance of the views and acts of Prussian Junkerism. And I see the German people stirred to the depths by a similar antipathy to English Junkerism, and anger at the apparent treachery and duplicity of the attack made on them by us in their extremest peril from France and Russia. I see both nations duped, but alas! not quite unwillingly duped, by their Junkers and Militarists into wreaking on one another the wrath they should have spent in destroying Junkerism and Militarism in their own country. And I see the Junkers and Militarists of England and Germany jumping at the chance they have longed for in vain for many years of smashing one another and establishing their own oligarchy as the dominant military power in the world. No doubt the heroic remedy for this tragic misunderstanding is that both armies should shoot their officers and go home to gather in their harvests in the villages and make a revolution in the towns; and though this is not at present a practicable solution, it must be frankly mentioned, because it or something like it is always a possibility in a defeated conscript army if its commanders push it beyond human endurance when its eyes are opening to the fact that in murdering its neighbors it is biting off its nose to vex its face, besides riveting the intolerable yoke of Militarism and Junkerism more tightly than ever on its own neck. But there is no chance—or, as our Junkers would put it, no danger—of our soldiers yielding to such an ecstasy of common sense. They have enlisted voluntarily; they are not defeated nor likely to be; their communications are intact and their meals

reasonably punctual; they are as pugnacious as their officers; and in fighting Prussia they are fighting a more deliberate, conscious, tyrannical, personally insolent, and dangerous Militarism than their own. Still, even for a voluntary professional army, that possibility exists, just as for the civilian there is a limit beyond which taxation, bankruptcy, privation, terror, and inconvenience cannot be pushed without revolution or a social dissolution more ruinous than submission to conquest. I mention all this, not to make myself wantonly disagreeable, but because military persons, thinking naturally that there is nothing like leather, are now talking of this war as likely to become a permanent institution like the Chamber of Horrors at Madame Tussaud's, forgetting, I think, that the rate of consumption maintained by modern military operations is much greater relatively to the highest possible rate of production maintainable under the restrictions of wartime than it has ever been before.

The Day of Judgment

The European settlement at the end of the war will be effected, let us hope, not by a regimental mess of fire-eaters sitting around an up-ended drum in a vanquished Berlin or Vienna, but by some sort of Congress in which all the Powers (including, very importantly, the United States of America) will be represented. Now I foresee a certain danger of our being taken by surprise at that Congress, and making ourselves unnecessarily difficult and unreasonable, by presenting ourselves to it in the character of Injured Innocence. We shall not be accepted in that character. Such a Congress will most certainly regard us as being, next to the Prussians (if it makes even that exception), the most quarrelsome people in the universe. I am quite conscious of the surprise and scandal this anticipation may cause among my more highminded (*hochnaessig*, the Germans call it) readers. Let me therefore break it gently by expatiating for a while on the subject of Junkerism and Militarism generally, and on the history of the literary propaganda of

war between England and Potsdam which has been going on openly for the last forty years on both sides. I beg the patience of my readers during this painful operation. If it becomes unbearable, they can always put the paper down and relieve themselves by calling the Kaiser Attila and Mr. Keir Hardie a traitor twenty times or so. Then they will feel, I hope, refreshed enough to resume. For, after all, abusing the Kaiser or Keir Hardie or me will not hurt the Germans, whereas a clearer view of the political situation will certainly help us. Besides, I do not believe that the true-born Englishman in his secret soul relishes the pose of Injured Innocence any more than I do myself. He puts it on only because he is told that it is respectable.

Junkers All

What is a Junker? Is it a German officer of twenty-three, with offensive manners and a habit of cutting down innocent civilians with his sabre? Sometimes; but not at all exclusively that or anything like that. Let us resort to the dictionary. I turn to the *Encyclopædisches Woerterbuch* of Muret Sanders. Excuse its quaint German-English.

Junker=Young nobleman, younker, lordeing, country squire, country gentleman, squirearch. **Junkerherrschaft**=squirearchy, landocracy. **Junkerleben**=life of a country gentleman, (*figuratively*,) a jolly life. **Junkerpartei**=country party. **Junkerwirtschaft**=doings of the country party.

Thus we see that the Junker is by no means peculiar to Prussia. We may claim to produce the article in a perfection that may well make Germany despair of ever surpassing us in that line. Sir Edward Grey is a Junker from his topmost hair to the tips of his toes; and Sir Edward is a charming man, incapable of cutting down even an Opposition front bencher, or of telling a German he intends to have him shot. Lord Cromer is a Junker. Mr. Winston Churchill is an odd and not disagreeable compound of Junker and Yankee: his frank anti-German pugnacity is enormously more popular than the moral

babble (Milton's phrase) of his sanctimonious colleagues. He is a bumptious and jolly Junker, just as Lord Curzon is an uppish Junker. I need not string out the list. In these islands the Junker is literally all over the shop.

It is very difficult for any one who is not either a Junker or a successful barrister to get into an English Cabinet, no matter which party is in power, or to avoid resigning when we strike up the drum. The Foreign Office is a Junker Club. Our governing classes are overwhelmingly Junker; all who are not Junkers are riff-raff whose only claim to their position is the possession of ability of some sort: mostly ability to make money. And, of course, the Kaiser is a Junker, though less true-blue than the Crown Prince, and much less autocratic than Sir Edward Grey, who, without consulting us, sends us to war by a word to an Ambassador and pledges all our wealth to his foreign allies by a stroke of his pen.

What Is a Militarist?

Now that we know what a Junker is, let us have a look at the Militarists. A Militarist is a person who believes that all real power is the power to kill, and that Providence is on the side of the big battalions. The most famous Militarist at present, thanks to the zeal with which we have bought and quoted his book, is General Friedrich von Bernhardi. But we cannot allow the General to take precedence of our own writers as a Militarist propagandist. I am old enough to remember the beginning of the anti-German phase of that very ancient propaganda in England. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 left Europe very much taken aback. Up to that date nobody was afraid of Prussia, though everybody was a little afraid of France; and we were keeping "buffer States" between ourselves and Russia in the east. Germany had indeed beaten Denmark; but then Denmark was a little State, and was abandoned in her hour of need by those who should have helped her, to the great indignation of Ibsen. Germany had also beaten Austria; but somehow everybody seems able to beat

Austria, though nobody seems able to draw the moral that defeats do not matter as much as the Militarists think, Austria being as important as ever. Suddenly Germany beat France right down into the dust, by the exercise of an organized efficiency in war of which nobody up to then had any conception. There was not a State in Europe that did not say to itself: "Good Heavens! what would happen if she attacked us?" We in England thought of our old-fashioned army and our old-fashioned commander George Ranger (of Cambridge), and our War Office with its Crimean tradition of imbecility; and we shook in our shoes. But we were not such fools as to leave it at that. We soon produced the first page of the Bernhardian literature; an anonymous booklet entitled *The Battle of Dorking*. It was not the first page of English Militarist literature: you have only to turn back to the burst of glorification of war which heralded the silly Crimean campaign (Tennyson's *Maud* is a surviving sample) to find paeans to Mars which would have made Treitschke blush (perhaps they did); but it was the first page in which it was assumed as a matter of course that Germany and not France or Russia was England's natural enemy. *The Battle of Dorking* had an enormous sale; and the wildest guesses were current as to its authorship. And its moral was "To arms; or the Germans will besiege London as they besieged Paris." From that time until the present, the British propaganda of war with Germany has never ceased. The lead given by *The Battle of Dorking* was taken up by articles in the daily press and the magazines. Later on came the Jingo fever (anti-Russian, by the way; but let us not mention that just now), Stead's *Truth About the Navy*, Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, the suppression of the Channel Tunnel, Mr. Robert Blatchford, Mr. Garvin, Admiral Maxse, Mr. Newbolt, Mr. Rudyard Kipling, *The National Review*, Lord Roberts, the Navy League, the imposition of an Imperialist Foreign Secretary on the Liberal Cabinet, Mr. Wells's *War in the Air* (well worth re-reading just now), and the

Dreadnoughts. Throughout all these agitations the enemy, the villain of the piece, the White Peril, was Prussia and her millions of German conscripts. At first, in *The Battle of Dorking* phase, the note was mainly defensive. But from the moment when the Kaiser began to copy our Armada policy by building a big fleet, the anti-German agitation became openly aggressive; and the cry that the German fleet or ours must sink, and that a war between England and Germany was bound to come some day, speedily ceased to be merely a cry with our Militarists and became an axiom with them. And what our Militarists said our Junkers echoed; and our Junker diplomatists played for. The story of how they manoeuvred to hem Germany and Austria in with an Anglo-Franco-Russian combination will be found told with soldierly directness and with the proud candor of a man who can see things from his own side only in the article by Lord Roberts in the current number of *The Hibbert Journal* (October, 1914). There you shall see also, after the usual nonsense about Nietzsche, the vision of "British administrators bearing the White Man's Burden," of "young men, fresh from the public schools of Britain, coming eagerly forward to carry on the high traditions of Imperial Britain in each new dependency which comes under our care," of "our fitness as an Imperial race," of "a great task committed to us by Providence," of "the will to conquer that has never failed us," of our task of "assuming control of one-fifth of the earth's surface and the care of one in five of all the inhabitants of the world." Not a suggestion that the inhabitants of the world are perhaps able to take care of themselves. Not even a passing recollection when that White Man's Burden is in question that the men outside the British Empire, and even inside the German Empire, are by no means exclusively black. Only the *sancta simplicitas* that glories in "the proud position of England," the "sympathy, tolerance, prudence and benevolence of our rule" in the east (as shown, the Kaiser is no doubt sarcastically re-

marking, in the Delhi sedition trial), the chivalrous feeling that it is our highest duty to save the world from the horrible misfortune of being governed by anybody but those young men fresh from the public schools of Britain. Change the words Britain and British to Germany and German, and the Kaiser will sign the article with enthusiasm. *His* opinion, *his* attitude (subject to that merely verbal change) word for word.

Six of One: Half-a-Dozen of The Other

Now, please observe that I do not say that the agitation was unreasonable. I myself steadily advocated the formation of a formidable armament, and ridiculed the notion that we, who are wasting hundreds of millions annually on idlers and wasters, could not easily afford double, treble, quadruple our military and naval expenditure. I advocated the compulsion of every man to serve his country, both in war and peace. The idlers and wasters perceiving dimly that I meant the cost to come out of their pockets and meant to use the admission that riches should not exempt a man from military service as an illustration of how absurd it is to allow them to exempt him from civil service, did not embrace my advocacy with enthusiasm; so I must reaffirm it now lest it should be supposed that I am condemning those whose proceedings I am describing. Though often horribly wrong in principle, they were quite right in practice as far as they went. But they must stand to their guns now that the guns are going off. They must not pretend that they were harmless Radical lovers of peace, and that the propaganda of Militarism and of inevitable war between England and Germany is a Prussian infamy for which the Kaiser must be severely punished. That is not fair, not true, not gentlemanly. We began it; and if they met us half-way, as they certainly did, it is not for us to reproach them. When the German fire-eaters drank to The Day (of Armageddon) they were drinking to the day of which our Navy League fireeaters had first said "It's bound to come." Therefore, let us have no more

nonsense about the Prussian Wolf and the British Lamb, the Prussian Machiavelli and the English Evangelist. We cannot shout for years that we are boys of the bulldog breed, and then suddenly pose as gazelles. No. When Europe and America come to settle the treaty that will end this business (for America is concerned in it as much as we are), they will not deal with us as the lovable and innocent victims of a treacherous tyrant and a savage soldiery. They will have to consider how these two incorrigibly pugnacious and inveterately snobbish peoples, who have snarled at one another for forty years with bristling hair and grinning fangs, and are now rolling over with their teeth in one another's throats, are to be tamed into trusty watch-dogs of the peace of the world. I am sorry to spoil the saintly image with a halo which the British Jingo journalist sees just now when he looks in the glass; but it must be done if we are to behave reasonably in the imminent day of reckoning.

And now back to Friedrich von Bernhardt.

General Von Bernhardt

Like many soldier-authors, Friedrich is very readable; and he maintains the good and formidable part of the Bismarck tradition; that is, he is not a humbug. He looks facts in the face; he deceives neither himself nor his readers; and if he were to tell lies—as he would no doubt do as stoutly as any British, French, or Russian officer if his country's safety were at stake—he would know that he was telling them. Which last we think very bad taste on his part, if not downright wickedness.

It is true that he cites Frederick the Great as an exemplary master of war and of *Weltpolitik*. But his chief praise in this department is reserved for England. It is from our foreign policy, he says, that he has learnt what our journalists denounce as "the doctrine of the bully, of the materialist, of the man with gross ideals: a doctrine of diabolical evil." He frankly accepts that doctrine from us (as if our poor, honest muddleheads had ever formulated anything so intellectual as a doctrine), and blames us

for nothing but for allowing the United States to achieve their solidarity and become formidable to us when we might have divided them by backing up the South in the Civil War. He shows in the clearest way that if Germany does not smash England, England will smash Germany by springing at her the moment she can catch her at a disadvantage. In a word he prophesies that we, his great masters in *Realpolitik*, will do precisely what our Junkers have just made us do. It is we who have carried out the Bernhardi programme; it is Germany who has neglected it. He warned Germany to make an alliance with Italy, Austria, Turkey, and America, before undertaking the subjugation, first of France, then of England. But a prophet is not without honor save in his own country; and Germany has allowed herself to be caught with no ally but Austria between France and Russia, and thereby given the English Junkers their opportunity. They have seized it with a punctuality that must flatter von Bernhardi, even though the compliment be at the expense of his own country. The Kaiser did not give them credit for being keener Junkers than his own. It was an unpleasant, indeed an infuriating surprise. All that a Kaiser could do without unbearable ignominy to induce them to keep their bulldogs off and give him fair play with his two redoubtable foes, he did. But they laughed Frederick the Great's laugh and hurled all our forces at him, as he might have done to us, on Bernhardian principles, if he had caught us at the same disadvantage. Officially, the war is Junker-cut-Junker, Militarist-cut-Militarist; and we must fight it out, not *Heuchler-cut-Hypocrite*, but hammer and tongs.

Militarist Myopia

Unofficially, it is quite another matter. Democracy, even social-Democracy, though as hostile to British Junkers as to German ones, and under no illusion as to the obsolescence and colossal stupidity of modern war, need not lack enthusiasm for the combat, which may serve their own ends better than those of their political opponents. For Bernhardi the

Brilliant and our own very dull Militarists are alike mad; the war will not do any of the things for which they rushed into it. It is much more like to do the things they most dread and deprecate; in fact, it has already swept them into the very kind of organization they founded an Anti-Socialist League to suppress. To show how mad they are, let us suppose the war carries out their western program to the last item. Suppose France rises from the war victorious, happy and glorious, with Alsace and Lorraine regained, Rheims cathedral repaired in the best modern trade style, and a prodigious indemnity in her pocket! Suppose we tow the German fleet into Portsmouth, and leave Hohenzollern metaphorically under the heel of Romanoff and actually in a comfortable villa in Chislehurst, the hero of all its tea parties and the judge of all its gymkhanas! Well, cry the Militarists, suppose it by all means; could we desire anything better? Now I happen to have a somewhat active imagination; and it flatly refuses to stop at this convenient point. I must go on supposing. Suppose France, with its military prestige raised once more to the Napoleonic point, spends its indemnity in building an invincible Armada, stronger and nearer to us than the German one we are now out to destroy! Suppose Sir Edward Grey remonstrates, and Monsieur Delcasse replies, "Russia and France have humbled one Imperial Bully, and are prepared to humble another. I have not forgotten Fashoda. Stop us if you can; or turn, if you like, for help to the Germany we have smashed and disarmed!" Of what use will all this bloodshed be then, with the old situation reproduced in an aggravated form, the enemy closer to our shores, a raid far more feasible, the tradition of "natural enmity" to steel the foe, and Waterloo to be wiped out like Sedan? A child in arms should be able to see that this idiotic notion of relaxing the military pressure on us by smashing this or that particular Power is like trying to alter the pressure of the ocean by dipping up a bucket of water from the North Sea and pouring it into the Bay of Biscay.

I purposely omit more easterly sup-

posings as to what victorious Russia might do. But a noble emancipation of Poland and Finland at her own expense, and of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Austria's, might easily suggest to our nervous Militarists that a passion for the freedom of Egypt and India might seize her, and remind her that we were Japan's ally in the day of Russia's humiliation in Manchuria. So there at once is your Balance of Power problem in Asia enormously aggravated by throwing Germany out of the anti-Russian scale and grinding her to powder. Even in North Africa—but enough is enough. You can *durchhauen* your way out of the frying pan, but only into the fire. Better take Nietzsche's brave advice, and make it your point of honour to "live dangerously." History shews that it is often the way to live long.

Learning Nothing: Forgetting Everything

But let me test the Militarist theory, not by a hypothetical future, but by the accomplished and irrevocable past. Is it true that nations must conquer or go under, and that military conquest means prosperity and power for the victor and annihilation for the vanquished? I have already alluded in passing to the fact that Austria has been beaten repeatedly: by France, by Italy, by Germany, almost by everybody who has thought it worth while to have a whack at her; and yet she is one of the Great Powers; and her alliance has been sought by invincible Germany. France was beaten by Germany in 1870 with a completeness that seemed impossible; yet France has since enlarged her territory whilst Germany is still pleading in vain for a place in the sun. Russia was beaten by the Japanese in Manchuria on a scale that made an end forever of the old notion that the West is the natural military superior of the East; yet it is the terror of Russia that has driven Germany into her present desperate onslaught on France; and it is the Russian alliance on which France and England are depending for their assurance of ultimate success. We ourselves confess that the military efficiency with which we have so astonished the Germans

is the effect, not of Waterloo and Inkerman, but of the drubbing we got from the Boers, who would probably have beaten us if we had been anything like their own size. Greece has lately distinguished herself in war within a few years by a most disgraceful beating of the Turks. It would be easy to multiply instances from remoter history: for example, the effect on England's position of the repeated defeats of our troops by the French under Luxembourg in the Balance of Power War at the end of the seventeenth century differed surprisingly little, if at all, from the effect of our subsequent victories under Marlborough. And the inference from the Militarist theory that the States which at present count for nothing as military Powers necessarily count for nothing at all is absurd on the face of it. Monaco seems to be, on the whole, the most prosperous and comfortable State in Europe.

In short, Militarism must be classed as one of the most inconsiderately foolish of the bogus "sciences" which the last half century has produced in such profusion, and which have the common characteristic of revolting all sane souls, and being stared out of countenance by the broad facts of human experience. The only rule of thumb that can be hazarded on the strength of actual practice is that wars to maintain or upset the Balance of Power between States, called by inaccurate people Balance of Power wars, and by accurate people Jealousy of Power wars, never establish the desired peaceful and secure equilibrium. They may exercise pugnacity, gratify spite, assuage a wound to national pride, or enhance or dim a military reputation; but that is all. And the reason is, as I shall show very conclusively later on, that there is only one way in which one nation can really disable another, and that is a way which no civilized nation dare even discuss.

Are We Hypocrites?

And now I proceed from general considerations to the diplomatic history of the present case, as I must in order to make our moral position clear. But first, lest I should lose all credit by the startling incompatibility between the familiar

personal character of our statesmen and the proceedings for which they are officially responsible, I must say a word about the peculiar psychology of English statesmanship, not only for the benefit of my English readers (who do not know that it is peculiar just as they do not know that water has any taste because it is always in their mouths), but as a plea for a more charitable construction from the wider world.

We know by report, however unjust it may seem to us, that there is an opinion abroad, even in the quarters most friendly to us, that our excellent qualities are marred by an incorrigible hypocrisy. To France we have always been Perfidious Albion. In Germany, at this moment, that epithet would be scorned as far too flattering to us. Victor Hugo explained the relative unpopularity of *Measure for Measure* among Shakespeare's plays on the ground that the character of the hypocrite Angelo was a too faithful dramatization of our national character. Pecksniff is not considered so exceptional an English gentleman in America as he is in England.

Now we have not acquired this reputation for nothing. The world has no greater interest in branding England with this particular vice of hypocrisy than in branding France with it; yet the world does not cite Tartuffe as a typical Frenchman as it cites Angelo and Pecksniff as typical Englishmen. We may protest against it as indignantly as the Prussian soldiers protest against their equally universal reputation for ferocity in plunder and pillage, sack and rapine; but there is something in it. If you judge an English statesman by his conscious intentions, his professions, and his personal charm, you will often find him an amiable, upright, humane, anxiously truthful man. If you judge him, as a foreigner must, solely on the official acts for which he is responsible, and which he has to defend in the House of Commons for the sake of his party, you will often be driven to conclude that this estimable gentleman is, in point of being an unscrupulous superprig and fool, worse than Caesar Borgia and General von Bernhardt rolled into one, and in foreign

affairs a Bismarck in everything except commanding ability, blunt common sense, and freedom from illusion as to the nature and object of his own diplomacy. And the permanent officials in whose hands he is will probably deserve all that and something to spare. Thus you will get that amazing contrast that confronts us now between the Machiavellian Sir Edward Grey of the Berlin newspapers and the amiable and popular Sir Edward Grey we know in England. In England we are all prepared to face any World Congress and say, "We know that Sir Edward Grey is an honest English gentleman, who meant well as a true patriot and friend of peace; we are quite sure that what he did was fair and right; and we will not listen to any nonsense to the contrary." The Congress will reply, "We know nothing about Sir Edward Grey except what he did; and as there is no secret and no question as to what he did, the whole story being recorded by himself, we must hold England responsible for his conduct, whilst taking your word for the fact, which has no importance for us, that his conduct has nothing to do with his character."

Our Intellectual Laziness

The general truth of the situation is, as I have spent so much of my life in trying to make the English understand, that we are cursed with a fatal intellectual laziness, an evil inheritance from the time when our monopoly of coal and iron made it possible for us to become rich and powerful without thinking or knowing how; a laziness which is becoming highly dangerous to us now that our monopoly is gone or superseded by new sources of mechanical energy. We got rich by pursuing our own immediate advantage instinctively; that is, with a natural childish selfishness; and when any question of our justification arose, we found it easy to silence it with any sort of plausible twaddle (provided it flattered us, and did not imply any trouble or sacrifice) provided by our curates at £70 a year, or our journalists at a penny a line, or commercial moralists with axes to grind. In the end we became fatheaded, and

not only lost all intellectual consciousness of what we were doing, and with it all power of objective self-criticism, but stacked up a lumber of pious praises for ourselves which not only satisfied our corrupted and half atrophied consciences, but gave us a sense that there is something extraordinarily ungentlemanly and politically dangerous in bringing these pious phrases to the test of conduct. We carried Luther's doctrine of Justification by Faith to the insane point of believing that as long as a man says what we have agreed to accept as the right thing it does not matter in the least what he actually does. In fact, we do not clearly see why a man need introduce the subject of morals at all, unless there is something questionable to be whitewashed. The unprejudiced foreigner calls this hypocrisy; that is why we call him prejudiced. But I, who have been a poor man in a poor country, understand the foreigner better.

Now from the general to the particular. In describing the course of the diplomatic negotiations by which our Foreign Office achieved its design of at last settling accounts with Germany at the most favorable moment from the Militarist point of view, I shall have to exhibit our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as behaving almost exactly as we have accused the Kaiser of behaving. Yet I see him throughout as an honest gentleman, "perplexed in the extreme," meaning well, revolted at the last moment by the horror of war, clinging to the hope that in some vague way he could persuade everybody to be reasonable if they would only come and talk to him as they did when the big Powers were kept out of the Balkan war, but hopelessly destitute of a positive policy of any kind, and therefore unable to resist those who had positive business in hand. And do not for a moment imagine that I think that the conscious Sir Edward Grey was Othello, and the subconscious, Iago. I do think that the Foreign Office, of which Sir Edward was merely the figurehead, was as deliberately and consciously bent on a long-deferred Militarist war with Germany

as the Admiralty was; and that is saying a good deal. If Sir Edward Grey did not know what he wanted, Mr. Winston Churchill was in no such perplexity: He was not an "ist" of any sort, but a straightforward holder of the popular opinion that if you are threatened you should hit out, unless you are afraid to. Had he had the conduct of the affair he might quite possibly have averted the war (and thereby greatly disappointed himself and the British public) by simply frightening the Kaiser. As it was, he had arranged for the co-operation of the French and British fleets; was spoiling for the fight; and must have restrained himself with great difficulty from taking off his coat in public whilst Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey were giving the country the assurances which were misunderstood to mean that we were not bound to go to war, and not more likely to do so than usual. But though Sir Edward did not clear up the misunderstanding, I think he went to war with the heavy heart of a Junker Liberal (such centaurs exist) and not with the exultation of a Junker Jingo.

I may now, without more than the irreducible minimum of injustice to Sir Edward Grey, proceed to tell the story of the diplomatic negotiations as they will appear to the Congress which, I am assuming, will settle the terms on which Europe is to live more or less happily ever after.

Diplomatic History of the War

The evidence of how the Junker diplomatists of our Foreign Office let us in for the war is in the White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914), containing correspondence respecting the European crisis, and since reissued, with a later White Paper and some extra matter, as a penny bluebook in miniature. In these much-cited and little-read documents we see the Junkers of all the nations, the men who have been saying for years "It's bound to come," and clamoring in England for compulsory military service and expeditionary forces, momentarily staggered and not a little frightened by the sudden realization that it has come at last. They rush round from foreign

office to embassy, and from embassy to palace, twittering "This is awful. Can't you stop it? Won't you be reasonable? Think of the consequences," etc., etc. One man among them keeps his head and looks the facts in the face. That man is Sazonoff, the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs. He keeps steadily trying to make Sir Edward Grey face the inevitable. He says and reiterates, in effect, "You know very well that you cannot keep out of a European war. You know you are pledged to fight Germany if Germany attacks France. You know that your arrangements for the fight are actually made; that already the British army is commanded by a Franco-British Council of War; that there is no possible honorable retreat for you. You know that this old man in Austria, who would have been superannuated years ago if he had been an exciseman, is resolved to make war on Serbia and sent that silly forty-eight hours' ultimatum when we were all out of town so that he could begin fighting before we could get back to sit on his head. You know that he has the Jingo mob of Vienna behind him. You know that if he makes war, Russia must mobilize. You know that France is bound to come in with us as you are with France. You know that the moment we mobilize, Germany, the old man's ally, will have only one desperate chance of victory, and that is to overwhelm our ally, France, with one superb rush of her millions, and then sweep back and meet us on the Vistula. You know that nothing can stop this except Germany remonstrating with Austria, and insisting on the Servian case being dealt with by an international tribunal and not by war. You know that Germany dares not do this, because her alliance with Austria is her defense against the Franco-Russian alliance, and that she does not want to do it in any case, because the Kaiser naturally has a strong class prejudice against the blowing up of Royal personages by irresponsible revolutionists, and thinks nothing too bad for Serbia after the assassination of the Archduke. There is just one chance of avoiding Armageddon; a slender one, but worth trying. You averted war in the Algeiras crisis,

and again in the Agadir crisis, by saying you would fight. Try it again. The Kaiser is stiffnecked because he does not believe you are going to fight this time. Well, convince him that you are. The odds against him will then be so terrible that he may not dare to support the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia at such a price. And if Austria is thus forced to proceed judicially against Serbia, we Russians will be satisfied; and there will be no war."

Sir Edward could not see it. He is a member of a Liberal Government, in a country where there is no political career for the man who does not put his party's tenure of office before every other consideration. What would *The Daily News* and *The Manchester Guardian* have said had he, Bismarck-like, said bluntly: "If war once breaks out, the old score between England and Prussia will be settled, not by ambassadors' tea parties and Areopaguses, but by blood and iron?" In vain did Sazonoff repeat, "But if you are going to fight, as you know you are, why not say so?" Sir Edward, being Sir Edward and not Winston Churchill or Lloyd George, could not admit that he was going to fight. He might have forestalled the dying Pope and his noble Christian "I bless peace" by a noble, if heathen, "I fight war." Instead, he persuaded us all that he was under no obligation whatever to fight. He persuaded Germany that he had not the slightest serious intention of fighting. Sir Owen Seaman wrote in *Punch* an amusing and witty No-Intervention poem. Sporting Liberals offered any odds that there would be no war for England. And Germany, confident that with Austria's help she could break France with one hand and Russia with the other if England held aloof, let Austria throw the match into the magazine.

The Battery Unmasked

Then the Foreign Office, always acting through its amiable and popular but confused instrument, Sir Edward, unmasked the Junker-Militarist battery. He suddenly announced that England must take a hand in the war, though he did not yet tell the English people so, it

being against the diplomatic tradition to tell them anything until it is too late for them to object. But he told how the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, caught in a death trap, pleaded desperately for peace with Great Britain. Would we promise to spare Germany if Belgium were left untouched? No. Would we say on what conditions we would spare Germany? No. Not if the Germans promised not to annex French territory? No. Not even if they promised not to touch the French colonies? No. Was there no way out? Sir Edward Grey was frank. He admitted there was just one chance; that Liberal opinion might not stand the war if the neutrality of Belgium were not violated. And he provided against that chance by committing England to the war the day before he let the cat out of the bag in Parliament.

All this is recorded in the language of diplomacy in the White Paper on or between the lines. That language is not so straightforward as my language; but at the crucial points it is clear enough. Sazonoff's tone is politely diplomatic in No. 6; but in No. 17 he lets himself go. "I do not believe that Germany really wants war; but her attitude is decided by yours. If you take your stand firmly with France and Russia there will be no war. If you fail them now, rivers of blood will flow, and you will in the end be dragged into war." He was precisely right; but he did not realize that war was exactly what our Junkers wanted. They did not dare to tell themselves so; and naturally they did not dare to tell him so. And perhaps his own interest in war was too strong to make him regret the rejection of his honest advice. To break up the Austrian Empire and achieve for Russia the Slav Caliphate of South-East Europe whilst defeating Prussia with the help of France and of Russia's old enemy and Prussia's old ally, England, was a temptation so enormous that Sazonoff, in resisting it so far as to shew Sir Edward Grey frankly the only chance of preventing it, proved himself the most genuine humanitarian in the diplomatic world.

Number 123

The decisive communication between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky is recorded in the famous No. 123. With the rather childish subsequent attempt to minimize No. 123 on the ground that the Prince was merely an amiable nincompoop who did not really represent his fiendish sovereign, neither I nor any other serious person need be concerned. What is beyond all controversy is that after that conversation Prince Lichnowsky could do nothing but tell the Kaiser that the *Entente*, having at last got his imperial head in chancery, was not going to let him off on any terms, and that it was now a fight to a finish between the British and German empires. Then the Kaiser said: "We are Germans. God help us!" When a crowd of foolish students came cheering for the war under his windows, he bade them go to the churches and pray. His telegrams to the Tzar (the omission of which from the penny bluebook is, to say the least, not chivalrous) were dignified and pathetic. And when the Germans, taking a line from the poet they call "unser Shakespeare," said: "Come the four quarters of the world in arms and we shall shock them," it was, from the romantic militarist point of view, fine. What Junker-led men could do they have since done to make that thrasonical brag good. But there is no getting over the fact that, in Tommy Atkins's phrase, they had asked for it. Their Junkers, like ours, had drunk to The Day; and they should not have let us choose it after riling us for so many years. And that is why Sir Edward had a great surprise when he at last owned up in Parliament.

How the Nation Took It

The moment he said that we could not "stand aside with our arms folded" and see our friend and neighbor France "bombarded and battered," the whole nation rose to applaud him. All the Foreign Office distrust of public opinion, the concealment of the Anglo-French plan of campaign, the disguise of the *Entente* in a Quaker's hat, the duping of the British public and the Kaiser with one and the same prevarication, had

been totally unnecessary and unpopular, like most of these ingenuities which diplomatists think subtle and Machiavellian. The British Public had all along been behind Mr. Winston Churchill. It had wanted Sir Edward to do just what Sazonoff wanted him to do, and what I, in the columns of *The Daily News* proposed he should do nine months ago (I must really be allowed to claim that I am not merely wise after the event), which was to arm to the teeth regardless of an expense which to us would have been a mere fleabite, and tell Germany that if she laid a finger on France we would unite with France to defeat her, offering her at the same time as consolation for that threat, the assurance that we would do as much to France if she wantonly broke the peace in the like fashion by attacking Germany. No unofficial Englishman worth his salt wanted to snivel hypocritically about our love of peace and our respect for treaties and our solemn acceptance of a painful duty, and all the rest of the nauseous mixture of schoolmaster's twaddle, parish magazine cant, and cinematograph melodrama with which we were deluged. We were perfectly ready to knock the Kaiser's head off just to teach him that if he thought he was going to ride roughshod over Europe, including our new friends the French, and the plucky little Belgians, he was reckoning without old England. And in this pugnacious but perfectly straightforward and human attitude the nation needed no excuses because the nation honestly did not know that we were taking the Kaiser at a disadvantage or that the Franco-Russian alliance had been just as much a menace to peace as the Austro-German one. But the Foreign Office knew that very well, and therefore began to manufacture superfluous, disingenuous, and rather sickening excuses at a great rate. The nation had a clean conscience, and was really innocent of any aggressive strategy: the Foreign Office was rehanding, and did not want to be found out. Hence its sermons.

H. G. Wells Hoists the Country's Flag

It was Mr. H. G. Wells who at the critical moment spoke with the nation's

voice. When he uttered his electric outburst of wrath against "this drilling, trampling foolery in the heart of Europe" he gave expression to the pent-up exasperation of years of smouldering revolt against swank and domineer, guff and bugaboo, calling itself blood and iron, and mailed fist, and God and conscience and anything else that sounded superb. Like Nietzsche, we were "fed up" with the Kaiser's imprisonments of democratic journalists for *Majestaetsbeleidigung* (monarch disparagement), with his ancestors, and his mission, and his gospel of submission and obedience for poor men, and of authority, tempered by duelling, for rich men.

The world had become soreheaded, and desired intensely that they who clatter the sword shall perish by the sword. Nobody cared twopence about treaties: indeed, it was not for us, who had seen the treaty of Berlin torn up by the brazen seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1909, and taken that lying down, as Russia did, to talk about the sacredness of treaties, even if the wastepaper baskets of the Foreign Offices were not full of torn up "scraps of paper," and a very good thing, too; for General von Bernhardt's assumption that circumstances alter treaties is not a page from Machiavelli: it is a platitude from the law books. The man in the street understood little or nothing about Serbia or Russia or any of the cards with which the diplomatists were playing their perpetual game of Beggar my Neighbour. We were rasped beyond endurance by Prussian Militarism and its contempt for us and for human happiness and common sense; and we just rose at it and went for it. We have set out to smash the Kaiser exactly as we set out to smash the Mahdi. Mr. Wells never mentioned a treaty. He said, in effect: "There stands the monster all freedom-loving men hate; and at last we are going to fight it." And the public, bored by the diplomatists, said: "Now you're talking!" We did not stop to ask our consciences whether the Prussian assumption that the dominion of the civilized

earth belongs to German culture is really any more bumptious than the English assumption that the dominion of the sea belongs to British commerce. And in our island security we were as little able as ever to realize the terrible military danger of Germany's geographical position between France and England on her west flank and Russia on her east: all three leagued for her destruction; and how unreasonable it was to ask Germany to lose the fraction of a second (much less Sir Maurice de Rusens's naïve "a few days' delay") in dashing at her Western foe when she could obtain no pledge as to Western intentions. "We are now in a state of necessity; and Necessity knows no law," said the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag. "It is a matter of life and death to us," said the German Minister for Foreign Affairs to our Ambassador in Berlin, who had suddenly developed an extraordinary sense of the sacredness of the Treaty of London, dated 1839, and still, as it happened, inviolate among the torn fragments of many subsequent and similar "scraps of paper." Our Ambassador seems to have been of Sir Maurice's opinion that there could be no such tearing hurry. The Germans could enter France through the line of forts between Verdun and Toul if they were really too flustered to wait a few days on the chance of Sir Edward Grey's persuasive conversation and charming character softening Russia and bringing Austria to conviction of sin. Thereupon the Imperial Chancellor, not being quite an angel, asked whether we had counted the cost of crossing the path of an Empire fighting for its life (for these Militarist statesmen do really believe that nations can be killed by cannon shot). That was a threat; and as we cared nothing about Germany's peril, and wouldn't stand being threatened any more by a Power of which we now had the inside grip, the fat remained in the fire, blazing more fiercely than ever. There was only one end possible to such a clash of high tempers, national egotisms, and reciprocal ignorances.

Delicate Position of Mr. Asquith

It seemed a splendid chance for the Government to place itself at the head of the nation. But no British Government within my recollection has ever understood the nation. Mr. Asquith, true to the Gladstonian tradition (hardly just to Gladstone, by the way) that a Liberal Prime Minister should know nothing concerning foreign politics and care less, and calmly insensible to the real nature of the popular explosion, fell back on 1839, picking up the obvious barrister's point about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium, and tried the equally obvious barrister's claptrap about "an infamous proposal" on the jury. He assured us that nobody could have done more for peace than Sir Edward Grey, though the rush to smash the Kaiser was the most popular thing Sir Edward had ever done.

Besides, there was another difficulty. Mr. Asquith himself, though serenely persuaded that he is a Liberal statesman, is, in effect, very much what the Kaiser would have been if he had been a Yorkshireman and a lawyer, instead of being only half English and the other half Hohenzollern, and an anointed Emperor to boot. As far as popular liberties are concerned, history will make no distinction between Mr. Asquith and Metternich. He is forced to keep on the safe academic ground of Belgium by the very obvious consideration that if he began to talk of the Kaiser's imprisonments of editors and democratic agitators and so forth, a Homeric laughter punctuated with cries of "How about Denshawai?" "What price Tom Mann?" "Votes for women!" "Been in India lately?" "Make McKenna Kaiser," "Or dear old Herbert Gladstone," etc., etc., would promptly spoil that pose. The plain fact is that, Militarism apart, Germany is in many ways more democratic in practice than England; indeed the Kaiser has been openly reviled as a coward by his Junkers because he falls short of Mr. Asquith in calm indifference to Liberal principles and blank ignorance of working-class sympathies, opinions, and interests.

Mr. Asquith had also to distract public attention from the fact that three official members of his Government, all men of unquestioned and conspicuous patriotism and intellectual honesty, walked straight out into private life on the declaration of war. One of them, Mr. John Burns, did so at an enormous personal sacrifice, and has since maintained a grim silence far more eloquent than the famous speech Germany invented for him. It is not generally believed that these three statesmen were actuated by a passion for the violation of Belgian neutrality.

On the whole, it was impossible for the Government to seize its grim chance and put itself at the head of the popular movement that responded to Sir Edward Grey's declaration: the very simple reason being that the Government does not represent the nation, and is in its sympathies just as much a Junker government as the Kaiser's. And so, what the Government cannot do has to be done by unofficial persons with clean and brilliant anti-Junker records like Mr. Wells, Mr. Arnold Bennett, Mr. Neil Lyons, and Mr. Jerome K. Jerome. Neither Mr. Asquith nor Sir Edward Grey can grasp, as these real spokesmen of their time do, the fact that we just simply want to put an end to Potsdamnation, both at home and abroad. Both of them probably think Potsdam a very fine and enviable institution, and want England to out-Potsdam Potsdam and to monopolize the command of the seas; a monstrous aspiration. We, I take it, want to guarantee that command of the sea which is the common heritage of mankind to the tiniest State and the humblest fisherman that depends on the sea for a livelihood. We want the North Sea to be as safe for everybody, English or German, as Portland Place.

The Need for Recrimination

And now somebody who would rather I had not said all this (having probably talked dreadful nonsense about Belgium and so forth for a month past) is sure to ask: "Why all this recrimination? What is done is done. Is it not now the duty of every Englishman to sink all differences in the face of the common peril?"

etc., etc. To all such prayers to be shielded from that terrible thing, the truth, I must reply that history consists mainly of recrimination, and that I am writing history because an accurate knowledge of what has occurred is not only indispensable to any sort of reasonable behavior on our part in the face of Europe when the inevitable day of settlement comes, but because it has a practical bearing on the most perilously urgent and immediate business before us: the business of the appeal to the nation for recruits and for enormous sums of money. It has to decide the question whether that appeal shall be addressed frankly to our love of freedom, and our tradition (none the less noble and moving because it is so hard to reconcile with the diplomatic facts) that England is a guardian of the world's liberty, and not to bad law about an obsolete treaty, and cant about the diabolical personal disposition of the Kaiser, and the wounded propriety of a peace-loving England, and all the rest of the slosh and tosh that has been making John Bull sick for months past. No doubt at first, when we were all clasping one another's hands very hard and begging one another not to be afraid, almost anything was excusable. Even the war notes of Mr. Garvin, which stood out as the notes of a gentleman amid a welter of scurrilous rubbish and a rather blackguardly *Punch* cartoon mocking the agony of Berlin (*Punch* having turned its non-interventionist coat very promptly), had sometimes to run: "We know absolutely nothing of what is happening at the front, except that the heroism of the British troops will thrill the ages to the last syllable of recorded time," or words to that effect. But now it is time to pull ourselves together; to feel our muscle; to realize the value of our strength and pluck; and to tell the truth unashamed like men of courage and character, not to shirk it like the official apologists of a Foreign Office plot.

What Germany Should Have Done

And first, as I despise critics who put people in the wrong without being able to set them right, I shall, before I go

any further with my criticism of our official position, do the Government and the Foreign Office the service of finding a correct official position for them; for I admit that the popular position, though sound as far as it goes, is too crude for official use. This correct official position can be found only by considering what Germany should have done, and might have done had she not been, like our own Junkers, so fascinated by the Militarist craze, and obsessed by the chronic Militarist panic, that she was "in too great hurry to bid the devil good morning." The matter is simple enough: she should have entrusted the security of her western frontier to the public opinion of the west of Europe and to America, and fought Russia, if attacked, with her rear not otherwise defended. The Militarist theory is that we, France and England, would have immediately sprung at her from behind; but that is just how the Militarist theory gets its votaries into trouble by assuming that Europe is a chess board. Europe is not a chess board, but a populous continent in which only a very few people are engaged in military chess; and even those few have many other things to consider besides capturing their adversary's king. Not only would it have been impossible for England to have attacked Germany under such circumstances; but if France had done so England could not have assisted her, and might even have been compelled by public opinion to intervene by way of a joint protest from England and America, or even by arms, on her behalf if she were murderously pressed on both flanks. Even our Militarists and diplomatists would have had reasons for such an intervention. An aggressive Franco - Russian hegemony, if it crushed Germany, would be quite as disagreeable to us as a German one. Thus Germany would at worst have been fighting Russia and France with the sympathy of all the other Powers, and a chance of active assistance from some of them, especially those who share her hostility to the Russian Government. Had France not attacked her—and

though I am as ignorant of the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance as Sir Edward Grey is strangely content to be, I cannot see how the French Government could have justified to its own people a fearfully dangerous attack on Germany had Russia been the aggressor—Germany would have secured fair play for her fight with Russia. But even the fight with Russia was not inevitable. The ultimatum to Serbia was the escapade of a dotard; a worse crime than the assassination that provoked it. There is no reason to doubt the conclusion in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's dispatch (No. 161) that it could have been got over, and that Russia and Austria would have thought better of fighting and come to terms. Peace was really on the cards; and the sane game was to play for it.

The Achilles Heel of Militarism

Instead, Germany flew at France's throat, and by incidentally invading Belgium gave us the excuse our Militarists wanted to attack her with the full sympathy of the nation. Why did she do this stupid thing? Not because of the counsels of General von Bernhardt. On the contrary, he had warned her expressly against allowing herself to be caught between Russia and a Franco-British combination until she had formed a counterbalancing alliance with America, Italy and Turkey. And he had most certainly not encouraged her to depend on England sparing her: on the contrary, he could not sufficiently admire the wily ruthlessness with which England watches her opportunity and springs at her foe when the foe is down. (He little knew, poor man, how much he was flattering our capacity for Realpolitik!) But he had reckoned without his creed's fatal and fundamental weakness, which is, that as Junker-Militarism promotes only stupid people and snobs, and suppresses genuine realists as if they were snakes, it always turns out when a crisis arrives that "the silly people don't know their own silly business." The Kaiser and his Ministers made an appalling mess of their job. They were inflamed by Bernhardt; but they did not understand him.

They swallowed his flattery, but did not take in his strategy or his warnings. They knew that when the moment came to face the Franco-Russian alliance, they were to make a magnificent dash at France and sweep her pieces off the great chess board before the Russians had time to mobilize; and then return and crush Russia, leaving the conquest of England for another day. This was honestly as much as their heads could hold at one time; and they were helplessly unable to consider whether the other conditions postulated by Bernhardi were present, or indeed, in the excitement of their schoolboyish imaginations, to remember whether he had postulated any at all. And so they made their dash and put themselves in the wrong at every point morally, besides making victory humanly impossible for themselves militarily. That is the nemesis of Militarism: the Militarist is thrown into a big game which he is too stupid to be able to play successfully. Philip of Spain tried it 300 years ago; and the ruin he brought on his empire has lasted to this day. He was so stupid that though he believed himself to be the chosen instrument of God (as sure a sign of a hopeless fool in a man who cannot see that every other man is equally an instrument of that Power as it is a guarantee of wisdom and good-will in the man who respects his neighbor as himself) he attempted to fight Drake on the assumption that a cannon was a weapon that no real gentleman and good Catholic would condescend to handle. Louis XIV. tried again two centuries ago, and, being a more frivolous fool, got beaten by Marlborough and sent his great-grandson from the throne to the guillotine. Napoleon tried it 100 years ago. He was more dangerous, because he had prodigious personal ability and technical military skill; and he started with the magnificent credential of the French Revolution. All that carried him further than the Spanish bigot or the French fop; but he, too, accreted fools and knaves, and ended defeated in St. Helena after pandering for twenty years to the appetite of idiots for glory and bloodshed; waging war as "a great game"; and finding in

a field strewn with corpses "un beau spectacle." In short, as strong a magnet to fools as the others, though so much abler.

Our Own True Position

Now comes the question, in what position did this result of a mad theory and a hopelessly incompetent application of it on the part of Potsdam place our own Government? It left us quite clearly in the position of the responsible policeman of the west. There was nobody else in Europe strong enough to chain "the mad dog." Belgium and Holland, Norway and Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland could hardly have been expected to take that duty on themselves, even if Norway and Sweden had not good reason to be anti-Russian, and the Dutch capitalists were not half convinced that their commercial prosperity would be greater under German than under native rule. It will not be contended that Spain could have done anything; and as to Italy, it was doubtful whether she did not consider herself still a member of the Triple Alliance. It was evidently England or nobody. For England to have refrained from hurling herself into the fray, horse, foot, and artillery, was impossible from every point of view. From the democratic point of view it would have meant an acceptance of the pretension of which Potsdam, by attacking the French Republic, had made itself the champion; that is, the pretension of the Junker class to dispose of the world on Militarist lines at the expense of the lives and limbs of the masses. From the international Socialist point of view, it would have been the acceptance of the extreme nationalist view that the people of other countries are foreigners, and that it does not concern us if they choose to cut one another's throats. Our Militarist Junkers cried "If we let Germany conquer France it will be our turn next." Our romantic Junkers added "and serve us right too; what man will pity us when the hour strikes for us, if we skulk now?" Even the wise, who loathe the war, and regard it as such a dishonor and disgrace in itself that all its laurels cannot hide its brand of Cain,

had to admit that police duty is necessary and that war must be made on such war as the Germans had made by attacking France in an avowed attempt to substitute a hegemony of cannon for the comity of nations. There was no alternative. Had the Foreign Office been the International Socialist Bureau, had Sir Edward Grey been Jaurès, had Mr. Ramsay Macdonald been Prime Minister, had Russia been Germany's ally instead of ours, the result would still have been the same: we must have drawn the sword to save France and smash Potsdam as we smashed and always must smash Philip, Louis, Napoleon, *et hoc genus omne*.

The case for our action is thus as complete as any *casus belli* is ever likely to be. In fact its double character as both a democratic and military (if not Militarist) case makes it too complete; for it enables our Junkers to claim it entirely for themselves, and to fake it with pseudo-legal justifications which destroy nine-tenths of our credit, the military and legal cases being hardly a tenth of the whole; indeed, they would not by themselves justify the slaughter of a single Pomeranian grenadier. For instance, take the Militarist view that we must fight Potsdam because if the Kaiser is victorious, it will be our turn next! Well: are we not prepared to fight always when our turn comes? Why should not we also depend on our navy, on the extreme improbability of Germany, however triumphant, making two such terrible calls on her people in the same generation as a war involves, on the sympathy of the defeated, and on the support of American and European public opinion when our turn comes, if there is nothing at stake now but the difference between defeat and victory in an otherwise indifferent military campaign? If the welfare of the world does not suffer any more by an English than by a German defeat who cares whether we are defeated or not? As mere competitors in a race of armaments and an Olympic game conducted with ball cartridge, or as plaintiffs in a technical case of international law (already decided against us in 1870, by the way, when Gladstone had to re-

sort to a new treaty made *ad hoc* and lapsing at the end of the war) we might as well be beaten as not, for all the harm that will ensue to anyone but ourselves, or even to ourselves apart from our national vanity. It is as the special constables of European life that we are important, and can send our men to the trenches with the assurance that they are fighting in a worthy cause. In short, the Junker case is not worth twopence: the Democratic case, the Socialist case, the International case is worth all it threatens to cost.

The German Defense to Our Indictment

What is the German reply to this case? Or rather, how would the Germans reply to it if their official Militarist and Kaiserist panjandrums had the wit to find the effective reply? Undoubtedly they would say that our Social-Democratic professions are all very fine, but that our conversion to them is suspiciously sudden and recent. They would remark that it is a little difficult for a nation in deadly peril to trust its existence to a foreign public opinion which has not only never been expressed by the people who really control England's foreign policy, but is flatly opposed to all their known views and prejudices. They would ask why, instead of making an *Entente* with France and Russia and refusing to give Germany any assurance concerning its object except that we would not pledge ourselves to remain neutral if the Franco-Russian *Entente* fell on Germany, we did not say straight out in 1912 (when they put the question flatly to us), and again last July when Sazonoff urged us so strongly to show our hand, that if Germany attacked France we should fight her, Russia or no Russia (a far less irritating and provocative attitude), although we knew full well that an attack on France through Belgium would be part of the German program if the Russian peril became acute. They would point out that if our own Secretary for Foreign Affairs openly disclaimed any knowledge of the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance, it was hard for a German to believe that they were wholly fit for publication. In short, they

would say "If you were so jolly wise and well intentioned before the event, why did not your Foreign Minister and your ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna and St. Petersburg—we beg pardon, Petrograd—invite us to keep the peace and rely on western public opinion instead of refusing us every pledge except the hostile one to co-operate with France against us in the North Sea, and making it only too plain to us that your policy was a Junker policy as much as ours, and that we had nothing to hope from your goodwill? What evidence had we that you were playing any other game than this Militarist chess of our own, which you now so piously renounce, but which none of you except a handful of Socialists whom you despise and Syndicalists whom you imprison on Militarist pretexts has opposed for years past, though it has been all over your Militarist anti-German platforms and papers and magazines? Are your Social-Democratic principles sincere, or are they only a dagger you keep up your sleeve to stab us in the back when our two most formidable foes are trying to garrote us? If so, where does your moral superiority come in, hypocrites that you are? If not, why, we repeat, did you not make them known to all the world, instead of making an ambush for us by your senseless silence?"

I see no reply to that except a frank confession that we did not know our own minds; that we came to knowledge of them only when Germany's attack on France forced us to make them up at last; that though doubtless a chronic state of perfect lucidity and long prevision on our part would have been highly convenient, yet there is a good deal to be said for the policy of not fording a stream until you come to it; and that in any case we must entirely decline to admit that we are more likely than other people to do the wrong thing when circumstances at last oblige us to think and act. Also that the discussion is idle on the showing of the German case itself; for whether the Germans assumed us to be unscrupulous Militarists or conscientious Democrats they were bound to come to the same conclusion; namely, that we

should attack them if they attacked France; consequently their assumption that we would not interfere must have been based on the belief that we are simply "contemptible," which is the sort of mistake people have to pay for in this wicked world.

On the whole, we can hector our way in the Prussian manner out of that discussion well enough, provided we hold our own in the field. But the Prussian manner hardly satisfies the conscience. True, the fact that our diplomatists were not able to discover the right course for Germany does not excuse Germany for being unable to find it for herself. Not that it was more her business than ours: it was a European question, and should have been solved by the united counsels of all the ambassadors and Foreign Offices and chanceries. Indeed it could not have been stably solved without certain assurances from them. But it was, to say the least, as much Germany's business as anyone else's, and terribly urgent for her: "a matter of life and death," the Imperial Chancellor thought. Still, it is not for us to claim moral superiority to Germany. It was for us a matter of the life and death of many Englishmen; and these Englishmen are dead because our diplomatists were as blind as the Prussians. The war is a failure for secret Junker diplomacy, ours no less than the enemy's. Those of us who have still to die must be inspired, not by devotion to the diplomatists, but, like the Socialist hero of old on the barricade, by the vision of "human solidarity." And if he purchases victory for that holy cause with his blood, I submit that we cannot decently allow the Foreign Office to hang up his martyr's palm over the War Office Mantelpiece.

The First Penalty of Disingenuousness

The Foreign Office, however, can at least shift its ground, and declare for the good cause instead of belittling it with quibbling excuses. For see what the first effect of the nonsense about Belgium has been! It carried with it the inevitable conclusion that when the last German was cleared off Belgian soil, peace-

loving England, her reluctant work in this shocking war done, would calmly retire from the conflict, and leave her Allies to finish the deal with Potsdam. Accordingly, after Mr. Asquith's oration at the Mansion House, the Allies very properly insisted on our signing a solemn treaty between the parties that they must all stand together to the very end. A pitifully thin attempt has been made to represent that the mistrusted party was France, and that the Kaiser was trying to buy her off. All one can say to that is that the people who believe that any French Government dare face the French people now with anything less than Alsace and Lorraine as the price of peace, or that an undefeated and indeed masterfully advancing German Kaiser (as he seemed then) dare offer France such a price, would believe anything. Of course we had to sign; but if the Prime Minister had not been prevented by his own past from taking the popular line, we should not have been suspected of a possible backing-out when the demands of our sanctimoniousness were satisfied. He would have known that we are not vindicating a treaty which by accident remains among the fragments of treaties of Paris, of Prague, of Berlin, of all sorts of places and dates, as the only European treaty that has hitherto escaped flat violation: we are supporting the war as a war on war, on military coercion, on domineering, on bullying, on brute force, on military law, on caste insolence, on what Mrs. Fawcett called insensible deviltry (only to find the papers explaining apologetically that she, as a lady, had of course been alluding to war made by foreigners, not by England). Some of us, remembering the things we have ourselves said and done, may doubt whether Satan can cast out Satan; but as the job is not exactly one for an unfallen angel, we may as well let him have a try.

The Blank Cheque

In the meantime behold us again hopelessly outwitted by Eastern diplomacy as a direct consequence of this ill-starred outburst of hypocrisy about treaties! Everybody has said over and over again that this war is the most tremendous war ever waged. Nobody has said that

this new treaty is the most tremendous blank cheque we have ever been forced to sign by our Parliamentary party trick of striking moral attitudes. It is true that Mr. J. A. Hobson realised the situation at once, and was allowed to utter a little croak in a corner; but where was the trumpet note of warning that should have rung throughout the whole Press? Just consider what the blank cheque means. France's draft on it may stop at the cost of recovering Alsace and Lorraine. We shall have to be content with a few scraps of German colony and the heavy-weight championship. But Russia? When will she say "Hold! Enough!" Suppose she wants not only Poland, but Baltic Prussia? Suppose she wants Constantinople as her port of access to the unfrozen seas, in addition to the dismemberment of Austria? Suppose she has the brilliant idea of annexing all Prussia, for which there is really something to be said by ethnographical map-makers, Militarist madmen, and Pan-Slavist megalomaniacs? It may be a reasonable order; but it is a large one; and the fact that we should have been committed to it without the knowledge of Parliament, without discussion, without warning, without any sort of appeal to public opinion or democratic sanction, by a stroke of Sir Edward Grey's pen within five weeks of his having committed us in the same fashion to an appalling European war, shows how completely the Foreign Office has thrown away all pretence of being any less absolute than the Kaiser himself. It simply offers *carte blanche* to the armies of the Allies without a word to the nation until the cheque is signed. The only limit there is to the obligation is the certainty that the cheque will be dishonored the moment the draft on it becomes too heavy. And that may furnish a virtuous pretext for another war between the Allies themselves. In any case no treaty can save each Ally from the brute necessity of surrendering and paying up if beaten, whether the defeat is shared by the others or not. Did I not say that the sooner we made up our minds to the terms of the treaty of peace, so that we might know what

we were fighting for, and how far we were bound to go, the better? Instead of which we sign a ridiculous "scrap of paper" to save ourselves the intolerable fatigue of thought.

Belgium Crucified Between the European Powers

And now, before I leave the subject of Belgium, what have we done for Belgium? Have we saved her soil from invasion? Were we at her side with half a million men when the avalanche fell on her? Or were we safe in our own country praising her heroism in paragraphs which all contrived to convey an idea that the Belgian soldier is about four feet high, but immensely plucky for his size? Alas, when the Belgian soldier cried: "Where are the English?" the reply was "a mass of concrete as large as a big room," blown into the air by a German siege gun, falling back and crushing him into the earth we had not succeeded in saving from the worst of the horrors of war. We have not protected Belgium: Belgium has protected us at the cost of being conquered by Germany. It is now our sacred duty to drive the Germans out of Belgium. Meanwhile we might at least rescue her refugees by a generous grant of public money from the caprices of private charity. We need not press our offer to lend her money: German capitalists will do that for her with the greatest pleasure when the war is over. I think the Government realizes that now; for I note the afterthought that a loan from us need not bear interest.

Now that we begin to see where we really are, what practical morals can we draw?

Unpreparedness the Price of Secrecy

First, that our autocratic foreign policy, in which the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is always a Junker, and makes war and concludes war without consulting the nation, or confiding in it or even refraining from deceiving it as to his intentions, leads inevitably to a disastrous combination of war and unpreparedness for war. Wars are planned which require huge expeditionary armies trained and

equipped for war. But as such preparation could not be concealed from the public, it is simply deferred until the war is actually declared and begun, at the most frightful risk of such an annihilation of our little peace army as we escaped by the skin of our teeth at Mons and Cambrai. The military experts tell us that it takes four months to make an infantry and six to make a cavalry soldier. And our way of getting an army able to fight the German army is to declare war on Germany just as if we had such an army, and then trust to the appalling resultant peril and disaster to drive us into wholesale enlistment, voluntary or (better still from the Junker point of view) compulsory. It seems to me that a nation which tolerates such insensate methods and outrageous risks must shortly perish from sheer lunacy. And it is all pure superstition: the retaining of the methods of Edward the First in the reign of George the Fifth. I therefore suggest that the first lesson of the war is that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs be reduced to the level of a simple Prime Minister, or even of a constitutional monarch, powerless to fire a single shot or sign a treaty without the authority of the House of Commons, all diplomatic business being conducted in a blaze of publicity, and the present regulation which exacts the qualification of a private income of at least £400 a year for a position in the Diplomatic Service replaced by a new regulation that at least half the staff shall consist of persons who have never dined out at the houses of hosts of higher rank than unfashionable solicitors or doctors.

In these recommendations I am not forgetting that an effective check on diplomacy is not easy to devise, and that high personal character and class disinterestedness (the latter at present unattainable) on the part of our diplomats will be as vital as ever. I well know that diplomacy is carried on at present not only by official correspondence meant for possible publication and subject to an inspection which is in some degree a responsible inspection, but by private letters which the King himself has no right

to read. I know that even in the United States, where treaties and declarations of war must be made by Parliament, it is nevertheless possible for the President to bring about a situation in which Congress, like our House of Commons in the present instance, has no alternative but to declare war. But though complete security is impracticable, it does not follow that no precautions should be taken, or that a democratic tradition is no safer than a feudal tradition. A far graver doubt is raised by the susceptibility of the masses to war fever, and the appalling danger of a daily deluge of cheap newspapers written by nameless men and women whose scandalously low payment is a guarantee of their ignorance and their servility to the financial department, controlled by a moneyed class which not only curries favour with the military caste for social reasons, but has large direct interests in war as a method of raising the price of money, the only commodity the moneyed class has to sell. But I am quite unable to see that our Junkers are less susceptible to the influence of the Press than the people educated by public elementary schools. On the contrary, our Democrats are more fool-proof than our Plutocrats and the ravings our Junkers send to the papers for nothing in war time would be dear at a halfpenny a line. Plutocracy makes for war because it offers prizes to Plutocrats; Socialism makes for peace because the interests it serves are international. So, as the Socialist side is the democratic side, we had better democratize our diplomacy if we desire peace.

II.

RECRUITING

And now as to the question of recruiting. This is pressing, because it is not enough for the Allies to win: we and not Russia must be the decisive factor in the victory, or Germany will not be fairly beaten, and we shall be only rescued *protégés* of Russia instead of the saviours of Western Europe. We must have the best army in Europe; and we shall not get it under existing arrangements. We are passing out of

the first phase of the war fever, in which men flock to the colours by instinct, by romantic desire for adventure, by the determination not, as Wagner put it, "to let their lives be governed by fear of the end," by simple destitution through unemployment, by rancour and pugnacity excited by the inventions of the Press, by a sense of duty inculcated in platform orations which would not stand half an hour's discussion, by the incitements and taunts of elderly non-combatants and maidens with a taste for mischief, and by the verses of poets jumping at the cheapest chance in their underpaid profession. The difficulty begins when all the men susceptible to these inducements are enlisted, and we have to draw on the solid, skeptical, sensible residuum who know the value of their lives and services and liberties, and will not give them except on substantial and honourable conditions. These Ironsides know that it is one thing to fight for your country, and quite another to let your wife and children starve to save our rich idlers from a rise in the supertax. They also know that it is one thing to wipe out the Prussian drill sergeant and snob officer as the enemies of manhood and honour, and another to let that sacred mission be made an excuse for subjecting us to exactly the same tyranny in England. They have not forgotten the "On the knee" episode, nor the floggings in our military prisons, nor the scandalous imprisonment of Tom Mann, nor the warnings as to military law and barrack life contained even in Robert Blatchford's testimony that the army made a man of him.

What the Labour Party Owes to the Army

And here is where the Labour Party should come in. The Labour Party's business is to abolish the Militarist soldier, who is only a quaint survival of the King's footman (himself a still quainter survival of the medieval baron's retainer), and substitute for him a trained combatant with full civil rights, receiving the Trade Union rate of wages proper to a skilled worker at

a dangerous trade. It must co-operate with the Trade Unions in fixing this moral minimum wage for the citizen soldier, and in obtaining for him a guarantee that the wage shall continue until he obtains civil employment on standard terms at the conclusion of the war. It must make impossible the scandal of a monstrously rich peer (his riches, the automatic result of ground land-landlordism, having "no damned nonsense of merit about them") proclaiming the official weekly allowance for the child of the British soldier in the trenches. That allowance is eightpence, being less than one-third of the standard allowance for an illegitimate child under an affiliation order. And the Labour Party must deprive the German bullet of its present double effect in killing an Englishman in France and simultaneously reducing his widow's subsistence from a guinea a week to five shillings. Until this is done we are simply provoking Providence to destroy us.

I wish I could say that it is hardly necessary to add that Trade Unionism must be instituted in the Army, so that there shall be accredited secretaries in the field to act as a competent medium of communication between the men on service and the political representatives of their class at the War Office (for I shall propose this representative innovation presently). It will shock our colonels, but I know of no bodies of men for whom repeated and violent shocking is more needed and more likely to prove salutary than the regimental masses of the British army. One rather pleasant shock in store for them is the discovery that an officer and a gentleman, whose sole professional interest is the honour and welfare of his country, and who is bound to the mystical equality of life-and-death duty for all alike, will get on much more easily with a Trade Union Secretary than a commercial employer whose aim is simply private profit and who regards every penny added to the wages of his employees as a penny taken off his own income. Howbeit, whether the colonels like it or not—that is, whether

they have become accustomed to it or not—it has to come, and its protection from Junker prejudice is another duty of the Labour Party. The Party as a purely political body must demand that the defender of his country shall retain his full civil rights unimpaired; that the unnecessary, mischievous, dishonourable and tyrannical slave code called military law, which at its most savagely stern point produced only Wellington's complaint that "it is impossible to get a command obeyed in the British Army," be carted away to the rubbish heap of exploded superstitions; and that if Englishmen are not to be allowed to serve their country in the field as freely as they do in the numerous civil industries in which neglect and indiscipline are as dangerous as they are in war, their leaders and Parliamentary representatives will not recommend them to serve at all. In wartime these things may not matter; discipline either goes by the board or keeps itself under the pressure of the enemy's cannon; and bullying sergeants and insolent officers have something else to do than to provoke men—they dislike into striking them and then reporting them for two years' hard labour without trial by jury. In battle such officers are between two fires. But soldiers are not always, or even often, at war; and the dishonour of abdicating dearly bought rights and liberties is a stain both on war and peace. Now is the time to get rid of that stain. If any officer cannot command men without it, as civilians and police inspectors do, that officer has mistaken his profession and had better come home.

Obsolete Tests in the Army

Another matter needs to be dealt with at the same time. There are immense numbers of atheists in this country; and though most of them, like the Kaiser, regard themselves as devout Christians, the best are intellectually honest enough to object to profess beliefs they do not hold, especially in the solemn act of dedicating themselves to death in the service of their country. Army form E 501 A (September, 1912) secured to these the

benefit of the Bradlaugh Affirmation Act of 1888, as the enlisting soldier said simply "I, So and So, do make Oath," &c. But recruits are now confronted with another form (E 501, June, 1914) running "I, So and So, swear by Almighty God," &c. On September 1st, at Lord Kitchener's call, a civil servant obtained leave to enlist and had the oath put to him in this form by the attesting officer. He offered to swear in the 1912 form. This was refused; and we accordingly lost a recruit of just that sturdily conscientious temper which has made the most formidable soldiers known to history. I am bound to add, however, that the attesting officer, on being told that the oath would be a blasphemous farce to the conscience of the recruit, made no difficulty about that, and was quite willing to accept him if he, on his part, would oblige by professing what he did not believe. Thus a Ghoorka's religious conscience is respected: an Englishman's is insulted and outraged.

But; indeed, all these oaths are obstructive and useless superstitions. No recruit will hesitate to pledge his word of honour to fight to the death for his country or for a cause with which he sympathizes; and that is all we require. There is no need to drag in Almighty God and no need to drag in the King. Many an Irishman, many a colonial Republican, many an American volunteer who would fight against the Prussian monarchy shoulder to shoulder with the French Republicans with a will, would rather not pretend to do it out of devotion to the British throne. To vanquish Prussia in this war we need the active aid or the sympathy of every Republican in the world. America, for instance, sympathizes with England, but classes the King with the Kaiser as an obsolete institution. Besides, even from the courtly point of view the situation is a delicate one. Why emphasize the fact that, formally speaking, the war is between two grandsons of Albert the Good, that thoroughbred German whose London monument is so much grander than Cromwell's?

The Labour Party should also set its

face firmly against the abandonment of Red Cross work and finance, or the support of soldiers' families, or the patrolling of the streets, to amateurs who regard the war as a wholesome patriotic exercise, or as the latest amusement in the way of charity bazaars, or as a fountain of self-righteousness. Civil volunteering is needed urgently enough: one of the difficulties of war is that it creates in certain departments a demand so abnormal that no peace establishment can cope with it. But the volunteers should be disciplined and paid: we are not so poor that we need sponge on anyone. And in hospital and medical service war ought not at present to cost more than peace would if the victims of our commercial system were properly tended, and our Public Health service adequately extended and manned. We should therefore treat our Red Cross department as if it were destined to become a permanent service. No charity and no amateur anarchy and incompetence should be tolerated. As to allowing that admirable detective agency for the defence of the West End against begging letter writers, the Charity Organization Society, to touch the soldier's home, the very suggestion is an outrage. The C. O. S., the Poor Law, and the charitable amateur, whether of the patronizing or prying or gushing variety, must be kept as far from the army and its folk as if they were German spies. The business of our fashionable amateurs is to pay Income Tax and Supertax. This time they will have to pay through the nose, vigorously wrung for that purpose by the House of Commons; so they had better set their own houses in order and leave the business of the war to be officially and responsibly dealt with and paid for at full standard rates.

Wanted: Labour Representation in the War Office.

But parliamentary activity is not sufficient. There must be a more direct contact between representative Labour and the Army, because Parliament can only remedy grievances, and that not before years of delay and agitation elapse.

Even then the grievances are not dealt with on their merits; for under our party system, which is the most abominable engine for the perversion and final destruction of all political conscience ever devised by man, the House of Commons never votes on any question but whether the Government shall remain in office or give the Opposition a turn, no matter what the pretext for the division may be. Only in such emergencies as the present, when the Government is forced to beg the Labour members to help them to recruit, is there a chance of making reasonable conditions for the soldier.

The Four Inoculations

It is therefore necessary that the War Office should have working class representatives on all committees and councils which issue notices to the public. There is at present, it would seem, not a single person in authority there who has the faintest notion of what the immense majority of possible British recruits are thinking about. The results have been beyond description ludicrous and dangerous. Every proclamation is urgently worded so as to reassure recruits with £5,000 a year and repel recruits with a pound a week. On the very day when the popular Lord Kitchener, dropping even the *et rex meus* of Wolsey, frankly asked the nation for 100,000 men for his army, and when it was a matter of life and death that every encouragement should be held out to working men to enlist, the War Office decided that this was the psychological moment to remind everybody that soldiers on active service often die of typhoid fever, and to press inoculation on the recruits pending the officially longed-for hour when Sir Almroth Wright's demand for compulsion can be complied with. I say nothing here about the efficacy of inoculation. Efficacious or not, Sir Almroth Wright himself bases his demand for compulsion on the ground that it is hopeless to expect the whole army to submit to it voluntarily. That being so, it seems to me that when men are hesitating on the threshold of the recruiting station, only a German spy

or our War Office (always worth ten thousand men to our enemies) would seize that moment to catch the nervous postulant by the sleeve and say, "Have you thought of the danger of dysentery?" The fact that the working class forced the Government, very much against its doctor-ridden will, to abolish compulsory vaccination, shows the extent to which its households loathe and dread these vaccines (so called, but totally unconnected with cows or Jenner) which, as they are continually reminded by energetic anti-inoculation propagandists in largely circulated journals and pamphlets, not to mention ghastly photographs of disfigured children, sometimes produce worse effects than the diseases they are supposed to prevent. Indifferent or careless recruits are easily induced to submit to inoculation by little privileges during the ensuing indisposition or by small money bribes; and careful ones are proselytized by Sir Almroth's statistics; but on the whole both inoculation and amateur medical statistics are regarded with suspicion by the poor; and the fact that revaccination is compulsory in the regular army, and that the moral pressure applied to secure both typhoid inoculation and vaccination both in the regular army and the Territorials is such as only a few stalwarts are able to resist, is deeply resented. At present the inoculation mania has reached the pitch of proposing no less than four separate inoculations: revaccination, typhoid, cholera, and—Sir Almroth's last staggerer—inoculation against wounds! When the War Office and its medical advisers have been successfully inoculated against political lunacy, it will be time enough to discuss such extravagances. Meanwhile, the sooner the War Office issues a proclamation that no recruit will be either compelled or importuned to submit to any sort of inoculation whatever against his will, the better for the recruiting, and the worse for the enemy.

The War Office Bait of Starvation

But this blunder was a joke compared to the next exploit of the War Office. It

suddenly began to placard the country with frantic assurances to its five-thousand-a-year friends that they would be "discharged with all possible speed THE MINUTE THE WAR IS OVER. Only considerations of space restrained them, I presume, from adding "LAWN TENNIS, SHOOTING, AND ALL THE DELIGHTS OF FASHIONABLE LIFE CAN BE RESUMED IMMEDIATELY ON THE FIRING OF THE LAST SHOT." Now what does this mean to the wage worker? Simply that the moment he is no longer wanted in the trenches he will be flung back into the labour market to sink or swim without an hour's respite. If we had had a Labour representative or two to help in drawing up these silly placards—I am almost tempted to say if we had had any human being of any class with half the brains of a rabbit there—the placards would have contained a solemn promise that no single man should be discharged at the conclusion of the war, save at his own request, until a job had been found for him in civil life. I ask the heavens, with a shudder, do these class-blinded people in authority really intend to take a million men out of their employment; turn them into soldiers; and then at one blow hurl them back, utterly unprovided for, into the streets?

But a War Office capable of placarding Lord Roberts's declaration that the men who are enlisting are doing "what all able-bodied men in the kingdom should do," is clearly ignorant enough for anything. I do not blame Lord Roberts for his oratorical flourish: we have all said things just as absurd on the platform in moments of enthusiasm. But the officials who reproduced it in cold blood would have us believe that soldiers live on air; that ammunition drops from heaven like manna; and that an army could hold the field for twenty-four hours without the support of a still more numerous body of civilians working hard to support it. Sane men gasp at such placards and ask angrily, "What sort of fools do you take us for?" I have in my hand a copy of *The Torquay Times* containing a hospitable invitation

to soldiers' wives to call at the War Office, Whitehall, S.W., if they desire "assistance and explanation of their case." The return fare from Torquay to London is thirty shillings and sixpence third class, but the War Office no doubt assumes that all soldiers' wives keep motor cars. Still, let us be just even to the War Office. It did *not* ask the soldiers' wives for forms of authorization to pay the separation allowance to their bankers every six months. It actually offered the money monthly!

Delusive Promises

The middle and upper classes are nearly as bad as the War Office. They talk of keeping every man's place open for him until the end of the war. Obviously this is flatly impossible. Some places can be kept, and no doubt are being kept. Some functions are suspended by the war and cannot be resumed until the troops return to civil life and resume them. Employers are so hardened to the daily commercial necessity for discharging men without a thought as to what is to become of them that they are quite ready to undertake to sack the replacers when the troops come back. Also the return of peace may be followed by a revival of trade in which employment may not be hard to find, even by discharged soldiers, who are always passed over in the labour market in favour of civilians, as those well know who have the task of trying to find places for them. But these considerations do not justify an attempt to persuade recruits that they can go off soldiering for months—they are told by Lord Kitchener that it will probably be for years—and then come back and walk to their benches or into their offices and pick up their work as if they had left only the night before. The very people who are promising this are raising the cry "business as usual" in the same breath. How can business be carried on as usual, or carried on at all, on unoccupied office stools and at counters with no men behind them? Such rubbish is an insult to the recruit's intelligence. These promises of keeping places open were made to the men who enlisted for

South Africa, and were of course broken, as a promise to supply green cheese by quarrying the moon would have been broken. New employees must be found to do the work of the men who are in the field; and these new ones will not all be thrown into the street when the war is over to make room for discharged soldiers, even if a good many of these soldiers are not disqualified by their new training and habits for their old employment. I repeat, there is only one assurance that can be given to the recruits without grossly and transparently deluding them and that is that they shall not be discharged, except at their own request, until civil employment is available for them.

Funking Controversy

This is not the only instance of the way in which, under the first scare of the war, we shut our eyes and opened our mouths to every folly. For example, there was a cry for the suspension of all controversy in the face of the national danger. Now the only way to suspend controversial questions during a period of intense activity in the very departments in which the controversy has arisen is to allow them all to be begged. Perhaps I should not object if they were all begged in favour of my own side, as, for instance, the question of Socialism was begged in favour of Socialism when the Government took control of the railways; bought up all the raw sugar; regulated prices; guaranteed the banks; suspended the operation of private contracts; and did all the things it had been declaring utterly and eternally Utopian and impossible when Socialists advocated them. But it is now proposed to suspend all popular liberties and constitutional safeguards; to muzzle the Press, and actually to have no contests at bye-elections! This is more than a little too much. We have submitted to have our letters, our telegrams, our newspapers censored, our dividends delayed, our trains cut off, our horses and even our houses commandeered, our streets darkened, our restaurants closed, and ourselves shot dead on the public highways if we were slow to realize that some ex-

cited person bawling in the distance was a sentry challenging us. But that we are to be politically gagged and enslaved as well; that the able-bodied soldier in the trenches, who depends on the able-minded civilian at home to guard the liberties of his country and protect him from carelessness or abuse of power by the authorities whom he must blindly and dumbly obey, is to be betrayed the moment his back is turned to his fellow-citizens and his face to the foe, is not patriotism: it is the paralysis of mortal funk: it is the worst kind of cowardice in the face of the enemy. Let us hear no more of it, but contest our elections like men, and regain the ancient political prestige of England at home as our expeditionary force has regained it abroad.

The Labour Party, then, need have no hesitation in raising all the standing controversies between Democracy and Junkerism in their acutest form, and taking advantage of the war emergency to press them to a series of parliamentary victories for Labour, whether in negotiations with the Government whips, in divisions on the floor of the House, or in strenuously contested bye-elections. No doubt our Junkers will try to disarm their opponents by representing that it would be in the last degree unfair, un-English, and ungentlemanly on the part of the Labour members to seize any tactical advantage in parliamentary warfare, and most treacherous and unpatriotic to attack their country (meaning the Junker Party) when it is at war. Some Labour members will be easily enough gulled in this way: it would be laughable, if the consequences were not so tragic, to see how our parliamentary beginners from the working class succumb to the charm of the Junker appeal. The Junkers themselves are not to be coaxed in this manner: it is no use offering tracts to a missionary, as the poor Kaiser found when he tried it on. The Labour Party will soon learn the value of these polite demonstrations that it is always its duty not to hamper the governing classes in their very difficult and delicate and dangerous task of safeguard-

ing the interests of this great empire: in short, to let itself be gammoned by elegant phrases and by adroit practisings on its personal good-nature, its inveterate proletarian sentimentality, and its secret misgivings as to the correctness of its manners. The Junkers have already taken the fullest advantage of the war to paralyze democracy. If the Labour members do not take a vigorous counter-offensive, and fight every parliamentary trench to the last division, the Labour Movement will be rushed back as precipitately as General von Kluck rushed the Allies back from Namur to the gates of Paris. In truth, the importance of the war to the immense majority of Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans lies in the possibility that when Junkers fall out common men may come by their own.

III.

THE TERMS OF PEACE

Natural Limits to Duration of the War

So much for the recruiting. Now for the terms of peace. It is time to take that subject in hand; for Lord Kitchen-er's notion that we are going to settle down to years of war as we did a century ago is soldierly, but not sensible. It is, of course, physically possible for us to continue for twenty years digging trenches and shelling German troops and shoving German armies back when they are not shoving us, whilst old women pull turnips and tend goats in the fire zones across which soldiers run to shelter. But we cannot afford to withdraw a million male adults who have passed a strictish health test from the work of parentage for several years unless we intend to breed our next generation from parents with short sight, varicose veins, rotten teeth, and deranged internal organs. Soldiers do not think of these things: "theirs not to reason why: theirs but to do and die"; but sensible civilians have to. And even soldiers know that you cannot make ammunition as fast as you can burn it, nor produce men and

horses as instantaneously as you can kill them by machinery. It would be well, indeed, if our papers, instead of writing of ten-inch shells, would speak of £1,000 shells, and regimental bands occasionally finish the National Anthem and the Brabançonne and the Marseillaise with the old strain, "That's the way the money goes: Pop goes the Ten Inch." It is easy to rebuke Mr. Norman Angell and Herr Bloch for their sordid references to the cost of war; and Mr. H. G. Wells is profoundly right in pointing out that the fact that war does not pay commercially is greatly to its credit, as no high human activity ever does pay commercially. But modern war does not even pay its way. Already our men have "pumped lead" into retreating Germans who had no lead left to pump back again; and sooner or later, if we go on indefinitely, we shall have to finish the job with our fists, and congratulate ourselves that both Georges Carpentier and Bombardier Wells are on our side. This war will stop when Germany throws up the sponge, which will happen long before she is utterly exhausted, but not before we ourselves shall be glad enough of a rest. Nations are like bees: they cannot kill except at the cost of their own lives.

The question of terms will raise a fierce controversy. At the extremes of our public opinion we have two temperaments, first, our gentlemen, our sportsmen, our daredevils, our *preux chevaliers*. To these the notion of reviling your enemy when he is up; kicking him when he is knocked down by somebody else; and gouging out his eyes, cutting out his tongue, hewing off his right arm, and stealing all his money, is abhorrent and cowardly. These gallants say, "It is not enough that we can fight Germany to-day. We can fight her any day and every day. Let her come again and again and yet again. We will fight her one to three; and if she comes on ten to one, as she did at Mons, we will mill on the retreat, and drive her back again when we have worn her down to our weight. If her fleet will not come out to fight us because we have too many ships, we will send all the odds in our favour back to Portsmouth and fight

ship to ship in the North Sea, and let the bravest and best win." That is how gallant fighters talk, and how Drake is popularly (though erroneously) supposed to have tackled the Armada.

The Ignoble Attitude of Cruel Panic

But we are not all *preux chevaliers*. We have at the other extremity the people who are craving for loot and vengeance, who clamor for the humiliation and torture of the enemy, who rave against the village burnings and shootings by the Prussians in one column and exult in the same proceedings by the Russians in another, who demand that German prisoners of war shall be treated as criminals, who depict our Indian troops as savage cutthroats because they like to think of their enemies being mauled in the spirit of the Indian Mutiny, who shriek that the Kaiser must be sent to Devil's Island because St. Helena is too good for him, and who declare that Germany must be so maimed and trodden into the dust that she will not be able to raise her head again for a century. Let us call these people by their own favourite name, Huns, even at the risk of being unjust to the real Huns. And let us send as many of them to the trenches as we can possibly induce to go, in the hope that they may presently join the lists of the missing. Still, as they rather cling to our soil, they will have to be reckoned with when the settlement comes. But they will not count for much then. Most of them will be heartily ashamed of what they said in those first three or four weeks of blue funk (I am too timid myself not to make allowances for that most distressing and universal, but fortunately transient effect of war); and most of those who are not will be ashamed to bear malice publicly.

The Commercial Attitude

Far more weighty in the matter will be the intermediate sections. First, our commercial main body, which thinks that chivalry is not business, and that rancour is childish, but cannot see why we should not make the Germans pay damages and supply us with some capital to

set the city going again, forgetting that when France did that after 1871 for Berlin, Berlin was set going so effectually that it went headlong to a colossal financial smash, whilst the French peasant who had provided the capital from his old stocking throve soberly on the interest at the expense of less vital classes. Unfortunately Germany has set the example of this kind of looting. Prussian generals, like Napoleon's marshals, have always been shameless brigands, keeping up the seventeenth and eighteenth century tradition of making cities bribe them to refrain from sack and pillage and even billeting, and being quite incapable of the magnificence of the great Condé (or was it Turenne?), who refused a payment offered by a city on the ground that he had not intended to march through it. Blucher's fury when Wellington would not allow him to plunder Paris, and his exclamation when he saw London "What a city to loot!" is still regarded as fair soldiering; and the blackmail levied recently by the Prussian generals on the Belgian and French towns they have occupied must, I suppose, be let pass as ransom, not as ordinary criminal looting. But if the penalty of looting be thus spared, the Germans can hardly complain if they are themselves held to ransom when the fortunes of war go against them. Liège and Lille and Antwerp and the rest must be paid their money back with interest; and there will be a big builder's bill at Rheims. But we should ourselves refrain strictly from blackmail. We should sell neither our blood nor our mercy. If we sell either we are as much brigands as Blucher.

Vindictive Damages

And we must not let ourselves be tempted to soil our hands under pretext of vindictive damages. The man who thinks that all the money in Germany could pay for the life of a single British drummer boy ought to be shot merely as an expression of the feeling that he is unfit to live. We stake our blood as the Germans stake theirs; and in that *ganz besonderes Saft* alone should we

pay or accept payment. We had better not say to the Kaiser at the end of the war, "Scoundrel! You can never replace the Louvain library, nor the sculpture of Rheims; and it follows logically that you shall empty your pockets into ours." Much better say: "God forgive us all!" If we cannot rise to this, and must soil our hands with plunder, at least let us call it plunder, and not profane our language and our souls by giving it fine names.

Our Annihilationists.

Then we shall have the Militarists, who will want to have Germany "bled to the white," dismembered and maimed, so that she may never do it again. Well, that is quite simple, if you are Militarist enough to do it. Loading Germany with debt will not do it. Towing her fleet into Portsmouth or sinking it will not do it. Annexing provinces and colonies will not do it. The effective method is far shorter and more practical. What has made Germany formidable in this war? Obviously her overwhelmingly superior numbers. That was how she rushed us back almost to the gates of Paris. The organization, the readiness, the sixteen-inch howitzer helped; but it was the multitudinous *Kanonenfutter* that nearly snowed us under. The British soldier at Cambrai and Le Cateau killed and killed until his rifle was too hot to hold and his hand was paralyzed with slayer's cramp; but still they came and came.

Why Not Kill the German Women?

Well, there is no obscurity about that problem. Those Germans whom it took but an instant to kill had taken the travail of a woman for three-quarters of a year to breed and eighteen years to ripen for the slaughter. All we have to do is to kill, say, 75 per cent. of all the women in Germany under 60. Then we may leave Germany her fleet and her money, and say, "Much good may they do you." Why not, if you are really going in to be what you, never having read "this Neech they talk of," call a Nietzschean Superman? War is not an affair of sentiment. Some of our newspapers

complain that the Germans kill the wounded and fire on field hospitals and Red Cross ambulances. These same newspapers fill their columns with exultant accounts of how our wounded think nothing of modern bullet wounds and hope to be back at the front in a week, which I take to be the most direct incitement to the Germans to kill the wounded that could be devised. It is no use being virtuously indignant: "Stone dead hath no fellow" is an English proverb, not a German one. Even the killing of prisoners is an Agincourt tradition. Now, it is not more cowardly to kill a woman than to kill a wounded man. And there is only one reason why it is a greater crime to kill a woman than a man, and why women have to be spared and protected when men are exposed and sacrificed. That reason is that the destruction of the women is the destruction of the community. Men are comparatively of no account: kill 90 per cent. of the German men, and the remaining 10 per cent. can repeople her. But kill the women and *Delenda est Carthago*. Now this is exactly what our Militarists want to happen to Germany. Therefore the objection to killing women becomes in this case the reason for doing it. Why not? No reply is possible from the Militarist, disable-your-enemy point of view. If disablement is your will, there is your way, and the only effectual way. We really must not call the Kaiser and Von Bernhardt disciples of the mythical Neech when they have either overlooked or shrunk from such a glaring "biological necessity." A pair of puling pious sentimentalists, if you like. But Supermen! Nonsense. O my brother journalists, if you revile the Prussians, call them sheep led by snobs, call them beggars on horseback, call them sausage eaters, depict them in the good old English fashion in spectacles and comforter, seedy overcoat buttoned over paunchy figure, playing the contrabass tuba in a street band; but do not flatter them with the heroic title of Superman, and hold up as magnificent villainies worthy of Milton's Lucifer these common crimes of violence and raid and lust that any

drunken blackguard can commit when the police are away, and that no mere multiplication can dignify. As to Nietzsche, with his Polish hatred of Prussia (who heartily reciprocated the sentiment), when did he ever tell the Germans to allow themselves to be driven like sheep to the slaughter in millions by mischievous dolts who, being for the most part incapable of reading ten sentences of a philosophic treatise without falling asleep, allow journalists as illiterate as themselves to persuade them that he got his great reputation by writing a cheap gospel for bullies? Strictly between ourselves, we also are an illiterate people; but we may at least hold our tongues about matters we don't understand, and not say in the face of Europe that the English believe that the composer of "Parsifal" was a Militarist Prussian (he was an exiled revolutionist); that Nietzsche was a disciple of Wagner (Nietzsche preferred the music of Bizet, a Frenchman); and that the Kaiser is a disciple of Nietzsche, who would have laughed his childish pietism to scorn.

The Simple Answer.

Nietzsche would certainly have agreed that we must kill the German women if we mean business when we talk of destroying Germany. But he would also have answered my Why not?—which is more than any consistent Militarist can. Indeed, it needs no philosopher to give the answer. The first ordinary anti-Militarist human person you meet will tell you that it would be too horrible; that life would be unbearable if people did such things. And he would be quite right; so please let us hear no more of kicking your enemy when he is down so that he may be unable to rise for a whole century. We may be unable to resist the temptation to loot Germany more or less if we conquer her. We are already actively engaged in piracy against her, stealing her ships and selling them in our prize courts, instead of honestly detaining them until the war is over and keeping a strict account of them. When gentlemen rise in the House of Commons and say that they owe Germans money and do not intend to pay it, one

must face the fact that there will be a strong popular demand for plunder. War, after all, is simply a letting loose of organized murder, theft, and piracy on a foe; and I have no doubt the average Englishman will say to me what Falstaff said to Pistol concerning his share in the price of the stolen fan: "Reason, you rogue, reason: do you think I'll endanger my soul *gratis*?" To which I reply, "If you can't resist the booty, take it frankly, and know yourself for half patriot, half brigand; but don't talk nonsense about disablement. Cromwell tried it in Ireland. He had better have tried Home Rule. And what Cromwell could not do in Ireland we cannot do to Germany."

The Sensible People.

Finally, we come to the only body of opinion in which there is any hope of civilization: the opinion of the people who are bent, not on gallantry nor revenge nor plunder nor pride nor panic nor glory nor any of the invidiousnesses of patriotism, but on the problem of how to so redraw the map of Europe and reform its political constitutions that this abominable crime and atrocious nuisance, a European war, shall not easily occur again. The map is very important; for the open sores which have at last suppurated and burst after having made the world uneasy for years, were produced by altering the colour of Alsace and Lorraine and of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the map. And the new map must be settled, not by conquest, but by consent of the people immediately concerned. One of the broken treaties of Europe which has been mentioned less frequently of late than the Belgian treaty is the Treaty of Prague, by which a plebiscite was to have been taken on the subject of the nationality of Schleswig and Holstein. That plebiscite has never been taken. It may have to be taken, with other plebiscites, before this war is settled.

German Unity Inviolable.

But here let me warn those who are hoping for a disintegrated Germany like that which Thackeray ridiculed, that their hopes are vain. The southern

Germans, the friendliest, most easy-going people in the world (as far as I know the world), dislike the Prussians far more heartily than we do; but they know that they are respected and strong and big as part of United Germany, and that they were weak and despised and petty as separate kingdoms. Germany will hold together. No doubt the Germans may reasonably say to the Prussian drill sergeant and his master Hohenzollern, "A nice mess you have made of your job after all we have endured from you because we believed you could make us invincible. We thought that if you were hard masters you were at any rate good grenadiers; but here are these piffing little Belgians and these Russians who were beaten by the Japanese, and these English who made such a poor show against a handful of Boer farmers, fighting and organizing just as well as you. So, as the French and English are organized as a republic and an extremely limited monarchy, we will try how that sort of constitution will suit us." But they will not break up; on the contrary, they are much more likely to extend the German community by incorporating German Austria. And as this would raise the question whether Hohenzollern or Hapsburg should rule the roost, the simplest solution would be to get rid of them both, and take the sooner or later inevitable step into the democratic republican form of Government to which Europe is visibly tending, though "this king business," as my American correspondents call it, has certain conveniences when it is limited and combined with an aristocracy also limited by primogeniture and politically controlled by a commonalty into which all but the eldest brothers in the aristocratic families fall, thus making the German segregation of the *adel* class impossible. Such a monarchy, especially when the monarch is a woman, as in Holland today, and in England under Victoria, is a fairly acceptable working substitute for a formal republic in old civilizations with inveterate monarchical traditions, absurd as it is in new and

essentially democratic States. At any rate, it is conceivable that the western allies might demand the introduction of some such political constitution in Germany and Austria as a guarantee; for though the demand would not please Russia, some of Russia's demands will not please us; and there must be some give and take in the business.

Limits of Constitutional Interference

Let us consider this possibility for a moment. First, it must be firmly postulated that civilized nations cannot have their political constitutions imposed on them from without if the object of the arrangement is peace and stability. If a victorious Germany were to attempt to impose the Prussian constitution on France and England, they would submit to it just as Ireland submitted to Dublin Castle, which, to say the least, would not be a millennial settlement. Profoundly as we are convinced that our government of India is far better than any native Indian government could be (the assumption that "natives" could govern at all being made for the sake of argument with due reluctance), it is quite certain that until it becomes as voluntary as the parliamentary government of Australia, and has been modified accordingly, it will remain an artificial, precarious, and continually threatening political structure. Nevertheless, we need not go to the opposite extreme and conclude that a political constitution must fit a country so accurately that it must be home-made to measure. Europe has a stock of ready-made constitutions, both Monarchical and Republican, which will fit any western European nation comfortably enough. We are at present considerably bothered by the number of Germans who, though their own country and constitution is less than a day's journey away, settle here and marry Englishwomen without feeling that our constitution is unbearable. Englishmen are never tired of declaring that "they do things better abroad" (as a matter of fact they often do) and that the ways of Prussia are smarter than the ways of Paddington. It is therefore quite possible that a reach-me-down constitution proposed,

not by the conquerors, but by an international congress with no interest to serve but the interests of peace, might prove acceptable enough to a nation thoroughly disgusted with its tyrants.

Physician: Heal Thyself

Now a congress which undertook the liberalization of Germany would certainly not stop there. If we invite a congress to press for a democratization of the German constitution, we must consent to the democratization of our own. If we send the Kaiser to St. Helena (or whatever the title of the Chiselhurst villa may be) we must send Sir Edward Grey there, too. For if on the morrow of the peace we may all begin to plot and plan one another's destruction over again in the secrecy of our Foreign Office, so that in spite of Parliament and free democratic institutions the Foreign Secretary may at any moment step down from the Foreign Office to the House of Commons and say, "I arranged yesterday with the ambassador from Cocagne that England is to join his country in fighting Brobdingnag; so vote me a couple of hundred millions, and off with you to the trenches," we shall be just where we were before as far as any likelihood of putting an end to war is concerned. The congress will certainly ask us to pledge ourselves that if we shake the mailed fist at all we shall shake it publicly, and that though we may keep our sword ready (let me interject in passing that disarmament is all nonsense: nobody is going to disarm after this experience) it shall be drawn by the representatives of the nation, and not by Junker diplomatists who despise and distrust the nation, and have planned war behind its back for years. Indeed they will probably demur to its being drawn even by the representative of the nation until the occasion has been submitted to the judgment of the representatives of the world, or such beginnings of a world representative body as may be possible. That is the true *Weltpolitik*.

The Hegemony of Peace

For the main business of the settlement, if it is to have any serious busi-

ness at all, must be the establishment of a Hegemony of Peace, as desired by all who are really capable of high civilization, and formulated by me in the daily press in a vain attempt to avert this mischief whilst it was brewing. Nobody took the smallest public notice of me; so I made a lady in a play say "Not bloody likely," and instantly became famous beyond the Kaiser, beyond the Tsar, beyond Sir Edward Grey, beyond Shakespeare and Homer and President Wilson, the papers occupying themselves with me for a whole week just as they are now occupying themselves with the war, and one paper actually devoting a special edition to a single word in my play, which is more than it has done for the Treaty of London (1839). I concluded then that this was a country which really could not be taken seriously. But the habits of a lifetime are not so easily broken; and I am not afraid to produce another dead silence by renewing my good advice, as I can easily recover my popularity by putting still more shocking expressions into my next play, especially now that events have shown that I was right on the point of foreign policy.

East Is East; and West Is West

I repeat, then, that there should be a definite understanding that whatever may happen or not happen further east, England, France, and Germany solemnly pledge themselves to maintain the internal peace of the west of Europe, and renounce absolutely all alliances and engagements that bind them to join any Power outside the combination in military operations, whether offensive or defensive, against one inside it. We must get rid of the monstrous situation that produced the present war. France made an alliance with Russia as a defense against Germany. Germany made an alliance with Austria as a defense against Russia. England joined the Franco-Russian alliance as a defense against Germany and Austria. The result was that Germany became involved in a quarrel between Austria and Russia. Having no quarrel with France, and only a second-hand quarrel with Russia, she was, nevertheless,

forced to attack France in order to disable her before she could strike Germany from behind when Germany was fighting France's ally, Russia. And this attack on France forced England to come to the rescue of England's ally, France. Not one of the three nations (as distinguished from their tiny Junker-Militarist cliques) wanted to fight; for England had nothing to gain and Germany had everything to lose, whilst France had given up hope of her Alsace-Lorraine *revanche*, and would certainly not have hazarded a war for it. Yet because Russia, who has a great deal to gain by victory and nothing except military prestige to lose by defeat, had a quarrel with Austria over Serbia, she has been able to set all three western friends and neighbors shedding "rivers of blood" from one another's throats; an outrageous absurdity. Fifty years ago the notion of England helping Russia and Japan to destroy Germany would have seemed as suicidal as Canada helping the Apaches to destroy the United States of America; and though we now think much better of the Japanese (and also, by the way, of the Apaches), that does not make us any the more patient with the man who burns down his own street because he admires the domestic architecture of Yokohama, especially when the fire presently spreads to the cathedral of Rheims. It is bad enough that we should have betrayed oriental Persia to oriental Russia as we did (and get nothing for our pains but what we deserved); but when it comes to sacrificing occidental Germany to her as well, we are sharpening a knife for our own occidental throat. The Russian Government is the open enemy of every liberty we boast of. Charles I.'s unsuccessful attempt to arrest five members of the House of Commons for disagreeing with him is ancient history here; it occurred 272 years ago; but the Tsar's successful attempt to arrest thirty members of the Duma and to punish them as dangerous criminals is a fact of today. Under Russian government people whose worst crime is to find *The Daily News*

a congenial newspaper are hanged, flogged, or sent to Siberia as a matter of daily routine; so that before 1906 even the articles in *The Times* on such events as the assassinations of Bobrikoff and the Grand Duke were simply polite paraphrases of "Serve him right." It may be asked why our newspapers have since ceased to report examples of Russia's disregard of the political principles we are supposed to stand for. The answer is simple. It was in 1906 that we began to lend Russia money, and Russia began to advertise in *The Times*. Since then she has been welcome to flog and hang her H. G. Wellses and Lloyd Georges by the dozen without a word of remonstrance from our plutocratic press, provided the interest is paid punctually. Russia has been embraced in the large charity of cosmopolitan capital, the only charity that does not begin at home.

The Russian Russians and Their Prussian Tsars

And here I must save my face with my personal friends who are either Russians or discoverers of the soul of the Russian people. I hereby declare to Sasha Kropotkin and Cunninghame Graham that my heart is with their Russia, the Russia of Tolstoy and Turgenieff and Dostoieffsky, of Gorki and Tchekoff, of the Moscow Art Theatre and the Drury Lane Ballet, of Peter Kropotkin and all the great humanitarians, great artists, and charming people whom their very North German Tsars exile and imprison and flog and generally do what in them lies to suppress and abolish. For the sake of Russian Russia, I am prepared to strain every point in Prussian Russia's favor. I grant that the Nihilists, much as we loved them, were futile romantic people who could have done nothing if Alexander II. had abdicated and offered them the task of governing Russia instead of persecuting them and being finally blown to bits by them. I grant that the manners of the Finns to the Russians are described as insufferable both by the Swedes and the Russians, and that we never listened to the Russian side of that story. I am ready to grant Gil-

bert Murray's plea that the recent rate of democratic advance has been greater in Russia than anywhere else in Europe, though it does remind me a little of the bygone days when the Socialists, scoring 20 votes at one general election and 40 at the next, were able to demonstrate that their gain of 100 per cent. was immensely in excess of the wretched 2 or 3 per cent. that was the best the Unionists or Liberals could show. I am willing to forget how short a time it is since Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said: "The Duma is dead; long live the Duma!" and since we refused to allow the Tsar to land in England when his ship was within gangway's length of our shore, on which occasion I myself held up the Anglo-Russian agreement for the partition of Persia to the execration of a crowd in Trafalgar Square, whilst our Metropolitan Police snatched the *Tsarbeleidigend* English newspapers from the sellers and tore them up precisely in the Cossack manner. I have an enormous relish for the art of Russia; I perceive a spirit in Russia which is the natural antidote to Potsdamnation; and I like most of the Russians I know quite unaffectedly. I could find it in my heart to reproach the Kaiser for making war on the Russia of these delightful people, just as I like to think that at this very moment good Germans may be asking him how he can bring himself to discharge shrapnel at the England of Bernard Shaw and Cunninghame Graham. History may not forgive him for it; but the practical point at the moment is that he does it, and no doubt attributes the perfidy of England to the popularity of our works. And as we have to take the Kaiser as we find him, and not as the Hohenzollern legend glorifies him, I have to take the Tsar as I find him. When we fight the Kaiser we are not fighting Bach and Wagner and Strauss, to whom we have just joyfully surrendered without a blow at the battle of Queen's Hall, but all the forces in Germany that made things hard for Wagner and Strauss. And when we fight for the Tsar we are not fighting for Tolstoy and Gorki, but for the forces that Tolstoy thundered

against all his life and that would have destroyed him had he not been himself a highly connected Junker as well as a revolutionary Christian. And if I doubt whether the Tsar would feel comfortable as a member of a Democratic League of Peace, I am not doubting the good intent of Kropotkin; I am facing the record of Kropotkin's imperial jailer, and standing on the proud fact that England is the only country in Europe, not excepting even France, in which Kropotkin has been allowed to live a free man, and had his birthday celebrated by public meetings all over the country, and his articles welcomed by the leading review. In point of fact, it is largely on Kropotkin's account that I regard the Tsar as a gentleman of slightly different views to President Wilson, and hate the infamous tyranny of which he is the figurehead as I hate the devil. And I know that practically all our disinterested and thoughtful supporters of the war feel deeply uneasy about the Russian alliance. At all events, I should be trifling grossly with the facts of the situation if I pretended that the most absolute autocracy in Europe, commanding an inexhaustible army in an invincible country with a dominion stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific, may not, if it achieves a military success against the most dreaded military Power in Europe, be stirred to ambitions far more formidable to western liberty and human welfare than those of which Germany is now finding out the vanity after worrying herself and every one else with them for forty years. When all is said that can be said for Russia, the fact remains that a forcibly Russianized German province would be just such another open sore in Europe as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, Macedonia or Ireland. It is useless to dream of guarantees; if Russia undertook to govern democratically she would not be able to redeem her promise; she would do better with primitive Communism. Her city populations may be as capable of democracy as our own (it is, alas! not saying much); but the overwhelming mass of peasants to whom the Tsar is a personal God will for a long time to

come make his bureaucracy irresistible. As against Russian civilization German and Austrian civilization is our civilization: there is no getting over that. A constitutional kingship of Poland and a sort of Caliphate of the Slavs in remapped southeastern Europe, with that access to warm sea water which is Russia's common human right, valid against all Balances of Power and Keys to India and the like, must be her reward for her share in the war, even if we have to nationalize Constantinople to secure it to her. But it cannot be too frankly said at the outset that any attempt to settle Europe on the basis of the present hemming in of a consolidated Germany and German Austria by a hostile combination of Russia and the extreme states against it, would go to pieces by its own inherent absurdity, just as it has already exploded most destructively by its own instability. Until Russia becomes a federation of several separate democratic States, and the Tsar is either promoted to the honourable position of hereditary President or else totally abolished, the eastern boundary of the League of Peace must be the eastern boundary of Swedish, German, and Italian civilization; and Poland must stand between it and the quite different and for the moment unassimilable civilization of Russia, whose friendship we could not really keep on any other terms, as a closer alliance would embarrass her as much as it would embarrass us. Meanwhile, we must trust to the march of Democracy to de-Russianize Berlin and de-Prussianize Petrograd, and to put the nagaikas of the Cossacks and the riding-whips with which Junker officers slash German privates, and the forty tolerated homosexual brothels of Berlin, and all the other psychopathic symptoms of overfeeding and inculcated insolence and sham virility in their proper place, which I take to be the dustbin.

Driving Capital Out of the Country

But I must here warn every one concerned that the most formidable opposition to the break-up of these unnatural alliances between east and west, between

Democracy and Autocracy, between the twentieth century and the Dark Ages, will not come from the Balancers of Power. They are not really Balance of Power alliances: in fact, they are tending to an enormous overbalance of power in favor of the east as against the west and in favor of Militarist Autocracy as against Democracy. They are at root absolutely unpatriotic, even absolutely conscienceless, products of commercial finance; and the Balance of Power theories are only the attempts of our diplomats to put a public-spirited face on the operations of private cupidity. This is not the first time nor the second that I have had to urge that the greatest danger to us in the sphere of foreign politics is the tendency of capital to run away from civilization; the one running downhill to hell as naturally as the other struggles uphill to the Celestial City. The Englishman is allowed to produce the subsistence of himself and his family only on condition that he produces the subsistence of the capitalist and his retainers as well; and lo! he finds more and more that these retainers are not Englishmen, but Russians, South Americans, Kaffirs, Persians, or yellow or black barbarians armed for his destruction (not to mention Prussians and Austrians), and that the treaties made by our diplomatists have less and less to do with the security of the nation or the balance of power or any other public business, and more and more with capitalist opportunities of making big dividends out of slavish labour. For instance, the Anglo-Russian agreement is not a national treaty: it is the memorandum of a commercial agreement settling what parts of Persia are to be exploited by the Russian and English capitalists, respectively; the capitalists, always against State interference for the benefit of the people, being very strongly in favor of it for coercing strikers at home and keeping foreign rivals off their grass abroad. And the absurd part of it is that when the State has thus arranged for our capitalists to exploit certain parts of Persia, and for their sakes to protect the parliamentary liber-

ties of the part left to Russia, they discovered that, after all, the most profitable game was to lend Russia the money to exploit with, and to facilitate the operation by allowing her to destroy the Persian Parliament in the face of our own exhortation to it to keep the flag flying, which we accordingly did without a blush. The French capitalists had dragged France into an alliance with Russia long before this; but the French Republic had the excuse of the German peril and the need for an anti-German ally. Her natural ally for that purpose was England; but as there was no market in England for her money, her plutocrats drove her into the alliance with Russia as well; and it is that alliance and not the alliance with England that has terrified Germany into flying at her throat and plunging Europe into a frightful war. The natural alliance with England twice averted war; in the Moroccan crises of Algieras and Agadir, when Sir Edward Grey said boldly that we should defend France, and took the first steps towards a joint military and naval control of the French and English forces. Why he shrank from that firm position last July and thereby led Germany to count so fatally on our neutrality I do not pretend to know; it suffices for my argument that we were able to hold the balance between France and Germany, but failed to hold it between Germany and Russia, and that it was the placing of Russian loans in France and England that brought Russia into our western affairs. It would have paid us ten times over to have made Russia a present of all we and France have lent her (indemnifying, of course, the holders of the stock through an addition to the income tax) rather than pay the price of a European war. But what is the use of crying for spilt milk? I am merely explaining why, when French money went to Russia, the French papers discovered that the Russians were a most interesting people and their Government—properly understood—a suprisingly Liberal Government; and why, when English money went to Russia, the English papers sud-

denly developed leanings toward the Greek Church, and deplored the unofficial execution of Stolypin as deeply as it had rejoiced in the like fate of Bobrikoff. The upshot of it all is that western civilization is at present busy committing suicide by machinery, and importing hordes of Asiatics and Africans to help in the throat cutting, not for the benefit of the silly capitalists, who are being ruined wholesale, but to break up the Austrian Empire for the benefit of Russia and the Slavs of eastern Europe, which may be a very desirable thing, but which could and should be done by the eastern Powers among themselves, without tearing Belgium and Germany and France and England to pieces in the process.

The Red Flag and the Black

Will you now at last believe, O stupid British, German, and French patriots, what the Socialists have been telling you for so many years; that your Union Jacks and tricolours and Imperial Eagles ("where the carcass is, there will the eagles be gathered") are only toys to keep you amused, and that there are only two real flags in the world henceforth: the red flag of Democratic Socialism and the black flag of Capitalism, the flag of God and the flag of Mammon? What earthly or heavenly good is done when Tom Fool shoots Hans Narr? The plain fact is that if we leave our capital to be dealt with according to the selfishness of the private man he will send it where wages are low and workers enslaved and docile; that is, as many thousand miles as possible from the Trade Unions and Trade Union rates and parliamentary Labour Parties of civilization; and Germany, at his sordid behest, will plunge the world into war for the sake of disgracing herself with a few rubber plantations, poetically described by her orators and journalists as "a place in the sun." When you do what the Socialists tell you by keeping your capital jealously under national control and reserving your shrapnel for the wasters who not only shirk their share of industrial service of their country, but intend that their

children and children's children shall be idle wasters like themselves, you will find that not a farthing of our capital will go abroad as long as there is a British slum to be cleared and rebuilt, or a hungry, ragged, and ignorant British child to be fed, clothed, and educated.

A League of Peace

But in the west I see no insuperable obstacle to a Treaty of Peace in the largest sense. This war has smoothed the way to it, if I may use the word smoothing to describe a process conducted with so little courtesy and so much shrapnel. Germany has now learned—and the lesson was apparently needed, obvious as it would have been to a sanely governed nation—that when it comes to shoving and shooting, Germany instantly loses all the advantages of her high civilization, because France and England, cultured or uncultured, can shove and shoot as well or better than she, whilst as to slashing and stabbing, their half barbarous Turco and Ghoorka slaves can cut the Prussian Guard to bits, in spite of the unquestionable superiority of Wagner's music to theirs. Then take France. She does not dream that she could fight Germany and England single-handed. And England could not fight France and Germany without a sacrifice as ruinous as it would be senseless. We therefore have the necessary primary conditions for a League of Peace between the three countries; for if one of them break it, the other two can make her sorry, under which circumstances she will probably not break it. The present war, if it end in the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine by the French, will make such a League much more stable; not that France can acquire by mere conquest any right to hold either province against its will (which could be ascertained by plebiscite), but because the honors of war as between France and Germany would then be easy, France having regained her laurels and taught Germany to respect her, without obliterating the record of Germany's triumph in 1870. And if the war should further result in the political reconstruction of

the German Empire as a democratic Commonwealth, and the conquest by the English people of democratic control of English foreign policy, the combination would be immensely eased and strengthened, besides being brought into harmony with American public feeling, which is important to the security and prestige of the League.

The Case of the Smaller States

Already the war has greatly added to the value of one of the factors upon which the League of Peace will depend. The smaller States: Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian Powers, would have joined it any time these 40 years, had it existed, for the sake of its protection, and thereby made the Protestant north of Mr. Houston Chamberlain's dream as much a reality as any such dream is ever likely to be. But after the fight put up by Belgium the other day, the small States will be able to come in with the certainty of being treated with considerable respect as military factors; for Belgium can now claim to have saved Europe single-handed. Germany has been very unpleasantly reminded of the fact that though a big man may be able to beat a little one, yet if the little one fights for all he is worth he may leave the victor very sorry he broke the peace. Even as between the big Powers, victory has not, as far as the fighting has yet gone, been always with the biggest battalions. With a couple of millions less men, the Kaiser might have taken more care of them and made a better job of it.

At the same time I hold no brief for small States as such, and most vehemently deny that we are in any way bound to knight errantry on their behalf as against big ones. They are mostly either incorrigibly bellicose themselves, like Montenegro, or standing temptations to the big Powers, like Bosnia and Herzegovina. They multiply frontiers, which are nuisances, and languages, which have made confusion since the building of Babel. The striking contrast between the United States of North America and the disunited States of

South America in this respect is, from the Pacifist point of view, very much in favor of the northern unity. The only objection to large political units is that they make extremely dangerous autocracies. But as groups of federated democracies they are the best neighbours in the world. A federal democratic Russia would be as safe a colleague as America: a federal democratic Germany would be as pleasant company as Switzerland. Let us, I beg, hear no more of little States as British Dulcineas.

The Claims of Belgium

As to the special case of Belgium, its claims in the settlement are simple and indeed single. If we conclude a peace without clearing the Germans completely out of Belgium, we shall be either beaten or dishonoured. And such indemnity as a money payment can effect for Belgium is due not only by Germany, but by Britain, France, and Russia as well. Belgium has been crushed between the Alliance and the Entente; it was these two menaces to the peace of Europe that produced Armageddon; and as Belgium's heroic resistance served the Entente against the Alliance, the obligation to make good the remediable damage is even more binding on the Entente.

But there is another and more pressing matter arising out of the conquest of Belgium.

The Belgian Refugees and the Problem of Unemployment

As I write these lines the descent on our shores of an army of refugees from captured Antwerp and threatened Ostend has forced the President of the Local Government Board to make a desperate appeal to all and sundry to form representative committees to deal with the prevention and relief of distress: in other words to save the refugees from starving to death. Now the Board of Trade has already drawn attention to a memorandum of the Local Government Board as to the propriety of providing employment for refugees. And instantly and inevitably the condition had to be laid down that if the Committees find employment

for anyone, they shall refer the case to the local Labour Exchange in order that "any step taken to assist refugees to find employment shall not be such as to endanger the employment of British workpeople." In other words, the starving Belgians have fled from the Germans only to compete for crust with starving Englishmen. As long as there is an unemployed Englishman in the country—and there are a good many, especially in the cotton industry—how is it possible to give a job to a Belgian without depriving an Englishman of it? Why, instead of making impossible conditions, and helplessly asking private citizens to do something for pity's sake, will not the Government face the fact that the refugee question is simply an intensification of the normal unemployed question, the only difference being that we are accustomed to leave our own people to starve when they are common persons with whom the governing classes do not associate, whereas the Belgians have rendered us such a tremendous service in the war, and our statesmen have so loudly protested that the integrity of Belgium is dearer to England than her own heart's blood, that we cannot with any decency treat the destitute Belgians as if they were mere British riffraff. Yet when we attempt to provide for the Belgians by finding work for them the Board of Trade has to point out that by doing so we are taking the bread out of the mouths of our own people. Hence we arrive at the remarkable situation of starving Britons and Belgians looking hungrily through barbed wire fences at flourishing communities of jolly and well fed German prisoners of war (whose friendly hat wavings to me and my fellow passengers as I rush through Newbury Racecourse Station in the Great Western Express I hereby acknowledge publicly with all possible good feeling). I therefore for the present strongly recommend all Belgians who have made up their minds to flee to England, to pick up German uniforms on the battle fields and surrender to the British in the character of Uhlans. Their subsistence will then be secure until the war is over, as

we dare not illtreat our prisoners lest the Germans should retaliate upon the British soldiers in their hands, even if we were all spiteful enough to desire to do it, as some of our baser sort have not been ashamed to propose.

But the women and children, and the too young and the too old, cannot resort to this expedient. And though theoretically our own unemployed could be dressed in British uniforms and sent abroad with instructions to take refuge in neutral territory and be "interned" or to surrender to the first Uhlan patrol they met, yet it would be difficult to reduce this theory to practice, though the possibility is worth mentioning as a reduction to absurdity of the situation. As a matter of common sense we should at once place all destitute Belgian refugees on the footing of prisoners of war, except that we need not post sentries to shoot them if they try to escape, nor surround them with barbed wire. Indeed these precautions are necessary in the case of the Germans rather to save their sense of honour whilst remaining here than to defeat any very strong longing on their part to return to the trenches.

In a reasonable state of society there would be another difference. The Belgians would offer to work so as not to be a burden to us; whilst the German prisoner would say—as he actually does, by the way—"No: I am not here by my own will: if you open the door I shall go home and take myself off your hands; so I am in no way bound to work for you." As it is, our Trade Unions are up in arms at the slightest hint of either Belgian or German labour being employed when there is no shortage of English labour!

The Minority Report

All this exasperating anomaly and deadlock and breakdown would disappear if we had a proper system of provision for our own unemployed civilians (there are no unemployed soldiers: we do not discharge them between the battles). The Belgians would have found an organization of unemployment ready for them, and would have

been provided for with our own unemployed, not as refugees, but simply as unemployed. How to do that need not be explained here. The problem was worked out by one of the hardest bits of thinking yet done in the Socialist movement, and set forth in the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress, 1909. Our helplessness in the present emergency shows how very unwise we were to shelve that report. Unluckily, what with the wounded vanity of the majority of the Commission, who had been played off the stage by Mrs. Sidney Webb; the folly of the younger journalists of the advanced guard, who had just then rediscovered Herbert Spencer's mare's nest of "the servile State," and revolted with all the petulant anarchism of the literary profession against the ideal Interfering Female as typified in their heated imaginations by poor Mrs. Sidney Webb, who became the Aunt Sally of our young artists in stale anti-bureaucratic invective; and, above all, the mulishly silent refusal of our governing classes to see why the unemployed should not be simply left to starve, as they had always been (the Poor Law being worse than useless for so large a purpose), nothing was done; and there is consequently no machinery ready for dealing with the refugees. That is why we must treat them for the moment simply as unguarded prisoners of war.

The General Strike Against War

But if the problem of unemployment among our own people becomes acute, we shall have to fall back on the Minority Report proposals or else run the risk of a revolt against the war. We have already counted on the chances of that revolt hampering Germany, just as Germany counted on the chances of its hampering Russia. The notion that the working classes can stop a war by a general international strike is never mentioned during the first rally to the national flag at the outbreak of a war; but it is there all the time, ready to break out again if the supplies of food and glory run short. Its gravity lies in its impracticability. If it were practicable, every sane man

would advocate it. As it is, it might easily mean that British troops would be coercing British strikers at home when they should be fighting Potsdam abroad, thus producing a disastrous and detestable division of popular feeling in the face of the enemy.

The Disarmament Delusion

Objections to the Western Pacifist settlement will come from several quarters, including the Pacifist quarters. Some of the best disposed parties will stumble over the old delusion of disarmament. They think it is the gun that matters. They are wrong: the gun matters very much when war breaks out; but what makes both war and the gun is the man behind them. And if that man really means the peace of the world to be kept, he will take care to have a gun to keep it with. The League of Peace must have a first-rate armament, or the League of War will very soon make mincemeat of it. The notion that the men of evil intent are to have all the weapons will not work. Theoretically, all our armaments should be pooled. But as we, the British Empire, will most certainly not pool our defenses with anyone, and as we have not the very smallest intention of disarming, and will go on building gun for gun and ship for ship in step with even our dearest friends if we see the least risk of our being left in a position of inferiority, we cannot with any countenance demand that other Powers shall do what we will not do ourselves. Our business is not to disable ourselves or anyone else, but to organize a balance of military power against war, whether made by ourselves or any other Power; and this can be done only by a combination of armed and fanatical Pacifists of all nations, not by a crowd of noncombatants wielding deprecations, remonstrances, and Christmas cards.

America's Example: War at a Year's Notice

How far it will be possible to take these national armaments out of national control remains to be seen. Already America, who is as deeply demoralized

by Capitalism as we are, though much less tainted with Militarism now that Colonel Roosevelt has lost his front seat, has pledged herself to several European States not to go to war with them until the matter under dispute has been in the hands of an international tribunal for a year. Now there is no military force on earth, or likely to be, strong enough to prevent America from treating these agreements as Germany has just treated the 1839 Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Therefore the Militarists declare that the agreements are not worth the scraps of paper they are written on. They always will footle in this way. They might as well say that because there are crimes which men can commit with legal impunity in spite of our haphazard criminal codes, men always do commit them. No doubt nations will do what it is to their interest to do. But because there is in every nation a set of noisy moral imbeciles who cannot see that nations have an overwhelming interest in creating and maintaining a tradition of international good faith, and honouring their promissory notes as scrupulously as the moral imbeciles pay their silly gambling debts and fight their foolish duels, we are not, I presume, going to discard every international guarantee except the howitzer. Why, the very Prussian Militarists themselves are reviling us for doing what their own Militarist preachers assumed as a matter of course that we should do; that is, attack Prussia without regard to the interests of European civilization when we caught her at a disadvantage between France and Russia. But we should have been ashamed to do that if she had not, by assuming that there was no such thing as shame (*alias* conscience), terrified herself into attacking France and Belgium, when, of course, we were immediately ashamed not to defend them. This idiotic ignoring of the highest energies of the human soul, without the strenuous pressure of which the fabric of civilization—German civilization perhaps most of all—could not hold together for a single day, should really be treated in the asylums of Europe, not on battlefields.

I conclude that we might all very well make a beginning by pledging ourselves as America has done to The Hague tribunal not to take up arms in any cause that has been less than a year under arbitration, and to treat any western Power refusing this pledge as an unpopular and suspicious member of the European club. To break such a pledge would be an act of brigandage; and the need for suppressing brigandage cannot be regarded as an open question.

The Security Will o' the Wisp

It will be observed that I propose no guarantee of absolute security. Not being a sufferer from *delirium tremens* I can live without it. Security is no doubt the Militarists' most seductive bait to catch the coward's vote. But their method makes security impossible. They undertook to secure the English in Egypt from an imaginary Islam rising by the Denshawai Horror, as a result of which nobody has ventured to suggest that we should trust the Egyptian army in this conflict, though India, having learnt from Mr. Keir Hardie and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald that there are really anti-Militarists in England who regard Indians as fellow creatures, is actually rallying to us against the Prussian Junkers, who are, in Indian eyes, indistinguishable from the Anglo-Indians who call Mr. Keir Hardie and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald traitors, and whose panicstricken denial of even a decent pretence of justice in the sedition trials is particularly unfortunate just now. We must always take risks; and we should never trade on the terror of death, nor forget that this wretchedest of all the trades is none the less craven because it can so easily be gilt with romance and heroism and solemn national duty and patriotism and the like by persons whose superficial literary and oratorical talent covers an abyss of Godforsaken folly.

The Only Real World Danger

The one danger before us that nothing can avert but a general raising of human character through the deliberate cultivation and endowment of democratic virtue without consideration of property and class, is the danger created by inventing

weapons capable of destroying civilization faster than we produce men who can be trusted to use them wisely. At present we are handling them like children. Now children are very pretty, very lovable, very affectionate creatures (sometimes); and a child can make nitroglycerine or chloride of nitrogen as well as a man if it is taught to do so. We have sense enough not to teach it; but we do teach the grown-up children. We actually accompany that dangerous technical training with solemn moral lessons in which the most destructive use of these forces at the command of kings and capitalists is inculcated as heroism, patriotism, glory and all the rest of it. It is all very well to fire cannons at the Kaiser for doing this; but we do it ourselves. It is therefore undeniably possible that a diabolical rhythm may be set up in which civilization will rise periodically to the point at which explosives powerful enough to destroy it are discovered, and will then be shattered and thrown back to a fresh start with a few starving and ruined survivors. H. G. Wells and Anatole France have prefigured that result in fiction; and I cannot deny the strength of its probability; for if England and Germany can find no better way of celebrating their arrival at the highest point of civilization yet attained than setting out to blow one another to fragments with fulminates, it would seem that the peace of the neutral States is the result, not of their being more civilized, but less heavily armed. And when we see that the effect of the enterprise is not to redouble civil vigilance and stimulate the most alert and jealous political criticism, but on the contrary to produce an assumption that every constitutional safeguard must be suspended until the war is over, and that every silly tyrannical expedient such as censorship of the press, martial law, and the like, will begin to work good instead of evil the moment men take to murdering one another, it must be admitted that the prospect is not too hopeful. Our only consolation is that civilization has survived very destructive wars before, mostly because they have produced ef-

fects not only unintended but violently objected to by the people who made them. In 1870, for instance, Napoleon III. can hardly have intended his own overthrow and return to exile in England; nor did Bismarck aim at the restoration of French Republicanism and the formation of an Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance against Prussia. Several good things may come out of the present war if it leaves anybody alive to enjoy them.

The Church and the War

And now, where in our society is the organ whose function it should be to keep us constantly in mind that, as Lassalle said, "the sword is never right," and to shudder with him at the fact that "the Lie is a European Power"? In no previous war have we struck that top note of keen irony, the closing of the Stock Exchange and not the Church. The pagans were more logical: they closed the Temple of Peace when they drew the sword. We turn our Temples of Peace promptly into temples of war, and exhibit our parsons as the most pugnacious characters in the community. I venture to affirm that the sense of scandal given by this is far deeper and more general than the Church thinks, especially among the working classes, who are apt either to take religion seriously or else to repudiate it and criticize it closely. When a bishop at the first shot abandons the worship of Christ and rallies his flock around the altar of Mars, he may be acting patriotically, necessarily, manfully, rightly; but that does not justify him in pretending that there has been no change, and that Christ is, in effect, Mars. The straightforward course, and the one that would serve the Church best in the long run, would be to close our professedly Christian Churches the moment war is declared by us, and reopen them only on the signing of the treaty of peace. No doubt to many of us the privation thus imposed would be far worse than the privation of small change, of horses and motor cars, of express trains, and all the other prosaic inconveniences of war. But would it be worse than the privation of faith, and the hor-

ror of the soul, wrought by the spectacle of nations praying to their common Father to assist them in sabring and bayonetting and blowing one another to pieces with explosives that are also corrosives, and of the Church organizing this monstrous paradox instead of protesting against it? Would it make less atheists or more? Atheism is not a simple homogeneous phenomenon. There is the youthful atheism with which every able modern mind begins: an atheism that clears the soul of superstitions and terrors and servilities and base compliances and hypocrisies, and lets in the light of heaven. And there is the atheism of despair and pessimism: the sullen cry with which so many of us at this moment, looking on blinded, deafened, maimed wrecks that were once able-bodied, admirable, lovable men, and on priests blessing war, and newspapers and statesmen and exempt old men hounding young men on to it, are saying "I know now there is no God." What has the Church in its present attitude to set against this crushed acceptance of darkness, except the quaint but awful fact that there are cruder people on whom horrifying calamities have just the opposite effect, because they seem the work of some power so overwhelming in its malignity that it must be worshipped because it is mighty? Let the Church beware how it plays to that gallery. If all the Churches of Europe closed their doors until the drums ceased rolling they would act as a most powerful reminder that, though the glory of war is a famous and ancient glory, it is not the final glory of God.

But, as I know quite well that the Churches are not going to do anything of the kind, I must not close on a note which might to some readers imply that I hope, as some highly respected friends of mine do, to build a pacific civilization on the ruins of the vast ecclesiastical organizations which have never yet been able to utter the truth, because they have had to speak to the poor according to their ignorance and credulity, and to the rich according to their power. When I read

that the icon of the Russian peasant is a religious force that will prevail over the materialism of Helmholtz and Haeckel, I have to contain myself as best I can in the face of an assumption by a modern educated European which implies that the Irish peasants who tied scraps of rag to the trees over their holy wells and paid for masses to shorten the stay of their dead relatives in purgatory were more enlightened than their countryman Tyndall, the Lucretian materialist, and to ask whether the Russian peasant may not find his religious opinions somewhat neutralized by his alliance with the countries of Paul Bert and Combes, of Darwin and Almroth Wright. If we are to keep up any decent show of talking sense on this point we must begin by recognizing that the lines of battle in this war cut right across all the political and sectarian lines in Europe, except the line between our Socialist future and our Commercialist past. Materialist France, metaphysical Germany, muddle-headed England, Byzantine Russia may form what military combinations they please: the one thing they cannot form is a Crusade; and all attempts to represent this war as anything higher or more significant philosophically or politically or religiously for our Junkers and our Tommies than a quite simple primitive contest of the pugnacity that bullies and the pugnacity that will not be bullied are foredoomed to the derision of history. However far-reaching the consequences of the war may be, we in England are fighting to shew the Prussians that they shall not trample on us nor on our neighbours if we can help it, and that if they are fools enough to make their fighting efficiency the test of civilization, we can play that game as destructively as they. That is simple, and the truth, and by far the jolliest and most inspiring ground to recruit on. It stirs the blood and stiffens the back as effectively and quickly as hypocrisy and cant and humbug sour and trouble and discourage. But it will not carry us farther than the end of the fight. We cannot go on fighting

forever, or even for very long, whatever Lord Kitchener may think; and win, lose, or tie, the parties, when the fight is over, must fall back on their civil wisdom and political foresight for a settlement of the terms on which we are to live happily together ever after. The practicable conditions of a stable comity of nations cannot be established by the bayonet, which settles nothing but the hash of those who rely on it. They are to be found, as I have already explained, in the substitution for our present Militarist kingdoms of a system of democratic units delimited by community of language, religion, and habit; grouped in federations of united States when their extent makes them politically unwieldy; and held against war by the bond of international Socialism, the only ground upon which the identity of interest between all workers never becomes obscured.

The Death of Jaures

By far the greatest calamity wrought by the war has been the death of Jaurès, who was worth more to France and to Europe than ten army corps and a hundred Archdukes. I once proposed a press law that might have saved him. It was that every article printed in a newspaper should bear not only the name and address of the writer, but the sum paid him for the contribution. If the wretched dupe who assassinated Jaurès had known that the trashy articles on the Three Years Law he had been reading were not the voice of France in peril, but the ignorant scribbling of some poor devil at his wits' end to earn three francs, he would hardly have thrown away his own life to take that of the greatest statesman his country has produced since Mirabeau. It is hardly too much to say that this ghastly murder and the appalling war that almost eclipsed its horror is the revenge of the sweated journalist on a society so silly that, though it will not allow a man to stuff its teeth without ascertained qualifications for the task, it allows anyone, no matter how poor, how ignorant, how untrained, how imbecile, to stuff its brains without even taking the trouble

to ask his name. When we interfere with him and his sweaters at all, we interfere by way of appointing a censorship to prevent him from telling, not lies, however mischievous and dangerous to our own people abroad, but the truth. To be a liar and a brewer of bad blood is to be a privileged person under our censorship, which, so far, has proceeded by no discoverable rule except that of concealing from us everything that the Germans must know lest the Germans should find it out.

Socialism Alone Keeps Its Head

Socialism has lost its leader on the Continent; but it is solid and representative on the main point: it loathes war; and it sees clearly that war is always waged by working men who have no quarrel, but on the contrary a supreme common interest. It steadily resists the dangerous export of capital by pressing the need for uncommercial employment of capital at home: the only practicable alternative. It knows that war on its romantic side is "the sport of kings;" and it concludes that we had better get rid of kings unless they can kill their tedium with more democratic amusements. It notes the fact that though the newspapers shout at us that these battles on fronts a hundred miles long, where the slain outnumber the total forces engaged in older campaigns, are the greatest battles known to history, such machine-carnages bore us so horribly that we are ashamed of our ingratitude to our soldiers in not being able to feel about them as about comparatively trumpery scraps like Waterloo or even Inkerman and Balaclava. It never forgets that as long as higher education, culture, foreign travel, knowledge of the world: in short, the qualification for comprehension of foreign affairs and intelligent voting, is confined to one small class, leaving the masses in poverty, narrowness, and ignorance, and being itself artificially cut off at their expense from the salutary pressure of the common burden which alone keeps men unspoilt and sane, so long will that small class be forced to obtain the support of the

masses for its wars by flattering proclamations of the national virtues and indignant denunciations of the villainies of the enemy, with, if necessary, a stifening of deliberate falsehood and a strenuous persecution of any attempt at inconvenient truth-telling. Here there is no question of the Junker being a monster. You must rule ignoramuses according to their ignorance. The priest must work bogus miracles for them; the man of science must offer them magical cures and prophylactics; the barrister must win their verdict by sophistries, false pathos and appeals to their prejudices; the army and navy must dazzle them with pageants and bands and thundering salvos and romantic tales; the king must cut himself off from humanity and become an idol. There is no escape whilst such classes exist. Mahomet, the boldest prophet that ever threw down the gage of the singleness and supremacy of God to a fierce tribe of warriors who worship stones as devotedly as we worship dukes and millionaires, could not govern them by religious truth, and was forced to fall back on revolting descriptions of hell and the day of judgment, invented by him for the purpose. What else could he do if his people were not to be abandoned to their own destruction? If it is an axiom of diplomacy that the people must not be told the truth, that is not in the least because, for example, Sir Edward Grey has a personal taste for mendacity; it is a necessity imposed by the fact that the people are incapable of the truth. In the end, lying becomes a reflex action with diplomatists; and we cannot even issue a penny bluebook without beginning it with the quite unprovoked statement that "no crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe" than the assassination of the Archduke. The real tragedy was that the violent death of a fellow creature should have aroused so little.

Divided Against Ourselves

This state of things would be bad enough if the governing classes really sought the welfare of the governed, and were deceiving them for their own good.

But they are doing nothing of the sort. They are using their power secondarily, no doubt, to uphold the country in which they have so powerful and comfortable a position; but primarily their object is to maintain that position by the organized legal robbery of the poor; and to that end they would join hands with the German Junkers as against the working class in Germany and England as readily as Bismarck joined hands with Thiers to suppress the Commune of Paris. And even if this were not so, nothing would persuade the working classes that those who sweat them ruthlessly in commercial enterprise are any more considerate in public affairs, especially when there is any question of war, by which much money can be made for rich people who deal in the things most wanted and most highly paid for in war time; to wit, armaments and money. The direct interest of our military caste in war accounts for a good deal; but at least it involves personal risk and hardship and bereavement to the members of that caste. But the capitalist who has shares in explosives and cannons and soldiers' boots runs no risk and suffers no hardship; whilst as to the investor pure and simple, all that happens to him is that he finds the unearned income obtainable on Government security larger than ever. Victory to the capitalists of Europe means that they can not only impose on the enemy a huge indemnity, but lend him the money to pay it with whilst the working classes produce and pay both principal and interest.

As long as we have that state of things, we shall have wars and secret and mendacious diplomacy. And this is one of many overwhelming reasons for building the State on equality of income, because without it equality of status and general culture is impossible. Democracy without equality is a delusion more dangerous than frank oligarchy and autocracy. And without Democracy there is no hope of peace, no chance of persuading ourselves that the sacredness of civilization will protect it any more than the sacredness of the cathedral of Rheims has protected it, not against

Huns and Vandals, but against educated German gentlemen.

Rheims

Commercial wage-slaves can never reproduce that wonderful company of sculptured figures that made Rheims unlike any other place in the world; and if they are now destroyed, or shortly about to be, it does not console me that we still have—perhaps for a few days longer only—the magical stained glass of Chartres and the choir of Beauvais. We tell ourselves that the poor French people must feel as we should feel if we had lost Westminster Abbey. Rheims was worth ten Westminster Abbeys; and where it has gone the others may just as easily go too. Let us not sneer at the German pretension to culture; let us face the fact that the Germans are just as cultured as we are (to say the least) and that war has nevertheless driven them to do these things as irresistibly as it will drive us to do similar things tomorrow if we find ourselves attacking a town in which the highest point from which our positions can be spotted by an observer with a field glass in one hand and a telephone in the other is the towering roof of the cathedral. Also let us be careful how we boast of our love of mediaeval art to people who well know, from the protests of Ruskin and Morris, that in times of peace we have done things no less mischievous and irreparable for no better reason than that the Mayor's brother or the Dean's uncle-in-law was a builder in search of a "restoration" job. If Rheims cathedral were taken from the Church to-morrow and given to an English or French joint stock company, everything transportable in it would presently be sold to American collectors, and the site cleared and let out in building sites. That is the way to make it "pay" commercially.

The Fate of The Glory Drunkard

But our problem is how to make Commercialism itself bankrupt. We must beat Germany, not because the Militarist hallucination and our irresolution forced Germany to make this war, so desperate for her, at a moment so unfavorable to herself, but because she has made her-

self the exponent and champion in the modern world of the doctrine that military force is the basis and foundation of national greatness, and military conquest the method by which the nation of the highest culture can impose that culture on its neighbors. Now the reason I have permitted myself to call General von Bernhardt a madman is that he lays down quite accurately the conditions of this military supremacy without perceiving that what he is achieving is a *reduction ad absurdum*. For he declares as a theorist what Napoleon found in practice, that you can maintain the Militarist hold over the imaginations of the people only by feeding them with continual glory. You must go from success to success; the moment you fail you are lost; for you have staked everything on your power to conquer, for the sake of which the people have submitted to your tyranny and endured the sufferings and paid the cost your military operations entailed. Napoleon conquered and conquered and conquered; and yet, when he had won more battles than the maddest Prussian can ever hope for, he had to go on fighting just as if he had never won anything at all. After exhausting the possible he had to attempt the impossible and go to Moscow. He failed; and from that moment he had better have been a Philadelphia Quaker than a victor of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram. Within a short breathing time after that morning when he stood outside Leipsic, whistling *Malborouck s'en va-t-en guerre* whilst his flying army gasped its last in the river or fled under a hail of bullets from enemies commanded by generals without a tenth of his ability or prestige, we find him disguised as a postillion, cowering abjectly behind the door of a carriage whilst the French people whom he had crammed with glory for a quarter of a century were seeking to tear him limb from limb. His success had made him the enemy of every country except France; his failure made him the enemy of the human race. And that was why Europe rose up finally and smashed him, although the English Government which profited by that operation oppressed the

English people for thirty years afterwards more sordidly than Napoleon would have oppressed them, and its Allies replaced him on the throne of France by an effete tyrant not worthy to unlace his shoe latchet. Nothing can finally redeem Militarism. When even genius itself takes that path its end is still destruction. When mere uppishness takes it the end is not changed, though it may be reached more precipitately and disastrously.

The Kaiser

Prussia has talked of that path for many years as the one down which its destiny leads it. Its ruler, with the kid gloves he called mailed fists and the high class tailoring he called shining armour, did much of the talking, though he is in practice a most peaceful teetotaler, as many men with their imaginations full of the romance of war are. He had a hereditary craze for playing at soldiers; and he was and is a naïve suburban snob, as the son of The Englishwoman would naturally be, talking about "the Hohenzollerns" exactly as my father's people in Dublin used to talk about "the Shaws." His stage walk, familiar through the cinematograph, is the delight of romantic boys, and betrays his own boyish love of the *Paradeschritt*. It is frightful to think of the powers which Europe, in its own snobbery, left in the hands of this Peter Pan; and appalling as the results of that criminal levity have been, yet, being by no means free from his romantic follies myself, I do not feel harshly toward Peter, who, after all, kept the peace for over twenty-six years. In the end his talk and his games of soldiers in preparation for a toy conquest of the world frightened his neighbors into a league against him; and that league has now caught him in just such a trap as his strategists were laying for his neighbours. We please ourselves by pretending that he did not try to extricate himself, and forced the war on us; but that is not true. When he realized his peril he tried hard enough; but when he saw that it was no use he accepted the situation and dashed at his enemies with

an infatuate courage not unworthy of the Hohenzollern tradition. Blinded as he was by the false ideals of his class, it was the best he could do; for there is always a chance for a brave and resolute warrior, even when his back is not to the wall but to the Russians.

That means that we have to conquer him and not to revile him and strike moral attitudes. His victory over British and French Democracy would be a victory of Militarism over civilization; it would literally shut the gates of mercy on mankind. Leave it to our official fools and governesses to lecture the Kaiser, and to let loose Turcos and Ghoorkas on him: a dangerous precedent. Let Thomas Atkins, Patrick Murphy, Sandy McAlister, and Pitou Dupont fight him under what leadership they can get, until honour is satisfied, simply because if St. George does not slay the dragon the world will be, as a friend of mine said of Europe the other day, "no place for a gentleman."

Recapitulation

1. The war should be pushed vigorously, not with a view to a final crushing of the German army between the Anglo-French combination and the Russian millions, but to the establishment of a decisive military superiority by the Anglo-French combination alone. A victory unattainable without Russian aid would be a defeat for Western European Liberalism; Germany would be beaten not by us, but by a Militarist autocracy worse than her own. By sacrificing Prussian Poland and the Slav portions of the Austrian Empire Germany and Austria could satisfy Russia, and merge Austria and Germany into a single German State, which would then dominate France and England, having ascertained that they could not conquer her without Russia's aid. We may fairly allow Russia to conquer Austria if she can; that is her natural part of the job. But if we two cannot without Russian help beat Potsdam, or at least hold her up in such a stalemate as will make it clear that it is impossible for her to subjugate us, then we shall simply have to "give Germany

best" and depend on an alliance with America for our place in the sun.

2. We cannot smash or disable Germany, however completely we may defeat her, because we can do that only by killing her women; and it is trifling to pretend that we are capable of any such villainy. Even to embarrass her financially by looting her would recoil on ourselves, as she is one of our commercial customers and one of our most frequently visited neighbors. We must, if we can, drive her from Belgium without compromise. France may drive her from Alsace and Lorraine. Russia may drive her from Poland. She knew when she opened fire that these were the stakes in the game; and we are bound to support France and Russia until they are won or lost, unless a stalemate reduces the whole method of warfare to absurdity. Austria, too, knew that the Slav part of her empire was at stake. By winning these stakes the Allies will wake the Kaiser from his dream of a Holy Teuton Empire, with Prussia as the Head of its Church, and teach him to respect us; but that once done, we must not allow our camp followers to undo it all again by spiteful humiliations and exactions which could not seriously cripple Germany, and would make bad blood between us for a whole generation, to our own great inconvenience, unhappiness, disgrace, and loss. We and France have to live with Germany after the war; and the sooner we make up our mind to do it generously, the better. The word after the fight must be *sans rancune*; for without peace between France, Germany, and England, there can be no peace in the world.

3. War, as a school of character and a nurse of virtue, must be formally shut up and discharged by all the belligerents when this war is over. It is quite true that ill-bred and swinish nations can be roused to a serious consideration of their position and their destiny only by earthquakes, pestilences, famines, comets' tails, Titanic shipwrecks, and devastating wars, just as it is true that African chiefs cannot make themselves respected unless they bury virgins alive beneath

the doorposts of their hut-palaces, and Tartar Khans find that the exhibition of a pyramid of chopped-off heads is a short way to impress their subjects with a convenient conception of their divine right to rule. Ivan the Terrible did undoubtedly make his subjects feel very serious indeed; and stupid people are apt to believe that this sort of terror-stifened seriousness is virtue. It is not. Any person who should set to deliberately to contrive artificial earthquakes, scuttle liners, and start epidemics with a view to the moral elevation of his countrymen would very soon find himself in the dock. Those who plan wars with the same object should be removed with equal firmness to Hanwell or Bethlehem Hospital. A nation so degraded as to be capable of responding to no higher stimulus than that of horror had better be exterminated, by Prussian war lords or anyone else foolish enough to waste powder on them, instead of leaving them to perish of their own worthlessness.

4. Neither England nor Germany must claim any moral superiority in the negotiations. Both were engaged for years in a race for armaments. Both indulged and still indulge in literary and oratorical provocation. Both claimed to be "an Imperial race," ruling other races by divine right. Both shewed high social and political consideration to parties and individuals who openly said that the war had to come. Both formed alliances to reinforce them for that war. The case against Germany for violating the neutrality of Belgium is of no moral value to England because (a) England has allowed the violation of the Treaty of Paris by Russia (violation of the neutrality of the Black Sea and closing of the free port of Batoum), and the high-handed and scandalous violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria (seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina), without resorting to arms or remedying the aggression in any other way; (b) because we have fully admitted that we should have gone to war in defense of France in any case, whether the Germans came through Belgium or not, and refused to give the German Ambassador any as-

surance that we should remain neutral if the Germans sacrificed the military advantage of attacking through Belgium for the sake of avoiding a war with us; (c) that the apparent moral superiority of the pledge given by France and England to respect Belgian neutrality is illusory in face of the facts that France and England stood to gain enormously, and the Germans to lose correspondingly, by confining the attack on France to the heavily fortified Franco-German frontier, and that as France and England knew they would be invited by the Belgians to enter Belgium if the Germans invaded it, the neutrality of Belgium had, as far as they were concerned, no real existence; (d) that as all treaties are valid only *rebus sic stantibus*, and the state of things which existed at the date of the Treaty of London (1839) had changed so much since then (Belgium is no longer menaced by France, at whom the treaty was aimed, and has acquired important colonies, for instance) that in 1870 Gladstone could not depend on it, and resorted to a special temporary treaty not now in force, the technical validity of the 1839 treaty is extremely doubtful; (e) that even if it be valid its breach is not a *casus belli* unless the parties for reasons of their own choose to make it so; and (f) that the German national peril pleaded by the Imperial Chancellor in his Peer Gynt speech (the *durchhauen* one), when he rashly but frankly threw away the strong technical case just started and admitted a breach of international law, was so great according to received Militarist ideas in view of the Russian mobilization, that it is impossible for us or any other Militarist-ridden Power to feel sure ourselves, much less to convince others, that we should have been any more scrupulous in the like extremity. It must be added that nothing can extenuate the enormity of the broad fact that an innocent country has been horribly devastated because her guilty neighbors formed two huge explosive combinations against one another instead of establishing the peace of Eu-

rope, but that is an offense against a higher law than any recorded on diplomatic scraps of paper, and when it comes to judgment the outraged conscience of humanity will not have much patience with the naughty child's plea of "he began it."

5. Militarism must not be treated as a disease peculiar to Prussia. It is rampant in England; and in France it has led to the assassination of her greatest statesman. If the upshot of the war is to be regarded and acted upon simply as a defeat of German Militarism by Anglo-French Militarism, then the war will not only have wrought its own immediate evils of destruction and demoralization, but will extinguish the last hope that we have risen above the "dragons of the prime that tare each other in their slime." We have all been equally guilty in the past. It has been steadily assumed for years that the Militarist party is the gentlemanly party. Its opponents have been ridiculed and prosecuted in England; hanged, flogged or exiled in Russia; and imprisoned in France: they have been called traitors, cads, cranks, and so forth: they have been imprisoned for "bad taste" and for sedition whilst the most virulent sedition against Democracy and the most muntinous military escapades in the commissioned ranks have been tolerated obsequiously, until finally the practical shelving of Liberal Constitutionalism has provoked both in France and England a popular agitation of serious volume for the supersession of parliament by some sort of direct action by the people, called Syndicalism. In short, Militarism, which is nothing but State Anarchism, has been carried to such a pitch that it has been imitated and countered by a movement of popular Anarchism, and has exploded in a European war because the Commercialist Governments of Europe had no faith in the effective guidance of any modern State by higher considerations than Lord Roberts's "will to conquer," the weight of the Kaiser's mailed fist, and the interest of the Bourses and Stock Exchanges. Unless we are all prepared to fight Militarism at home as well as abroad, the cessation of hostilities will last only until the bel-

ligerents have recovered from their exhaustion.

6. It had better be admitted on our side that as to the conduct of the war there is no trustworthy evidence that the Germans have committed any worse or other atrocities than those which are admitted to be inevitable in war or accepted as part of military usage by the Allies. By "making examples" of towns, and seizing irresponsible citizens as hostages and shooting them for the acts of armed civilians over whom they could exert no possible control, the Germans have certainly pushed these usages to a point of Terrorism which is hardly distinguishable from the deliberate murder of non-combatants; but as the Allies have not renounced such usages, nor ceased to employ them ruthlessly in their dealings with the hill tribes and fellaheen and Arabs with whom they themselves have to deal (to say nothing of the notorious domestic Terrorism of the Russian Government), they cannot claim superior humanity. It is therefore waste of time for the pot to call the kettle black. Our outcry against the Germans for sowing the North Sea with mines was followed too closely by the laying of a mine field there by ourselves to be revived without flagrant Pharisaism. The case of Rheims cathedral also fell to the ground as completely as a good deal of the building itself when it was stated that the French had placed a post of observation on the roof. Whether they did or not, all military experts were aware that an officer neglecting to avail himself of the cathedral roof in this way, or an opposing officer hesitating to fire on the cathedral so used, would have been court-martialed in any of the armies engaged. The injury to the cathedral must therefore be suffered as a strong hint from Providence that though we can have glorious wars or glorious cathedrals we cannot have both.

7. To sum up, we must remember that if this war does not make an end of war in the west, our allies of to-day may be our enemies of to-morrow, as they are of yesterday, and our enemies of to-day our allies of to-morrow as they are of

yesterday; so that if we aim merely at a fresh balance of military power, we are as likely as not to negotiate our own destruction. We must use the war to give the *coup de grace* to medieval diplomacy, medieval autocracy, and anarchic export of capital, and make its conclusion convince the world that Democracy is invincible, and Militarism a rusty sword that breaks in the hand. We must free our soldiers, and give them homes worth

fighting for. And we must, as the old phrase goes, discard the filthy rags of our righteousness, and fight like men with everything, even a good name, to win, inspiring and encouraging ourselves with definite noble purposes (abstract nobility butters no parsnips) to face whatever may be the price of proving that war cannot conquer us, and that he who dares not appeal to our conscience has nothing to hope from our terrors.

"Shaw's Nonsense About Belgium"

By Arnold Bennett

Mr. Bernard Shaw's "Common Sense About the War" is the talk of the town, and it deserves to be. One of its greatest values is its courage, for in it Shaw says many things no one else would have dared to say. It therefore, by breaking the unearthly silence on certain aspects of the situation, perhaps inaugurates a new and healthier period of discussion and criticism on such subjects as recruiting, treatment of soldiers and sailors' dependents, secret diplomacy, militarism, Junkerism, churches, Russia, peace terms, and disarmament. It contains the most magnificent, brilliant, and convincing common sense that could possibly be uttered. No citizen, I think, could rise from the perusal of this tract with a mind unilluminated or opinions unmodified. Hence everybody ought to read it, though everybody will not be capable of appreciating the profoundest parts of it.

Mixed up with the tremendous common sense, however, is a considerable and unusual percentage of that perverseness, waywardness, and harlequinading which are apparently an essential element of Mr. Shaw's best work. This is a disastrous pity, having regard to the immense influence and vogue of Shaw, not only in Germany, but in America, and the pity is more tragic

as Shaw has been most absurd about the very matter which most Englishmen regard as most important, namely, Great Britain's actual justification for going to war.

Shaw's Admitted Prejudice

Mr. Shaw begins by conceiving the possibility of his being blinded by prejudice or perversity, and admits his capacity for criticising England with a certain slight malicious taste for taking the conceit out of her. Seemingly he belongs to that numerous class who think that to admit a fault is to excuse it. As a high-wayman might say before taking your purse, "Now, I admit, I have a certain slight taste for thieving," and expect you to smile forgiveness of his depredation, Shaw's bias is evident wherever he discusses the action and qualities of Great Britain. Thus he contrasts Bernhardt's brilliant with our own very dull militarists' facts, the result being that the intense mediocrity of Bernhardt leaps to the eye on every page, and that events have thoroughly discredited all his political and many of his military ideas, whereas we possess militarists of first-class quality.

Naturally, Shaw calls England muddle-headed. Yet of late nothing has been less apparent than muddle-headedness.

Of British policy, Shaw says that since the Continent generally regards us as hypocritical, we must be hypocritical. He omits to say that the Continent generally, and Germany in particular, regards our policy and our diplomacy as extremely able and clear-sighted. The unscrupulous cleverness of Britain is one of Germany's main themes.

These are minor samples of Mr. Shaw's caprices. In discussing the origin of the war Mr. Shaw's aim is to prove that all the great powers are equally to blame. He goes far back and accuses Great Britain of producing the first page of Bernhardian literature in the anonymous pamphlet "The Battle of Dorking." He admits in another passage that the note of this pamphlet was mainly defensive. He is constantly thus making intrenchments for himself in case of forced retirement, and there is in his article almost nothing unjust against Great Britain that is not ingeniously contradicted or mitigated elsewhere.

Great Britain's War Literature

Beginning with "The Battle of Dorking" and ending with H. G. Wells's "War in the Air," one of the most disturbing and effective warnings against militarism ever written, he sees simply that Great Britain has produced threatening and provocative militarist literature comparable to Germany's. No grounds exist for such a contention. There are militarists in all countries, but there are infinitely more in Germany than in any other country. The fact is notorious. The fact is also notorious that the most powerful, not the most numerous, party in Germany wanted the war. It would be as futile to try to prove that Ireland did not want home rule as that Germany did not want war. As for a war literature, bibliographical statistics show, I believe, that in the last ten years Germany has published seven thousand books or pamphlets about war. No one but a German or a Shaw, in a particularly mischievous mood, would seek to show that Great Britain is responsible for the war fever. It simply is not so.

Mr. Shaw urges that we all armed together. Of course we did. When one

nation publicly turns bellicose the rest must copy her preparations. If Great Britain could live this century over again she would do over again what she actually did, because common sense would not permit her to do otherwise. The admitted fact that some Britons are militarists does not in the slightest degree impair the rightness or sagacity of our policy. If one member of a family happens to go to the bad and turn burglar, therein is no reason why the family mansion should not be insured against burglary.

Mr. Shaw proceeds to what he calls the diplomatic history of the war. His notion of historical veracity may be judged from his description of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia as an escapade of a dotard. He puts the whole blame of it on Franz Josef, and yet he must know quite well that Germany has admitted even to her own subjects that Austria asked Germany's opinion about her policy and obtained Germany's approval before delivering the ultimatum. [Official German pamphlet "Reasons for the War with Russia," August, 1914.] There is no word in Mr. Shaw's diplomatic history of the repeated efforts toward peace made by Great Britain and scotched by Germany. On the contrary, with astounding audacity and disingenuousness, he tries to make it appear that suggestions for peace were offered by Germany and rejected by Great Britain. Once more it simply was not so.

Defense of Sir Edward Grey

Mr. Shaw's paraphrase of Document 17 in the British diplomatic dispatches is a staggering travesty. So far as I can see it bears no relation to the original. Further, he not only deplores that a liberal government should have an imperialist Foreign Secretary, but he accuses Sir Edward Grey of sacrificing his country's welfare to the interests of his party and committing a political crime in order not to incur the wrath of *The Daily News* and *The Manchester Guardian*. This is totally inexcusable. Let me not be misunderstood. I am not a liberal. I am an out-and-out radical. I foresee a cleavage in the Liberal Party, and when that cleavage comes I shall

be on the extreme left wing. I entirely agree with Mr. Shaw's denunciation of secret diplomacy and undemocratic control of foreign policy. By every social tradition I should be in opposition to Sir Edward Grey, but I think Grey was the best Foreign Secretary that the Liberal Party could have chosen, and that he worked well on the only possible plane, the plane of practicality. I am quite sure he is an honest man, and I strongly resent, as Englishmen of all opinions will resent, any imputation to the contrary.

As for the undemocratic control of foreign policy, a strong point about our policy on the eve of the war is that it was dictated by public opinion. [See Grey's dispatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, No. 123.] Germany could have preserved peace by a single gesture addressed to Franz Josef. She did not want peace. Mr. Shaw said Sir Edward Grey ought to have shouted out at the start that if Germany fought we should fight. Sir Edward Grey had no authority to do so, and it would have been foolish to do so. Mr. Shaw also says Germany ought to have turned her whole army against Russia, and left the western frontier to the care of the world's public opinion in spite of the military alliance by which France was bound to Russia. We have here an example of his aptitude for practical politics.

Was Belgium a Mere Excuse?

Let us now come to Belgium. Mr. Shaw protests needlessly that he holds no brief for small States as such, and he most vehemently denies that we are bound to knight errantry on their behalf. His objection to small States is that they are either incorrigibly bellicose or standing temptations to big powers. Outside the Balkans no small State is bellicose. All are eminently pacific. That they are a standing temptation to thieves is surely no reason for their destruction. If it is a reason Mr. Shaw ought to throw his watch down the drain.

Mr. Shaw states that Belgium was a mere excuse for our going to war. That there was a vast deal more in the pre-war diplomacy than appears in the printed dispatches, or in any dispatches, I am

as convinced as Mr. Shaw is, but I am equally convinced that so far as we are concerned there was nothing in diplomacy, however secret, to contradict our public attitude. The chief item not superficially apparent is that the diplomats knew all along that Germany wanted war, and was doing all she could to obtain war on terms most favorable to herself. That our own interest coincided with our duty to Belgium did not by any means render our duty a mere excuse for action. If a burglar is making his way upward in the house where Mr. Shaw lives and Mr. Shaw comes down and collars him in the flat of a defenseless invalid below and hands him over to the police Mr. Shaw would not expect the police to say, "You are a hypocrite; you only seized the buglar because you feared he would come to you next." I stick to the burglar simile, because a burglar is just what Germany is.

The "Infamous Proposal" Phrase

Mr. Shaw characterizes Mr. Asquith's phrase, "Germany's infamous proposal," as the "obvious barrister's claptrap." Once more this is totally inexcusable. I do not always see eye to eye with Mr. Asquith, I agree with Mr. Shaw that he has more than once sinned against democratic principles, but what has that to do with the point? My general impression of Mr. Asquith and general impression of this country is that Mr. Asquith, in addition to being a pretty good Liberal, is an honest man. His memorable speech containing the "infamous proposal" phrase was most positively a genuine emotional expression of his conviction and of the conviction of the whole country, and Mr. Shaw, a finished master of barrister's claptrap when he likes, has been merely scurrilous about it. Germany's proposal was infamous. Supposing that we had taken the Belgium point at Mr. Shaw's valuation of it, the "nonsense about Belgium," as he calls it, and refrained from war, what would have been the result? The result would have been that today we could not have looked one another in the face as we passed down the street.

But Mr. Shaw is not content with ar-

guing that the Belgium point was a mere excuse for us. He goes further and continually implies that there was no Belgium point. Every time he mentions the original treaty that established Belgian neutrality he puts after it in brackets, [date 1839,] an obvious barrister's device, sarcastically to discredit the treaty because of its age. He omits to say that the chief clause in the treaty contains the word "perpetually." What is worse, he infers that by the mere process of years, as Belgium gradually made herself, civilized herself, enriched herself, and increased her stake in the world, her moral right to independence and freedom instead of being strengthened was somehow mysteriously weakened. The theory is monstrous, but if he does not mean that he means nothing.

Further, he says that in 1870 Gladstone could not depend on the treaty of 1839 and resorted to a special temporary treaty not now in force, and that, therefore, technically the validity of the 1839 treaty is extremely doubtful. This twisting of facts throws a really sinister light upon the later developments of Mr. Shaw as a controversial-

ist. The treaty of 1870 was, indeed, temporary, except in so far as it confirmed the treaty of 1839. Article 3 of the treaty of 1870 says it shall be binding on the contracting parties during the continuance of the war and for twelve months after, and then proceeds "and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the quintuple treaty of 1839," (textual.)

Mr. Shaw's manifesto is lengthy and it will no doubt be reprinted in book form. I repeat what I said in my first paragraph as to the major part of it, but I assert that the objectionable part of the manifesto is so objectionable in its flippancy, in its perversity, in its injustice, and in its downright inexactitude as to amount to a scandal. Mr. Shaw has failed to realize either his own importance or the importance and very grave solemnity of the occasion. The present is no hour for that disingenuous, dialectical bravura which might excusably relieve a domestic altercation. Before reprinting Mr. Shaw should, I suggest, seriously reconsider his position and rewrite.

"Bennett States the German Case"

By George Bernard Shaw

In justice to the enemy I am bound to admit that Mr. Bennett's case, which is the German case, is a very strong one and that his ironic comment on the case against Germany, "We have here an example of Mr. Shaw's aptitude for practical politics," is a comment that the Kaiser will probably make and that the average "practical man" will make, too.

Mr. Bennett, in saying that I am a simpleton to doubt that, if Germany had not attacked France, France would have attacked her, shows a much greater

courage than he credits me with. That is Germany's contention, and if valid is her justification for dashing at any enemy who, as Mr. Bennett believes, was lying in wait to spring on her back when Russia had her by the throat. If Mr. Bennett is right, and I am a simpleton, there is nothing more to be said. The Imperial Chancellor's plea of "a state of necessity" is proved up to the hilt.

I did not omit to say that Germany regards our policy and our diplomacy as extremely able and clear-sighted. I expressly and elaborately pointed that out.

Mr. Bennett, being an Englishman, is so flattered by the apparent compliment from those clever Germans that he insists it is deserved. I, being an Irishman and, therefore, untouched by flattery, see clearly that what the Germans mean by able and clear-sighted is crafty, ruthless, unscrupulous, and directed to the deliberate and intentional destruction of Germany by a masterly diplomatic combination of Russia, France and Great Britain against her, and I defend the English and Sir Edward Grey in particular on the ground, first, that the British nation at large was wholly innocent of the combination, and, second, that even among diplomatists, guilty as most of them unquestionably were and openly as our Junkers—like the German ones—clamored for war with Germany, there was more muddle than Machiavelli about them, and that Sir Edward never completely grasped the situation or found out what he really was doing and even had a democratic horror of war.

Shaw's Excuses Scorned

But Mr. Bennett will not have any of my excuses for his unhappy country. He will have it that the Germans are right in admiring Sir Edward as a modern Caesar Bogia, and that our militarist writers are "of first class quality," as contrasted with the "intense mediocrity" of poor Gen. Bernhardt.

If Mr. Bennett had stopped there the Kaiser would send him the Iron Cross, but of course, like a true born Englishman, he goes on to deny indignantly that England has produced a militarist literature comparable to Germany and to affirm hotly that Mr. Asquith is an honest man whose bad arguments are "a genuine emotional expression of his convictions and that of the whole country," and that Sir Edward Grey is an honest man, and that he (Mr. Bennett) "strongly resents as Englishmen of all opinions will resent any imputation to the contrary"—just what I said he would say and that he entirely agrees with my denunciation of secret diplomacy and undemocratic control of foreign policy and that I am a perverse and

wayward harlequin, mischievous, unvarnished, scurrilous, monstrous, disingenuous, flippant, unjust, inexact, scandalous, and objectionable, and that on all points to which he takes exception and a good many more I am so magnificent, brilliant, and convincing that no citizen could rise from perusing me without being illuminated.

That is just a little what I meant by saying that Englishmen are muddle-headed, because they never have been forced by political adversity to mistrust their tempers and depend on a carefully stated case as Irishmen have been.

Showed Germany the Way

I did with great pains what nobody else had done. I showed what Germany should have done, knowing that I had no right to reproach her for doing what she did until I was prepared to show that a better way had been open to her.

Bennett says, in effect, that nobody but a fool could suppose that my way was practicable, and proceeds to call Germany a burglar. That does not get us much further. In fact, to me it seems a step backward. At all events it is now up to Mr. Bennett to show us what practical alternative Germany had except the one I described. If he cannot do that, can he not, at least, fight for his side? We, who are mouthpieces of many inarticulate citizens, who are fighting at home against the general tumult of care and rancor and silly cinematograph heroics for a sane facing of facts and a stable settlement, are very few. We have to bring the whole continent of war-struck lunatics to reason if we can.

What chance is there of our succeeding if we begin by attacking one another because we do not like one another's style or confine ourselves to one another's pet points? I invite Mr. Bennett to pay me some more nice compliments and to reserve his fine old Staffordshire loathing for my intellectual nimbleness until the war is over.—G BERNARD SHAW.

Flaws in Shaw's Logic

By Cunningham Graham

The controversy between men of peace as to the merits, demerits, causes, and possible results of the great war is becoming almost as dangerous and little less noisy than the real conflict now being waged in and around Ypres. The only difference between the two conflicts is that the combatants in Flanders only strive to kill the body. Those who fire paper bullets aim at the annihilation of the soul.

Literature is a nice thing in its way. It both passes and gives us many weary hours. It has its place. But I submit that at present it is mere dancing on a tight rope. Whether the war could have been avoided or not is without interest today. In fact, there is no controversy possible after Maximilian Harden's pronouncement. In it he throws away the scabbard and says boldly that Germany from the first was set on war. Hence it becomes a work of supererogation to find excuses for her, and hence, my old friend, Bernard Shaw, penned his long indictment of his hereditary enemy, England, all in vain.

We are a dull-witted race. Although the Continent has dubbed us "Perfidious Albion," it is hard for us to take in general ideas, and no man clearly sees the possibilities of the development of the original sin that lies dormant in him. Thus it becomes hard for us to understand the reason why, if Germany tore up a treaty three months ago, we are certain to tear up another in three years' time.

All crystal gazing appeals but little to

the average man on this side of the St. George's channel. It may be that we shall tear up many treaties, but the broad fact remains that hitherto we have torn up none.

The particular treaty that Germany tore up was signed by five powers in 1839, ratified again in 1870 by a special clause respected by King Frederick William in his war against the French, was often referred to in Parliament by Gladstone and by other Ministers, and was considered binding on its signatories. Germany tore it up for her own ends, thus showing that she was a stupid though learned people, for she at once at the same time prejudiced her case to the whole world and made a military mistake.

No human motives are without alloy, but at the same time honesty in our case has proved the better policy. Germany, no doubt, would have granted us almost anything for our assent to her march through Belgium. We refused her offers, no doubt from mixed motives, for every Englishman is not an orphan archangel, stupid, or dull or muddle-headed, or what not. The balance of the world is with us, not, perhaps, because they love us greatly, but because they see that we, perhaps by accident, have been forced into the right course and that all smaller nationalities such as Montenegro, Ireland, Poland, and the rest would disappear on our defeat.

CUNNINGHAME GRAHAM.

London, England, November, 1914.

Editorial Comment on Shaw

FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 5, 1914

Mr. G. Bernard Shaw thinks that "the time has now come to pluck up courage and begin to talk and write soberly about the war." Our readers will find in THE TIMES Sunday Magazine this morning some of the fruits of this auto-suggestion. They are very remarkable. While Mr. Shaw can hardly be called a representative of any considerable class, the fact that one prominent writer, always much read, can assume Mr. Shaw's attitude and make public Mr. Shaw's comments throws a strong light on the spirit of British society. It is true that he intimates that he ran the risk of "prompt lynching" at one time, but that was probably the suggestion of a certain timidity and vanity to which he pleads guilty. His safe and prosperous existence is really a striking evidence, on the one hand, of British good nature, and, on the other, of the indifferent estimate the British put on his influence.

Like Iago, Mr. Shaw is nothing if not critical, and in this crisis his criticism is for the most part bitter, extreme, and in purpose destructive. He particularly dislikes Sir Edward Grey and the Government of which he is a leading spirit, and the class which the Government represents. He singles out Sir Edward as the chief "Junker" and among the chief "militarists" who brought about this war. Mr. Shaw's attacks on the Foreign Secretary are savage, and, as often happens with savage attacks, they are far from consistent. For example, Mr. Shaw paraphrases at some length the interview between Sir Edward and the German Ambassador, in which the latter made four different propositions to secure the neutrality of Great Britain if Germany waged war on France, all of which Sir Edward refused. Mr. Shaw sees in this only evidence of determination to take arms against Germany in any case, carrying

out a long-cherished plan formed by the Government of which Sir Edward Grey was, for this matter, the responsible member. He does not see—though it is so plain that a wayfaring man, though a professional satirist, should not err therein—that what the Secretary intended to do—what, in fact, he did do—was to refuse to put a price on British perfidy, to accept any "bargain" offered to that end.

On the other hand, Mr. Shaw paraphrases at still greater length the report of the interview in which the Russian Foreign Minister and the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg tried to induce the British Government to commit itself in advance to war against Germany. Mr. Shaw thinks that thus the German "bluff" would have been called and war would have been prevented, and he is confident that Mr. Winston Churchill would have taken the Bismarck tone and dictated the result. He cannot see—what is really the essential fact in both cases—that Sir Edward Grey was striving in every honorable way to preserve peace, that his Government refused to stand idle and see France crushed in the same spirit that it refused to menace Germany until a definite and undeniable cause of war arose.

That cause came with Germany's violation of its pledge to observe the neutrality of Belgium, and England's response excites Mr. Shaw's most furious contempt. He adopts with zest the judgment of the German Chancellor. The pladge for all who signed it was but a scrap of paper, of no more binding force than others that had gone their way to dusty death in the diplomatic waste baskets. To observe the obligation it imposed was hypocrisy. To fight in order to compel Germany to observe it was crass militarism. Plainly, Mr. Shaw is a little difficult.

The Government under which he lives is either too bellicose or not bellicose enough; too ready to help France if France is attacked or not ready enough to bully Germany, and especially it is all wrong about Belgium and its treaty, since treaties have several times been broken, and so on through a bewildering circle of contradictory statements and notions.

Mr. Shaw finds little to choose between the groups of combatants. He distinctly prides himself on his impartiality, not to say indifference. On account of his Irish birth he claims something of the detachment of a foreigner, but admits a touch of Irish malice in taking the conceit out of the English. Add to this his professed many-sidedness as a dramatist and playwright and we get as good an explanation as can be given of this noted writer's attitude toward the tremendous struggle now waging. But Mr. Shaw's assumption of even-handed scorn for every one concerned, of "six of one and a half dozen of the other," does not hold out. He feels profoundly that such fighting as Germany does, for such a purpose as inspires Germany, must be met by force, and that England could not in the long run, no matter by whom guided or governed, have shirked the task laid upon her. That being the case, one wonders a little why it was worth while to cover every one with ridicule and to present a picture of Great Britain so essentially grotesque and distorted.

Bernard Shaw on the End of the War

From The New York Sun, Nov. 15, 1914.

In the midst of a good deal of untimely gibing, George Bernard Shaw says one or two very wise and appropriate things about the end of the war and the times to come after it. His warnings are a useful check to the current loose talk of the fire-eaters and preachers of the gospel of vengeance.

"We and France have to live with Germany after the war," Mr. Shaw points out. Even to embarrass her financially would be a blow to England herself, Germany being one of England's best

customers and one of her most frequently visited neighbors. The truth of this is unanswerable. The great object must be to effect a peace with as little rancor as possible.

Mr. Shaw does not say it, but there are going to be overwhelming political reasons why the pride of Germany and Austria and still more why their military power shall not be too much impaired in case of their defeat.

Perhaps in the final settlement the Western Allies may be found to have more in common with Berlin than with St. Petersburg. Germany has pointed this out with much force.

Mr. Shaw's position is not admirable when he chooses their days of tribulation for sticking pins into his own people, even though some of the things he says may be unpleasantly true. But it cannot be denied that he has some sane views on the situation. The pity is that he must always impair the force of the useful things he has to say by flippancies, impertinences, and out-of-place girdings at those whose courage he should help to maintain. He reminds one of a man who insists on wrangling over the mistaken construction of a chimney while the house is burning down.

Bernard Shaw as a Patriot

From The New York World, Nov. 17, 1914.

Bernard Shaw has written for our neighbor THE TIMES an elaborate three-page thesis to maintain:

1. That Great Britain was abundantly justified in making war with Germany.
2. That the explanation given by the British Government for making war against Germany was stupid, hypocritical, mendacious, and disgraceful.
3. That he alone is capable of interpreting the moral purpose of the British people in undertaking this necessary work of civilization.
4. That the reason the British Government's justification of the war is so inadequate is because no British Government is ever so clever as Bernard Shaw.

5. That even in the midst of the most horrible calamity known to human history it pays to advertise.

Various patriots have various ways of

serving their country. Some go to the firing line to be shot and others stay at home to be a source of innocent merriment to the survivors.

"Shaw Empty of Good Sense"

By Christabel Pankhurst

His reputation for perversity and contrariety is fully maintained by George Bernard Shaw in the ineptly named article, "Common Sense About the War." At home in Britain we all know that it is Mr. Shaw's habit to oppose where he might be expected to support, and vice versa. For example, should he speak at a prohibition meeting he would most likely extol strong drink, or if asked to defend the sale of liquor declare dramatically for prohibition.

He sees himself as the critic of everything and everybody—the one and only man who knows what to do and how to do it.

Mr. Shaw charges his compatriots with intellectual laziness, but they are not so lazy as to leave him to do their thinking for them. That he sometimes—and oftener in the past than now—says illuminating things is true, but firm reliance cannot be placed upon his freakish mental processes, exemplified in his writings about the war. He has played with effect the part of jester to the British public, but when, as now, his jests are empty of the kernel of good sense, the matter gets beyond a joke.

The truth is that in face of this great and tragic reality of war the men of mere words, the literary theorists, are in danger of missing their way. Certainly women of deeds are more likely to see things aright than are men of words, and it is as a woman of deeds that I, a suffragette, make answer to my irresponsible compatriot, Mr. Bernard Shaw. And yet not a compatriot, for Mr. Shaw disclaims those feelings of

loyalty and enthusiasm for the national cause that fill the mass of us who live under the British flag!

"Until Home Rule emerges from its present suspended animation," says Mr. Shaw, "I shall retain my Irish capacity for criticising England with something of the detachment of a foreigner." Now, these words are not a little surprising, because Mr. Shaw's interest in the Home Rule cause has hitherto been of a most restrained and well-nigh secret character, and any one who imagines that Mr. Shaw is a strenuous campaigner for Home Rule is greatly mistaken. If in the years preceding the war the Home Rule cause had depended upon Mr. Shaw's activities, it would have been in a bad way. It is now, when a foreign enemy menaces our nation as a whole, that Mr. Shaw manifests this enhanced interest in Home Rule.

The suffragettes, who have fought and suffered for their cause as no living man reformer in the British Isles has fought and suffered for his, have during the present crisis subordinated their claim to the urgent claims of national honor and safety. So Mr. Shaw, whose campaigning is done generally in the armchair, and never in any place more dangerous than the rostrum, ought surely to refrain from his frivolous, inconsistent, destructive, and unprofitable criticism of our country.

As for the question of lynching, Mr. Shaw is, the American public may be assured, in no danger whatever of being lynched. He is in far more danger of having the Iron Cross conferred upon

him by the Kaiser in recognition of his attempt to supplement the activities of the official German Press Bureau. But if he were a German subject, writing on certain points of German policy as he does upon certain points of British policy, his fate can well be imagined. The only retribution that will come upon this man, who exploits the freedom of speech and pen that England gives him, is that his words lose now and henceforth the weight they used to have. Oh, the conceit of the man, who in this dark hour, when the English are dying on the battlefield, writes of "taking the conceit out of England" by a stroke of his inconsequent pen!

Admits England's Cause Is Just

But with all his will to "take the conceit" out of this England, so fiercely menaced, her sons killed, her daughters widowed—yet needing, so he thinks, his castigation into the bargain—the critic is constrained to admit that our country is playing the part of "the responsible policeman of the West" and that "for England to have refrained from hurling herself into the fray, horse, foot, and artillery, was impossible from every point of view." Then why preface these statements by a series of attacks upon the country which is admitted to be justly fighting in a just cause?

The sole importance of Mr. Shaw's criticism comes from this. He unwarrantably indorses statements made by Germany in her attempt to put the Allies in the wrong. Because he is known to the German people by his dramatic work, extracts from his article will be circulated among them as an expression of the views of a representative British citizen. And how are the Germans to know that this is false, deprived as they are of news of what is happening in the outside world and ignorant as they must be of Mr. Shaw's real lack of influence at this serious time?

That their traffic in mere words disables some literary men from comprehending facts is shown by Mr. Shaw's play upon the word "Junkerism." He points to the dictionary definition of the

word instead of to the fact it represents, and by this verbal juggling tries to convince his readers that the military autocracy that dominates and misdirects Germany has its counterpart and equal in Great Britain. Whereas, the conditions in the two countries are wholly different, and it is this very difference that Germany has regarded as one of the signs of British inferiority.

Mr. Shaw's suggestion that the British are posing as "Injured Innocence" and as "Mild Gazelles" is neither funny nor true. We are simply a people defending ourselves, resisting conquest and military despotism, and fighting for the ideal of freedom and self-government. When our country is no longer in danger we suffragettes, if it be still necessary, are prepared to fight on and wage our civil war that we may win freedom and self-government for women, as well as men. But, in the meantime, we support the men—yes, and even the Government do we in a sense support—in fighting the common enemy who menaces the freedom of men and women alike. Although the Government in the past have erred gravely in their dealing with the woman question, they are for the purpose of this war the instrument of the nation.

Facts Belie Him

Mr. Shaw would seem to hold Britain responsible for German militarism, but the facts he cites are against him there. "I am old enough," says he, "to remember the beginnings of the anti-German phase of military propaganda in England. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 left England very much taken aback. Up to that date nobody was much afraid that Prussia—suddenly Prussia beat France right down in the dust." Precisely! It was this war on France, deliberately engineered by Bismarck, and it was the defeat and despoilment of France that fed Germany's militarism and encouraged Germany to make those plans of military aggression which, after long and deliberate preparation, are being carried into effect in the present war. Germany's plans of military aggression have compelled other countries to prepare,

however inadequately, to defend themselves.

Mr. Shaw gives support to the Germans' contention that they are not the aggressors but are menaced by Russia. Yet he does not explain why, if that is so, Germany took French gold and territory in 1870 and has since continued to alienate France; nor why Germany has chosen Britain as her enemy of enemies to be supplanted and surpassed in power.

If Germany is simply on the defensive against Russia and has no desire to attack and cripple France and Britain, then why has she antagonized these countries and driven one after the other into a Russian alliance?

When he affects to criticise Germany for not having "entrusted the security of her western frontier to the public opinion of Western Europe and to America and fought Russia, if attacked, with her rear not otherwise defended," Mr. Shaw burkes the fact that Germany's object is to seize Belgium and to make it part of the German Empire, also to seize at least the northern coast of France and to make this seizure the means of dominating Britain.

Indeed, the point at which German ambition for conquest ceases would be hard to fix. And yet Mr. Shaw pictures for us an injured-innocent, mild-gazelle Germany on the defensive! Quite in this picture is his assertion that "the ultimatum to Serbia was the escapade of a dotard," whereas, everybody knows that the ultimatum was dictated at Berlin. It is plain as a pikestaff that in order to bring on the Great War of conquest for which her rulers thought The Day had arrived, Germany dictated the issue and terms of the ultimatum to Serbia and then urged Austria to refuse any compromise and arbitration which might have averted war.

Mr. Shaw has assumed the impossible task of trying to blind the American public to these and other facts that prove Germany to be the aggressor in this war, but he will fail in his attempt at whitewashing German policy because it is one of the characteristics of the American people that they have a strong feeling

for reality and that no twisting and combining of words can prevent them from getting at the facts beneath.

Bernhardi's writings are generally believed to be an inspiration, and in part a statement of German policy. But Mr. Shaw differs. In trying to prove that Bernhardism has nothing to do with the case, he maintains that Germany has neglected the Bernhardi programme, and says:

"He warned Germany to make an alliance with Italy, Austria, Turkey, and America before undertaking the subjugation of France, then of England."

Mr. Shaw then asserts that Germany disregarded this advice and allowed herself to be caught between Russia and a Franco-British combination with no ally save Austria. But here again facts are against him. For Germany has followed with marvelous precision the line drawn by Bernhardi.

She is actually fighting in partnership with Austria. She allied herself with Italy—though Italy has refused to fight with her in this present war of aggression. Germany has also bent Turkey to her purpose, and has dragged the Turks into the war. An alliance with America! Well, to have gained the help of America in crushing France and crippling England and ravaging and conquering Belgium was quite beyond the power of German diplomacy and intrigue! Still Germany's attempts to win at least America's moral support in this war are vigorous, if unsuccessful.

And with what quotable matter Mr. Shaw provides the German rulers for the further deluding of their subjects when he writes of the German people being "stirred to their depths by the apparent treachery and duplicity of the attack made upon them in their extremest peril from France and Russia," when he writes of the Kaiser doing "all a Kaiser could do without unbearable ignominy to induce the British not to fight him and give him fair play with Russia," and when he writes of "taking the Kaiser at a disadvantage." As though we ought meekly to have agreed to the Kaiser's plan of defeating France

and using her defeat as a bridge to England and a means of conquering England! Uncommon nonsense about the war—so we must rename Mr. Shaw's production!

And what is all this that flows from the pen of Mr. Shaw about Belgium and "obsolete treaties," "rights of way," "necessities that know no international law," "circumstances that alter treaties"? Made in Germany such statements are, and yet even the Imperial German Chancellor is not so contemptuous as Bernard Shaw is of Belgium's charter of existence, the treaty now violated by Germany.

That is a treaty that cannot become obsolete until the powers who made it release Belgium from the restrictions and obligations which the treaty imposes. Germany pleads guilty in this matter of the violation of Belgian neutrality, though Mr. Shaw attempts to show her innocent, for the German Chancellor has said: "This is an infraction of international law—we are compelled to overrule the legitimate protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. We shall repair the wrong we are doing as soon as our military aims have been achieved." And again the Chancellor said the invasion of Belgium "is contrary to the law of nature." To Mr. Bernard Shaw's peculiar sense of international morality such dealing is not, however, repugnant.

No "Right of Way" in Belgium

In his letter to President Wilson Mr. Shaw, either willfully or ignorantly, seeks to confuse the neutrality of a neutralized State such as Belgium and the neutrality of an ordinary State such as Italy, and he pretends that violation of the first sort of neutrality creates a situation in no way different from that created by the violation of the second and normal sort of neutrality. I would refer Mr. Shaw to "The Case for Belgium" issued by the Belgian delegates to the United States, wherein they point out that "the peculiarity about Belgian neutrality is that it has been imposed upon her by the powers as the one con-

dition upon which they recognized her national existence."

The consequence of this is that whereas Italy and the United States and other powers having a similar status can, subject to the risk of attack from an affronted belligerent, please themselves whether or not they condone a violation of their neutrality, Belgium and the other neutralized States cannot condone such violation, but must either resist all breaches of their neutrality or surrender their right to existence. And further a neutralized State, putting faith in the treaty that guarantees its existence and its neutrality, refrains naturally from that preparation for war which would be deemed necessary in the absence of such a treaty.

There is no such thing as the "right of way" through neutralized Belgium which Mr. Shaw claims on behalf of belligerent Germany. Far from exercising a right of way Germany has violently committed a trespass, offering a German promise, a mere "scrap of paper," as reparation. "A right of way," argues Bernard Shaw, is not a right of conquest"; but the truth is that in passing through Belgium Germany assumed dominion over Belgium, which dominion she has since formally asserted and is seeking forcibly to maintain.

A New Shavian Theory

No comprehension does Mr. Shaw display of the hurt to the Belgians' sense of honor involved in Germany's use of their territory for purposes hostile to their friendly neighbor, France. To be forced into injuring a friend is an outrage, indeed, and Mr. Shaw surely knows too much of matters military to be unaware that to permit a right of way to one combatant amounts to making an attack upon the other, and that Germany, by the very fact of crossing Belgian soil, was forcing Belgium to be the enemy of France. Only by their great heroism were the Belgians able to escape this infamy that had been planned for them.

To be conquered does not really matter! There we have another Shavian

theory. How grateful would the would-be world-ruling Kaiser feel to Mr. Shaw were he to succeed in inoculating the peoples of Europe and of America with that theory! So would the task of putting the peoples under the German yoke (otherwise known as German culture) be made easier—and cheaper. But the spirit of national freedom, which is as precious to humanity as is the spirit of individual freedom, cannot be driven out by words any more than it can be driven out by blows. The most unlettered Belgian soldier, fighting for a truth that is at the very heart and depth of all things true, puts the mere wordmonger to shame.

That Great Britain does not fight only for Belgium is certainly a fact, though Belgium's plight alone would have been enough to bring us into the conflict. We fight also for France, because she is wrongfully attacked, and because she is by her civilization and culture one of the world's treasures. We fight for the all-sufficient reason of self-defense.

There is the case for Britain, and despite his special pleading for Germany, Mr. Shaw can show no flaw in it. He does say, however, that the British Government, instead of first seeking a mild way of preserving peace, ought to have said point-blank to Germany: "If you attack France we shall attack you." I also think that such a declaration would have been the right one. To me and to many others the thought that our country might stand by and watch inactively an attack upon France was intolerable. Great was our relief when this apprehension was removed by the British Government's declaration of war. Why did not the British Government say to Germany before the war cloud burst that Britain would fight to defend France, and why did the Government delay so long in declaring war? Mr. Shaw does not give the reason, but I will give it.

It was that the Government feared opposition to our entering into the war would come from a Radico-Socialist literary clique in London, from a section

of the Liberal press, and from certain Liberal and Labor politicians who had been deceived by German professors and other missionaries of the Kaiser into thinking the German peril did not exist. When Belgium was invaded most of these misguided ones were unable to cling any longer to their "keep out of it" policy, and then the Government felt free to act. Yet the Government need not have waited, because with the facts before them the people as a whole would perfectly have understood the necessity of fighting even had Belgium not been invaded.

Henceforward the general public must be kept informed of what is happening in the international world. Foreign politics must be conducted with greater publicity. There, at least, Bernard Shaw is right, but this is a reform which he and his fellow-men have failed to effect, whereas women, had they been voters, would have demanded and secured it long ago.

Now, although undue diplomatic secrecy, always wrong, will be especially wrong when the terms of peace come to be made, sentimentality will certainly be more mischievous still. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Bernard Shaw's writings on the war are intended as an appeal to sentimentality—an appeal that Germany at the close of the war shall have treatment which, by being more than just to her, would be less than just to the countries whom she has attacked, and would mean a recurrence of this appalling war in after years.

Before the war specious words were used to cloak the German policy of aggression which has plunged the world in horror and is martyrizng peoples. In view of the coming victory of the Allies, the same tactics will be adopted by the German militarists, and it behooves Bernard Shaw to beware lest even without intent he serve as their tool. Men such as he who believe that, while they can never be in the wrong, their country can never be in the right, are just the men who are in danger of stumbling at this time.

Comment by Readers of Shaw

Shaw Has Made Minister von Jagow's Remark on a "Scrap of Paper"

Understandable

Most hearty thanks for that masterly "common-sense" article of Bernard Shaw. How clearly he expresses the much that many of us have felt way down inside and have not been able to formulate even to ourselves!

He has made at least one woman—and one of German parentage at that—understand what reams of public and private communications from all over the Fatherland could not make clear: just why the blunt, impetuous, shocked, and astounded Kaiser dared give utterance to that disgraceful "scrap of paper" remark—inexcusable but also very understandable in the light of his knowledge of and confidence in a more astute miscreant; why France and Germany have always considered England more or less of a *Tartuffe* and a "*Scheinheilige*" (one who seems holy); and why every German—man, woman and child—so execrates Sir Edward Grey and colleagues.

Nothing in all the sickening present conditions, the future long-lasting woe and misery, the barbarous neutrality violations, has so made me blush for my mother's country as the "scrap of paper" incident; and it has been most bitter to listen to the extravagant, fantastic eulogies on England, with which we've been so favored without feeling honestly able to make any excuses whatever for Germany.

But now—thanks to that article—I can understand what I may not condone, and, though abhorring the Kaiser and my mother's compatriots for their share in that horror going on abroad, I can also pity the hot-headed, imperfect mere man going to war under a carefully incited and fostered misapprehension, and need no longer glorify the cool-headed, sapient

policy which so cleverly duped ruler and people.

Not since the war began have I felt so undepressed, so free to sympathize where I so love, so free from having to commend those for whom I feel no love whatever. For all of which accept the warmest thanks of

KATE HUDSON.

New York, Nov. 17, 1914.

Shaw Article Work of "Farceur"

"Common sense and Shaw!" Shaw begins his article by saying, "I am giving my views for what they are worth, with a malicious bias." Later on he says: "I am writing history." Toward the end, after having obscured with words many things which had hitherto been clear to most people, he says: "Now that we begin to see where we really are," &c. How Shavian!

There are at least two sides to all questions, and so long as they are reasonably presented one is glad to hear them even if they fail to convince, but when a farceur is allowed to occupy three newspaper pages usually filled by serious and interesting writers it seems time to protest. The subject itself is not one for easy paradox or false and flip-pant epigram.

Mr. Shaw says he does not hold his tongue easily. He certainly does not, and when it wags it wags foolishly, and, as he admits, maliciously, albeit sometimes amusingly, and with superficial brilliance. He says the Irish do not consider England their country yet. Of course they do not. Why should the Irish consider themselves English? Neither do the Scots, nor the Welsh, nor the Canadians, nor will they ever so think. But they are all British, and so, despite all Mr. Shaw says to the contrary, Kitchener was right.

Mr. Shaw falls into a common and regrettable error when he continually writes England when he really means the British Empire. It is the British Empire that is at war, for which, though a citizen, Mr. Shaw has no authority to speak or to be considered a representative, for, as he unnecessarily admits, he is not a "British patriot"; neither is he a "Junker," for I have looked through all his definitions of the word, and none applies to him.

In what way is the "Battle of Dorking" like Bernhardi? The one he says had as a moral: "To arms! or the Germans will besiege London!" The other said: "To arms! so that the Germans may besiege London, or any other country that does not want compulsory culture!" The one was defensive, the other offensive.

He says of the war: "We" began it. Since he says he is not English, and that it is an English war, whom does he mean by "We"? If he means the British, then, should a policeman see a small boy being ill-treated by a large man and go to the help of that boy, he, the policeman, must be said to have begun the fight which would probably ensue between him and said man, notwithstanding that the policeman is only fulfilling what he has sworn to do.

Monaco, he says, "seems to be, on the whole, the most prosperous and comfortable Staate in Europe." If this is buffoonery it is singularly out of place. But even Monaco has an "army," has had recently a small revolution, and the Monegasques do not consider themselves ideally comfortable, and they have many "injustices." Does he hold the principality up as a model administration and the source of its prosperity as above reproach?

Mr. Shaw represents no one but himself, and, like all small men, he reviles others greater than he, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but it does not become him, looking at his own life's history, to cast cheap sneers at anonymous journalists in cheap newspapers, who, though they may lack his literary

style, possess, at least, one virtue which he boasts that he has not—patriotism!
Yours very truly,

LAWRENCE GRANT.

New York, Nov. 18, 1914.

Antidote to "Long Infliction of Dreary Stuff"

Hail to Bernard Shaw! Could anything be more refreshing? After the long infliction upon us of the flood of dreary stuff from London and Paris, and all the talk of German militarism, and what is to become of it at the hands of such immaculately unmilitary apostles of peace and international righteousness and treaty observances as Russia, France, and England, and all the maudlin denunciations of the German Nietzsche and Bernhardi, and the terrible Kaiser, could anything be more refreshing than Shaw's advent in the field of current war history?

Though an Anglo-Saxon of American birth and long descent, and no believer in militarism of any sort of itself, yet I see in that no reason to distort ancient history by an attempt to make it appear that German militarism is at all the chief sinner, or, for that matter, not a very necessary and desirable thing in order that Germany may have her rightful place in the world, or any place at all.

V. A. W.

Warwick, N. Y., Nov. 16, 1914.

False Assumptions Basis of Shaw's Attack

The article on the European war by Mr. G. B. Shaw appeals to me as a noteworthy specimen of what an artful literary genius can do in the way of argumentative cantankerousness. His chief grievance is British diplomacy as represented by Sir Edward Grey, upon whose devoted head he empties the vials of his splenetic humor.

Underlying his argument are two glaringly false assumptions, and on these the whole fabric rests. The first is that a certain undefined but presumably mul-

titudinous body, which he designates as "Socialist," "Democratic," and "Social Democratic," is better qualified to determine the policy and conduct the correspondence of the Foreign Office than trained and experienced statesmen.

The second is that Sir Edward Grey should have followed the suggestion of Sazonof and threatened Germany with war at a certain stage of the correspondence. This can now be only a matter of opinion, but it may be confidently affirmed that of all nations the Germany of this day would be the last to back down in face of a threat. It may be also said generally that an open threat is about the surest way to bring on a war. Austria threatened Serbia and war ensued. Germany threatened Russia and war ensued. Germany threatened Belgium—in the form of a notification that she intended to invade her territory—and war ensued.

Mr. Shaw's contentions are grotesque.
Flushing, Nov. 16. SAM TEST.

"Junkers" Controlled Old World Ages Before Shaw

With regard to the article by Mr. Bernard Shaw, the gist of the matter can be expressed in fewer words. The ideas expressed are not the exclusive property of Mr. Shaw. The Old World for indefinite ages has been controlled and directed by what he calls the

"Junker" class, the rich and idle aristocrats who want for nothing, and, being born to rule, do not find it worth while to exert themselves mentally, and for whom there is no suitable profession but the army and diplomacy.

The mass of the people are to them the great unwashed, and those a little higher in the scale "cads and bounders," or the German equivalent, in fact the canaille of the French who at the time of the Revolution took things into their own hands to the great surprise of everybody. This substratum is not considered in the scheme of the "Junker's" existence, though the lower orders alone are the workers and producers and make ease and luxury possible.

Mr. Shaw, I believe, intends to intimate that there might be a use for the intellectual class, the thinkers and writers with the imagination that can put them mentally in the place of the individuals who make up the masses, think the thoughts and live the lives vicariously of the people who are the nation, and if the "Junker" class of England and Germany and kindred nations who govern and dictate its policies were leavened with the brains and broad-mindedness of the thinkers there might be found a better use for men than killing each other and a brighter outlook for the world which is now filled with widows and orphans. Mrs. F. B. WILLIAMSON.

Elizabeth, N. J., Nov. 16, 1914.

Open Letter to President Wilson*

By George Bernard Shaw

Sir: I petition you to invite the neutral powers to confer with the United States of America for the purpose of requesting Britain, France, and Germany to withdraw from the soil of Belgium and fight out their quarrel on their own territories. However the sympathies of the neutral States may be divided, and whatever points now at issue between the belligerent powers may be doubtful, there is one point on which there can be neither division nor doubt, and that is that the belligerent armies have no right to be in Belgium, much less to fight in Belgium, and involve the innocent inhabitants of that country in their reciprocal slaughter. You will not question my right to address this petition to you. You are the official head of the nation that is beyond all question or comparison the chief of the neutral powers, marked out from all the rest by commanding magnitude, by modern democratic constitution,

and by freedom from the complication of monarchy and its traditions, which have led Europe into the quaint absurdity of a war waged formally between the German Kaiser, the German Czar, the German King of the Belgians, the German King of England, the German Emperor of Austria, and a gentleman who shares with you the distinction of not being related to any of them, and is therefore describable monarchically as one Poincaré, a Frenchman.

I make this petition on its merits, without claiming any representative character except such as attaches to me as a human being. Nobody here has asked me to do it. Except among the large class of constitutional beggars, the normal English feeling is that it is no use asking for a thing if you feel certain that it will be refused, and are not in a position to enforce compliance. Also, that the party whose request is refused

*The English newspaper, *The Nation*, in which Mr. Shaw's letter to the President of the United States appeared on Nov. 7, made the following comment thereon:

We are glad to publish Mr. Shaw's brilliant appeal to the President of the United States, because we believe that when the time for settlement arrives, the influence of America will be a powerful, perhaps a decisive, factor in obtaining it. We agree, too, with him that while she is not likely to respond to an appeal to intervene on the side of the Entente or the Alliance, the case of Belgium, the innocent victim of the war, is bound to find her in a very different mood. The States are already Belgium's almoner; it is only a step further for them to come in as her savior. But on a vital point we disagree with Mr. Shaw. His Irish mind puts the case with an indifference to which we cannot pretend. We have got to save Western Europe from a victory of Prussian militarism, as well as to avenge Belgium and set her on her feet again. We regard the temper and policy revealed in Germany's violation of Belgian soil and her brutalization of the Belgian people as essential to our judg-

ment of this war and its end. And we dare not concede an inch to Mr. Shaw's "right of war" theory. His distinction between "right of way" and a "right of conquest" has no practical effect other than to extinguish the rights of small nationalities as against great ones, who alone have the power to take a "right of way" when it is refused, and afterward to turn it into a right of conquest. Germany's action was not only a breach of her own treaty (only revealed within a few hours of its execution), but of Article I. of The Hague Convention on the rights of neutral powers:

"THE TERRITORY OF NEUTRAL POWERS IS INVIOABLE"

It is not therefore a small thing that Germany has ripped clean through the whole fabric of The Hague Conventions of 1907. Could the American Government, aware of that fact, address herself to intervention on the Belgian question without regard to the breaches of international law which were perpetrated, first, through the original German invasion of Belgium, and then in the conduct of the campaign in that country?

and not enforced looks ridiculous. Many Englishmen will say that a request to the belligerents to evacuate Belgium forthwith would be refused, could not be enforced; and would make the asker ridiculous. We are, in short, not a prayerful nation. But to you it will be clear that even the strongest power, or even allied group of powers, can have its position completely changed by an expression of the public opinion of the rest of the world. In your clear western atmosphere and in your peculiarly responsible position as the head centre of western democracy, you, when the European situation became threatening three months ago, must have been acutely aware of the fact to which Europe was so fatally blinded—namely, that the simple solution of the difficulty in which the menace of the Franco-Russo-British Entente placed Germany was for the German Emperor to leave his western frontier under the safeguard of the neighborliness and good faith of American, British, and French democracy, and then await quite calmly any action that Russia might take against his country on the east. Had he done so, we could not have attacked him from behind; and had France made such an attack—and it is in the extremest degree improbable that French public opinion would have permitted such a hazardous and unjustifiable adventure—he would at worst have confronted it with the fullest sympathy of Britain and the United States, and at best with their active assistance. Unhappily, German Kings do not allow democracy to interfere in their foreign policy; do not believe in neighborliness; and do believe in cannon and cannon fodder. The Kaiser never dreamed of confiding his frontier to you and to the humanity of his neighbors. And the diplomatists of Europe never thought of that easy and right policy, and could not suggest any substitute for it, with the hideous result which is before you.

The State of Belgium

Now that this mischief has been done, and the two European thunderclouds have met and are discharging their lightnings, it is not for me to meddle with

the question whether the United States should take a side in their warfare as far as it concerns themselves alone. But I may plead for a perfectly innocent neutral State, the State of Belgium, which is being ravaged in a horrible manner by the belligerents. Her surviving population is flying into all the neighboring countries to escape from the incessant hail of shrapnel and howitzer shells from British cannon, French cannon, German cannon, and, most tragic of all, Belgian cannon; for the Belgian Army is being forced to devastate its own country in its own defense.

For this there can be no excuse; and at such a horror the rest of the world cannot look on in silence without incurring the guilt of the bystander who witnesses a crime without even giving the alarm. I grant that Belgium, in her extreme peril, made one mistake. She called to her aid the powers of the Entente alone instead of calling on the whole world of kindly men. She should have called on America, too, and it is hard to see how you could in honor have disregarded that call. But if Belgium says nothing, but only turns her eyes dumbly toward you while you look at the red ruin in which her villages, her heaps of slain, her monuments and treasures are being hurled by her friends and enemies alike, are you any the less bound to speak out than if Belgium had asked you to send her a million soldiers?

Not for a moment do I suggest that your intervention should be an intervention on behalf of either the Allies or the Entente. If you consider both sides equally guilty, we know that you can find reasons for that verdict. But Belgium is innocent and it is on behalf of Belgium that so much of the world as is still at peace is waiting for a lead from you. No other question need be prejudged. If Germany maintains her claim to a right of way through Belgium on a matter which she believed (however erroneously) to be one of life and death to her as a nation, nobody, not even China, now pretends that such rights of way have not their place among those common human rights which are

superior to the more artificial rights of nationality. I think, for example, that if Russia made a descent on your continent under circumstances which made it essential to the maintenance of your national freedom that you should move an army through Canada, you would ask our leave to do so, and take it by force if we did not grant it. You may reasonably suspect, even if all our statesmen raise a shriek of denial, that we should take a similar liberty under similar circumstances in the teeth of all the scraps of paper in our Foreign Office dustbin. You see, I am frank with you, and fair, I hope, to Germany. But a right of way is not a right of conquest; and even the right of way was not, as the Impérial Chancellor imagined, a matter of life and death at all, but a militarist hallucination, and one that has turned out, so far, a military mistake. In short, there was no such case of overwhelming necessity as would have made the denial of a right of way to the German Army equivalent to a refusal to save German independence from destruction, and therefore to an act of war against her, justifying a German conquest of Belgium. You can therefore leave the abstract question of international rights of way quite unprejudiced by your action. You can leave every question between the belligerents fully open, and yet, in the common interest of the world, ask Germany to clear out of Belgium, into France or across the Channel, if she can, back home if she can force no other passage, but at all events out of Belgium. A like request would, of course, be addressed to Britain and to France at the same time. The technical correctness of our diplomatic position as to Belgium may be unimpeachable; but as the effect of our shells on Belgium is precisely the same as that of the German shells, and as by fighting on Belgian soil we are doing her exactly the same injury that we should have done if the violation of her neutrality had been initiated by us instead of by Germany, we could not decently refuse to fall in with a general evacuation.

A Certain Result of Intervention

At all events, your intervention could not fail to produce at least the result that even if the belligerents refused to comply, your request would leave them in an entirely new and very unpleasant relation to public opinion. No matter how powerful a State is, it is not above feeling the vast difference between doing something that nobody condemns and something that everybody condemns except the interested parties.

That difference alone would be well worth your pains. But it is by no means a foregone conclusion that a blank refusal would be persisted in. Germany must be aware that the honor of England is now so bound up with the complete redemption of Belgium from the German occupation that to keep Antwerp and Brussels she must take Portsmouth and London. France is no less deeply engaged. You can judge better than I what chance Germany now has, or can persuade herself she has, of exhausting or overwhelming her western enemies without ruining herself in the attempt. Whatever else the war and its horrors may have done or not done, you will agree with me that it has made an end of the dreams of military and naval steam-rolling in which the whole wretched business began. At a cost which the conquest of a whole continent would hardly justify, these terrible armaments and the heroic hosts which wield them push one another a few miles back and forward in a month, and take and retake some miserable village three times over in less than a week. Can you doubt that though we have lost all fear of being beaten, (our darkened towns, and the panics of our papers, with their endless scares and silly inventions, are mere metropolitan hysteria,) we are getting very tired of a war in which, having now re-established our old military reputation, and taught the Germans that there is no future for their empire without our friendship and that of France, we have nothing more to gain? In London and Paris and Berlin nobody at present dares say "Sirs, ye are brethren; why do ye wrong one to an-

other?"; for the slightest disposition toward a Christian view of things is regarded as a shooting matter in these capitals; but Washington is still privileged to talk common humanity to the nations.

An Advantage of Aloofness

Finally, I may remind you of another advantage which your aloofness from the conflict gives you. Here, in England and in France, men are going to the front every day; their women and children are all within earshot; and no man is hard-hearted enough to say the worst that might be said of what is going on in Belgium now. We talk to you of Louvain and Rheims in the hope of enlisting you on our side or prejudicing you against the Germans, forgetting how sorely you must be tempted to say as you look on at what we are doing, "Well, if European literature, as represented by the library of Louvain, and European religion, as represented by the Cathedral of Rheims, have not got us beyond this, in God's name let them perish." I am thinking of other things—of the honest Belgians, whom I have seen nursing

their wounds, and whom I recognize at a glance as plain men, innocent of all warlike intentions, trusting to the wisdom and honesty of the rulers and diplomatists who have betrayed them, taken from their farms and their businesses to destroy and be destroyed for no good purpose that might not have been achieved better and sooner by neighborly means. I am thinking of the authentic news that no papers dare publish, not of the lies that they all publish to divert attention from the truth. In America these things can be said without driving American mothers and wives mad; here, we have to set our teeth and go forward. We cannot be just; we cannot see beyond the range of our guns. The roar of the shrapnel deafens us; the black smoke of the howitzer blinds us; and what these do to our bodily senses our passions do to our imaginations. For justice, we must do as the mediaeval cities did—call in a stranger. You are not altogether that to us; but you can look at all of us impartially. And you are the spokesman of Western democracy. That is why I appeal to you.

G. BERNARD SHAW.

A German Letter to G. Bernard Shaw

By Herbert Eulenberg

The following letter from the noted German playwright Eulenberg, whose plays of a decided modern tendency have been presented extensively in Germany and in Vienna, was made public by the German Press Bureau of New York in October, 1914.

Bernard Shaw: You have addressed us Germans several times of late without receiving a reply from us. The reason for this was probably the momentary bitterness against your country of our people's intellectual representatives. Indeed, our best scholars and artists, Ernst Haeckel at 81 years, leading the rest, stripped themselves during these past weeks of all the honors which England had apportioned them. Permit me as one who had the opportunity to do much for the propagation of your dramatic works, especially of your finest drama, "Candida," in Western Germany and in Holland, to present as quiet and as moderate a retort as is possible.

Your appeal to intellectual Germany we reciprocate with a question to intellectual England. It is as follows: How is it possible for you to witness your country's present unheard of policy (so opposed to culture) without rising as one man against it? Do you believe that we thinking Germans would ever, without saying or doing anything, observe an alliance of our Government, whose goal was the strengthening of imperialism and the subjugation and destruction of a cultured power, such as France or England? Never! Among your people only a very small number of brave scholars protested against this criminal alliance of your Government at the beginning of the war. You others, you poets, painters, and musicians of present-day England, were silent and permitted Sir Edward Grey to continue to sin against a people related to you by blood and intellect. You raised your

voice a little, Bernard Shaw! But what did you propose to us: "Refrain from your militarism, my dear Germans, and become again the congenial, complacent poets and thinkers, the people of Goethe and Beethoven, whom no one hated! Then we will surely help you against the bad Russians!"

Is not this proposal a bit too naïve for you, Bernard Shaw? We are situated in the midst of Russians and Frenchmen, who have formed an open alliance against us for more than twenty years. Our neighbors in the East denounce nothing more than us, and our neighbors in the West denounce us and plan against us, who have for nearly half a century evinced nothing but friendliness toward them. When such enemies surround us, does not your friendly counsel, Bernard Shaw, seem as if you said to us: "Just let yourself be massacred, Germans! Afterward your British cousins will vouchsafe you their protection."

Germany Not Isolated

Do you think that we would carry on our militarism and our expensive drilling if we lived on an island as you do? We would not think of it. We would speedily dispatch a blood-thirsty butcher, like your Lord Kitchener, from our island to our most unhealthy colony. We could not even reconcile our worthy Dr. Karl Peters, who had dealt a little unscrupulously with a few negro women, with our conceptions of culture, and had to pass him over to you! But the thought shall not come to me or to us, as it does to your Prime Ministers, to pose as angels of light, a fact about which you have yourself told your compatriots the bitter truth to our great joy. We admit having injured Belgium's neutrality, but we have only done it because of dire necessity, because we could not otherwise reach France and take up the fight against two sides forced upon us. Bel-

gium's independence and freedom, which is suddenly of the utmost importance to your King and your Ministers, we have not touched. Even after the expeditious capture of Liège we asked Belgium for the second time: "Let us pass quickly through your country. We will make good every damage, and will not take away a square foot of your country! Do destroyers of liberty and Huns and vandals, or whatever other defamatory names your English papers now heap upon us, who at the time of Beethoven and Schopenhauer formed the Areopagus of culture, conduct themselves in such a way? Does not one of your living spirits in England cry aloud at the reprehensible alliance which your Government has made over your heads with Russia and Japan? On the most shameful day in English history, on the day when Mongolian Japan gave the German people her ultimatum at the instigation of your politicians, on this, I repeat it, most shameful day in the entire English history, I believed that the great dead in Westminster Abbey would rise from their graves horrified at the shameful deed which their grandsons and great-grandsons imposed upon old England.

The Land of Shakespeare

We Germans venerated the old England almost as a fatherland. We have recognized, understood, and studied Shakespeare, whom you, Bernard Shaw, so dislike, more than any other people, even more than the English Nation itself. Lord Byron received more benefits from Goethe alone than from all of England put together. Newton, Darwin, and Adam Smith found in Germany their best supporters and interpreters. The dramatic writers of latter-day England, most worthy of mention, from Oscar Wilde to you, Galsworthy and Knoblauch, are recognized by us and their plays performed numberless times. We have always endeavored to understand the English character. "Nowhere did we feel so much at home as in Germany," all your compatriots will tell you who have been guests here.

In "gratitude" for this our merchants were persecuted for years by your mer-

chants, because of a wild hatred for Germans, which, by the way, had a most disagreeable effect upon the races of other colors. In "gratitude," with but few exceptions which we will not forget, we are now abused and belittled by your press before all of Europe and America as if we were assassins, vagabonds, enemies of culture and murderers, far worse than the Russians. As thanks for that you have entered upon a war against us, for which even Sir Edward Grey could not at first give a good reason until the injury of Belgium neutrality luckily came to his assistance.

Our people are, therefore, now rightly embittered against England because through your groundless participation you have made more difficult the war against Russia and France, for which one alone, the Czar of Russia, bears the blame. But despite this great bitterness they would never approve the demolition of your country and your nation, because of their respect for your great past and your share in the development of culture in Europe. You, however, joined an alliance as a third great power, whose only purpose is our dissolution and destruction. Merely for reasons of justice and of moral courage a Pitt, a Burke, a Disraeli would have withdrawn their participation in such an alliance, which—Oh, heroic deed—falls upon the Germans by threes, no, by fours or fives. Your present-day statesmen, wholly unworthy of representing a people with your past and your inheritance, incite the Mongolians and blacks against us, your brother nation. They steal and permit our small and insufficiently protected colonies to be stolen and do not care a jot for all considerations of Europeans' culture and morals.

An Unnatural Russian Alliance

England, once the home and the refuge for all free spirits from the days of the Inquisition, from Rousseau until Freiligrath and Karl Marx, England has allied herself with Russia—the prison and the horror of all friends of liberty! Hear ye, hear ye illustrious dead, who lived and struggled for the freedom and the greatest possible joy of mankind, and

shake in your tombs with disgust and with horror! But you living ones, and you, Bernard Shaw, the foremost of all English artists, do everything in your power to break this terrible alliance and make it powerless for England. Much more lies in the balance for her than is understood by your present near-sighted politicians, who have in mind only the momentary advantages. The destruction of the German power is not the only thing in question here; no, it concerns a great part of civilized Europe in regard to the suspension of their hard-won political liberty; and England, the people of the Magna Charta, the first free Constitution, can never be a party to that. That is why we call to you, Bernard Shaw, in the name of Europe, and ask you for your voice in the struggle.

It is a splendid thing that this serious time has also aroused the poets, the thinkers and artists as political and diplomatic advisers, and we should not let ourselves be crowded out of this profession, for which, thanks to our minds, we are not less fitted than the high-brow Lords and Counts. Men of our guild from Thucydides and Herodotus to Petrarch and Rubens, and our Humboldt and your Beaconsfield have ever shown themselves to be good intermediaries and peace advocates. And that, believe me, Bernard Shaw, is of more importance to our people, as well as to our Kaiser, who for over twenty-five years has avoided war like a poison, than all other bloody laurels. Here's to a decent, honorable and "eternal" peace.

HERBERT EULENBERG.

British Authors Defend England's War

One of the most interesting documents brought forth about the war was issued Sept. 17 in London. It was signed by fifty-three of the leading British writers. Herewith are presented the text of their defense of England and their autograph signatures in facsimile.

The undersigned writers, comprising among them men of the most divergent political and social views, some of them having been for years ardent champions of good-will toward Germany, and many of them extreme advocates of peace, are nevertheless agreed that Great Britain could not without dishonor have refused to take part in the present war. No one can read the full diplomatic correspondence published in the "White Paper" without seeing that the British representatives were throughout laboring wholeheartedly to preserve the peace of Europe, and that their conciliatory efforts were cordially received by both France and Russia.

When these efforts failed Great Britain had still no direct quarrel with any

power. She was eventually compelled to take up arms because, together with France, Germany, and Austria, she had solemnly pledged herself to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. As soon as danger to that neutrality arose she questioned both France and Germany as to their intentions. France immediately renewed her pledge not to violate Belgian neutrality; Germany refused to answer, and soon made all answer needless by her actions. Without even the pretense of a grievance against Belgium she made war on the weak and unfending country she had undertaken to protect, and has since carried out her invasion with a calculated and ingenious ferocity which has raised questions other and no less grave than that of the willful disregard of treaties.

When Belgium in her dire need appealed to Great Britain to carry out her pledge, that country's course was clear. She had either to break faith, letting the

sanctity of treaties and the rights of small nations count for nothing before the threat of naked force, or she had to fight. She did not hesitate, and we trust she will not lay down arms till Belgium's integrity is restored and her wrongs redressed.

The treaty with Belgium made our duty clear, but many of us feel that, even if Belgium had not been involved, it would have been impossible for Great Britain to stand aside while France was dragged into war and destroyed. To permit the ruin of France would be a crime against liberty and civilization. Even those of us who question the wisdom of a policy of Continental ententes or alliances refuse to see France struck down by a foul blow dealt in violation of a treaty.

We observe that various German apologists, official and semi-official, admit that their country had been false to its pledged word, and dwell almost with pride on the "frightfulness" of the examples by which it has sought to spread terror in Belgium, but they excuse all these proceedings by a strange and novel plea. German culture and civilization are so superior to those of other nations that all steps taken to assert them are more than justified, and the destiny of Germany to be the dominating force in Europe and the world is so manifest that ordinary rules of morality do not hold in

her case, but actions are good or bad simply as they help or hinder the accomplishment of that destiny.

These views, inculcated upon the present generation of Germans by many celebrated historians and teachers, seem to us both dangerous and insane. Many of us have dear friends in Germany, many of us regard German culture with the highest respect and gratitude; but we cannot admit that any nation has the right by brute force to impose its culture upon other nations, nor that the iron military bureaucracy of Prussia represents a higher form of human society than the free Constitutions of Western Europe.

Whatever the world destiny of Germany may be, we in Great Britain are ourselves conscious of a destiny and a duty. That destiny and duty, alike for us and for all the English-speaking race, call upon us to uphold the rule of common justice between civilized peoples, to defend the rights of small nations, and to maintain the free and law-abiding ideals of Western Europe against the rule of "Blood and Iron" and the domination of the whole Continent by a military caste.

For these reasons and others the undersigned feel bound to support the cause of the Allies with all their strength, with a full conviction of its righteousness, and with a deep sense of its vital import to the future of the world.

R. C. Carton

Jerome K. Jerome

C. Weddell Chambers

Henry Arthur Jones

John Galsworthy

Thomas Hardy

Hubert Henry Davies


George Macaulay Trevelyan



George Otto Trevelyan

Arthur Conan Doyle

Humphrey Ward

H. A. L. Fisher


 Margaret L. Woods
 Anne Janyard.

 George R. Sims
 Mary Sinclair
 Flora Annie Steel
 Alfred Sutcliffe
 William Archer

 Granville Barker
 Annota Jewell
 Edward Frederic Benson.

 Robert Bridges
 Laurence Binyon
 A. C. Bradley
 Rudyard Kipling
 W. Locke
 E. V. Lucas
 H. S. Wells
 J. M. Barrie
 Robert Agn. Benson.
 Arthur Benson.
 Arthur Christopher Benson
 Mary Benson.
 Edmund Benson
 Mary A. Ward
 J. W. Mackail
 John Mackail.
 A. L. W. Mason
 Gilbert Murray
 Henry Newhall
 Orr Seaman
 A. J. Benson
 John Phillips
 H. Rider Haggard
 Jane Helen Harrison
 Anthony Hope Hawkins
 Mollie Rawle
 Robert Hichens

WHO'S WHO AMONG THE SIGNERS

WILLIAM ARCHER, dramatic critic and editor of Ibsen's works, author of "Life of Macready," "Real Conversations," "The Great Analysis," and (with Granville Barker) "A National Theatre."

H. GRANVILLE BARKER, actor, dramatist, and manager, shares with his wife management of the Kingsway Theatre, London; author of "The Voysey Inheritance," and (with Laurence Housman) "Prunella."

SIR JAMES MATTHEW BARRIE, creator of "Sentimental Tommy" and "Peter Pan," famous for his sympathetic studies of Scotch life and his fantastic comedies.

HILAIRE BELLOC, best known as a writer on history, politics, and economics; a recognized authority on the French Revolution.

ARNOLD BENNETT, author of many popular realistic studies of English provincial life, including "Clayhanger" and "Hilda Lessways."

ARTHUR CHRISTOPHER BENSON, chiefly known for "From a College Window," "Beside Still Waters," and other volumes of essays.

EDWARD FREDERIC BENSON, brother of the preceding, author of many novels of modern life, including "Dodo."

VERY REV. MONSIGNOR ROBERT HUGH BENSON, the youngest of the three famous Benson brothers. Besides numerous devotional and theological works, Monsignor Benson has written several widely appreciated historical novels.

- LAWRENCE BINYON, author of many lyrics and poetic dramas, Assistant Keeper in the British Museum, in charge of Oriental Prints and Drawings.
- ANDREW CECIL BRADLEY, critic, sometime Professor of Poetry at Oxford University, author of a standard work on Shakespeare.
- ROBERT BRIDGES, Poet-Laureate. Prominent as a physician before his poetry brought him the high honor he now enjoys.
- HALL CAINE, one of the most popular of contemporary novelists.
- R. C. CARTON, dramatist, author of "Lord and Lady Algy" and "A White Elephant."
- CHARLES HADDON CHAMBERS, dramatist, author of "John a Dreams," part author of "The Fatal Card."
- GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, essayist, novelist, poet; defender of orthodox thought by unorthodox methods.
- HUBERT HENRY DAVIES, dramatist, author of "The Mollusc" and "A Single Man."
- SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, creator of "Sherlock Holmes."
- HERBERT ALBERT LAURENS FISHER, Vice Chancellor of Sheffield University, author of "The Mediaeval Empire," "Napoleon Bonaparte," and other historical works.
- JOHN GALSWORTHY, a novelist and dramatist who has come into great prominence during the last five years, his plays, "Strife" and "Justice," and his novel, "The Dark Flower," being widely known.
- ANSTEY GUTHIE, (F. GUTHRIE,) author of "The Brass Bottle," "The Talking Horse," and other fantastic and humorous tales.
- SIR HENRY RIDER HAGGARD, author of many widely read romances, among them being "She."
- THOMAS HARDY, generally considered to be the greatest living English novelist.
- JANE ELLEN HARRISON, sometime Fellow and Lecturer at Newnham College, Cambridge University; writer of many standard works on classical religion, literature, and life.
- ANTHONY HOPE HAWKINS, (ANTHONY HOPE,) author of popular historical romance and sketches of modern society, including "The Prisoner of Zenda."
- MAURICE HEWLETT, poet and romantic novelist, author of "Earthworks Out of Tuscany" and other mediaeval tales.
- ROBERT HICHENS, novelist, author of "The Garden of Allah," "Bella Donna," and other stories.
- JEROME K. JEROME, humorist, famous for "Idle Thoughts of an Idle Fellow" and the "Three Men" series, and for his play "The Passing of the Third Floor Back."
- HENRY ARTHUR JONES, dramatist, author of "The Silver King," "The Hypocrites," and other plays.
- RUDYARD KIPLING needs no introduction to people who read the English language.
- WILLIAM J. LOCKE, author of "The Morals of Marcus," "Septimus," and "The Beloved Vagabond," which have been made into successful plays.
- EDWARD VERRAL LUCAS, associate editor of Punch and editor of several popular anthologies, author of "A Wanderer in Holland."
- JOHN WILLIAM MACKAIL, Professor of Poetry at Oxford University, author and editor of many volumes dealing with ancient Greek and Roman literature.
- JOHN MASEFIELD, known chiefly for his long poems of life among the British poor.
- ALFRED EDWARD WOODLEY MASON, writer of romantic novels, of which "The Four Feathers" and "The Turnstile" are perhaps the best known, and of several popular dramas.
- GILBERT MURRAY, Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford University since 1908, editor and translator of Greek classics, perhaps the greatest Greek scholar now living.
- HENRY NEWBOLT, "laureate of the British Navy," author of "Drake's Drum" and many other songs.
- BARRY PAIN, author of "Eliza" and other novels and short stories of adventure, of many well-known parodies and poems.
- SIR GILBERT PARKER, of Canadian birth, poet and author of romantic novels, including "The Judgment House," and "The Right of Way."
- EDEN PHILLPOTTS, realistic novelist, noted for his exact portraits of the English rustic, author of "Down Dartmoor Way."
- SIR ARTHUR WING PINERO, one of the most popular of living dramatists. His plays include "Sweet Lavender" and "The Second Mrs. Tanqueray."

SIR ARTHUR QUILLER-ROUCH, Professor of English Literature at Cambridge University, poet, novelist, and writer of short stories.

SIR OWEN SEAMAN, since 1906 editor of *Punch*, writer of parodies and light verse.

GEORGE R. SIMS, journalist, poet, and author of many popular dramas, including "The Lights of London," "Two Little Vagabonds," and "Harbour Lights."

MAY SINCLAIR, writer of novels dealing with modern moral problems, "The Divine Fire" and "The Combined Maze" being best known.

FLORA ANNIE STEEL, author of "Tales from the Punjab," "On the Face of the Waters," "A Prince of Dreamers," and other novels and short stories, most of which deal with life in India.

ALFRED SUTRO, dramatist, author of "The Walls of Jericho," "The Barrier," and other plays of modern society.

GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; author of "England Under the Stuarts" and other historical and biographical works.

RT. HON. GEORGE OTTO TREVELYAN, historian, biographer of Macaulay, and author of a four-volume work on the American Revolution.

HUMPHRY WARD, journalist and author, sometime Fellow of Brasenose College, editor of several biographical and historical works.

MARY A. WARD, (Mrs. HUMPHRY WARD,) best known of contemporary women novelists; her first success was "Robert Elsmere."

H. G. WELLS, novelist, author of "Tono Bungay" and "Ann Veronica."

MARGARET L. WOODS, poet; her "Wild Justice" and "The Invader" have placed her in the front rank.

ISRAEL ZANGWILL, novelist, poet, dramatist, interpreter of the modern Jewish spirit.

The Fourth of August—Europe at War

By H. G. Wells

Copyright, 1914, by The New York Times Company War Volumes

Europe is at war!

The monstrous vanity that was begotten by the easy victories of '70 and '71 has challenged the world, and Germany prepares to reap the harvest Bismarck sowed. That trampling, drilling foolery in the heart of Europe, that has arrested civilization and darkened the hopes of mankind for forty years. German imperialism, German militarism, has struck its inevitable blow. The victory of Germany will mean the permanent enthronement of the War God over all human affairs. The defeat of Germany may open the way to disarmament and peace throughout the earth.

To those who love peace there can be no other hope in the present conflict than the defeat, the utter discrediting of the German legend, the ending for good and all of the blood and iron superstition, of Krupp, flag-wagging Teutonic Kiplingism, and all that criminal, sham efficiency that centres in Berlin. Never was war so righteous as war against Germany now. Never has any State in the world so clamored for punishment.

But be it remembered that Europe's quarrel is with the German State, not with the German people; with a system, and not with a race. The older tradition of Germany is a pacific and civilizing tradition. The temperament of the mass of German people is kindly, sane, and amiable. Disaster to the German Army, if it is unaccompanied by any such memorable wrong as dismemberment or intolerable indignity, will mean the restoration of the greatest people in Europe to the fellowship of Western nations. The rôle of England in this huge struggle is plain as daylight. We have to fight. If only on account of the Luxemburg outrage, we have to fight. If

we do not fight, England will cease to be a country to be proud of; it will be a dirt-bath to escape from. But it is inconceivable that we should not fight. And having fought, then in the hour of victory it will be for us to save the liberated Germans from vindictive treatment, to secure for this great people their right, as one united German-speaking State, to a place in the sun.

First we have to save ourselves and Europe, and then we have to stand between German on the one hand and the Cossack and revenge on the other.

For my own part, I do not doubt that Germany and Austria are doomed to defeat in this war. It may not be catastrophic defeat, though even that is possible, but it is defeat. There is no destiny in the stars and every sign is false if this is not so.

They have provoked an overwhelming combination of enemies. They have underrated France. They are hampered by a bad social and military tradition. The German is not naturally a good soldier; he is orderly and obedient, but he is not nimble nor quick-witted; since his sole considerable military achievement, his not very lengthy march to Paris in '70 and '71, the conditions of modern warfare have been almost completely revolutionized and in a direction that subordinates the massed fighting of unintelligent men to the rapid initiative of individualized soldiers. And, on the other hand, since those years of disaster, the Frenchman has learned the lesson of humility; he is prepared now sombrely for a sombre struggle; his is the gravity that precedes astonishing victories. In the air, in the open field, with guns and machines, it is doubtful if any one fully realizes the superiority of his

quality to the German. This sudden attack may take him aback for a week or so, though I doubt even that, but in the end I think he will hold his own; even without us he will hold his own, and with us then I venture to prophesy that within three months from now his tricolor will be over the Rhine. And even suppose his line gets broken by the first rush. Even then I do not see how the Germans are to get to Paris or anywhere near Paris. I do not see how against the strength of the modern defensive and the stinging power of an intelligent enemy in retreat, of which we had a little foretaste in South Africa, the exploit of Sedan can be repeated. A retiring German army, on the other hand, will be far less formidable than a retiring French army, because it has less "devil" in it, because it is made up of men taught to obey in masses, because its intelligence is concentrated in its aristocratic officers, because it is dismayed when it breaks ranks. The German Army is everything the conscriptionists dreamed of making our people; it is, in fact, an army about twenty years behind the requirements of contemporary conditions.

On the eastern frontier the issue is more doubtful because of the uncertainty of Russian things. The peculiar military strength of Russia, a strength it was not able to display in Manchuria, lies in its vast resources of mounted men. A set invasion of Prussia may be a matter of many weeks, but the raiding possibilities in Eastern Germany are enormous. It is difficult to guess how far the Russian attack will be guided by intelligence, and how far Russia will blunder, but Russia will have to blunder very disastrously indeed before she can be put upon the defensive. A Russian raid is far more likely to threaten Berlin than a German to reach Paris.

Meanwhile there is the struggle on the sea. In that I am prepared for some rude shocks. The Germans have devoted an amount of energy to the creation of an aggressive navy that would have been spent more wisely in consolidating their European position. It is

probably a thoroughly good navy, and ship for ship the equal of our own. But the same lack of invention, the same relative uncreativity that has kept the German behind the Frenchman in things aerial has made him, regardless of his shallow seas, follow our lead in naval matters, and if we have erred, and I believe we have erred, in overrating the importance of the big battleship, the German has at least very obligingly fallen in with our error. The safest, most effective place for the German fleet at the present time is the Baltic Sea. On this side of the Kiel Canal, unless I overrate the powers of the waterplane, there is no safe harbor for it. If it goes into port anywhere that port can be ruined, and the bottled-up ships can be destroyed at leisure by aerial bombs. So that if they are on this side of the Kiel Canal they must keep the sea and fight, if we let them, before their coal runs short. Battle in the open sea in this case is their only chance. They will fight against odds, and with every prospect of a smashing, albeit we shall certainly have to pay for that victory in ships and men. In the Baltic we shall not be able to get at them without the participation of Denmark, and they may have a considerable use against Russia. But in the end, even there, mine and aeroplane and destroyer should do their work.

So I reckon that Germany will be held east and west, and that she will get her fleet practically destroyed. We ought also to be able to sweep her shipping off the seas, and lower her flag forever in Africa and Asia and the Pacific. All the probabilities, it seems to me, point to that. There is no reason why Italy should not stick to her present neutrality, and there is considerable inducement close at hand for both Denmark and Japan to join in, directly they are convinced of the failure of the first big rush on the part of Germany. All these issues will be more or less definitely decided within the next two or three months. By that time I believe German imperialism will be shattered, and it may be possible to anticipate the

end of the armaments phase of European history. France, Italy, England, and all the smaller powers of Europe are now pacific countries; Russia, after this huge war, will be too exhausted for further adventure; a shattered Germany will be a revolutionary Germany, as sick of uniforms and the imperialist idea as France was in 1871, as disillusioned about

predominance as Bulgaria is today. The way will be open at last for all these western powers to organize peace. That is why I, with my declared horror of war, have not signed any of these "stop-the-war" appeals and declarations that have appeared in the last few days. Every sword that is drawn against Germany now is a sword drawn for peace.

If the Germans Raid England

By H. G. Wells

In The London Times, Oct. 31, 1914

At the outset of the war I made a suggestion in your columns for the enrollment of all that surplus of manhood and patriotic feeling which remains after every man available for systematic military operations has been taken. My idea was that comparatively undrilled boys and older men, not sound enough for campaigning, armed with rifles, able to shoot straight with them, and using local means of transport, bicycles, cars, and so forth, would be a quite effective check upon an enemy's scouting, a danger to his supplies, and even a force capable of holding up a raiding advance—more particularly if that advance was poor in horses and artillery, as an overseas raid was likely to be. I suggested, too, that the mere enrollment and arming of the population would have a powerful educational effect in steadying and unifying the spirit of our people. My proposals were received with what seemed even a forced amusement by the "experts." I was told that I knew nothing about warfare, and that the Germans would not permit us to do anything of the sort. The Germans, it seems, are the authorities in these matters, a point I had overlooked. They

would refuse to recognize men with only improvised uniforms, they would shoot their prisoners—not that I had proposed that my irregulars should become prisoners—and burn the adjacent villages. This seemed to be an entirely adequate reply from the point of view of the expert mind, and I gathered that the proper rôle for such an able-bodied civilian as myself was to keep indoors while the invader was about and supply him as haughtily as possible with light refreshments and anything else he chose to requisition. I was also reminded that if only men like myself had obeyed their expert advice and worked in the past for national service and the general submission of everything to expert military direction, these troubles would not have arisen. There would have been no surplus of manhood and everything would have gone as smoothly and as well for England as—the Press Censorship.

An Improbable Invasion

For a time I was silenced. Under war conditions it is always a difficult question to determine how far it is better to obey poor, or even bad, directions or to criticise them in the hope of getting better. But the course of the war since

that correspondence and the revival of the idea of a raid by your military correspondent provoke me to return to this discussion. Frankly, I do not believe in that raid, and I think we play the German game in letting our minds dwell upon it. I am supposed to be a person of feverish imagination, but even by lashing my imagination to its ruddiest I cannot, in these days of wireless telegraphy, see a properly equipped German force, not even so trivial a handful as 20,000 of them, getting itself with guns, motors, ammunition, and provisions upon British soil. I cannot even see a mere landing of infantrymen. I believe in that raid even less than I do in the suggested raid of navigables that has darkened London. I admit the risk of a few aeroplane bombs in London, but I do not see why people should be subjected to danger, darkness, and inconvenience on account of that one-in-a-million risk. Still, as the trained mind does insist upon treating all unenlisted civilians as panic-stricken imbeciles and upon frightening old ladies and influential people with these remote possibilities, and as it is likely that these alarms may even lead to the retention of troops in England when their point of maximum effectiveness is manifestly in France, it becomes necessary to insist upon the ability of our civilian population, if only the authorities will permit the small amount of organization and preparation needed, to deal quite successfully with any raid that in an extremity of German "boldness" may be attempted.

And, in the first place, let the expert have no illusions as to what we ordinary people are going to do if we find German soldiers in England one morning. We are going to fight. If we cannot fight with rifles, we shall fight with shotguns, and if we cannot fight according to rules of war apparently made by Germans for the restraint of British military experts, we will fight according to our inner light. Many men, and not a few women, will turn out to shoot Germans. There will be no preventing them after the Belgian stories. If the experts attempt any pedantic interference, we will shoot the

experts. I know that in this matter I speak for so sufficient a number of people that it will be quite useless and hopelessly dangerous and foolish for any expert-instructed minority to remain "tame." They will get shot, and their houses will be burned according to the established German rules and methods on our account, so they may just as well turn out in the first place, and get some shooting as a consolation in advance for their inevitable troubles. And if the raiders, cut off by the sea from their supports, ill-equipped as they will certainly be, and against odds, are so badly advised as to try terror-striking reprisals on the British pattern, we irregulars will, of course, massacre every German straggler we can put a gun to. Naturally. Such a procedure may be sanguinary, but it is just the common sense of the situation. We shall hang the officers and shoot the men. A German raid to England will in fact not be fought—it will be lynched. War is war, and reprisals and striking terror are games that two can play at. This is the latent temper of the British countryside, and the sooner the authorities take it in hand and regularize it the better will be the outlook in the remote event of that hypothetical raid getting home to us. Levity is a national characteristic, but submissiveness is not. Under sufficient provocation the English are capable of very dangerous, bad temper, and the expert is dreaming who thinks of a German expedition moving through an apathetic Essex, for example, resisted only by the official forces trained and in training.

And whatever one may think of the possibility of raids, I venture to suggest that the time has come when the present exclusive specialization of our combatant energy upon the production of regulation armies should cease. The gathering of these will go on anyhow; there are unlimited men ready for intelligent direction. Now that the shortage of supplies and accommodation has been remedied the enlistment sluices need only be opened again. The rank and file of this country is its strength; there is no need,

and there never has been any need, for press hysterics about recruiting. But there is wanted a far more vigorous stimulation of the manufacture of material—if only experts and rich people would turn their minds to that. It is the trading and manufacturing class that needs goading at the present time. It is very satisfactory to send troops to France, but in France there are still great numbers of able-bodied, trained Frenchmen not fully equipped. It is our national duty and privilege to be the storehouse and arsenal of the Allies. Our factories for clothing and material of all sorts should be working day and night. There is the point to which enthusiasm should be turned. It is just as heroic and just as useful to the country to kill yourself making belts and boots as it is to die in a trench. But our organization for the enrollment and utilization of people not in the firing line is still amazingly unsatisfactory. The one convenient alternative to enlistment as a combatant at present is hospital work. But this is really far more urgent to direct enthusiasm and energy now to the production of war material. If this war does not end, as all the civilized world hopes it will end, in the complete victory of the Allies, our failure will not be through any shortage of men, but through a shortage of gear and organizing ability. It will not be through a default of the people, but through the slackness of the governing class.

Arms and Equipment Needed

Now so far as the enrollment of us goes, of the surplus people who are willing to be armed and to be used for quasi-military work at home, but who are not of an age or not of a physique or who are already in shop or office serving some quite useful purpose at home, we want certain very simple things from the authorities. We want the military status that is conferred by a specific enrollment and some sort of uniform. We want accessible arms. They need not be modern service weapons; the rifles of ten years ago are quite good enough for the possible need we shall have for them. And we

want to be sure that in the possible event of an invasion the Government will have the decision to give every man in the country a military status by at once resorting to the *levée en masse*. Given a recognized local organization and some advice—it would not take a week of Gen. Baden-Powell's time, for example, to produce a special training book for us—we could set to work upon our own local drill, rifle practice, and exercises, in such hours and ways as best suited our locality. We could also organize the local transport, list local supplies, and arrange for their removal or destruction if threatened. Finally, we could set to work to convert a number of ordinary cars into fighting cars by reconstructing and armoring them and exercising crews. And having developed a discipline and self-respect as a fighting force, we should be available not only for fighting work at home, in the extremely improbable event of a raid, but also for all kinds of supplementary purposes, as a reserve of motor drivers, as a supply of physically exercised and half-trained recruits in the events of an extended standard, and as a guarantee of national discipline under any unexpected stress. Above all, we should be relieving the real fighting forces of the country for the decisive area, which is in France and Belgium now and will, I hope, be in Westphalia before the Spring.

At present we non-army people are doing only a fraction of what we would like to do for our country. We are not being used. We are made to feel out of it, and we watch the not always very able proceedings of the military authorities and the international mischief making of the Censorship with a bitter resentment that is restrained only by the supreme gravity of the crisis. For my own part I entertain three Belgians and make a young officer possible by supplementing his expenses, and my wife knits things. A neighbor, an able-bodied man of 42 and an excellent shot, is occasionally permitted to carry a recruit to Chelmsford. If I try to use my pen on behalf of my country abroad, where I have a few friends and readers, what I

write is exposed to the clumsy editing and delays of anonymous and apparently irresponsible officials. So practically I am doing nothing, and a great number of people are doing very little more. The authorities are concentrated upon the creation of an army numerically vast, and for the rest they seem to think that the chief function of government is inhibition. Their available energy and ability is taxed to the utmost in maintaining the fighting line, and it is sheer

greed for direction that has led to their systematic thwarting of civilian co-operation. Let me warn them of the boredom and irritation they are causing. This is a people's war, a war against militarism; it is not a war for the greater glory of British diplomatists, officials, and people in uniforms. It is our war, not their war, and the last thing we intend to result from it is a permanently increased importance for the military caste.

H. G. WELLS.

Sir Oliver Lodge's Comment

In a strikingly vigorous letter Mr. H. G. Wells claims that a nation of which every individual prefers death to submission is unconquerable and cannot be successfully invaded. Ways of hampering an army are too numerous, if people are willing to run every risk, not only for themselves but for those dependent on them.

This may be admitted. And we may also agree that the British race would be likely to risk everything if the consequences of carefully engendered hate were loosed upon us. But here comes a point worthy of consideration. An invasion of England is, to say the least, unlikely; an invasion of Germany may soon have to be undertaken. May it not add to the difficulties of our troops if a policy of "arming every woman, child, and cat and dog" is favorably regarded by us? Is not such a policy a sort of left-handed outcome of the Prussian contention that even their own unarmed civilian populace is contemptible and may be slaughtered without mercy if military procedure is resisted, or even if supplies are not forthcoming?

It will be difficult, and I hope impossible, for the Allies to act in accordance

with this latter view; though the German peasantry may have been so fed with lies that it will be unable to believe that our soldiers can be trusted to behave like civilized beings when the time has come for a forward march. It is clear that riotous license is subversive of discipline, and conduces to defeat—as it probably has in recent Continental experience. For, although ancient warriors used to ravage a country, and although women have occasionally intervened in order to stop a battle, surely never before in the history of the world have women and children been forced forward in defense of a fighting line! Yet undoubtedly war can be so conducted that foes mutually respect each other; indeed, save for the cowardly abomination of floating mines, this present war has been so conducted at sea. I suggest that the fair procedure in case of invasion is for each civilian to choose whether to be a combatant or not, and to incur the danger of an affirmative choice in a sufficiently conspicuous and permanent manner. I am, Sir, faithfully yours,

OLIVER LODGE.

The University, Birmingham, Oct. 31.

What the German Conscript Thinks

By Arnold Bennett

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Some hold that this is a war of Prussian militarism, and not a war of the German people. This view has the merits of kindness and convenience. Others warn us not to be misled by such sentimentalists, and assert that the heart of the German people is in the war. The point is of importance to us, because the work of the conscript in the field must be influenced by his private feelings. Notwithstanding all drill and sergeantry, the German Army remains a collection of human beings—and human beings more learned, if not better educated, than our own race! It is not a mere fighting machine, despite the efforts of its leaders to make it into one.

Among those who assert that the heart of the German people is in the war are impartial and experienced observers who have carefully studied Germany for many years. For myself, I give little value to their evidence. To come at the truth by observation about a foreign country is immensely, overpoweringly difficult. I am a professional observer: I have lived in Paris and in the French provinces for nine years; I am fairly familiar with French literature and very familiar with the French language—and I honestly would not trust myself to write even a shilling handbook about French character and life. Nearly all newspapers are conservative; nearly all foreign correspondents adopt the official or conventional point of view; and the pictures of foreign life which get into the press are, as a rule—shall I say incomplete?

Even when the honest observer says, "These things I saw with my own eyes and will vouch for," I am not convinced that he saw enough. An intelligent foreigner with first-class introductions might go through England and see with his own eyes that England was longing

for protection, the death of home rule, and the repeal of the Insurance act. The unfortunate Prince Lichnowsky, after an exhaustive inquiry and access to the most secret sources of exclusive information, telegraphed to the Kaiser less than a month ago that civil war was an immediate certainty throughout Ireland. Astounding fatuity? Not at all. English observers of England have made, and constantly do make, mistakes equally prodigious. See Hansard every month. So that when I read demonstrations of the thesis that the heart of the German people is in the war, I am not greatly affected by them.

German Heart Is in the War

Still, I do myself believe that the heart of the German people is in the war, and that that heart is governed by two motives—the motive of self-defense against Russia and the motive of overbearing self-aggrandizement. I do not base my opinion on phenomena which I have observed. Beyond an automobile journey through Schleswig-Holstein, which was formidably tedious, and a yacht journey through the Kiel Canal and Kiel Bay, which was somewhat impressive, I have never traveled in Germany at all. I base my opinion on general principles. In a highly educated and civilized country such as Germany (the word "civilized" must soon take on a new significance!) it is impossible that an autocracy, even a military autocracy, could exist unrooted in the people. "Prussian militarism" may annoy many Germans, but it pleases more than it annoys, and there can be few Germans who are not flattered by it. That the lower classes have an even more tremendous grievance against the upper classes in Germany than in England or France is a

certitude. But the existence and power of the army are their reward, their sole reward, for all that they have suffered in hardship and humiliation at the hands of the autocracy. It is the autocracy's bribe and sweetmeat to them.

The Germans are a great nation; they have admirable qualities, but they have also defects, and among their defects is a clumsy arrogance, which may be noticed in any international hotel frequented by Germans. It is a racial defect, and to try to limit it to the military autocracy is absurd. An educated and civilized nation has roughly the Government that it wants and deserves. And it has in the end ways of imposing itself on its apparent rulers that are more effective than the ballot box or the barricade, and just as sure. No election was needed to prove to the Italian Government that Italy did not want to fight for the Triple Alliance, and would not fight for it. The fact was known; it was immanent in the air, beyond all arguments and persuasions. Italy breathed a negative, and war was not. So in Germany the mass of Germans have for years breathed war, and war is. The war may be autocratic, dynastic, what you will; but it is also national, and it symbolizes the national defect.

How About the Leaders?

Does the German conscript believe in the efficacy of his leaders? I mean when he is lying awake and fatigued at night, not when he is shouting "Hoch!" or watching the demeanor of women in front of him. Does no doubt ever lancinate him? Again I would answer the question from general principles and not from observation. The German conscript must know what everybody knows—that in almost every bully there is a coward. And he must know that he is led by bullies. He learned that in the barrack yard. An enormous number of conscripts must also know that there is something seriously wrong with a system that for the sake of its own existence has killed freedom of the press. And the million little things that are wrong in the system he also knows out of his own daily life as a conscript. Further, he must be aware

that there is a dearth of really great men in his system. In the past there were in Germany men great enough to mesmerize Europe — Bismarck and von Moltke. There is none today that appeals to the popular imagination as Kitchener does in England or Joffre in France. Alone, in Germany, the Kaiser has been able to achieve a Continental renown. The Kaiser has good qualities. But twenty-four years ago he committed an act of folly and (one may say) "bad form" which nothing but results could justify, and which results have not justified. Whatever his good qualities may be it is an absolute certainty that common sense, foresight, and mental balance are not among them. The conscript feels that, if he does not state it clearly to himself. And as for the military organization of which the Kaiser is the figurehead, it has shown for many years past precisely those signs which history teaches us are signs of decay. It has not withstood the fearful ordeal of success. Just lately, if not earlier, the conscript must have felt that, too.

What is the conclusion? Take the average conscript, the member of the lower middle class. He is accustomed to think politically, because at least fifty out of every hundred of him are professed Socialists with a definite and bitter political program against certain manifestations of the autocracy. (It is calculated that two-fifths of the entire army is Socialist.) He may not argue very closely while in the act of war; indeed, he could not. But enormous experience is accumulated in his subconsciousness — experience of bullying and cowardice, of humiliation, of injustice, of lying, and of his own most secret shortcomings—for he, too, is somewhat of the bully, out for self-aggrandizement as well as for self-defense, and his conscience privately tells him so. The organization is still colossal, magnificent, terrific. In the general fever of activity he persuades himself that nothing can withstand the organization; but at the height of some hand-to-hand crisis, when one-hundredth of a dogged grain of obstinacy will turn the scale, he may remember an insult from an incompetent

officer, or the protectionism at home which puts meat beyond his purse in order to enrich the landowner, or even the quite penal legislation of the autocracy against the co-operative societies

of the poor, and the memory (in spite of him) may decide a battle. Men think of odd matters in a battle, and it is a scientific certainty that, at the supreme pinch, the subconscious must react.

The German Philosophy

By Felix Adler

Founder and Leader of the Ethical Culture Society

Apropos of a recent article by Mr. Arnold Bennett, wherein he speaks of the resentment which the German soldiers—two-fifths of them Socialists—must feel against the bullying discipline to which they have been subjected, the following reflections are jotted down. The reader who is interested in pursuing the subject further may profitably consult a book entitled "Imperial Germany," by Prince von Bülow, which contains some penetrating observations on the workings of the German mind, as well as the chapter on Germany in Alfred Fouillée's notable work, "Esquisse Psychologique des Peuples Européens."

The precision which characterizes the operations of the German military machine is due to the German notion of discipline. Discipline in Germany is based on the peculiar place assigned to the expert. Military experts exercise in their branch an authority different in degree but not in kind from that belonging to experts in other departments—strategy, tactics, improvements of armament, methods of mobilization. The inexpert soldier submits to the military expert as a person about to undergo a necessary operation would submit to a surgeon. It is a mistake to suppose that the Germans, a highly intelligent and educated people, are being cowed into submission by brutal non-commissioned officers. Brutality, when it occurs, is looked upon as exceptional and incidental to a system on the whole approved. The Germans would never tolerate the severe discipline to which they are subjected did they not willingly submit to it. They

regard a highly efficient army as necessary to the safety of the Fatherland, and they are willing to leave the responsibility for the means of securing efficiency to the experts. During the Franco-German war, when a student in the University of Berlin, I talked with some of the brightest of the younger men about their military obligations, and I found that they took precisely the view just stated. The Pomeranian peasant may submit to military dictation in a dull, half-instinctive fashion. The flower and élite of German intelligence submit to it no less—from conviction.

How shall we account for the unique predominance of the expert in German life? The explanation would seem to lie in the phrase invented by a brilliant writer of the last century, "Deutschland ist Hamlet" (Germany is Hamlet). The Germans are a resolute people—not at all, as has been erroneously supposed, a nation of dreamers—just as Hamlet, according to recent criticism, was essentially of a resolute character. In the days of the Hansa and of the Hohenstaufen the Germans cut a great figure in overseas commerce and in war. They were great doers of deeds. The Germans are intensely volitional, but also intensely intellectual. Hence the native hue of resolution has sometimes been sicklied o'er by too much thinking. The intellect of the German refuses to sanction action until the successive steps to be taken have been worked out with logical accuracy, and a scientific groove, so to speak, has been hollowed out along which action can proceed. As soon as

this is accomplished, the flood of volitional impulse enters gladly into the channel prepared for it and moves on in it with irresistible force. Bismarck represents the active side, as the eminent philosophers of the German people represent the side of logical construction. The two sides must be taken together to understand German history and the tendencies prevailing in Germany today.

Underneath it all, of course, is German sentiment, but of this we need take no account in discussing German discipline, except in so far as love for the Fatherland enters in to sustain the patience of the people under the burden of their military establishment.

Discipline, or the subordination of the inexpert to the expert, likewise accounts for certain peculiarities of the German political parties. Prince von Bülow mentions three examples of supremely efficient organization—the Prussian Army, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and the German Social Democracy. There are some 4,200 Socialist associations, subject to the orders of forty-two district associations, these in turn being ruled by the Central Committee. The working of the Social Democratic machine is almost flawless. The discipline, it is said, is iron.

Again, the conception of Government in Germany, unlike that which prevails in England, France, or America, is deter-

mined by the idea of expertness. The Government is the political expert par excellence. Its business is to study the interests of the State as a whole. In all matters of economic theory, of finance, of administration, of social reform, it invokes the advice of specialists. But it is itself the supreme political specialist. It stands high above all the political parties. It does not depend for its existence on majorities in Parliament. It seeks the co-operation of Parliament, but reserves to itself the right of initiative and leadership.

The object of the above remarks is to explain, not to justify, and in the face of much uninstructed criticism to point out the deep sources in the nature of the German people from which spring the influences that have molded their life. The chief objections to their system may be summarized in the statements, that it takes too little account of the value of the inexpert; that it tends to suppress latent spontaneity; and, especially in the sphere of government, that it ascribes to the expert a knowledge of the needs of the people such as no ruling class can ever possess. And it overlooks the highest aim of political life and activity, which is the education of the inexpert to such a point that they may become more or less expert in understanding and promoting the public weal.

FELIX ADLER.

When Peace Is Seriously Desired

By Arnold Bennett

When peace is seriously desired in any quarter, the questions to be discussed by the plenipotentiaries will fall into three groups:

1. Those which affect all Europe.
2. Those which chiefly affect Western Europe.
3. Those which chiefly affect Eastern Europe.

The first group is, of course, the most important, both practically and sentimentally. And the main question in it is the question of Belgium. The original cause of the war was Germany's deliberate and advertised bellicosity, and it might be thought that the first aim of peace would be by some means to extinguish that bellicosity. But relative values may change during the progress of a war, and the question of Belgium—which means the question of the sanction of international pledges—now stands higher in the general view than the question of disarmament. Germany has outraged the public law of Europe, and she has followed up her outrage with a series of the most cowardly and wanton crimes. She ought to pay, and she ought to apologize. Only by German payment and German apology can international law be vindicated. Germany should pay a sum large enough to do everything that money can do toward the re-establishment of Belgium's well-being. I have no competence to suggest the amount of the indemnity. A hundred million pounds does not appear to me too large.

Then the apology. It may be asked: Why an apology? Would not an apology be implied in the payment of an indemnity?

It is undeniable that Germany is now directed by hysteric stupidity wielding a bludgeon. Granted, if you will, that half the nation is at heart against the stupidity and the bludgeon. So much the

worse for the half. Citizens who have not had the wit to get rid of the Prussian franchise law must accept all the consequences of their political ineffectiveness. The peacemakers will not be able to divide Germany into two halves.

For Potsdam a first-rate spectacular effect is needed, and that effect would best be produced by a German national apology carried by a diplomatic mission with ceremony to Brussels and published in all German official papers, and emphasized by a procession of Belgian troops down Unter den Linden. This visible abasement of German arms in front of the Socialists of Berlin would be an invaluable aid to the breaking of military tyranny in Prussia.

So much for the Belgian question and the sanction of international pledges. The other question affecting the whole of Europe is the hope of a universal limitation of armaments. But there is a particular question, touching France, which in practice would come before that. I mean Alsace-Lorraine. Unless Germany conquers Europe, Alsace-Lorraine should be restored to France. A profound national sentiment, to which all conceivable considerations of expediency or ultimate advantage are unimportant, demands imperatively the return of the plunder. And in the councils of the Allies, either alone or with German representatives, the attitude of French diplomacy would be: "Is it clear about Alsace-Lorraine? If so, we may proceed. If not, it's no use going any further."

Question of Armaments

We now come to armaments. I have seen it suggested that the destruction of Essen, Wilhelmshaven, and Heligoland ought to be a condition of peace with Germany. Certainly the disappearance of these phenomena would be a gain

to the world. So would the disappearance of Rosyth and Toulon. It seems to me, however, very improbable that their destruction or dismantling by international command would occur after hostilities have ceased, or could usefully so occur. If the French Army on its way to Berlin can treat the Krupp factory as the German Army on its way to Paris treated Rheims Cathedral, well and good! In fact, most excellent! And if the British Navy can somehow emasculate Wilhelmshaven and Heligoland I shall not complain that its behavior has been purely doctrinaire. But otherwise I see nothing practical in the Essen-Wilhelmshaven-Heligoland suggestion. Nor in the project for dethroning the Kaiser and sending him and his eldest son to settle their differences in St. Helena! The Kaiser—happily—is not a Napoleon, nor has he yet himself accomplished anything big enough or base enough to merit Napoleon's fate. Any dethroning that may enliven the gray monotony of the post-bellum era at Potsdam should and will be done by the German soldiers themselves. Even in international politics it is futile to try to meddle in other people's private affairs.

Disarmament in Germany can be achieved by the exercise of one principle, and one principle only. That principle is the principle of mutuality. A scheme in which every nation will proportionately share should be presented to Germany, and she should be respectfully but quite firmly asked to participate in it. There would be no sense in saying to Germany: "You must disarm." The magic words would be: "We are going to disarm, and so are you, whether you want to or not." As to the procedure of disarmament—whether it shall be slow or fast, whether it shall include destruction or be content with mere omission to renew, how the proportions shall be decided, who shall give the signal to begin—here are matters which I am without skill or desire to discuss. All I know about them is that they are horribly complicated, unprecedentedly difficult, and bursting with danger; and that they will strain the wisdom, patience, and ingenuity of the negotiators to the very utmost.

Three Vital Points

Compared to disarmament, all remaining questions whatsoever affecting peace are simple and secondary. Indemnities for France or Russia, or both, a Polish Kingdom, a Balkan United States, the precise number of nations into which Austria-Hungary is to be shattered, the ownership of the east coast of the Adriatic, even the reparation of the infamy by which Denmark was robbed of Schleswig-Holstein—what are these but favorable ground for the art of compromise? The vital points, at any rate for us Westerners, are only three: Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and disarmament. * * * Stay, there is another. It is vital to Great Britain's reputation that she should accept nothing—neither indemnity nor colonies; not a single pound, not a single square mile.

Many persons, I gather, find it hard to believe that Prussia will ever admit that she is beaten or consent to her own humiliation. Naturally her conduct will depend upon the degree to which she is beaten. She has admitted defeat and swallowed the leek before, though it is a long time ago. Meanwhile she has forgotten, and her opponents seem to have forgotten also, that though her name is Prussia she is subject to the limitations of the human race. Out of her prodigious score off little Denmark, her thrashing of Austria—a country which never wins a war—and her victory over France, there grew a legend that Prussia, and therefore Germany, was not as other nations. This legend is contrary to fact. Every nation must yield to force—here, indeed, is Germany's contribution to our common knowledge.

If in July, 1870, it had been prophesied that France would give up Alsace-Lorraine and pay two hundred millions to get rid of a foreign army of occupation, France would have protested that she would fight to the last man and to the last franc first. But nations don't do these things. If Germany won the present war and fulfilled her dream of establishing an army in this island, we should yield, and we should submit

to her terms, we who have never been beaten save by our own colonies—that is a scientific certainty. And Germany's terms would not be amusing; in their terribleness they would outrun our poor Anglo-Saxon imagination. Similarly, if Germany is beaten, she will bow the head, and to precisely the extent to which she is walloped. We need not worry about that. Were she recalcitrant we need not even murmur in her ear: "What would you have extorted if you'd won?" A gesture of the still uplifted sword would suffice to convince her that facts are facts.

Assuming that the tide turns not again, the chances of a thorough, workmanlike common-sense peace can only be imperiled by one thing—the deep desire of France and of Belgium for repose and recuperation. We in England do not know what war is. We have not lived in hell. Our plains have not been devastated, nor our women and children shot, nor our ears deafened by the boom of cannon, nor our cathedrals shelled, nor our land turned into a vast and bloody hospital; and we have not experienced the appalling terror and shame of the foes' absolute dominion in our streets and lanes. We have suffered; we shall suffer; but our suffering is nought and less than nought weighed against the suffering on the Continent. Why, in the midst of a war of unparalleled horror, we

grumble if a train is late! We can talk calmly of fighting Germany to a standstill, even if the job takes two years, and it behooves us to talk so, and to prepare for the task; and for myself I am convinced that we could make good the word. But France and Belgium will not use that tone, if Russia does. Once the German armies are across the frontiers, the instinctive pressure in favor of peace would be enormous, and considerations of the distant future, of the welfare of our descendants and the progress of mankind, would count little in the scale. In that moment, if it happily comes, our part and Russia's would be to sustain and encourage and salve the supreme victims of fate. A tremendous factor in our favor would be the exhaustion of Germany; and the measure of our power and of the fear we inspire is the furious intensity of Germany's anger against our inconvenient selves. Without us the war could not last beyond the end of this year, and the peace would be unsatisfactory.

And even with us, insisting on our own terms of reconciliation, I do not see how it can last over six months more on anything like the present scale, for the Kaiser, despite his kinship with Deity, can neither create men nor extract gold coins out of an empty hat. Military arguments, in Germany as elsewhere, hold good only for a certain period.

Japan and the European Armageddon

By Count Okuma

Premier of Japan

IN a signed article that appeared in the Japan Magazine for November, 1914, Count Okuma, Premier of Japan, discussed Japanese ideals in the war. Defining war as "the result of the pressure offered in resistance to the growth of civilization," Count Okuma said:

"It will be our ambition at this time to show the West what it is slow to believe, that we can work harmoniously with great Occidental powers to support and protect the highest ideals of civilization, even to the extent of dying for them."

The article in part was as follows:

"As one who has been a lifelong friend of peace I profoundly deplore the unwelcome fact that mankind somehow seems unable as yet to avert war. But war, it seems to me, is always due to an unevenness of advancement in the progress of civilization. I have often said, and I now repeat it, that civilization, like water, must find its level; and where its pace is obstructed there will be violence and bloodshed. War is a result of the pressure offered in resistance to the growth of civilization. Anything tending to destroy a balance of power among nations will lead to disturbance.

"The root of the present trouble in Europe, I am inclined to think, lies in the weakness of the Balkan Peninsula. Like China, it is a seething crater in the world's diplomacy. The unequal civilizations of that peninsula are in constant clash and antagonism. Disruption would long ago have come but for the unnatural pressure of the great European powers. The small nations of the Balkan Peninsula are either constantly clamoring about their own rights or disputing with the larger nations who press them. Consequently, from conditions apparently insignificant in themselves,

half the world can be set on fire and plunged into distress and decimation. Europe is today a hell of exploding shells and poisonous powder fumes, all emanating from a quarrel between little Serbia and Austria.

"The resultant war is the greatest in extent and consequences involved that the world has ever seen. It is difficult for us to realize that the greatest war of history has begun. The machine guns, airplanes, airships, telephones, huge battleships, torpedoes, and submarines now used in the destruction of an enemy were undreamed of in Napoleonic days. The total cost of the war cannot be less than \$50,000,000,000, to say nothing of the destruction of European civilization and the losses in property and life.

"But it is not Europe alone that is affected by this terrible outrage upon human civilization. Europe, being the centre of the world's monetary circulation, all countries are injured financially. Commerce and shipping are likewise unfavorably affected. The fact was brought home to us in Japan when on the outbreak of the war in Europe we could not so much as draw a foreign bill of exchange. As the nations at strife possess colonies in various parts of the world, the war will spread everywhere. From Northern Canada to Central Africa, and from Britain to Japan, all are involved. Even Australia, New Zealand, and the islands of the South Seas will not escape.

"Japan, too, has to do her part, and has already been intrusted with the protection of shipping in Far Eastern waters, obliging her to dislodge Germany from occupation of Kiao-Chau. Japan must maintain the peace of the Far East at all costs; and as Germany

has begun to capture and interfere with shipping in these waters, our duty is plain.

"Such is the meaning of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; it was concluded for just such an emergency as this. We owe it to ourselves and to our ally to take the course we are adopting. Japan has no desire to resort to arms without undoubted necessity. But we must do our duty and sustain peace. We are the only people at this moment who can guarantee peace in the Far East. How great, then, is the mission of Japan!

"It will be our one ambition at this time to show the West what it is slow to believe, that we can work harmoniously with great Occidental powers to support and protect the highest ideals of civilization, even to the extent of dying for them. Not only in the Far

East, but anywhere else that may be necessary, Japan is ready to lay down her life for the principles that the foremost nations will die for. It is to be in line with these nations that she is at this time opposing and fighting what she believes to be opposed to these principles. She entered the alliance with Great Britain to stand for and die for what Anglo-Saxons are everywhere ready to defend, even unto death.

"It is Japan's aim and ambition to participate in all world movements toward noble diplomacy, international relations, and the principle of equal opportunity and peace, and to prevent by the proper means the outbreak or continuance of bloodshed between nations. Japan's relation to the present conflict is as a defender of the things that make for higher civilization and a more permanent peace."

How Tsing-tao Fell

By the Correspondent of the Japan Advertiser

From a long and detailed narrative of the capture of Tsing-tao, cabled from Japanese Headquarters at Shantung on Nov. 8, 1914, the following extracts descriptive of the fall of the German fortress are taken:

Early on the morning of Nov. 7, after two days of heavy firing upon the German forts at Tsing-tao, General Horiuchi and General Yamada charged the redoubts. For days the Japanese infantry had been standing in trenches filled with water from incessant rain, and the troops were impatient to begin the attack.

But the attack was short lived. No sooner had the Japanese forces swarmed the German redoubts and captured Forts 2, 3, and 4 than there was a lull in the German firing and a white flag was seen hoisted from the staff on Fort C.

Instantly the Japanese soldiers burst into mighty "banzai" for the Emperor. Out of trenches directly under the noses of German guns and from the hills about they swarmed, cheering and shouting. In fifteen minutes Iltis, Bismarck, Moltke, and the other German forts were alive with hundreds of Japanese soldiers. The

German garrison at Tsing-tao had surrendered.

2,000 Germans Drop Their Guns

Of the German garrison that surrendered, more than 2,000 men dropped their guns as they ceased firing, and were quickly marched out of the forts and collected on the main roadways leading into Tsing-tao.

Japanese soldiers went about collecting German guns, shells, and cartridges scattered all about the forts, while others were cutting the barbed-wire entanglements that stretched in an endless fabric from Kiao-Chau Bay around the forts to the Yellow Sea, on the opposite side of Tsing-tao. Whole sections of wire entanglements had been cut away during the morning attack by Japanese officers and soldiers, and it was through these defiles that the troops swarmed just before the white flag was flown.

All of the German forts, especially the central fort, were masses of broken-down walls, shattered concrete, twisted steel pipes, and caved-in redoubt walls. The heavy Japanese shells had torn their way through walls and high parapets and had

left the ground strewn with their wreckage. Immense holes, as if trees had been pulled from the ground, scarred the embankments.

Beds Beside the Guns

Near the coast forts we passed many blanket beds where the German defenders had snatched a bit of sleep while their machine guns, just a foot away, were cooling. Long ribbons of cartridges containing 100 to 300 shells lay beside the beds, ready to be slipped into the guns.

Below the parapet walls was the utmost confusion. The odor of burned powder still lingered along the walls, and scattered about was half-eaten food, blankets, guns, cartridges, transportation wagons, and stretchers, covered with blood and pieces of exploded shells. Above, on the next embankment, we passed some fresh graves that evidently had been made earlier in the morning.

Above some were little wooden crosses made out of cartridge-box staves. Many of them bore no inscription whatever.

Just beyond these graves I came upon a group of dead German soldiers. Blood was still flowing from their wounds, and I judged they were men who had been killed in the final charge of the Japanese troops. One man had his right arm up against his face as if to shield himself from the shot that had penetrated his cheek, while still another evidently had died in a sitting posture, with a gun in his hand.

Hissed As a Britisher

I entered Tsing-tao on the road directly back of the Moltke, Bismarck, and Itlis forts just as the British Sikh troops were pouring in. German prisoners had been collected near a building opposite the Kiao-Chau police station, and here they hooted and hissed at me as I passed by.

They had evidently taken me for a British subject. One German stood at the side of the road and, taking off his hat, marked "Infantry, Kiao-Chau," shouted at me: "Three cheers for Transvaal! Yes, and here is one of the Boers who was there."

Many of the buildings about this avenue had gaunt holes in the roofs, where stray shells had landed, while in others panes of glass had been shattered, evidently from the concussion of the heavy siege guns on the German forts near by. Along the wood, wagons, appearing much like hayracks and driven by Germans bearing Red Cross badges on their sleeves, rumbled and rattled along, still bearing wounded men from the forts to the brewery near by, which had been made into a hospital. The first change of things in the surrender of Tsing-tao was noted at this brewery, where some one had pasted a sign over its doorway marked "Anglo-German Brewery, Hongkong."

Groups of soldiers in the British expeditionary force passed along this roadway, some assisting their fellows who had become sick or who were crippled. These soldiers had luncheon, while officers went about congratulating the men.

Japanese Flags Everywhere

As we left Tsing-tao, Japanese flags were flying from every fort and peak in the neighborhood. A group of German prisoners, being marched to headquarters, was soon caught up with, and again there were murmurings of "English" as I passed through, with much jostling from the sides. * * *

Tsing-tao itself is practically undamaged. Only a few buildings in the rear of the forts and in the suburbs were hit by stray shells. Kiao-Chau Bay, however, is unsafe for navigation.

A "Credo" for Keeping Faith

By John Galsworthy

I believe in peace with all my heart. I believe that war is outrage—a black stain on the humanity and the fame of man. I hate militarism and the god of force. I would go any length to avoid war for material interests, war that involved no principles, distrusting profoundly the common meaning of the phrase "national honor."

But I believe there is a national honor charged with the future happiness of

man, that loyalty is due from those living to those that will come after; that civilization can only wax and flourish in a world where faith is kept; that for nations, as for individuals, there are laws of duty, whose violation harms the whole human race; in sum, that stars of conduct shine for peoples, as for private men.

And so I hold that without tarnishing true honor, endangering civilization pres-

ent and to come, and ruining all hope of future tranquillity, my country could not have refused to take up arms for the defense of Belgium's outraged neutrality, solemnly guaranteed by herself and France.

I believe, and claim in proof, the trend of events and of national character during the last century, that in democracy alone lies any coherent hope of progressive civilization or any chance of lasting peace in Europe, or the world.

I believe that this democratic principle, however imperfectly developed, has so worked in France, in England, in the United States, that these countries are already nearly safe from inclination to aggress, or to subdue other nationalities.

And I believe that while there remain autocratic Governments basing themselves on militarism, bitterly hostile to the democratic principle. Europe will never be free of the surcharge of swollen armaments, the nightmare menace of wars like this—the paralysis that creeps on civilizations which adore the god of force.

And so I hold that, without betrayal of

trusteeship, without shirking the elementary defense of beliefs coiled within its fibre, or beliefs vital to the future welfare of all men, my country could not stand by and see the triumph of autocratic militarism over France, that very cradle of democracy.

I believe that democratic culture spreads from west to east, that only by maintenance of consolidate democracy in Western Europe can democracy ever hope to push on and prevail till the Eastern powers have also that ideal under which alone humanity can flourish.

And so I hold that my country is justified at this juncture in its alliance with the autocratic power of Russia, whose people will never know freedom till her borders are joined to the borders of democracy.

I do not believe that jealous, frightened jingoism has ever been more than the dirty fringe of England's peace-loving temper, and I profess my sacred faith that my country has gone to war at last, not from fear, not from hope of aggrandizement, but because she must—for honor, for democracy, and for the future of mankind.

Hard Blows, Not Hard Words

By Jerome K. Jerome

In one of Shaw's plays—I think it is "Superman"—one of the characters hints, toward the end of the last act, that the hero is a gentleman somewhat prone to talking. The hero admits it, but excuses himself on the ground that it is the only way he knows of explaining his opinions.

Times of stress and struggle, whether individual or national, afford men and women other methods of expressing their views, and a large number of our citizens are, very creditably, taking the present opportunity to act instead of shout. There are the young fellows who in their thousands are pressing around the door of the recruiting offices. They are throwing up, many of them, good jobs

for the privilege of drilling for the next six months for eight hours a day. Their reward will be certain hardship, their share of sickness and wounds, the probability of lying ten deep in a forgotten grave, their chance of glory a name printed in small type among a thousand others on a War Office report.

There are the mothers and wives and children who are encouraging them to go; to whom their going means semi-starvation. The old, bent crones whose feeble hands will have to grasp again the hoe and the scrubbing brush. The young women who know only too well what is before them—the selling of the home just got together; first the easy chair and the mirror, and then the bed

and the mattress; the weary tramping of the streets, looking for work. The children awestruck and wondering.

There are the men who are quietly going on with their work, doing their best with straightened means to keep their business going; giving employment; getting ready to meet the income tax collector, who next year one is inclined to expect will be demanding anything from half a crown to five shillings in the pound. There are others. But there is a certain noisy and, to me, particularly offensive man (and with him, I am sorry to say, one or two women) very much to the fore just now with whose services the country could very well dispense. He is the man who does his fighting with his mouth. Unable for reasons of his own to get at the foe in the field, he thirsts for the blood of the unfortunate unarmed and helpless Germans that the fortunes of war have left stranded in England. He writes to the paper thoughtfully suggesting plans that have occurred to him for making their existence more miserable than it must be. He generally concludes his letter with a short homily directed against the Prussian Military Staff for their lack of the higher Christian principles.

He has spies on the brain. Two quite harmless English citizens have already been shot in consequence of the funk this spy mania has created among us. The vast majority of Germans in England have come to live in England because they dislike Germany. That a certain number of spies are among us I take to be highly probable. I take it that if the Allies know their business a certain number of English spies are doing what they can for us at great personal risk to themselves in Germany. Until the German Army has landed on our shores German spies can do little or no harm to us. The police can be trusted to know something about them, and if any are caught red-handed the rules of war are not likely to be strained for their benefit.

A Story from the South

From a small town in the South of England comes a story I can vouch for. A couple of Boy Scouts had been set to

guard the local reservoir. About noon one sunny day they remarked the approach, somewhat ostentatious, of a desperate-looking character. Undoubtedly a German spy! What can he be up to? The boys approached him and he fled, leaving behind him the damning evidence—a tin suggestive of sardines and labeled "Poison!" That the gentleman should have chosen broad daylight for his nefarious design, should have been careful to label his tin, seemed to the good townsfolk under present scare conditions proof that they had at last discovered the real German spy, full of his devilish cunning. The tin was taken possession of by the police. And then the Sergeant's little daughter, who happened to have had a few lessons in French, suggested that the word on the tin was "Poisson," and the town now breathes again.

So long as the war continues the spy will be among us. I suggest that we face the problem of his activities without blue funk and hysteria. The men and women who are shrieking for vicarious vengeance upon all the Germans remaining in our midst must remember that there are thousands of English families at the present moment residing in Germany and Austria. The majority of them, comparatively poor people, with all their belongings around them, were unable to get away. I shall, until I receive convincing proof to the contrary, continue to believe that they are living among their German neighbors unmolested. Even were it not so, I would suggest our setting the example of humanity rather than our slavishly following an example of barbarity.

We are fighting for an idea—an idea of some importance to the generations that will come after us. We are fighting to teach the Prussian Military Staff that other laws have come to stay—laws superseding those of Attila the Hun. We are fighting to teach the German people that, free men with brains to think with, they have no right to hand themselves over body and soul to their rulers to be used as mere devil's instruments; that if they do so they shall pay the penalty, and the punishment shall go hard. We

are fighting to teach the German Nation respect for God! Our weapons have got to be hard blows, not hard words. We are tearing at each other's throats; it has got to be done. It is not a time for yelping.

Jack Johnson as a boxer I respect. The thing I do not like about him is his habit of gibing and jeering at his opponent while he is fighting him. It isn't gentlemanly, and it isn't sporting. The soldiers are fighting in grim silence. When one of them does talk, it is generally to express admiration of German bravery. It is our valiant stay-at-homes, our valiant clamorers for everybody else to enlist but themselves, who would have us fight like some drunken fish hag, shrieking and spitting while she claws.

Incredible Reports of Atrocities

Half of these stories of atrocities I do not believe. I remember when I was living in Germany at the time of the Boer war the German papers were full of accounts of Tommy Atkins's brutality. He spent his leisure time in tossing babies on bayonets. There were photographs of him doing it. Detailed accounts certified by most creditable witnesses. Such lies are the stock in trade of every tenth-rate journalist, who, careful not to expose himself to danger, slinks about the byways collecting hearsay. In every war each side, according to the other, is supposed to take a fiendish pleasure in firing upon hospitals—containing always a proportion of their own wounded. An account comes to us from a correspondent with the Belgian Army. He tells us that toward the end of the day a regrettable incident occurred. The Germans were taking off their wounded in motor cars. The Belgian sharpshooters, not noticing the red flag in the dusk, kept up a running fire, and a large number of the wounded were killed. Had the incident been the other way about it would have been cited as a deliberate piece of villainy on the part of the Germans. According to other accounts, the Germans always go into action with screens of women and children before them. The explanation, of course, is that a few poor terrified creatures

are rushing along the road. They get between the approaching forces, and I expect the bullets that put them out of their misery come pretty even from both sides.

The men are mad. Mad with fear, mad with hate, blinded by excitement. Take a mere dog fight. If you interfere you have got to be prepared for your own dog turning upon you. In war half the time the men do not know what they are doing. They are little else than wild beasts. There was great indignation at the dropping of bombs into Antwerp. One now hears that a French dirigible has been dropping bombs into Luxemburg—a much more dignified retort. War is a grim game. Able editors and club-chair politicians have been clamoring for it for years past. They thought it was all goose-step and bands.

The truth is bad enough, God knows. There is no sense in making things out worse than they are. When this war is over we have got to forget it. To build up barriers of hatred that shall stand between our children and our foemen's children is a crime against the future.

These stories of German naval officers firing on their wounded sailors in the water! They are an insult to our intelligence. At Louvain fifty of the inhabitants were taken out and shot. On Monday the fifty had grown to five hundred; both numbers vouched for by eyewitnesses, "Dutchmen who would have had no interest," &c. That the beautiful old town has been laid in ashes is undoubted. Some criminal lunatic strutting in pipeclay and mustachios was given his hour of authority and took the chance of his life. If I know anything of the German people it will go hard with him when the war is over, if he has not had the sense to get killed. But that won't rear again the grand old stones or wipe from Germany's honor the stain of that long line of murdered men and women—whatever its actual length may have been. War puts a premium on brutality and senselessness. Men with the intelligence and instincts of an ape suddenly find themselves possessed of the powers of a god. And we are astonished that they do not display the wisdom of a god!

There are other stories that have filtered through to us. There was a dying Uhlan who caught a child to his arms and kissed him. One would like to be able to kiss one's own child before one dies, but failing that—well, after all, there is a sort of family likeness between them. The same deep wondering eyes, the same—and then the mist grows deeper. Perhaps after all it was Baby Fritz that he kissed.

And of a Belgian woman. She had seen her two sons killed before her eyes. She tells of that and of other horrors. Among such, of the German lads she had stepped over, their blue eyes quiet in death. The passion and the fear and

the hate cleansed out of them. Just boys with their clothes torn—so like boys.

"They, too, have got mothers, poor lads!" is all she says, thinking of them lying side by side with her own.

When the madness and the folly are over, when the tender green is creeping in and out among the blackened ruins, it will be well for us to think of that dying Uhlan who had to put up with a French baby instead of his own; of that Belgian mother to whom the German youngsters were just "poor lads"—with their clothes torn.

And the savagery and the cruelty and the guiltiness that go to the making of war we will seek to forget.



"As They Tested Our Fathers"

By Rudyard Kipling

Following is the text of an address by Mr. Kipling to a mass meeting at Brighton, Sept. 8, 1914:

Through no fault nor wish of ours we are at war with Germany, the power which owes its existence to three well-thought-out wars; the power which for the last twenty years has devoted itself to organizing and preparing for this war; the power which is now fighting to conquer the civilized world.

For the last two generations the Germans in their books, teachers, speeches, and schools have been carefully taught that nothing less than this world conquest was the object of their preparations and their sacrifices. They have prepared carefully and sacrificed greatly.

We must have men and men, and men, if we with our allies are to check the onrush of organized barbarism.

Have no illusions. We are dealing with a strong and magnificently equipped enemy, whose avowed aim is our complete destruction.

The violation of Belgium, the attack on France, and the defense against Russia are only steps by the way. The Germans' real objective, as she has always told us, is England and England's

wealth, trade, and worldwide possessions.

If you assume for an instant that that attack will be successful, England will not be reduced, as some people say, to the rank of a second-rate power, but we shall cease to exist as a nation. We shall become an outlying province of Germany, to be administered with what severity German safety and interest require.

We warn against such a fate. We enter into a new life in which all the facts of war that we had put behind or forgotten for the past hundred years have returned to the front and test us as they tested our fathers. It will be a long and a hard road, beset with difficulties and discouragements, but we tread it together and we will tread it together to the end.

Our petty social divisions and barriers have been swept away at the outset of our mighty struggle. All the interests of our life of six weeks ago are dead. We have but one interest now, and that touches the naked heart of every man in this island and in the empire.

If we are to win the right for ourselves and for freedom to exist on earth, every man must offer himself for that service and that sacrifice.

On the Impending Crisis

By Norman Angell

A nation's first duty is to its own people. We are asked to intervene in the Continental war because unless we do so we shall be "isolated." The isolation which will result for us if we keep out of this war is that, while other nations are torn and weakened by war, we shall not be, and by that fact might conceivably for a long time be the strongest power in Europe, and, by virtue of our strength and isolation, its arbiter, perhaps, to useful ends.

We are told that if we allow Germany

to become victorious she would be so powerful as to threaten our existence by the occupation of Belgium, Holland, and possibly the north of France. But, as your article of today's date so well points out, it was the difficulty which Germany found in Alsace-Lorraine which prevented her from acting against us during the South African war. If one province, so largely German in its origin and history, could create this embarrassment, what trouble will not Germany pile up for herself if she should attempt the

absorption of a Belgium, a Holland, and a Normandy? She would have created for herself embarrassments compared with which Alsace and Poland would be a trifle; and Russia, with her 160,000,000, would in a year or two be as great a menace to her as ever.

The object and effect of our entering into this war would be to insure the victory of Russia and her Slavonic allies. Will a dominant Slavonic federation of, say, 200,000,000 autocratically governed people, with a very rudimentary civilization, but heavily equipped for military aggression, be a less dangerous factor in Europe than a dominant Germany of 65,000,000 highly civilized and mainly given to the arts of trade and commerce?

The last war we fought on the Continent was for the purpose of preventing the growth of Russia. We are now asked to fight one for the purpose of

promoting it. It is now universally admitted that our last Continental war—the Crimean war—was a monstrous error and miscalculation. Would this intervention be any wiser or likely to be better in its results?

On several occasions Sir Edward Grey has solemnly declared that we are not bound by any agreement to support France, and there is certainly no moral obligation on the part of the English people so to do. We can best serve civilization, Europe—including France—and ourselves by remaining the one power in Europe that has not yielded to the war madness.

This, I believe, will be found to be the firm conviction of the overwhelming majority of the English people.

NORMAN ANGELL.

4 Kings Bench Walk, Temple, E. C.,
July 31.

Why England Came To Be In It

By Gilbert K. Chesterton

I.

Unless we are all mad, there is at the back of the most bewildering business a story; and if we are all mad, there is no such thing as madness. If I set a house on fire, it is quite true that I may illuminate many other people's weaknesses as well as my own. It may be that the master of the house was burned because he was drunk; it may be that the mistress of the house was burned because she was stingy, and perished arguing about the expense of the fire-escape. It is, nevertheless, broadly true that they both were burned because I set fire to their house. That is the story of the thing. The mere facts of the story about the present European conflagration are quite as easy to tell.

Before we go on to the deeper things which make this war the most sincere war of human history, it is easy to answer the question of why England came to be in it at all; as one asks how a man

fell down a coal hole, or failed to keep an appointment. Facts are not the whole truth. But facts are facts, and in this case the facts are few and simple.

Prussia, France, and England had all promised not to invade Belgium, because it was the safest way of invading France. But Prussia promised that if she might break in through her own broken promise and ours she would break in and not steal. In other words, we were offered at the same instant a promise of faith in the future and a proposal of perjury in the present.

Those interested in human origins may refer to an old Victorian writer of English, who in the last and most restrained of his historical essays wrote of Frederick the Great, the founder of this unchanging Prussian policy. After describing how Frederick broke the guarantee he had signed on behalf of Maria Theresa he then describes how Frederick sought

to put things straight by a promise that was an insult. "If she would but let him have Silesia, he would, he said, stand by her against any power which should try to deprive her of her other dominions; as if he was not already bound to stand by her, or as if his new promise could be of more value than the old one." That passage was written by Macaulay; but so far as the mere contemporary facts are concerned, it might have been written by me.

Diplomacy That Might Have Been

Upon the immediate logical and legal origin of the English interest there can be no rational debate. There are some things so simple that one can almost prove them with plans and diagrams, as in Euclid. One could make a kind of comic calendar of what would have happened to the English diplomatist if he had been silenced every time by Prussian diplomacy. Suppose we arrange it in the form of a kind of diary:

July 24—Germany invades Belgium.

July 25—England declares war.

July 26—Germany promises not to annex Belgium.

July 27—England withdraws from the war.

July 28—Germany annexes Belgium. England declares war.

July 29—Germany promises not to annex France. England withdraws from the war.

July 30—Germany annexes France. England declares war.

July 31—Germany promises not to annex England.

Aug. 1—England withdraws from the war. Germany invades England.

How long is anybody expected to go on with that sort of game, or keep peace at that illimitable price? How long must we pursue a road in which promises are all fetiches in front of us and all fragments behind us? No; upon the cold facts of the final negotiations, as told by any of the diplomatists in any of the documents, there is no doubt about the story. And no doubt about the villain of the story.

These are the last facts, the facts which involved England. It is equally easy to state the first facts—the facts which involved Europe. The Prince who practically ruled Austria was shot by

certain persons whom the Austrian Government believed to be conspirators from Serbia. The Austrian Government piled up arms and armies, but said not a word either to Serbia, their suspect, or Italy, their ally. From the documents it would seem that Austria kept everybody in the dark, except Prussia. It is probably nearer the truth to say that Prussia kept everybody in the dark, including Austria.

The Demands on Serbia

But all that is what is called opinion, belief, conviction, or common sense, and we are not dealing with it here. The objective fact is that Austria told Serbia to permit Servian officers to be suspended by the authority of Austrian officers, and told Serbia to submit to this within forty-eight hours. In other words, the sovereign of Serbia was practically told to take off not only the laurels of two great campaigns, but his own lawful and national crown, and to do it in a time in which no respectable citizen is expected to discharge a hotel bill. Serbia asked for time for arbitration—in short, for peace. But Russia had already begun to mobilize, and Prussia, presuming that Serbia might thus be rescued, declared war.

Between these two ends of fact, the ultimatum to Serbia, the ultimatum to Belgium, any one so inclined can, of course, talk as if everything were relative. If any one asks why the Czar should rush to the support of Serbia, it is easy to ask why the Kaiser should rush to the support of Austria. If any one says that the French would attack the Germans, it is sufficient to answer that the Germans did attack the French.

There remain, however, two attitudes to consider, even perhaps two arguments to counter, which can best be considered and countered under this general head of facts. First of all, there is a curious, cloudy sort of argument, much affected by the professional rhetoricians of Prussia, who are sent out to instruct and correct the minds of Americans or Scandinavians. It consists of going into convulsions of incredulity and scorn at

the mention of Russia's responsibility for Serbia or England's responsibility for Belgium; and suggesting that, treaty or no treaty, frontier or no frontier, Russia would be out to slay Teutons or England to steal colonies.

England Kept Her Contracts

Here, as elsewhere, I think the professors dotted all over the Baltic plain fail in lucidity and in the power of distinguishing ideas. Of course, it is quite true that England has material interests to defend, and will probably use the opportunity to defend them; or, in other words, of course England, like everybody else, would be more comfortable if Prussia were less predominant. The fact remains that we did not do what the Germans did. We did not invade Holland to seize a naval and commercial advantage; and whether they say that we wished to do it in our greed or feared to do it in our cowardice, the fact remains that we did not do it. Unless this common-sense principle be kept in view, I cannot conceive how any quarrel can possibly be judged. A contract may be made between two persons solely for material advantages on each side; but the moral advantage is still generally supposed to lie with the person who keeps the contract. Surely, it cannot be dishonest to be honest—even if honesty is the best policy. Imagine the most complex maze of indirect motives, and still the man who keeps faith for money cannot possibly be worse than the man who breaks faith for money.

It will be noted that this ultimate test applies in the same way to Serbia as to Belgium and Britain. The Servians may not be a very peaceful people; but on the occasion under discussion it was certainly they who wanted peace. You may choose to think the Serb a sort of born robber; but on this occasion it was certainly the Austrian who was trying to rob. Similarly, you may call England perfidious as a sort of historical summary, and declare your private belief that Mr. Asquith was vowed from infancy to the ruin of the German Empire—a Hannibal and hater of the eagles. But when all is said, it is nonsense to

call a man perfidious because he keeps his promise. It is absurd to complain of the sudden treachery of a business man in turning up punctually to his appointment, or the unfair shock given to a creditor by the debtor paying his debts.

Lastly, there is an attitude not unknown in the crisis against which I should particularly like to protest. I should address my protest especially to those lovers and pursuers of peace who, very shortsightedly, have occasionally adopted it. I mean the attitude which is impatient of these preliminary details about who did this or that and whether it was right or wrong. They are satisfied with saying that an enormous calamity called war has been begun by some or all of us, and should be ended by some or all of us. To these people this preliminary chapter about the precise happenings must appear not only dry (and it must of necessity be the driest part of the task), but essentially needless and barren. I wish to tell these people that they are wrong; that they are wrong upon all principles of human justice and historic continuity; but that they are especially and supremely wrong upon their own principles of arbitration and international peace.

As to Certain Peace Lovers

These sincere and high-minded peace lovers are always telling us that citizens no longer settle their quarrels by private violence, and that nations should no longer settle theirs by public violence. They are always telling us that we no longer fight duels, and need no longer wage wars. In short, they perpetually base their peace proposals on the fact that an ordinary citizen no longer avenges himself with an axe.

But how is he prevented from avenging himself with an axe? If he hits his neighbor on the head with the kitchen chopper what do we do? Do we all join hands, like children playing mulberry bush, and say: "We are all responsible for this, but let us hope it will not spread. Let us hope for the happy, happy day when he shall leave off chopping at the man's head, and when nobody shall ever chop anything forever and

ever." Do we say: "Let bygones be bygones. Why go back to all the dull details with which the business began? Who can tell with what sinister motives the man was standing there within reach of the hatchet?"

We do not. We keep the peace in private life by asking for the facts of provocation and the proper object of punishment. We do not go into the dull details; we do inquire into the origins; we do emphatically inquire who it was that hit first. In short, we do what I have done very briefly in this place.

Given this, it is indeed true that behind these facts there are truths—truths of a terrible, of a spiritual sort. In mere

fact the Germanic power has been wrong about Serbia, wrong about Russia, wrong about Belgium, wrong about England, wrong about Italy. But there was a reason for its being wrong everywhere, and of that root reason, which has moved half the world against it, I shall speak later in this series. For that is something too omnipresent to be proved, too indisputable to be helped by detail. It is nothing less than the locating, after more than a hundred years of recriminations and wrong explanations, of the modern European evil—the finding of the fountain from which poison has flowed upon all the nations of the earth.

II.

Russian or Prussian Barbarism?

It will hardly be denied that there is one lingering doubt in many who recognize unavoidable self-defense in the instant parry of the English sword and who have no great love for the sweeping sabre of Sadowa and Sedan. That doubt is the doubt of whether Russia, as compared with Prussia, is sufficiently decent and democratic to be the ally of liberal and civilized powers. I take first, therefore, this matter of civilization.

It is vital in a discussion like this that we should make sure we are going by meanings and not by mere words. It is not necessary in any argument to settle what a word means or ought to mean. But it is necessary in every argument to settle what we propose to mean by the word. So long as our opponent understands what is the thing of which we are talking, it does not matter to the argument whether the word is or is not the one he would have chosen. A soldier does not say, "We were ordered to go to Mechlin, but I would rather go to Malines." He may discuss the etymology and archaeology of the difference on the march, but the point is that he knows where to go. So long as we know what a given word is to mean in a given discussion, it does not

even matter if it means something else in some other and quite distinct discussion. We have a perfect right to say that the width of a window comes to four feet, even if we instantly and cheerfully change the subject to the larger mammals and say that an elephant has four feet. The identity of the words does not matter, because there is no doubt at all about the meanings, because nobody is likely to think of an elephant as four feet long, or of a window as having tusks and a curly trunk.

Two Meanings of "Barbarian"

It is essential to emphasize this consciousness of the thing under discussion in connection with two or three words that are, as it were, the keywords of this war. One of them is the word "barbarian." The Russians apply it to the Russians, the Russians apply it to the Prussians. Both, I think, really mean something that really exists, name or no name. Both mean different things. And if we ask what these different things are we shall understand why England and France prefer Russia, and consider Prussia the really dangerous barbarian of the two.

To begin with, it goes so much deeper even than atrocities of which, in the past, at least all the three empires of Central Europe have partaken pretty equally, as they partook of Poland. An English writer, seeking to avert the war by warnings against Russian influence, said that the flogged backs of Polish women stood between us and the Alliance. But not long before the flogging of women by an Austrian General led to that officer being thrashed in the streets of London by Barclay and Perkins draymen. And as for the third power, the Prussians, it seems clear that they have treated Belgian women in a style compared with which flogging might be called an official formality.

But, as I say, something much deeper than any such recrimination lies behind the use of the word on either side. When the German Emperor complains of our allying ourselves with a barbaric and half Oriental power, he is not (I assure you) shedding tears over the grave of Kosciusko. And when I say (as I do most heartily) that the German Emperor is a barbarian, I am not merely expressing any prejudices I may have against the profanation of churches or of children. My countrymen and I mean a certain and intelligible thing when we call the Prussians barbarians. It is quite different from the thing attributed to Russians; and it could not possibly be attributed to Russians. It is very important that the neutral world should understand what this thing is.

If the German calls the Russian barbarous, he presumably means imperfectly civilized. There is a certain path along which Western nations have proceeded in recent times; and it is tenable that Russia has not proceeded so far as the others; that she has less of the special modern system in science, commerce, machinery, travel, or political constitution. The Russ plows with an old plow; he wears a wild beard; he adores relics; his life is as rude and hard as that of a subject of Alfred the Great. Therefore, he is, in the German sense, a barbarian. Poor fellows like Gorky and Dostoieffsky have to form their own reflections

on the scenery, without the assistance of large quotations from Schiller on garden seats; or inscriptions directing them to pause and thank the All-Father for the finest view in Hesse-Pumpnickel. The Russians, having nothing but their faith, their fields, their great courage, and their self-governing communes, are quite cut off from what is called (in the fashionable street in Frankfort) the true, the beautiful, and the good. There is a real sense in which one can call such backwardness barbaric, by comparison with the Kaiserstrasse; and in that sense it is true of Russia.

Now we, the French and English, do not mean this when we call the Prussians barbarians. If their cities soared higher than their flying ships, if their trains traveled faster than their bullets, we should still call them barbarians. We should know exactly what we meant by it; and we should know that it is true. For we do not mean anything that is an imperfect civilization by accident. We mean something that is the enemy of civilization by design. We mean something that is willfully at war with the principles by which human society has been made possible hitherto. Of course, it must be partly civilized even to destroy civilization. Such ruin could not be wrought by the savages that are merely undeveloped or inert. You could not have even Huns without horses or horses without horsemanship. You could not have even Danish pirates without ships, or ships without seamanship.

The "Positive Barbarian"

This person, whom I may call the positive barbarian, must be rather more superficially up to date than what I may call the negative barbarian. Alaric was an officer in the Roman legions, but for all that he destroyed Rome. Nobody supposes that Eskimos could have done it at all neatly. But (in our meaning) barbarism is not a matter of methods but of aims. We say that these veneered vandals have the perfectly serious aim of destroying certain ideas which, as they think, the world has outgrown; without which, as we think, the world will die.

It is essential that this perilous peculiarity in the Pruss, or positive barbarian, should be seized. He has what he fancies is a new idea, and he is going to apply it to everybody. As a fact, it is simply a false generalization, but he is really trying to make it general. This does not apply to the negative barbarian; it does not apply to the Russian or the Servian, even if they are barbarians. If a Russian peasant does beat his wife, he does it because his fathers did it before him; he is likely to beat less rather than more as the past fades away. He does not think, as the Prussian would, that he has made a new discovery in physiology in finding that a woman is weaker than a man. If a Servian does knife his rival without a word, he does it because other Servians have done it. He may regard it even as piety—but certainly not as progress. He does not think, as the Prussian does, that he founds a new school of horology by starting before the word "Go." He does not think he is in advance of the world in militarism—merely because he is behind it in morals.

No; the danger of the Pruss is that he is prepared to fight for old errors as if they were new truths. He has somehow heard of certain shallow simplifications, and imagines that we have never heard of them. And, as I have said, his limited but very sincere lunacy concentrates chiefly in a desire to destroy two ideas, the twin root ideas, of national society. The first is the idea of record and promise; the second is the idea of reciprocity.

It is plain that the promise, or extension of responsibility through time, is what chiefly distinguishes us, I will not say from savages, but from brutes and reptiles. This was noted by the shrewdness of the Old Testament when it summed up the dark, irresponsible enormity of Leviathan in the words, "Will he make a pact with thee?" The promise, like the wind, is unknown in nature and is the first mark of man. Referring only to human civilization, it may be said with seriousness that in the beginning was the Word. The vow is to the

man what the song is to the bird or the bark to the dog; his voice, whereby he is known. Just as a man who cannot keep an appointment is not fit to fight a duel, so the man who cannot keep an appointment with himself is not sane enough even for suicide. It is not easy to mention anything on which the enormous apparatus of human life can be said to depend. But if it depends on anything it is on this frail cord, flung from the forgotten hills of yesterday to the invisible mountains of tomorrow. On that solitary string hangs everything from Armageddon to an almanac, from a successful revolution to a return ticket. On that solitary string the barbarian is hacking heavily with a sabre which is fortunately blunt.

Prussia's Great Discovery

Any one can see this well enough merely by reading the last negotiations between London and Berlin. The Prussians had made a new discovery in international politics—that it may often be convenient to make a promise, and yet curiously inconvenient to keep it. They were charmed, in their simple way, with this scientific discovery and desired to communicate it to the world. They therefore promised England a promise on condition that she broke a promise, and on the implied condition that the new promise might be broken as easily as the old one. To the profound astonishment of Prussia, this reasonable offer was refused. I believe that the astonishment of Prussia was quite sincere. That is what I mean when I say that the barbarian is trying to cut away that cord of honesty and clear record on which hangs all that men have made.

The friends of the German cause have complained that Asiatics and Africans upon the very verge of savagery have been brought against them from India and Algiers. And in ordinary circumstances I should sympathize with such a complaint made by a European people. But the circumstances are not ordinary. Here again the quite unique barbarism of Prussia goes deeper than what we call barbarities. About mere barbarities, it is true, the Turco and the Sikh would

have very good reply to the superior Teuton. The general and just reason for not using non-European tribes against Europeans is that given by Chatham against the use of the red Indian—that such allies might do very diabolical things. But the poor Turco might not unreasonably ask, after a week-end in Belgium, what more diabolical things he could do than the highly cultured Germans were doing themselves.

Nevertheless, as I say, the justification of any extra-European aid goes deeper than by any such details. It rests upon the fact that even other civilizations, even much lower civilizations, even remote and repulsive civilizations, depend as much as our own on this primary principle on which the supermorality of Potsdam declares open war. Even savages promise things, and respect those who keep their promises. Even Orientals write things down; and though they write them from right to left, they know the importance of a scrap of paper. Many merchants will tell you that the word of the sinister and almost unhuman Chinaman is often as good as his bond; and it was amid palm trees and Syrian pavilions that the great utterance opened the tabernacle to him that sweareth to his hurt and changeth not. There is doubtless a dense labyrinth of duplicity in the East; and perhaps more guile in the individual Asiatic than in the individual German. But we are not talking of the violations of human morality in various parts of the world.

A Fight Against Anarchy

We are talking about a new inhuman morality which denies altogether the day of obligation. The Prussians have been told by their literary men that every-

thing depends upon "mood," and by their politicians that all arrangements dissolve before "necessity." That is the importance of the German Chancellor's phrase. He did not allege some special excuse in the case of Belgium, which might make it seem an exception that proved the rule. He distinctly argued, as on a principle applicable to other cases, that victory was a necessity and honor was a scrap of paper. And it is evident that the half-educated Prussian imagination really cannot get any further than this. It cannot see that if everybody's action were entirely incalculable from hour to hour, it would not only be the end of all promises but the end of all projects.

In not being able to see that, the Berlin philosopher is really on a lower mental level than the Arab who respects the salt, or the Brahmin who preserves the caste. And in this quarrel we have a right to come with scimitars as well as sabres, with bows as well as rifles, with assegai and tomahawk and boomerang, because there is in all these at least a seed of civilization that these intellectual anarchists would kill. And if they should find us in our last stand girt with such strange swords and following unfamiliar ensigns and ask us for what we fight in so singular a company, we shall know what to reply: "We fight for the trust and for the tryst; for fixed memories and the possible meeting of men; for all that makes life anything but an uncontrollable nightmare. We fight for the long arm of honor and remembrance; for all that can lift a man above the quicksands of his needs and give him the mastery of time."

III.

Disposing of Germany's Civilizing Mission

In the last summary I suggested that barbarism, as we mean it, is not mere ignorance or even mere cruelty. It has a more precise sense, and means militant hostility to certain necessary human ideas. I took the case of the vow or the contract which Prussian intellectualism would destroy. I urged that the Prussian is a spiritual barbarian, because he is not bound by his own past, any more than a man in a dream. He avows that when he promised to respect a frontier on Monday he did not foresee what he calls "the necessity" of not respecting it on Tuesday. In short, he is like a child who at the end of all reasonable explanations and reminders of admitted arrangements has no answer except "But I want to."

There is another idea in human arrangements so fundamental as to be forgotten, but now for the first time denied. It may be called the idea of reciprocity; or, in better English, of give and take. The Prussian appears to be quite intellectually incapable of this thought. He cannot, I think, conceive the idea that is the foundation of all comedy—that in the eyes of the other man he is only the other man. And if we carry this clue through the institutions of Prussianized Germany we shall find how curiously his mind has been limited in the matter. The German differs from other patriots in the inability to understand patriotism. Other European peoples pity the Poles or the Welsh for their violated borders, but Germans only pity themselves. They might take forcible possession of the Severn or the Danube, of the Thames or the Tiber, of the Garry or the Garonne—and they would still be singing sadly about how fast and true stands the watch on the Rhine, and what a shame it would be if any one took their own little river away from them. That is what I mean by not being reciprocal; and you will

find it in all that they do, as in all that is done by savages.

"Laughs When He Hurts You"

Here again it is very necessary to avoid confusing this soul of the savage with mere savagery in the sense of brutality or butchery, in which the Greeks, the French, and all the most civilized nations have indulged in hours of abnormal panic or revenge. Accusations of cruelty are generally mutual. But it is the point about the Prussian that with him nothing is mutual. The definition of the true savage does not concern itself even with how much more he hurts strangers or captives than do the other tribes of men. The definition of the true savage is that he laughs when he hurts you and howls when you hurt him. This extraordinary inequality in the mind is in every act and word that comes from Berlin.

For instance, no man of the world believes all he sees in the newspapers, and no journalist believes a quarter of it. We should therefore be quite ready in the ordinary way to take a great deal off the tales of German atrocities; to doubt this story or deny that. But there is one thing that we cannot doubt or deny—the seal and authority of the Emperor. In the imperial proclamation the fact that certain "frightful" things have been done is admitted and justified on the ground of their frightfulness. It was a military necessity to terrify the peaceful populations with something that was not civilized, something that was hardly human.

"Howls When You Hurt Him"

Very well. That is an intelligible policy; and in that sense an intelligible argument. An army endangered by foreigners may do the most frightful things. But then we turn the next page of the Kaiser's public library, and we find him writing to the President of the

United States to complain that the English are using dum-dum bullets and violating various regulations of The Hague Conference. I pass for the present the question of whether there is a word of truth in these charges. I am content to gaze rapturously at the blinking eyes of the true, or positive, barbarian. I suppose he would be quite puzzled if we said that violating The Hague Conference was "a military necessity" to us; or that the rules of the conference were only a scrap of paper. He would be quite pained if we said that dum-dum bullets "by their very frightfulness" would be very useful to keep conquered Germans in order. Do what he will, he cannot get outside the idea that he, because he is he and not you, is free to break the law and also to appeal to the law. It is said that the Prussian officers play at a game called *Kriegspiel*, or the war game. But in truth they could not play at any game, for the essence of every game is that the rules are the same on both sides.

But, taking every German institution in turn, the case is the same; and it is not a case of mere bloodshed or military bravado. The duel, for example, can legitimately be called a barbaric thing, but the word is here used in another sense. There are duels in Germany; but so there are in France, Italy, Belgium, Spain; indeed, there are duels wherever there are dentists, newspapers, Turkish baths, time tables, and all the curses of civilization—except in England and a corner of America. You may happen to regard the duel as a historic relic of the more barbaric States on which these modern States were built. It might equally well be maintained that the duel is everywhere the sign of high civilization, being the sign of its more delicate sense of honor, its more vulnerable vanity, or its greater dread of social disrepute. But, whichever of the two views you take, you must concede that the essence of the duel is an armed equality. I should not, therefore, apply the word barbaric, as I am using it, to the duels of German officers, or even the broadsword combats that are conventional among the German

students. I do not see why a young Prussian should not have scars all over his face if he likes them; nay, they are often the redeeming points of interest on an otherwise somewhat unenlightening countenance. The duel may be defended; the sham duel may be defended.

The One-Sided Prussian Duel

What cannot be defended is something really peculiar to Prussia, of which we hear numberless stories, some of them certainly true. It might be called the one-sided duel. I mean the idea that there is some sort of dignity in drawing the sword upon a man who has not got a sword—a waiter, or a shop assistant, or even a schoolboy. One of the officers of the Kaiser in the affair at Zabern was found industriously hacking at a cripple. In all these matters I would avoid sentiment. We must not lose our tempers at the mere cruelty of the thing, but pursue the strict psychological distinction. Others besides German soldiers have slain the defenseless, for loot or lust or private malice, like any other murderer. The point is that nowhere else but in Prussian Germany is any theory of honor mixed up with such things, any more than with poisoning or picking pockets. No French, English, Italian, or American gentleman would think he had in some way cleared his own character by sticking his sabre through some ridiculous greengrocer who had nothing in his hand but a cucumber. It would seem as if the word which is translated from the German as "honor" must really mean something quite different in German. It seems to mean something more like what we should call "prestige."

Absence of the Reciprocal Idea

The fundamental fact, however, is the absence of the reciprocal idea. The Prussian is not sufficiently civilized for the duel. Even when he crosses swords with us his thoughts are not as our thoughts; when we both glorify war we are glorifying different things. Our medals are wrought like his, but they do not mean the same thing; our regiments are cheered as his are, but the thought in the heart is not the same; the Iron

Cross is on the bosom of his King, but it is not the sign of our God. For we, alas! follow our God with many relapses and self-contradictions, but he follows his very consistently. Through all the things that we have examined, the view of national boundaries, the view of military methods, the view of personal honor and self-defense, there runs in their case something of an atrocious simplicity; something too simple for us to understand; the idea that glory consists in holding the steel, and not in facing it.

If further examples were necessary it would be easy to give hundreds of them. Let us leave, for the moment, the relations between man and man in the thing called the duel. Let us take the relation between man and woman, in that immortal duel which we call a marriage. Here again we shall find that other Christian civilizations aim at some kind of equality, even if the balance be irrational or dangerous. Thus, the two extremes of the treatment of women might be represented by what are called the respectable classes in America and in France. In America they choose the risk of comradeship, in France the compensation of courtesy. In America it is practically possible for any young gentleman to take any young lady for what he calls (I deeply regret to say) a joy ride; but at least the man goes with the woman as much as the woman with the man. In France the young woman is protected like a nun while she is unmarried; but when she is a mother she is really a holy woman; and when she is a grandmother she is a holy terror.

By both extremes the woman gets something back out of life. There is only one place where she gets little or nothing back, and that is the north of Germany. France and America aim alike at equality; America by similarity, France by dissimilarity. But North Germany does definitely aim at inequality. The woman stands up with no more irritation than a butler; the man sits down with no more embarrassment than a guest. This is the cool affirmation of inferiority, as in the case of the sabre

and the tradesmen. "Thou goest with women; forget not thy whip," said Nietzsche. It will be observed that he does not say "poker," which might come more naturally to the mind of a more common or Christian wife-beater. But, then, a poker is a part of domesticity, and might be used by the wife as well as the husband. In fact, it often is. The sword and the whip are the weapons of a privileged caste.

Pass from the closest of all differences, that between husband and wife, to the most distant of all differences, that of the remote and unrelated races who have 'seldom seen each other's faces, and never been tinged with each other's blood. Here we still find the same unvarying Prussian principle. Any European might feel a genuine fear of the Yellow Peril, and many Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Russians have felt and expressed it. Many might say, and have said, that the heathen Chinese is very heathen indeed; that if he ever advances against us he will trample and torture and utterly destroy, in a way that Eastern people do, but Western people do not. Nor do I doubt the German Emperor's sincerity when he sought to point out to us how abnormal and abominable such a nightmare campaign would be, supposing that it could come.

But now comes the comic irony, which never fails to follow on the attempt of the Prussian to be philosophic. For the Kaiser, after explaining to his troops how important it was to avoid Eastern barbarism, instantly commanded them to become Eastern barbarians. He told them, in so many words, to be Huns, and leave nothing living or standing behind them. In fact, he frankly offered a new army corps of aboriginal Tartars to the Far East, within such time as it may take a bewildered Hanoverian to turn into a Tartar. Any one who has the painful habit of personal thought will perceive here at once the non-reciprocal principle again. Boiled down to its bones of logic, it means simply this: "I am a German and you are a Chinaman. Therefore, I,

being a German, have a right to be a Chinaman. But you have no right to be a Chinaman, because you are only a Chinaman." This is probably the highest point to which the German culture has risen.

"The Principle of Being Unprincipled"

The principle here neglected, which may be called mutuality by those who misunderstand and dislike the word equality, does not offer so clear a distinction between the Prussian and the other peoples as did the first Prussian principle of an infinite and destructive opportunism; or, in other words, the principle of being unprincipled. Nor upon this second can one take up so obvious a position touching the other civilizations or semi-civilizations of the world. Some idea of oath and bond there is in the rudest tribes, in the darkest continents. But it might be maintained, of the more delicate and imaginative element of reciprocity, that a cannibal in Borneo understands it almost as little as a professor in Berlin. A narrow and one-sided seriousness is the fault of barbarians all over the world. This may have been the meaning, for aught I know, of the one eye of the Cyclops; that the barbarian cannot see around things or look at them from two points of view, and thus becomes a blind beast and an eater of men. Certainly there can be no better summary of the savage than this, which, as we have seen, unfits him for the duel. He is the man who cannot love—no, nor even hate—his neighbor as himself.

But this quality in Prussia does have one effect which has reference to the same question of the lower civilizations. It disposes once and for all at least of the civilizing mission of Germany. Evidently the Germans are the last people in the world to be trusted with the task. They are as short-sighted morally as physically. What is their sophism of "necessity" but an inability to imagine tomorrow morning? What is their non-reciprocity but an inability to imagine, not a god or devil, but merely another man? Are these to judge mankind? Men of two tribes in Africa not only

know that they are all men but can understand that they are all black men. In this they are quite seriously in advance of the intellectual Prussian, who cannot be got to see that we are all white men. The ordinary eye is unable to perceive in the Northeast Teuton anything that marks him out especially from the more colorless classes of the rest of Aryan mankind. He is simply a white man, with a tendency to the gray or the drab. Yet he will explain in serious official documents that the difference between him and us is a difference between "the master race and the inferior race."

How to Know "The Master Race"

The collapse of German philosophy always occurs at the beginning rather than the end of an argument, and the difficulty here is that there is no way of testing which is a master race except by asking which is your own race. If you cannot find out, (as is usually the case,) you fall back on the absurd occupation of writing history about prehistoric times. But I suggest quite seriously that if the Germans can give their philosophy to the Hottentots there is no reason why they should not give their sense of superiority to the Hottentots. If they can see such fine shades between the Goth and the Gaul, there is no reason why similar shades should not lift the savage above other savages; why any Ojibway should not discover that he is one tint redder than the Dakotas, or any nigger in the Kameruns say he is not so black as he is painted. For this principle of a quite unproved racial supremacy is the last and worst of the refusals of reciprocity. The Prussian calls all men to admire the beauty of his large blue eyes. If they do, it is because they have inferior eyes; if they don't, it is because they have no eyes.

Wherever the most miserable remnant of our race, astray and dried up in deserts or buried forever under the fall of bad civilization, has some feeble memory that men are men, that bargains are bargains, that there are two sides to a question, or even that it takes two to make a quarrel—that remnant has the

right to assist the New Culture, to the knife and club and the splintered stone. For the Prussian begins all his culture by that act which is the destruction of

all creative thought and constructive action. He breaks that mirror in the mind in which a man can see the face of his friend or foe.

IV.

Russia Less Despotic Than Prussia

The German Emperor has reproached this country (England) with allying itself with "barbaric and semi-Oriental power." We have already considered in what sense we use the word barbaric; it is in the sense of one who is hostile to civilization, not one who is insufficient in it. But when we pass from the idea of the barbaric to the idea of the Oriental, the case is even more curious. There is nothing particularly Tartar in Russian affairs, except the fact that Russia expelled the Tartars. The Eastern invader occupied and crushed the country for many years; but that is equally true of Greece, of Spain, and even of Austria. If Russia has suffered from the East, she has suffered in order to resist it; and it is rather hard that the very miracle of her escape should make a mystery about her origin. Jonah may or may not have been three days inside a fish, but that does not make him a merman. And in all the other cases of European nations who escaped the monstrous captivity, we do admit the purity and continuity of the European type. We consider the old Eastern rule as a wound, but not as a stain. Copper-colored men out of Africa overruled for centuries the religion and patriotism of Spaniards. Yet I have never heard that "Don Quixote" was an African fable on the lines of "Uncle Remus." I have never heard that the heavy black in the pictures of Velasquez was due to a negro ancestry. In the case of Spain, which is close to us, we can recognize the resurrection of a Christian and cultured nation after its age of bondage. But Russia is rather remote; and those to whom nations are but names in newspapers can really fancy, like Mr. Baring's friend, that all Russian

churches are "mosques." Yet the land of Turgenev is not a wilderness of fakirs; and even the fanatical Russian is as proud of being different from the Mongol as the fanatical Spaniard was proud of being different from the Moor.

"Scratch a Russian"

The town of Reading, as it exists, offers few opportunities for piracy on the high seas; yet it was the camp of the pirates in Alfred's days. I should think it hard to call the people of Berkshire half Danish merely because they drove out the Danes. In short, some temporary submergence under the savage flood was the fate of many of the most civilized States of Christendom, and it is quite ridiculous to argue that Russia, which wrestled hardest, must have recovered least. Everywhere, doubtless, the East spread a sort of enamel over the conquered countries; but everywhere the enamel cracked. Actual history, in fact, is exactly opposite to the cheap proverb invented against the Muscovite. It is not true to say, "Scratch a Russian and you find a Tartar." In the darkest hour of the barbaric dominion it was truer to say, "Scratch a Tartar and you find a Russian." It was the civilization that survived under all the barbarism. This vital romance of Russia, this revolution against Asia, can be proved in pure fact; not only from the almost superhuman activity of Russia during the struggle, but also (which is much rarer as human history goes) by her quite consistent conduct since. She is the only great nation which has really expelled the Mongol from her country and continued to protest against presence of the Mongol in her continent. Knowing what he had been in Russia, she knew what he would be in Europe. In this she pur-

sued a logical line of thought, which was, if anything, too unsympathetic with the energies and religions of the East. Every other country, one may say, has been an ally of the Turk—that is, of the Mongol and the Moslem. The French played them as pieces against Austria; the English warmly supported them under the Palmerston régime; even the young Italians sent troops to the Crimea; and of Russia and her Austrian vassal it is nowadays needless to speak. For good or evil, it is the fact of history that Russia is the only power in Europe that has never supported the Crescent against the Cross.

That doubtless will appear an unimportant matter, but it may become important under certain peculiar conditions. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there were a powerful Prince in Europe who had gone ostentatiously out of his way to pay reverence to the remains of the Tartar, Mongol, and Moslem left as an outpost in Europe. Suppose there were a Christian Emperor who could not even go to the tomb of the crucified without pausing to congratulate the last and living crucifier. If there were an Emperor who gave guns and guides and maps and drill instructors to defend the remains of the Mongol in Christendom, what would we say to him? I think at least we might ask him what he meant by his impudence when he talked about supporting a semi-Oriental power. That we support a semi-Oriental power we deny. That he has supported an entirely Oriental power cannot be denied; no, not even by the man who did it.

Whom Has Prussia Emancipated?

But here is to be noted the essential difference between Russia and Prussia; especially by those who use the ordinary liberal arguments against the latter. Russia has a policy, which she pursues, if you will, through evil and good; but at least so as to produce good as well as evil. Let it be granted that the policy has made her oppressive to the Finns, the Poles—though the Russian Poles feel far less oppressed than do the Prussian Poles. But it is a mere historic fact that

if Russia has been a despot to some small nations, she has been a deliverer to others. She did, so far as in her lay, emancipate the Servians or the Montenegrins. But whom did Prussia ever emancipate—even by accident? It is, indeed, somewhat extraordinary that in the perpetual permutations of international politics the Hohenzollerns have never gone astray into the path of enlightenment. They have been in alliance with almost everybody off and on; with France, with England, with Austria, with Russia. Can any one candidly say that they have left on any one of these people the faintest impress of progress or liberation? Prussia was the enemy of the French monarchy, but a worse enemy of the French Revolution. Prussia had been an enemy of the Czar, but she was a worse enemy of the Duma. Prussia totally disregarded Austrian rights; but she is to-day quite ready to inflict Austrian wrongs. This is the strong particular difference between the one empire and the other. Russia is pursuing certain intelligible and sincere ends, which to her at least are ideals, and for which, therefore, she will make sacrifices and will protect the weak. But the North German soldier is a sort of abstract tyrant; everywhere and always on the side of materialistic tyranny. This Teuton in uniform has been found in strange places; shooting farmers before Saratoga and flogging soldiers in Surrey, hanging negroes in Africa and raping girls in Wicklow, but never, by some mysterious fatality, lending a hand to the freeing of a single city or the independence of one solitary flag. Wherever scorn and prosperous oppression are, there is the Prussian; unconsciously consistent, instinctively restrictive, innocently evil; "following darkness like a dream."

Disinterested Despotism

Suppose we heard of a person (gifted with some longevity) who had helped Alva to persecute Dutch Protestants, then helped Cromwell to persecute Irish Catholics, and then helped Claverhouse to persecute Scotch Puritans—we should find it rather easier to call him a persecutor than to call him a Protestant or a

Catholic. Curiously enough, this is actually the position in which the Prussian stands in Europe. No arguments can alter the fact that in three converging and conclusive cases he has been on the side of three distinct rulers of different religions who had nothing whatever in common except that they were ruling oppressively. In these three Governments, taken separately, one can see something excusable, or at last human. When the Kaiser encouraged the Russian rulers to crush the revolution, the Russian rulers undoubtedly believed they were wrestling with an inferno of atheism and anarchy. A Socialist of the ordinary English kind cried out upon me when I spoke of Stolypin and said he was chiefly known by the halter called "Stolypin's Necktie." As a fact, there were many other things interesting about Stolypin besides his necktie—his policy of peasant proprietorship, his extraordinary personal courage, and certainly none more interesting than that movement in his death agony, when he made the sign of the cross toward the Czar, as the crown and captain of his Christianity. But the Kaiser does not regard the Czar as the captain of Christianity. Far from it. What he supported in Stolypin was the necktie, and nothing but the necktie; the gallows, and not the cross. The Russian ruler did believe that the Orthodox Church was orthodox. The Austrian Archduke did really desire to make the Catholic Church catholic. He did really believe that he was being pro-Catholic in being pro-Austrian. But the Kaiser cannot be pro-Catholic, and, therefore, cannot have been really pro-Austrian; he was simply and solely anti-Servian; nay, even in the cruel and sterile strength of Turkey, any one with imagination can see something of the tragedy, and, therefore, of the tenderness of true belief. The worst that can be said of the Moslems is, as the poet put it, they offered to man the choice of the Koran or the sword. The best that can be said for the German is that he does not care about the Koran, but is satisfied if he can have the sword. And for me, I confess, even the sins of these three

other striving empires take on, in comparison, something that is sorrowful and dignified; and I feel they do not deserve that this little Lutheran lounge should patronize all that is evil in them, while ignoring all that is good. He is not Catholic; he is not Orthodox; he is not Mohammedan. He is merely an old gentleman who wishes to share the crime, though he cannot share the creed. He desires to be a persecutor by the pang without the palm. So strongly do all the instincts of the Prussian drive against liberty that he would rather oppress other peoples' subjects than think of anybody going without the benefits of oppression. He is a sort of disinterested despot. He is as disinterested as the devil, who is ready to do any one's dirty work.

The Paradox of Prussia

This would seem obviously fantastic were it not supported by solid facts which cannot be explained otherwise. Indeed it would be inconceivable if we were thinking of a whole people consisting of free and varied individuals. But in Prussia the governing class is really a governing class, and a very few people are needed to think along these lines to make all the other people act along them. And the paradox of Prussia is this: That while its princes and nobles have no other aim on this earth but to destroy democracy wherever it shows itself, they have contrived to get themselves trusted, not as wardens of the past, but as forerunners of the future. Even they cannot believe that their theory is popular, but they do believe that it is progressive. Here again we find the spiritual chasm between the two monarchies in question. The Russian institutions are, in many cases, really left in the rear of the Russian people, and many of the Russian people know it. But the Prussian institutions are supposed to be in advance of the Prussian people, and most of the Prussian people believe it. It is thus much easier for the war lords to go everywhere and impose a hopeless slavery upon every one, for they have al-

ready imposed a sort of hopeful slavery on their own simple race.

A Factory of Thumbscrews

And when men shall speak to us of the hoary iniquities of Russia and of how antiquated is the Russian system we shall answer, "Yes; that is the superiority of Russia." There institutions are part of their history, whether as relics or fossils. Their abuses have really been uses; that is to say, they have been used up. If they have old engines of terror or torment, they may fall to pieces from mere rust, like an old coat of armor. But in the case of the Prussian tyranny, if it be tyranny at all, it is the whole point of its claim that it is not antiquated, but just going to begin, like the showman. Prussia has a whole thriving factory of thumbscrews, a whole humming workshop of wheels and racks, of the newest and neatest pattern, with which to win Europe back to reaction * * * infandum renovare dolorem. And if we wish to test the truth of this, it can be done by the same method which showed us that Russia, if her race or religion

could sometimes make her an invader and an oppressor, could also be made an emancipator and a knight errant. In the same way, if the Russian institutions are old-fashioned, they honestly exhibit the good as well as the bad that can be found in old-fashioned things. In their police system they have an inequality which is against our ideas of law. But in their commune system they have an equality that is older than law itself. Even when they flogged each other like barbarians, they called each other by their Christian names like children. At their worst, they retained all the best of a rude society. At their best, they are simply good, like good children or good nuns. But in Prussia, all that is best in the civilized machinery is put at the service of all that is worst in the barbaric mind. Here again the Prussian has no accidental merits, none of those lucky survivals, none of those late repentances, which make the patchwork glory of Russia. Here all is sharpened to a point and pointed to a purpose; and that purpose, if words and acts have any meaning at all, is the destruction of liberty throughout the world.

V.

The "Bond of Teutonism"

In considering the Prussian point of view we have been considering what seems to be mainly a mental limitation—a kind of knot in the brain. Toward the problem of Slav population, of English colonization, of French armies, and of reinforcements it shows the same strang philosophic sulks. So far as I can follow it, it seems to amount to saying, "It is very wrong that you should be superior to me, because I am superior to you." The spokesman of this system seems to have a curious capacity for concentrating this entanglement or contradiction sometimes into a single paragraph, or even a single sentence. I have already referred to the German Emperor's celebrated suggestion that in order to avert the peril of Hun-

nishness we should all become Huns. A much stronger instance is his more recent order to his troops touching the war in Northern France. As most people know, his words ran: "It is my royal and imperial command that you concentrate your energies, for the immediate present, upon one single purpose, and that is that you address all your skill and all the valor of your soldiers to exterminate first the treacherous English and to walk over Gen. French's contemptible little army." The rudeness of the remark an Englishman can afford to pass over. What I am interested in is the mentality, the train of thought that can manage to entangle itself even in so brief a space. If French's little army is contemptible it would seem clear that

all the skill and valor of the German Army had better not be concentrated on it, but on the larger and less contemptible allies. If all the skill and valor of the German Army are concentrated on it it is not being treated as contemptible. But the Prussian rhetorician had two incompatible sentiments in his mind, and he insisted on saying them both at once. He wanted to think of an English Army as a small thing; but he also wanted to think of an English defeat as a big thing. He wanted to exult, at the same moment, in the utter weakness of the British Nation in their attack and the supreme skill and valor of the Germans in repelling such an attack. Somehow it must be made a common and obvious collapse for England and yet a daring and unexpected triumph for Germany. In trying to express these contradictory conceptions simultaneously he got rather mixed. Therefore he bade Germania fill all her vales and mountains with the dying agonies of this almost invisible earwig, and let the impure blood of this cockroach redden the Rhine down to the sea.

Prof. Harnack's Reproach

But it would be unfair to base the criticism on the utterance of any accidental and hereditary Prince; and it is quite equally clear in the case of the philosophers who have been held up to us, even in England, as the very prophets of progress. And in nothing is it shown more sharply than in the curious, confused talk about race, and especially about the Teutonic race. Prof. Harnack and similar people are reproaching us, I understand, for having broken "the bond of Teutonism"—a bond which the Prussians have strictly observed, both in breach and observance. We note it in the open annexation of lands wholly inhabited by negroes, such as Denmark. We note it equally in their instant and joyful recognition of the flaxen hair and light blue eyes of the Turks. But it is still the abstract principle of Prof. Harnack which interests me most, and in following it I have the same complexity of inquiry, but the same simplicity of

result. Comparing the professor's concern about "Teutonism" with his unconcern about Belgium, I can only reach the following result: "A man need not keep a promise he has made. But a man must keep a promise he has not made." There certainly was a treaty binding Britain to Belgium, if it was only a scrap of paper. If there was any treaty binding Britain with Teutonism it is, to say the least of it, a lost scrap of paper—almost what one might call a scrap of waste paper. Here again the pedants under consideration exhibit the illogical perversity that makes the brain reel. There is obligation and there is no obligation; sometimes it appears that Germany and England must keep faith with each other; sometimes that Germany need not keep faith with anybody and anything; sometimes that we, alone among European peoples, are almost entitled to be Germans; sometimes that besides us Russians and Frenchmen almost rise to a Germanic loveliness of character. But through all there is, hazy but not hypocritical; this sense of some common Teutonism.

Prof. Haeckel, another of the witnesses raised up against us, attained to some celebrity at one time through proving the remarkable resemblance between two different things by printing duplicate pictures of the same thing. Prof. Haeckel's contribution to biology, in this case, was exactly like Prof. Harnack's contribution to ethnology. Prof. Harnack knows what a German is like. When he wants to imagine what an Englishman is like he simply photographs the same German over again. In both cases there is probably sincerity, as well as simplicity. Haeckel was so certain that the species illustrated in embryo really are closely related and linked up that it seemed to him a small thing to simplify it by mere repetition. Harnack is so certain that the German and Englishman are almost alike that he really risks the generalization that they are exactly alike. He photographs, so to speak, the same fair and foolish face twice over, and calls it a remarkable resemblance between cousins. Thus he can prove the

existence of Teutonism just about as conclusively as Haeckel has proved the more tenable proposition of the non-existence of God.

Germans and English

Now, the German and the Englishman are not in the least alike—except in the sense that neither of them are negroes. They are, in everything good and evil, more unlike than any other two men we can take at random from the great European family. They are opposite from the roots of their history—nay, of their geography. It is an understatement to call Britain insular. Britain is not only an island, but an island slashed by the sea till it nearly splits into three islands. and even the midlands can almost smell the salt. Germany is a powerful, beautiful, and fertile inland country, which can only find the sea by one or two twisted and narrow paths, as people find a subterranean lake. Thus the British Navy is really national because it is natural. It has cohered out of hundreds of accidental adventures of ships and shipmen before Chaucer's time and after it. But the German Navy is an artificial thing, as artificial as a constructed Alp would be in England. William II. has simply copied the British Navy, as Frederick II. copied the French Army, and this Japanese or antlike assiduity in imitation is one of the hundred qualities which the Germans have and the English markedly have not. There are other German superiorities which are very much superior. The one or two really jolly things that the Germans have got are precisely the things which the English haven't got, notably a real habit of popular music and of the ancient songs of the people; not merely spreading from the towns or caught from the professionals. In this the Germans rather resemble the Welsh, though heaven knows what becomes of Teutonism if they do. But the difference between the Germans and the English goes deeper than all these signs of it. They differ more than any other two Europeans in the normal posture of the mind.

Above all, they differ in what is the

most English of all English traits—that shame which the French may be right in calling “the bad shame,” for it is certainly mixed up with pride and suspicion, the upshot of which we call shyness. Even an Englishman's rudeness is often rooted in his being embarrassed. But a German's rudeness is rooted in his never being embarrassed. He eats and makes love noisily. He never feels a speech or a song or a sermon or a large meal to be what the English call “out of place” in particular circumstances. When Germans are patriotic and religious they have no reactions against patriotism and religion, as have the English and the French. Nay, the mistake of Germany in the modern disaster largely arose from the facts that she thought England was simple, when England is very subtle. She thought that because our politics have become largely financial they had become wholly financial; that because our aristocrats had become pretty cynical they had become entirely corrupt. They could not seize the subtlety by which a rather used-up English gentleman might sell a coronet when he could not sell a fortress; might lower the public standards and yet refuse to lower the flag. In short, the Germans are quite sure that they understand us entirely because they do not understand us at all. Possibly, if they began to understand us they might hate us even more, but I would rather be hated for some small but real reason than pursued with love on account of all kinds of qualities which I do not possess and which I do not desire. And when the Germans get their first genuine glimpses of what modern England is like they will discover that England has a very broken, belated, and inadequate sense of having an obligation to Europe; but no sort of sense whatever of having any obligation to Teutonism.

Slippery Strength of Stupidity

This is the last and strongest of the Prussian qualities we have here considered. There is in stupidity of this sort a strange, slippery strength, because it can be not only outside rules, but outside reason. The man who really cannot see that he is contradicting him-

self has a great advantage in controversy, though the advantage breaks down when he tries to reduce it to simple addition, to chess—or to the game called war. It is the same about the stupidity of the one-sided kinship. The drunkard who is quite certain that a total stranger is his long-lost brother has a great advantage until it comes to matters of detail. "We must have chaos within," said Nietzsche, "that we may give birth to a dancing star."

In these slight notes I have suggested the principal strong points of the Prussian character—a failure in honor which almost amounts to a failure in memory; an egomania that is honestly blind to the fact that the other party is an ego, and, above all, an actual itch for tyranny and interference, the devil which everywhere torments the idle and the proud. To these must be added a certain mental shapelessness, which can expand or contract without reference to reason or record—a

potential infinity of excuses. If the English had been on the German side the German professors would have noted what irresistible energies had evolved the Teutons. As the English are on the other side, the German professors will say that these Teutons were not sufficiently evolved; or they will say they were just sufficiently evolved to show that they were not Teutons. Probably they will say both. But the truth is that all that they call evolution should rather be called evasion. They tell us they are opening windows of enlightenment and doors of progress. The truth is that they are breaking up the whole house of the human intellect that they may abscond in any direction. There is an ominous and almost monstrous parallel between the position of their overrated philosophers and of their comparatively underrated soldiers. For what their professors call roads of progress are really routes of escape.

South Africa's Boers and Britons

By H. Rider Haggard

The heart of South Africa, Boer and Briton, is with England in this war. Here and there you will find an individual who cherishes bitter and hostile memories, of which there has been an example in Mr. Beyer's letter the other day, so effectually answered by Gen. Botha. But such instances, I believe, are so rare that really they are the exceptions which seem to prove the rule. Of course, it goes without saying that every person of English descent is heartily with the mother country, and I do not suppose it would be an overestimate to add that quite 80 per cent. of the Dutch are of the same way of thinking.

Still, there is a party among the South African Dutch that sees no necessity for the invasion of German Southwest Africa. This party overlooks the fact that the Germans have for long been pre-

paring to invade them; also that if by any chance Germany should conquer in this war South Africa would be one of the first countries that they would seize.

In speaking of this I talk of what I understand, since for the last two and a half years it has been my duty to travel around the British Empire upon the service of his Majesty. In addition to South Africa, I have visited India, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and Canada. I have recently traveled throughout South Africa as a member of the Dominion's Royal Commission. It was my first visit there after the lapse of a whole generation, and I can only say that everywhere I have found the most intense loyalty and devotion to the old motherland. The empire is one and indivisible; together it will stand or together it will fall.

South Africa is united; it has forgotten its recent labor troubles. I answer "absolutely" all such things are past history, blown away and destroyed by this great wind of war. South Africa, down to its lowest Hottentot, has, I believe, but one object, to help England to win in this vast battle of the nations. Why, even the natives, as you may have noticed, are sending subscriptions from their scanty hoards and praying to be allowed "to throw a few stones for the King." Did not Poutsma say as much the other day?

In the old days, of course, there were very strained relations between the English and Boers, which had their roots in foolish and inconsistent acts carried out by the Home Government, generally to forward party ends. I need not go into them, because they are too long.

Then came the Boer war, which, as you know, proved a much bigger enterprise than the Home Government had anticipated. It cost Britain 20,000 lives and £300,000,000 of English money before the Boers were finally subdued. Only about half a score of years have gone by since peace was declared. Within two or three years of that peace the British Government made up its mind to a very bold step and one which was viewed with grave doubts by many people—namely, to give full self-government to the Transvaal and the Orange River Colonies.

Astonished at Results

When I traveled through South Africa the other day this new Constitution had been working for a few years, and I can only say that I was astonished at the results. Here and there in the remoter districts, it is true, some racial feeling still prevailed, but taken as a whole this seems absolutely to have died away. Briton and Boer have come together in a manner for which I believe I am right in saying there is no precedent in the history of the world, so shortly, at any rate, after a prolonged and bitter struggle to the death. I might give many instances, but I will only take one. At Pretoria I was asked to inspect a company of Boy

Scouts, and there I found English and Dutch lads serving side by side with the utmost brotherhood. Again I met most of the men who had been leaders of the Boers in the war. One and all professed the greatest loyalty to England. Moreover, I am certain that this was not lip loyalty; it was from the heart. Especially was I impressed by that great man, Gen. Botha, with whom I had several conversations. I am convinced that at this moment the King has no truer or more faithful servant than Gen. Botha. Again and again did I hear from prominent South Africans of Dutch or Huguenot extraction that never more was there any chance of trouble between Boer and Briton.

I know it is alleged by some that this is because the Dutch feel that they have on the whole made a good bargain, having won absolute constitutional liberty and the fullest powers of self-government, plus the protection of the British fleet. There may be something in this view, but I am sure that the feeling goes a great deal deeper than self-interest. Mutual respect has arisen between those who ten years ago were enemies fighting each other.

Appeal to People's Imagination

Moreover, the Boer now knows a great deal more of the British Empire and what it means than he did then. Lastly, the supreme generosity evinced by Britain in giving her enemy of the day before every right and privilege that is owned by her other oversea dominions with whom she has never had a quarrel appeals deeply to the imagination of the Dutch people. Now the world sees the results. Germany, which has miscalculated so much in connection with this war and the part that the British Empire would play in it, miscalculated nowhere more than it did in the case of South Africa. The German war lords hoped that India and Egypt would rise, they trusted that Canada and Australia would prove lukewarm, but they were certain that South Africa would seize the opportunity to rebel. How could it be other-

wise, they thought, seeing that but yesterday she was at death grips with us.

Then came the great surprise. Lo and behold! instead of rebelling, South Africa promptly cabled to England saying that every British soldier might be withdrawn from her shores, and, further, that the burghers of the land would themselves undertake the conquest of the German possessions of Southwest Africa for the Crown. They are doing so at this moment. I believe that today there is no British soldier left at the Cape, and I know that now a great force is moving on Southwest Africa furnished by Boer and Briton alike. Can the history of the world tell us of any parallel case to this—that a country conquered within a dozen years should not only need no garrison, but by its own free will undertake war against the enemies of its late victor? Surely this is something of which Britain may feel proud.

Deep Distrust of Germany

Now, some of our readers may ask: "Why is it? How did this miracle, for it is little less, happen?" My answer is that it has been caused first by a supreme and glorious trust in the justice and generosity of England, which knows how to rule colonies as no other nation has done in the history of the earth, and secondly by a deep distrust of Germany. To my own knowledge, Germany has been intriguing in South Africa for the last quarter of a century. I remember, I suppose it must be almost twenty years ago, sending to the late Mr. Chamberlain, who was then Colonial Secretary, information to this effect which reached me from undoubted sources in South Africa. Again, not long ago, I was shown a document which was found among the papers of the Zulu Prince Dinizulu, son of King Cetewayo, who died the other day. It was concluded between himself and Germans, and under it the poor man had practically sold his country nominally to a German firm, but doubtless to more powerful persons behind. In short, there is no question that for many years Germany has had its eye upon South Africa as a desirable field of settlement for its subjects under the German and not the

British flag. Now, the Boers are perfectly well acquainted with this fact and have no wish to exchange the beneficent rule of Britain for that of Potsdam, the King Log of George V. for the King Stork of Kaiser Wilhelm.

You ask me if I think that the Boers are likely to succeed in their attack on Southwest Africa, where it must be remembered the Germans have a very formidable force; indeed, I have been told, I do not know with what accuracy, that they have accumulated there the vast arsenal of war material that was obviously intended to be used on some future occasion in the invasion of the Cape. I answered: "Certainly, they will succeed, though not easily." Remember what stock these Boers come from. They are decedents of the men who withstood and beat Alva in the sixteenth century.

Botha of Huguenot Descent

I happen to be well acquainted with that period of history. I wrote a story called "Lysbeth" concerning it, and to do this I found it necessary not only to visit Holland on several occasions, but to read all the contemporary records. In the light of the information which I thus obtained, I state positively that the world has no record of a more glorious and heroic struggle than that made by the Dutch against all the power of Spain. Well, the Boers are descended from these men and women (for both fought). Also, they include a very large dash of some of the best blood of Europe, namely, that of the Huguenots. For instance, Botha himself is of Huguenot descent. It is impossible for a person like myself, who has that same blood in me, to talk with him for five minutes without becoming aware of his origin. Long before he told me so I knew that he was in part a Frenchman. Men so great are not easily conquered, as we know to our cost. Why, it took quite 250,000 soldiers and three years of strenuous guerrilla warfare to enable Britain to defeat 40,000 or 50,000 Dutch farmers. Therefore I have personally not the least fear of the ultimate result of the campaign against Southwest Africa.

I went as a lad as Secretary to the Governor of Natal. That was in 1875. Subsequently I accompanied Sir Theophilus Shepstone, one of the greatest men that ever lived in South Africa, on his famous mission to the Transvaal. I am now, I believe, the only survivor of that mission, and certainly the only man who knows all the inner political history of that event. Afterward I held office in the Transvaal, and was in the country during all the disastrous period of the first Boer war. For instance, I dined with Gen. Colley the night before he started on his ill-fated expedition. I think there were thirteen of us present at that historical dinner. Within a few weeks six or eight of these were dead, including Colley himself, killed in the fight of Majuba, of which I heard the guns. Of those present at that dinner party there now survive only Lady Colley, my wife, and myself.

Felt Like Rip Van Winkle

After this I left Africa, and more than thirty years went by before I returned as a Commissioner in the service of the Crown. It was a very extraordinary experience; indeed, I felt like a new Rip Van Winkle, for nearly all my old chiefs and colleagues were dead, and another generation had arisen. I can only say

that I was deeply touched by the reception which I received throughout the country. It was with strange feelings that almost on the very spot where I helped to read the proclamation of annexation of the Transvaal, in 1877, and with my own hands hoisted the British flag over the land, I listened to my health being proposed by the Dutch Chief Justice of the Transvaal territory, once more a part of the British Empire. Such was my greeting everywhere. Three and thirty years before I had left the shores of Africa, believing that soon or late the British power was doomed to failure and probably to extinction there. When I left them again, six months ago, it was with the glad knowledge that, by the united wish of the inhabitants of South Africa, it was re-established, never again to pass away. It is a wonderful thing for a man in his own lifetime to see a country pass through so many vicissitudes, and in the end to appear in the face of the world no longer as England's enemy, but as a constituent part of the great British Empire, one of her best friends and supporters, glorying in her flag, which now floats from Cape Agalhas to the Zambesi, and soon will float over those contingent regions that have been siezed by the mailed fist of Germany.

Death of Rider Haggard's Nephew

In various papers throughout England has appeared a letter, or part of a letter, written by Private C. Derry of the Second Battalion, Welsh Regiment. It concerns the fall of my much-loved nephew, Capt. Mark Haggard, of the same regiment, on Sept. 13 in the battle of the Aisne.

Since this letter has been published and, vivid, pathetic, and pride-inspiring as it is, does not tell all the tale, I have been requested, on behalf of Mark's mother, young widow, and other members of our family, to give the rest of it as it was collected by them from the lips

of Lieut. Somerset, who lay wounded by him when he died. Therefore I send this supplementary account to you in the hope that the other journals which have printed the first part of the story will copy it from your columns.

It seems that after he had given the order to fix bayonets, as told by Private Derry, my nephew charged the German Maxims at the head of his company, he and his soldier servant outrunning the other men. Arrived at the Maxim in front of him, with the rifle which he was using as Derry describes, he shot and killed the three soldiers who were serving it,

and then was seen "fighting and laying out" the Germans with the butt end of his empty gun, "laughing" as he did so, until he fell mortally wounded in the body and was carried away by his servant.

His patient and heroic end is told by Private Derry, and I imagine that the exhortation to "Stick it, Welsh!" which from time to time he uttered in his agony, will not soon be forgotten in his regiment. Of that end we who mourn him can only say in the simple words of Derry's letter, that he "died as he had lived—an officer and a gentleman."

Perhaps it would not be inappropriate to add, as a thought of consolation to those throughout the land who day by

day see their loved ones thus devoured by the waste of war, that of a truth these do not vainly die. Not only are they crowned with fame, but by the noble manner of their end they give the lie to Bernhardt and his school, who tell us that we English are an effete and worn-out people, befogged with mean ideals; lost in selfishness and the lust of wealth and comfort. Moreover, the history of these deeds of theirs will surely be as a beacon to those destined to carry on the traditions of our race in that new England which shall arise when the cause of freedom for which we must fight and die has prevailed—to fall no more.

H. RIDER HAGGARD.

Ditchingham, Norfolk, Oct. 9, 1914.

An Anti-Christian War

By Robert Bridges

Since the beginning of this war the meaning of it has in one respect considerably changed, and I hope that our people will see that it is primarily a holy war. It is manifestly a war declared between Christ and the devil.

The conduct of the German conscripts has demonstrated that they have been instructed to adopt in full practice the theories of their political philosophers, and that they have heartily consented to do this and freely commit every cruelty that they think will terrorize the people whom they intend to crush. The details of their actions are too beastly to mention.

Their philosophers, as I read them, teach openly that the law of love is silly and useless, but that brutal force and cruelty are the useful and proper means of attaining success in all things. Shortly, you are not to do to others as you wish they should do to you, but you should do exactly what you wish they should not do to you; that is, you

should cut their throats and seize their property, and then you will get on.

As for these enlightened philosophers, their doctrines are plainly an apostasy from the Gospel—and this they do not scruple to avow; and their tenets are only a recrudescence or reassertion of the barbarism which we hoped we had grown out of; it is all merely damnable. But it seems to me that, judged only as utilitarian policy, it is stupid; and that they blundered in neglecting the moral force (for that is also a force) of the antagonism that they were bound to arouse in all gentle minds, whether simple or cultured. It was stupid of them not to perceive that their hellish principles would shock everything that is most beloved and living in modern thought, both the "humanitarian" tendency of the time and the respect which has grown up for the rights of minorities and nationalities. Now, not to reckon with such things was stupid, unless they can win temporary justification by immediate success.

What success is possible for those who thus openly outrage humanity remains to be seen; but they cannot be allowed the advantage of any doubt as to what they are about. Those who fight for them will fight for "the devil and all his works"; and those who fight against them will be fighting in the holy cause of humanity and the law of love. If the advocacy of their bad principles and their diabolical conduct do not set the whole world against them, then the world is worse than I think. My belief is that there are yet millions of their own countrymen who have not bowed the knee to Satan, and who will be as much shocked as we are; and that this internal moral disruption will much hamper them. This morning I have a legal notice sent me from a German resident in England announcing that he has changed his name, for shame (I suppose) of his Fatherland.

All their apology throughout has been

a clumsy tissue of self-contradictory lies, and their occasional hypocrisy has been hastily pretended and ill-conceived. The particular contention against us—that we were betraying the cause of civilization by supporting the barbarous Slav—does not come very convincingly from them if their apostle is Nietzsche, while the Russian prophet is Tolstoy.

The infernal machine which has been scientifically preparing for the last twenty-five years is now on its wild career like one of Mr. Wells's inventions, and wherever it goes it will leave desolation behind it and put all material progress back for at least half a century. There was never anything in the world worthier of extermination, and it is the plain duty of all civilized nations to unite to drive it back into its home and exterminate it there. I am, &c.,

ROBERT BRIDGES.

Sept. 1, 1914.

English Artists' Protest

Art lovers in Great Britain have drawn up a protest against the vandalism of German soldiers. Copies of this protest have been sent to the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London; the American Ambassador, with a humble request that it may be forwarded to the President of the United States; and Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove, Art Adviser to the Belgian Government. Those who have signed include well-known collectors, Trustees of the British Museum, the National Gallery, the National Portrait Gallery, and the National Galleries of Scotland; the Director and Principal Librarian of the British Museum; the Directors of the National Gallery, the Victoria and Albert Museum, and the National Galleries of Scotland and Ireland; the Keepers of the Wallace Collection and the National Gallery of British Art; Keepers in the British Museum; the Joint Honorary Secretaries of the National Art Collections Fund, and many critics and others prominent in the art world.

The whole civilized world has witnessed with horror the terrible effects of modern warfare on helpless inhabitants of Belgium and France, and on ancient buildings and other works of art which are the abiding monuments of the piety and culture of their ancestors.

Some of the acts of the invading German army against buildings may be defensible from the military standpoint; but it seems certain from present information that in some signal instances, notably at Louvain and Rheims, this defense cannot hold good against the mass of evidence to the contrary.

The signatories of this protest claim that they are in no sense a partisan body. Their contention in this matter is that the splendid monuments of the arts of the Middle Ages which have been destroyed or damaged are the inheritance of the whole world, and that it is the duty of all civilized communities to endeavor to preserve them for the benefit and instruction of posterity. While France and Belgium are individually the poorer from such wanton destruction, the world at large is no less impoverished.

On these grounds, therefore, we desire to express our strong indignation and abhorrence at the gratuitous destruction

of ancient buildings that has marked the invasion of Belgium and France by the Germany Army, and we wish to enter a protest in the strongest terms against the continuance of so barbarous and reckless a policy. That it is the result of a policy, and not of an accident, is shown by the similarity of the fate of Louvain, Malines, Termonde, Senlis, and finally Rheims.

Many of us have had the opportunity of showing that our love and respect for art are not bounded by our nationality, but we feel compelled to publish to the world our horror and detestation of the barbarous acts committed by the army that represents a country which has done so much to promote and advance the study of art and its history.

The signatories are:

DEVONSHIRE.
CHOLMONDELEY.
LANSDOWNE.
FEVERSHAM.
MABEL FEVERSHAM.
LEICESTER.
LONSDALE.
NORMANTON.
NORTHBROOK.
PLYMOUTH.
DILLON.
ALINGTON.
D'ABERNON.
ISABEL SOMERSET.
FREDERICK L. COOK.
AUDLEY D. NEELD.
HERBERT RAPHAEL.
SIDNEY COLVIN.
MARTIN CONWAY.
CHARLES HOLROYD.

FREDERIC G. KENYON.
HUGH LANE.
FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER.
C. HERCULES READ.
CECIL HARCOURT SMITH.
ISIDORE SPIELMANN.
HERBERT B. TREE.
WHITWORTH WALLIS.
CHARLES AITKEN.
OTTO BEIT.
MAURICE W. BROCKWELL.
A. H. BUTTERY.
C. S. CARSTAIRS.
JAMES L. CAW.
HERBERT COOK.
D. H. S. CRANAGE.
LIONEL CUST.
CAMPBELL DODSON.
CHARLES DOWDESWELL.
DAVID ERSKINE.
H. A. L. FISHER.
J. L. GARVIN.
PERCIVAL GASKELL.
ALGERNON GRAVES.
JAMES GREIG.
O. GUTEKUNST.
EDWARD HUTTON.
G. B. CROFT-LYONS.
D. S. MACCOLL.
ERIC MACLAGAN.
G. MAYER.
MORTIMER MENPES.
ALMERIC H. PAGET.
J. S. R. PHILLIPS.
G. N. COUNT PLUNKETT.
JANET ROSS.
ROBERT ROSS.
M. E. SADLER.
MARION SPIELMANN.
A. J. SULLEY.
D. CROAL THOMSON.
T. HUMPHRY WARD.
W. H. JAMES WEALE.
FREDERICK A. WHITE.
R. C. WITT.

To Arms!

By Sir Arthur Conan Doyle

Is it possible that there are still some of our people who do not understand the causes of this war, and are ignorant of the great stakes at issue which will speedily have so important a bearing upon the lives of each and all of them? It is hard to believe it, and yet it is so stated by some who profess to know. Let me try, in the shortest space and in the clearest words that I can command, to lay before them both the causes and the possible effects, and to implore them now, now, at this very moment, before it is too late, to make those efforts and sacrifices which the occasion demands. In Germany, every man from the ages of sixteen to fifty-five is with the colors. The last man has been called up. And yet we hear—we could not bear to see—that young athletic men in this country are playing football or cricket, while our streets are full of those who should be in our camps. All our lives have been but a preparation for this supreme moment. All our future lives will be determined by how we bear ourselves in these few months to come. Shame, shame on the man who fails his country in this its hour of need! I would not force him to serve. I could not think that the service of such a man was of any avail. Let the country be served by free men, and let them deal with the coward or the sluggard who flinches.

The causes of the war are only of moment to us, at this stage, in that we gain more strength in our arms and more iron in our souls by a knowledge that it is for all that is honorable and sacred for which we fight. What really concerns us is that we are in a fight for our national life, that we must fight through to the end, and that each and all of us must help, in his own fashion, to the last ounce of his strength, that this end may be victory. That is the essence of the situation. It is not words and phrases that

we need, but men, men—and always more men. If words can bring the men then they are of avail. If not they may well wait for the times to mend. But if there is a doubt in the mind of any man as to the justice of his country's quarrel, then even a writer may find work ready to his hand.

Let us cast our minds back upon the events which have led up to this conflict. They may be divided into two separate classes, those which prepared the general situation, and those which caused the special quarrel. Each of these I will treat in its turn.

Teuton Intoxication

It is a matter of common knowledge, one which a man must be blind and deaf not to understand, that for many years Germany, intoxicated by her success in war and by her increase of wealth, has regarded the British Empire with eyes of jealousy and hatred. It has never been alleged by those who gave expression to this almost universal national passion that Great Britain had in any way, either historically or commercially, done Germany a mischief. Even our most bitter traducers, when asked to give any definite historical reasons for their dislike, were compelled to put forward such ludicrous excuses as that the British had abandoned the Prussian King in the year 1761, quite oblivious of the fact that the same Prussian King had abandoned his own allies in the same war under far more damaging circumstances, acting up to his own motto that no promises are binding where the vital interests of a State are in question. With all their malevolence they could give no examples of any ill turn done by us until their deliberate policy had forced us into antagonism. On the other hand, a long list of occasions could very easily be compiled on which we had helped them in some

common cause, from the days of Marlborough to those of Blücher. Until the twentieth century had turned they had no possible cause for political hatred against us. In commerce our record was even more clear. Never in any way had we interfered with that great development of trade which has turned them from one of the poorest to one of the richest of European States. Our markets were open to them untaxed, while our own manufactures paid 20 per cent. in Germany. The markets of India, of Egypt, and of every portion of the empire which had no self-appointed tariff were as open to German goods as to British ones. Nothing could possibly have been more generous than our commercial treatment. No doubt there was some grumbling when cheap imitations of our own goods were occasionally found to oust the originals from their markets. Such a feeling was but natural and human. But in all matters of commerce, as in all matters political before the dawn of this century, they have no shadow of a grievance against us.

And yet they hated us with a most bitter hatred, a hatred which long antedates the days when we were compelled to take a definite stand against them. In all sorts of ways this hatred showed itself, in the diatribes of professors, in the pages of books, in the columns of the press. Usually it was a sullen, silent dislike. Sometimes it would flame up suddenly into bitter utterance, as at the time of the unseemly dispute around the deathbed of the Emperor's father, or on the occasion of the Jameson Raid. And yet this bitter antagonism was in no way reciprocated in this country. If a poll had been taken at any time up to the end of the century as to which European country was our natural ally, the vote would have gone overwhelmingly for Germany. "America first and then Germany" would have been the verdict of nine men out of ten. But then occurred two events which steadied the easy-going Briton, and made him look more intently and with a more questioning gaze at his distant cousin over the water. Those two events were the Boer

war and the building of the German fleet. The first showed us, to our amazement, the bitter desire which Germany had to do us some mischief, the second made us realize that she was forging a weapon with which that desire might be fulfilled.

The Boer War and Germany

We are most of us old enough to remember the torrent of calumny and insult which was showered upon us in the day of our temporary distress by the nation to whom we had so often been a friend and an ally. It is true that other nations treated us little better, and yet their treatment hurt us less. The difference as it struck men at the time may be summarized in this passage from a British writer of the period.

"But it was very different with Germany," he says. "Again and again in the world's history we have been the friends and the allies of these people. It was so in the days of Marlborough, in those of the Great Frederick, and in those of Napoleon. When we could not help them with men we helped them with money. Our fleet has crushed their enemies. And now, for the first time in history, we have had a chance of seeing who were our friends in Europe, and nowhere have we met more hatred and more slander than from the German press and the German people. Their most respectable journals have not hesitated to represent the British troops—troops every bit as humane and as highly disciplined as their own—not only as committing outrages on person and property, but even as murdering women and children.

"At first this unexpected phenomenon merely surprised the British people, then it pained them, and finally, after two years of it, it has roused a deep, enduring anger in their minds."

He goes on to say: "The continued attacks upon us have left an enduring feeling of resentment, which will not and should not die away in this generation. It is not too much to say that five years ago a complete defeat of Germany in a European war would have certainly

caused British intervention. Public sentiment and racial affinity would never have allowed us to see her really go to the wall. And now it is certain that in our lifetime no British guinea and no soldier's life would under any circumstances be spent for such an end. That is one strange result of the Boer war, and in the long run it is possible that it may prove not the least important."

Such was the prevailing mood of the nation when they perceived Germany, under the lead of her Emperor, following up her expressions of enmity by starting with restless energy to build up a formidable fleet, adding programme to programme, out of all possible proportion to the German commerce to be defended or to the German coastline exposed to attack. Already vainglorious boasts were made that Germany was the successor to Britain upon the seas. "The Admiral of the Atlantic greets the Admiral of the Pacific," said the Kaiser later in a message to the Czar. What was Britain to do under this growing menace? So long as she was isolated the diplomacy of Germany might form some naval coalition against her. She took the steps which were necessary for her own safety, and without forming an alliance she composed her differences with France and Russia and drew closer the friendship which united her with her old rival across the Channel. The first fruit of the new German fleet was the entente cordiale. We had found our enemy. It was necessary that we should find our friends. Thus we were driven into our present combination.

And now we had to justify our friendship. For the first time we were compelled to openly oppose Germany in the deep and dangerous game of world politics. They wished to see if our understanding was a reality or a sham. Could they drive a wedge between us by showing that we were a fair-weather friend whom any stress would alienate? Twice they tried it, once in 1906 when they bullied France into a conference at Algeciras but found that Britain was firm at her side, and again in 1911 when in a time of profound peace they stirred up

trouble by sending a gunboat to Agadir, and pushed matters to the very edge of war. But no threats induced Britain to be false to her mutual insurance with France. Now for the third and most fatal time they have demanded that we forswear ourselves and break our own bond lest a worse thing befall us. Blind and foolish, did they not know by past experience that we would keep our promise given? In their madness they have wrought an irremediable evil to themselves, to us, and to all Europe.

I have shown that we have in very truth never injured nor desired to injure Germany in commerce nor have we opposed her politically until her own deliberate actions drove us into the camp of her opponents. But it may well be asked why, then, did they dislike us, and why did they weave hostile plots against us? It was that, as it seemed to them, and as indeed it actually may have been, we, independently of our own wills, stood between Germany and that world empire of which she dreamed. This was caused by circumstances over which we had no control and which we could not modify if we had wished to do so. Britain, through her maritime power and the energy of her merchants and people, had become a great world power when Germany was still unformed. Thus, when she had grown to her full stature, she found that the choice places of the world and those most fitted for the spread of a transplanted European race were already filled up. It was not a matter which we could help nor could we alter it, since Canada, Australia, and South Africa would not, even if we could be imagined to have wished it, be transferred to German rule. And yet the Germans chafed, and if we can put ourselves in their places we may admit that it was galling that the surplus of their manhood should go to build up the strength of an alien and possibly a rival State. So far we could see their grievance, or, rather their misfortune, since no one was in truth to blame in the matter. Had their needs been openly and reasonably expressed, and had the two States moved in concord in the matter,

it is difficult to think that no helpful solution of any kind could have been found.

As Germans See England

But the German method of approaching the problem has never been to ask sympathy and co-operation, but to picture us as a degenerate race from whom anything might be gained by playing upon our imagined weakness and cowardice. A nation which attends quietly to its own sober business must, according to their mediaeval notions, be a nation of decadent poltroons. If we fight our battles by means of free volunteers instead of enforced conscripts then the military spirit must be dead among us. Perhaps, even in this short campaign, they have added this delusion also to the dustbin of their many errors. But such was their absurd self-deception about the most virile of European races. Did we propose disarmament, then it was not humanitarianism but cowardice that prompted us, and their answer was to enlarge their programme. Did we suggest a navy-building holiday, it was but a cloak for our weakness and an incitement that they should redouble their efforts. Our decay had become a part of their national faith. At first the wish may have been the father to the thought, but soon under the reiterated assertions of their crazy professors the proposition became indisputable. Bernhardt in his book upon the next war cannot conceal the contempt in which he has learned to hold us. Neibuhr long ago had prophesied the coming fall of Britain, and every year was believed to bring it nearer and to make it more certain. To these jaundiced eyes all seemed yellow, when the yellowness lay only in themselves. Our army, our navy, our colonies, all were equally rotten. "Old England, old, indeed, and corrupt, rotten through and through." One blow and the vast sham would fly to pieces, and from those pieces the victor could choose his reward. Listen to Prof. Treitschke, a man who, above all others, has been the evil genius of his country, and has done most to push it toward this abyss: "A thing that is

wholly a sham," he cried, in allusion to our empire, "cannot, in this universe of ours, endure forever. It may endure for a day, but its doom is certain." Were ever words more true when applied to the narrow bureaucracy and swaggering Junkerdom of Prussia, the most artificial and ossified sham that ever our days have seen? See which will crack first, our democracy or this, now that both have been plunged into the furnace together. The day of God's testing has come, and we shall see which can best abide it.

The Blame Not England's

I have tried to show that we are in no way to blame for the hostility which has grown up between us. So far as it had any solid cause at all it has arisen from fixed factors, which could no more be changed by us than the geographical position which has laid us right across their exit to the oceans of the world. That this deeply rooted national sentiment, which forever regarded us as the Carthage to which they were destined to play the part of Rome, would, sooner or later, have brought about war between us, is, in my opinion, beyond all doubt. But it was planned to come at the moment which was least favorable for Britain. "Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us to the real situation," says Bernhardt. "We may, at most, use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success." A more shameless sentence was never penned, and one stands marveling which is the more grotesque—the cynicism of the sentiment or the folly which gave such a warning to the victim. For be it remembered that Bernhardt's words are to be taken very seriously, for they are not the ravings of some Pan-German monomaniac, but the considered views of the foremost military writer of Germany, one who is in touch with those inner circles whose opinions are the springs of national policy. "Our last and greatest reckoning is to be with Great Britain," said the bitter Treitschke. Sooner or later the shock was to come. Germany

sat brooding over the chessboard of the world, waiting for the opening which should assure a winning game.

It was clear that she should take her enemies separately rather than together. If Britain were attacked it was almost certain that France and Russia would stand by her side. But if, on the contrary, the quarrel could be made with these two powers, and especially with Russia, in the first instance, then it was by no means so certain that Great Britain would be drawn into the struggle. Public opinion has to be strongly moved before our country can fight, and public opinion under a Liberal Government might well be divided upon the subject of Russia. Therefore, if the quarrel could be so arranged as to seem to be entirely one between Teuton and Slav there was a good chance that Britain would remain undecided until the swift German sword had done its work. Then, with the grim acquiescence of our deserted allies, the still bloody sword would be turned upon ourselves, and that great final reckoning would have come.

Such was the plan, and fortune favored it. A brutal murder had, not for the first time, put Serbia into a position where a State may be blamed for the sins of individuals. An ultimatum was launched so phrased that it was impossible for any State to accept it as it stood and yet remain an independent State. At the first sign of argument or remonstrance the Austrian Army marched upon Belgrade. Russia, which had been already humiliated in 1908 by the forcible annexation of Bosnia, could not possibly submit a second time to the Caudine Forks. She laid her hand upon her sword hilt. Germany sprang to the side of her ally. France ranged herself with Russia. Like a thunderclap the war of the nations had begun.

So far all had worked well for German plans. Those of the British public who were familiar with the past and could look into the future might be well aware that our interests were firmly bound with those of France, and that if our faggots were not tied together they would assuredly be snapped each in its turn. But

the unsavory assassination which had been so cleverly chosen as the starting point of the war bulked large in the eyes of our people, and, setting self-interest to one side, the greater part of the public might well have hesitated to enter into a quarrel where the cause seemed remote and the issues ill-defined. What was it to us if a Slav or a Teuton collected the harbor due of Saloniki! So the question might have presented itself to the average man who in the long run is the ruler of this country and the autocrat of its destinies. In spite of all the wisdom of our statesmen, it is doubtful if on such a quarrel we could have gained that national momentum which might carry us to victory. But at that very moment Germany took a step which removed the last doubt from the most cautious of us and left us in a position where we must either draw our sword or stand forever dishonored and humiliated before the world. The action demanded of us was such a compound of cowardice and treachery that we ask ourselves in dismay what can we ever have done that could make others for one instant imagine us to be capable of so dastardly a course. Yet that it was really supposed that we could do it, and that it was not merely put forward as an excuse for drawing us into war, is shown by the anger and consternation of the Kaiser and his Chancellor when we drew back from what the British Prime Minister had described as "an infamous proposal." One has only to read our Ambassador's description of his interview with the German Chancellor after our decision was announced, "so evidently overcome by the news of our action," to see that through some extraordinary mental aberration the German rulers did actually believe that a vital treaty with Britain's signature upon it could be regarded by this country as a mere "scrap of paper."

The Treaty of 1839

What was this treaty which it was proposed so lightly to set aside? It was the guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium signed in 1839 (confirmed verbally and in writing by Bismarck in 1870) by

Prussia, France, and Britain, each of whom pledged their word to observe and to enforce it. On the strength of it Belgium had relied for her security amid her formidable neighbors. On the strength of it also France had lavished all her defenses upon her eastern frontier, and left her northern exposed to attack. Britain had guaranteed the treaty, and Britain could be relied upon. Now, on the first occasion of testing the value of her word it was supposed that she would regard the treaty as a worthless scrap of paper, and stand by unmoved while the little State which had trusted her was flooded by the armies of the invader. It was unthinkable, and yet the wisest brains of Germany seem to have persuaded themselves that we had sunk to such depths of cowardly indolence that even this might go through. Surely they also have been hypnotized by those foolish dreams of Britain's degeneration, from which they will have so terrible an awakening.

As a matter of fact the General Staff had got ahead of the diplomatists, and the German columns were already over the border while the point was being debated at Berlin. There was no retreat from the position which had been taken up. "It is to us a vital matter of strategy and is beyond argument," said the German soldier. "It is to us a vital matter of honor and is beyond argument," answered the British statesman. The die was cast. No compromise was possible. Would Britain keep her word or would she not? That was the sole question at issue. And what answer save one could any Briton give to it? "I do not believe," said our Prime Minister, "that any nation ever entered into a great controversy with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance of its own selfish interest, but in defense of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world." So he spoke, and history will indorse his words, for we surely have our quarrel just.

So much for the events which have

led us to war. Now for a moment let us glance at what we may have to hope for, what we may have to fear, and, above all, what we must each of us do that we win through to a lasting peace.

What have we to gain if we win? That we have nothing material to gain, no colonies which we covet, no possessions of any sort that we desire, is the final proof that the war has not been provoked by us. No nation would deliberately go out of its way to wage so hazardous and costly a struggle when there is no prize for victory. But one enormous indirect benefit we will gain if we can make Germany a peaceful and harmless State. We will surely break her naval power and take such steps that it shall not be a menace to us any more. It was this naval power, with its rapid increase and the need that we should ever, as Mr. Churchill has so well expressed it, be ready at our average moment to meet an attack at their chosen moment—it was this which has piled up our war estimates during the last ten years until they have bowed us down. With such enormous sums spent upon ships and guns, great masses of capital were diverted from the ordinary channels of trade, while an even more serious result was that our programmes of social reform had to be curtailed from want of the money which could finance them. Let the menace of that lurking fleet be withdrawn. The nightmare of those thousand hammers working day and night in forging engines for our destruction—and our estimates will once again be those of a civilized Christian country, while our vast capital will be turned from measures of self-protection to those of self-improvement. Should our victory be complete, there is little which Germany can yield to us save the removal of that shadow which has darkened us so long. But our children and our children's children will never, if we do our work well now, look across the North Sea with the sombre thoughts which have so long been ours, while their lives will be brightened and elevated by money which we, in our darker days, have had to spend upon our ships and our guns.

Consider, on the other hand, what we should suffer if we were to lose. All the troubles of the last ten years would be with us still, but in a greatly exaggerated form. A larger and stronger Germany would dominate Europe and would overshadow our lives. Her coast line would be increased, her ports would face our own, her coaling stations would be in every sea, and her great army, greater than ever, would be within striking distance of our shores. To avoid sinking forever into the condition of a dependant, we should be compelled to have recourse to rigid compulsory service, and our diminished revenues would be all turned to the needs of self-defense. Such would be the miserable condition in which we should hand on to our children that free and glorious empire which we inherited in all the fullness of its richness and its splendor from those strong fathers who have built it up. What peace of mind, what self-respect could be left for us in the remainder of our lives! The weight of dishonor would lie always upon our hearts. And yet this will be surely our fate and our future if we do not nerve our souls and brace our arms for victory. No regrets will avail, no excuses will help, no after-thoughts can profit us. It is now—now—even in these weeks and months that are passing that the final reckoning is being taken, and when once the sum is made up no further effort can change it. What are our lives or our labors, our fortunes or even our families, when compared with the life or death of the great mother of us all? We are but the leaves of the tree. What matter if we flutter down today or tomorrow, so long as the great trunk stands and the burrowing roots are firm. Happy the man who can die with the thought that in this greatest crisis of all he has served his country to the uttermost, but who would bear the thoughts of him who lives on with the memory that he had shirked his duty and failed his country at the moment of her need?

There is a settled and assured future if we win. There is darkness and trouble if we lose. But if we take a broader sweep and trace the meanings of this

contest as they affect others than ourselves, then ever greater, more glorious are the issues for which we fight. For the whole world stands at a turning point of its history, and one or other of two opposite principles, the rule of the soldier or the rule of the citizen, must now prevail. In this sense we fight for the masses of the German people, as some day they will understand to free them from that formidable military caste which has used and abused them, spending their bodies in an unjust war and poisoning their minds by every device which would inflame them against those who wish nothing save to live at peace with them. We fight for the strong, deep Germany of old, the Germany of music and of philosophy, against this monstrous modern aberration the Germany of blood and of iron, the Germany from which, instead of the old things of beauty, there come to us only the rant of scolding professors with their final reckonings, their Weltpolitik, and their Godless theories of the Superman who stands above morality and to whom all humanity shall be subservient. Instead of the world-inspiring phrases of a Goethe or a Schiller, what are the words in the last decade which have been quoted across the sea? Are they not always the ever-recurring words of wrath from one ill-balanced man? "Strike them with the mailed fist." "Leave such a name behind you as Attila and his Huns." "Turn your weapons even upon your own flesh and blood at my command." These are the messages which have come from this perversion of a nation's soul.

A Mighty Despotism

But the matter lies deep. "The Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs have used their peoples as a great landowner might use the serfs upon his estate. It was, and is, their openly expressed theory that they were in their position by the grace of God, that they owed no reckoning to any man, and that kingdom and folk were committed for better or worse to their charge. Round this theory of the Dark Ages there gathered all the forces

of the many courts of the empire, all the nobility who make so huge a class in Germanic countries, all the vast army to whom strict discipline and obedience were the breath of life, all the office-holders of the State, all the purveyors of warlike stores. These and their like were the natural setting to such a central idea. Court influence largely controlled the teaching at school and universities, and so the growing twig could be bent. But all these forces together could not have upheld so dangerous and unnatural a theory had it not been for the influence of a servile press. How that press was managed, how the thoughts of the people could be turned to the right or the left with the same precision as a platoon of grenadiers, has been shown clearly enough in the memoirs of Bismarck. Public opinion was poisoned at its very roots. The average citizen lived in a false atmosphere where everything was distorted to his vision. He saw his Kaiser, not as an essentially weak and impetuous man with a dangerous entourage who were ever at his ear, but as Germany personified, an angel with a flaming sword, beating back envious assailants from the beloved Fatherland. He saw his neighbors not as peaceful nations who had no possible desire to attack him, but on the contrary lived in constant fear of him, but as a band of envious and truculent conspirators who could only be kept in order by the sudden stamp of the jackboot and the menacing clatter of the sabre. He insensibly imbibed the Nietzsche doctrine that the immorality of the Superman may be as colossal as his strength and that the slave-evangel of Christianity was superseded by a sterner law. Thus, when he saw acts which his reason must have told him were indefensible he was still narcotized by this conception of some new standard of right. He saw his Kaiser at the time of a petty humiliation to Great Britain sending a telegram of congratulation to the man who had inflicted this rebuff. Could that be approved by reason? At a time when all Europe was shuddering over the Armenian massacres he saw this same Kaiser paying a complimentary

visit to the Sultan whose hands were still wet with the blood of murdered Christians. Could that be reconciled with what is right? A little later he saw the Kaiser once again pushing himself into Mediterranean politics, where no direct German interest lay, and endeavoring to tangle up the French developments in Northern Africa by provocative personal appearances at Morocco, and, later, by sending a gunboat to intrude upon a scene of action which had already by the Treaty of Algenciras been allotted to France. How could an honest German whose mind was undebauched by a controlled press justify such an interference as that? He is or should be aware that, in annexing Bosnia, Austria was tearing up a treaty without the consent of the other signatories, and that his own country was supporting and probably inciting her ally to this public breach of faith. Could he honestly think that this was right? And, finally, he must know, for his own Chancellor has publicly proclaimed it, that the invasion of Belgium was a breach of international right, and that Germany, or, rather, Prussia, had perjured herself upon the day that the first of her soldiers passed over the frontier. How can he explain all this to himself save on a theory that might is right, that no moral law applies to the Superman, and that so long as one hews one's way through, the rest can matter little? To such a point of degradation have public morals been brought by the infernal teachings of Prussian military philosopsey, dating back as far as Frederick II., but intensified by the exhortations of press and professors during our own times. The mind of the average kindly German citizen has been debauched and yet again debauched until it needed just such a world crisis as this to startle him at last from his obsession and to see his position and that of his country in its true relation with humanity and progress.

The Final Stakes

Thus I say, that for the German who stands outside the ruling classes, our victory would bring a lasting relief, and some hope that in future his destiny should be controlled by his own judg-

ment and not by the passions or interests of those against whom he has at present no appeal. A system which has brought disaster to Germany and chaos to all Europe can never, one would think, be resumed, and amid the débris of his empire the German may pick up that precious jewel of personal freedom which is above the splendor of foreign conquest. A Hapsburg or a Hohenzollern may find his true place as the servant rather than the master of a nation. But apart from Germany, look at the effects which our victory must have over the whole wide world. Everywhere it will mean the triumph of reasoned democracy, of public debate, of ordered freedom in which every man is an active unit in the system of his own Government, while our defeat would stand for a victory to a privileged class, the thrusting down of the civilian by the arrogance and intolerance of militarism, and the subjection of all that is human and progressive to all that is cruel, narrow, and reactionary. This is the stake for which we play, and the world will lose or gain as well as we. You may well come, you democratic overseas men of our blood, to rally round us now, for all that you cherish, all that is bred in your very bones, is that for

which we fight. And you, lovers of freedom in every land, we claim at least your prayers and your wishes, for if our sword be broken you will be the poorer. But fear not, for our sword will not be broken, nor shall it ever drop from our hands until this matter is forever set in order. If every ally we have upon earth were to go down in blood and ruin, still would we fight through to the appointed end. Defeat shall not daunt us. Inconclusive victory shall not turn us from our purpose. The grind of poverty and the weariness of hopes deferred shall not blunt the edge of our resolve. With God's help we shall go to the end, and when that goal is reached it is our prayer that a new era shall come as our reward, an era in which, by common action of State with State, mutual hatreds and strivings shall be appeased, land shall no longer be estranged from land, and huge armies and fleets will be nightmares of the past. Thus, as ever, the throes of evil may give birth to good. Till then our task stands clear before us,—a task that will ask for all we have in strength and resolution. Have you who read this played your part to the highest? If not, do it now, or stand forever shamed.

Conan Doyle on British Militarism

Early last year, in the course of some comments which I made upon the slighting remarks about our army by Gen. von Bernhardt, I observed: "It may be noted that Gen. von Bernhardt has a poor opinion of our troops. This need not trouble us. We are what we are, and words will not alter it. From very early days our soldiers have left their mark upon Continental warfare, and we have no reason to think that we have declined from the manhood of our forefathers." Since then he has returned to the attack.

With that curious power of coming after deep study to the absolutely diametrically wrong conclusion which the German expert, political or military, ap-

pears to possess, he says in his "War of Today": "The English Army, trained more for purposes of show than for modern war," adding in the same sentence a sneer at our "inferior colonial levies."

He will have an opportunity of reconsidering his views presently upon the fighting value of our overseas troops, and surely, so far as our own are concerned, he must already be making some interesting notes for his next edition, or, rather, for the learned volume upon "Germany and the Last War," which will, no doubt, come from his pen. He is a man to whom we might well raise a statue, for I am convinced that his frank

confession of German policy has been worth at least an army corps to this country. We may address to him John Davidson's lines to his enemy:

Unwilling friend, let not your spite abate.
Spur us with scorn and strengthen us
with hate.

There is another German gentleman who must be thinking rather furiously. He is a certain Col. Gadke, who appeared officially at Aldershot some years ago, was hospitably entertained, being shown all that he desired to see, and on his return to Berlin published a most deprecatory description of our forces. He found no good thing in them. I have some recollection that Gen. French alluded in a public speech to this critic's remarks, and expressed a modest hope that he and his men would some day have the opportunity of showing how far they were deserved. Well, he has had his opportunity, and Col. Gadke, like so many other Germans, seems to have made a miscalculation.

Germans Untried in War

An army which has preserved the absurd parade schritt, an exercise which is painful to the bystander, as he feels that it is making fools of brave men, must have a tendency to throw back to earlier types. These Germans have been trained in peace and upon the theory of books. In all that vast host there is hardly a man who has stood at the wrong end of a loaded gun. They live on traditions of close formations, vast cavalry charges, and other things which will not fit into modern warfare. Braver men do not exist, but it is the bravery of men who have been taught to lean upon each other, and not the cold, self-contained, resourceful bravery of the man who has learned to fight for his own hand. The British have had the teachings of two recent campaigns fought with modern weapons—that of the Tirah and of South Africa. Now that the reserves have joined the colors there are few regiments which have not a fair sprinkling of veterans from these wars in their ranks. The Pathan and the Boer have been their instructors in something

more practical than those imperial grand manoeuvres where the all-highest played with his puppets in such a fashion that one of his Generals remarked that the chief practical difficulty of a campaign so conducted would be the disposal of the dead.

Boers and Pathans have been hard masters and have given many a slap to their admiring pupils, but the lesson has been learned. It was not show troops, General, who, with two corps, held five of your best day after day from Mons to Compiègne. It is no reproach to your valor, but you were up against men who were equally brave and knew a great deal more of the game. This must begin to break upon you, and will surely grow clearer as the days go by. We shall often in the future take the knock as well as give it, but you will not say that we are a slow army if you live to chronicle this war, nor will your imperial master be proud of the adjective which he has demeaned himself in using before his troops had learned their lesson.

The South African Lesson

The fact is that the German Army, with all its great traditions, has been petrifying for many years back. They never learned the lesson of South Africa. It was not for want of having it expounded to them, for their military attaché—"im with the spatchcock on 'is 'elmet," as I heard him described by a British orderly—missed nothing of what occurred, as is evident from their official history of the war. And yet they missed it, and with all those ideas of individual efficiency and elastic independent formation which are the essence of modern soldiering. Their own more liberal thinkers were aware of it. Here are the words which were put into the mouth of Guntz, the representative of the younger school, in Beverlein's famous novel:

"The organization of the German Army rested upon foundations which had been laid a hundred years ago. Since the great war they had never seriously been put to the proof, and during the last three decades they had only been altered in the most trifling details. In

three long decades! And in one of those decades the world at large had advanced as much as in the previous century.

"Instead of turning this highly developed intelligence to good account, they bound it hand and foot on the rack of an everlasting drill which could not have been more soullessly mechanical in the days of Frederick. It held them together as an iron hoop holds together a cask, the dry staves of which would fall asunder at the first kick."

Lord Roberts has said that if ten points represent the complete soldier, eight should stand for his efficiency as a shot. The German maxim has rather been that eight should stand for his efficiency as a drilled marionette. It has been reckoned that about two hundred books a year appear in Germany upon military affairs, against about twenty in Britain. And yet, after all this expert debate, the essential point of all seems to have been missed—that in the end everything depends upon the man behind the gun, upon his hitting his opponent and upon his taking cover so as to avoid being hit himself.

After all the efforts of the General Staff, the result when shown upon the field of battle has filled our men with a mixture of admiration and contempt—contempt for the absurd tactics and admiration for the poor devils who struggle on in spite of them. Listen to the voices of the men who are the real experts. Says a Lincolnshire Sergeant: "They were in solid square blocks, and we couldn't help hitting them." Says Private Tait (Second Essex): "Their rifle shooting is rotten. I don't believe they could hit a haystack at 100 yards." "They are rotten shots with their rifles," says an Oldham private. "They advance in close column, and you simply can't help hitting them," writes a Gordon Highlander. "You would have thought it was a big crowd streaming out from a cup tie," says Private Whitaker of the Guards. "It was like a farmer's machine cutting grass," so it seemed to Private Hawkins of the Coldstreams. "No damned good as riflemen," says a

Connemara boy. "You couldn't help hitting them. As to their rifle fire, it was useless." "They shoot from the hip, and don't seem to aim at anything in particular."

Not Books That Count

These are the opinions of the practical men upon the field of battle. Surely a poor result from the 200 volumes a year and all the weighty labors of the General Staff! "Artillery nearly as good as our own, rifle fire beneath contempt." That is the verdict. How will the well-taught parade schritt avail them when it comes to a stricken field?

But let it not seem as if this were meant for disparagement. We should be sinking to the Kaiser's level if we answer his "contemptible little army" by pretending that his own troops are anything but a very formidable and big army. They are formidable in numbers, formidable, too, in their patriotic devotion, in their native courage, and in the possession of such material, such great cannon, aircraft, machine guns, and armored cars as none of the Allies can match. They have every advantage which a nation would be expected to have when it has known that war was a certainty, while others have only treated it as a possibility. There is a minuteness and earnestness of preparation which are only possible for an assured event. But the fact remains, and it will only be brought out more clearly by the Emperor's unchivalrous phrase, that in every arm the British have already shown themselves to be the better troops. Had he the Froissart spirit within him he would rather have said: "You have today a task which is worthy of you. You are faced by an army which has a high repute and a great history. There is real glory to be won today." Had he said this then, win or lose, he would not have needed to be ashamed of his own words—the words of ungenerous spirit.

It is a very strange thing how German critics have taken for granted that the British Army had deteriorated, while the opinion of all those who were in close touch with it was that it was never so good. Even some of the French experts

made the same mistake, and Gen. Bonnat counseled his countrymen not to rely upon it, since "it would take refuge amid its islands at the first reverse." One would think that the cause which makes for its predominance were obvious. Apart from any question of national spirit there is the all-important fact that the men are there of their own free will, an advantage which I trust that we shall never be compelled to surrender. Again, the men are of longer service in every arm, and they have far more opportunities of actual fighting than come to any other force. Finally they are divided into regiments with centuries of military glories streaming from their banners, which carry on a mighty tradition. The very words the Guards, the Rifles, the Connaught Rangers, the Buffs, the Scots Greys, the Gordons, sound like bugle calls. How could an army be anything but dangerous which had such units in its line of battle?"

History Repeating Itself

And yet there remains the fact that both enemies and friends are surprised at our efficiency. This is no new phenomenon. Again and again in the course of history the British armies have had to win once more the reputation which had been forgotten. Continentals have always begun by refusing to take them seriously. Napoleon, who had never met them in battle, imagined that their unbroken success was due to some weakness in his Marshals rather than in any excellence of the troops. "At last I have them, these English," he exclaimed as he gazed at the thin, red line at Waterloo. "At last they have me, these English," may have been his thought that evening as he spurred his horse out of the débâcle. Foy warned him of the truth. "The British infantry is the devil," said he. "You think so because you were beaten by them," cried Napoleon. Like von Kluck or von Kluck's master, he had something to learn.

Why this continental depreciation? It may be that the world pays so much attention to our excellent right arm that it cannot give us credit for having a very servicable left as well. Or it may

be that they take seriously those jeremiads over our decay which are characteristic of our people, and very especially of many of our military thinkers. I have never been able to understand why they should be of so pessimistic a turn of mind, unless it be a sort of exaltation of that grumbling which has always been the privilege of the old soldier. Croker narrates how he met Wellington in his later years, and how the Iron Duke told him that he was glad he was so old, as he would not live to see the dreadful military misfortunes which were about to come to his country. Looking back, we can see no reason for such pessimism as this. Above all, the old soldier can never make any allowance for the latent powers which lie in civilian patriotism and valor. Only a year ago I had a long conversation with a well-known British General, in which he asserted with great warmth that in case of an Anglo-German war with France involved the British public would never allow a trained soldier to leave these islands. He is at the front himself and doing such good work that he has little time for reminiscence, but when he has he must admit that he underrated the nerve of his countrymen.

Assurance Beneath Pessimism

And yet under the pessimism of such men as he there is a curious contradictory assurance that there are no troops like our own. The late Lord Goschen used to tell a story of a letter that he had from a Captain in the navy at the time when he was First Lord. This Captain's ship was lying alongside a foreign cruiser in some port, and he compared in his report the powers of the two vessels. Lord Goschen said that his heart sank as he read the long catalogue of points in which the British ship was inferior—guns, armor, speed—until he came to the postscript, which was: "I think I could take her in twenty minutes."

With all the grumbling of our old soldiers, there is always some reservation of the sort at the end of it. Of course those who are familiar with our ways of getting things done would understand

that a good deal of the croaking is a means of getting our little army increased, or at least preventing its being diminished. But whatever the cause, the result has been the impression abroad of a "contemptible little army." Whatever surprise in the shape of 17-inch howitzers or 900-foot Zeppelins the Kaiser may have for us, it is a safe prophecy that it will be a small matter compared to that which Sir John French and his men will be to him.

But above all I look forward to the development of our mounted riflemen. This I say in no disparagement of our cavalry, who have done so magnificently. But the mounted rifleman is a peculiarly British product—British and American—with a fresh edge upon it from South

Africa. I am most curious to see what a division of these fellows will make of the Uhlans. It is good to see that already the old banners are in the wind, Lovat's Horse, Scottish Horse, King Edward's Horse, and the rest. All that cavalry can do will surely be done by our cavalry. But I have always held, and I still very strongly hold, that the mounted rifleman has it in him to altar our whole conception of warfare, as the mounted archer did in his day; and now in this very war will be his first great chance upon a large scale. Ten thousand well-mounted, well-trained riflemen, young officers to lead them, all broad Germany, with its towns, its railways and its magazines before them—there lies one more surprise for the doctrinaires of Berlin.

The Need of Being Merciless

By Maurice Maeterlinck

At these moments of tragedy none should be allowed to speak who cannot shoulder a rifle, for the written word seems so monstrously useless and so overwhelmingly trivial in face of this mighty drama that will for a long time and maybe forever free mankind from the scourge of war—the one scourge among all that cannot be excused and that cannot be explained, since alone among all scourges it issues entirely from the hands of man.

But it is while this scourge is upon us—while we have our being in its very centre—that we shall do well to weigh the guilt of those who committed this inexpressible crime. It is now, when we are in the awful horror, undergoing and feeling it, that we have the energy and clearheadedness needed to judge it. From the depths of the most fearful injustice justice is best perceived. When the hour shall have come for settling accounts—it will not long be delayed—we shall have forgotten much of what

we have suffered and a censurable pity will creep over us and cloud our eyes.

Will Seek Sympathy

This is the moment, therefore, for us to frame our inexorable resolution. After the final victory, when the enemy is crushed—as crushed as he will be—efforts will be made to enlist our sympathy. We shall be told that the unfortunate German people are merely the victims of their monarch and their feudal caste; that no blame attaches to the Germany we know that is so sympathetic and cordial—the Germany of quaint old houses and open-hearted greetings; the Germany that sits under its lime trees beneath the clear light of the moon—but only to Prussia, hateful, arrogant Prussia; that homely, peace-loving Bavaria, the genial, hospitable dwellers on the banks of the Rhine, the Silesian and Saxon—I know not who besides—have merely obeyed and been compelled to obey orders they detested, but were unable to resist.

We are in the face of reality now. Let us look at it well and pronounce our sentence, for this is the moment when we hold the proofs in our hands; when the elements of the crime are hot before us and should out—the truth that will soon fade from our memory. Let us tell ourselves now, therefore, that all we shall be told hereafter will be false. Let us unflinchingly adhere to what we decide at this moment when the glare of the horror is on us.

No Degrees of Guilt

It is not true that in this gigantic crime there are innocent and guilty or degrees of guilt. They stand on one level, all who have taken part. The German from the north has no more especial craving for blood than the German from the south has especial tenderness and pity. It is very simple. It is the German from one end of the country to the other who stands revealed as a beast of prey that the firm will of our planet finally repudiates. We have here no wretched slaves dragged along by a tyrant King who alone is responsible. Nations have the Government they deserve, or rather the Government they have is truly no more than a magnified public projection of the private morality and mentality of the nation.

If eighty million innocent people merely expose the inherent falseness and superficiality of their innocence—and it is a monster they maintain at their head who stands for all that is true in their nature, because it is he who represents the eternal aspirations of their race, which lie far deeper than their apparent transient virtues—let there be no suggestion of error, of intelligent people having been tricked and misled. No nation can be deceived that does not wish to be deceived. It is not intelligence that Germany lacks. In the sphere of intellect such things are not possible, nor in the region of the enlightened, reflecting will. No nation permits herself to be coerced into the one crime man cannot pardon. It is of her own accord she has-

tens toward it. Her chief has no need to persuade. It is she who urges him on.

We have forces here quite different from those on the surface—forces that are secret, irresistible, profound. It is these we must judge, must crush under heel once for all, for they are the only ones that will not be improved, softened or brought into line by experience, progress, or even the bitterest lesson. They are unalterable, immovable. Their springs lie far beneath hope or influence. They must be destroyed as we destroy a nest of wasps, since we know these never can change into a nest of bees.

Even though individually and singly Germans are all innocent and merely led astray, they are none the less guilty in mass. This is the guilt that counts—that alone is actual and real, because it lays bare underneath their superficial innocence, the subconscious criminality of all. No influence can prevail on the unconscious or subconscious. It never evolves. Let there come a thousand years of civilization, a thousand years of peace, with all possible refinements, art, and education, the German spirit which is its underlying element will remain absolutely the same as today and would declare itself when the opportunity came under the same aspect with the same infamy.

Through the whole course of history two distinct will-powers have been noticed that would seem to be the opposing elemental manifestations of the spirit of our globe, one seeking only evil, injustice, tyranny, suffering; the other strives for liberty, right, radiance, joy. These two powers stand once again face to face. Our opportunity is to annihilate the one that comes from below. Let us know how to be pitiless that we have no more need for pity. It is the measures of organic defense—it is essential that the modern world should stamp out Prussian militarism as it would stamp out a poisonous fungus that for half a century has poisoned its days. The health of our planet is the question. Tomorrow the United States and Europe will have to take measures for the convalescence of the earth.

Letters to Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler

By Baron d'Estournelles de Constant

Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, has permitted THE NEW YORK TIMES WAR VOLUMES to have the extracts printed herewith from letters sent to him since the beginning of the war by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, Senator of France and Member of the International Court at The Hague.

First Letter

PARIS, Aug. 15, 1914.—* * * Today I am full of grief to feel myself impotent before the murderous conflicts now going on in Belgium and at a number of points on our northern and eastern frontiers, while awaiting the great battles and hecatombs which will follow; my thought is full of these terrible calamities willfully brought about; so many precious lives already wiped out or soon to be; so much avoidable mourning which one neither can nor wishes now to avoid!

In France there is not a single family which has not given without hesitation all its children of military age to fight for the repulse of the invader. All the men from Créans, of ages 20 to 48 years, have gone, with one exception, and he is now going; and meanwhile no work has ceased because of their absence. In all the communes, in all the hamlets of the whole of France, the women, the children, and the men over 48 have assumed all duties, in particular the gathering of the harvests, which I see already finished as in normal times. * * *

When one thinks that Servia alone, even though exhausted by two atrocious wars, is sufficient to hold in check imperial Austria; when one sees Italy remain neutral, and in reality hostile to Austria, and Russia open slowly, inexorably, her reservoir of men, resources, and infinite energy on the eastern frontier of Germany, one asks truly if the Pan-Germanists have not been the veritable plague of God for their country; the Fatherland, which men like Goethe, Kant, and Beethoven had made so cultured, so glorious, and which asked only to live

and to prosper, the Pan-Germanists have isolated only to deliver it to the execration of the world. It was the same in France formerly, when she ceded to chauvinistic influences.

Second Letter

PARIS, Sept. 3, 1914.

* * * May you never witness such calamities as have fallen upon Europe. The visions of horror, which formerly we evoked in order to terrify the world and to try to conjure them away, are now surpassed; and we are only at the commencement of the war! The trains, thronged with youth and enthusiasm, which I saw leave are now returning, crowded with the wounded. They have filled all the hospitals, the barracks which had been left empty, the lyceums, and the schools throughout France. In but a few days they have arrived everywhere in the south, the west and the centre of the country. At La Flèche alone we have five improvised hospitals with 1,200 beds. Créans is a hospital annex, and so it is in all the villages and in the dwellings which can provide one or more beds. The wounded who occupy these beds are happy, very happy. One of them, who has only a broken leg, but who thinks of the thousands of his comrades who remain wounded upon the fields of battle, said to me, "I am in heaven." * * *

The worst of all, (I have always said it, but it is even worse than I had thought,) the worst is that each of the combatants, for the most part incapable of cruelty under ordinary conditions, is now devoted to the horrible work of hatred and of reprisal; and even more than the combatants, their children, their orphans, all those who are to remain in mourning. * * *

As far as France is concerned, our first reverses have served to exalt the national

spirit and to fortify the unanimous resolution to conquer or to die. It is important that this be well understood in the United States and that it be given due consideration if it is desired to intervene without irritating the most noble scruples. * * *

It is the Prussian military system of domination with its contagion which has done the harm and which ought to disappear, and that system itself is the fruit of Napoleonic imperialism. The struggle is always, and more now than ever, between imperialism and liberty, between force and right. May you in the United States profit by this lesson, so that you may avoid falling into the European error. * * * It is barbarity triumphant. But that triumph will be only momentary, and all agree at the conclusion of this terrible drama on having a United States of Europe with disarmament, or at least with armaments limited to a collective police force.

Third Letter

PARIS, Sept. 8, 1914.

* * * You have comprehended that France is struggling for justice and peace. Be sure that she will resist even to the last man, with the certainty that she is defending not herself alone but also civilization. Never have I suspected to what degree of savagery man can be degraded by unrestrained violence. I had believed that the world could never again see the time of the Massacre of the Innocents; I deceived myself; we have returned to barbarity, and the Prussian Army leaves us no alternative between victory and extermination; should she become mistress of Paris, which I doubt, and of the half of France, she will find the other half which will bury her under its ruins. * * *

The English troops march on our roads, stop at Clermont-Créans! Oh, miracle! I see among my compatriots the worst chauvinists, those who openly desire for me the fate of Jaurès, those who fought me in 1902 with cries of "Fashoda" or "Chicago," hasten to meet the English soldiers in order to aid and acclaim them, in this country still full of the memories

and the ruins of the hundred years' war! It is because the English troops are also defending the land of liberty, theirs as ours and as yours. Every one except the Prussians comprehend this, and this it is which exalts their souls! * * *

The whole misfortune, I repeat, is the result of the crime committed forty-three years ago, the crime which we accepted to avoid recommencing the war. Our resignation has not sufficed; it has not caused the trouble to disappear; the German Government has none the less been obliged to confirm it each day. The misfortune has been the forcible annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. For that the Germans are paying today; for that they will pay until they have made atonement for their fault. In this regard France is irreproachable; she has resisted the chauvinists; our general elections, the conferences of Berne and of Basle, have proved that, far from seeking revenge, she wished by mutual concessions to arrive worthily at reconciliation in peace.

The Germans are paying today for their fault of 1870-71, because that fault has corrupted and poisoned them. I have said it a thousand times. In order to keep those two unfortunate provinces under their domination it has been necessary for them to use force, to institute a régime of force. * * * It has been necessary to prevent revolts by repressive measures, as at Saverne, which have disgusted, and even disquieted, the whole world; that ignominious brutality become sovereign mistress, by the force of circumstances, even against the will of the Kaiser and against the protestation of all the élite of Germany, of such men as Zorn, Förster, Nippold, and Bebel, has ended by being a menace and a danger to Germany itself. All this is connected, and, whatever happens, Germany cannot emerge victorious from a war which is itself but the logical result of the abuse of her victories. She cannot conquer civilization; it is impossible. * * *

Comprehend this well, repeat it, publish it if you wish: France, Belgium, and England may suffer check after check; they are prepared for this, they expect it, but they will not be discouraged. The German armies may exhaust themselves

uselessly in killing, burning, and destroying. They will destroy themselves in the end. Our national policy is to take them in their own trap and to wear them out.

The day of reckoning is coming, when the inexorable advance of the Slavic race, always increasing in numbers—it little matters whether it is well or badly organized—will come from the rear to attack the Germans at the time when they are confident of victory and to drown them in the floods of blood which they have caused to flow; terrible punishment for a war which we and our friends have done everything to prevent. The victims of this punishment will be at least a half million of French, Belgians, and Englishmen, together with a whole nation which desired peace as we did, but which has allowed herself to be misled by a Government mad enough to wish to reconcile the irreconcilable, namely, the maintenance of peace and the spirit of conquest. May this punishment at least begin an era of new peace! Alas! how may we hope for this when we see the human beast awakening in a delirium of fury and getting beyond our control to destroy the masterpieces of human genius.

Fourth Letter

PARIS, Sept. 11, 1914.

The Germans appear to have comprehended that the atrocities which have bitterly aggravated the remorseless violation of Belgian neutrality have only aroused general indignation, and have at the same time exasperated the opposing nations and armies. Contrary to the tales which appear in the sensational journals, which are naturally as eager today to embitter the war as they were formerly to bring it about, I am assured that the German armies in France are repudiating the unworthy excesses of the beginning of the campaign and are respecting life and private property. This will alleviate the horrors of the war, but France nevertheless will place no limit on the sacrifices which she will make. She will wear out the German Army and destroy it, day after day, in continuous battles. * * *

The Belgians with us at Clermont-

Créans, instead of being a burden, as I had feared, are making themselves useful. They are very welcome. They are gradually recognized and appreciated as estimable people, and are employed in the homes and farms and fields. We should like to have more of them. How we shall regret them when they leave! * * *

The German Emperor must stand either as a pacifist or as a conqueror. He cannot pass as both. All the results which may follow this war could well have been obtained in peace by a general effort of good-will. On the other hand, the legacy of the war will be endless rancor, hatred, reprisal, and savagery. When it shall be understood that, in spite of Governments and Parliaments, the war has been, in large part, excited by the manoeuvres of an international band of the dealers in military supplies and by their all-powerful newspapers, when it shall be thoroughly comprehended that these dealers and these newspapers have played with rumors of war as with a scarecrow, for the purpose of keeping up a general condition of disquiet favorable to their sinister operations, then, too late, alas! there will be a revulsion of public opinion to sustain finally those men, like our friends, who have urged arbitration rather than war, and conciliation rather than arbitration.

* * * More than ever our motto, "Pro patria per orbis concordiam," will be that of every good patriot who wishes to develop the internal prosperity of his country through friendly foreign relations. * * * More than a century ago you Americans condemned and executed British imperialism; subsequently Europe condemned and executed Napoleonic imperialism; Europe is now going to condemn and execute Germanic imperialism; profit by this threefold lesson to make an end of imperialism in your country, and by your good example to render to Europe an incalculable service.

Such an example will be more efficacious than overhasty or superficial intervention, however well intentioned it might be. Above all, beware of offering

aid to Europe in a spirit of opportunism rather than of high principle. Especially, do not try to take advantage of some circumstances in order to urge a lame and ephemeral peace. Public opinion will be bitterly divided if the war is brought to an end merely by lassitude and a desire for comfort. Public opinion will accept only a peace inspired with high ideals, without needless humiliation for the conquered, and equally without sacrifice of any principles which have brought together the anti-German coalition.

The war itself, however atrocious it has been and still may be, will have been only a commencement, the beginning of continual wars into which the New World will be drawn, if we do not leave the desire of life and the means of living to Germany, conquered but still alive. It is possible to conquer and to exterminate armies, but it is not possible to exterminate a nation of 70,000,000 people. It will then be necessary to make a place for Germany which will permit the exercise of her fecund activity in the struggle of universal competition. If we yield to the temptation to make an end of German competition, we shall neither end the competition nor shall we end war.

For years I have repeated this to our English friends who were intoxicated with the theories of Chamberlain. I see without surprise but with sorrow that serious journals of London and Paris spread before the eyes of their readers the absurd idea that this war will kill the German foreign commerce, while the English and French production will be enriched without a rival, and consequently without effort. Place should be made for Germany from Berlin to Vienna in the organization of a general European confederation which will give full satisfaction to Italy at Trieste, will install the Turkish Government in Asia, will bring about an agreement between the Christian Balkan States, and give the free disposal of their destinies to Poland, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Alsace-Lorraine.

In this manner the worst problems on which general peace depends would be solved, and with these problems that of

armaments, which it would no longer be dangerous nor humiliating to reduce if the general reduction, extending even to Japan and seconded by all the republics of the New World, were agreed to by all. Certainly such an agreement would be difficult to develop; it would terrify the diplomats, but outside of such an agreement I see in perspective nothing but perpetual war, internal revolution, and general ruin.

Fifth Letter

PARIS, Sept. 18, 1914.

* * * The pride of an empire may not be crushed without a bitter struggle. The German Government has at its disposition the live force of a young and growing people. However, the day is coming when that people, aware that they have been deceived, will be able to repudiate their Government, just as the French people did after Sedan. Meanwhile the German armies have stopped their retreat in order to form a new line of resistance. But to what good? This land which it has laid waste.

The true difficulties, in my opinion, are going to commence when the conquered Germans must submit to the conditions made by the conquerors. The victors will be able to agree, I believe, to stop the war and to dictate conditions. But will they agree to make these conditions moderate? That is the question. At that moment even France will be far from unanimous, as she has been unanimous in defending herself. France is of one opinion on these principal points:

1. Alsace-Lorraine ought to be liberated at last, free to return to France; her rights ought to be respected and recognized. Such liberation should extend as far as possible to every country in Europe whose right has been violated.

2. We must make an end of ruinous armed peace, invented, so it was said, to prevent war, but which has made war inevitable. German militarism must be crushed unless it is again to become a menace and give the signal for another

competition of armaments. This peace will be only a truce, a sinister comedy, unless it is crowned by a general convention of disarmament, to which Germany must subscribe with all the others and before all the others.

3. Arbitration, conciliation, all the means already provided for amicable adjustment, and if possible for the prevention of international conflicts, should be organized on a more solid and more definite basis than in the past, with the sanction, or at least the maximum of necessary precautions, of a federated Europe. All which we have done at The Hague, far from being lost, will serve as a foundation for the building of a pacific federation.

On these three points one may prophesy a unanimity almost complete; but the division will begin when it comes to distinguishing between Germany and the empire, between the German people who have a right to live and the German Empire which opposed the right to live; the division will begin when some demand the humiliation of Germany, others the ruin of her colonies, and of her very life. France, who has defended peace, will, I am sure, also defend justice; but justice will not triumph without difficulty. And it is here that the United States will render great service, if the United States has preserved, as one can see so clearly in the Mexican crisis, her moral authority and disinterestedness.

In the cuttings from the American papers which you have sent me I have read with great disquietude an article which says that, after all, the United States "will be the beneficiary of the European war." This article claims that the United States may profit very easily by this war to take away from Germany her commerce in the three Americas, &c. It is a dangerous form of reasoning, which, however, is not new.

If war has attracted ardent partisans it is because it appeals to the temperament of many people, it flatters their self-pride, but also it serves their interests. I have never understood it as I do at present. I see, for example, the town of Mons enriching itself through

the war; cafés, restaurants, the hotels, are unable to accommodate all who come to them; the farmers are seen disputing about their products. There are also the military requisitions by which one can profit in getting rid of an old horse, of a wagon, an automobile, &c.; there are the butchers, the bakers, the dealers in cutlery, &c., who have never had so many purchasers; the furnishers of materials for the hospitals, pharmacists, orthopedists, &c.

Add to these an immense number of furnishers of military supplies, not only those who sell cannon, arms, and ammunition, but the accessories, the uniforms, material for the transports, and for the administrative work, &c. They are legion. Add to these all the combatants who have been promised positions as officers, Colonels, Generals. * * * Napoleon I. gave titles and honors. * * * You will understand that after the war, if there is an infinite number of unfortunates who mourn and who are ruined by the war, there are others, on the contrary, who have profited very well, who have enriched themselves and been raised to a privileged, fortunate class, who will find it quite natural to demand war or whose children will demand it later; while the mass of unfortunates, without strength, without resources, without protection, will need years to reconquer in peace the rights which they legally enjoyed before the war, and which the war suddenly took from them.

If to this class, more powerful than numerous, of natural partisans of the war in Europe, you are going to add the American partisans of the European war, you will commit a grave fault, for the Americans have more than ever everything to gain by peace and all to lose in war, which they will not be able to limit if it breaks out again in the world.

The truth is that the Americans evidently gain in the war, but they lose more. Europe is something else to them than a market over which to dispute, she is a reservoir of experiences, good and bad, but of experiences which you cannot do without. To wish for the continuation of the war in Europe or even to take

sides with it as a sort of half evil is for the Americans a crime, a sort of suicide; that would be to applaud the destruction of models which civilization seems to have collected for your edification and for your development. Later, the United States can do without many of these lessons which she learns from Europe, but she will always have need of the inspiration of the masterpieces of our civilization. It is only a barbarous reasoning which allows one to see in the European war profit for the United States; it is a loss, a mourning, a shame for the whole world, and particularly for the free countries which are the guides of other peoples and which can only fulfill their mission in times of peace.

I have often heard the "profits of war" discussed. The undertakers of impressive funeral services can also congratulate themselves over catastrophes. A railroad accident which puts an entire country in mourning can enrich them. The most murderous battles bring profit in the final reckoning to somebody, if it is only to the jackals and the crows; but it is the whole of a country, and for the United States it is the whole world, which must be considered, and the more the whole world prospers the more will the United States find friends, collaborators, and clients. The more the world is troubled, on the contrary, the more commence and general activities will suffer from it, without mention of the development of instruction and of the progress of human thought, which will be paralyzed.

I have been surprised to see a serious American paper bring up these old questions for discussion, and I conclude that we are going to feel in Europe the result of our errors. It is going to be necessary to find money to fill up the financial gulf which we dig each day under our feet without realizing it; a gulf twice made, by the billions which it has been necessary to spend for the war, by the billions of ordinary income which must now go by default. We cannot reasonably expect that Germany will be able to pay all the deficits in France, England, Russia, Belgium, and Japan; she will have

no longer her foreign commerce; her misery is going to be frightful; it will be necessary then that each of the adversaries which she has so rashly provoked limit his demands; we must ourselves limit her ruin unless our own credit shall be ruined also.

In a word, there are two victories equally difficult for the Allies to win: the first over Germany, the second over themselves. Let us prepare ourselves to the uttermost and with all the authority which we can husband to facilitate the first here, and from your side as well as from ours, the second. To make war there is the first difficulty; but to finish well, that is what makes me anxious for the future.

Sixth Letter

PARIS, Sept. 24, 1914.

In spite of all, unity of purpose is maintained among the Allies as well as among Frenchmen. I say in spite of all, because at Berlin this was hardly believed possible at the beginning of the war.

* * * All the men have left Créans; my farm is empty, and, as I told you, the work is accomplished just the same. Means are found to feed the wounded English, becoming more and more numerous, the wounded Belgians and the prisoners. At the mill the miller's wife has four sons and a son-in-law in the army. I went to see her; not a tear, she looked straight before her absorbed in her work and said only "It is necessary." She continues her work as yesterday, as always, only with more energy and seriousness than formerly, with the purpose to accomplish double.

Meanwhile, in spite of lack of news, we are beginning to learn that many sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers whom we saw go away will never return. Each day a few of the wounded are buried, and so it is in all the communities in the country which are not occupied by the Germans. In every town, village, home, and heart the national tribulations have their local echo.

If all France were victim of a catastrophe of nature, an earthquake, a conflagration, or a flood, the country would

be crushed; but, no, the contrary is now true, for the present catastrophe has been brought about by an evil will and each one comprehends that this will, if left free to act, will continue to do evil until it has been crushed. We have neither the time nor the wish to complain; we fight. * * *

The people, all those who are now devoted to my policy, to our policy, remain more faithful than ever. They keep silent, awaiting the end of the war and knowing well that in fact it is not so much a question of Germany as of German reaction, German imperialism, and German militarism. They know also that if the German reaction might have been crushed sooner, the war would not have broken out. Thus, far from being blind, public opinion is alive to the truth. The grandeur, and to speak the whole truth, alas, the beauty of the atrocious war is that it is a war of liberation. * * *

It is impossible that the New World should remain a simple spectator before the gigantic struggle which is progressing in Europe. I do not ask that the New World intervene by armed force, but that it shall not conceal its opinion, its aver-

sion for that horror which is called reaction and which truly is only death; that it shall not conceal its indignation for the abominable calculation of that reaction which is incapable of comprehending anything of the life, the work, the science, and the art of human genius, I ask that the New World shall not remain skeptical before the senile attacks of those armies which respect nothing, neither women, children, old men, unfortified cities, museums, nor cathedrals. * * *

It is impossible that the free United States, born out of the sacred struggle against European domination, enlarged, enriched, and ennobled by that struggle, and now in the front rank among nations as the fruit of that struggle, should hesitate between revolution and reaction, between right and conquest, between peace and war.

Americans are too generous to hesitate, too wise, also, for Prussian reaction is cracking and is going to crumble; even Americans of German origin would be acting against their own Fatherland if they, by their sympathies, should sustain the régime of caporalism which is now destroying it.

The Vital Energies of France

By Henri Bergson

The issue of the war is not doubtful: Germany will succumb. Material force and moral force, all that sustains her will end by failing her because she lives on provisions garnered once for all, because she wastes them and will not know how to renew them.

Everything has been said about her material resources. She has money, but her credit is sinking, and it is not apparent where she can borrow. She needs nitrates for her explosives, oil for her motors, bread for her sixty-five millions of inhabitants. For all this she has made provision, but the day will come when

her granaries will be empty and her reservoirs dry. How will she fill them? War as she practices it consumes a frightful number of her men, and here, too, all revitalization is impossible; no aid will come from without, since an enterprise launched to impose German domination, German "culture," German products, does not and never will interest those who are not Germans. Such is the situation of Germany confronting a France who keeps her credit intact and her ports open, who procures provisions and ammunition according to her need, who reinforces her army with all that her al-

lies bring to her, and who can count—since her cause is that of humanity itself—upon the increasingly active sympathy of the civilized world.

But it is not merely a question of material force, of visible force. What of the moral force that cannot be seen and that is more important than the other—which to a certain degree can be supplied—that is essential, since without it nothing avails?

The moral energy of nations, like that of individuals, can only be sustained by some ideal superior to themselves, stronger than they are, to which they can cling with a strong grip when they feel their courage vacillate. Where lies the ideal of contemporary Germany? The time has passed when her philosophers proclaimed the inviolability of justice, the eminent dignity of the person, (the individual?), the obligation laid upon nations to respect one another. Germany militarized by Prussia has thrust far from her those noble ideas which came to her formerly for the most part from the France of the eighteenth century and the Revolution. She has made for herself a new soul, or, rather, she has docilely accepted that which Bismarck has given her. To that statesman has been attributed the famous phrase, "Might makes right." As a matter of fact, Bismarck never said it, because he

was unable to distinguish between might and right; in his eyes right was simply that which is desired by the strongest, that which is declared in the law imposed by the victor upon the vanquished. His whole moral philosophy is summed up in that. The Germany of the present knows no other. She also worships brute force. And as she believes herself strongest she is entirely absorbed in adoration of herself. Her energy has its origin in this pride. Her moral force is only the confidence by which her material force inspires her. That is to say, that here also she lives on her reserves, that she has no means of revitalization. Long before England was blockading her coasts she had blockaded herself, morally, by isolating herself from all ideals capable of revivifying her.

Therefore she will see her strength and her courage worn out. But the energy of our soldiers is linked to something which cannot be worn out, to an ideal of justice and liberty. Time has no hold on us. To a force nourished only by its own brutality we oppose one that seeks outside of itself, above itself, a principle of life and of renewal. While the former is little by little exhausted, the latter is constantly revived. The former already is tottering, the latter remains unshaken. Be without fear: the one will be destroyed by the other.

Paris, Nov. 5, 1914.

France Through English Eyes

With Rene Bazin's Appreciation

Referring to the article printed below, which appeared in The London Times Literary Supplement of Oct. 1, and which the French Government ordered to be read in all Parisian schools, M. René Bazin writes in l'Echo de Paris:

Is not this language admirable? What full and flowing phrases! They are like a ship filled with grain sailing into port with her sails full. Preserve them, these fugitive lines written by a neighbor, and read them to your children. They will

teach them the greatness of France and the greatness of England.

The whole world recognizes two qualities in the Englishman: his bravery and his common sense. We know that the Englishman is true to his given word, and that even in the antipodes he never changes his habits. As I write, the postman brings me a letter from the front, dated Oct. 17. The cavalryman who sends it tells of our allies. "We are fighting the enemy's cavalry," he writes, "and for

two days my brigade was in action with the British. They know how to fight and they astonish us by their marvelous powers of organization and their coolness."

Yes, we know that of old. We also know that England never closes her doors to liberty. We have a confused memory of the hospitality given to our priests in the times of the Revolution. Now England provides us with fresh proof of her kindness of heart. You have heard the news—the professors and students of the Catholic University of Louvain invited to Cambridge. The destroyed Belgian university reconstituted in the home of the celebrated English university. What a magnificent idea!

I do not know whether the author who has spoken so well of France in the great English newspaper has ever visited this country. But he has surely meditated

on our history and has divined the reason of the very existence of France; why she merits love beyond her frontiers, and why she should be defended "like a treasure." England is not made up of traders, soldiers, sailors, politicians, but also—and that is what the French people will learn better every day—of poets, subtle philosophers, and of thoughtful and religious spirits.

In truth, the day which Joan of Arc foresaw has arrived. She did not hate the English. It was only their intolerable rule of the kingdom which was hateful to her. The good maid of Lorraine said that after having driven the English out of France she would reconcile them with the French and lead them together in a crusade. This has become true. Her dream is accomplished. The crusade is not against the Saracens, but it is a crusade all the same.

France

From The London Times Literary Supplement

Among all the sorrows of this war there is one joy for us in it: that it has made us brothers with the French as no other two nations have ever been brothers before. There has come to us, after ages of conflict, a kind of millennium of friendship; and in that we feel there is a hope for the world that outweighs all our fears, even at the height of the worldwide calamity. There were days and days, during the swift German advance, when we feared that the French armies were no match for the German, that Germany would be conquered on the seas and from her eastern frontier, that after the war France would remain a power only through the support of her allies. For that fear we must now ask forgiveness; but at least we can plead in excuse that it was unselfish and free from all national vanity. If, in spite of ultimate victory, France had lost her high place among the nations, we should have felt that the victory itself was an irreparable loss for the world. And now we may speak frankly of that fear be-

cause, however unfounded it was, it reveals the nature of the friendship between France and England.

That is also revealed in the praise which the French have given to our army. There is no people that can praise as they can: for they enjoy praising others as much as some nations enjoy praising themselves, and they lose all the reserve of egotism in the pleasure of praising well. But in this case they have praised so generously because there was a great kindness behind their praise, because they, like us, feel that this war means a new brotherhood stronger than all the hatreds it may provoke, a brotherhood not only of war but of the peace that is to come after it. That welcome of English soldiers in the villages of France, with food and wine and flowers, is only a foretaste of what is to be in both countries in a happier time. It is what we have desired in the past of silly wrangles and misunderstandings, and now we know that our desire is fulfilled.

"That Sweet Enemy"

For behind all those misunderstandings, and in spite of the difference of character between us, there was always an understanding which showed itself in the courtesies of Fontenoy and a hundred other battles. When Sir Philip Sidney spoke of France as that sweet enemy, he made a phrase for the English feeling of centuries past and centuries to be. We quarreled bitterly and long; but it was like a man and woman who know that some day their love will be confessed and are angry with each other for the quarrels that delay the confession. We called each other ridiculous, and knew that we were talking nonsense; indeed, as in all quarrels without real hatred, we made charges against each other that were the opposite of the truth. We said that the French were frivolous; and they said that we were gloomy. Now they see the gayety of our soldiers and we see the deep seriousness of all France at this crisis of her fate. She, of all the nations at war, is fighting with the least help from illusion, with the least sense of glory and romance. To her the German invasion is like a pestilence; to defeat it is merely a necessity of her existence; and in defeating it she is showing the courage of doctors and nurses, that courage which is further removed from animal instinct and most secure from panic reaction. There is no sign in France now of the passionate hopes of the revolutionary wars; 1870 is between them and her; she has learned, like no other nation in Europe, the great lesson of defeat, which is not to mix material dreams with spiritual; she has passed beyond illusions, yet her spirit is as high as if it were drunk with all the illusions of Germany.

And that is why we admire her as we have never admired a nation before. We ourselves are an old and experienced people, who have, we hope, outlived gaudy and dangerous dreams; but we have not been tested like the French, and we do not know whether we or any other nation could endure the test they have endured. It is not merely that they have survived and kept their strength.

It is that they have a kind of strength new to nations, such as we see in beautiful women who have endured great sorrows and outlived all the triumphs and passions of their youth, who smile where once they laughed; and yet they are more beautiful than ever, and seem to live with a purpose that is not only their own, but belongs to the whole of life. So now we feel that France is fighting not merely for her own honor and her own beautiful country, still less for a triumph over an arrogant rival, but for what she means to all the world; and that now she means far more than ever in the past.

Furia Francese

This quarrel, as even the Germans confess, was not made by her. She saw it gathering, and she was as quiet as if she hoped to escape war by submission. The chance of revenge was offered as it had never been offered in forty years; yet she did not stir to grasp it. Her enemy gave every provocation, yet she stayed as still as if she were spiritless; and all the while she was the proudest nation on the earth, so proud that she did not need to threaten or boast. Then came the first failure, and she took it as if she had expected nothing better. She had to make war in a manner wholly contrary to her nature and genius, and she made it as if patience, not fire, were the main strength of her soul. Yet behind the new patience the old fire persisted; and the *Furia Francese* is only waiting for its chance. The Germans believe they have determined all the conditions of modern war, and, indeed, of all modern competition between the nations, to suit their own national character. It is their age, they think, an age in which the qualities of the old peoples, England and France, are obsolete. They make war, after their own pattern, and we have only to suffer it as long as we can. But France has learned what she needs from Germany so that she may fight the German idea as well as the German armies; and when the German armies were checked before Paris there was an equal check to the German idea. Then the world, which was holding its breath, knew that the

old nations, the old faith and mind and conscience of Europe, were still standing fast and that science had not utterly betrayed them all to the new barbarism. Twice before, at Tours and in the Catalaunian fields, there had been such a fight upon the soil of France, and now for the third time it is the heavy fate and the glory of France to be the guardian nation. That is not an accident, for France is still the chief treasury of all that these conscious barbarians would destroy. They knew that while she stands unbroken there is a spirit in her that will make their Kultur seem unlovely to all the world. They know that in her, as in Athens long ago, thought remains passionate and disinterested and free. Their thought is German and exercised for German ends, like their army; but hers can forget France in the universe, and for that reason her armies and ours will fight for it as if the universe were at stake. Many forms has that thought taken, passing through disguises and errors, mocking at itself, mocking at the holiest things; and yet there has always been the holiness of freedom in it. The French blasphemer has never blasphemed against the idea of truth even when he mistook falsehood for it. In the Terror he said there was no God, because he believed there was none, but he never

said that France was God so that he might encourage her to conquer the world. Voltaire was an imp of destruction perhaps, but with what a divine lightning of laughter would he have struck the Teutonic Antichrist, and how the everlasting soul of France would have risen in him if he could have seen her most sacred church, the visible sign of her faith and her genius, ruined by the German guns. Was there ever a stupidity so worthy of his scorn as this attempt to bombard the spirit? For, though the temple is ruined, the faith remains; and whatever war the Germans may make upon the glory of the past, it is the glory of the future that France fights for. Whatever wounds she suffers now she is suffering for all mankind; and now, more than ever before in her history, are those words become true which one poet who loved her gave to her in the Litany of Nations crying to the earth:

I am she that was thy sign and standard
bearer,
Thy voice and cry;
She that washed thee with her blood and
left thee fairer,
The same am I.
Are not these the hands that raised thee
fallen, and fed thee,
These hands defiled?
Am not I thy tongue that spake, thine
eye that led thee,
Not I thy child?

The Soldier of 1914

By Rene Doumic

In spite of the great European war, which struck France with the full force of its horrors, the Institute of France, which includes the world-famous French Academy, held its regular session on Oct. 26 last. The feature of this session, widely heralded beforehand, was the address of the celebrated critic, M. Rene Doumic of the Academy, on "The Soldier of 1914." "Every sentence, every word of it, was punctuated with acclamations from the audience," says Le Figaro in its report. Below is a translation of M. Doumic's address:

The soldier of 1914. We think only of him. We live only for him, just as we

live only through him. I have not chosen this subject; it has forced itself upon me. My only regret is that I come here in academician's costume, with its useless sword, to speak to you about those whose uniforms are torn by bullets, whose rifles are black with powder.

And I am ashamed, above all, of placing so feeble a voice at the service of so great a cause. But what do words matter, when the most brilliant of them would pale before acts of which each day makes us the witnesses? For these acts

we have only words, but let us hope that these, coming from the heart, may bring to those who are fighting for their country somewhere near the frontier the spirit of our gratitude and the fervor of our admiration.

Our history is nothing but the history of French valor, so ingenious in adopting new forms and adapting itself each time to the changing conditions of warfare. Soldiers of the King or of the republic, old "grogards" of Napoleon, who always growled yet followed just the same, youngsters who bit their cartridges with childish lips, veterans of fights in Africa, cuirassiers of Reichshofen, gardes-mobiles of the Loire, all, at the moment of duty and sacrifice, did everything that France expected of her sons.

So, too, for this war, the soldier needed has arisen. After so many heroes he has invented a new form of heroism.

I say the soldier, for the soldier is what one must say. Here begins what is clearly expressed in one phrase only—the French miracle. This national union in which all opinions have become fused is merely a reflection of the unity which has been suddenly created in our army.

When War Broke Out

When war broke out it found military France ready and armed; mere troopers, officers none of whom ever thought that he would one day lead his men under fire, and that admirable General Staff which, never allowing itself to be deflected from its purpose, did its work silent and aloof.

But there was beside this France another France, the France of civilians, accustomed by long years of peace to disbelieve in war; which, in conjuring up a picture of Europe delivered over to fire and blood, could not conceive that any human being in the world would assume the responsibility for such an act before history. War surprised the employe at his desk, the workman in his workshop, the peasant in his field. It snatched them from the intimacy of their hearths, from the amenities of family life which in France is sweeter than elsewhere. These men were obliged to leave behind beings whom they loved

tenderly. For the last time they clasped in their arms the beloved partners of their lives, so deeply moved yet so proud, and their children, the eldest of whom have understood and will never forget. And all of them, artist and artisan, priest and teacher, those who dreamed of revenge and those who dreamed of the fraternity of nations, those of every mind, every profession, every age, as they stepped into their places, were endowed with the soul of the soldier of France, every one of them, and became thus the same soldier.

The war which lay in wait for these men, many of whom did not seem made for war, was a war of which nobody had ever seen the like. We have heard tell of wars of giants, of battles of nations, but nobody had ever seen a war extending from the Marne to the Vistula, nor battles with a front of hundreds of kilometers, lasting weeks without respite day or night, fought by millions of men. Never in its worst nightmares had hallucinated imagination conjured up the progress made in the art of mowing down human lives. The German Army, to which the German Nation has never refused anything, either moral support or money, the nerve of war, has been able to profit by all this progress, to reduce to a formula the violence which drives forward the attack, to prepare the spy system which watches over the unarmed foe, to organize even incendiarism, and to become thus, forged by forty-four years of hatred, the most formidable tool of destruction that has ever sown ruin and death.

German Meets Belgian

The Germans arrived, with the irresistible impetus of their masses, with the fury of a tempest, with the roar of thunder, enraged at having been confronted on their road by that little Belgian Nation which has just inscribed its name among the first on the roster of heroism. Already the German chiefs imagined themselves lords of Paris, which they threatened to reduce to ashes—and which did not tremble.

It was to meet this colossus of war

that our little soldier marched forth. And he made it fall back.

To this new war he brings his old qualities, the qualities of all time. Courage—let us not speak of that. Can one speak of courage? Just read the short sentences in the army orders.

Corporal Voituret of the Second Dragons, mortally wounded on a reconnaissance, cries: "Vive la France! I die for her! I die happy!" Private Chabannes of the Eighteenth Chasseurs, unhorsed and wounded, replies to the Major who asks him why he had not surrendered: "We Frenchmen never surrender!" And remember those who, mortally wounded, stick to their posts so as to fight to the end with their men, and those wounded men who have but one desire—every one of us can vouch for this—to return to the firing line! And that one who, hopelessly mutilated, said to me: "It is not being crippled that hurts me; it is that I shall not be able to see the best part of the thing!" These, and the others, the thousands of others, shall we speak of their courage?—what would it mean to speak of their courage?

And the dash of them!—the only criticism to which they lay themselves open is that they are too fiery, that they do not wait the right moment for the charge, in order to drive back the enemy at the point of the bayonet. What spirit! What gayety! All the letters from our soldiers are overflowing with cheerfulness. Where, for instance, does that nickname come from applied by them to the enemy—the "Boches"? It comes from where so many more have come; its author is nobody and everybody; it is the spontaneous product of that Gallic humor which jokes at danger, takes liberties with it.

What pride! What sense of honor! Whereas the German officer, posted behind his men, drives them forward like a flock of sheep, revolver in his hand and insults on his lips, we, on our side, hear nothing but those beautiful, those radiant words: "Forward! For your country!"—the call of the French officer to his children, whom he impels for-

ward by giving them the example, by plunging under fire first, before all of them, at their head.

The Password: "Smile!"

And—supreme adornment of all—with what grace they deck their gallantry! A few seconds before being killed by an exploding shell, Col. Doury, ordered to resist to the last gasp, replies: "All right! We will resist. And now, boys, here is the password: Smile!" It is like a flower thrown on the scientific brutality of modern war, that memory of the days when men went to war with lace on their sleeves. There we recognize the French soldier such as we have always known him through fifteen centuries of the history of France.

But now we look upon him in a form of which we did not suspect the existence, the form in which he has just revealed himself to us.

To go forward is all very well; but to fall back in good order, to understand that a retreat may be a masterpiece of strategy, to find in himself that other kind of courage which consists in not getting discouraged, to be able to wait without getting demoralized, to preserve unshaken the certainty of the final outcome—in these things lies a virtue which we did not know we possessed; the virtue of patience. It won us our victory of the Marne. One man is its personification today, that great chief, wise and prudent, who spares his men, who makes up his mind not to give battle except in his own time on his own ground, that chief toward whom at this moment the calm and confident eyes of the entire country are turned.

To carry a position by assault is one thing. But to stand impassive in a rain of shot, amid exploding shells, amid infernal din and blinding smoke; to fire at an invisible enemy, to dispute foot by foot ground covered with traps, to retake the same village ten times, to burrow into the soil and crouch there, to watch day after day for the moment when the beast at bay ventures from his lair—where have we acquired the phlegmatic coolness for such things? Has it come from the proximity of our English allies?

It is in the English reports that we read the eulogies of our army for its endurance and tenacity.

We have always known how to pluck the laurels of the brave on fields of battle and to water them with our blood. We Frenchmen, all of us, are lovers of glory. The stories of war which we read in our childhood days—captures of redoubts, fiery charges, furious fights around the flag—made us thrill. And, like the Athenians who left the performance of a tragedy by Aeschylus thirsting to close their books and march on the enemy, we dreamed of combats in which we were to win fame.

But since those days military literature has undergone somewhat of a change, and the communiqués which we devour twice a day, hungry for news, give us no such tales of prowess.

"On the left wing we have progressed. On the right wing we have repulsed violent counterattacks. On the front the situation remains without change." Where are our men? What troops are meant? What Generals? Nothing is told of such things. The veil of anonymity shrouds great actions, a barrier of impenetrable mystery protects the secret of the operations.

Great Things Done Simply

Our soldiers have endured every hardship, braved every danger, never knowing whether each dawning day was their last, yet the cleverest manœuvring, the most gallant feats, are obliterated, effaced, lost, in the calculated colorlessness of an enigmatic report. But that sacrifice also have they made. To be at the post assigned to them, to play a great or infinitesimal rôle in the common work, is the only reward they desire. Can it be that the disease of individualism is a thing of yesterday? The soldier of 1914 has cured us of it. Never have disinterestedness and modesty been pushed so far.

Let us say it in a word: Never have great things been done so simply.

But he knows why he is fighting. It is not for the ambition of a sovereign or the impatience of his heir, for the arrogance of a caste of country squires or

the profit of a firm of merchants. No; he fights for the land where he was born and where his dead sleep; he fights to free his invaded country and give her back her lost provinces, for her past, struck to the heart by the shells that bombarded the Cathedral of Rheims; he fights so that his children may have the right to think, speak, and feel in French, so that there may still be in the world a French race, which the world needs. For this war of destruction is aimed at the destruction of our race, and our race has been moved to its depths. It has risen as one man and assembled together; it has called up from its remotest history all its energy, in order to incarnate them in the person of him whose duty is to defend the race today; it has inspired in him the valor of the knights of old, the endurance of the laborer bending over his furrow, the modesty of the old masters who made of our cathedrals masterpieces of anonymity, the honesty of the bourgeois, the patience of humble folk, the consciousness of duty which mothers teach to their children, all those virtues which, developed from one generation to another, become a tradition, the tradition of an industrious people, made strong by a long past and made to endure. It is these qualities, all of them together, which we admire in the soldier of 1914, the complete and superb type of the entire race.

A Holy Intoxication

When it has such an aim, the noblest of all, war is sublime; all who go into it are as if transfigured. It exalts, expands, and purifies souls. On approaching the battlefield a holy intoxication, a holy happiness, takes possession of those for whom has been reserved the supreme joy of braving death for their country. Death is everywhere, but they do not believe in it any more. And when, on certain mornings, to the sound of cannon that mix their rumblings with mystic voices of bells, in the devastated church which cries to the heavens through every breach opened in its walls, the Chaplain blesses the regiment that he will accompany the next minute to the firing line,

every head will be bent at the same time and all will feel on their brows the breath of God.

Alas! the beauty of the struggle does not hide from me its sadness. How many went away, full of youth and hope, to return no more. How many have fallen already without seeing realized what they so ardently desired; sowers they, who to make the land fertile have watered it with their blood, yet will not see the harvest.

But at least their sacrifice will not have been in vain. They have brought reconciliation to their divided country, they have made her become conscious of herself again, they have made her learn enthusiasm once again. They have not seen victory, but they have merited it. Honor to them, struck down first, and glory to those who will avenge them! We enfold them both in our devotion to the same sacred cause.

Would that a new era might dawn, thanks to them, that a new world might be born in which we might breathe more freely, where injustices centuries old might be made good, where France, arising from long humiliation, might resume her rank and destiny. Then, in that cured, vivified France, what an awakening, what a renewal, what a sap, what a magnificent flowering there would be! This will be thy work, soldier of 1914! To you we shall owe this resurrection of our beloved country. And later on, and always, in everything beautiful and good that may be done among us, in the creations of our poets and the discoveries of our savants, in the thousand forms of national activity, in the strength of our young men and the grace of our young women, in all that will be the France of tomorrow, there will be, soldier so brave and so simple in your greatness, a little of your heroic soul!

Germany's Civilized Barbarism

By Emile Boutroux

I sincerely thank M. Emile Boutroux for the letter he has been good enough to write to me; and the readers of the *Revue* will join me, for it is addressed to them also. No one could speak of Germany more authoritatively than M. Boutroux; no one, indeed, is better acquainted with the Germany of yesterday and that of today, or better equipped to draw a comparison between them, which for the Prussianized Germany of the present is a verdict and a condemnation. The violence, brutality, barbarism which she displays—a frightful spectacle—doubtless spring from the deepest instincts of race; but man always feels the need of justifying his conduct, and the Germans are too much philosophers not to seek justification for theirs in a scientific system in which these doctrinaires of a new sort are encouraged to persevere without the least scruple or

pity. M. Boutroux explains to us the detestable sophism which has perverted the entire German soul and made of a nation which our grandfathers loved and admired, a monster whose implacable egotism weighs heavily on the world. But let M. Boutroux speak.

FRANCIS CHARMES.

PARIS, 28 September, 1914.

To the Director of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*:

Mr. Director and Dear Colleague: You have done me the honor to ask me, as I have lived in Germany and studied in part German philosophy and literature, whether I was not prepared to submit some observations touching the present war. I confess that at this moment words, and even thoughts, seem to me to amount to little. Like every French-

man, I am given up wholly to the task of the hour; all my interest is in our generous and admirable army, and my sole concern is to take part, however modestly, in the work of the nation. True, a thousand memories and reflections crowd my mind; the notion of pausing to express them in writing had not occurred to me, but it would be ungracious in me to decline your kind invitation. Please omit from the ideas I throw on paper whatever seems to you to be lacking in interest.

Mephistopheles Appears

In the presence of such events as are passing before our eyes, how can we keep our minds free? We have to say to ourselves: "See what has come of that philosophic, artistic, scientific development whose grandeur and idealistic character all the world has proclaimed!" "That is what the infernal cur had in his belly," said Faust as he saw the dog which was playing at his side change into Mephistopheles. What! Having declared the morality of Plato and Aristotle inadequate and mediocre, having preached duty for duty's sake, having established the unconditioned supremacy of moral worth, the royalty of the intellect, to end by officially declaring that a signed engagement is but a scrap of paper, and that juridic or moral laws do not count if they incommode us and if we are the strongest! Having given to the world marvelous music, in which the purest and deepest aspirations seem to be heard; having raised art and poetry to a sort of religion, in which man communes with the Eternal by the worship of the ideal; having exalted the universities as the most sublime of human creations, temples of science and of intellectual freedom, to come to bombarding Louvain, Malines, and the Cathedral of Rheims! Having assumed the rôle of representative par excellence of culture, of civilization in its loftiest form, at the end to aim at the subjugation of the world and to strive toward that aim by the methodical letting loose of brute force, wickedness, and barbarism! To boast of having attained the highest plane of

human nature, and to reveal themselves as survivors of the Huns and Vandals!

Only yesterday Germany was feared throughout the world because of her power, but esteemed for her science and her heritage of idealism. Today, on the contrary, there is a common cry of reprobatation and horror raised against her from one end of the earth to the other. Fear is overcome by indignation. On every side it is asserted that the victory of German imperialism and militarism would be the triumph of despotism, brutality, and barbarism. These ideas are expressed to us by Americans of the North and South, by Spaniards, Italians, Greeks, Swiss, and Rumanians. The nation which burned the University of Louvain and the Cathedral of Rheims has brought dishonor upon itself.

What shall we think of the prodigious contrast which manifests itself between the high culture of Germany and the end at which she aims, the means which she employs in the present war? Is it enough to explain this contrast, to allege that in spite of all their science the Germans are but slightly civilized, that in the sixteenth century they were still boorish and uncultivated and that their science, an affair of specialists and pundits, has never penetrated their soul or influenced their character?

This explanation is justified. Consider the German professor in the beer garden, in the relations of everyday life, in his amusements. With certain notable exceptions he excels only in discovering and collecting materials for study and in drawing from them, by mechanical operations, solutions that rest wholly upon text and argument and make no appeal whatever to ordinary judgment and good sense. What a disproportion often between his science and his real education. What vulgarity of tastes and sentiments and language. What brutality of methods on the part of this man whose authority is indisputable in his specialty. Take this learned man from his university chair, place him on that scene of war where force can alone reign and where the gross appetites are un-

chained, it is not surprising that his conduct approaches that of savages.

A Culture of Violence

That is the current judgment, and not without reason. The savant and the man, among the Germans, are only too often strangers to each other. The German in war is inhuman not merely because of an explosion of his true nature, gross and violent, but by order. His brutality is calculated and systematized. It justifies the words of La Harpe, "There is such a thing as a scientific barbarity." In 1900 the German Emperor, haranguing his soldiers about to set sail for China, exhorted them to leave nothing living in their path and to bear themselves like Huns.

If, then, in this war, in the manner in which they have prepared and provoked it and now conduct it, they violate without scruple the laws of the civilized world, it is not despite their superior culture, it is in consequence of that very culture. They are barbarous because they are more civilized. How can such a combination of contradictory elements, such a synthesis, be possible?

Fichte in the famous discourses to the German Nation which he delivered at the University of Berlin during the Winter of 1807 and 1808, had one object: to arouse the German Nation by kindling its self-consciousness, that is to say, its pure Germanic essence, *Deutschheit*, in order to realize that essence when possible beyond its borders, and to make it dominate the world. The general idea which must guide Germany in the accomplishment of this double task is: Germany is to all the rest of the world as good is to evil.

The appeal of Fichte was heard. During the century which followed, Germany in the most precise and practical manner, on the one hand built up the theory of Germanism or *Deutschtum*, on the other hand prepared the domination of Germanism in the world. This notion of Germanism furnishes, if I am not mistaken, the principle of the inference which I wish to indicate, the explanation of the surprising solidarity which Ger-

mans have created between culture and barbarism.

It would be interesting to probe this notion and follow its development.

In the first place, how can a people come to claim for its ideas, its virtue, its achievements, not only the right to exist and to be respected by other people, but the privilege of being the sole expression of the true and the good while everything which emanates from other peoples represents nothing but error and evil?

The philosopher Fichte after having built up his system under the influence of Kant and of French ideas, notably under the influence of Rousseau—of whom he said "peace to his ashes, for he has done things"—could think of nothing better to reinforce the German soul after Jena than to persuade it that in itself and itself alone there was to be found the sense of the ideal combined with power to realize that ideal in the world.

The Power to Realize

Starting from a certain notion of the absolute he found after Jena that this very notion constituted the foundation of the German genius. Soon this mystic method was merged in a more concrete method better adapted to the positive spirit of modern generations. The one science where all knowledge and ideas which concern human life are concentrated is history. To this science our epoch has devoted a veritable worship. Now the Germans have drawn from history two lessons of the highest importance. One is that history is not only the succession of events, which mark the life of humanity, it is the judgment of God upon the rivalries of peoples. Everything which is wished to be, and to endure, struggle, and impose itself. History tells us which are the men and the things Providence has elected. The sign of that election is success. To subsist, grow, conquer, dominate is to prove that one is the confidant of the thought of Providence, the dispenser of the power of Providence. If one people appears designated by history to dominate the others, then that people is the vicegerent

of God upon earth, is God Himself, visible and tangible for His creatures.

The second lesson which German erudition has drawn from the study of history is that the actual existence of a people charged with representing God is not a myth, that such a people exists and that the German people is that people. From the victory of Hermann (Arminius) over Varus in the forest of Teutoburg in the year 9 A. D., the will of God is evident. The Middle Ages show it, and if in modern times Germany has appeared to efface herself it is because she was reposing to collect her force and strike more heavily. When she was not obviously the first, she was so virtually. It was in 1844 that Hoffmann von Fallersleben composed the national song, *Deutschland über alles, über alles in der Welt*. Germany over all, Germany over all the world, Germany extending from the Meuse to the Niemen, from the Adige to the Belt.

Not only is Germany the elect of Providence, but the sole elect, and other nations are rejected. The sign of her election is the annihilation of the three legions of Quinctilius Varus, and her eternal task is to revenge herself for the insolence of the Roman General. "We shall give battle to Hermann and we shall avenge ourselves," "*und wollen Rache haben*." Thus ran the celebrated national song. *Der Gott, der Eisen wachsen liess*.

Germanism and God

German civilization has developed in antagonism with the Greco-Roman civilization. To adopt the former was on the part of God to reject the latter. Therefore German consciousness, realized without hindrance in all its force, is but the Divine consciousness. *Deutschtum*=God, and God=*Deutschtum*. In practice it is enough that an idea is authentically German in order that we may and must conclude that it is true, that it is just, and that it ought to prevail.

What are the essential dogmas of this truth, which is German because it is true and which is true because it is German? German metaphysicians explain that to us more clearly than is usual

by thought. The first quality of this truth is that it is in opposition to what classic or Greco-Latin thought would recognize as true. The latter has sought to discover what in man is essentially human, to render man superior to other beings, and to substitute more and more the superior elements for the inferior elements in human life—reason for blind impulse, justice for force, good for wickedness. It has undertaken to create in the world a moral force capable of controlling and humanizing material forces. To this doctrine, which rests upon man as its centre and which was essentially human, German thought opposes itself as the infinite opposes the finite, the absolute the relative, the whole the part. The disciples of the Greeks had at their disposition no light except that of human reason; the German genius possesses a transcendent reason which pierces the mysteries of the absolute, of the Divine. What would light be without the shadow from which it is detached? How could the ego exist if there was not somewhere a non ego to which it is opposed? Evil is not less indispensable than good in the transcendent symphony of the whole.

There is something more. It may be a satisfaction for a Greco-Latin, impelled by his mediocre logic, to say that good is good, evil is evil, but these simple formulas are contrary to the truth per se. Good by itself is absolutely impotent to realize itself. It is only an idea, an abstraction. The power and faculty of creation belong to evil alone. So that if good is to be realized it can only be by means of evil, and by means of evil left entirely to itself. God could not exist if He were not created by the devil, and thus, in a sense, evil is good and good is bad. Evil is good because it creates. Good is bad because it is impotent. The supreme and true divine law is just this: That evil left to itself, evil as evil, gives birth to good, which, by itself, would never be able to advance from the ideal to the real. "I am," said Mephistopheles, "part of that force which always wishes evil and always creates the good." Such is the divine order. He who undertakes to do good by good will only do evil. It is only in unchaining the power of evil

that one has a chance to realize any good.

From these metaphysical principles questions raised by the idea of civilization receive most remarkable solutions.

The Essence of Civilization

What is civilization in the German and true sense of the word?

Nations in general, especially the Latin nations, put the essence of civilization in the moral element of human life, in the softening of human manners. To those who understand human culture in this way the Germans will apply the words of Ibsen's Brand, "You wish to do great things but you lack energy. You expect success from mildness and goodness." According to the German thought, mildness and goodness are only weakness and impotence. Force alone is strong and force *par excellence* is science, which puts at our disposal the powers of nature and indefinitely multiplies our strength. Science, then, should be the principal object of our efforts. From science and from the culture of scientific intelligence there will necessarily result, by the effect of Divine grace, the progress of the will and of the conscience which is called moral progress. It is in this sense that Bismarck said, "Imagination and sentiment are to science and intelligence what the tares are to the wheat. The tares threaten to stifle the wheat; that is why they are cut down and burned." True civilization is a virile education, aiming at force and implying force. A civilization which under pretext of humanity and of courtesy enervates and softens man is fit only for women and for slaves.

Is that to say that the notion of right which men invoke against force has in reality no meaning, and that a highly civilized people would disregard it? We must clearly understand the relation which exists between the notion of right and the notion of force. Force is not the right. All existing forces do not have an equal right to exist; mediocre forces in reality have but a feeble share in the Divine force; but in proportion as a force becomes greater it is more noble. A universally victorious and all-powerful

force would be identical with Divine force and should, therefore, be obeyed and honored in the same degree. Justice and force, moreover, belong to two different worlds—the natural and the spiritual. The former is the phenomenon and symbol of the latter. We live in a world of symbols; and so preponderant force is for us the visible and practical equivalent of right.

It is, then, puerile to admit the existence of a natural right inherent in individuals or in nations, and manifested in their aspirations, their powers, their sympathies, their wills. The right of peoples should be determined by a purely objective method.

Now in this sense people should be divided into *Naturvölker*, *Halbkulturvölker*, and *Kulturvölker*—people in the state of nature, half-cultivated people, and cultivated people. This is not all. There are people who are simply cultivated—*Naturvölker*—and people who are wholly cultivated—*Vollkulturvölker*. Now the degree of right depends on the degree of culture. As compared with the *Kulturvölker* the *Naturvölker* have no rights. They have only duties—submission, docility, obedience. And if there exists a people which deserves more than all others the title of *Vollkulturvölker*—completely cultured people—to this people the earth belongs and the supremacy thereof. Its mission is to bend all other peoples beneath the yoke of its omnipotence co-ordinated with its supreme culture.

The Master Nation

Such is the idea of the master nation. This nation must not be simply an abstract type, it must necessarily be able to realize itself in our world. In effect the spirit is the supreme form of being; it necessarily wishes to be; and as it is infinite, it can be realized only by means of an infinite force. A nation capable of imposing its will upon everybody is the necessary instrument of the Divine will which can grant the prayer: "Our Father, Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is done in heaven."

As a master nation is necessary in the

world there must be subordinate nations. There can be no efficient "yes" without a decided "no." The ego, says Fichte, is effort. Therefore it presupposes something that resists it, namely, that which we call matter. The master nation commands. Therefore nations must exist who are made to obey it. It is needful even that these nations, which are to the master nation what the non ego is to the ego, should resist the action of this superior nation. For this resistance is necessary to enable the latter to develop and employ its force and to become fully itself; that is, to become the whole, enriching itself by the spoils of its enemies.

The ideal nation is thus defined by a transcendental deduction, and this same deduction leads us to affirm that the master nation must be not merely an idea but a reality. Now, it is plain that this realization of the ideal nation is going on under our eyes in the German Nation, which represents the highest created race and which surpasses all other nations in science and in power. It is to her, and to her alone, that the task of accomplishing the will of God upon earth is consigned.

Means of Success

To succeed in it, what means must she employ?

In the first place she must acquire complete consciousness of her superiority and of her own genius. Nothing German is found in the same degree of excellence in other nations. German women, German fidelity, German wine, the German song, hold the first rank in the world. To combat Satan, that is to say, enemies of Germany, the Germans have at their service the ancient god, the German god, *der alte, der deutsche Gott*, who identifies His cause with theirs. And as everything which is German is by that very fact unique and inimitable, so it is correspondingly true that everything which the world has of excellence belongs to Germany in fact and in right. Rembrandt, Shakespeare, Ibsen, are Germans. A German brain alone could understand them and has a right to admire them. It is doubtful if even Joan of Arc, that sublime heroine, is French.

German savants have maintained her German nationality. If the people of Alsace and Lorraine are faithful to France that only proves that they ought to be German subjects, because fidelity is a German virtue.

As Germany possesses, in principle, all the virtues, all the perfections, she suffices to herself and can learn nothing from other people. By still stronger reason she owes them no duty of respect or good-will. What is called humanity has no meaning for the German. The *mot* of William II., "Humanity for me stops at the Vosges," is not merely an instance of national egoism. The German Emperor feels that what is for the present beyond his empire can only acquire value when it shall be annexed to it.

How, then, ought Germany to behave to other nations?

There are people who wish to be loved, who believe that among nations as between individuals courtesy may have a place and that it would be an advance for humanity to admit that justice and equity may rule international relations. But Germany, as regards other nations, makes no account of justice. She has nothing but scorn for that feminine sentiment which particularly characterizes the Latin races. The sentiment of justice and humanity is weakness and Germany is and ought to be force. *Wo Preussens Macht in Frage kommt, kenne ich kein Gesetz*, said Bismarck—"When the power of Prussia is in question I know no law."

Enemies Most Welcome

The German does not ask to be loved. He prefers to be hated provided he is feared. *Oderint, dum metuant*. He does not mind being surrounded by enemies. He knows with satisfaction that in the very heart of the empire certain annexed provinces constantly protest against the violence which has been done to them. The ego cannot work without opposition. The German needs enemies to keep himself in that state of tension and of struggle which is the condition of vigor. He willingly applies to himself what the Lord God said of man in general in the prologue of Goethe's "Faust":

Man's activity has only too great a propensity to relax. Left by himself man seeks repose. That is why I give him a devil for a companion. He will excite him and keep him from getting sleepy.

Germany has a certain satisfaction in recognizing in the neighbors whom she menaces, in the subjects whom she oppresses, these providential devils whose mischief will stimulate her activity and her virtue.

Not that Germany rejects, as regards other nations, every régime except that of hostility. Her aim is domination, the only rôle which suits the people of God. Now, to attain that, two means are offered to her. The first plainly is intimidation which must never flag. The feeble quickly become insolent if their feebleness is not recalled to them. Other nations must feel themselves constantly threatened with the worst catastrophes if they resist Germany. But it being well understood that Germany is the strongest, that she will never give up what she possesses, however unjustly, then bargains advantageous not only for herself but occasionally for the other party may be the more direct and less onerous means than violence to attain her end. So Germany will be, by turns, or both at once, threatening and amiable. Amiability itself can be effective when it rests on hatred, contempt, and omnipo-
tence.

Now power counts before all. Germany must possess armaments superior to those of all other nations. The reason is plain. The German Empire is a rock of peace, *der Hort des Friedens*. The force which it accumulates is directed toward imposing upon mankind the German peace, the divine peace. Since Germany represents peace, whoever opposes Germany intends war. Now it is legitimate that Germany should arm to the teeth because she is the incarnation of peace, but the adversaries of Germany, who, in opposing Germany oppose peace, cannot have the same right. It is the duty of Germany to carry her armaments to the maximum; other peoples have the right to arm only as Germany may permit.

Germany does not seek war. On the contrary, she tries by inspiring terror to render it impossible. But if some nation should profit or be capable of profiting by her love of peace to pretend to rights which offend her she will consent to punish that nation. She will be pained by the violence she has to do to that nation and the severity which she has to use toward the guilty. But soldier of God as she is, she cannot fail in her mission. Any nation which refuses to do the will of Germany proves by that very fact its cultural inferiority and becomes guilty. It must be chastised.

The method according to which Germany will make war is determined by these premises. War is a return to the state of nature. Germany yields to this temporary retrogression because she has to do with people of an inferior culture who must be taught a lesson, and must be spoken to in a language which they understand. Now a characteristic of a state of nature is that force reigns undisputed. In this very trait resides the sublime beauty of that state, its grandeur and its fecundity. Don't talk of that romantic chivalry which pretends in time of war to temper the violence of savage instincts by the intervention of feminine sensibility. War is war. *Krieg ist Krieg*. It isn't child's play, it isn't sport where it is necessary to blend barbarity and humanity so as to conciliate and humanize them. It is barbarity itself let loose as widely and fully as possible. This is not perversity. Man as man suffers in becoming barbarous, but the man who replaces God suppresses the feebleness of the creature. He submits himself to the mysterious and sublime law in virtue of which evil is by so much more beneficent as it is achieved with resolution and completeness. *Pecca fortiter*.

The Nature of War

The first article of the code of war is then the suppression of all sensibility, pity, humanity. The nature of war is to kill and destroy. The more it destroys and kills the sooner it comes to its ideal form. Moreover, it is at bottom

more humane the more inhuman it is, because the very terrors which its excesses inspire shorten it and make it less murderous.

In the second place, war necessarily ignores moral laws. Respect for laws, treaties, conventions, loyalty, good faith, sentiment and honor, scruples, nobility of soul, generosity—these are mere fetters. The God-people do not recognize them. It will then, without hesitation, violate the rights of neutrals if it is to its interest. It will use falsehood, perfidy, treachery. It will justify itself by futile pretexts in committing the most atrocious acts—bombardment of undefended cities, massacre of old men, women and children; barbarous torture, pillage and assassination; bestiality to women; organized incendiarism; methodical destruction of monuments which, by their history and their antiquity and by the admiration of the world, would seem to be inviolable. "I am told: I must avenge myself." This reason suffices. We are told that some inhabitant of one city or another has been wanting in respect toward one of our men. Therefore we must burn the city and show the inhabitants what we have. Definitely, our duty is to let loose the elementary energies of nature as far as possible to attain the maximum force and the maximum of result.

The effect should, moreover, be psychological as well as material. Actions which seem horrible to man and which spread terror are commendable means, because they break the spirit even if they have no value from a military point of view. Moreover, what offends common morality is conformed to transcendent morality. The mission of the Germans at war is to punish. They work Divine vengeance. They compel their enemies to expiate the crime of resisting them. After they have taken a city, if the enemy has the insolence to take it back, it is just that they shall sack that city if possible, killing its inhabitants and burning its finest monuments.

Barbarity Multiplied by Science.

Given this problem, how to let loose most widely the powers of evil, it is

clear that a people of superior culture is better equipped than any other to resolve that problem. In fact, science, where it excels, can work destruction and evil with the very forces which nature employs only to create light, heat, life, and beauty. The God-people therefore unites the maximum of science to the maximum of barbarity. The formula of its action may be thus written: "Barbarity multiplied by science."

This is the last word of the famous doctrine of Germanism. Now the identity of the ultimate consequences of the doctrine and the features which the present war presents is evident. The problem which we undertook is, therefore, solved. If, contrary to all likelihood, barbarity co-exists with culture in the Germans; if in the present war it appears to be absolutely bound up in that culture, the reason is that German culture differs profoundly from what humanity understands by culture and civilization. Human civilization tries to humanize war. German culture tends indefinitely to increase its primitive brutality by science.

In everything the Germans must be unique—in their women, their God, their wine, their loyalty. The war which the Germans wage against us strikes the world with horror and terror, because it is in the full force of the term "the German way, *die deutsche Art*, the German war."

As the world recognizes this astonishing proposition it asks with anxiety, what may be its future relations to Germany? Knowingly and systematically, Germany opposes to all Hellenic, Christian, humane civilizations the devastating theory of the Huns. True, after the war she will claim that she has done nothing but conform, often with pain, to the conditions of ideal and divine war, and she will appear willing to pardon to her enemies the cruelties she has had to inflict upon them. Decidedly, the world will refuse to admire this horrible magnanimity which on the first impulse of resistance becomes savagery. Today the veil is torn away. German culture is shown to be a scientific bar-

barity. The world, which means in the future to rid itself of all despotism, will not compromise with the despotism of barbarity.

But what a disappointment and what a grief! Formerly, Germany was held to be a great nation. Its praises were sounded in many a land of solid and high culture. The German tradition once held other doctrines than those we have now seen develop under the hands of Prussia. Germanism, as the Prussians formulate it, consists essentially in contempt for all other nations and in the pretension of domination. But Leibnitz—as highly esteemed in the Latin world as in the German—professed a philosophy which valued unity only under the form of harmony between free and autonomous forces. Leibnitz exalted the multiple, the diverse, the spontaneous. Between rival powers he sought to establish relations which would reconcile them without changing or diminishing the value or independence of any of them. Witness his effort at the reunion of the Catholic and Protestant Churches. After Leibnitz came Kant. He certainly was very much of a German. He owned, nevertheless, that he had learned from Rousseau to honor the common man who, not being a savant, possesses moral value far above the savant, who has no merit but science. And, starting from the principle that every person, so far as he is capable of moral value, is entitled to respect, he urged men to create not a universal and despotic monarchy but a republic of nations in which each should possess a free and independent personality.

This willingness to put liberty before unity, and respect and honor the dignity of other nations while at the same time serving its own, was not extinguished in Germany with Leibnitz and Kant. Permit me, my dear Director, on this subject to indulge in some personal reminiscences.

Treitschke Versus Bluntschli

In January, 1869, I was sent to Heidelberg by the Minister of Public Instruction, Victor Duruy; to study the organiza-

tion of German universities. Germany was for me the land of metaphysics, music, and poetry. I was greatly astonished to find that outside of the lecture courses the only thing discussed was the war which Prussia was about to make on France. Invited to a soirée, I heard it whispered behind me, *Vielleicht ist er ein französischer Spion*—"Perhaps he is a French spy." Such were the words as I caught them. At the beer garden a student seated himself near me. He said to me, "We are going to war with you. We shall take Alsace and Lorraine." That night I could see from my window, looking out on the Neckar, the students clad in their club costumes floating down the river on an illuminated raft singing the famous song in honor of Blücher, who "taught the Welches the way of the Germans." And at the university itself the lectures of Treitschke, attended by excited crowds, were heated harangues against the French, inciting to hatred and to war. Seeing that nothing was thought of but the preparation for war, I came back at the Easter vacation of 1869 convinced that hostilities would ensue. I returned to Heidelberg some time later and became acquainted with other persons, other centres of ideas. I understood then that opinion in Germany was divided between two opposite doctrines. The general aspiration was for the unity of Germany, but there was no agreement as to the way of conceiving and realizing this unity. The thesis of Treitschke was, *Freiheit durch Einheit*, "liberty through unity," that is to say, unity first, unity before all; liberty later, when circumstances should permit. And to realize at once this unity, which really was the only thing that mattered, the enrollment of all Germany under the command of Prussia for a war against France.

Now the formula of Treitschke was opposed by that of Bluntschli, *Einheit durch Freiheit*—"Unity through liberty." This doctrine, which counted at that time some eminent advocates, aimed first to safeguard the independence and unity of the German States and then to establish between them on that basis a


federated union. And as it contemplated in the heart of Germany a union without hegemony, so it conceived of German unity as something to be realized without harm to other nations, and especially without harm to France. It was to be a free Germany in a free world.

Germany at that epoch was at the parting of the ways. Should she follow a tendency still living in many and noble minds or should she abandon it entirely, to march head down in the ways in which Prussia had entangled her? That was the question. The party of war, the party of unity as a means of attacking and despoiling France, the Prussian party, gained the day. And its success rendered its preponderance definitive. Since then those who have undertaken to

remain faithful to an ideal of liberty and humanity have been annihilated.

Is it still possible that Germany may some day regain the parting of the ways where she was before 1870 and this time take the other road, the road of the Leibnizes, the Kants, the Bluntschlis, which leads first to the liberty of individuals and of peoples and afterward—and only afterward—a form of harmony where the rights of all are equally respected? A word of the Scotch professor, William Knight, comes back to my memory at this moment: "The best things have to die and be reborn." The Germany which the world respected and admired, the Germany of Leibnitz, appears indeed dead. Can it be reborn?

EMILE BOUTROUX.



The German Religion of Duty

By Gabriele Reuter *

On various occasions in the past I have been reproached by my friends for not showing the proper spirit of patriotism.

I have merely smiled at their criticism, for it was my opinion that true patriotism does not consist of flowery speeches and assertions, but in the effort dutifully to accomplish that for which one is best qualified.

It seemed to me that I was truly showing my love for the Fatherland by writing my books to the best of my ability.

But the source of this reproach was very evident to me. The cause could be traced to a quality which I share with many of my compatriots. It must, in truth, be called a particularly characteristic trait. This is a very earnest desire for and love of justice, which is not satisfied simply to "recognize," but endeavors thoroughly to understand the material and spiritual points of view of the other nations in order to show them the proper appreciation.

It is natural to develop affection for that which one earnestly desires to understand.

Many Germans have had the experience that they have rather overzealously commenced by weighing the good of a foreign people in the balance with the good of their own, and with well-nigh fanatic honesty they have ended by acknowledging their own shortcomings compared to the merits and advantages of the foreign nation. There have been instances when some foreigner has drawn our attention to this or that particular weakness and immediately innumerable of my countrymen assented, saying, "Certainly it is true, the criticism is just, matters are probably even worse than they have been represented."

Many of us, and I acknowledge I am

one of the many, have developed a form of ascetic mania for self-abasement, a desire for truth which knows no limits in the dissection of its own condition and the disclosure of social and personal shortcomings and disadvantages. This tendency may be easily discerned in much of the German literature of the past twenty years; also, in my books.

The individual is really always the symbol of the whole, and the thoughts and feelings of one person are but the expression of strong forces in national life and culture. It was not want of patriotism, but an unbounded love for the universality of European culture which drove us, drove many thousand people with German souls, to reach out over the boundaries of our own Fatherland for intellectual conquests, for permeation and coalescence with all the world's riches, goodness, and beauty.

We loved the others; and believing ourselves among friends we were candid and disclosed our weaknesses.

Germans Trusted Too Well

We permitted criticism and criticised ourselves, because we were convinced that those others had our welfare at heart, and also because we were convinced that only by unsparing self-knowledge can the heights be scaled which lead to superior and more refined development. It is therefore probable that we ourselves have delivered the weapons into our enemies' hands.

Confiding and harmless as children, we were blind to the enigmatical hatred which has to an appalling extent developed all around us. This hate which has been nourished systematically and with satanic cleverness probably originated in a slight feeling of jealousy, and the tendency of my countrymen to criticise each other led our enemies to believe that they might look for internal dis-

*Gabriele Reuter is one of the foremost German woman authors.

cord in the Fatherland and that our humiliation could therefore be more easily accomplished.

If we had recognized the danger in time, we might have prevented this hatred, to which they at the beginning were hardly prone, from taking root in the souls of nations. But only very few among us were aware of it and they received little credence from the others. There were times when each one of us sensed the antipathy which we encountered beyond the boundary lines of our own country. But we never realized how deeply it had taken root and how widely it had spread. We loved our enemies! We loved this French Nation for its high development of etiquette, language, and taste; a culture which seemed well adapted to serve as a complement to our own. How much misery France might have been spared had she but understood this unfortunate love of the German people for the "Hereditary Enemy!"

We loved the deep, mystically religious soul of the Russians in their anguished struggles for freedom! How many Germans have looked upon Tolstoy as a new savior!

Above all, though, the German admired the Englishman, in the rôle of the "royal merchant," the far-seeing colonizer, the master of the seas. Without envy Germany gave England credit for all these qualities. And when during the Boer war voices were raised to warm against the English character, even then to most of us our Anglo-Saxon cousin remained the "Gentleman beyond reproach."

Then there is the great German love for Holland, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries; here we may find the Germanic race less adulterated than in our own country. Scandinavian poets have become our poets and we are as proud of the works of the Swedish artist as we are of those of our people.

We gaze with delight upon the proud, blonde grace of the Norse maid; the more gentle and pliant manners of the Swedes and Danes arouse our admiration; and

we dearly love their beautiful fjords and forests of beech and birch.

Love Changed to Suspicion

Many of us wonder today how much of all this love we, in the days to come, will be able to rescue from the *débris*. "Has the world gone mad that it has ceased to believe in our sincerity?" This at present is the cry of many, many thousand German men and women. Do we deserve to have our love requited with hate? And to find in the countries which declare themselves neutral, distrust, reserve, and, in fact, doubt of our honest intentions? Sad, dull despair has taken possession of the hearts of our best men and women. It is not because they tremble for the fate of the loved ones who have been compelled to go to the front and not because there is any fear as to the outcome of this war. Not one among us doubts the ultimate triumph of Germany. We also know that we must pay a terrible toll for this victory with the blood of our sons, fathers and husbands.

Equally as much as they mourn the loss of our young manhood many of our best citizens deplore the hatred which has spread over the face of the globe, hate which has torn asunder what was believed to have been a firmly woven net of a common European culture. That which we with ardent souls have labored to create is being devastated by ruthless force.

The following story of the non-commissioned German officer is typical or symbolical of many. He, while the bullets of the inhabitants of Louvain fell around him, rescued the priceless old paintings from the burning Church of St. Peter, simply because he was an art-historian and knew and loved each of the masterpieces. And well we all understand the feelings which mastered him during those moments of horror.

He would probably think and say, "I have but done my duty."

And now we have arrived at the point which gives rise to the greatest amount of antipathy. Our opponents declare we are endowed with great ability—they say

they must acknowledge that. But how can a race of stiff, dry, duty-performing beings awaken love? The German must lose all claim to individual freedom and independence of thought in consequence of the training which he receives. When he is a child he commences it in a military subordination in the school, he continues it in the barracks, and later, when he enters a vocational life, under the stern leadership of his superiors. He becomes, our critics continue, simply a disagreeable pedantic tool of the all-powerful "drill." This atmosphere of "drill," or in other words this stern, hard military spirit, envelops him, accompanies him as guardian from the cradle to the grave, and makes of him an unbearable companion for all the more refined, gentle, and amiable nations. Yes, our opponents often declare that they are waging war not only against Germany, but against this pedantic, military, tyrannical sense of duty, which they call the "Prussian spirit." It shall once and for all, they assert, be eradicated from the world.

A Religious Feeling of Duty

Far be it from me to deny that my country people, male and female, do indeed possess an unusually strong sense of duty. This is combined with a desire for justice which is so often looked upon by outsiders as a lack of patriotic pride, and with an honesty which easily makes the German appear so clumsy and awkward. These three characteristics belong indissolubly together and one is not to be thought of without the other. The spirit from which the German sense of duty arises is what the foreigner so often misunderstands in us. He generally confuses sense of duty with blind obedience. But this sense of duty does not originate from a need for submission or from a mental dependence. No, it rests on a deep philosophical reason and arises from the mental recognition of ethical and national necessity. That is why it can exist side by side with the most extreme individualism, which also belongs to the peculiarities of the character of our people. The Germans have always been a nation of thinkers. Not

only the scholar, also the simple worker, the laborer, the modest mother take a deep pleasure in forming their philosophy of life and the world. Side by side with the loud triumph of our industry goes this quieter existence which has been rather pushed into the background in the last decades, but has not, therefore, ceased to exist. And the further the belief in miracles stepped into the background, the more the belief in duty acquired a warm religious tinge. The loud complaints about the vanishing of the sense of duty among the young, which has so often been voiced by public opinion, only prove how strongly this ethical force was governing people's minds. Every seeming diminution of it was felt to be a disastrous endangerment of the knowledge of the people. We have perhaps acted childishly and foolishly toward other nations by too great confidence. But in the consciousness of the entire German Nation the ominous feeling was living and working with mighty power, that only if every one of us devotes his entire strength to the post assigned to him, and works until the exhaustion of his last mental and physical power, only then can we as a national whole retain our high level and, surrounded by dangers on all sides, create sufficient room for ourselves to breathe and live.

The Military and the Socialists

Two mighty organizations exist among us which were opposed to each other until recently—the military and the Social Democratic. The world sees with amazement the perfection which has been reached by the military organization of our army. Its achievements have only become possible through the above-mentioned philosophical conception of the sense of duty which raises it far above any systematic obedience and lets it appear in the light of religious ideal. Duty becomes in these serious and energetic minds a voluntary adaptation to a carefully organized whole with the knowledge that to serve this whole at the same time produces the highest achievement of the individual personality. The Social Democratic or-

ganization, opposed though it is to the military organization, is also composed of Germans and is, therefore, directed by the same basic principles as the military organization, although for entirely different purposes. For this one reason it was almost a matter of course that the Social Democrats offered their services for the war at the moment when they recognized that it had become of imperious necessity to set aside personal wishes and ideals and to put in the foreground only the duty of the defense of their country. The idea of our opponents, that they would find a support in the Socialists of our country, rested on a complete misunderstanding of the German character.

A foreign woman wrote to me in the days of the mobilization: "I do not understand the German enthusiasm for war—how it is possible that one can become enthusiastic about murder!" The woman only saw the exterior and superficial phase of things.

In its endeavor to unite itself with the world the German soul had suddenly come upon the wildest hatred * * * numerous high ideals of culture fell to ruin within a few hours. Deeply wounded, it was hurled back into its most personal possessions. Here it found itself face to face with tasks which far surpassed anything demanded heretofore of it as fulfillment of duty. And now there came to pass a wonder which will be unforgettable for every one who lived through this period. Everything dry, petty, pedantic, connected with German ways, which had often made many of us impatient with ourselves, was suddenly swept away by the storm of these days.

A gigantic wave of fiery hot feeling passed through our country flaming up like a beautiful sacrificial pyre. It was no longer a duty to offer one's self and one's life—it was supreme bliss. That might easily sound like a hollow phrase. But there is a proof, which is more genuine than words, than songs, and cheers. That is the expression in the faces of the people, their uncontrolled spontaneous movements. I saw the eyes light up of an old woman who had sent four sons into battle and exclaimed: "It is glorious to be allowed to give the Fatherland so much!" I saw the controlled calm in the features of sorrowing mothers who knew that their only sons had fallen. But the expression in the faces of many wounded who were already returning home gripped me the most. They had lived through the horror of the battle, their feet had waded through blood, their young bodies were horribly maimed. I saw this strangely serene, quietly friendly expression in the young faces. They were men who had sacrificed their ego. They were great patient conquerors of selfishness. And with what tenderness, what goodness are they surrounded, to lighten their lot, to give them joy. How the general sentiment is often expressed in the gesture of a single person—you did that for us—how can we sufficiently requite you?

A stream of love is flowing through our Fatherland and is uniting all hearts. The unobtrusive mother "duty" gave birth to the genial child "feeling." She bestowed on it her strong vitality so that it can defy a world of hatred—and conquer it.

A Letter to Gerhart Hauptmann

By Romain Rolland

I am not, Gerhart Hauptmann, of those Frenchmen who call Germany barbarian. I recognize the intellectual and moral grandeur of your mighty race. I realize all that I owe to the thinkers of old Germany; and even at this extreme hour I recall to mind the example and the words of our Goethe—for he belongs to all humanity—repudiating national hatred and preserving his soul serene in those heights “where one feels the joys and sorrows of all peoples as one’s own.” It has been the labor of my life to bring together the minds of our two nations; and the atrocities of impious war shall never lead me to soil my heart with hatred.

Whatever reason I may have, therefore, to suffer through the deeds of your Germany and to judge as criminal the German policy and the German methods, I do not hold responsible the people who submit thereto and are reduced to mere blind instruments. This does not mean that I regard war as a fatality. A Frenchman knows no such word as fatality. Fatality is the excuse of souls that lack a will.

No. This war is the fruit of the feebleness of peoples and of their stupidity. One can only pity them; one cannot blame them. I do not reproach you for our sorrows. Your mourning will not be less than ours. If France is ruined, so also will be Germany, I did not even raise my voice when I saw your armies violate the neutrality of noble Belgium. This forfeit of honor, which compels the contempt of every right-thinking mind, is too well within the political tradition of Prussian Kings to have surprised me.

But the fury with which you treated that generous land whose one crime was to defend, unto despair, its independence and the idea of justice—that was too much! The world revolts in wrath at this.

Reserve for us your violence—for us French, who are your enemies. But to trample upon your victims, upon the little Belgian people, unfortunate and innocent—that is ignominy!

And not content with assaulting the Belgium that lives, you wage war on the dead, on the glory of past centuries. You bombard Malines, you put Rubens to flame, Louvain comes from your hands a heap of ashes—Louvain with its treasures of art and knowledge, the holy city! Who indeed are you and what name do you conjure us to call you, Hauptmann, you who reject the title of barbarian?

Are you the children of Goethe or of Attila? Do you wage war against armies or against the human spirit? Kill men if you must, but respect man’s work. For this is the heritage of the human race. And you, like us, are its trustees. In making pillage of it as you have done you prove yourselves unworthy of this great inheritance, unworthy of holding rank in the small European army which is the garde d’honneur of civilization.

It is not to the sense of the rest of the world that I appeal against you. It is to yourself, Hauptmann. In the name of our Europe, of which up to the present you have been one of the noblest champions—in the name of that civilization for which the greatest of men have struggled—in the name of the honor even of your German race, Gerhart Hauptmann, I adjure you, I command you, you and the intellectual élite of Germany, where I have so many friends, to protest with utmost vehemence against this crime which leaps back upon yourselves.

If you fail in this, one of two things will be proved—that you acquiesce, (and then the opinion of the world will crush you,) or that you are powerless to raise

your voice against the Huns that now command you. And in that case, with what right will you still pretend, as you have written, that your cause is that of liberty and human progress?

You will be giving to the world a proof that, incapable of defending the liberty of the world, you are helpless even to uphold your own; that the élite of Ger-

many lies subservient to the blackest despotism—to a tyranny which mutilates masterpieces and assassinates the human spirit.

I await your response, Hauptmann—a response which shall be an act. The opinion of Europe awaits it, as do I. Bear this in mind; in a moment like this, even silence is an act.

A Reply to Rolland

By Gerhart Hauptmann

You address me, Herr Rolland, in public words which breathe the pain over this war, (forced by England, Russia, and France,) pain over the endangering of European culture and the destruction of hallowed memorials of ancient art. I share in this general sorrow, but that to which I cannot consent is to give an answer whose spirit you have already prescribed and concerning which you wrongly assert that it is awaited by all Europe. I know that you are of German blood. Your beautiful novel, "Jean-Christophe," will remain immortal among us Germans, together with "Wilhelm Meister" and "der grüne Heinrich."

But France became your adopted fatherland; therefore your heart must now be torn and your judgment confused. You have labored zealously for the reconciliation of both peoples. In spite of all this when the present bloody conflict destroys your fair concept of peace, as it has done for so many others, you see our nation and our people through French eyes, and every attempt to make you see clearly and as a German is absolutely sure to be in vain.

Naturally everything which you say of our Government, of our army, and of our people is distorted, everything is false, so false that in this respect your open letter to me appears as an empty black surface.

War is war. You may lament war, but you should not wonder at the things that

are inseparable from the elementary fact itself. Assuredly it is deplorable that in the conflict an irreplaceable Rubens is destroyed, but—with all honor to Rubens!—I am among those in whom the shattered breast of his fellow-man compels far deeper pain.

And, Herr Rolland, it is not exactly fitting that you should adopt a tone implying that the people of your land, the French, are coming out to meet us with palm branches, when in reality they are plentifully equipped with cannon, with cartridges, yes, even with dum dum bullets. It is apparent that you have grown pretty fearful of our brave troops! That is to the glory of a power which is invincible through the justice of its cause. The German soldier has nothing whatsoever in common with the loathsome and puerile were-wolf tales which your lying French press so zealously publishes abroad, that press which the French and the Belgian people have to thank for their misfortune.

Let the idle Englishmen call us Huns; you may, for all I care, characterize the warriors of our splendid Landwehr as sons of Attila; it is enough for us if this Landwehr can shatter into a thousand pieces the ring of our merciless enemies. Far better that you should call us sons of Attila, cross yourselves in fear and remain outside our borders, than that you should indite tender inscriptions upon the tomb of our German name, call-

ing us the beloved descendants of Goethe. The epithet Huns is coined by people who, themselves Huns, are experiencing disappointment in their criminal attacks on the life of a sound and valorous race, because it knows the trick of parrying a fearful blow with still more fearful force. In their impotence, they take refuge in curses.

I say nothing against the Belgian people. The peaceful passage of German troops, a question of life for Germany, was refused by Belgium because the Government had made itself a tool of England and France. This same Govern-

ment then organized an unparalleled guerrilla warfare in order to support a lost cause, and by that act—Herr Rolland, you are a musician!—struck the horrible keynote of conflict. If you are at all in a position to break your way through the giant's wall of anti-German lies, read the message to America, by our Imperial Chancellor, of Sept. 7; read further the telegram which on Sept. 8 the Kaiser himself addressed to President Wilson. You will then discover things which it is necessary to know in order to understand the calamity of Louvain.

Another Reply to Rolland

By Karl Wolfskehl

To you, Rolland, belonging as a chosen one to the more important Frenchmen who can rise above their race, the German nature has often been revealed. To you, now, we shall make answer, offer frank testimony concerning the spirit of the time, concerning that fate, that very fate in which you, the Frenchman, do not believe. You do not believe in it; what to us is fate, mysterious necessity, to you is fatalité, an unavoidable Alp which threatens the individual in his individual freedom. This fatalité, we, too, do not believe in it, but we do believe in the forces which bring forth the eternal in human will, that these both are one, will and forces, one with necessity, with actuality, with creative, moral power, of which all great ideas are the children, the idea of freedom, the idea of the beautiful, the idea of tragic fidelity, and that these, reaching far above being and passing away, are nevertheless real, life entire, fact entire. All that which is as dear to you as to us, great works and great feelings, resignation and self-restraint, all that is necessity, is fate, that became will—all that a unity out of choice and compulsion. All that is for us eternal, not according to the measure of time, but

according to the beginning and the power of its working forces, in so far as it is necessary.

Thus has it become fate, destiny, not fatalité, rather like that fate which in Beethoven's own words in the first movement of his "Eroica" "is the knocking at the gate."

Such a fate is this war. No one wanted it in our Germany, for it was forced upon us with terrible arbitrariness, contrary to all right. Do you not know of the net that has been spun around us and drawn tight for the last half of a generation, to choke us? Do you not know how often this most peaceful of peoples has drawn back, how often the strange powers in the East and in the West have with contemptuous snarls said, "Wilhelm will not make war"? That you ought to know, Rolland, for it is known to the whole world.

The War "Came from God"

But I will betray something to you that you cannot know, because you are a stranger; and this will probably show you where we see fate. I will betray to you the fact that there is still another Germany behind the exterior in which great politics and great finance meet

with the literary champions of Europe. That Germany tells you in this heavy hour of Europe:

This undesired war that has been forced upon us is nevertheless a necessity; it had to come to pass for the sake of Germany and the world of European humanity, for the sake of the world. We did not want it, but it came from God. Our poet knew of it. He saw this war and its necessity and its virtues, and heralded it, long before an ugly suspicion of it flew through the year—before the leaves began to turn. The "Stern des Bundes" ["Star of the Federation"] is this book of prophecy, this book of necessity and of triumph.

The present need and the present triumph are quite human and quite inexorable. They have a part in all that has taken place, and they are unprecedented and new. None of us—do you hear, Rolland?—none of us Germans to-day would hesitate to help destroy every monument of our holy German past, if necessity made it a matter of the last ditch, for that from which alone all monuments of all times draw their right of existence and their worth unless they are empty husks, skeletons, and framework; even so, we alone may ask what shall come to pass, not what shall cease. Which ruins are ravings, and which are the pains of childbirth, we do not presume to decide; but you, too, who are so pained by ruins, even as we are pained by them, you, too, do not know it.

Today it is a question of the life or death of the European soul. Do you not believe that this soul is more endangered at the hands of the hordes of stubborn Slavs than of the phalanx of those whom you, Rolland, call Huns? Your sense must give you the right to answer. Recall the terrible story of Russian incendiarism for the last hundred years, which has torn to pieces in ever-increasing lust for murder bodies and souls; recall the eternally perjured and law-defying regiment of grave diggers; and then blush that you have characterized as a heavy crime a manfully con-

fessed act of self-defense on the part of the Germans, the temporary occupation of Belgium! Blush that you have forgotten the Russian Moloch now loosed upon us, drunk with the blood and tears of alien peoples as well as of its own children! That you have forgotten all that, in order to lament over buildings which we have been forced in self-defense—again in self-defense—to sacrifice! And blush for those of your people who have become accomplices of that Moloch! Those who are sinning against the Holy Ghost of Europe, in order to attempt belated vengeance against Germany! Do you know what the ancients, the very Greeks and Romans from whom you have drawn your blood and temperament, called that sin? Blood-guiltiness is the name of that horror. And do you know how it is atoned for? I shrink to ask further, yea, even to think further; for horror falls upon me, and I see the unspeakable.

Today, battling against you allies of the swarms of Muscovites, we Europeans are battling also for that France which you are threatening—you, not we!

German Intellectuals "All Afire"

Yes, Romain Rolland, try, Frenchman that you are, to look into the mysteries of the time. Ask yourself, marvel, how it comes to pass that we, the intellectuals among the Germans, take part without exception in this dreadful war; take part with body and soul. None of us ambitious, none of us a politician, not one of us who, till this war, busied himself about anything except his idea, the Palladium of his life! And now we are all afire, with all our hearts, with our whole people, all full of determination and prepared for the last. All our youth in the field, every man among us thrilled with faith in our God and this battle of our God, every man among us conscious of the sacred necessity that has driven us, every man among us consecrated for timely death! Are these incendiaries? Are these slaves, whom a despot points the way to the rolling dead? Every one knows it is our all that is at stake; it is

a matter of the divine in humanity, a matter of our preservation and that of Europe.

And so we stand amid death and ruins under the star—one federation, one

single union. This I have had to tell you, whether you will listen to it, whether Europe has ears to hear it, or not. From now on, may our deeds be our words!

Are We Barbarians?

By Gerhart Hauptmann

The idea of cosmopolitanism has never taken deeper root anywhere than in Germany. Let any person reflect about our literary translations and then name a nation that has tried so honestly as we to do justice to the spirit and the feelings of other races, to understand their inmost soul in all good-will.

I must out with it: We had and have no hatred against France; we have idolized the fine arts, the sculpture and painting and the literature of that country. The worldwide appreciation of Rodin had its origin in Germany—we esteem Anatole France, Maupassant, Flaubert, Balzac, as if they were German authors. We have a deep affection for the people of South France. We find passionate admirers of Mistral in small German towns, in alleys, in attics. It was deeply to be regretted that Germany and France could not be friends politically. They ought to have been, because they were joint trustees of the intellectual treasures of the Continent, because they are two of the great cultivated nations of Europe. But fate has willed it otherwise.

In the year 1870 the German races fought for the union of the Germans and the German Empire. Owing to the success of this struggle Germany has enjoyed an era of peace for more than forty years. A time of budding, growing, becoming strong, flowering, and bearing fruit, without parallel in history. Out of a population, growing more and more numerous, an ever-increasing number of individuals have been formed. Individual energy and a general tendency to expand led to the great achievements of our industry, our

commerce, and our trade. I do not think that any American, Englishman, Frenchman, or Italian when in a German family, in German towns, in German hotels, on German ships, in German concerts, in German theatres, at Baireuth, in German libraries, or in German museums, ever felt as if he were among "barbarians." We visited other countries and kept an open door for every stranger.

English Relations

It is with pain and with bitterness that I speak the word England. I am one of those barbarians on whom the English University of Oxford conferred the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa. "I have friends in England who stand with one foot on the intellectual soil of Germany. Haldane, formerly English Minister of War, and with him countless other Englishmen, made regular pilgrimages to the little barbarous town of Weimar, where the barbarians Goethe, Schiller, Herder, Wieland, and others have created another world for humanity. We have a poet, whose plays, more than those of any other German poet, have become national property; his name is Shakespeare. This Shakespeare is, at the same time, the prince of English poets. The mother of our Emperor is an Englishwoman, the wife of the King of England a German, and yet this nation, so closely related by blood and choice, has declared war against us. Why? Heaven only knows. This much, however, is certain, that the now beginning European concert, saturated with blood, as it is, has an English statesman for its impresario and its conductor. It is doubtful, however, whether the finale of this terrible music will find the same conductor at

the stand. "My cousin, you did not mean well either with yourselves or with us when your tools threw the fire-brand into our dwellings!"

If heaven wills that we should issue regenerated from this terrible trial, we shall have the sacred duty of showing ourselves worthy of our regeneration. By the complete victory of German arms the independence of Europe would be secured. It would be necessary to make it clear to the different nations of Europe that this war must be the last between themselves. They must see at last that their sanguinary duels only bring a shameful advantage to the one who, without taking part in them, is their originator. Then they must devote themselves mutually to the work of civilization and peace, which will then make misunderstandings impossible.

In this direction much had already been done before the war began. The different nations had already met in peaceful emulation and were to meet again at Berlin for the Olympian games. It is only necessary to recall the aeronautic races, the boat races, the horse races, and the beneficial international influence of the arts and sciences, and the great super-national Nobel Prizes. The barbarian Germany has, as is well known, led the way among the other nations with her great institutions for social reform. A victory would oblige us to go forward on this path and to make the blessings of such institutions general. Our victory would, furthermore, secure the future existence of the Teutonic race for the welfare of the world. During the last decade, for example, how fruitful has the Scandinavian literature been

for the German, and, vice versa, the German for the Scandinavian. How many Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes have lately, without feeling conscious of a drop of foreign blood, shaken hands with German brothers in Stockholm, Christiania, Copenhagen, Munich, Vienna, and Berlin. How much homely good-fellowship has grown up around the noble names of Ibsen, Björnson, and Strindberg.

Faust and Rifles

I hear that abroad an enormous number of lying tales are being fabricated to the detriment of our honor, our culture, and our strength. Well, those who create these idle tales should reflect that the momentous hour is not favorable for fiction. On three frontiers our own blood bears witness. I myself have sent out two of my sons. All our intrepid German soldiers know why they are going to war. There are no analphabets to be found among them; all the more, however, of those who, besides their rifle, have their Goethe's "Faust," their "Zarathustra," a work of Schopenhauer's, the Bible, or their Homer in their knapsacks. And even those who have no book in the knapsack know that they are fighting for a hearth at which every guest is welcome.

On the frontier stands our blood testimony; the Socialist side by side with the bourgeois, the peasant beside the man of learning, the Prince beside the workman; and they all fight for German freedom, for German domestic life, for German art, German science, German progress; they fight with the full, clear consciousness of a noble and rich national possession, for internal and external goods, all of which serve for the general progress and development of mankind.

To Americans From a German Friend

By Ludwig Fulda

Like most of the champions of Germany in the literary field, Ludwig Fulda is a Doctor of Philosophy. He is also author of many famous poetical and prose works of fiction.

Many things have been revealed to us by this war that even the keenest-minded among us would have declared immediately before its outbreak to be impossibilities. Nothing, however, has been a greater and more painful surprise to Germans than the position taken by a great part of the American press. There is nothing that we would have suspected less than that within the one neutral nation with which we felt ourselves most closely connected, both by common interests and by common ideals, voices would be raised that in the hour of our greatest danger would deny us their sympathy, yes, even their comprehension of our course.

To me, personally—I cannot avoid saying it—this was a very bitter disappointment. A year has hardly passed since I was over there the second time as a guest and returned strengthened in my admiration for that great, upward striving community. In my book, “Amerikanische Eindrücke,” (“American Impressions,”) a new edition of which has just appeared in a considerably supplemented form, comprising the fruits of that trip, I have made every effort to place before my countrymen in the brightest light the advantages and superiorities of Americans, and especially to convince them that the so-called land of the dollar was not only economically but also mentally and spiritually striding upward irresistibly; that also in the longing and effort to obtain education and knowledge and in the valuation of all the higher things in life, it was not surpassed by any other country in the world. In the entire book there is not a page that is not filled with the confidence that for these very reasons America and Ger-

many were called upon to march hand in hand at the head of cultured humanity. Is this belief now to be contradicted? Shall I as a German no longer be permitted to call myself a friend of America because over there they think the worst of us for the reason that we, attacked in dastardly wise by a world of foes, are struggling with unanimous determination for our existence?

Guillotining German Honor

Of course I know very well that public opinion over there has largely been misled by our opponents and is continuously being misled. Did not the English at the very beginning of the war cut our cable, in order to be able to guillotine our honor without the least interference? For this reason I cannot blame the masses if they took for truth the absurd fables dished out to them, when no contradicting voice could reach them. Less than that, however, can I understand how educated beings, even men who, thanks to their gifts and their standing, play the part of responsible leaders, not only accepted believingly these prevarications and distortions, but, with them as a basis, immediately rendered a verdict against us. For he who publicly judges must be expected to have heard first both parties; and whoever is not in a position to do this must in decency be expected to postpone his verdict. Yes, even more than that, one should think that the sense of justice of every non-partisan must be violated if the one party is absolutely muzzled by the other, and even for this one reason the cause of the latter must be considered as not being free from reason for doubt. Furthermore, one should assume that he who once has been unmasked as a liar therewith should have lost the blind confidence of the impartial in his future assertions. In spite of this, although the first ridiculous news

of German defeats and internal dissent could not withstand the far-sounding echo of facts, there still seems to be no twisting of the truth, no defamation, which over there is considered as too thin and too ridiculous by the press and as too shameless by the public.

Should the Germans, who, since the time when they fought for and attained their national unity, have exclusively devoted themselves to works of peace and culture, suddenly have been transformed into an adventurous, booty-hungry horde which from mere lust challenged a tremendously superior force to do battle? Should they suddenly have sacrificed to their so-called militarism all their other efforts in commerce, industry, art, and science, in order to risk their very existence for the love of this Moloch? Do you believe that, Americans?

Question of Militarism

Our militarism! What does this expression, quoted until it is sickening, mean in the mouth of enemies who in respect of the energy and extent of their armaments were not behind us? Is there no such thing as militarism in France and in Russia? Is the English giant fleet an instrument of peace? Was the Triple Entente founded in order to bring about the millennium on earth? Would the Entente, if we had been foolish enough to disarm, have guaranteed our possessions as a reward for being good? Do you believe that, Americans?

It certainly may be difficult for the citizens of the Union—happy beings they are for it—to put themselves in the place of a nation that knows it is surrounded on its open borders by jealous, hateful, and greedy neighbors; of a country that for centuries has been the battlefield of all European wars, the place of strife of all the European peoples. They, the members of a nation which for itself occupies a space nearly as large as Europe, almost half of a continent, protected on both sides by the ocean and on the other borders not seriously threatened for as long a time to come as may be anticipated, have no people's army because they do not need any; and yet they would—their history proves it—give their

blood and that of their sons for the cause of their nation just as gladly as we, if the necessity for doing so came to them. Will they, therefore, reproach us for loving our country not less than they do theirs, only for the reason that we have a thousand times more difficulty in protecting it?

Our general military service, which today is being defamed by the word "militarism," is born of the iron commandment of self-preservation. Without it the German Empire and the German Nation long ago would have been struck out of the list of the living. Only lack of knowledge or intentional misconception of our character could accuse us of having an aggressive motive back of it. On earth there is no more peaceful nation than Germany, providing she be left in peace and her room to breathe be not lessened. Germany never has had the least thought of assuming for herself the European hegemony, much less the rulership of the world. She has never greedily eyed colonial possessions of other great powers. On the contrary, in the acquisition of her colonies she was satisfied with whatever the others had left for her. And least of all did she carry up her sleeve a desire of extending the frontiers of the empire. The famous word of Bismarck, that Germany was "saturated" with acquired territory, is still accepted as fully in force to such an extent that even in case of her victory the question as to which parts of the enemies' territory we should claim for our own would cause us a great deal of perplexity. The German Empire could only lose as the national State she is in strength and unity by acquiring new and strange elements.

Otherwise would the empire, from the day of its founding until now, for nearly half a century, actually have avoided every war, often enough under the most difficult circumstances? Would it have quietly suffered the open or hidden challenges, the machinations of its enemies constantly appearing more plainly? Yes, would it have tried again and again to improve its relations with these very same enemies by the greatest ad-

vances? As opposed to the ill-concealed hostility of the French, would it not have been shaken in its steadfast policy of conciliation by the fact that this policy with them only made the impression of weakness and fear? Would it have permitted France to reconstruct her power which was destroyed in 1870 to a greater extent than before, and, in addition, allowed her to conquer a new and gigantic colonial empire? Would it have permitted prostrate Russia to recuperate undisturbed from the almost annihilating blows of the revolution and the Japanese war? Would it, in the countless threatening conflicts of the last decades, have on every occasion thrown the entire weight of its sword into the scales for the preservation of peace?

The Kaiser's Responsibility

Then, too, many Americans emphasize the fact that they are making not the German people but the Emperor alone responsible for this war. It is hardly conceivable how serious-minded people can lend themselves to the spreading of a fable so childish. When William II., 29 years old, mounted the throne, the entire world said of him that his aim was the acquirement of the laurels of war. In spite of this for twenty-six years he has shown that this accusation was absurd and has proved himself to be the most honest and most dependable protector of European peace. In fact, the very circle of enemies which now dares to call him a military despot thirsting for glory, has year in and year out ridiculed him as a ruler, whose provocation to the very limit was an amusement absolutely fraught with no danger. He who has never been misled by the fiery enthusiasm of youth nor by the full strength of ripe manhood to adorn his brow with the bloody halo of glory, should he suddenly, when his hair is turned gray, have turned into a Caesar, an Attila? Do you believe that, Americans?

It is a fact in times of peace there have been certain differences of opinion between the Emperor and his people. Although at all times the honesty of his intentions was elevated above every doubt, the one or other impulsive moves

he took to obtain their realization exposed him to criticism at home. Today one may safely admit that—today, when of these trifling disputes not even a breath, not even a shadow, remains. Never before has his whole people, his whole nation, in every grade of education, in all classes, in all parties, stood behind him so absolutely without reserve as now, when in the last, the very last hour, and driven by direst need, he finally drew the sword to ward off an attack from three sides, long ago prepared.

Our nation and our Emperor have not wanted this war and are not to be blamed for it. Even the "White Book" of the German Government, by the very uncontrovertible language of its documents, must convince every impartial being of this fact. And day by day the overwhelming evidence of the plot systematically hatched and systematically carried out under the guidance of England, which put before us the alternative of cutting our way through or being annihilated, is increasing.

No Treason to Austria Considered

It may be that the catastrophe, so far as we are concerned, might have been staved off once more if we would have disregarded the obligation of our alliance and would have left Austria in the lurch—the Austria which did not want anything else than to put a stop to the nasty work of a band of assassins organized by a neighboring State. But it requires an extreme degree of political blindness for the assumption that by such cowardly treason we should have been able to purchase a change of mind or a lasting peace from our enemies. On the contrary, they would soon enough have used a suitable opportunity to fall upon Germany, which then would have been completely isolated, and the struggle for our national existence would have had to be fought under conditions very much more favorable to our enemies.

According to a newspaper report, the esteemed President Eliot of Harvard has written that the fear of the Museovites could not explain our action, and that an alliance with the Western powers would

have offered better protection against a Russian attack. Yes, if such a thing had been possible! As a matter of fact, however, the Western powers did not ally themselves with us against Russia, but with Russia against us; and not the fear of the Muscovites, but their mobilization, encouraged and aided by the very same Western powers, drove us to war. I wonder what President Eliot himself would have done under these circumstances had he been the guardian responsible for Germany's fate?

Belgium's Alleged Neutrality

But then the violation of Belgian neutrality! How with the aid of this bug-aboo the entire neutral world has been stirred up against us, after England made it the hypocritical excuse for her declaration of war! We knew very well that England and France were determined to violate this neutrality; but, then, we ought to have been very good; we ought to have waited until they did so. Waited until their armies would break into our country across our unprotected Belgian frontier! In other words, we ought to have committed national suicide. Whoever, even up until now, has doubted the German assertion that Belgium was under one roof with England and France, and had herself thrown away her neutrality, must have his eyes opened by the latest official developments. The documents of the Belgian General Staff which have fallen into our hands contain an agreement according to which the march through Belgium of British troops in the case of a Franco-German war was provided for in every detail. Whosoever in the face of these documents repeats the assertion that we have committed a violation of innocent Belgium gives aid to a historical forgery.

We have violated the alleged neutrality of Belgium in self-defense. On the other hand, the Japanese, egged on and supported by England, have violated the real neutrality of China from pure lust for robbery. For the three great powers allied against Germany and Austria have not been satisfied with their own nominal superiority of 220 millions

against 110 millions! In addition to this they have urged on into war against us a Mongolian people, the most dangerous enemy of the white race and its culture. They have supplemented their armies by a motley collection of all the African negro tribes. They lead into battle against us Indian troops, and the Christian Germanic King of England prays to God for the victory of the heathen Hindus over his coreligionists and blood relatives. Americans, does your racial feeling, at other times so sensitive, remain silent in view of this unexampled shame? Do you accord to the English and the French, who are attacking us in co-operation with the Russians, the Serbians, and the Montenegrins, who are dirtying themselves with a brotherhood in arms with the yellow skins, the brown skins, and the blacks, the right to declare themselves the representatives of civilization and us to be barbarians?

In order to drive home such evident absurdities, they were, of course, obliged to carry on the poisoning of the spring of information to the utmost, they had to suppress the news of the vile deeds of guerrillas and "snipers" in Belgium and of the Russian ghouls in East Prussia, that were crying to heaven, and to send out into the world instead fables of German brutality. Our national army, permeated with ethical seriousness and iron discipline, the scientist standing beside the farmer, the workman beside the artist, should be guilty of unnecessary severity, uncontrollable brutality, brutality against people unable to defend themselves? Do you believe that, Americans?

The Charge of Vandalism

The climax of absurdity, however, is reached when the Germans, who in their love and appreciation of art are not surpassed by any people in the world, are accused of having raged as vandals against works of art. Even now these accusations, which the French Government itself had the pitiful courage to support, have proved totally groundless. The City Hall at Louvain stands uninjured; while the populace fired at them, our soldiers had, risking their own lives,

saved it from the flames. An imperial art commission followed at the heels of our victorious troops in Belgium, in order to take charge of the guarding and administration of the treasures of art. The cathedral at Rheims has received but slight damage, and would not have been damaged at all had its tower not been misused by the French as an observation station. I should like to see the commander of an army who, for the sake of the safety of a historical monument, would forget the safety of the troops intrusted to his care!

Enough of it! What I have stated is sufficient to show what low weapons our enemies are using behind the battlefield to sully Germany's shield of honor. It is enough for those who care to listen at all. But, also, wherever the weak voice of one rebounds from ears stubbornly closed, the more powerful voice of truth eventually will force a more just verdict.

Justice—that is all that we expect from America. We respect its neutrality; we do not ask from it an ideal partisanship for our benefit. If it does not have for us the sympathy which we have already extended to it and, after a century and a half of unclouded intercourse between the two nations, have anticipated there, then we cannot imbue it with that spirit by reasoning. Furthermore, in the existence of nations sympathy is not the deciding factor, and every nation should be rebuked which out of regard for sympathy would in decisive matters act against its own interests. But just for that very reason one more question must be raised. In the present conflict, which momentarily almost splits the entire

world into two camps, where do the interests of America lie?

That they are not lying on the side of Russia probably is self-evident. No free American can find desirable a further extension of the Russian world empire and of Russian despotism at the expense of Germany. But how about a country from which once America had to wrest its own liberty in bloody battle? How about England? Where, if England should succeed in downing Germany, would her eyes next be pointed? Has she not herself admitted that she is making war on us principally because she sees in us an uncomfortable competitor in trade? And which competitor would be the next one after us that would become awkward to the trust on the Thames? Yes, have they not already hauled off for the smash against America, when Japan is given opportunity to increase her power—the same Japan with whom America sooner or later will be bound to have an accounting and whose victory over us would make that accounting a great deal more difficult for the United States?

Germany's fate certainly does not depend upon the friendly or unfriendly feeling of America. It will be decided solely upon the European battlefields. But because we are looking out from the night to a future dawn, because in the midst of our national need the cause of humanity is close to our heart, for these reasons it is not immaterial to us how the greatest neutral nation of culture thinks of us. Americans, the cable between us has been cut. It is our wish and our hope that the stronger band that unites American ideals with German ideals shall not also be cut.

To the Civilized World

By Professors of Germany

As representatives of German science and art, we hereby protest to the civilized world against the lies and calumnies with which our enemies are endeavoring to stain the honor of Germany in her hard struggle for existence—in a struggle which has been forced upon her.

The iron mouth of events has proved the untruth of the fictitious German defeats, consequently misrepresentation and calumny are all the more eagerly at work. As heralds of truth we raise our voices against these.

It is not true that Germany is guilty of having caused this war. Neither the people, the Government, nor the Kaiser wanted war. Germany did her utmost to prevent it; for this assertion the world has documental proof. Often enough during the twenty-six years of his reign has Wilhelm II. shown himself to be the upholder of peace, and often enough has this fact been acknowledged by our opponents. Nay, even the Kaiser they now dare to call an Attila has been ridiculed by them for years, because of his steadfast endeavors to maintain universal peace. Not till a numerical superiority which had been lying in wait on the frontiers assailed us did the whole nation rise to a man.

It is not true that we trespassed in neutral Belgium. It has been proved that France and England had resolved on such a trespass, and it has likewise been proved that Belgium had agreed to their doing so. It would have been suicide on our part not to have been beforehand.

It is not true that the life and property of a single Belgian citizen was injured by our soldiers without the bitterest self-defense having made it necessary; for again and again, notwithstanding repeated threats, the citizens lay in ambush, shooting at the troops out of the houses,

mutilating the wounded, and murdering in cold blood the medical men while they were doing their Samaritan work. There can be no baser abuse than the suppression of these crimes with the view of letting the Germans appear to be criminals, only for having justly punished these assassins for their wicked deeds.

It is not true that our troops treated Louvain brutally. Furious inhabitants having treacherously fallen upon them in their quarters, our troops with aching hearts were obliged to fire a part of the town as a punishment. The greatest part of Louvain has been preserved. The famous Town Hall stands quite intact; for at great self-sacrifice our soldiers saved it from destruction by the flames. Every German would of course greatly regret if in the course of this terrible war any works of art should already have been destroyed or be destroyed at some future time, but inasmuch as in our great love for art we cannot be surpassed by any other nation, in the same degree we must decidedly refuse to buy a German defeat at the cost of saving a work of art.

It is not true that our warfare pays no respect to international laws. It knows no indiscriminate cruelty. But in the east the earth is saturated with the blood of women and children unmercifully butchered by the wild Russian troops, and in the west dum-dum bullets mutilate the breasts of our soldiers. Those who have allied themselves with Russians and Serbians, and present such a shameful scene to the world as that of inciting Mongolians and negroes against the white race, have no right whatever to call themselves upholders of civilization.

It is not true that the combat against our so-called militarism is not a combat against our civilization, as our enemies hypocritically pretend it is. Were it not

for German militarism German civilization would long since have been extirpated. For its protection it arose in a land which for centuries had been plagued by bands of robbers as no other land had been. The German Army and the German people are one, and today this consciousness fraternizes 70,000,000 of Germans, all ranks, positions, and parties being one.

We cannot wrest the poisonous weapon—the lie—out of the hands of our enemies. All we can do is to proclaim

to all the world that our enemies are giving false witness against us. You, who know us, who with us have protected the most holy possessions of man, we call to you:

Have faith in us! Believe that we shall carry on this war to the end as a civilized nation, to whom the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant is just as sacred as its own hearths and homes.

For this we pledge you our names and our honor:

ADOLF VON BAEYER, Professor of Chemistry, Munich.

Prof. PETER BEHRENS, Berlin.

EMIL VON BEHRING, Professor of Medicine, Marburg.

WILHELM VON BODE, General Director of the Royal Museums, Berlin.

ALOIS BRANDL, Professor, President of the Shakespeare Society, Berlin.

LUJU BRENTANO, Professor of National Economy, Munich.

Prof. JUSTUS BRINKMANN, Museum Director, Hamburg.

JOHANNES CONRAD, Professor of National Economy, Halle.

FRANZ VON DEFREGGER, Munich.

RICHARD DEHMEL, Hamburg.

ADOLF DEITZMANN, Professor of Theology, Berlin.

Prof. WILHELM DOERPFELD, Berlin.

FRIEDRICH VON DUHN, Professor of Archaeology, Heidelberg.

Prof. PAUL EHRLICH, Frankfurt on the Main.

ALBERT EHRRHARD, Professor of Roman Catholic Theology, Strassburg.

KARL ENGLER, Professor of Chemistry, Karlsruhe.

GERHARD ESSER, Professor of Roman Catholic Theology, Bonn.

RUDOLF EUCKEN, Professor of Philosophy, Jena.

HERBERT EULENBERG, Kaiserswerth.

HEINRICH FINKE, Professor of History, Freiburg.

EMIL FISCHER, Professor of Chemistry, Berlin.

WILHELM FOERSTER, Professor of Astronomy, Berlin.

LUDWIG FULDA, Berlin.

EDUARD VON GEBHARDT, Düsseldorf.

J. J. DE GROOT, Professor of Ethnography, Berlin.

FRITZ HABER, Professor of Chemistry, Berlin.

ERNST HAECKEL, Professor of Zoology, Jena.

MAX HALBE, Munich.

Prof. ADOLF VON HARNACK, General Director of the Royal Library, Berlin.

GERHART HAUPTMANN, Agnetendorf.

KARL HAUPTMANN, Schreiberhau.

GUSTAV HELLMANN, Professor of Meteorology, Berlin.

WILHELM HERRMANN, Professor of Protestant Theology, Marburg.

ANDREAS HEUSLER, Professor of Northern Philology, Berlin.

ADOLF VON HILDEBRAND, Munich.

LUDWIG HOFFMANN, City Architect, Berlin.

ENGELBERT HUMPERDINCK, Berlin.

LEOPOLD GRAF KALCKREUTH, President of the German Confederation of Artists, Eddelsen.

ARTHUR KAMPE, Berlin.

FRITZ AUG. VON KAULBACH, Munich.

THEODOR KIPP, Professor of Jurisprudence, Berlin.

FELIX KLEIN, Professor of Mathematics, Goettingen.

MAX KLINGER, Leipzig.

ALOIS KNOEPFLER, Professor of History of Art, Munich.

ANTON KOCH, Professor of Roman Catholic Theology, Münster.

PAUL LABAND, Professor of Jurisprudence, Strassburg.

KARL LEMPRECHT, Professor of History, Leipzig.

PHILIPP LENARD, Professor of Physics, Heidelberg.

MAX LENZ, Professor of History, Hamburg.

MAX LIEBERMANN, Berlin.

FRANZ VON LISZT, Professor of Jurisprudence, Berlin.

LUDWIG MANZEL, President of the Academy of Arts, Berlin.

JOSEF MAUSBACH, Professor of Roman Catholic Theology, Münster.

GEORG VON MAYR, Professor of Political Sciences, Munich.

SEBASTIAN MERKLE, Professor of Roman Catholic Theology, Würzburg.

EDUARD MEYER, Professor of History, Berlin.

HEINRICH MORF, Professor of Roman Philology, Berlin.

FRIEDRICH NAUMANN, Berlin.

ALBERT NEISSER, Professor of Medicine, Breslau.

- WALTER NERNST, Professor of Physics, Berlin.
- WILHELM OSTWALD, Professor of Chemistry, Leipzig.
- BRUNO PAUL, Director of School for Applied Arts, Berlin.
- MAX PLANCK, Professor of Physics, Berlin.
- ALBERT PLEHN, Professor of Medicine, Berlin.
- GEORG REICKE, Berlin.
- Prof. MAX REINHARDT, Director of the German Theatre, Berlin.
- ALOIS RIEHL, Professor of Philosophy, Berlin.
- KARL ROBERT, Professor of Archaeology, Halle.
- WILHELM ROENTGEN, Professor of Physics, Munich.
- MAX RUBNER, Professor of Medicine, Berlin.
- FRITZ SCHAPER, Berlin.
- ADOLF VON SCHLATTER, Professor of Protestant Theology, Tübingen.
- AUGUST SCHMIDLIN, Professor of Sacred History, Münster.
- GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, Professor of National Economy, Berlin.
- FRANZ VON STUCK, Munich.
- REINHOLD SEEBERG, Professor of Protestant Theology, Berlin.
- MARTIN SPAHN, Professor of History, Strassburg.
- HERMANN SUDERMANN, Berlin.
- HANS THOMA, Karlsruhe.
- WILHELM TRUEBNER, Karlsruhe.
- KARL VOLLMOELLER, Stuttgart.
- RICHARD VOTZ, Berchtesgaden.
- KARL VOTZLER, Professor of Roman Philology, Munich.
- SIEGFRIED WAGNER, Baireuth.
- WILHELM WALDEYER, Professor of Anatomy, Berlin.
- AUGUST VON WASSERMANN, Professor of Medicine, Berlin.
- FELIX VON WEINGARTNER.
- THEODOR WIEGAND, Museum Director, Berlin.
- WILHELM WIEN, Professor of Physics, Wurzburg.
- ULRICH VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLEN-DORFF, Professor of Philology, Berlin.
- RICHARD WILLSTAETTER, Professor of Chemistry, Berlin.
- WILHELM WINDELBAND, Professor of Philosophy, Heidelberg.
- WILHELM WUNDT, Professor of Philosophy, Leipzig.

Appeal of the German Universities

The campaign of systematic lies and slander which has been carried on against the German people and empire for years has since the outbreak of the war surpassed everything with which one might have credited even the most unscrupulous press. To repudiate any charges raised against our Kaiser and his Government rests with the authorities in question. They have done so, and their defense is substantiated by striking proofs. He who wants to know the truth can learn it, and we trust that truth will prevail. But if we are to look on, when our enemies, guided by envy and malice, are shameless enough to charge our army and with it our whole nation with barbarous atrocities and senseless vandalism, and when their statements appear to be believed, to a certain extent, among neutrals and in places which, at other times, were well disposed toward us; if we are quietly to look on when all this happens, we, the appointed trustees of culture and education in our Fatherland, feel in duty bound to break the

reserve which our calling and position impose on us with a strong expression of protest. Hence we now appeal to the learned bodies with whom we hitherto worked in common in the interests of the highest ideals of the human race and with whom, even at this time, when hatred and passion rule the world and confuse the minds of men, we hope to remain of the same mind, in the same service of truth. We appeal to them in the confident belief that our voice will find hearing, and that the expression of our honest indignation will meet with credence. Moreover, we appeal to the love of truth and to the sense of justice of the many thousands all over the world who, being welcome guests in our educational institutions, have taken part in the inheritance of German culture, and who thus have had an opportunity of watching and appreciating the German people in peaceful labor, their industry and uprightness, their sense of order and discipline, their reverence for intellectual work of every kind,

and their profound love for science and arts. All of you who know that our army is no mercenary host but embraces the entire nation from first to last, that it is led by the country's best sons, and that, at this very hour, thousands from our midst, teachers as well as students, are shedding their life's blood as officers and soldiers on the battlefields of Russia and France; you who have seen and heard for yourselves in what spirit and with what success our youths are treated and taught, and that nothing is stamped upon their minds more deeply than reverence and admiration for artistic, scientific and technical creations of the human mind, no matter what country and nation brought them forth; we call upon you who know all this as witnesses, whether it can be true what our enemies report that the German Army is a horde of barbarians and a band of incendiaries who take pleasure in leveling defenseless cities to the ground and in destroying venerable monuments of history and art. If you wish to pay honor to the cause of truth you will be as firmly convinced as we are that German troops, wherever they had to do destructive work, could only have done so in the bitterness of defensive warfare. But we appeal to all those whom the slanderous reports of our enemies reach and who are

not yet altogether blinded by passion, in the name of truth and justice, to shut their ears to such insults to the German people, and not allow themselves to be prejudiced by those who prove ever anew that they hope to be victorious by the instrumentality of lies. Now, if in this fearful war, in which our nation is compelled to fight not only for its power, but for its very existence and its entire civilization, the work of destruction should be greater than in former wars, and if many a precious achievement of culture falls to ruin, the responsibility for all this entirely rests with those who were not content with letting loose this ruthless war, nay, who did not even shrink from pressing murderous weapons upon a peaceful population for them to fall surreptitiously upon our troops who trusted in the observance of the military usages of all civilized peoples. They alone are the guilty authors of everything which happens here. Upon their heads the verdict of history will fall for the lasting injury which culture suffers.

September, 1914.

UNIVERSITIES

Tuebingen, Berlin, Bonn, Breslau, Erlangen, Frankfurt, Freiburg, Giessen, Goettingen, Greifswald, Halle, Heidelberg, Jena, Kiel, Königsberg, Leipzig, Marburg, München, Münster, Rostock, Strassburg, Wuerzburg.

Reply to the German Professors

By British Scholars

We see with regret the names of many German professors and men of science, whom we regard with respect and, in some cases, with personal friendship, appended to a denunciation of Great Britain so utterly baseless that we can hardly believe that it expresses their spontaneous or considered opinion. We do not question for a moment their personal sincerity when they express their horror of war and their zeal for "the achievements of culture." Yet we are

bound to point out that a very different view of war, and of national aggrandizement based on the threat of war, has been advocated by such influential writers as Nietzsche, von Treitschke, von Bülow, and von Bernhardi, and has received widespread support from the press and from public opinion in Germany. This has not occurred, and in our judgment would scarcely be possible, in any other civilized country. We must also remark that it is German armies alone which

have, at the present time, deliberately destroyed or bombarded such monuments of human culture as the Library at Louvain and the Cathedrals at Rheims and Malines.

The Diplomatic Papers

No doubt it is hard for human beings to weigh justly their country's quarrels; perhaps particularly hard for Germans, who have been reared in an atmosphere of devotion to their Kaiser and his army; who are feeling acutely at the present hour, and who live under a Government which, we believe, does not allow them to know the truth. Yet it is the duty of learned men to make sure of their facts. The German "White Book" contains only some scanty and carefully explained selections from the diplomatic correspondence which preceded this war. And we venture to hope that our German colleagues will sooner or later do their best to get access to the full correspondence, and will form therefrom an independent judgment.

They will then see that, from the issue of the Austrian note to Serbia onward, Great Britain, whom they accuse of causing this war, strove incessantly for peace. Her successive proposals were supported by France, Russia, and Italy, but, unfortunately, not by the one power which could by a single word at Vienna have made peace certain. Germany, in her own official defense—incomplete as that document is—does not pretend that she strove for peace; she only strove for "the localization of the conflict." She claimed that Austria should be left free to "chastise" Serbia in whatever way she chose. At most she proposed that Austria should not annex a portion of Servian territory—a futile provision, since the execution of Austria's demand would have made the whole of Serbia subject to her will.

Great Britain, like the rest of Europe, recognized that, whatever just grounds of complaint Austria may have had, the unprecedented terms of her note to Serbia constituted a challenge to Russia and a provocation to war. The Austrian Emperor in his proclamation admitted

that war was likely to ensue. The German "White Book" states in so many words: "We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field and therefore involve us in war. * * * We could not, however, * * * advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity." The German Government admits having known the tenor of the Austrian note beforehand, when it was concealed from all the other powers; admits backing it up after it was issued; admits that it knew the note was likely to precipitate war; and admits that, whatever professions it made to the other powers, in private it did not advise Austria to abate one jot of her demands. This, to our minds, is tantamount to admitting that Germany has, together with her unfortunate ally, deliberately provoked the present war.

One point we freely admit. Germany would very likely have preferred not to fight Great Britain at this moment. She would have preferred to weaken and humiliate Russia; to make Serbia a dependent of Austria; to render France innocuous and Belgium subservient; and then, having established an overwhelming advantage, to settle accounts with Great Britain. Her grievance against us is that we did not allow her to do this.

Britain's Love of Peace

So deeply rooted is Great Britain's love of peace, so influential among us are those who have labored through many difficult years to promote good feeling between this country and Germany, that, in spite of our ties of friendship with France, in spite of the manifest danger threatening ourselves, there was still, up to the last moment, a strong desire to preserve British neutrality, if it could be preserved without dishonor. But Germany herself made this impossible.

Great Britain, together with France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, had solemnly guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. In the preservation of this neutrality our deepest sentiments and our most vital interests are alike involved. Its violation would not only shatter the

independence of Belgium itself: it would undermine the whole basis which renders possible the neutrality of any State and the very existence of such States as are much weaker than their neighbors. We acted in 1914 just as we acted in 1870. We sought from both France and Germany assurances that they would respect Belgian neutrality. In 1870 both powers assured us of their good intentions, and both kept their promises. In 1914 France gave immediately, on July 31, the required assurance; Germany refused to answer. When, after this sinister silence, Germany proceeded to break under our eyes the treaty which we and she had both signed, evidently expecting Great Britain to be her timid accomplice, then even to the most peace-loving Englishman hesitation became impossible. Belgium had appealed to Great Britain to keep her word, and she kept it.

The German professors appear to think that Germany has in this matter some considerable body of sympathizers in the universities of Great Britain. They are gravely mistaken. Never within our lifetime has this country been so united on any great political issue. We ourselves have a real and deep admiration for German scholarship and science. We have many ties with Germany, ties of comradeship, of respect, and of affection. We grieve profoundly that, under the baleful influence of a military system and its lawless dreams of conquest, she whom we once honored now stands revealed as the common enemy of Europe and of all peoples which respect the law of nations. We must carry on the war on which we have entered. For us, as for Belgium, it is a war of defense, waged for liberty and peace.

Sir CLIFFORD ALLBUTT, Regius Professor of Physics, Cambridge.

T. W. ALLEN, Reader in Greek, Oxford.

E. ARMSTRONG, Pro-Provost of Queen's College, Oxford.

E. V. ARNOLD, Professor of Latin, University College of North Wales.

Sir C. B. BALL, Regius Professor of Surgery, Dublin.

Sir THOMAS BARLOW, President of the Royal College of Physicians, London.

BERNARD BOSANQUET, formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy, St. Andrews.

A. C. BRADLEY, formerly Professor of Poetry, Oxford.

W. H. BRAGG, Cavendish Professor of Physics, Leeds.

Sir THOMAS BROCK, Membre d'honneur de la Sociétés des Artistes Français.

A. J. BROWN, Professor of Biology and Chemistry of Fermentation, University of Birmingham.

JOHN BURNET, Professor of Greek, St. Andrews.

J. B. EURY, Regius Professor of Modern History, Cambridge.

Sir W. W. CHEYNE, Professor of Clinical Surgery, King's College, London, President of the Royal College of Surgeons.

J. NORMAN COLLIE, Professor of Organic Chemistry and Director of the Chemical Laboratories, University College, London.

F. C. CONYBEARE, Honorary Fellow of University College, Oxford.

Sir HENRY CRAIK, M. P. for Glasgow and Aberdeen Universities.

Sir JAMES CRICHTON-BROWNE, Vice President and Treasurer, Royal Institution.

Sir WILLIAM CROOKES, President of the Royal Society.

Sir FOSTER CUNLIFFE, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.

Sir FRANCIS DARWIN, late Reader in Botany, Cambridge.

A. V. DICEY, Fellow of All Souls College and formerly Vinerian Professor of English Law, Oxford.

Sir S. DILL, Hon. Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

Sir JAMES DONALDSON, Vice Chancellor and Principal of the University of St. Andrews.

F. W. DYSON, Astronomer Royal.

Sir EDWARD ELGAR.

Sir ARTHUR EVANS, Extraordinary Professor of Prehistoric Archaeology, Oxford.

L. R. FARNELL, Rector of Exeter College, Oxford.

C. H. FIRTH, Regius Professor of Modern History, Oxford.

H. A. L. FISHER, Vice Chancellor of Sheffield University.

J. A. FLEMING, Professor of Electrical Engineering in the University of London.

H. S. FOXWELL, Professor of Political Economy in the University of London.

Sir EDWARD FRY, Ambassador Extraordinary and First British Plenipotentiary to The Hague Peace Conference in 1907.

Sir ARCHIBALD GEIKIE, Past President of the Royal Society.

- W. M. GELDART, Fellow of All Souls and Vinerian Professor of English Law, Oxford.
- Sir RICKMAN GODLEE, Emeritus Professor of Clinical Surgery, University College, London.
- B. P. GRENFELL, late Professor of Papyrology, Oxford.
- EL. H. GRIFFITHS, Principal of the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire.
- W. H. HADOW, Principal of Armstrong College, Newcastle.
- J. S. HALDANE, late Reader in Physiology, Oxford.
- MARCUS HARTOG, Professor of Zoology in University College, Cork.
- F. J. HAVERFIELD, Camden Professor of Ancient History, Oxford.
- W. A. HERDMAN, Professor of Zoology at Liverpool, General Secretary of the British Association.
- Sir W. P. HERRINGHAM, Vice Chancellor of the University of London.
- E. W. HOBSON, Sadleirian Professor of Pure Mathematics, Cambridge.
- D. G. HOGARTH, Keeper of the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford.
- Sir ALFRED HOPKINSON, late Vice Chancellor of Manchester University.
- A. S. HUNT, Professor of Papyrology, Oxford.
- HENRY JACKSON, Regius Professor of Greek, Cambridge.
- Sir THOMAS G. JACKSON, R. A.
- F. B. JEVONS, Professor of Philosophy, Durham.
- H. H. JOACHIM, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford.
- J. JOLLY, Professor of Geology and Mineralogy, University of Dublin.
- COURTNEY KENNY, Downing Professor of the Laws of England, Cambridge.
- Sir F. G. KENYON, Director and Principal Librarian, British Museum.
- HORACE LAMB, Professor of Mathematics, Manchester University.
- J. N. LANGLEY, Professor of Physiology, Cambridge.
- WALTER LEAF, Fellow of London University, President of the Hellenic Society.
- Sir SIDNEY LEE, Editor of the Dictionary of National Biography, Professor of the English Language and Literature in the University of London.
- Sir OLIVER LODGE, Principal of Birmingham University.
- Sir DONALD MACALISTER, Principal and Vice Chancellor, Glasgow.
- R. W. MACAN, Master of University College, Oxford.
- Sir WILLIAM MACEWEN, Professor of Surgery, Glasgow.
- J. W. MACKAIL, formerly Professor of Poetry, Oxford.
- Sir PATRICK MANSON.
- R. R. MARETT, Reader in Social Anthropology, Oxford.
- D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, Laudian Professor of Arabic, Oxford.
- Sir H. A. MIERS, Principal of the University of London.
- FREDERICK W. MOTT, Fullerian Professor of Physiology, Royal Institution.
- LORD MOULTON OF BANK, Lord of Appeals in Ordinary.
- J. E. H. MURPHY, Professor of Irish, Dublin.
- GILBERT MURRAY, Regius Professor of Greek, Oxford.
- J. L. MYRES, Wykeham Professor of Ancient History, Oxford.
- G. H. F. NUTTALL, Quick Professor of Biology, Cambridge.
- Sir W. OSLER, Regius Professor of Medicine, Oxford.
- Sir ISAMBARD OWEN, Vice Chancellor of the University of Bristol.
- Sir WALTER PARRATT, Professor of Music, Oxford.
- Sir HUBERT PARRY, Director of Royal College of Music.
- W. H. PERKIN, Waynflete Professor of Chemistry, Oxford.
- W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE EDWARDS, Professor of Egyptology, University College, London.
- A. F. POLLARD, Professor of English History, London.
- Sir F. POLLOCK, formerly Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford.
- EDWARD B. POULTON, Hope Professor of Zoology, Oxford.
- Sir E. J. POYNTER, President of the Royal Academy of Arts.
- Sir A. QUILLER-COUCH, King Edward VII. Professor of English Literature, Cambridge.
- Sir WALTER RALEIGH, Professor of English Literature, Oxford.
- Sir W. RAMSAY, Emeritus Professor of Chemistry, London.
- Lord RAYLEIGH, Past President Royal Society, Nobel Laureate, Chancellor of Cambridge University.
- Lord REAY, First President British Academy.
- JAMES REID, Professor of Ancient History, Cambridge.
- WILLIAM RIDGEWAY, Disney Professor of Archaeology, Cambridge.
- T. F. ROBERTS, Principal of the University College of Wales, Aberystwith.
- J. HOLLAND ROSS, formerly Professor of Tropical Medicine, Liverpool, Nobel Laureate.
- M. E. SADLER, Vice Chancellor of Leeds.
- W. SANDAY, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Oxford.
- Sir J. E. SANDYS, Public Orator, Cambridge.

Sir ERNEST SATOW, Second British Delegate to The Hague Peace Conference in 1907.

A. H. SAYCE, Professor of Assyriology, Oxford.

ARTHUR SCHUSTER, late Professor of Physics, Manchester.

D. H. SCOTT, Foreign Secretary, Royal Society.

C. S. SHERRINGTON, Waynflete Professor of Physiology, Oxford.

GEORGE ADAM SMITH, Principal and Vice Chancellor, Aberdeen.

G. C. MOORE SMITH, Professor of English Language and Literature, Sheffield.

E. A. SONNENSCHNEIN, Professor of Latin and Greek, Birmingham.

W. R. SORLEY, Professor of Moral Philosophy, Cambridge.

Sir C. V. STANFORD, Professor of Music, Cambridge.

V. H. STANTON, Ely Professor of Divinity, Cambridge.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON, Regius Professor of Natural History, Aberdeen.

Sir J. J. THOMSON, Professor of Experimental Physics, Cambridge.

T. F. TOUT, Professor of Mediaeval and Modern History, Manchester.

Sir W. TURNER, Principal and Vice Chancellor, Edinburgh.

Sir C. WALDSTEIN, late Reader in Classical Archaeology and Slade Professor of Fine Art, Cambridge.

Sir J. WOLFE-BARRY.

Sir ALMROTH WRIGHT, formerly Professor of Pathology, Netley.

C. T. HAGBERG WRIGHT, Librarian, London Library.

JOSEPH WRIGHT, Professor of Comparative Philology, Oxford.

Concerning the German Professors

By Frederic Harrison

I was not invited to join the reply of our distinguished scholars and professors, perhaps because it is so many years since I was the colleague of James Bryce as Professor of Jurisprudence to the Inns of Court. And, indeed, I do not care to bandy recriminations with these German defenders of the attack on civilization by the whole imperial, military, and bureaucratic order. It seems to me waste of time and loss of self-respect to notice these pedants.

The whole German press and the entire academic class seem to be banded together as an official bureau in order to spread mendacious insults and spiteful slanders. Not a word comes from them to excuse or deny the defiance of public law and the mockery of public faith by the German Emperor, his Ministers, and his armies. These professors seem to exult in serving the new Attila—rather let us say the new Caligula, for Attila at least was an open soldier and did not skulk under the Red Cross behind barbed wire fences.

We have long known that all German academic and scholastic officials are the

creatures of the Government, as obedient to orders as any Drill Sergeant. They seem to have sold their consciences for place. Not a word comes from them even of regret for the massacre of civilians on false charges, for the wanton murder of children, for the wholesale rape of women, the showering of bombs upon sleeping towns in sheer cruelty of destruction. The intellectual energies of Kultur seem concentrated on distorting the meaning of our dispatches and the speeches of our statesmen, and in manufacturing for their people and neutrals venomous falsehoods. German Geist to-day is a huge machine to cram lies upon their own people, and to insinuate lies to the world around. Their system of war is based upon lying at home and abroad, on treachery and terrorism. They think that murdering a few civilians would terrify France to surrender, and will drive England to betray the Allies. Their poor conscripts are told that we kill and torture prisoners; their monuments at home are bedizened with mock laurels; and neutrals are poisoned with wild inventions.

For years past their public men have

been tricking our politicians, journalists, and professors to accept them as peaceful leaders of a higher civilization—while all the while their soldiers, diplomats, and spies (the three are really but one class) were secretly courting our own royalties and society, studying our naval and military defenses, filling our homes with tens of thousands of reservists having secret orders to spy, to destroy our arsenals and roads, and even planting out bogus industries and laying concrete bases for cannon, to bombard the open towns of friendly nations. We have been living unsuspectingly with a nation of assassins plotting to destroy us.

Did these professors of Kultur not know of this elaborate conspiracy of Kaisertum, which unites the stealthy treachery of a Mohawk or a thug to the miracles of modern science? For years past the ideal of Kultur has been to lay down secret mines to destroy their peaceful neighbors. Did these professors of the Fatherland not know this? Then they are unable to grasp the most obvious facts—the lifework of their own masters under their own eyes. And, if they did know it, and must at least know it now, and yet approve and glory in it, they must be beneath contempt. Why argue with such hypocrites?

Not a few of us have known and watched this conspiracy for years. I have preached this ever since the advent of Bismarckism and the new Europe that was formed forty years ago. Not a few of us have foretold not only the tremendous attack on the British Empire designed by German sea power but the precise steps of the war upon France, through Belgium, and to be executed by an overwhelming force of sudden shock in the midst of peace. For my part, nothing in this war since July 30 has at all surprised me, unless it be the foul cruelty with which Belgian civilians have been treated. Indeed, in January, 1913, I wrote a warning which reads now like a summary of events that have since happened. I was denounced as a senile alarmist by some who are now the loudest in calling to arms. Alas! too late is their repentance.

May I ask why our eminent academicians and scholars who still profess "friendship and admiration" for their German confrères never even suspected the huge conspiracy of which civilization has been the victim? Why did they accept the stars and crosses of Caligula-Attila? Why hob-nob with the docile creatures of his chancery, and spread at home and abroad the worship of Geist and Kultur? Are they fit to instruct us about politics, public law, and international relations, when they were so egregiously mistaken, so blind, so befuddled, with regard to the most portentous catastrophe in the memory of living men? I am glad that they see their blindness now—but why this sentimental friendliness for those who hoodwinked them?

Surely this should open their eyes to the mountains of pretentious clouds on which the claims of Kultur rest. I am myself a student of German learning, and quite aware of the enormous industry, subtlety, and ingenuity of German scholarship. We owe deep gratitude to the older race of the Savignys, Rankes, Mommsens. Since 1851 I have been five times in Germany on different occasions down to 1900. I read and speak the language, and twice I lived in Germany for months together, even in the house of a distinguished man of science. I study their theology, their sociology, economics, history, and their classics. I am quite aware of the supremacy of German scholars in ancient literature, in many branches of science, in the record of the past in art, manners, and civilization. But to have edited a Greek play or to have discovered a new explosive, a new comet, another microbe, does not qualify a savant to dogmatize on international morals and the hegemony of the world. Sixty years ago in Leipzig the editor of a famous journal undertook to prove to me that Shakespeare was a German. Our poet, he said, was the grandest output of the Teutonic mind; nine-tenths of the Teutonic mind was German-argal, Shakespeare was a German, Q. E. D.

With the vast accumulation of solid

knowledge of provable facts there is too often in the German mind a sudden bounding up into a cloudland of crude and unproved guesswork. In the logic of Kultur there seems to be a huge gap in the reasoning of the middle terms. A savant unearths a manuscript in Syria, which he deciphers with marvelous industry, learning, and ingenuity. Straightway he cries, "Eureka, behold the original Gospel—the true Gospel!" and he proceeds to turn Christianity upside down. He may have experimented on cultures of microbes for a generation; and then he calls on earth and heaven to acknowledge the mystery of the self-creation of the universe. We hear much of Treitschke today—no doubt a man of genius with a gift for research—but what ferocious pyrotechnics were poured forth by this apostle of mendacious swagger. And as to Nietzsche, he was anticipated by Shakespeare in Timon—a diseased cynic—

henceforth hated be
Of Timon, man and all humanity.

They seem to think that to have put the critics right about a few lines in

Sophocles, or to have discovered a new chemical dye, dispenses the German Superman from being bound to humanity, truthfulness, and honor. Charge them with the mutilation of little girls and the violation of nuns in Belgium, and they reply: Yes! but think of Kant and Hegel! It is treason to philosophy, they say, that a man who has translated Schopenhauer should condemn Germans for burning Malines and making captive women a screen for troops in battle. Kultur, it seems, has its own "higher law," which its professors expound to the decadent nations of Europe.

Let us hold no parley with these arrogant sophists. Let all intellectual commerce be suspended until these official professors have unlearned the infernal code of "military necessity" and "world policy" which, to the indignation of the civilized world, they are ordered by the Vicegerent of God at Potsdam to teach to the great Teutonic Super-race. Yours, &c.,

FREDERIC HARRISON.

Bath, Oct. 29, 1914.

The Reply From France

By M. Yves Guyot and Prof. Bellet

The following is the text of an open letter, addressed by M. Yves Guyot, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal des Economistes, and M. Bellet, Professor at the Schools of Political Science and Commercial Studies, to Prof. Brentano of the University of Munich, the communication being a reply to the recent German Appeal to Civilized Nations on the subject of the war:

PARIS, Oct. 15, 1914.

To Prof. Brentano of the University of Munich:

Very Learned Professor and Colleague:
On reading the Appeal to Civilized Nations, (among which France is evidently not included,) which has just been sent forth by ninety-three persons declaring themselves to be representatives of German science and art, we were not

surprised to find Prof. Schmoller's signature. He had already shown his hatred for France by refusing to assist at the gatherings organized, a little more than two years ago, to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the Paris Society of Political Economy, (gatherings at which we were happy to enjoy your presence and that of your colleague, Mr. Lotz.) In his Rector's speech at the Berlin University, in 1897, he declared that German science had no other object than to celebrate the imperial messages of 1880 and 1890; and he pointed out that every disciple of Adam Smith who was not willing to make it a servant of that policy "should resign his seat." But we

felt painful surprise when, at the foot of the said factum, we found your name side by side with his.

You and the other representatives of German science and art accuse France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Russia of falsehood. Would you have submitted, on the part of one of your pupils, to so grave an imputation, so lightly bandied? Admitting you to be in absolute ignorance of the documents published since the war declaration, you have certainly been acquainted with the ultimatum pronounced by Austria to Servia. It must have struck you with surprise; for it stands as a unique diplomatic document in all history. Did you not ask yourselves whether the demands of Austria did not go beyond all bounds, seeing that they insisted on the abdication of an independent State? You learned that, in spite of Servia's humble reply, because it contained a reservation, immediately, without discussion, the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary left Belgrade, and that the following day Austria declared war. You do not ignore the steps taken by Great Britain and France, the demand for delay made by Russia, and the reply of the German Chancellor "that none should intervene between Austria and Servia." He elegantly qualified the attitude thus adopted as "localizing the conflict."

Is there a single member among those who signed the document of Intellectuals who has been able to believe—have you been able to believe, Mr. Brentano, with your quick and perspicacious mind?—that this reply from Berlin did not imply war as a fatal consequence; for any nation accepting it was certain to be treated in future, by Germany, as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy treated Servia? How, then, knowing the initial pretext of the war, are you able to realize that there was no other relation between this cause and the effect produced than the will of those who made use of it to provoke either a dishonoring humiliation for the countries accepting such a situation, or a general conflagration? How, then, do you, and the signatories of your appeal, dare to state,

"It is not true that Germany provoked the war"? You dare to speak of proofs taken from authentic documents. Those published by Great Britain, Russia, and Belgium are known. All agree; and they give clear proof that the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was pronounced with full complicity of the Berlin Chancellery. They prove, moreover, that the German Ambassador at Petrograd, fearing a withdrawal on the part of Hungary, precipitated events while your Emperor kept himself out of the way. Meanwhile, your General Staff had, in underhanded manner, mobilized a portion of its troops, by individual call, while in France we waited, unable to imagine that the German Government had resolved to engage in European war without motives. In the pocketbooks of your reservists have been found forms calling them to the army long before the end of July. Our friend and colleague, Courcelle-Seneuil, has seen the military book of a German living in Switzerland, at Bex, containing this call.

Bismarckian Loyalty

Correspondence of official nature has been stopped at the Cape, which should have reached in full time officers of the German Navy, warning them to prepare for mid-July. Such advance taken by your troops has rendered the task the more difficult for ours. We were very simple, for we believed in the affirmations of your statesmen. You state that these are loyal war methods; so be it. That belongs to the diplomatic rules of loyalty bequeathed by Bismarck to his successors. But to attempt to carry on this falsehood, you have no longer the excuse of its utility. It is clear to all, except, it seems, the representatives of science and art in Germany, who are sufficiently devoid of perspicacity to ignore it.

They affirm, moreover, that Germany has not violated the neutrality of Belgium; she merely contented herself with "taking the first step." Beyond the authentic proofs which have been published, we would draw your attention to an undeniable fact. Trusting in the

treaty which guaranteed Belgium neutrality—and at the foot of which figured Germany's signature—in the promise made a short while ago to the King of the Belgians by your Emperor, we unfortunately left our northern frontier unguarded. You must be aware, professor, that the English did not move until Belgian soil had been effectively violated. It is true that we knew the plan of campaign set forth by Gen. Bernhardt, but we naïvely believed that, whatever might be the opinion of a General, the Chancellor of the Empire would consider a treaty bearing the imperial signature as something more than a mere "bit of paper." Germany has also been untrue to her signature by violating the treaty of neutrality of Luxembourg. You forgot to state that there also you only "took the first step." Your appeal echoes the German papers, which declare that it was the Belgians, and particularly the women, who "began against your troops." An American paper replied by stating that if it was the Belgian women who attacked German soldiers on Belgian soil, what were the soldiers doing there? The truth is that your troops, obeying their officers, as is proved by papers which have been seized and which you would find quoted in the report presented by the Belgian Commission to President Wilson, have executed orders which seem inspired by the ferocious inscriptions of Assyrian Kings, no doubt exhumed on the Bagdad railway line; and you think it quite natural that massacre and arson should have been perpetrated at Louvain because the civil population fired on your soldiers; but an inquiry made together with the representatives of the United States (whom you deign to consider sufficiently to ask them to represent your defenses) proved that the civil population was unarmed. If you today approve of the burning of the Louvain Library, have you until now approved of the destruction of the library at Alexandria? It is true there was no Deutsch Kultur there. The result of German culture as regards military matters is to place your soldiers on a stratum of civilization anterior to that of

the Vandals, who, when taking Hippone, spared the library.

In Paris, if one of us, passing, on Friday, Oct. 9, in the Rued'Edimbourg, to an office of the Société d'Economie Politique, situated at No. 14, had passed near to that address, he might have been murdered by a bomb thrown from one of your Taubes on the civil population of a town whose bombarding had not been notified. Another Taube caused, through the throwing of a bomb, a fire at the Cathedral of Notre Dame. You cannot, to excuse such an assault, invoke the pretext put forward to excuse the destruction of the Cathedral of Rheims. No observer could have caught sight of a German soldier from the top of the towers.

Barbarian Soldiery

Your co-signatories and you express indignation because the civilized world describes your soldiers as barbarians. Do you therefore consider such deeds as those specified to be a high expression of civilization? And here is the dilemma: either you are in ignorance of these deeds, then you are indeed very careless, or you approve of them, in which case you must make the defense of them enter into your works on right and ethics. In doing so you would only be following the theories of your military authors who have insisted on the necessity of striking terror into the hearts of the civil population, in order that it may weigh on its Government and its army so strongly that they may be forced to ask for peace. But those of your colleagues who profess psychology must, if they have approved such a theory, confess today that they made a great mistake; for such deeds, far from forcing the people to cowardly action, awaken indignation in all hearts and fire the courage of our soldiers. Nevertheless, your military authors have not stated that theft was a means of assuring victory. And yet the Crown Prince, your Emperor of tomorrow, gathered together at the castle of the Count of Baye articles in precious metals, belonging to a collection, which he had carefully packed up and sent off. Some of your officers' trunks have been found stuffed with

goods which would constitute the stock of a second-hand clothes seller. Do you and your co-signatories include in German science and art the science and art of housebreaking? Are the law professors and the economists willing to defend such a manner of acquiring property? And, if so, what becomes of your penal code?

You and your co-signatories affirm that the present struggle is directed against "German culture." If such culture teaches that the rights of men include contempt of treaties, contempt of private property, contempt of the lives of noncombatants, you cannot be surprised that the other nations show no desire to preserve it for your benefit and their detriment.

It is not by arms but by arguments and facts that economists like us, faithful to the teachings of the physiocrats and of Adam Smith, have sought to protect ourselves against it. On the eve of the war, at the inauguration of Turgot's monument, we set forth his ideas of liberty and humanity in opposition to the German *realpolitik*. We hope that the present events will cure those among our professors whom it had contaminated, and that they will cease to constitute themselves accomplices of that form of Pan-Germanism which they introduced to public opinion and to our legislation. The acts of your diplomatists and of your Generals, and the approbation given them by you and other representatives of German science, are a terrible demonstration, but conclusive, of the dangers and vanity of German culture. You are its true destroyers.

Militarism and Civilization

"Without our militarism," say you, "our civilization would have been annihilated long ago." And you invoke the inheritance of Goethe, Beethoven, Kant. But Goethe, born in the free city of Frankfort, lived at the Court of Charles Augustus, which was a liberal and artistic centre ever threatened by Prussia. But Beethoven was of Flemish ori-

gin, and lived in Holland until the age of twenty-four, spending the rest of his life in Vienna, and he has nothing in common with Prussian militarism, so redoubtable for Austria. But Kant, if he was born and lived at Königsberg, the true capital of the Prussian Kingdom, welcomed the French Revolution, and when he died in 1804 it was not Prussian militarism which had recommended his writings to the world.

But the solidarity which you establish between German militarism and German culture, of which you and your colleagues claim to be the representatives, is a proof of the confusion of German conceptions.

To present Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant to the world you surround them with bayonets. In the same manner every tradesman and every merchant throughout Germany has got into the habit of saying: "I have four million bayonets behind me!" Your Emperor said to some tradesmen who complained of bad business: "I must travel!" And he went to Constantinople; he went to Tangier, after the speech at Bremen. In every one of his words, in each of his gestures, he affirmed the subordination of economic civilization to military civilization. He considered that it was his duty to open up markets and assert the value of German products with cannon and sword. Hence his formidable armaments, his perpetual threats which held all nations in a constant state of anxiety.

There is the deep and true cause of the war. And it is due entirely to your Emperor and his environment. We readily understand that the greater number of "representatives of German science and art" who signed the appeal are incapable of fathoming this fact; but this is not your case, you who denounced the abuses and consequences of German protectionism, and we remember that at the Antwerp Congress you agreed with us in recognizing its aggressive nature.

In conclusion, we beg to express the deep consideration which we feel for your science, hitherto so unerring.

To Americans in Germany

By Prof. Adolf von Harnack

Citizens of the United States, ladies and gentlemen: It is my pleasure and my privilege to address to you today a few words.

Let me begin with a personal recollection. Ten years ago I was in the United States and I came away with some unforgettable memories. What impression was the strongest? Not the thundering fall of Niagara, not the wonderful entrance into New York Harbor with its skyscrapers, not the tremendous World's Fair of St. Louis in all its proud grandeur, not the splendid universities of Harvard and Columbia or the Congressional Library in Washington—these are all works of technique or of nature and cannot arouse our deepest admiration and make the deepest impression. What was the deepest impression? It was twofold: first, the great work of the American Nation, and, next, American hospitality.

The great work of the American Nation, that is, the nation itself! From the smallest beginning the American Nation has in 200 years developed itself to a world power of more than 100,000,000 souls, and has not only settled but civilized the whole section of the world from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the Great Lakes to the West Indies. And not only civilized; everything which has drifted to it has been welded together by this nation with an indescribable power, welded together to the unity of a great, noble nation of educated men—such a thing as has never before happened in all history. After two, or at the most three, generations, all are welded together in the American body and the American spirit, and this without petty rules, without political pressure. In the definite frame of this people every individual character fits in without coercion, becomes American and yet re-

tains its own quality. The world has never witnessed such a spectacle, but it is witnessing it continually now. On the one side it hears and sees the fact that every alien after a short time announces, "America is now my Fatherland!" and on the other hand the old country still continues undisturbed the bond between them. Yes, here is at once a national strength and freedom which another could not copy from you very easily.

The Spirit of America

But, further: Among those who have wandered to your shores are millions of Germans—several millions! For more than two years—where shall I begin to relate—since the days of Steuben and of Carl Schurz—but how can I name names?—they have been all received as brothers, bringing their best; and their best was not lost. More I cannot say.

Furthermore, what sort was the spirit which received them? Upon each one, without and within, that spirit has imprinted its seal. Concerning this spirit I shall speak later, but for the present I will only say, it is the spirit of common courage and common freedom! And from this unity I saw had developed a tremendous contribution as the work of this nation, a contribution to agriculture, to technology, and, as we of the German universities have known for several decades, an extraordinary contribution to science. And this contribution has been derived from a combination such as we in Europe cannot effect, of the good old traditional wisdom which has been brought down out of the history of Europe, and a youthful courage, I might almost say, a childlike spirit. These two combined, this circumspection and at the same time this courage of youth, which I met everywhere and which has stamped itself upon all American work, is what I have admired.

And the second was the American hospitality!

Like a warm breeze, this hospitality surrounded me and my friends. Wherever we went we breathed the air of this friendship, indeed, it almost took away our powers of will, so thoroughly did it anticipate every plan and every need. Like parcels of friendship, we were sent from place to place, always the feeling that we had all known each other forever. That was an experience for which all of us—for who of us Germans who have come over here has not experienced it?—will be perpetually thankful. That will never be forgotten.

Friendship for Germany

But beautiful and noble as that was, your nation has furnished ours with something still more unforgettable. In those horrible days of 1870, when a great number of Germans were shut up in unfortunate Paris, the American Ambassador assumed the care of them, and what America did at that time she is again doing for all of our country—men who, surprised in the enemy's country by the war, have been detained there. They are intrusted to the special care of the American Ambassador, and we know with as much certainty as though it were an actual fact already that that care will be the best and the most loyal. That, my friends, is true service of friendship, which is not mere convention but such as it is in the Catechism: "Give us our daily bread and good friends." They belong together.

But to answer the question why you are our good friends we must reflect a little for the answer which we might have given a few days ago—"You are our good friends as our blood relations"—alas! that answer no longer holds. That is over! God grant that in later days we may again be able to say it, but by a circumstance which has torn our very heartstrings it has been proved that blood is not thicker than water. But where then is the deep-lying reason for this friendship? Does it rest in the fact that we have so many Germans over there; that they have been received

so cordially; that they have done so much for the building up of America, soul and body, or that we find friends in so many Americans on this side of the water? This is an important consideration, but it is not the ultimate cause we are seeking.

My friends, when it is a powerful relationship, imbedded in rock as it were, which is under consideration, then the matter is more than superficial, and that which is at the bottom of this deeper fact, history is at this very moment showing us as she writes in characters of bronze before our eyes; because we have a common spirit which springs from the very depths of our hearts, for that reason are we friends!

And what is that spirit? It is the spirit of the deep religious and moral culture which has possessed us through a succession of centuries and out of which this powerful American offshoot has sprung. To this culture belong three things, or, rather, it rests upon three pillars. The first pillar is the recognition of the eternal value of every human soul, consequently the recognition of personality and individuality. These are respected, nourished, striven for. Second is the recognition of the duty at any time to risk this human soul, which is to each one of us so dear, for that great ideal—"God, freedom, and the Fatherland." The dearer that human soul, that life, is prized by us, Germans and Americans, the more surely do we give it up willingly and joyously when a high cause demands it. And the third pillar is respect for law and therewith the capability for powerful organization in all lines and in all manner of communities.

A Different Culture

But now before my eyes I see rising up against the culture which rests upon these three pillars—personality, duty to sacrifice all for ideals, law and organization—another culture, a culture of the horde whose Government is patriarchal, a civilization of the mob which is brought together and held together by despots, the Byzantine—I must extend it further—Mongolian-Muscovite culture.

My friends, this was once a true cul-

ture, but it is no longer. This culture was not able to bear the light of the eighteenth century, still less that of the nineteenth, and now, in this twentieth century, it breaks out and threatens us—this unorganized mob, this mob of Asia; like the sands of the desert it would sweep down over our harvest fields. That we already know; we are already experiencing it. That, too, the Americans know, for every one who has stood upon the ground of our civilization and who with a keen glance regards the present situation knows that the word must be: "Peoples of Europe, save your most hallowed possessions!"

"I Cover My Head!"

This, our culture, the chief treasure of mankind, was in large part, yes, almost wholly, intrusted to three peoples: to us, to the Americans, and—to the English. I will say no more! I cover my head! Two still remain, and must stand all the more firmly together where this culture is menaced. It is a question of our spiritual existence, and Americans will realize that it is also their existence. We have a common culture, and a common duty to protect it!

To you, American citizens, we give the holy pledge that we shall offer our last drop of blood in the cause of this culture. May I in addition say to you, since I have made this pledge, that we shall as a matter of course protect those of you here in our land and care for you and do everything for you? If we have made the greater pledge, surely we can manage these trifles.

But you, my dear fellow-countrymen, we are all thinking with one mind on what is now going on about us. It is a very grave but a splendid time. Whatever in the last analysis we shall go through, at present there is no longer any one of us who any longer regards life in the rôle of a blasé or critical spectator, but each one of us stands in the very midst of life, and, indeed, in the very midst of a higher life. God has of a sudden brought us out of the wretchedness of the day to a high place to which

we have never before spiritually attained. But always where life emerges a higher life or merely life itself, wherever there is a thirst for life, there is it set close around by death, as at every birth when something new comes to the light of day, and so if the most precious thing is to be gained, then death will stand close by life. But this we also know, that when death and life intertwine in this fashion, the fear of death vanishes away; in the intertwining, life only appears and full of life man goes through death and into death. It brings to my mind an old song, the powerful song of victory of our fathers:

It was a famous battle,
Fought 'twixt Life and Death;
Life came out the victor,
Triumphant over Death;
Already it was written
How one Death killed the other,
So making mock of Death!

Death which is willingly met kills the great death and secures the higher life. Death makes us free. Thus spake Luther.

Let me say a few words in closing. Before all of us there stands in time of crisis an image under which are the plain words: "He was faithful unto death, yea, even to death on the cross." Now the time for great faithfulness has come for us, for this obedience for which our neighbors in former times have ridiculed us, saying: "See, these are the faithful Germans, the men who do all on command and are so obedient!" Now they shall see that this great obedience was not mere discipline, but a matter of will. It was and still is discipline, but it is also will. They shall see that this great obedience is not pettiness and death, but power and life.

From the east—I say it once more—the desert sands are sweeping down upon us; on the west we are opposed by old enemies and treacherous friends. When will the German be able to pray again, confessing:

God is the Orient,
God is the Occident;
Northernmost and Southern lands
Rest in peace beneath His hands.

We shall hope that God may give us strength to make this true, not only for us but for all Europe.

Until then, since we see the very

springs of our higher life and our existence threatened, we shout: "Father, protect our springs of life and save us from the Huns."

A Reply to Prof. Harnack

By Some British Theologians

Prof. Harnack.

Honored Sir: We, the undersigned, a group of theologians who owe more than we can express to you personally and to the great host of German teachers and leaders of thought, have noticed with pain a report of a speech recently delivered by you, in which you are said to have described the conduct of Great Britain in the present war as that of a traitor to civilization.

We are quite sure that you could never have been betrayed into such a statement if you had been acquainted with the real motives which actuate the British Nation in the present crisis.

Permit us, in the interests of a better understanding now and subsequently, to state to you the grounds on which we, whose obligations to Germany, personal and professional, are simply incalculable, have felt it our duty to support the British Government in its declaration of war against the land and people we love so well.

We are not actuated by any preference for France over Germany—still less by any preference for Russia over Germany. The preference lies entirely the other way. Next to the peoples that speak the English tongue, there is no people in the world that stands so high in our affection and admiration as the people of Germany. Several of us have studied in German universities. Many of us have enjoyed warm personal friendship with your fellow-countrymen. All of us owe an immeasurable debt to German theology, philosophy, and literature. Our sympathies are in matters of the spirit so largely German that nothing but the very strongest reasons could ever lead us to contemplate the possibility of hostile

relations between Great Britain and Germany.

Nor have we the remotest sympathy with any desire to isolate Germany, or to restrict her legitimate expansion, commercial and colonial. We have borne resolute witness against the endeavor made by foes of Germany to foment anti-German suspicion and ill-will in the minds of our fellow-countrymen.

The Sanctity of Treaties

But we recognize that all hopes of settled peace between the nations, and indeed of any civilized relations between the nations, rest on the maintenance inviolate of the sanctity of treaty obligations. We can never hope to put law for war if solemn international compacts can be torn up at the will of any power involved. These obligations are felt by us to be the more stringently binding in the case of guaranteed neutrality. For the steady extension of neutralization appears to us to be one of the surest ways of the progressive elimination of war from the face of the earth. All these considerations take on a more imperative cogency when the treaty rights of a small people are threatened by a great world power. We therefore believe that when Germany refused to respect the neutrality of Belgium, which she herself had guaranteed, Great Britain had no option, either in international law or in Christian ethics, but to defend the people of Belgium. The Imperial Chancellor of Germany has himself admitted, on Aug. 4, that the protest of the Luxembourg and Belgian Governments was "just," and that Germany was doing "wrong" and acting "contrary to the dictates of international law." His only

excuse was "necessity"—which recalls our Milton's phrase, "necessity, the tyrant's plea." It has cost us all the deepest pain to find the Germany which we love so intensely committing this act of lawless aggression on a weak people, and a Christian nation becoming a mere army with army ethics. We loathe war of any kind. A war with Germany cuts us to the very quick. But we sincerely believe that Great Britain in this conflict is fighting for conscience, justice, Europe, humanity, and lasting peace.

Dictated Terms

This conviction is deepened by the antecedents of the present unhappy war. In allowing her ally Austria to dictate terms to Serbia which were quite incompatible with the independence of that little State, Germany gave proof of her disregard for the rights of smaller States. A similar disregard for the sovereign rights of greater States was shown in the demand that Russia should demobilize her forces. It was quite open to Germany to have answered Russia's mobilization with a countermobilization without resorting to war. Many other nations have mobilized to defend their frontiers without declaring war. Alike indirectly in regard to Serbia and directly in regard to Russia, Germany was indisputably the

aggressor. And this policy of lawless aggression became more nakedly manifest in the invasion of Belgium. Great Britain is not bound by any treaty rights to defend either Serbia or Russia. But she is bound by the most sacred obligations to defend Belgium, obligations which France undertook to observe. We have been grieved to the heart to see in the successive acts of German policy a disregard of the liberties of States, small or great, which is the very negation of civilization. It is not our country that has incurred the odium of being a traitor to civilization or to the conscience of humanity.

Doubtless you read the facts of the situation quite differently. You may think us entirely mistaken. But we desire to assure you, as fellow-Christians and fellow-theologians, that our motives are not open to the charge which has been made.

We have been moved to approach you on this matter by our deep reverence for you and our high appreciation of the great services you have rendered to Christendom in general. We trust that you will receive what we have said in the spirit in which it was sent.

We have the honor to be,

Yours very sincerely,

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eral Secretary of the Presbyterian Church of England.

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J. HERBERT STEAD, M. A. Glasgow. Warden of the Robert Browning Settlement, London.

Prof. Harnack in Rebuttal

BERLIN, Sept. 10, 1914.

Gentlemen: The words, "The conduct of Great Britain is that of a traitor to civilization," were not used by me; but you have expressed my general judgment of this conduct correctly. The sentence in question in my speech reads: "This, our culture, the chief treasure of mankind, was in large part, yes, almost wholly, intrusted to three peoples: To us, to the Americans, and—to the English. I will say no more. I cover my head." To my deep sorrow I must, even after your communication, maintain this judgment.

You claim that England has drawn and must draw the sword purely for the protection of the small nations of Serbia and Belgium and for the sake of an international treaty. In this claim I see at the very least a fearful self-delusion.

It is an actual fact that what Serbia desired was that her Government should in no wise be mixed up with the shameful crime of Serajevo, and it is also an established fact that for years Serbia, with the support of Russia, has attempted by the most despicable means to incite to rebellion the Austrian South Slavs. When Austria finally issued to her a decided ultimatum without making any actual attack on her territory, it was the duty of every civilized land—England as well—to keep hands off, for Austria's royal house, Austria's honor, and Austria's existence were attacked. Austria's yielding to Serbia would mean the sovereignty of Russia in the eastern half of the Balkans, for Serbia is nothing more than a Russian satrapy, and the Balkan federation brought about by Russia had for its ultimate purpose opposition to Austria. This is as well known in England as in Germany. If, gentlemen, in spite of this, you can presume to judge that in this circumstance it was purely a case of protecting the right of a small nation against a large

one, I shall find great difficulty in believing in your good faith.

Against Pan-Slavism

It was not a question of little Serbia but of Austria's battle for life and the struggle of Western culture against Pan-Slavism. Serbia is, after all, only an outpost of Russia and as opposed to this nation, Serbia's "sovereignty" is less than a mere shadow; in fact, it can hardly be protected by England, for in reality it does not exist. For in addition Serbia, through the most dastardly murder known to history, struck her name from the list of the nations with which one does business as equals. What would England have done had the Prince of Wales been assassinated by the emissary of a little nation which had continually been inciting the Irish to revolt? Would it have issued a milder ultimatum than Austria's? But of all this you say not a word in your communication, but instead persist on seeing in the situation into which Serbia and Russia have brought Austria only the necessity of an oppressed little country to whose help haste must be made! Thus to judge would be more than blindness, indeed, it would be a crime that cries unto heaven, were it not known that the life problems of other great powers do not exist for Great Britain, because she is only concerned about her own life problems and those of little nations whose support can be useful to her.

At bottom Serbia is of as little consequence to you as to us. Austria, too, is of no consequence to you; and you realize that Austria had the right to punish Serbia. But because Germany, who stands behind Austria, is to be struck; therefore Serbia is the guiltless little State which must be spared! What is the result? Great Britain sides with Russia against Germany. What does that mean? That means that Great

Britain has torn down the dike which has protected West Europe and its culture from the desert sands of the Asiatic barbarism of Russia and of Pan-Slavism. Now we Germans are forced to stop up the breach with our bodies. We shall do it amid streams of blood, and we shall hold out there. We must hold out, for we are protecting the labor of thousands of years for all of Europe, and for Great Britain! But that day when Great Britain tore down the dam will never be forgotten in the history of the world, and history's judgment shall read: On that day when Russian-Asiatic power rushed down upon the culture of Europe Great Britain declared that she must side with Russia because "the sovereignty of the murderer-nation Serbia had been violated!"

As to Neutrality

But no, the maintenance of Serbia's sovereignty is not according to your communication the first, but only the second reason for Great Britain's declaration of war against us. The first reason is our violation of Belgian neutrality; "Germany broke a treaty which she herself had guaranteed." Shall I remind you how Great Britain has disported herself in the matter of treaties and pleasant promises? How about Egypt, for example? But I do not need to go into these flagrant and repeated violations of treaty rights, for a still more serious violation of the rights of a people stands today on your books against you; it has been proved that your army is making use of dum-dum bullets and thereby turning a decent war into the most bloody butchery. In this Great Britain has severed herself from every right to complain about the violation of the rights of a people.

But aside from that—in your communication you have again emphasized the main point. We did not declare war against Belgium, but we declared that since Russia and France compelled us to wage a war with two fronts (190,000,000 against 68,000,000) we had then to suffer defeat if we could not march through Belgium; that we should do that but that we should carefully keep from harm-

ing Belgium in any way and would indemnify all damage incurred—our hand upon it! Would Great Britain, had she been in our position, have hesitated a moment to do likewise? And would Great Britain have drawn the sword for us if France had violated the neutrality of Belgium by marching through it? You know well enough that both these questions must be answered in the negative.

Our Imperial Chancellor has with his characteristic conscientiousness declared that we have on our side committed a certain wrong. I cannot agree with him in this judgment, and I cannot even recognize the commission of a formal wrong, for we were in a situation where formalities no longer obtain, and where moral duties only prevail. When David, in the extremity of his need, took the show-bread from the Table of the Lord, he was in every sense of the word justified, for the letter of the law ceased at that moment to exist. It is as well known to you as to me that there is a law of necessity which breaks iron asunder, to say nothing of treaties.

Appreciate our position! Prove to me that Germany has flippantly constructed a law of necessity; prove it to me in this hour, when your country has gone over to our enemies, and we have half the world to fight. You cannot do that; you could not do it on the 4th of August, and consequently you have assumed the most miserable of pretexts, because you wished to destroy us. From your letter, gentlemen, I must believe that you are far from holding this view; but do you believe, and would you really try to make me believe, that your statesmen would have declared war against us only because we were determined to march through Belgium? You could not consider them so foolish and so flippant.

An Earlier Treachery

But I am not yet at an end. It is not we who have first violated the neutrality of Belgium. Belgium, as we feared and as we now, informed by the actual facts, see still more clearly, was for a long time in alliance with France and—with you. France's airmen were flying over

Belgium before we marched in; negotiations with France had already taken place, and in Maubeuge there was found an arsenal full of English munitions which had been stationed there before the declaration of war. This arsenal—you know where Maubeuge is situated!—points to agreements which Great Britain had made with France, and to which Belgium was also party. These agreements are before the whole world today, for the chain of evidence is complete and the treacherous plot of Great Britain is revealed. She has encouraged and pledged the Belgians against us, and therefore it is she who must answer for all the misery which has been visited upon that poor country. Had it been our responsibility, not a single hair of a Belgian's head should have been harmed.

If, then, the Belgian wrongs like those of Servia are only the flimsiest pretexts for Great Britain's declaration of war against us, there remains, unfortunately, no other reason for this declaration of war save the intention of your statesmen either to destroy us or so to weaken us that Great Britain will rule supreme on the seas and in all distant parts of the world. This intention you personally deny and thus far I must take your word for it. But do you deny it also for your Government? That you cannot do, for the facts have been brought to light; when Great Britain determined to join the coalition of Russia with France, which is ruled by Russia, when it put aside all the differences that stood between her and Russia, when it set upon us not only the hordes of Russia but the scrupulous Japanese, "the yellow peril," and called upon all Europe, when it also sunk in the ocean its duties to European culture—for all of that there is but one explanation: England believes that the hour for our destruction has struck. Why does she wish to destroy us? Because she will not endure our power, our zeal, our perfection of growth! There is no other explanation!

Lifting Humanity

We and Great Britain in alliance with America were able in peaceful co-

operation to lift humanity to a higher plane, and to lead the world in peace, allowing to each his rights. We Germans now know no, and have never known any, higher ideal than this. In order to realize this ideal the German Kaiser and the German people have made many sacrifices in the last 43 years. In proportion to the development of our strength, we should be able to lay claim to more territory than we now possess in the world. But we have never attempted to force this claim. We held that the strength of our nation should be in its zeal and in the peaceful fruits of that zeal. Great Britain has begrudged us that; she has been jealous of our powers, jealous of our fleet, jealous of our industries and our commerce, and jealousy is the root of all evil. Jealousy it is which has driven Great Britain into the most fearful war which history knows and the end of which is unforeseen.

What course is open to you, gentlemen, once you are enlightened as to the policy of your country? In the name of our Christian culture, which your Government has frivolously placed in jeopardy, I can offer you but one counsel: To burden your consciences no longer with Servia and Belgium, which you must protect, but to face about and stop your Government in its headlong course; it may not be too late. As far as we Germans are concerned, our way is clearly indicated, though not so our fate. Should we fall, which God and our strong arm prevent, then there sinks with us to its grave all the higher culture of our part of the world, whose defenders we were called to be; for neither with Russia nor against Russia will Great Britain be able longer to maintain that culture in Europe. Should we conquer—and victory is for us something more than mere hope—then shall we feel ourselves responsible, as formerly, for this culture, for the learning and the peace of Europe, and shall put from us any idea of setting up a hegemony in Europe. We shall stand by the one who, together in fraternal union with us, will create and maintain such a peaceful Europe.

For the continuation of your cordial attitude toward me I am personally grateful. I would not unnecessarily sever the bond which holds me to the upright Christians and the learning of your country, but at the present moment this bond has no value for me.

PROF. VON HARNACK.

P. S.—It is in your power now to wage a battle which would be of honor to you. As a fourth great power arrayed

against Germany, the lying international press has raised itself up, flooded the world with lies about our splendid and upright army, and slandered everything that is German. We have been almost entirely cut off from any possibility of protecting ourselves against this "beast of the pit." Do not believe the lies, and spread abroad the truth about us. We are today no different than Carlyle pictured us to you. HARNACK.

The Causes of the War

By Theodore Niemeyer

Theodore Niemeyer, Kaiser Wilhelm Exchange Professor at Columbia University for 1914-15, and well-known Professor of Kiel University, has addressed the following letter to the editor of the New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung:

KIEL, 14th August, 1914.

To the Editor of the New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung:

Dear Sir: English papers publish a telegram from Mr. Andrew Carnegie, in which the view is expressed that the German Emperor, "in declining to take part in the peace conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey, an advocate of peace," proved unfaithful to that love of peace which he has shown during the last twenty-five years—that he, on the contrary, has taken up the rôle of a disturber of the peace of Europe.

To the best of my knowledge, the German press has only referred to this telegram with the simple remark that intelligence of the real state of affairs has evidently not yet reached the ears of the sender of the telegram.

This attitude of the German press is in conformity with its firm consciousness of the justice of its cause and its confidence in the ultimate triumph of truth. Both in this consciousness and in this confidence I will not be surpassed by any one, but to observe silence in the face of such accusations is beyond my power. To allow such a misconstruction to pass unchallenged through the

world seems to me (and doubtless to many thousands besides me) unbearable.

The misunderstanding about the Peace Conference is easily put right. Sir Edward Grey did not propose any peace conference at all, but a conference of the Ambassadors of those four powers which were at that time not directly concerned, namely Germany, England, France, and Italy. These powers were to attempt to exert their influence on Austria-Hungary and Russia in the same way as the Ambassador's Conference (or rather Ambassadorial Reunion) in London had done, in 1912 and 1913, on the Balkan States and Turkey. What the united six powers at that time undertook toward the Balkan States was now to be done by four—discordant—powers upon two others who are in a state of highest political tension. To this proposal Germany replied that the apparatus of an Ambassadorial Conference does not work quickly or effectually enough for the emergency of the moment, or to be able to ease the tense political situation.

The Kaiser's Efforts

In place of this, however, the German Emperor undertook to negotiate in person with the Russian and Austrian monarchs and was overwhelmed with grief when the leaders of Muscovite policy frustrated all his exertions by completely ignoring his efforts for peace, (made at the express desire of the Czar,) and then in

real earnest amassing Russian forces on the German frontier, evidently resolved to force on a war under any circumstances—even against the will of the Czar.

It is here that the clue to all the terrible events of the present day is to be found.

The incessant intriguing of the Russian military party for many years past has at last succeeded in drawing first France and then England to their cause, by turning the mistrust, the dread of competition, the hopes of revenge, and the ever-increasing armaments to their use with incomparable skill. The task was facilitated by Germany's industrial upgrowth, which—in willful misconstruction of the truths of the laws of international communities—has been represented as a calamity for other States.

England's Growing Friendship

In quite recent times people in England began to recognize this misconstruction of facts as such. They began to understand that friendship with Germany might be a blessing and that in this way peace would be possible. This, however, meant the possibility of the Muscovite policy being completely frustrated. An Anglo-German understanding seemed already to be shaking the very foundations of the Triple Entente. Russia had been obliged during the two Balkan wars (the London Ambassadorial Conference was in fact the clearing house for this) to make important concessions to the detriment of her protégés, Serbia and Montenegro, in order to retain the friendship of England, which ardently strove for peace. Now, however, it was highest time for Russia to pocket her gains; for the English people

were slowly beginning to realize that in St. Petersburg they were trying to engage England in the cause of Pan-Slavism. The unnatural alliance was becoming more and more unpopular from day to day. How long would it be before Russia lost England's help forever?

Before this took place Russia must bring about a European war. The iron, which had been prepared with the help of the English military party, had to be forged, for never again would there be a moment so favorable for the complete destruction of Austria and the humiliation of Germany. Serbia was thrust to the front. Russia's Ambassador managed that wonderfully. The fire was set in so skillful a manner that the incendiaries knew in advance there was no possibility of extinguishing it. The conflagration must spread and soon blaze in all corners of Europe.

What was the use of a Peace Conference in such circumstances? Conscious of the irresistible consequences of their action the real rulers of Russia sent forward their armies; it was now or never, if the work was to be done with the help of England. And without England perhaps even France would not consent to join.

Thus it came about, and thus we have seen the peaceful policy of the German Emperor, which he has upheld for twenty-five years, completely wrecked.

We are now fighting not only for our Fatherland, but also for the emancipation of our culture from a menace that has become insupportable.

Yours faithfully,

TH. NIEMEYER,

Kaiser Wilhelm Professor, Columbia University.

Comment by Dr. Max Walter

To the letter addressed by Prof. Th. Niemeyer to the editor of the New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung (see No. 237, 3, 2, of Frankfurter Zeitung) I should like to add the following remarks: During my activity as Professor of the Methodics of

Foreign Language Teaching at Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, (January-June, 1911,) I was introduced to Mr. Andrew Carnegie, with whom I had a long interview. He expressed his views upon the peace question and arbi-

tration, and spoke for a long time about the German Emperor who had repeatedly received him during his visits to Germany. He expressed his great appreciation of the important services rendered by our Emperor for the maintenance of peace, and declared that he, above all others, deserved the title of the Peace-loving Monarch, (Friedensfürst.) To him it was chiefly due that, during the various crises which had repeatedly brought Europe to the brink of war, the disaster had again and again been averted. The German Emperor, he considered, looked upon it as his chief pride that no war should take place during his reign, that Germany should develop and prosper in peaceful emulation with other countries, and his greatest desire was that other nations should recognize ungrudgingly that all Germany did to raise the moral and ethical standard of mankind was for the benefit of all.

If now Carnegie has really declared, as this letter maintains, that he considers the German Emperor the "Disturber of Peace," it shows clearly how baleful the influence of the English press has been—that it could shake such a firm conviction in our Emperor's love of

peace. Let us hope that this letter of Prof. Niemeyer's and other explanations to the same effect will induce him to recognize the horrible misrepresentations of English papers and to return to his former conviction.

It was on this occasion, too, that Andrew Carnegie indorsed Prof. Burgess's view, that the three nations—America, Germany, and England—should unite, and then they would be able to keep the peace of the world. When I expressed my doubts in the real friendship of England, he replied, then America and Germany, at least, must hold together to secure universal peace. Hitherto I have refrained from publishing this interview, but now I consider it my duty to make known the views that Carnegie once held, and to which, if he has really changed them, we may hope he, who has done so much in his noble striving after peace, will return right away.

If there should remain the least doubt in Mr. Andrew Carnegie's mind, he has only to read the telegrams exchanged between the Emperor William and the Czar on the one hand, and King George and the Emperor on the other.

The Russian Army From Within

In his book, "The Russian Army From Within," written in London toward the end of 1914, and reprinted in the United States, Mr. W. B. Steveni deals with the gigantic power of Russia in men, money, and resources. He says that the money borrowed from France, estimated to exceed \$3,000,000,000, has helped to replenish the State Treasury, to reconstruct the navy, to build strategic military railways, and to arm the soldiers with excellent weapons. Estimates show that there are 120,000,000 peasants in Russia, "and probably no body of men in existence is so hardy as this." Their physique is admirable. Mr. Steveni writes:

The ordinary peasant, the man who has built up the Russian Empire with his blood and his toil, is not a big man; he is of medium stature, broad shouldered

and sturdy, with square forehead, square jaw, regular Arian features, and a flowing beard, unless he comes of Tartar or Finnish extraction. In short, the pure Russian is an Arian like ourselves, with a considerable admixture of Scandinavian blood in his veins, especially in the northern Governments, where the finest Rus or Russian types are found.

Seventy per cent. of the recruits for the army of the Czar can neither read nor write; the average recruit is "careless, procrastinating, happy-go-lucky, slavish, superstitious, and generally exceedingly ignorant." But the author pronounces "the finished material excellent" after the officers have drilled the recruits into soldiers. In war Ivan is formidable, stubborn, self-sacrificing, contemptuous of death. "Life is a farthing" is his saying.

PERIOD II.

The Speeches of Kaiser Wilhelm—The Mighty Fate of Europe—Austria-Hungary's Version of the War—Speculations About Peace—First Warnings of Europe's Peril—Great Britain's Mobilization—The Nations Called to Arms—Teachings of Bernhardi—Entrance of France Into the War—Russian Proclamations—French Manifestos—The Facts About Belgium—Belgo-British Plot Alleged by Germany—Atrocities of the War—The Bombardment of Rheims Cathedral—The Socialist View of War.

WHO BEGAN THE WAR, AND WHY? THE CASE FOR GERMANY

SPEECHES BY KAISER WILHELM II.

[From the Balcony of the Palace, Berlin, July 31, 1914.]

A FATEFUL hour has fallen for Germany. Envious peoples everywhere are compelling us to our just defense.

The sword is being forced into our hand. I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in bringing our opponents to see eye to eye with us and in maintaining peace we shall with God's help so wield the sword that we shall restore it to its sheath again with honor.

War would demand enormous sacrifices of blood and property from the German people, but we should show our enemies what it means to provoke Germany.

And now I commend you to God. Go to church. Kneel down before God and pray for His help for our Gallant Army.

FORGIVES ENEMIES

Kaiser Wilhelm's Speech from the Balcony of the Palace, Berlin, Aug. 2.

I thank you for the love and loyalty shown me. When I enter upon a fight let all party strife cease. We are German brothers and nothing else. All parties have attacked me in times of peace. I forgive them with all my heart. I hope and wish that the good German sword will emerge victorious in the right.

SPEECH FROM THE THRONE

Kaiser Wilhelm II., Opening Special Session of the Reichstag in White Room of the Royal Palace, Berlin, Aug. 4.

Honored Sirs: It is in an hour fraught with fate that I have assembled about me all the representatives of the German people. For almost half a century we have been able to keep to the path of peace. The attempts to attribute a warlike temperament to Germany and to circumscribe its position in the world have often put to severe tests the patience of our people. With unswerving honesty, my Government, even in provoking circumstances, has pursued as its highest aim the development of all moral, spiritual, and economic powers. The world has been witness how tirelessly we strove in the first rank during the pressure and confusion of the last few years to spare the nations of Europe a war between the great powers.

The very grave dangers which had arisen owing to the events in the Balkans appeared to have been overcome, but then the murder of my friend, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, opened up a great abyss. My high ally, the Emperor and King Francis Joseph, was compelled to take up arms to defend the security of his empire against dangerous intrigues from a neighboring State. In the pursuit of her proper interests the Dual Monarchy has found her path obstructed by the Russian Empire. Not only our

duty as an ally calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary, but on us falls also the mighty task of defending the ancient community of culture of the two kingdoms and our own position in the world against the attack of hostile powers. With a heavy heart I have been compelled to mobilize my army against a neighbor with whom it has fought side by side on so many fields of battle. With sincere sorrow I saw a friendship broken of which Germany had given faithful proofs. The Imperial Russian Government, yielding to the pressure of an insatiable nationalism, has taken sides with a State which by encouraging criminal attacks has brought on the evil of this war. That France, also, placed herself on the side of our enemies could not surprise us. Too often have our efforts to arrive at friendlier relations with the French Republic come in collision with old hopes and ancient malice.

Honored Sirs: What human insight and power could do to arm a people against the last extremities has been done with your patriotic help. The hostility which has been smoldering for a long time in the East and in the West has now burst into bright flames. The present situation did not proceed from transient conflicts of interest or diplomatic entanglements, it is the result of an ill will which has for many years been active against the strength and the prosperity of the German Empire. We are not incited by lust for conquest, we are inspired by the unyielding determination to keep for ourselves and all future generations the place which God has given us.

From the proofs which have been given you, you will see how my Government, and especially my Chancellor, strove up to the last moment to avert the worst. We grasp the sword in compulsory self-defense, with clean hands and a clean conscience.

To the peoples and races of the German Empire my call goes forth to defend with all their strength and in brotherly co-operation with our ally that which we have created by peaceful labor. After the example of our fathers, firmly and

faithfully, sincerely and with chivalry, humbly before God and battling joyfully before the enemy, let us place our trust in the eternal Omnipotence, and may He strengthen our defense and bring it to a good end!

To you, honored Sirs, the whole German people, assembled about its Princes and its leaders, look this day. Make your decision unanimously and quickly. That is my heartfelt wish.

Gentlemen (addressing the Deputies directly): You have read what I said to my people the other day from the balcony of my castle. I repeat now that I no longer know any parties. I know only Germans. And in order to testify that you are firmly resolved without distinction of party to stand by my side through danger and death, I call upon the leaders of the different parties in this House to come forward and lay their hands in mine as a pledge.

TO THE GERMAN ARMY AND NAVY

Proclamation by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

After three and forty years of peace I call the men of Germany to arms.

It has become necessary to protect our most sacred possessions, the Fatherland, our very hearths against ruthless destruction.

Enemies on every hand! That is the situation. A mighty struggle, a great sacrifice confronts us.

I trust that the old spirit of battle still lives on in the German people, that powerful spirit of battle which grapples with the foe wherever it meets it, be the cost what it may, which has ever been the terror and fear of our enemies.

Soldiers of Germany, in you I place my trust! In each one of you lives the passionate will to conquer, which nothing can subdue. Each one of you knows, if need be, how to die a hero's death.

*Remember our great and glorious past!
Remember that you are Germans!
God help us!*

WILHELM.

Berlin, Schloss, Aug. 6, 1914.

TO GERMAN WOMEN

An Appeal from the Kaiserin.

On the summons of the Emperor our people are preparing for an unprecedented struggle, which it did not invoke and which it is only carrying on in its defense. Whoever can bear arms will joyfully hasten to the colors to defend the Fatherland with his blood. The struggle will be gigantic and the wounds to be healed innumerable, therefore I call upon you women and girls of Germany, and all to whom it is not given to fight for our beloved home, for help. Let every one now do what lies in her power to lighten the struggle for our husbands, sons, and brothers. I know that in all ranks of our people, without exception, the will exists to fulfill this high ideal, but may the Lord God strengthen us in our holy work of love, which summons us women to devote all our strength to the Fatherland in its decisive struggle.

The organizations primarily concerned who should be supported first have already sent out notices regarding the mustering of volunteers and the collection of gifts of all kinds.

AUGUSTE VICTORIA.

Berlin, Aug. 6.

"TO THE LAST BREATH OF MAN AND HORSE"

Proclamation by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Since the foundation of the empire it has been for forty-three years the object of the efforts of myself and my ancestors to preserve the peace of the world and to advance by peaceful means our vigorous development. But our adversaries were jealous of the successes of our work. There has been latent hostility on the east and on the west and beyond the sea. It was borne by us till now, as we were aware of our responsibility and power. Now, however, these adversaries wish to humiliate us, asking that we should look on with crossed arms and watch our enemies preparing themselves for a com-

ing attack. They will not suffer that we maintain resolute fidelity to our ally who is fighting for its position as a great power and with whose humiliation our power and honor would equally be lost. So the sword must decide.

In the midst of perfect peace the enemy surprises us. Therefore to arms! Any dallying, any temporizing would be to invite final disaster. To be or not to be, is the question for the empire which our fathers founded. To be or not to be German power and German existence. We shall resist to the last breath of man and horse, and shall fight out the struggle even against a world of enemies. Never has Germany been subdued when it was united. Forward with God, who will be with us as He was with our ancestors!

WILHELM.

Berlin, Aug. 6.

JOY IN GLORIOUS VICTORY

Speech of Kaiser at a Parade During Swift German Advance Toward Paris.

Comrades: I have gathered you around me here in order to take joy with you in the glorious victory which our comrades have in several days of hot battle won with their swords. Troops out of every nook and cranny of the empire helped one another in invincible bravery and unshakable loyalty to win great results. There stood together under the leadership of the son of the Bavarian King and fought, with equal blades, troops of all ages, active, reservists, and landwehr.

For our victory we are thankful, in the first place, to our God, (unserem alten Gott.) He will not desert us, since we stand for a holy cause. Many of our comrades have already fallen in battle. They died as heroes for the Fatherland. We will think of them with honor here, and shout to the honor of those still in the field. Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah!

We still have many a bloody battle before us. Let us hope for further successes like this. We shall not relent, and we shall get to the enemy's hide. We shall not lose our faith and trust in

our good old God up there, (unserem guten alten Gott dort oben.) We are determined to win, and we must win.

FIRST SUCCESSFUL BATTLE

Telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm II. to Chief of Troops in Upper Alsace, Aug. 15.

Grateful to God, Who was with us. I thank you and your troops for the first victory. Please convey to all the troops which took part in the fight my imperial thanks in the name of the Fatherland.

YOUR CHIEF WAR CAPTAIN.

A PRAYER FOR VICTORY

By the Kaiser's Order to Supreme Council of the Evangelical Church—To Be Included in the Liturgy Throughout the War.

Almighty and merciful God! God of the armies! We beseech Thee in humility for Thy almighty aid for our German Fatherland. Bless the entire German war force, lead us to victory, and give us grace that we may show ourselves to be Christians toward our enemies as well. Let us soon arrive at the peace which will everlastingly safeguard our free and independent Germany.

"UP AND AT THE FOES"

Kaiser's Farewell Speech to First Regiment of Foot Guards at Potsdam.

I draw the sword that with God's help I have kept all these years in the scabbard. I have drawn the sword, which without victory and without honor I cannot sheath again. All of you will see to it that only in honor is it returned to the scabbard. You are my guarantee that I can dictate peace to my enemies. Up and at the foes, and down with the enemies of Brandenburg!

ON VICTORY NEAR METZ

From Cabinet Order of Kaiser Wilhelm II., Published in Berlin Aug. 23.

The mobilization and concentration of the army is now complete, the German railways having carried out the enormous transport movements with unparalleled certainty and punctuality. With a heart filled with gratitude my first thoughts turn to those who since 1870-71 have worked quietly upon the development of an organization which has emerged from its first serious test with such glorious success. To all who have co-operated with them I wish to express my imperial thanks for their loyal devotion to duty in making possible in obedience to my call the transportation of armed masses of German troops against my enemies. The present achievement [near Metz] convinces me that the railways of the country will be equal to the heaviest demands that might be made upon them during the course of the gigantic struggle in which we are engaged for the future of the German Nation.

THE SPIRIT OF THE MEN

Kaiser's Telegram from Dresden to the King of Saxony, Oct. 2.

I am very glad to be able to send you the best reports of the Nineteenth Army Corps and the Twelfth Reserve Corps. I visited yesterday the Third Army and greeted especially the brave 181st Regiment, to which I expressed my recognition. I found your third son and your brother Max as well as Laffert and Kirchbach in the best of health. The spirit among the men is splendid. With such an army we shall be able to complete victoriously the rest of our difficult task. To this end may the Almighty stand by us. WILHELM.

HIS INDISCRETION WAS "CALCULATED"

Interview With Kaiser Wilhelm II., Oct. 28, 1908, and Its Consequences.

An interview between the German Emperor and "a representative Englishman, who long

since passed from public to private life," appeared in The London Telegraph on Oct. 28, 1908, and was the next day authenticated by the German Foreign Office in Berlin with the comment that it was "intended as a message to the English people." This last expression of the Kaiser toward Great Britain—until his declarations on the eve of the present war—deeply stirred the German people in protest and resulted in the Kaiser's pledge to Chancellor von Buelow that henceforth the imperial views would be subject to the bridle of the Ministry and the Council of the Empire. The interview as recorded by the "representative Englishman" was as follows:

Moments sometimes occur in the history of nations when a calculated indiscretion proves of the highest public service. It is for this reason that I have decided to make known the substance of a lengthy conversation which it was my recent privilege to have with the Emperor.

I do so in the hope that it will help to remove that obstinate misconception of the character of the Emperor's feelings toward England, which I fear is deeply rooted in the ordinary Englishman's breast. It is the Emperor's sincere wish that it should be eradicated. He has given repeated proofs of his desire by word and deed. But, to speak frankly, his patience is sorely tried now; he finds himself so continually misrepresented and has so often experienced the mortification of finding that any momentary improvement in relations is followed by renewed outbursts of prejudice and a prompt return to the old attitude of suspicion.

His Majesty spoke with impulsive and unusual frankness, saying: "You English are as mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are completely given over to suspicions that are quite unworthy of a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? I declared with all the emphasis at my command in my speech at the Guildhall that my heart was set upon peace, and that it was one of my dearest wishes to live on the best terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word? Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My actions ought to speak for themselves, but you will not listen

to them, but to those who misinterpret and distort them.

Resents a Personal Insult

"This is a personal insult which I resent; to be forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friendship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, mistrustful eyes taxes my patience severely. I have said time after time that I am a friend of England, and your press, or at least a considerable section of it, bids the people of England to refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other hand holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation against its will?"

Complaining again of the difficulty imposed on him by English distrust, his Majesty said: "The prevailing sentiment of large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in the minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best element, just as it is in England respecting Germany."

The Englishman reminded the Kaiser that not only England but the whole of Europe viewed with disapproval the recent sending of the German Consul at Algiers to Fez and forestalling France and Spain by suggesting the recognition of Sultan Mulai Hafid. The Kaiser made an impatient gesture and exclaimed: "Yes, that is an excellent example of the way German actions are misrepresented," and with vivid directness he defended the aforesaid incident, as the German Government has already done.

The interviewer reminded the Kaiser that an important and influential section of the German newspapers interpreted these acts very differently, and effusively approved of them because they indicated that Germany was bent upon shaping events in Morocco.

"There are mischief makers," replied the Emperor, "in both countries. I will not attempt to weigh their relative capacity for misrepresentation, but the facts are as I have stated. There has been nothing in Germany's recent action in regard to Morocco contrary to the explicit declaration of my love of peace made both at the Guildhall and in my latest speech at Strassburg."

Kaiser and the Boer War

Reverting to his efforts to show his friendship for England, the Kaiser said they had not been confined to words. It was commonly believed that Germany was hostile to England throughout the Boer war. Undoubtedly the newspapers were hostile and public opinion was hostile. "But what," he asked, "of official Germany? What brought to a sudden stop, indeed, to an absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates, who were striving to obtain European intervention?"

"They were fêted in Holland. France gave them a rapturous welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the German people would have crowned them with flowers, but when they asked me to receive them I refused. The agitation immediately died away and the delegates returned empty handed. Was that the action of a secret enemy?"

"Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German Government was invited by France and Russia to join them in calling upon England to end the war. The moment had come, they said, not only to save the Boer republic, but also to humiliate England to the dust. What was my reply? I said so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to bring pressure against England and bring about the downfall Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England.

"Posterity will one day read the exact terms of a telegram, now in the archives of Windsor Castle, in which I informed the sovereign of England of the answer I returned to the powers which then sought to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what my actions were in the hour of their adversity.

"Nor was that all. During your black week in December, 1899, when disasters followed one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sorrow and affliction and bearing manifest traces of the anxieties which were prey-

ing upon her mind and health. I at once returned a sympathetic reply. I did more. I bade one of my officers to procure as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants on both sides and the actual positions of the opposing forces.

"With the figures before me I worked out what I considered the best plan of campaign in the circumstances and submitted it to my General Staff for criticism. Then I dispatched it to England. That document likewise is among the State papers at Windsor awaiting the serenely impartial verdict of history.

"Let me add as a curious coincidence that the plan which I formulated ran very much on the same lines as that actually adopted by Gen. Roberts and carried by him into successful operation. Was that the act of one who wished England ill? Let Englishmen be just and say."

The German Navy

Touching then upon the English conviction that Germany is increasing her navy for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, the Kaiser reiterated the explanation that Chancellor von Bülow and other Ministers have made familiar, dwelling upon Germany's worldwide commerce, her manifold interests in distant seas, and the necessity for being prepared to protect them. He said:

"Patriotic Germans refuse to assign any bounds to their legitimate commercial ambitions. They expect their interests to go on growing. They must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. Germany looks ahead. Her horizons stretch far away. She must be prepared for any eventualities in the Far East. Who can foresee what may take place in the Pacific in the days to come, days not so distant as some believe, but days, at any rate, for which all European powers with Far Eastern interests ought to steadily prepare?

"Look at the accomplished rise of Japan. Think of a possible national awakening in China, and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only

those powers which have great navies will be listened to with respect when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved, and if for that reason only Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may even be that England herself will be glad that Germany has a fleet when they speak together in the great debates of the future."

The interviewer concludes:

"The Emperor spoke with all that earnestness which marks his manner when speaking on deeply pondered subjects. I ask my fellow-countrymen who value the cause of peace to weigh what I have written and revise, if necessary, their estimate of the Kaiser and his friendship for England by his Majesty's own words. If they had enjoyed the privilege of hearing them spoken they would no longer doubt either his Majesty's firm desire to live on the best of terms with England or his growing impatience at the persistent mistrust with which his offer of friendship is too often received."

The Consequences

On Nov. 17 following Prince von Bülow met the Kaiser at Kiel, taking with him evidence of the feeling in Germany regarding the Emperor's published interview and setting forth:

First, that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, is firm in the opinion formulated at the meeting held yesterday that it would be wiser for the Emperor not to express views affecting the relations of the empire with other countries except through his responsible Ministers. This expression derives weight from the fact that the Governments of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony were represented on the committee.

Second, that the entire Reichstag assented to the declarations made by the speakers on Tuesday that the Emperor had exceeded his constitutional prerogatives in private discussion with foreigners concerning Germany's attitude on controverted questions.

Third, that the feeling of the people at large on this matter was accurately indicated by the press of the country.

The Kaiser's reply was published on the same date in the *Reichsanzeiger*, in the form of a communication, which read:

During today's audience granted to the Imperial Chancellor, his Majesty the Emperor and King listened for several hours to a report by Prince von Bülow. The Imperial Chancellor described the feeling and its causes among the German people in connection with the article published in *The Daily Telegraph*. He also explained the position he had taken during the course of the debates and interpellations on this subject in the Reichstag. His Majesty the Emperor received the statements and explanations with great earnestness, and then expressed his will as follows:

"Headless of the exaggerations of public criticism, which are regarded by him as incorrect, his Majesty perceives that his principal imperial task is to insure the stability of the policies of the empire, under the guardianship of constitutional responsibilities. In conformity therewith, his Majesty the Emperor approves the Chancellor's utterances in the Reichstag, and assures Prince von Bülow of his continued confidence."

WILHELM II'S LETTER TO LORD TWEEDMOUTH

[PUBLISHED BY THE MORNING POST OF
LONDON, OCT. 30, 1914]

The subjoined letter written to the late Lord Tweedmouth by the German Emperor is made public for the first time. It is a literal transcript of the original document in which occur a few slight errors in spelling. The existence of the document was first made known to the public by the military correspondent of *The Times*, who published a letter on the subject on March 6, 1908, but its contents were not divulged.

The significance of the letter can be understood only in the light of the naval and political situation six years ago. During the preceding year, 1907, The Hague Conference, ostensibly convened in the interests of international peace, had resolved itself into a committee to determine how to diminish the severities of war. There was a section of opinion in this country which was persuaded that the only method of seeking peace was to reduce the navy and army. At the same time the Imperial German Navy was making swift and steady

progress, and its menace to British supremacy aroused considerable alarm in this country. Although the British Navy held superiority over the German Navy in ships not of the dreadnought type, the balance in dreadnoughts was virtually even.

Dreadnought Supremacy

It was stated in Parliament that in the year 1916 Germany, according to her naval law, would have thirty-six dreadnoughts, a number which would involve the building by this country of forty-four such vessels in the same period, toward which the Government was only providing two in the current year. It was also stated that in the year 1911 Germany would possess thirteen dreadnoughts and Great Britain only twelve, which statement was founded upon reasonable assumptions. Could Germany reckon upon the continuance of such a relative position, the advantage to her would be very great.

It was at this critical moment that the German Emperor indited his letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty, which is printed below. When the fact became known there was a good deal of public feeling aroused both in this country and abroad. Lord Tweedmouth stated that the letter was a private letter and purely personal. Prince von Bülow informed the Reichstag that the letter was of both a private and political character, adding some remarks concerning the "purely defensive character of our naval programme which," said the Chancellor, "cannot be emphasized too frequently."

The German Foreign Office officially announced that "in his letter the Emperor merely corrected certain erroneous views prevalent in England regarding the development of the German fleet."

Readers are now in a position to judge for themselves the accuracy of these statements. It should be remembered that the reduced navy estimates of 1908-9 were followed by national alarm and the publication of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford's shipbuilding programme and large increase in estimates of the following year. Here is the letter:

The Kaiser's Letter

Berlin, 14th-2, 1908.

My Dear Lord Tweedmouth: May I intrude on your precious time and ask for a few moments' attention to these lines I venture to submit to you? I see by the daily papers and reviews that a battle royal is being fought about the needs of the navy. I therefore venture to furnish you with some information anent the German naval program, which it seems is being quoted by all parties to further their ends by trying to frighten peaceable British taxpayers with it as a bogey.

During my last pleasant visit to your hospitable shores I tried to make your authorities understand what the drift of German naval policy is, but I am afraid that my explanations have been either misunderstood or not believed, because I see "German danger" and "German challenge to British naval supremacy" constantly quoted in different articles. This phrase, if not repudiated or corrected, sown broadcast over the country and daily dinned into British ears, might in the end create the most deplorable results.

I therefore deem it advisable, as Admiral of the Fleet, to lay some facts before you to enable you to see clearly that it is absolutely nonsensical and untrue that the German naval bill is to provide a navy meant as a challenge to British naval supremacy. The German fleet is built against nobody at all; it is solely built for Germany's needs in relation with that country's rapidly growing trade. The German naval bill was sanctioned by the Imperial Parliament and published ten years ago, and may be had at any large bookseller's. There is nothing surprising, secret, or underhand in it, and every reader may study the whole course mapped out for the development of the German Navy with the greatest ease.

Thirty to Forty Battleships in 1920

The law is being adhered to, and provides for about thirty to forty ships of the line in 1920. The number of ships fixed by the bill included the fleet then actually in commission, notwithstanding its material being already old and far surpassed by contemporary types. In other foreign navies the extraordinary rapidity with which improvements were introduced in types of battleships, armaments, and armor made the fleet in commission obsolete before the building program providing additions to it was half finished.

The obsolete fleet had to be struck off the list, thus leaving a gap, lowering the number of ships below the standard prescribed by the bill. This gap was stopped by using the finished ships to replace the obsolete ones instead of being added to

them as originally intended. Therefore, instead of steadily increasing the standing fleet by regular additions, it came to a wholesale rebuilding of the entire German Navy. Our actual program in course of execution is practically only the exchange of old material for new, but not an addition to the number of units originally laid down by the bill of ten years ago, which is being adhered to.

It seems to me that the main fault in the discussions going on in the papers is the permanent ventilating of so-called two to three or more power standard and then only exemplifying on one power, which is invariably Germany. It is fair to suppose that each nation builds and commissions its navy according to its needs and not only with regard to the program of other countries. Therefore, it would be the simplest thing for England to say: "I have a worldwide empire and the greatest trade of the world, and to protect them I must have so and so many battleships, cruisers, &c., as are necessary to guarantee the supremacy of the sea to me, and they shall, accordingly, be built and manned."

That is the absolute right of your country, and nobody anywhere would lose a word about it, and whether it be 60 or 90 to 100 battleships, that would make no difference and certainly no change in the German naval bill. May the numbers be as you think fit, everybody here would understand it, but the people would be very thankful over here if at last Germany was left out of the discussion, for it is very galling to the Germans to see their country continually held up as the sole danger and menace to Great Britain by the whole press of the different contending parties, considering that other countries are building, too, and there are even larger fleets than the German.

Fears German Retaliation

Doubtless, when party faction runs high there is often a lamentable lack of discrimination in the choice of weapons, but I really must protest that the German naval program should be only one for her exclusive use, or that such a poisoned view should be forged as a German challenge to British supremacy of the sea. If permanently used mischief may be created at home, and the injured feeling engendering the wish for retaliation in the circle of the German Naval League as a representative of the nation which would influence public opinion and place the Government in a very disagreeable position by trying to force it to change its program through undue pressure, difficult to ignore.

In a letter which Lord Esher caused to be published a short time ago he wrote

that every German, from the Emperor down to the last man, wished for the downfall of Sir John Fisher. Now I am at a loss to tell whether the supervision of the foundations and drains of royal palaces is apt to qualify somebody for the judgment of naval affairs in general. As far as regards German affairs, the phrase is a piece of unmitigated balderdash, and has created immense merriment in the circles of those here who know. But I venture to think that such things ought not to be written by people who are high placed, as they are liable to hurt public feelings over here.

Of course I need not assure you that nobody here dreams of wishing to influence Great Britain in the choice of those to whom she means to give the direction of her navy or to disturb them in the fulfillment of their noble task. It is expected that the choice will always fall on the best and ablest, and their deeds will be followed with interest and admiration by their brother officers in the German Navy.

It is, therefore, preposterous to infer that the German authorities work for or against persons in official positions in foreign countries. It is as ridiculous as it is untrue, and I hereby repudiate such calumny. Besides, to my humble notion, this perpetual quoting of the German danger is utterly unworthy of the great British Nation, with its worldwide empire and mighty navy. There is something nearly ludicrous about it. The foreigners in other countries might easily conclude that Germans must be an exceptionally strong lot, as they seem to be able to strike terror into the hearts of the British, who are five times their superiors.

I hope your Lordship will read these lines with kind consideration. They are written by one who is an ardent admirer of your splendid navy, who wishes it all success, and who hopes that its ensign may ever wave on the same side as the German Navy's, and by one who is proud to wear a British naval uniform of Admiral of the Fleet, which was conferred on him by the late great Queen of blessed memory.

Once more the German naval bill is not aimed at England and is not a challenge to British supremacy of the sea, which will remain unchallenged for generations to come. Let us all remember the warn-

ing Admiral Sir John Fisher gave to his hearers in November, when so cleverly he cautioned them not to get scared by using the admirable phrase "if Eve had not always kept her eye on the apple she would not have eaten it, and we should not now be bothered with clothes."

I remain yours truly,

WILLIAM I. R.,
Admiral of the Fleet.

Attacks Kaiser's Veracity

The Morning Post, commenting on the letter of the Kaiser, says:

It is not usual for an Emperor to address a Minister of a foreign country with reference to the affairs of his department. It is a fact that it is not done. Lord Tweedmouth said the letter was a private letter. The German Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, said the letter partook of both a private and a political character. The fact remains that it involved an extraordinary breach of etiquette. There is no reflection cast upon the late Lord Tweedmouth. No one can help receiving a letter from an Emperor if that monarch condescends to dispatch it. Few persons, perhaps, could help being influenced, albeit unconsciously influenced, by the perusal of such an epistle.

Perhaps the German Emperor reflected upon that psychological contingency; for to what conclusion is the whole tenor of the letter directed? That the German Navy existed solely for purposes of defense in case of aggression and for the protection of German commerce, and that it was no part of German policy, and never had been, to menace the sea power of Britain.

Now turn to the notorious preamble of the German navy law of 1900, which in his letter the Emperor cites as a guarantee of good faith. It is there stated that the German Navy must be made so powerful that it would be dangerous for any nation, even the strongest maritime nation, to attack it.

If that is not a challenge, what is? Had it not been in terms a challenge the preamble would surely have run that it was not the intention to make the German Navy so strong that the strongest naval power could not attack it without danger to that power.

The Mighty Fate of Europe

As Interpreted by Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg,
German Imperial Chancellor.

"YOUR HEARTS FOR GOD, YOUR FISTS ON THE ENEMY"

*Speech from Balcony of Chancellor's
Official Residence, Berlin, Aug. 1.*

At this serious hour in order to give expression to your feelings for your Fatherland you have come to the house of Bismarck, who with Emperor William the Great and Field Marshal von Moltke welded the German Empire for us.

We wished to go on living in peace in the empire which we have developed in forty-four years of peaceful labor.

The whole work of Emperor William has been devoted to the maintenance of peace. To the last hour he has worked for peace in Europe, and he is still working for it. Should all his efforts prove vain and should the sword be forced into our hands we will take the field with a clear conscience in the knowledge that we did not seek war. We shall then wage war for our existence and for the national honor to the last drop of our blood.

In the gravity of this hour I remind you of the words of Prince Frederick Charles to the men of Brandenburg:

"Let your hearts beat for God and your fists on the enemy."

AS ONE MAN FOR THE KAISER

*Speech from Balcony of Royal Palace,
Berlin, Aug. 2.*

All stand as one man for our Kaiser, whatever our opinions or our creeds. I am sure that all the young German men are ready to shed their blood for the fame and greatness of Germany. We can only trust in God, Who hitherto has always given us victory.

DECLARES FOR WAR*

*Speech Delivered in the Reichstag,
Berlin, Afternoon of Aug. 4.*

A mighty fate has descended upon Europe. Because we were struggling for the esteem of the German Empire in the world, we have for forty-four years lived in peace and safeguarded the peace of Europe. In peaceful industry we have become strong and mighty and in consequence envied. With patience we have borne that, under the pretext that Germany was desirous of war, hostility toward us was being nursed and chains forged for us both in the East and in the West.

We wished to continue to live in peaceful industry, and, like an unexpressed vow, there was passed on from Kaiser to the youngest soldier: "Only in defense of a righteous cause shall our sword be drawn." (Hearty applause.) The day when we must draw it has appeared, contrary to our desire, contrary to our honest efforts to avoid it. Russia has applied the firebrand to the house. We find ourselves in a forced war with Russia and France.

Gentlemen, a series of documents, composed in the rush of events, is in your hands. Allow me to place before you the facts which characterize our attitude.

From the very beginning of the Austrian conflict we strove and worked toward the end that this trouble remain confined to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All Cabinets, especially that of England, take the same stand; only Russia de-

*The Times of London contained on Aug. 12, 1914, the following:

"The statement made by the German Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag on Aug. 4, which we published yesterday and reproduce below, lends piquancy to a communication that reached us from an influential quarter in Germany on Aug. 2. The communication.

clares that she must have a word in the decision of this conflict. Therewith the danger of European entanglements arises. As soon as the first authentic reports of the military preparations in Russia reached us we declared in a friendly but emphatic manner in St. Petersburg that war measures and military preparations would force us also to prepare, and that mobilization is closely akin to war.

Russia asserts in what is an apparently friendly manner that she is not mobilizing against us. In the meantime England tries to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, in which she is warmly supported by us. On July 28 the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar, asking him to consider that Austria-Hungary has the right and that it is her duty to defend herself against Servian intrigues, which threaten to undermine her existence. The Kaiser called the attention of the Czar to their common monarchical interests with regard to the Serajevo outrage, and asked him personally to support him in order to establish harmony between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

At about the same hour in which this telegram was sent the Czar asked the

Kaiser for his support and requested him to advise Vienna to be moderate in its demands. The Kaiser assumed the rôle of mediator. Hardly had he begun his activity when Russia mobilized its entire fighting force against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary, however, had mobilized only those army corps which were directed against Servia; in the north there were only two army corps and these far from the Russian border.

The Kaiser immediately called the attention of the Czar to the fact that this mobilization of his forces against Austria-Hungary made his position as mediator difficult or absolutely impossible. In spite of this we continued our mediatorial activities in Vienna, going to the utmost limits of consistency with the terms of our federal treaty. ["Very true! Hear, hear!"] During this time Russia again spontaneously assured us that her military preparations were not directed against us. ["Hear, hear, fie!"]

The 31st of July arrived. In Vienna the decision was to be made. In the meantime we had succeeded with our negotiations to reaching a point where Vienna resumed intercourse with St. Petersburg, which for some time had been discontinued, but before the final

which we give in its original form, bore the name of a personage holding a prominent position in Germany, and standing in a close personal relationship to the German Emperor. It was evidently timed for publication on the morning of Aug. 3, the day of Sir Edward Grey's historic speech in the House of Commons":

Aug. 2, 1914.

I hear with astonishment that in France and elsewhere in the world it is imagined that Germany wants to carry on an aggressive war, and that she had with this aim brought about the present situation. It is said that the Emperor was of the opinion that the moment had come to have a final reckoning with his enemies; but what a terrible error that is! Whoever knows the Emperor as I do, whoever knows how very seriously he takes the responsibility of the crown, how his moral ideas are rooted in true religious feeling, must be astonished that any one could attribute such motives to him.

He has not wanted the war; it has been forced upon him by the might of the circumstances. He has worked unswerv-

ingly to keep the peace, and has together with England thrown his whole influence into the scales to find a peaceful solution, in order to save his people from the horrors of war. But everything has been wrecked upon the attitude of Russia, which in the middle of negotiations which offered good outlook of success mobilized her forces, wherewith she proved that she did not mean in earnest what her assurances of peaceful intentions indicated.

Now Germany's frontiers are menaced by Russia which drags her allies into the war, now Germany's honor is at stake. Is it possible under these circumstances that the most peace-loving monarch can do otherwise than take to the sword in order to defend the most sacred interests of the nation?

And, finally, the German people! In them is firmly rooted the word of Prince Bismarck against aggressive wars: "One must not try to look into the cards of Fate."

It must be stated again: Russia alone forces the war upon Europe. Russia alone must carry the full weight of responsibility.

decision was reached in Vienna the news arrived that Russia had mobilized its entire fighting force, which meant also against us. ["Hear, hear!"]

Russia's Mobilization

The Russian Government, which from repeated admonitions knew what mobilizing on our borders meant, did not notify us of this mobilization and gave us absolutely no explanation. ["Hear! hear!"] Not until the afternoon of July 31 did the Kaiser receive a message from the Czar in which he assured him that the attitude of his army was not hostile toward us. ["Hear! hear!" and laughter.]

However, the mobilization against us on the Russian border was on the night of July 31 already in full progress. While we, at the request of Russia, were mediating in Vienna, the Russian Army appeared on our long, almost entirely open border. France, although not yet mobilizing, was making preparations for war. And we, up to this point, had intentionally not then called a single soldier of the reserve, for the sake of European peace. ["Bravo!"]

Should we continue to wait with patience until the powers by which we are surrounded choose the moment for attack? ["No!"] To expose Germany to this danger would have been criminal! [Stormy, concerted prolonged "Very true and bravo!"—also from the Social Democrats.] Therefore, on July 31 we demanded that Russia demobilize, this being the only measure which could save the peace of Europe. [Hearty approval.] The Imperial Ambassador received, furthermore, the order to declare to the Russian Government that in case they did not comply with our demands they should consider that a state of war exists.

The Imperial Ambassador performed this mission. Up till the present we have not learned Russia's answer to this demand. ["Hear, hear!"] Telegraphic reports concerning it have not yet reached us, although the wire still transmits less important messages. ["Hear, hear!"] Therefore, on Aug. 1, at 5 o'clock, when the appointed period of grace was long

past, the Kaiser considered it necessary to mobilize.

At the same time we had to make sure of the position France would take. To our direct question whether in case of a German-Russian war she would remain neutral, France answered that she would do what she had to do in her own interests. [Laughter.] That was an evasive if not a negative answer to our question.

Declares France Began War.

In spite of this the Kaiser gave the order that the French border should be respected. The command was strictly enforced, with a single exception France, which mobilized simultaneously with us, declared that she would respect a zone of ten kilometers from the border. ["Hear, hear!"] And what happened in reality? There were bomb-throwing fliers, cavalry patrols, invading companies in the Reichsland Alsace-Lorraine. ["Unheard of!"] Thereby France, although the condition of war had not yet been declared, had attacked our territory.

Concerning the French complaints in regard to violations of the border, I have received from the Chief of the General Staff the following report: Only one offense has been committed. Contrary to an emphatic order a patrol of the Fourteenth Army Corps, led by an officer, crossed the border on Aug. 2. They apparently were killed. Only one man returned. However, long before the crossing of the border French fliers were dropping bombs in Southern Germany, and at Schluchtpass the French troops had attacked our border troops.

Until the present our troops have confined their activity to the protection of our borders. They are now on the defense, and necessity recognizes no law. ["Very true!"]

Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have also found it necessary to enter Belgian territory. [Hearty applause.] This is contrary to international law. The French Government has declared in Brussels they will respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as she respects the opponent. We knew, however, that France was ready to invade

Belgium. ["Hear, hear!"] France could wait; we, however, could not, because a French invasion in our lower Rhein flank would have proved fatal.

So we were forced to disregard the protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. We shall try to make good the injustice we have committed as soon as our military goal has been reached. [Applause.] Who like we are fighting for the highest, must only consider how victory can be gained. [Enthusiastic applause in entire house.]

Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary. With reference to England, the declaration which Sir Edward Grey made in the House of Commons yesterday plainly shows our attitude. We have assured England that as long as she remains neutral our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France and that the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium will not be violated. This declaration I repeat before the whole world, and I can add that so long as England remains neutral we are prepared in case of reciprocity to refrain from all hostile operations against French merchant vessels. [Applause.]

Gentlemen, so much for the events. I repeat the words of the Kaiser: "With a clear conscience Germany goes to the battlefield." [Enthusiastic approval.] We are fighting for the fruits of our peaceful industry, for the inheritance of a great past, and for our future.

The fifty years of which Moltke spoke, and in which we should stand armed and ready to protect our inheritance and the acquisitions of 1870, have not yet passed. The hour of trial for the German Nation has struck, but we are facing it with confidence. [Stormy approval.]

Our army is in the field, our fleet is ready for battle, and behind it stands the entire German Nation. [Enthusiastic applause from the entire house.] The entire nation! [with a gesture particularly directed toward the Social Democrats. Renewed applause, in which the Social Democrats also joined.] You, gentlemen, realize your duty in its entirety. The question needs no further

consideration, and I request speedy action. [Enthusiastic applause.]

STATEMENT TO AMERICA

*Issued to The Associated Press From
General Headquarters, Sept. 2*

I do not know what is thought of this war in America. I assume there have been published in America the telegrams exchanged between the German Emperor, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of England, containing the history of the events that preceded the outbreak of the war, and which bear irrefutable testimony of how the Emperor, until the last moment, strove hard to preserve the peace.

These efforts had to be futile, as Russia, under all circumstances, had resolved upon war, and as England, which for decades had encouraged the anti-German nationalism in Russia and France, did not avail herself of the splendid opportunity offered her to prove her often-emphasized love of peace, otherwise the war between Germany and France and England could have been averted.

When once the archives are opened the world will learn how often Germany extended to England her friendly hand, but England did not desire the friendship of Germany. Jealous of the development of Germany, and feeling that by German efficiency and German industry she had been surpassed in some fields, she had the desire to crush Germany by brute force, as she in former times subdued Spain, Holland, and France. She believed the moment had arrived, and therefore the entry of German troops into Belgium gave her a welcome pretext to take part in the war.

Germany, however, was forced to enter Belgium because she had to forestall the planned French advance, and Belgium only awaited this advance to join France. That only a pretext was involved as far as England is concerned is proved by the fact that already on the afternoon of Aug. 2, that is, prior to the violation of Belgium neutrality by Germany, Sir Ed-

ward Grey assured the French Ambassador unconditionally of the help of England in case the German fleet attacked the French coast.

Moral scruple, however, the English policy does not know. And thus the English people, who always posed as the protagonist of freedom and right, has allied itself with Russia, the representative of the most terrible barbarism, a country that knows no spiritual or no religious freedom, that tramples upon the freedom of peoples as well as of individuals. Already England is beginning to recognize that she has made a mistake in her calculations, and that Germany will master her enemies. She is therefore trying by her pettiest means to injure Germany as much as possible in her commerce and colonies, by instigating Japan, regardless of the consequences to the cultural community of the white race, to a pillaging expedition against Kiao-Chau, and leading the negroes in Africa to fight against the Germans in the colonies.

Having strangled the news service of Germany to the whole world, and having opened the campaign against us with a falsehood, England will tell your countrymen that the German troops burned down Belgian villages and cities, but will pass over in silence the fact that Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of defenseless wounded. Officials of Belgian cities have invited our officers to dinner and shot and killed them across the table. Contrary to all international law, the whole civilian population of Belgium was called out, and after having at first shown friendliness, carried on in the rear of our troops a terrible warfare with concealed weapons.

Belgian women cut the throats of soldiers whom they had quartered in their homes while they were sleeping. England also will say nothing of the dum-dum bullets which are being used by the English and French despite all conventions and their hypocritical proclamations of humanity, which can be seen here in their original packing as they were found on French and English prisoners of war.

The Emperor has authorized me to

say all this and to state that he has full confidence in the sense of justice of the American people, which will not allow themselves to be deceived through the war of falsehoods which our enemies are conducting against us.

The statement of the Chancellor concludes as follows:

Every one who has lived in Germany since the outbreak of the war has been able to witness the great moral uprising of all Germans who, pressed hard on all sides, cheerfully take the field for the defense of their rights and their existence; every one knows that this people is not capable of any unnecessary cruelty or of any brutality. We will win, thanks to the great moral strength which our just cause gives to our troops, and in the end the greatest falsehoods will be able to obscure our victories as little as they do our rights.

GERMANY'S ARMAMENTS

*Speech Delivered in the Reichstag,
March 30, 1911.*

I have been asked to speak in order to make a few brief remarks on the question of disarmament and arbitration. The Social Democratic motion proposes that I should take steps to bring about a general limitation of armaments. As a matter of fact, the idea of disarmament is being constantly discussed by pacifists in Parliaments and in Congresses far and wide. Even the first peace conference at The Hague had to confine itself to expressing the wish that the Governments should devote themselves to the continued study of the question.

Germany has responded to this desire, but has been able to find no suitable formula, and I am not aware that other Governments have been more successful. The time when wars were made by Cabinets is past. The feelings which here in Europe may lead to war lie elsewhere.

They have their roots in antagonisms which must be found in popular sentiment. Everybody knows how easily this

sentiment is influenced and how, unfortunately, in many cases, it abandons itself helplessly to irresponsible press agitations. A counterpoise to all such and similar influences can but be desired. I shall be the first to welcome it whenever international efforts succeed in creating such a counterpoise.

But if I am to take practical steps and am to propose mutual disarmament to the other powers, then general pacific assurances and adjurations are not enough. With Germany there is no need for such assurances or adjurations, in view of her constant policy throughout forty years, which shows that we seek no quarrels in the world. I should have to submit a fixed, definite programme. Then I should have to consider in all sobriety whether such a programme could be drawn up and carried out. Any one who makes uncertain and vague proposals can easily become a disturber of the peace rather than a peacemaker.

I shall have to decline to draw up such a formula and submit it to an international congress.

England's Naval Police

England is convinced, and has repeatedly declared, in spite of her desires for the limitation of expenditure on armaments and for the adjustment of any disputes that may arise by arbitral procedure, that her fleet must in all circumstances be superior, or at any rate equal, to any possible combination in the world. England has a perfect right to strive for such a state of things, and, precisely because of the position that I take up toward the disarmament question, I am the last to cast doubts upon it. It is quite another thing, however, to make such a claim the basis of a convention which must be recognized by all the other powers in peaceful agreement. What if counterclaims are raised and the other powers are not satisfied with the rôles assigned to them?

One only requires to propound these questions in order to see things would not go well for European dignity at any world congress which had to decide upon such claims.

And then armies. If, for example, Germany should be required to reduce her army by 100,000 men, by how many men must the other powers diminish their armies? Notwithstanding all the pacific assurances which, thank God, are being given everywhere, every nation would reply to me at any preliminary inquiry that it claims that position in the world which corresponds with the sum of its national power, that the strength of its defensive forces must be adapted to this claim. At any rate, I would give no other reply for Germany. I should be touching the honor and national sentiment of any other people if I expected any other statement from it.

Question of Control

Every attempt at international disarmament must break down on the question of control, which is absolutely impracticable. A classic example of that is afforded by Prussia when overthrown by Napoleon. Her army was to be limited to 45,000 men, but her patriotism, notwithstanding the first ruthless application of every means of control, managed to raise an army four times as large. The question of disarmament is insoluble so long as men are men and States are States.

In the course of the debate reference has been made to the recent utterances of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on the disarmament question. The English Minister gave expression to the idea that a reciprocal exchange of information concerning the naval construction of both countries would insure them against surprises, and that thereby both countries would be convinced that they were not trying mutually to outstrip each other, while other powers would thereby be kept informed regarding the relations of Germany and England, and so the exchange of announcements would, on the whole, serve to promote peace.

We were all the more able to adhere to this idea, as our naval building program has always lain open. We have already declared our readiness to come to an understanding on this point with

England, in the hope that it may bring about a desired appeasement.

World-embracing international arbitration treaties dictated by an international areopagus I consider just as impossible as general international disarmament. Germany takes up no hostile position toward arbitration. In all the new German treaties of commerce there are arbitration clauses. In the main it was due to Germany's initiative that an agreement was arrived at at the second

Hague conference for the establishment of an International Prize Court.

Arbitration treaties can certainly contribute in a great measure to maintain and fortify peaceful relations. But strength must depend on readiness for war. The dictum still holds good that the weak becomes the prey of the strong. If a nation can not or will not spend enough of her defensive forces for her to be able to make her way in the world, then she falls back into the second rank.

Austria-Hungary's Version of the War

By Kaiser Franz Josef and Count Berchtold

The Imperial Rescript and Manifesto.

Ischl, July 28.

Dear Count Stürgkh:

I have resolved to instruct the Ministers of my Household and Foreign Affairs to notify the Royal Servian Government of the beginning of a state of war between the monarchy and Servia. In this fateful hour I feel the need of turning to my beloved peoples. I command you, therefore, to publish the inclosed manifesto.

MANIFESTO.

To my peoples! It was my fervent wish to consecrate the years which, by the grace of God, still remain to me, to the works of peace and to protect my peoples from the heavy sacrifices and burdens of war. Providence, in its wisdom, has otherwise decreed. The intrigues of a malevolent opponent compel me, in the defense of the honor of my monarchy, for the protection of its dignity and its position as a power, for the security of its possessions, to grasp the sword after long years of peace.

With a quickly forgetful ingratitude, the Kingdom of Servia, which, from the first beginnings of its independence as a State until quite recently, had been supported and assisted by my ancestors, has for years trodden the path of open hostility to Austria-Hungary. When, after

three decades of fruitful work for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I extended my sovereign rights to those lands, my decree called forth in the Kingdom of Servia, whose rights were in nowise injured, outbreaks of unrestrained passion and the bitterest hate. My Government at that time employed the handsome privilege of the stronger, and with extreme consideration and leniency only requested Servia to reduce her army to a peace footing and to promise that, for the future, she would tread the path of peace and friendship. Guided by the same spirit of moderation, my Government, when Servia, two years ago, was embroiled in a struggle with the Turkish Empire, restricted its action to the defense of the most serious and vital interests of the monarchy. It was to this attitude that Servia primarily owed the attainment of the objects of that war.

The hope that the Servian Kingdom would appreciate the patience and love of peace of my Government and would keep its word has not been fulfilled. The flame of its hatred for myself and my house has blazed always higher; the design to tear from us by force inseparable portions of Austria-Hungary has been made manifest with less and less disguise. A criminal propaganda has extended over the frontier with the object of destroying the foundations of

State order in the southeastern part of the monarchy; of making the people, to whom I, in my paternal affection, extended my full confidence, waver in its loyalty to the ruling house and to the Fatherland; of leading astray its growing youth and inciting it to mischievous deeds of madness and high treason. A series of murderous attacks, an organized, carefully prepared, and well carried out conspiracy, whose fruitful success wounded me and my loyal peoples to the heart, forms a visible bloody track of those obligations the fulfillment of which operated and directed in Servia.

A halt must be called to these intolerable proceedings and an end must be put to the incessant provocations of Servia. The honor and dignity of my monarchy must be preserved unimpaired, and its political, economic, and military development must be guarded from these continual shocks.

In vain did my Government make a last attempt to accomplish this object by peaceful means and to induce Servia, by means of a serious warning, to desist. Servia has rejected the just and moderate demands of my Government and refused to conform to those obligations the fulfillment of which forms the natural and necessary foundation of peace in the life of peoples and States. I must therefore proceed by force of arms to secure those indispensable pledges which alone can insure tranquillity to my States within and lasting peace without.

In this solemn hour I am fully conscious of the whole significance of my resolve and my responsibility before the Almighty. I have examined and weighed everything, and with a serene conscience I set out on the path to which my duty points. I trust in my peoples, who, throughout every storm, have always rallied in unity and loyalty around my throne, and have always been prepared for the severest sacrifices for the honor, the greatness, and the might of the Fatherland. I trust in Austria-Hungary's brave and devoted forces, and I trust in the Almighty to give the victory to my arms.

FRANZ JOSEF.

DECLARATION OF WAR

[PUBLISHED IN SPECIAL EDITION OF OFFICIAL GAZETTE, VIENNA, JULY 28.]

The Royal Government of Servia not having given a satisfactory reply to the note presented to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary finds it necessary itself to safeguard its rights and interests and to have recourse for this purpose to force of arms. Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers itself from this moment in a state of war with Servia.

"DAYS OF WORLD'S HISTORY"

CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM TO KAISER WILHELM II., AUG. 27.

Victory after victory. God is with you. He will be with us also. I most sincerely congratulate you, dear friend, also the young hero, your dear son, the Crown Prince, and the Crown Prince Rupprecht, as well as the incomparably brave German Army. Words fail to express what moves me and, with me, my army, in these days of world's history.

FRANZ JOSEPH.

WILL OF WILHELM II. THAT SWUNG THE SWORD

Kaiser Franz Josef's Address in Bestowing the Great Cross on the German Kaiser, September, 1914.

The glorious victories, so crushing to the foe, which the German Army has won in battle under your chief command owe their begetting and their success to your iron will, which sharpened and swung the heavy sword.

To the laurel that crowns you as victor I wish to add, if I may, the highest military honor which we possess, in begging you to take in true brotherhood of arms and as a token of my appreciation the Great Cross of my military Order of Marie Theresa. The decoration itself, dear friend, shall be handed to you by a special envoy as soon as it is convenient for you.

A PURELY DEFENSIVE WAR

By Count Berchtold, Foreign Minister
for Austria-Hungary

Austria-Hungary looks upon this war as a purely defensive one, which has been forced on her by the agitation directed by Russia against her very existence. Austria-Hungary has given many proofs in late years of her peaceful intention. She refrained from any interference with arms in the Balkan war, though her interests were at stake. Subsequent events have proved what a serious danger the increase in territory and prestige which it brought Serbia were for Austria-Hungary. Serbia's ambitions have since grown and have been solely directed against the Dual Monarchy. Russia has tacitly approved of Serbia's action because Russian statesmen wish to form an iron ring of enemies around Austria-Hungary and Germany in order that Russia's grasp on Constantinople and on Asia should never again be meddled with. Austro-Hungarian soldiers are fighting for their homes and for the maintenance of their country, the Russians are fighting to help the Russian Czar to gain the rule of the world, to destroy all his neighbors who may be dangerous to Russian ambitions. England is helping the Russians to oust her German rival. She feared for some time that German culture and German scientific methods would prove the stronger in a peaceful competition, and she now hopes to crush Germany with the help of Russia and France. And France is fighting to win back Alsace-Lorraine, to take her revenge on Germany, which the French Nation has been aiming at for the last forty-four years.

That is how Austria-Hungary looks upon the war. She never wished for ter-

ritorial increase, she wished for peace and that her people should develop in safety.

Germany equally had nothing to gain by a war, but Germany knows that Austria-Hungary's enemies are her enemies and that the dismemberment of the Hapsburg monarchy would mean the isolation of the German Empire.

And so, after all efforts to keep Russia and England from breaking the peace of Europe had failed, she drew her sword to defend her and her allies' (ally's) interests.

Truth and honor are on the side of the two empires in this war, the unspeakable inventions and prevarications published by the French, Russian, and English press in the last weeks alone must prove to the American people who can afford to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this war.

The Austro-Hungarian and German people have a clear conscience and need fear no misrepresentation of their action.

A DISCORDANT NOTE

By Count Michael Karolyi, Leader of
Hungarian Independent Party,
New York, July 27

If Austria had pursued a policy of directly helping the Balkan countries, if Austria had in the past made it a point to be actively their friend, this war would not confront us. Since it has come, of course all Hungarians will support the empire and internal differences will be dismissed while the empire is imperiled. As for the loyalty of the many Serbs within Austria-Hungary it is hard to say. There again we must hope that they will take the Austrian side. But the Austrian policy toward the Balkan countries has been wrong, all wrong.

A German Review of the Evidence

Certified by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, German Ex-Colonial Secretary

The following is presented as a complete defense of the German position in the present war and is based upon examination of the German and English "White Papers." It was prepared in Germany and forwarded to Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, who had it translated for THE NEW YORK TIMES of Nov. 1, 1914.

Dr. Dernburg gives this statement his full approval and accepts complete responsibility for it.

Two of the five great European powers that are at present engaged in war, Austria-Hungary and Russia, whose differences for years have been constantly increasing in sharpness, and after the tragedy in Serajevo became impossible to be bridged by diplomacy, conjured up the frightful struggle.

With these two, two other powers are so closely united by alliances that their participation in the war also was unavoidable; they are Germany and France.

There are two other great European powers whose relations to the two aforesaid groups before the war were very much alike in the essential points. Just as Italy was politically tied by alliance to the Central Powers, so England was with the Franco-Russian Alliance. Hence it was uncertain how these countries, each geographically removed from the main body of the Continent, would act in a war, and it seemed quite possible that both would decide to remain neutral.

As a matter of fact, the Italian Government came to the view that such a stand would be for the best interests of its country.

This decision might have made it considerably more easy for England to also maintain her neutrality, which, from political, economical, and ethical reasons, would have been advantageous and natural for the Island Empire. To the surprise and indignation of all those Germans who for years had been working toward an adjustment of the conflicting interests of both countries—among these

ought to be mentioned, above all, the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor—the Liberal British Ministry immediately declared war on Germany, and did not confine itself to a naval war, but, in keeping with agreements reached years ago between the English and French General Staffs, as is now admitted, equipped an expeditionary army, thus considerably strengthening the French forces.

The question arises, "What reasons led British politics to this monstrous step?"

Much has been written during the last weeks from the German side, criticising most sharply and with great justification the motive of the London Cabinet. In the following discussion we will confine ourselves to an impartial review of the documents published by the English Government itself in its own defense.

The essential part of this justification is contained in the "Correspondence Concerning the European Crisis," placed before the British Parliament shortly after the start of the war, which is known as the British "White Paper." In amplification are to be considered the "White Book" placed by the German Government before the Reichstag and the "Orange Book" published by Russia.

I.

THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION.

In a public speech, delivered Sept. 19, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lloyd George, according to the report of The Westminster Gazette, which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel between Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this statesman prefers, as follows:

GERMANY—I insist that you stand aside with crossed arms while Austria strangles your little brother, (Servia.)

RUSSIA—Just you touch this little fel-

low and I will tear your ramshackle empire limb from limb.

We will not waste words in considering the flippant form here used in a discussion of an unspeakably bloody and world-historic conflict. But this expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light in which the London powers-that-be desire to show the empire of the Czar to the British people, viz., in the rôle of the noble-hearted protector of persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on Austria-Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war.

Cites English Documents

This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Aug. 4. Translations of this speech have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries in hundreds of thousands of copies under the title: "The Power Responsible for War Is Germany."

Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes irrefutable proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered the hand of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that the Foreign Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact.

Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable.

The documents reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until July 20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given. The first of the very important reports of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to the Secretary of State, Grey, is dated on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government had been brought to the knowledge of the European Cabinets, and the British Ambassador conferred with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, over this matter. The French Minister also took part in this conference. When the latter and M. Sazonof, in the most insistent way, tried to prove to Buchanan that England, together with Russia and

France, must assume a threatening attitude toward Austria-Hungary and Germany, the British Ambassador replied:

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.—(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria. The following was the answer:

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would, at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. * * *

The dispatch continues:

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continue to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments. * * *—(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sazonof could not have spoken of the necessity of carrying it through.

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.

Finally we find that the British Government was fully informed at the very latest on July 24—it may have had before it previous documents, but they are not contained in the "White Paper"—concerning Russian mobilization and thereby the development of Russian and French politics that had to be anticipated.

Russian Aggression

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplomatists must have

made things plain. Russia's aggressive policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, which did not come until five days later, led to the European war. Serbia meant so little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England's interest in the kingdom on the Save as "nil." Only later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Serbia, and in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this "little nation," although he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its history is not untainted.

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British Ambassador had another talk with M. Sazonof, during the course of which he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning concerning its mobilization:

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war. * * *

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once! His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.—(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon unexpected Russia can hardly be imagined. Sazonof's conversation with the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia's dictation.

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Serbia, but from its viewpoint Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the Balkans.

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sazonof on July 27, although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any instructions by Sir Edward Grey.

His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to preceptitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.—(British "White Paper" No. 44.)

Just as its own Ambassador in Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor:

* * * but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the South, he thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia would be entirely responsible.—(British "White Paper" No. 71.)

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated:

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France.—(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

The British Government has added a few further publications to its "White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated Sept. 1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg. In this report it is stated:

(Retranslated.) M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna] on July 28th attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying on with M. Sazonof and which appeared very promising. Count Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30th, although Russia then had already started partial mobilization against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most courteous manner and gave his consent to a continuation of the pour parlers. * * * On Aug. 1st M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Serbia which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of Serbia. * * * Unfortunately these pour parlers in St. Petersburg and Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany on July 31 stepped between the two with its double ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris. * * * A delay of a few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the greatest wars in history.

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the

result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence. These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear. The Austran version of it is found in the Vienna *Fremdenblatt* of Sept. 25, 1914. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Serbia, are mentioned, as follows:

As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature of the steps undertaken by the Dual Monarchy in Belgrade, this would have been entirely inconceivable.

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which were brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communiqué, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Sukhom-

linof, assured the German Military Attaché upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered. Even as late as 2 P. M. on the 31st, however, (German "White Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.

In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.—(British "White Paper" No. 97.)

Proofs Lacking.

On the other hand, Buchanan's tele-

gram of July 31 (British "White Paper" No. 113) states:

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.—(British "White Paper" No. 113.)

So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof.

The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:

He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussion—and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.—(British "White Paper" No. 121.)

Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the Reichstag, stated with full justification:

The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at mediation on the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the eve of success, by the mobilization, endangering the safety of the empire. The measures for a mobilization, about whose seriousness the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, in connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia wanted war.

To this is to be added that the English Government also was made fully cognizant of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a witness that could not be suspected, namely, its own representative in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear full responsibility.

II.

GREY'S OMISSIONS AND ERRORS

We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London was informed at the very latest on July 24 by his Ambassador in St. Petersburg of the plan of the Russian mobilization and consequently of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time

to preserve peace, according to his own documents.

From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:

The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.—(British "White Paper" No. 3.)

Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note—meanwhile presented to Serbia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:

The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government. * * *

I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.—(British "White Paper" No. 5.)

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London:

M. Cambon said that if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed

out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia it would be too late for any mediation.—(British "White Paper" No. 10.)

Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Serbia by that time Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:

I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.—(British "White Paper" No. 11.)

From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25:

Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling [this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincaré and Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views.—(British "White Paper" No. 25.)

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.

That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as it

was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by the assurance of the Chancellor; he declares:

In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late] we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the monarchy.—(German "White Paper," Page 17, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint.)

Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna. He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue Book," Page 67):

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.—(British "White Paper" No. 67.)*

Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31 the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:

The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.—(British "White Paper" No. 108.)

*Recently a book entitled "Why We Make War," in defense of Great Britain, appeared at Oxford, as the authors of which "Members of the Faculty for Modern History in Oxford" are mentioned. This work undertakes, on the ground of the official publications, to whitewash Grey's policy, and of course incidentally the Russian policy. All together this publication, parading in the gown of science, is contradicted by our own presentation of the facts; it may be mentioned also that this work contains in part positive untruths. Thus it states on Page 70 (retranslation):

No diplomatic pressure whatever was exerted [by Germany] on Vienna, which, under the protection of Berlin, was permitted to do with Serbia as she liked.

Grey's own words contradict this assertion.

England and Russia

How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be found. The French Government thus far has not published any series of documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.

On the contrary, the latter power, wherever she puts in an appearance—as for instance in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sazonof, as mentioned above—appears as fully identical with Russia.

It is also stated on July 24:

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in all diplomatic negotiations. * * * It seems to me from the language held by French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.—(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a weak and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective advice to postpone mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.

The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Serbia was the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British

documents themselves. De Bunsen on July 26 telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th inst.—British "White Paper" No. 40.)

Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid efforts to maintain peace by the London Secretary of State, even where these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria.

Another proof: Sazonof on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which concerns itself with the much mentioned proposition of the latter to have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great powers not immediately concerned.

Russian Sincerity Questioned

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really want the conference? Minister Sazonof declares:

I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets. —(British "White Paper" No. 53.)

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be done immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have been no more time for this.*

*In the aforementioned book of the Oxford historians there is stated on Page 69 (translations):

This mediation [namely, Grey's mediation proposition] had already been accepted by Russia on July 25th.

We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no manner sub-

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27, (British "White Paper" No. 55,) shows how this conference was expected to be conducted in St. Petersburg:

His Excellency [Sazonof] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.—(British "White Paper" No. 55.)

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman. The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy. Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:

* * *. and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence. * * * In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points. * * *—(British "White Paper" No. 72.)

Entirely in contrast herewith is one

scribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an additional proof, a part of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be mentioned:

He [Sazonof] would like to see the question placed on international footing. * * * If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It would be possible in his opinion that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.—(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

Hence, not if England, but only if Servia would propose arbitration by the powers, Mr. Sazonof was willing! The most amusing part of this is that the Russian Minister himself considers such a proposition on the part of Servia merely as "possible"; evidently it would have appeared as a great condescension on the part of the Government at Belgrade if it, standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungary, would appear before a European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof necessary that a mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even when proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the move for such came from Servia. In expressing such an idea, Mr. Sazonof proved that it was his intention to bring war about.

report of the British representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador there:

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He said that Russia had no intention to attack Austria.—(British "White Paper" No. 141.)

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:

I entirely approve what you said * * * and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government. — (British "White Paper" No. 24.)

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally join Russia and France:

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their [the German] attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.—(British "White Paper" No. 44.)

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Rus-

sian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.—(British "White Paper" No. 47.)

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London:

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the great powers united action, [des actions conformes,] we count that England will not delay placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.—(Russian "Orange Paper" No. 17.)

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Sawa was the only consideration, although the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government:

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the neces-

sary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.—(British "White Paper" No. 54.)

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows:

In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button in the interests of peace."—(British "White Paper" No. 84.)

Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war. On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his softhearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. * * * Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.—(British "White Paper" No. 78.)

Naïvete or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naïveté of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.

This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.

On July 30 the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon

the European crisis. Owing to the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist writes:

It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to forestall a general conflict. * * *

And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia—what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied—was mobilizing its own army, he continues:

Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have even received assurances in that direction, that England and France will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.

On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen:

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. * * * But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him, that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action. * * * But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought that British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid.—(British "White Paper" No. 89.)

But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England:

I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise. * * *—(British "White Paper" No. 87.)

Stirring Up Trouble

On the German side Grey's open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow:

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.—(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports:

He [Poincaré] is convinced that peace between the powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany * * * there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.—(British "White Paper" No. 99.)

Did Grey really think for one moment

that the German Empire would change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments?

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British "White Paper" No. 85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From a material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country could never recover. —British "White Paper" No. 101.)

With this telegram the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded. If France—the question of French colonies is of very minor importance in this connection—must not be defeated by Germany, then England forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great power, even if she had backed down before such a challenge.

III.

THE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE

Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.

In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations to other large powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech in the House of Commons on Aug. 3, 1914, which meant the war with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with France in any European crisis.

The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter to the French Ambassador dealt with one of the most important compacts of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:

London Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My Dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other

whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

Was Parliament Deceived?

A few members of the English Parliament who on Aug. 3 dared to gingerly protest against the war may have had reason to complain about the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then—so far as England is concerned—the supervision of the Government, theoretically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction.

Veiled Defensive Alliance

As a matter of fact, Grey does not desire to have accepted as political obligations the conversations of the French and English Army and Navy General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this treatment, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to immediately enter with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in every critical situation; it means in reality nothing less than a veiled defensive alliance which by clever diplomatic manipulations can be changed without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English Government promises to consult and work together with France, and consequently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investigation of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent position.

How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations lasting through years?

Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the basis of documentary proof.

If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied—in the year 1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence which in a case of war between European powers would interfere with or limit free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to whether or not Britain should take part in a war—then certain reports making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1914, concerning an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light.

Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attaché in London, Capt Wolkow. As a matter of fact Wolkow during June went to St. Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.

Grey's "Twisty" Answer

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations would be entered into later on.

The big Liberal newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was not at all satisfied

with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European war. In the light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies' interest as far as England is concerned.

A German "Attack"

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things would France admit.—(British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England to come to her aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the Frenchman:

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. * * * We were free from engagements and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.—(British "White Paper" No. 87.)

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon:

Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. * * * M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. * * * I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.—(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.

At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the war by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by Grey's conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador:

He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. * * * The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise. * * *—(British "White Paper" No. 123.)

Belgium Not the Cause

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave on Aug. 2 the

following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London:

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.—(British "White Paper" No. 148.)

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality.

IV.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY

The highest representatives of the German Empire with emphatic seriousness declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following the law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great powers in the treaties of 1831 and 1839.

The German Secretary of State on Aug. 4 informed the English Government through the embassy in London that Germany intended to retain no Belgian territory, and added:

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned, according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being with her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.—(British "White Paper" No. 157.)

In answer Grey caused the English Ambassador in Berlin to demand his

passports and to tell the German Government that England would take all steps for defense of Belgian neutrality.

This, therefore, represents, in the view which very cleverly has been spread broadcast by British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in spite of the moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the consideration for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to have been in the foreground. We find on July 31 Grey stated to Cambon:

The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important, factor in determining our attitude.—(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of. For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.*

This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.

A Sudden Decision

It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.

If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be as-

sumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood. On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows:

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think necessary to take.—(British "White Paper" No. 151.)

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador in Brussels received the following orders:

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their power and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France.—(British "White Paper" No. 155.)

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany. Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On Aug. 1 he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.

*The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned previously states on Page 27 (retranslation):

That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had been taken into consideration by the Germans has been known in England generally for several years; and it has also been generally accepted that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring about the active resistance of the British armed forces; one assumed that these would be given the task of assisting the left wing of the French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian territory.

This suddenly became the new development, which was still lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England.

Another English Advantage

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for entirely different reasons: the thankful

part of the protector of the weak and the oppressed.

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However, when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war it stepped out before the limelight of the world as the champion of—the small nations.

"Truth About Germany"

Attested by Thirty-four German Dignitaries*

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MAX WARBURG, Hamburg.
SIEGFRIED WAGNER, Baireuth.

* "Athenwood," Newport, R. I.,
Sept. 17, 1914.

Today I have received from Germany a pamphlet entitled "Truth About Ger-many, Facts About the War." The cor-rectness and completeness of its state-ments are vouched for by thirty-four per-sons, whose names are recorded therein as members of an Honorary Committee. I know personally seventeen of these thirty-four persons, and have known them for years, some of them intimately. With six of them I have labored as a colleague in university work. I have been intro-

duced into their homes, have broken bread at their tables and have conversed with them long and often upon the prob-lems of life and culture. They are among the greatest thinkers, moralists and phi-lanthropists of the age. They are the salt of the earth! The great theologian Har-nack, the sound and accomplished political scientist and economist von Schmoller, the distinguished philologist von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian Lamprecht, the profound statesman von Posadowsky, the brilliant diplomatist von Bülow, the great financier von Gwinner, the great promoter

Try to realize, every one of you, what we are going through! Only a few weeks ago all of us were peacefully following our several vocations. The peasant was gathering in this Summer's plentiful crop, the factory hand was working with accustomed vigor. Not one human being among us dreamed of war. We are a nation that wishes to lead a quiet and industrious life. This need hardly be stated to you Americans. You, of all others, know the temper of the German who lives within your gates. Our love of peace is so strong that it is not regarded by us in the light of a virtue, we simply know it to be an in-born and integral portion of ourselves. Since the foundation of the German Empire in the year 1871, we, living in the centre of Europe, have given an example of tranquillity and peace, never once seeking to profit by any momentary difficulties of our neighbors. Our commercial extension, our financial rise in the world, is far removed from any love of adventure, it is the fruit of painstaking and plodding labor.

We are not credited with this temper, because we are insufficiently known. Our situation and our way of thinking are not easily grasped.

of trade and commerce Ballin, the great inventor Siemens, the brilliant preacher of the Gospel Dryander, the indispensable Director in the Ministry of Education Schmidt. Two of them are, in a sense, our own countrywomen, the Baroness Speck von Sternburg and Frau Staatsminister von Trott zu Solz. The latter is the granddaughter of our own John Jay. I have known her, her mother and her grandfather. No statement was ever issued which was vouched for by more solid, intelligent, and conscientious people. Its correctness, completeness and veracity cannot be doubted. As I read it the emotions which it arouses make both speech and sight difficult. I wish it might come into the hands of every man, woman, and child in the United States.

(Signed) JOHN W. BURGESS,

Ex-Dean Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure Science and Fine Arts, Columbia University; Roosevelt Professor of American History and Institutions at Friedrich Wilhelms University, Berlin, 1906; Visiting American Professor at Austrian Universities, 1914-15.

Every one is aware that we have produced great philosophers and poets, we have preached the gospel of humanity with impassioned zeal. America fully appreciates Goethe and Kant, looks upon them as cornerstones of elevated culture. Do you really believe that we have changed our natures, that our souls can be satisfied with military drill and servile obedience? We are soldiers because we have to be soldiers, because otherwise Germany and German civilization would be swept away from the face of the earth. It has cost us long and weary struggles to attain our independence, and we know full well that, in order to preserve it, we must not content ourselves with building schools and factories, we must look to our garrisons and forts. We and all our soldiers have remained, however, the same lovers of music and lovers of exalted thought. We have retained our old devotion to all peaceable sciences and arts; as all the world knows, we work in the foremost rank of all those who strive to advance the exchange of commodities, who further useful technical knowledge. But we have been forced to become a nation of soldiers in order to be free. And we are bound to follow our Kaiser, because he sym-

Under the head of "An Anti-British Pamphlet," The London Times of Aug. 23, 1914, noted as follows:

The Vossischezeitung gives extracts from a brochure issued under the auspices of a committee of such prominent Germans as Prince Bülow, Herr Ballin, Dr. von Gwinner, and Field Marshal von der Goltz, for the purpose of "opening the eyes" of the United States regarding the causes of the present war. Copies of this pamphlet are being given to all Americans returning home from Germany. One chapter, headed "Neutrality by Grace of England," scoffs at the idea of England today being the defender of neutral States and declares that it was England who in 1911 was ready to land 160,000 men at Antwerp to help the French against the Germans.

As to who will ultimately win in the war, the pamphlet asks whether it will be the striving nation, the young strength, or the old peoples, France and England, with their flagging civilization in alliance with Muscovite retrogression.

bolizes and represents the unity of our nation. Today, knowing no distinction of party, no difference of opinion, we rally around him, willing to shed the last drop of our blood. For though it takes a great deal to rouse us Germans, when once aroused our feelings run deep and strong. Every one is filled with this passion, with the soldier's ardor. But when the waters of the deluge shall have subsided, gladly will we return to the plow and to the anvil.

It deeply distresses us to see two highly civilized nations, England and France, joining the onslaught of autocratic Russia. That this could happen will remain one of the anomalies of history. It is not our fault; we firmly believed in the desirability of the great nations working together, we peaceably came to terms with France and England in sundry difficult African questions. There was no cause for war between Western Europe and us, no reason why Western Europe should feel itself constrained to further the power of the Czar.

The Czar, as an individual, is most certainly not the instigator of the unspeakable horrors that are now inundating Europe. But he bears before God and posterity the responsibility of having allowed himself to be terrorized by an unscrupulous military clique.

Ever since the weight of the crown has pressed upon him, he has been the tool of others. He did not desire the brutalities in Finland, he did not approve of the iniquities of the Jewish pogroms, but his hand was too weak to stop the fury of the reactionary party. Why would he not permit Austria to pacify her southern frontier? It was inconceivable that Austria should calmly see her heir apparent murdered. How could she?

All the nationalities under her rule realized the impossibility of tamely allowing Serbia's only too evident and successful intrigues to be carried on under her very eyes. The Austrians could not allow their venerable and sorely stricken monarch to be wounded and insulted any longer. This reasonable and honorable sentiment on the part of Aus-

tria has caused Russia to put itself forward as the patron of Serbia, as the enemy of European thought and civilization.

Russia has an important mission to fulfill in its own country and in Asia. It would do better in its own interest to leave the rest of the world in peace. But the die is cast, and all nations must decide whether they wish to further us by sentiments and by deeds, or the Government of the Czar. This is the real significance of this appalling struggle, all the rest is immaterial. Russia's attitude alone has forced us to go to war with France and with their great ally.

The German Nation is serious and conscientious. Never would a German Government dare to contemplate a war for the sake of dynastic interest, or for the sake of glory. This would be against the entire bent of our character. Firmly believing in the justice of our cause, all parties, the Conservatives and the Clericals, the Liberals and the Socialists, have joined hands. All disputes are forgotten, one duty exists for all, the duty of defending our country and vanquishing the enemy.

Will not this calm, self-reliant and unanimous readiness to sacrifice all, to die or to win, appeal to other nations and force them to understand our real character and the situation in which we are placed?

The war has severed us from the rest of the world, all our cable communications are destroyed. But the winds will carry the mighty voice of justice even across the ocean. We trust in God, we have confidence in the judgment of right-minded men. And through the roar of battle, we call to you all. Do not believe the mischievous lies that our enemies are spreading about! We do not know if victory will be ours, the Lord alone knows. We have not chosen our path, we must continue doing our duty, even to the very end. We bear the misery of war, the death of our sons, believing in Germany, believing in duty.

And we know that Germany cannot be wiped from the face of the earth.

HOW THE WAR CAME ABOUT

Who is responsible for the war?—Not Germany! England's policy! Her shifting of responsibility and promoting the struggle while alone possessing power to avert it.

It is an old and common experience that after the outbreak of a war the very parties and persons that wanted the war, either at once or later, assert that the enemy wanted and began it. The German Empire especially always had to suffer from such untruthful assertions, and the very first days of the present terrible European war confirm again this old experience. Again Russian, French, and British accounts represent the German Empire as having wanted the war.

Only a few months ago influential men and newspapers of Great Britain as well as of Paris could be heard to express the opinion that nobody in Europe wanted war and that especially the German Emperor and his Government had sincerely and effectively been working for peace. Especially the English Government, in the course of the last two years, asserted frequently and publicly, and was supported by The Westminster Gazette and a number of influential English newspapers in the assertion, that Great Britain and the German Empire during the Balkan crisis of the last few years had always met on the same platform for the preservation of peace. The late Secretary of State, von Kiderlen-Waechter, his successor, Mr. von Jagow, and the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, likewise declared repeatedly in the Reichstag how great their satisfaction was that a close and confidential diplomatic co-operation with Great Britain, especially in questions concerning the Near East, had become a fact. And it has to be acknowledged today that at that time the German and British interests in the Near East were identical or at any rate ran in parallel lines.

The collapse of European Turkey in the war against the Balkan Alliance created an entirely new situation. At first Bulgaria was victorious and great,

then it was beaten and humiliated by the others with the intellectual help of Russia. There could be no doubt about Russia's intentions: she was preparing for the total subjection of weakened Turkey and for taking possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople in order to rule from this powerful position Turkey and the other Balkan States. Great Britain and the German Empire, which only had economic interests in Turkey, were bound to wish to strengthen Turkey besides trying to prevent the Muscovite rule on the whole Balkan peninsula.

Servia had come out of the second Balkan war greatly strengthened and with her territory very much increased. Russia had done everything to strengthen this bitter enemy of our ally, Austria-Hungary. For a great number of years Servian politicians and conspirators had planned to undermine the southeastern provinces of Austria-Hungary and to separate them from the Dual Monarchy. In Servia as well as in Russia prevailed the opinion that, at the first attack, Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces. In this case Servia was to receive South Austria and Russia was to dictate the peace in Vienna. The Balkan war had ruined Turkey almost entirely, had paralyzed Bulgaria, that was friendly, and had strengthened the Balkan States that were hostile to Austria. At the same time there began in Rumania a Russian and French propaganda, that promised this country, if it should join the dual alliance, the Hungarian Province of Siebenbürgen.

Thus it became evident in Germany and in Austria that at St. Petersburg, first by diplomatic and political, then also by military, action a comprehensive attack of Slavism under Russian guidance was being prepared. The party of the Grand Dukes in St. Petersburg, the party of the Russian officers, always ready for war, and the Pan-Slavists, the brutal and unscrupulous representatives of the idea that the Russian Czarism was destined to rule Europe—all these declared openly that their aim was the destruction of Austria-Hungary. In Russia the army, already of an immense

size, was increased secretly but comprehensively and as quick as possible; in Serbia the same was done, and the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. von Hartwig, was, after the second Balkan war, the principal promoter of the plan to form against Austria a new Balkan alliance. In Bosnia, during all this time, the Servian propaganda was at work with high treason, and in the end with revolver and the bomb.

In Vienna and in Berlin the greatness and the purpose of the new danger could not remain doubtful, especially as it was openly said in St. Petersburg, in Belgrade, and elsewhere that the destruction of Austria-Hungary was imminent. As soon as the Balkan troubles began Austria-Hungary had been obliged to put a large part of her army in readiness for war, because the Russians and Servians had mobilized on their frontiers. The Germans felt that what was a danger for their ally was also a danger for them and that they must do all in their power to maintain Austria-Hungary in the position of a great power. They felt that this could only be done by keeping perfect faith with their ally and by great military strength, so that Russia might possibly be deterred from war and peace be preserved, or else that, in case war was forced upon them, they could wage it with honor and success. Now it was clear in Berlin that in view of the Russian and Servian preparations, Austria-Hungary, in case of a war, would be obliged to use a great part of her forces against Serbia and therefore would have to send against Russia fewer troops than would have been possible under the conditions formerly prevailing in Europe. Formerly even European Turkey could have been counted upon for assistance, that after her recent defeat seemed very doubtful. These reasons and considerations, which were solely of a defensive nature, led to the great German military bills of the last two years. Also Austria-Hungary was obliged to increase its defensive strength.

Whoever considers carefully the course of events that has been briefly sketched here will pronounce the assertion of our enemies, that Germany wanted the war,

ridiculous and absurd. On the contrary, it can be said that Germany never before endeavored more eagerly to preserve peace than during the last few years. Germany had plenty of opportunities to attack and good opportunities to boot, for we knew for years that the army of France was no more ready than that of Russia. But the Germans are not a warlike nation and the German Emperor, with his Government, has always shown how earnestly he meant his reiterated assertions that the preservation of peace was his principal aim. He was actuated in this by general considerations of humanity, justice, and culture, as well as by the consideration of the German trade and commerce. This, especially the transoceanic commerce of Germany, has increased from year to year. War, however, means the ruin of commerce. Why expose Germany needlessly to this terrible risk, especially as everything in Germany prospered and her wealth increased? No, the German Army bills were merely meant to protect us against, and prepare us for, the attacks of Muscovite barbarism. But nobody in Germany has ever doubted for a moment that France would attack us at the first Russian signal. Since the first days of the Franco-Russian alliance things have become entirely reversed. Then France wanted to win Russia for a war of revenge against Germany; now, on the contrary, France thought herself obliged to place her power and her existence at the disposal of the Russian lust of conquest.

In the Spring of 1914 the German press reported from St. Petersburg detailed accounts of Russia's comprehensive preparations for war. They were not denied in Russia, and Paris declared that Russia would be ready in two or three years and then pursue a policy corresponding to her power; France, too, would then be at the height of her power. If the German Government had desired war, on the strength of these accounts, which were true, it could have waged a preventive war at once and easily. It did not do so, considering that a war is just only when it is forced upon one by the enemy. Thus Spring went by with

the atmosphere at high tension. From St. Petersburg and Paris overbearing threats came in increasing numbers to the effect that the power of the Dual Alliance was now gigantic and that Germany and Austria soon would begin to feel it. We remained quiet and watchful, endeavoring with perseverance and with all our might to win over Great Britain to the policy of preserving peace. Colonial and economic questions were being discussed by the German and English Governments, and the cordiality between the two great powers seemed only to be equaled by their mutual confidence.

Then on the 28th of June occurred that frightful assassination by Servians of the successor to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The Greater Servia propaganda of action had put aside the man who was especially hated in Servia as the powerful exponent of Austro-Hungarian unity and strength. This murder is the real cause of the present European war. Austria-Hungary was able to prove to a shuddering world, a few days after the murder, that it had been prepared and planned systematically, yea, that the Servian Government had been cognizant of the plan. The immense extent of the Servian revolutionary organization in the provinces of Southern Austria, the warlike spirit of the Servians and its instigation by Russia and France, imposed upon the Vienna Government the duty to insist upon quiet and peace within and without its borders. It addressed to the Servian Government a number of demands which aimed at nothing but the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda. Servia was on the point of accepting the demand, when there arrived a dispatch from St. Petersburg, and Servia mobilized. Then Austria, too, had to act. Thus arose the Austro-Servian war. But a few days later the Russian Army was being mobilized, and the mobilization was begun also in France. At the same time, as the German "White Book" clearly proves, the diplomacy of Russia and France asserted its great love of peace and tried to prolong the negotiations in order to gain time, for, as is well known, the Russian mobilization proceeds slowly.

Germany was waiting, and again and again the German Emperor tried to win the Czar over to the preservation of peace, for he considered him sincere and thought him his personal friend. Emperor William was to be cruelly disappointed. He finally saw himself obliged to proclaim a state of war for Germany. But at that time the Russian and French armies were already in a state of complete mobilization. At that time The London Daily Graphic wrote the following article, which shows how an English paper that was only slightly friendly to Germany judged of the situation at that time:

The Mobilization Mystery

A general mobilization has been ordered in Russia, and Germany has responded by proclaiming martial law throughout the empire. We are now enabled to measure exactly the narrow and slippery ledge which still stands between Europe and the abyss of Armageddon. Will the Russian order be acted upon in the provinces adjoining the German frontier? If it is, then the work of the peacemakers is at an end, for Germany is bound to reply with a mobilization of her own armed forces, and a rush to the frontiers on all sides must ensue. We confess that we are unable to understand the action of Russia in view of the resumption of the negotiations with Austria. It is not likely that these negotiations have been resumed unless both sides think that there is yet a chance of agreement, but if this is the case, why the mobilization which goes far beyond the limits of necessary precaution, and is, indeed, calculated to defeat the efforts of the diplomatists, however promising they may be? There may, of course, be a satisfactory explanation, but as the matter stands it is inexplicable, and is all the more regrettable because it is calculated—we feel sure unjustly—to cast doubts on the loyalty and straightforwardness of the Russian Government.

When Russia had let pass the time limit set by Germany, when France had answered that she would act according to her own interests, then the German Empire had to mobilize its army and go ahead. Before one German soldier had crossed the German frontier a large number of French aeroplanes came flying into our country across the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxemburg without a word of warning on the part

of the Belgian Government. At the same time the German Government learned that the French were about to enter Belgium. Then our Government, with great reluctance, had to decide upon requesting the Belgian Government to allow our troops to march through its territory. Belgium was to be indemnified after the war, was to retain its sovereignty and integrity. Belgium protested, at the same time allowing, by an agreement with France, that the French troops might enter Belgium. After all this, and not till France and Belgium itself had broken the neutrality, our troops entered the neutral territory. Germany wanted nothing from Belgium, but had to prevent that Belgian soil be used as a gate of entrance into German territory.

Little has as yet been said of Great Britain. It was Germany's conviction that the sincerity of Britain's love for peace could be trusted. At any rate, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith asserted again and again in the course of the last few years that England wished friendly relations with Germany and never would lend its support to a Franco-Russian attack on Germany. Now this attack had been made; Germany was on the defensive against two powerful enemies. What would Great Britain do about it? That was the question. Great Britain asked in return for its neutrality that the German forces should not enter Belgium. In other words, it asked that Germany should allow the French and Belgian troops to form on Belgian territory for a march against our frontier! This we could not allow. It would have been suicidal. The German Government made Great Britain, in return for its neutrality, the following offers: we would not attack the northern coast of France, we would leave unmolested the maritime commerce of France and would indemnify Belgium after the war and safeguard its sovereignty and integrity. In spite of this Great Britain declared war on Germany and sides today with those Continental powers that have united for our destruction, in order that Muscovite barbarism may rule Europe. We know that Germany did not deserve such treatment on the part of Great Britain, and do not

believe that Great Britain by this action did a service to humanity and civilization.

Today we are facing hard facts. Germany has to fight for her existence. She will fight knowing that the great powers beyond the ocean will do her justice as soon as they know the truth.

REICHSTAG AND EMPEROR

England, France, and Russia, unthreatened by Germany, go to war for political reasons—Germany defends her independence and fights for her very existence, for her future as a great power—How a peaceful people were imbued with the spirit of war.

The last days of the month of July were days of anxiety and distress for the German people. They hoped that they would be permitted to preserve an honorable peace. A few months earlier, in 1913, when the centennial of the war for independence from French oppression and the twenty-fifth anniversary of Emperor William's ascent of the throne had been celebrated, they had willingly taken upon their shoulders the great sacrifice of the so-called "Wehrvorlage," which increased the peace strength of the standing army enormously and cost 1,000,000,000 marks. They considered it simply as an increase of their peace insurance premium. Our diplomats worked hard for the maintenance of peace, for the localization of the Austro-Servian war. So sure were the leading men of the empire of the preservation of general peace that at the beginning of the week which was to bring general mobilization they said to each other joyfully: Next week our vacation time begins. But they were fearfully disappointed. Russia's unexpected, treacherous mobilization compelled Germany to draw the sword also. On the evening of the first day of August the one word, Mobilization! was flashed by the electric spark all over the country. There was no more anxiety and uncertainty. Cool, firm resolution at once permeated the entire German folk. The Reichstag was called together for an extra session.

Three days later, on the anniversary of the battles of Weissenburg and Spichern, the representatives of the German people met. This session, which lasted only a few hours, proved worthy of the great historical moment marking the beginning of such a conflagration as the world had never seen before. The railroad lines were under military control and used almost exclusively for purposes of mobilization. In spite of all such difficulties, more than 300 of the 397 Deputies managed to get to Berlin in time. The rest sent word that they were unable to come. On the evening of Aug. 3 the Imperial Chancellor called the leaders of all parties, including the Socialists, to his house and explained to them in a concise and impressive statement how frivolously Germany had been driven to war. At the time of this meeting the unanimous acceptance of all war measures by the Reichstag was already assured. In numerous conferences the heads of the several departments explained the content and meaning of the bills to be submitted to the Reichstag. The participants of the conferences showed already what spirit would characterize the next day. The session of the Reichstag filled the entire German Nation with pride and enthusiasm; the Reichstag maintained the dignity of the German Empire and the German people.

In greater numbers than ever before the Deputies, high officers of the army and navy and the Civil Government assembled on Aug. 4, first in houses of worship to pray to God, and then in the Royal Castle of Berlin. The military character of the ceremony at the opening of the session showed under what auspices this memorable act took place. The Kaiser entered the hall in the simple gray field uniform, without the usual pomp, unaccompanied by chamberlains and court officials and pages in glittering court dresses. Only State Ministers, Generals, and Admirals followed him to the throne, from where he read his speech, after covering his head with his helmet. His voice betrayed the strain under which he was laboring. Repeatedly he was interrupted by enthusiastic

applause, and when he closed, a rousing cheer thundered through the famous White Hall, something that had never before occurred there since the erection of the old castle. Then came a surprise. The Emperor laid down the manuscript of his speech and continued speaking. From now on he knew only Germans, he said, no differences of party, creed, religion or social position, and he requested the party leaders to give him their hands as a pledge that they all would stand by him "in Not und Tod"—in death and distress. This scene was entirely impromptu, and thus so much more impressive and touching. And it was hardly over when the Reichstag—an unheard of proceeding in such surroundings—began to sing the German national hymn, "Heil Dir in Siegerkranz." The magnificent hall, until then only the scene of pompous court festivities, witnessed an outburst of patriotism such as was never seen there before. To the accompaniment of loud cheers the Kaiser walked out, after shaking the hands of the Imperial Chancellor and the Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke.

One hour later the Reichstag met in its own house. The Emperor had begged for quick and thorough work. He was not to be disappointed. Without any formalities the presiding officers of the last session were re-elected—in times of peace and party strife this would have been impossible. This short curtain raiser being over, the first act of the drama began. Before an overcrowded house the Chancellor described simply and clearly the efforts of the Government for the preservation of peace. He stated cold facts, showing unmistakably Russia's double dealing and justifying Germany's beginning of a war which she did not want. The Chancellor had begun in a quiet, subdued tone. Then he raised his voice and when, in words that rang through the hall, he declared that the entire nation was united, the Deputies and the spectators in the galleries could sit still no longer. They rose, with them at first some Socialists, then all of them, carried away by the impulse of the moment; the members of the Federal Council, of

the press, diplomats and the crowds in the galleries joined them. The whole multitude cheered and clapped its hands frantically. It reflected truly the spirit of the whole nation: The Speaker, who under ordinary circumstances would have suppressed the clapping of hands as unparliamentary and the demonstrations of the galleries as undignified, let the patriotic outburst go on to its end.

After a short intermission the business meeting began. Sixteen war measures had been introduced, the most important of which was the one asking for 5,000,000,000 marks to carry on the war. The leader of the Social Democrats read a statement explaining why his party, despite its opposition on principle to all army and navy appropriations, would vote for the proposed bills. Without further debates all the bills were passed, and shortly after 5 P. M. the Reichstag adjourned. At 7 P. M. the Emperor received the presiding officers of the Reichstag to thank them for their prompt and useful work. He signed the bills, which were immediately published and thus became laws.

The resolute attitude and quick work of the Reichstag reflected the unity and resolution of the entire nation. Sixty-seven millions of Germans feel, think, and act with their elected representatives. No party, no class, no creed is standing back; all are imbued with one single thought: United Germany is unconquerable.

The entire German people are united as never before in their history. Even 101 years ago, in 1813, the entire population cannot have been so uniformly seized by the spirit of war as at the outbreak of this struggle, which is the people's war in the truest sense of the word, and which was predicted by Bismarck. All reigning Princes are going out to fight with the army and have appointed their wives as regents. Instances include the Kaiser's son-in-law, the Duke of Brunswick, who appointed his consort, the only daughter of the Emperor, as regent. The Princes call their people to arms, and they themselves all stand ready to sacrifice all they have. This

example from above carries the nation with them. The Reichstag knew parties and factions no more, and neither does the nation. The Emperor sounded the word which has become common property from Königsberg to Constance, from Upper Silesia to the Belgian frontier: "I know only Germans!" And yet how terribly is our nation otherwise disrupted by party strife. Ill-advised persons across our frontiers hoped that creed differences would make for disunion, Frenchmen and Russians expected to weaken our empire with the aid of Alsations and Poles. This hope has been destroyed—we are a united people, as united as was the Reichstag, the Socialists included. The latter have for years voted against all army and navy appropriations, have advocated international peace, and last year voted against the bills increasing the army strength. In many foreign quarters strong hopes were nourished that this party would help them. But those men did not know our German people. Our civilization, our independence as a nation was threatened, and in that moment party interest or creed existed no more. The true German heart is beating only for the Fatherland, east and west, north and south, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are "a united people of brethren in the hour of danger." When Germany was so threatened by Russia, when the German "Peace Emperor" was shamefully betrayed by the Czar of all the Russias, then there was but one sacred party in existence: The party of Germans.

THE GERMAN MOBILIZATION

The clockworks of mobilization; perfect order and quiet everywhere—General acceptance by all classes and factions of the necessities of a war not sought by Germany.

The German mobilization was the greatest movement of people that the world has even seen. Nearly four million men had to be transported from every part of the empire to her borders. The manner in which the population is dis-

tributed made this task extremely difficult. Berlin, Rhenish Westphalia, Upper Silesia and Saxony especially had to send their contingents in every direction, since the eastern provinces are more thinly settled and had to have a stronger guard for the borders immediately. The result was a hurrying to and fro of thousands and hundreds of thousands of soldiers, besides a flood of civilians who had to reach their homes as soon as possible. Countries where the population is more regularly distributed have an easier task than Germany, with its predominating urban population. The difficulties of the gigantic undertaking were also increased by the necessity for transporting war materials of every sort. In the west are chiefly industrial undertakings, in the east mainly agricultural. Horse raising is mostly confined to the provinces on the North Sea and the Baltic, but chiefly to East Prussia, and this province, the furthest away from France, had to send its best horses to the western border, as did also Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover. Coal for our warships had to go in the other direction. From the Rhenish mines it went to the North Sea, from Upper Silesia to the Baltic. Ammunition and heavy projectiles were transported from the central part of the empire to the borders. And everywhere these operations had to be carried on with haste. One can thus say that the German mobilization was the greatest movement of men and materials that the world has ever seen.

And how was it carried on? No one could have wondered if there had been hundreds of unforeseen incidents, if military trains had arrived at their stations with great delays, if there had resulted in many places a wild hugger-mugger from the tremendous problems on hand. But there was not a trace of this. On the Monday evening of the first week of mobilization a high officer of the General Staff said: "It had to go well today, but how about tomorrow, the main day?" Tuesday evening saw no reason for complaint, no delay, no requests for instructions. All had moved with the regularity of clockwork. Regiments that had been ordered to mobilize

in the forenoon left in the evening for the field, fully equipped. Not a man was lacking. There were no deserters, no shirkers, no cowards. Instead, there were volunteers whose numbers far exceeded the number that could be used. Every German wanted to do his duty.

The most noteworthy thing was the earnest quietness with which the gigantic gathering proceeded. Not a city, not a village reported unrest or even an untoward incident. The separation was hard for many a soldier. Many a volunteer tore himself away from his dear ones with bleeding heart, but with face beaming with the light of one who looks forward to victory. Following the Kaiser's wish, those who remained behind filled the churches and, kneeling, prayed to God for victory for the just German cause. The folk-war, brought on by the wantonness of the opponents, in itself brought peace and order, safety and discipline. Never, probably, have the police had fewer excesses to deal with than in the days of the mobilization, although great crowds gathered constantly in every city.

The best criterion of the enthusiasm of the people is without doubt the number of volunteers. More than 1,000,000 of these, a number greater than that of the standing army, presented themselves within a few days. They came from all classes. There were sons of the nobility, university students, farmers, merchants, common laborers. No calling hung back. Every young man sorrowed when he was rejected. No section of the Fatherland was unrepresented, not even the Reichsland Alsace-Lorraine, where, indeed, the number of volunteers was conspicuously great. When the lists in various cities had to be closed, the young men who had not been accepted turned away with tears in their eyes, and telegraphed from regiment to regiment, hoping to find one where there were still vacancies. Where the sons of the wealthy renounced the pleasures of youth and the comforts of their homes to accept the hardships of war in serving the Fatherland, the poor and the poorest appeared in like degree. In families having four or five sons sub-

ject to military duty a youngest son, not yet liable for service, volunteered. The year 1870, truly a proud year in our history, saw nothing like this.

A thing that raised the national enthusiasm still higher was the appearance of the troops in brand-new uniforms, complete from head to foot. The first sight of these new uniforms of modest field gray, faultlessly made, evoked everywhere the question: Where did they come from? On the first day of mobilization dozens of cloth manufacturers appeared at the War Ministry with offers of the new material. "We don't need any" was the astonishing reply. Equal amazement was caused by the faultless new boots and shoes of the troops, especially in view of the recent famous "boot speech" of the French Senator Humbert.

Small arms, cannons, and ammunition are so plentiful that they have merely to be unpacked. In view of all this, it is no wonder that the regiments marching in were everywhere greeted with jubilation, and that those marching out took leave of their garrisons with joyful songs. No one thinks of death and destruction, every one of victory and a happy reunion. German discipline, once so slandered, now celebrates its triumph.

There was still another matter in which the troops gave their countrymen cause for rejoicing. Not one drunken man was seen during these earnest days in the city streets. The General Staff had, moreover, wisely ordered that during the mobilization, when every one had money in his pockets, alcoholic drinks were not to be sold at the railroad stations. Despite this, the soldiers did not lack for refreshments on their journey. Women and girls offered their services to the Red Cross, and there was no station where coffee, tea, milk, and substantial food were not at the disposal of the soldiers. They were not required to suffer hunger or any other discomfort. The German anti-alcoholists are rejoicing at this earnest tribute to their principles, which were at first laughed at and then pitied, but triumphed in the days of the mobilization.

The army is increased to many times

its ordinary strength by the mobilization. It draws from everywhere millions of soldiers, workmen, horses, wagons, and other material. The entire railway service is at its disposal. The mobilization of the fleet goes on more quietly and less conspicuously, but not less orderly and smoothly. Indeed, it is, even in peace times, practically mobilized as to its greatest and strongest units. For this reason its transports are smaller than those of the army; they are concentrated in a few harbors, and, therefore, do not attract so much public attention. The naval transports, working according to plans in connection with those of the army, have moved their quotas of men and materials with the most punctual exactitude. The naval reserve of fully trained officers and men is practically inexhaustible. The faithful work of our shipbuilding concerns, carried on uninterruptedly day and night under plans carefully prepared in time of peace, has wrought for our navy a strong increase in powerful warships.

As is known, the German fleet is built on the so-called "assumption-of-risk" plan. That is, it is intended that it shall be so strong that even the strongest sea power, in a conflict with the Germans, risks forfeiting its former rôle as a world factor. This "risk" idea has been hammered into the heart of every German seaman, and they are all eager to win for the fleet such glory that it can be favorably contrasted with the deeds of the old and new armies.

Contrary to general expectation, the German fleet has taken the offensive, and the first loss of the war was on the English side and in English waters, the English cruiser *Amphion* running on to German mines in the mouth of the Thames. In the Baltic and the Mediterranean also German ships have taken the offensive against the enemies' coast, as is shown by the bombardment by the Germans of the war harbor of Libau and of fortified landing places on the Algerian coast.

Thus the fleet, confiding in the "risk" idea now proved to be true, and, in its earnest and courageous spirit, may look

forward with confidence to coming events.

But will not civilians have to hunger and thirst in these days? That is an earnest question. The answer is, No. Even in Berlin, city of millions, the milk supply did not fail for a day. Infants will not have to bear the privations of war. All provisions are to be had at reasonable prices. Empire, municipalities and merchants are working successfully together to insure that there shall be a sufficient food supply at not too great a cost. Not only is our great army mobilized, but the whole folk is mobilized, and the distribution of labor, the food question and the care of the sick and wounded are all being provided for. The whole German folk has become a gigantic war camp, all are mobilized to protect Kaiser, Folk and Fatherland, as the closing report of the Reichstag put it. And all Germany pays the tribute of a salute to the chiefs of the army and navy, who work with deeds, not words.

ARMY AND NAVY

The German Army and Navy on the watch—Four million German men in the field—Thousands of volunteers join the colors to fight for Germany's existence, among them the flower of her scientific and artistic life.

There can be no greater contrast than that between the United States and Germany in one of the most important questions of existence with which a State is confronted. In its whole history the United States has never had a foreign hostile force of invaders upon its territory, foreign armies have never laid waste its fields. Until late in the last century, however, Germany was the battlefield for the then most powerful nations of Europe. The numerous German States and provinces, too, fought among themselves, often on behalf of foreign powers. The European great powers of that day were able, unhindered and unpunished, to take for themselves piece after piece of German territory. In the United States, on the other hand,

it was years before the steadily increasing population attained to the boundaries set for it by nature.

Our Bismarck was finally able, in the years from 1864 to 1871, to create a great empire from the many small German States. As he himself often remarked, however, this was possible only because his policies and diplomacy rested upon and were supported by a well-trained and powerful army. How the German Empire came into being at that time is well known. A war was necessary because of the fact that the then so powerful France did not desire that North and South Germany should unite. She was not able to prevent this union, was defeated and had to give back to us two old German provinces which she had stolen from the Germans. The old Field Marshal von Moltke said not long after the war of 1870-71 that the Germans would still have to defend Alsace-Lorraine for fifty years more. Perhaps he little realized how prophetic his words were, but he and those who followed him, the German Emperors and the German War Ministers, prepared themselves for this coming defensive struggle and unremittently devoted their attention to the German Army.

From 1887 on there had been no doubt that in the event of war with France we should have to reckon also with Russia. This meant that the army must be strong enough to be equal to the coming fight on two borders—a tremendous demand upon the resources of a land when one considers that a peaceful folk, devoted to agriculture, industry, and trade, must live for decades in the constant expectation of being obliged, be it tomorrow, be it in ten years, to fight for its life against its two great military neighbors simultaneously. There are, moreover, the great money expenditures, and also the burden of universal military service, which, as is well known, requires every able-bodied male German to serve a number of years with the colors, and later to hold himself ready, first as a reservist, then as member of the Landwehr, and finally as member of the Landsturm, to spring to arms at the call of

his supreme war lord, the German Emperor. A warlike, militant nation would not long have endured such conditions, but would have compelled a war and carried it through swiftly. As Bismarck said, however, the German Army, since it is an army of the folk itself, is not a weapon for frivolous aggression. Since the German Army, when it is summoned to war, represents the whole German people, and since the whole German people is peaceably disposed, it follows that the army can only be a defensive organization. If war comes, millions of Germans must go to the front, must leave their parents, their families, their children. They must. And this "must" means not only the command of their Emperor, but also the necessity to defend their own land. Did not this necessity exist, these sons, husbands, and fathers would assuredly not go gladly to the battlefield, and it is likewise certain that those who stayed at home would not rejoice so enthusiastically to see them go as we Germans have seen them rejoicing in these days. Again, then, let us repeat that the German Army is a weapon which can be and is used only for defense against foreign aggressions. When these aggressions come, the whole German folk stands with its army, as it does now.

The German Army is divided into 25 corps in times of peace. In war times reservists, members of the Landwehr, and occasionally also of the Landsturm are called to the colors. The result is that the German Army on a war footing is a tremendously powerful organ.

Our opponents in foreign countries have for years consistently endeavored to awaken the belief that the German soldier does his obligatory service very unwillingly, that he does not get enough to eat and is badly treated. These assertions are false, and anybody who has seen in these weeks of mobilization how our soldiers, reservists, and Landwehr men departed for the field or reported at the garrisons, anybody who has seen their happy, enthusiastic, and fresh faces knows that mishandled men, men who

have been drilled as machines, cannot present such an appearance.

On the day the German mobilization was ordered we traveled with some Americans from the western border to Berlin. These Americans said: "We do not know much about your army, but judging by what we have seen in these days there prevails in it and all its arrangements such system that it must win. System must win every time." In this saying there is, indeed, much of truth—order and system are the basis upon which the mighty organization of our army is built.

Now a word concerning the German officer. He, too, has been much maligned, he is often misunderstood by foreigners, and yet we believe that the people of the United States in particular must be able to understand the German officer. One of the greatest sons of free America, George Washington, gave his countrymen the advice to select only gentlemen as officers, and it is according to this principle that the officers of the German Army and Navy are chosen. Their selection is made, moreover, upon a democratic basis, in that the officers' corps of the various regiments decide for themselves whether they will or will not accept as a comrade the person whose name is proposed to them.

One sees that the German Army is not, as many say, a tremendous machine, but rather a great, living organism, which draws its strength and lifeblood from all classes of the whole German folk. The German Army can develop its entire strength only in a war which the folk approve, that is, when a defensive war has been forced upon them. That this is true will have been realized by our friends in the United States before this comes into their hands.

The German fleet is in like manner a weapon of defense. It was very small up to the end of the last century, but has since then been consistently built up according to the ground principles which Mr. Roosevelt has so often in his powerful manner laid down for the American fleet. The question has often been asked, what is there for the German fleet to de-

fend, since the German coastline is so short? The answer is that the strength of a fleet must not be made to depend upon the length of coastlines, but upon how many ships and how much merchandise go out from and enter the harbors, how great oversea interests there are, how large the colonies are and how they are situated, and, finally, how strong the sea powers are with which Germany may have to carry on a war and how they are situated. To meet all these requirements there is but one remedy, namely, either that our fleet shall be strong enough to prevent the strongest sea power from conducting war against us, or that, if war does come, it shall be able so to battle against the mightiest opponent that the latter shall be seriously weakened.

Germany, as especially the Americans know, has become a great merchant marine nation, whose colonies are flourishing. Furthermore, since the land's growing population has greatly increased its strength in the course of the last years, the mistrust and jealousy of Great Britain have in particular been directed steadily against the development of our ocean commerce, and later of our navy. To the upbuilding of the German Navy were ascribed all manner of plans—to attack Great Britain, to make war on Japan, &c. It was even declared by the English press that Germany intended to attack the United States as soon as its fleet was strong enough. Today, when Great Britain has needlessly declared war upon us, the Americans will perhaps believe that our fleet was never planned or built for an attack on any one. Germany desired simply to protect its coasts and its marine interests in the same manner in which it protects its land boundaries. It is realized in the United States as well as here that a fleet can be powerful only when it has a sufficient number of vessels of all classes and when it is thoroughly and unremittingly schooled in times of peace. We have tried to attain this ideal in Germany, and it may be remarked that the training of the personnel requires greater efforts here, since the principle of universal

service is also applied to the fleet, with a resulting short term of service, whereas all foreign fleets have a long term of enlistment.

The nominal strength of the German fleet is regulated by statute, as is also the term—twenty years—at the expiration of which old vessels must automatically be replaced by new ones. This fleet strength is set at forty-one line-of-battle ships, twenty armored cruisers and forty small cruisers, besides 144 torpedo boats and seventy-two submarine vessels. These figures, however, have not been reached. To offset this fact, however, almost the whole German fleet has been kept together in home waters. Great Britain's fleet is much stronger than ours, but despite this the German fleet faces its great opponent with coolness and assurance and with that courage and readiness to undertake great deeds that mark those who know that their land has been unjustifiably attacked. It is utterly incorrect to say, as has been said, that the German naval officers are filled with hatred for other navies, especially for the British. On the contrary, the relations between German and English officers and men have always been good, almost as good as those of the Germans with the American officers. It is not personal hatred that inspires our officers and men with the lust for battle, but their indignation over the unprovoked attack and the realization that, if every one will do his best for the Fatherland in this great hour, it will not be in vain, even against the greatest naval power. We, too, are confident of this, for strenuous and faithful effort always has its reward, and this is especially true of our fleet organization. The United States realizes this as well as we, for it, too, has built up a strong and admirably trained fleet by prodigious labor. As is the case with the German fleet, the American Navy also is not built for aggression, but for defense.

Neutrality by the Grace of England

Janus, a mighty god of the ancient Romans, was represented as having two faces. He could smile and frown simultaneously.

This god Janus is the personification of neutrality according to English ideas. Neutrality smiles when violated by England and frowns when violated by other powers.

The United States got a taste of England's neutrality when, a century ago, the English impressed thousands of American sailors, taking them from American ships on the high seas, when they searched neutral ships and confiscated the enemy's property on board of them, until Congress in Washington voted for the declaration of war against England.

In the great civil war, 1861 to 1864, England had counted on the victory of the Southern States; she recognized them as belligerents and supplied them with warships. This was not considered by England a breach of neutrality until the Minister of the United States declared, on Sept. 5, 1863, that unless England desisted war would result. England yielded.

But, according to the old German proverb, "A cat cannot resist catching mice," she secretly permitted the fitting out of privateers (the Alabama) for the Southern States, and was finally forced to pay an indemnity of \$15,000,000. England gained, however, more than she lost by this interpretation of neutrality, for by the aid of her privateers American maritime trade passed into English hands and was lost to the Americans.

May God's vengeance fall on Germany! She has violated Belgium's neutrality! the English piously ejaculate. They call themselves God's chosen people, the instrument of Providence for the benefit of the whole universe. They look down upon all other peoples with open or silent contempt, and claim for themselves various prerogatives, in particular the supremacy of the sea, even in American waters, from Jamaica to Halifax.

England's policy has always been to take all, to give back nothing, to constantly demand more, to begrudge others everything. Only where the New World is concerned has England, conscious of her own weakness, become less grasping,

since Benjamin Franklin "wrested the sceptre from tyrants," since the small colonies that fought so valiantly for their liberty rose to form the greatest dominion of the white race.

In the Summer of 1911, during the Franco-German Morocco dispute, the English were determined to assist their old enemies, the French, against Germany, and stationed 160,000 troops along their coast ready for embarkation. For the French coast? No, indeed! For transportation to Antwerp, where the English were to unite with the French Army and combine in the destruction of the German forces. But things did not reach that stage. England was not ready. England and France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium—the same England that solemnly assures the world that she has never at any time or place committed a breach of neutrality. England has observed neutrality only when compatible with her own interests, which has not often been the case. Her whole dissimulating policy is much more questionable than our one breach of neutrality, committed in self-defense and accompanied by the most solemn promises of indemnity and restitution.

England and France did not give up their plan of attacking Germany through Belgium, and by this means won the approval of the Muscovites. Three against one! It would have been a crime against the German people if the German General Staff had not anticipated this intention. The inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual, whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a friendly neutrality which would permit the unobstructed passage of German troops through small portions of her territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German General Staff was obliged to force this passage in order to avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most unfavorable ground.

The Germans have not forgotten the tone in which the French and Belgian

press reported the frequent excursions of French Staff officers and Generals for the purpose of making an exhaustive study of the territory through which the armies are now moving, and who were received with open arms in Belgium and treated like brothers. Belgium has become the vassal of France.

In our place the Government of the United States would not have acted differently. "Inter arma silent leges"—in the midst of arms the laws are silent. Besides, England had interfered beforehand in Germany's plan of campaign by declaring that she would not tolerate an attack upon the northern coast of France.

The German troops, with their iron discipline, will respect the personal liberty and property of the individual in Belgium, just as they did in France in 1870.

The Belgians would have been wise if they had permitted the passage of the German troops. They would have preserved their integrity, and, besides that, would have fared well from the business point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer and paid cash.

Germany has always been a good and just neighbor, to Belgium as well as to the other small powers such as Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland, which England in her place would have swallowed up one and all long ago.

The development of industry on the lower Rhine has added to the prosperity of Belgium and has made Antwerp one of the first ports on the Continent, as well as one of the most important centres of exchange for German-American trade.

Without Germany Belgium could never have acquired the Congo.

When England meditated taking possession of the Congo, claiming that great rivers are nothing but arms of the sea and consequently belong to the supreme maritime power, King Leopold turned to Germany for protection and received it from Bismarck, who called the Congo Conference of 1884-5 and obtained the recognition by the powers of the independence of the Congo State.

The struggle of the German States in Europe has some points in common with

the struggle of the Independent States of North America, (from 1778 to 1783,) for it is directed chiefly against England's scheming guardianship, and her practice of weakening the Continental powers by sowing or fostering dissension among them.

While continually protesting her love of peace, England has carried on no fewer than forty wars during the latter half of the nineteenth century, including the great Boer war. She has long imperiled, and in the end has succeeded in disturbing, the peace of Europe by her invidious policy of isolating Germany. Germany, on the other hand, has proved herself since 1871 to be the strongest and most reliable security for the peace of Europe.

The policy of sowing dissension, practiced by England more industriously than ever in recent years, cannot possibly meet with the approval of the peace-loving citizens of the United States, and should be condemned on merely humanitarian as well as commercial grounds.

England aims at being mistress of the Old World in order to occupy either an equal, or a menacing, position toward the New World, as circumstances may dictate. For this purpose she has encouraged this war. The German Federated States of Europe are defending themselves with might and main, and are counting in this struggle for existence on the good-will of the United States of America, for whose citizens they cherish the friendliest feelings, as they have proved at all times. All Americans who have visited Germany will surely bear witness to that effect.

THE ATTITUDES OF GERMANY'S ENEMIES

Germany overrun by spies for years past.

It goes without saying that in time of war the respective participants seek to gain for themselves every possible advantage, including as not the least of these advantages that of having public opinion on their side. It is equally understandable that Governments, for political or military reasons, often en-

deavor to conceal their real intentions until the decisive moment. In this matter, however, as in the conduct of war itself, there exists the basic principle, acknowledged throughout the civilized world, that no methods may be employed which could not be employed by men of honor even when they are opponents. One cannot, unfortunately, acquit Russia of the charge of employing improper policies against Germany. It must, unfortunately, be said that even the Czar himself did not, at the breaking out of hostilities against Germany, show himself the gentleman upon a throne which he had formerly been believed by every one to be.

The Russian Emperor addressed himself to Kaiser William in moving and friendly expressions, in which, pledging his solemn word and appealing to the grace of God, he besought the Kaiser, shortly before the outbreak of the war, to intervene at Vienna. There exists between Austria-Hungary and Germany an ancient and firm alliance, which makes it the duty of both Governments to afford unconditional support to each other in the moment that either one's vital interests come into question. There can be no doubt that the existence of Austria-Hungary is threatened by the Servian agitation. Despite this, the German Emperor, in offering his final counsels respecting the treatment of Servia and the concessions to be made to Russia, went, in his desire for peace, almost to the point where Austria could have had doubts of Germany's fidelity to the obligations of the alliance. Nevertheless, Russia at this very time not only continued its mobilization against Austria, but also simultaneously brought its troops into a state of preparedness for war against Germany. It is impossible that this could have been done without the order of the Czar. The conduct of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the Chief of the General Staff and of the War Minister was of a piece with this attitude of the ruler. They assured the German Ambassador and the German Military Attaché upon their word of honor that troops were not being mobil-

ized against Germany and that no attack upon Germany was planned. The facts, however, have proved that the decision to make war upon Germany had already been reached at that time.

The reason which impelled the Czar and his chief advisers to employ such base tactics with the help of their word of honor and appeals to the Supreme Being is plain. Russia requires a longer time for mobilization than Germany. In order to offset this disadvantage, to deceive Germany and to win a few days' start, the Russian Government stooped to a course of conduct as to which there can be but one judgment among brave and upright opponents. No one knew better than the Czar the German Emperor's love of peace. This love of peace was reckoned upon in the whole despicable game. Fortunately the plan was perceived on the German side at the right time. Advices received by Germany's representative in St. Petersburg concerning the actual Russian mobilization against Germany moved him to add to the report given him upon the Russian word of honor a statement of his own conviction that an attempt was obviously being made to deceive him. We find also that the character of the Russian operations had been rightly comprehended by so unimpeachable an organ as the English Daily Graphic of Aug. 1, which said: "If the mobilization order is also carried through in the provinces bordering on Germany, the work of the preservers of peace is ended, for Germany will be compelled to answer with the mobilization of her armed forces. We confess that we are unable to understand this attitude of Russia in connection with the renewal of the negotiations with Austria."

It is customary among civilized nations that a formal declaration of war shall precede the beginning of hostilities, and all powers, with the exception of some unimportant, scattered States, have obligated themselves under international law to observe this custom. Neither Russia nor France has observed this obligation. Without a declaration of war Russian troops crossed the German bor-

der, opened fire on German troops, and attempted to dynamite bridges and buildings. In like manner, without a declaration of war, French aviators appeared above unfortified cities in South Germany and sought, by throwing bombs, to destroy the railways. French detachments crossed the German border and occupied German villages. French aviators flew across neutral Holland and the then neutral Belgium to carry out warlike plans against the lower Rhine district of Germany. A considerable number of French officers, disguised in German uniforms, tried to cross the Dutch-German frontier in an automobile in order to destroy institutions in German territory. It is plain that both France and Russia desired to compel Germany to make the first step in declaring war, so that the appearance of having broken the peace might, in the eyes of the world, rest upon Germany. The Russian Government even attempted to disseminate through a foreign news agency the report that Germany had declared war on Russia, and it refused, contrary to the usage among civilized nations, to permit to be telegraphed the report of the German Ambassador that Russia had rejected the final German note concerning war and peace.

Germany for its part, in the hope that peace might yet be maintained, subjected itself to the great disadvantage of delaying its mobilization in the first decisive days in the face of the measures of its probable enemy. When, however, the German Emperor realized that peace was no longer possible, he declared war against France and Russia honorably, before the beginning of hostilities, thus bringing into contrast the moral courage to assume the responsibility for the beginning of the conflict as against the moral cowardice of both opponents, whose fear of public opinion was such that they did not dare openly to admit their intentions to attack Germany.

Germany, moreover, cared in a humane and proper manner at the outbreak of the war for those noncombatant subjects of hostile States—traveling

salesmen, travelers for pleasure, patients in health resorts, &c.—who happened to be in the country at the time. In isolated cases, where the excitement of the public grew disquieting, the authorities immediately intervened to protect persons menaced. In Russia, however, in France, and especially in Belgium the opposite of decency and humanity prevailed. Instead of referring feelings of national antipathy and of national conflicting interests to the decision of the battlefield, the French mishandled in the most brutal manner the German population and German travelers in Paris and other cities, who neither could nor wished to defend themselves, and who desired solely to leave the hostile country at once. The mob threatened and mishandled Germans in the streets, in the railway stations and in the trains, and the authorities permitted it.

The occurrences in Belgium are infamous beyond all description. Germany would have exposed itself to the danger of a military defeat if it had still respected the neutrality of Belgium after it had been announced that strong French detachments stood ready to march through that country against the advancing German Army. The Belgian Government was assured that its interests would be conscientiously guarded if it would permit the German Army to march through its territory. Its answer to this assurance was a declaration of war. In making this declaration it acted perhaps not wisely but unquestionably within its formal rights. It was, however, not right, but, on the contrary, a disgraceful breach of right, that the eyes of wounded German soldiers in Belgium were gouged out and their ears and noses cut off; that surgeons and persons carrying the wounded were shot at from houses.

Private dwellings of Germans in Antwerp were plundered. German women were dragged naked through the streets by the mob and shot to death before the eyes of the police and the militia. Captains of captured German ships in Antwerp were told that the authorities could not guarantee their lives, German

tourists were robbed of their baggage, insulted and mishandled, sick persons were driven from the German hospital, children were thrown from the windows of German homes into the streets and their limbs were broken. Trustworthy reports of all these occurrences, from respectable and responsible men, are at hand. We perceive with the deepest indignation that the cruelties of the Congo have been outdone by the motherland. When it comes to pass that in time of war among nations the laws of humanity respecting the helpless and the unarmed, the women and children, are no longer observed, the world is reverting to barbarism. Even in wartimes humanity and honor should still remain the distinguishing marks of civilization. That French and Russians, in their endeavors to spy upon Germany and destroy her institutions, should disguise themselves in German uniforms is a sorry testimony to the sense of honor possessed by our opponents. He who ventures to conduct espionage in a hostile land, or secretly to plant bombs, realizes that he risks the penalty of death, whether he be a civilian or a member of the army. Up to the present, however, it has not been customary to use a uniform, which should be respected even by the enemy, to lessen the personal risk of the spy and to facilitate his undertaking.

For a number of years there have been increasing indications that France, Russia, and England were systematically spying upon the military institutions of Germany. In the eight years from 1906 to 1913, 113 persons were found guilty of attempted or accomplished espionage of a grave nature. The methods employed by these spies included theft, attacks upon military posts and the employment of German officers' uniforms as disguises. The court proceedings threw a clear light upon the organization and operations of espionage in Germany. This espionage was directed from central points in foreign countries, often in the small neighboring neutral States. Repeatedly it appeared that the foreign embassies and consulates in Germany assisted in this work; it was also discovered

that Russia, France, and England were exchanging reports which they had received concerning Germany's means of defense.

This espionage system was supported with large funds. It endeavored whenever possible to seduce military persons and officials to betray their country and, when this was not possible, it devoted its attention to doubtful characters of every sort. It began its work with petty requests of a harmless appearance, followed these with inducements to violations of duty, and then proceeded with threats of exposure to compel its victims to betray their country further. Exact instructions, complete in the minutest detail, were given to the spies for the carrying on of their work; they were equipped with photographic apparatus, with skeleton keys, forged passes, &c.; they received fixed monthly salaries, special bonuses for valuable information, and high rewards for especially secret matters, such as army orders, descriptions of weapons and plans of fortifications. Principal attention was paid to our boundaries, railroads, bridges, and important buildings on lines of traffic, which were spied upon by specially trained men. With the reports of these spies as their basis, our opponents have carefully planned the destruction of the important German lines of communication. The extraordinary watchfulness of the German military officials immediately before the declaration of war and since then has been able to render futile the whole system of foreign attempts against our means of communication in every single instance, but a great number of such attempts have been made. All these things prove beyond doubt that a war against Germany has long been planned by our opponents.

LIES ABOUT GERMANY

The machinations of England and France to put Germany in the wrong—Lies on all sides.

Germany has now not only to battle against a world in arms, but it must also defend itself against lies and slanders

which have been piled up around it like a hostile rampart. There is no cable at our disposal. England has either cut the cables, or is in possession of them. No German description of what has actually occurred can be sent by telegraph; the wires are carrying into the world only the distortions of our enemies. Germany is shut off as with a hedge from the outside world, and the world is supplied solely with news given out by our enemies. This language is strictly true; for the boldest, nay, the most impudent, imagination would be unable to invent anything to exceed the false and absurd reports already printed by foreign newspapers.

In view of what we have experienced during this first week of the war we can already calmly assert that when the editors of foreign newspapers come later to compare their daily news of this week with the actual occurrences as testified to by authentic history, they will all open their eyes in astonishment and anger over all the lies which the countries hostile to Germany have sent over the cables to bamboozle the whole world. Much of all this has already become ridiculous; we must laugh over it despite the solemnity of the crisis in which we are living—for example, the bestowal of the cross of the Legion of Honor upon the City of Liège by the French President because it victoriously repulsed the attack of the Germans. Witness, too, the telegrams of congratulation sent by the King of England and the Czar of Russia to the Belgian King upon the victory of Liège! The joy over such "German defeats" will prove just as brief as the jubilation over such "Belgian victories." Such lies have short legs, and the truth will in any case soon overtake them.

But there are other lies of a more serious character and of more dangerous import—all such as misrepresent Germany's attitude and defame German character. Such defamation is designed to disturb old friendships and transform them into bitter estrangement; such defamation can also attain its hostile purpose wherever people do not say daily to themselves, "It is an enemy that re-

ports such things about Germany; let us be wise and suspend our judgment till we know actual results, till we know what is surely the truth."

Let us select several facts as examples and as evidence—facts connected with the preparation for this war, as well as with the conduct of it thus far.

All the cables controlled by the English-French-Russian coalition disseminate the lie about the ostensibly "preventive war" that Germany wished and prepared for. The German "White Book" prints documents proving the white purity of the German conscience as represented by Kaiser, Chancellor, and people. It reveals also the profound grief of the German Kaiser over the sly and insidious perfidy of the Czar, toward whom he steadily maintained German fidelity even in hours of grave danger. What Russia did was more than a mere attack, it was a treacherous assault. The following facts prove this:

The German mobilization was ordered on Aug. 1, whereas Russia began to mobilize fully four weeks earlier, or about the beginning of July. Papers found on several Russian harvest laborers arrested in the district of Konitz show that the Russian military authorities had already by the first of July—i. e., immediately after the tragedy at Serajevo—sent to the leaders of these men mustering-in orders, which were to be distributed immediately after a further word should be given. These confiscated papers prove that Russia hoped to be able to mobilize against Austria before Germany could get official information of Russia's measures. The Russian authorities purposely avoided the usual course of sending these orders through the Russian Consuls, and they assigned "military exercises" as the object of this call to the colors.

July 25—Military exercises at Krasnoye-Selo were suddenly broken off and the troops returned at once to their garrisons. The manoeuvres had been called off. The military cadets were advanced at once to officers, instead of waiting, as usual, till Autumn.

July 26—All ships and boats are forbidden to sail in the waters between Helsingfors and Yorkkele; and navigation between Sweden and Finland is closed.

July 28—Partial mobilization; sixteen army corps to be increased to the strength of thirty-two corps. On the same day the Czar begs for friendly mediation; and on the same day the Russian Minister of For-

eign Affairs and the Russian Minister of War give the German Military Attaché, upon their own initiative, their solemn word of honor that no mobilization has taken place.

July 30—The Second and Third Russian Cavalry Divisions appear on the German frontier between Wirballen and Augustov. The Czar issues a ukase calling to the colors the reserves in twenty-three entire Governments and in eighty districts of other Governments; also the naval reserves in sixty-four districts, or twelve Russian and one Finnish Government; also the Cossacks on furlough in a number of districts; also the necessary reserve officers, physicians, horses and wagons.

July 31—General mobilization of the whole Russian Army and Navy. The German steamer *Eitel Friedrich*, which keeps up a regular service between Stettin and St. Petersburg, is stopped by a Russian torpedo boat and brought into Revel, where the crew were made prisoners. The Russians blow up the railway bridge on Austrian territory between Szozakowa and Granica.

Night of Aug. 1—Russian patrols attack the German railway bridge near Eichenried and try to surprise the German railway station at Miloslaw. A Russian column crosses the German frontier at Schwidden, and two squadrons of Cossacks ride against Johannsburg.

Aug. 1—(At last) Germany's mobilization.

And France?

July 27—The Fourteenth Army Corps breaks off its manoeuvres.

July 31—General mobilization.

Aug. 2—French troops attack German frontier posts, cross the frontier, and occupy German towns. Bomb-throwing aviators come into Baden and Bavaria; also, after violating Belgium's neutrality by crossing Belgian territory, they enter the Rhine Province and try to destroy bridges.

Only after all this is the German Ambassador at Paris instructed to demand his passports.

And England?

In London war must already have been decided upon by July 31; the English Admiralty had even before that date advised Lloyd's against insuring German ships. On the same day the German Government gave emphatic support in Vienna to the English mediatory proposal of Sir Edward Grey. But the entire English fleet had already been assembled.

Of course, English public opinion was

and still is divided. As late as Aug. 1 The Daily Graphic wrote in reference to the Russian mobilization order: "Will the Russian order also be carried out in the provinces on the German frontier? If so, then the labor of the peace-preservers is at an end, for Germany is compelled to answer with the mobilization of its armed forces. We confess that we are not able to understand this attitude of Russia, in view of the resumption of negotiations at Vienna."

And a leaflet distributed in the streets of London said that "a war for Russia is a war against civilization."

So much as to the preparations for the war—and now we take up the conduct of the war itself.

By glancing at the foreign press during this one week we have been able to collect the following specimen pieces of news:

London—The British Admiralty reports that the English fleet had driven back the German fleet to the Dutch coast.

There is not one word of truth in this. The Admiralty itself appears later to have recovered its senses; at least, it denied a Reuter story about a "great English naval victory near the Dogger Bank." But the English manufactories of lies are already so actively at work that members of Parliament have protested in the House itself against the "lying reports of the English press."

Paris—From Paris the assertion was made and disseminated throughout the world that "the landing of English troops in Belgium has begun; they were enthusiastically received by the population. The landing proceeded rapidly and in the best order, as the agreement between the two General Staffs guaranteed the perfect carrying out of the disembarkment plans."

Not a single word of this is true. At present not one English soldier has been landed.

In a similar way the Baltic Sea has become the scene of invented "battles"—of "German defeats," of course; the Russian Baltic Fleet sank a German war vessel in a battle that never occurred.

And, "The Russian vanguard has crossed the German frontier without meeting with opposition." As a matter of fact there is not a single Russian

soldier on German soil. All inroads have been repulsed, and the German offensive has everywhere been successful.

A Dutch newspaper prints the following report from France:

Belfort—Many hundreds of Alsatians are joining the French Army with great enthusiasm, also many Italian Swiss. A large number of Alsace-Lorrainers are waiting near the frontier with a view of crossing it at a favorable opportunity to fight on the French side.

Such absurdity in the face of the unbroken unanimity of the entire German people and despite the manifest enthusiasm of the Alsace-Lorrainers for the German cause!

Equally stupid and made up for incurably credulous readers is an official report of the French War Ministry—not a private rumor, be it noted, but an official communication. It says:

A young Frenchman reports under oath that he was arrested, along with several other Frenchmen, at the railway station in Lörrach while on the homeward journey from Baden; and they were led through the whole city under a military escort. One of the Frenchmen shouted, "Hurrah for France," and was at once shot down. Three others who protested against this suffered the same fate; and so did a fifth man who thereupon had called the Germans murderers. The rest of the Frenchmen, proceeding to Switzerland by rail, heard shots fired in the adjoining compartment; they discovered that two Italians had been shot by Germans because one had protested against the opening of the window and another had jostled a German.

Does such stuff call for any refutation at all?

A typical example of how it is sought to work upon public opinion by means of systematic lying is afforded by the capture of Liège.

The fact is that this Belgian stronghold, along with its forts, which contained a garrison of 20,000 men, was taken by storm on Aug. 7 by the German troops, who fought with unparalleled bravery, and that 3,000 to 4,000 Belgian prisoners of war are already on their way to Germany.

Yet on Aug. 9—two days after the fall of Liège—a dispatch was still sent to the Dutch press, saying: "The Liège forts are still in Belgian hands."

And on Aug. 8—thirty-six hours after the fall of Liège—a dispatch was sent from Paris to the newspapers of Rome, saying:

The Germans lost 20,000 men at Liège and asked for an armistice of twenty-four hours. Liège has not yet fallen. The English landed 100,000 men at Antwerp, who were received with jubilation by the population. President Poincaré, upon the proposal of Doumergue, the Minister of War, conferred on the City of Liège the cross of the Legion of Honor.

Another newspaper reported as follows: "The King of England sent a congratulatory dispatch to the King of Belgium upon his victory at Liège; seven German regiments were slain."

At Paris itself a note of the French War Ministry—published on the evening of Aug. 7, Liège having fallen in the early morning of that day—mentions the resistance of Liège and says that the forts are still holding out; that the Germans who had entered the city on Thursday by passing between the forts had evacuated it on Friday; and that the Belgian division that went to the assistance of the city had therefore not even made an attack. The official note concludes from all this that the resistance of the Belgians was seriously disturbing the plan of the Germans, who were building hopes upon a rapid success.

And four full days after the capture of Liège the French Minister at Berne reported officially: "Liège has not yet been taken; the German troops were repulsed."

At Copenhagen the following dispatches were published: "The English and French troops had effected a junction with the Belgian Army and had entered Liège and made many German prisoners, among them a nephew of the German Kaiser."

Similarly at Stockholm: "The Germans had suffered a severe repulse."

Again a dispatch from Paris to Rome: "The Germans had been driven back behind the Moselle and were begging for an armistice; the French had passed Namur and were pressing forward in forced marches, while 500,000 English were falling upon the German flank."

Still another official report from

Paris: "Liège is becoming the grave of the 150,000 Germans who are breaking their heads against its walls; the Belgians had taken 3,000 prisoners, who were in a terrible condition; but for their good fortune of falling into captivity they would have starved to death."

In contrast to all this let us take the unvarnished truth as in the reported simple words of the German Quartermaster General:

We are now able to report upon Liège without doing any harm. * * * We had only a weak force at Liège four days ago, for it is not possible to prepare for such a bold undertaking by collecting large masses of men. That we attained the desired end in spite of this is due to the excellent preparation, the valor of our troops, their energetic leadership, and the help of God. The courage of the enemy was broken, and his troops fought badly. The difficulties against us lay in the exceedingly unfavorable topography of the surroundings, which consisted of hills and woods, and in the treacherous participation of the entire population in the fighting, not even excluding women. The people fired upon our troops from ambush, from villages and forests—fired upon our physicians who were treating the wounded, and upon the wounded themselves. Hard and bitter fighting occurred; whole villages had to be destroyed in order to break the resistance, before our brave troops penetrated the girdle of forts and took possession of the city. It is true that a part of the forts still held out, but they no longer fired. The Kaiser did not want to waste a drop of blood in storming the forts, which no longer hindered the carrying out of our plans. We were able to await the arrival of heavy artillery to level the forts one after the other at our leisure, and without the sacrifice of a single life—in case their garrisons should not surrender sooner. * * * So far as can be judged at present the Belgians had more men for the defense of the city than we had for storming it. Every expert can measure from this fact the greatness of our achievement; it is without a parallel. * * *

(Signed) VON STEIN,
Quartermaster General.

It is not the German people alone that will have cause to remember Liège; the whole world will do well to learn from the case of Liège that an organized manufactory of lies is trying to deceive the public opinion of all the nations. Glorious victories are converted into

"defeats with heavy losses," and the strong moral discipline of the German troops is slanderously described in the reports of the imaginative, phrase-loving French as cruelty—just as in 1870 the Prussian Uhlans were described as thrusting through with their lances all the French babies and pinning them fast to the walls.

How far the "grande nation" has already degenerated, and how far the Belgian population, akin to the French both in blood and in sentiments, imitate the French in their Balkan brutality, is illustrated by two examples. One of these, in the form of a German official warning, says: "The reports at hand about the fighting around Liège show that the population of the country took part in the battle. Our troops were fired upon from ambush. Physicians were shot at while following their profession. Cruelties were practiced by the population on wounded soldiers. There is also news at hand showing that German patrols in the vicinity of Metz were fired at from ambush from the French side. It may be that these occurrences are due to the composition of the population in those industrial regions, but it may also be that France and Belgium are preparing for a guerrilla warfare upon our troops. If the latter alternative should prove true, and this proof be strengthened through repetitions of these occurrences, then our opponents will have themselves to thank if this war be carried on with unrelenting severity even against the guilty population. The German troops, who are accustomed to preserve discipline and to wage war only against the armed forces of the hostile State, cannot be blamed if, in just self-defense, they give no quarter. The hope of influencing the result of the war by turning loose the passions of the populace will be frustrated by the unshaken energy of our leaders and our troops. Before neutral foreign countries, however, it must be demonstrated, even at the beginning of this war, that it was not the German troops who caused the war to take on such forms."

The details of the cruelties, here only

hinted at, on the Belgian and French side, are supplied and proved by an eyewitness, a German physician, who reports:

We have experienced from the Belgian population, from men, women, and half-grown boys, such things as we had hitherto seen only in wars with negroes. The Belgian civilian population shoots in blind hatred from every house, from every thick bush, at everything that is German. We had on the very first day many dead and wounded, caused by the civilian population. Women take part as well as men. One German had his throat cut at night while in bed. Five wounded Germans were put into a house bearing the flag of the Red Cross; by the next morning they had all been stabbed to death. In a village near Verviers we found the body of one of our soldiers with his hands bound behind his back and his eyes punched out. An automobile column which set out from Liège halted in a village; a young woman came up, suddenly drew a revolver, and shot a chauffeur dead. At Emmenich, an hour by foot from Aachen, a sanitary, automobile column was attacked by the populace on a large scale and fired at from the houses. The red cross on our sleeves and on our automobiles gives us physicians no protection at all.

GERMANY AND THE FOREIGNER

Respect for the foreigner—Russians willing to remain in Germany—Ill-treatment of Germans in Belgium and France.

Enemies on all sides! With dishonorable weapons against us, and with documentary lies for the rest of the world! Let us calmly allow them to continue lying and slandering as they have begun—it will result finally in injuring themselves. The world will very soon see through this impudent, unabashed game; and it will finally side with the people which keeps to the truth. Only the weakling lies and swindles; the strong man loves and honors truth. Let us act like the strong man in this struggle!

Respect for the foreigner, protection for his person and property have at all times been considered sacred among civilized people. Germany can without exaggeration claim to have upheld this respect and this protection in these fateful days. Except for a few insignificant incidents which took place in several large cities, where the natural excite-

ment of the people and the legitimate defense against an insolent system of spying led to the molesting and arrest of foreigners—mostly Russians—the measures taken against the citizens of hostile nations did not exceed what was absolutely necessary to the safety of the country. The Imperial Government and likewise the Federated States have refrained from expelling "en masse" Frenchmen, Russians, Belgians, and Englishmen. It was, of course, unavoidable to take measures for the detention of such persons as seemed suspicious and for the internation of strangers liable to be called to take arms against Germany. This took place in cities, e. g., Berlin, where these men were taken away as "prisoners of war," as soon as the "state of war" had been proclaimed, and placed in special rooms or camps. Lodgings and food are such as seem requisite and the treatment of these prisoners is, according to their own opinion, very kind. The Russian agricultural laborers constitute a special group of foreigners in Germany. There are about 40,000 to 50,000 of them, men and women.

From various parts of the country it is unanimously announced that these people are very glad not to be obliged to return to Russia. They are glad to remain in Germany, and willingly continue their work of gathering the rich German grain, potato and hay crops. Should there be any difficulties, these workmen would also have to be internated. No measures at all have been taken against women and children belonging to hostile States. They are left free to move about as they wish. Should they remain in Germany they can be sure that they will be subject to no other inconvenience except such as the general state of war inflicts upon Germans. The authorities will protect their persons, and their private property is respected. Nobody will touch it—as nobody has touched it so far.

If the German people and the German Government consider the respect they owe the foreigner as a sacred law, even though the foreigner belongs to the enemy, this respect is enhanced by affection and gratitude in the case of foreign-

ers whose countries are friendly or neutral. Thousands and thousands of Americans, Swiss, Dutch, Italians, and Scandinavians are still living in German countries. They may be sure that they can live as freely here as any German citizen. Should it be possible for them to return home, the best wishes will accompany them. The property they leave here will be protected. This is guaranteed by the authorities and by influential private persons. Should they stay in Germany, however, the German people will express their sense of gratitude for any friendly help they may lend, by increased respect and protection.

* * *

A strong contrast is noticeable between Germany's attitude toward foreigners and the facts revealed just now as to the treatment meted out in inimical countries not only to Germans but to other foreigners. Truly, in England there has been some effort to act according to the usages of civilized nations when engaged in warfare. Germans and Austrians have been insulted and molested; there has been some occasional destruction of property in stores; but as far as can be judged these were excesses of an uncontrollable mob. A general expulsion has not been ordered, and it is to be hoped that the Germans living in the United Kingdom and in its colonies will not suffer too heavy damages, in person or in property. Russia, France, and Belgium, on the other hand, have by the ill-treatment and plundering of foreigners living in their countries struck themselves out of the list of civilized nations. Innumerable reports from expelled or fugitive people prove this, and official reports confirm them. Also the press of neutral, neighboring countries, such as Switzerland, Holland, and Italy, is full of similar complaints. Owing to the scarcity of news from Russia, the facts known so far only concern Petersburg, where German and Austrian men and women, residents or transients, were beaten and stoned in the streets. Here were also some cruel mutilations and murders. The beautiful building of the German Embassy in Petersburg was attacked by the

mob. And the police watched all these misdeeds with crossed arms or even assisted. Probably what took place in Petersburg also occurred in other Russian cities; we shall soon know.

There are a great many complaints against the French and the Belgians. On the evening of Aug. 1 the mobilization was announced, and the next morning the official order was posted on the walls, that within twenty-four hours from the beginning of that day all Germans and Austrians, irrespective of sex, age or profession, would have to leave France. Those who remained and could not reach the boundary would be taken to the southwestern part of the country and imprisoned. There were few trains for Belgium or Switzerland. Thousands and thousands who had to abandon their property rushed to the stations with wife and children, fought for room in the overcrowded trains, surrounded by a howling mob, and even then were punched and slapped by policemen. During the trip there was nothing but misery. Men and women fell ill, children died. The refugees had to cross the Belgian boundary, walking a distance of six or seven kilometers in the middle of the night, dead tired, their luggage stolen—sometimes, it is said, by officials. In Belgium the same tragedy occurred as in France. And then came the salvation. The cordial, hospitable reception by the Germans in Holland and Switzerland is unanimously praised and appreciated.

The reports of brutal acts from Paris, Antwerp, Brussels, would be incredible were they not confirmed a hundredfold. The most brutal and insulting threats of death were flung by processions of people going through the streets to all those who looked like foreigners. They were severely ill-treated. Houses and stores were upset, furniture and the like were thrown into the streets, employes and working people were dragged out, women were stripped and pushed through the streets, children were thrown out of windows. Knives, swords, sticks and revolvers were used. One could fill books with the details, but they are all equally

cruel. Not only Germans and Austrians were expelled and ill-treated, but citizens of neutral States shared this awful lot. Thousands of Italians were expelled, as well as numerous Rumanians. The press in both countries complains bitterly and asks what has become of those who remained in France and were imprisoned in the south—but nobody knows.

History will place this ill-treatment and oppression of foreigners on record. The responsibility rests, not with an uncontrollable mob, but with the Government and the authorities of the two countries who have always boasted of their culture.

COMMERCE AND TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Germany's financial rise since 1870—Export and import with the United States of America—The present firm condition of German finance.

Politicians and commercial men must base their plans upon facts, as they are and not as they wish they were, otherwise they fail. France has closed its eyes not only to the great intellectual and moral assists of Germany but also to its commercial resources.

France has repeatedly declared that Germany could not effect a serious political opposition, because a war would result in the ruin of its commercial and financial strength. This we heard in the Morocco crisis, also in the Balkan wars. Germany's love of peace which was tested in the above-mentioned cases strengthened the French in their error. He, however, who has taken the trouble to visit Germany and the Germans in their places of employment—and especially Americans in recent years have done this, however, also many Englishmen, who in vain have protested against the war with Germany—he can testify to the astonishing commercial advancement which Germany has made since its political union by Bismarck.

A few facts and statistics may recall this to memory. The population of Ger-

many has since 1870, immigrants excluded, increased from 40,000,000 to 67,000,000, round numbers. Incomes and wages in particular have approximately doubled during the last generation; savings deposits have increased sixfold. Although, only a generation ago, commerce and trade employed only about two-fifths of the population, now more than three-fifths are engaged in this field of work, and Germany, as a result of its agricultural economy and increased intense farming, is today the third largest agricultural country of the world. In the coal and iron industries Germany is second only to America. In one generation its coal production increased two and a half fold, its raw iron production almost fourfold. During the same period of time the capital of the German banks increased fourfold and their reserve fund eightfold. Characteristic of Germany is the fact that hand in hand with this active private initiative is a strong feeling for the great universal interests and for organic co-operation of private and State resources. This feeling explains the perfect working of our State activities, in particular our railways, 95 per cent. of which are owned by the Government and which yield an essentially higher revenue than those in England or France; it explains further the willing assumption of the great financial burdens which general insurance imposes upon those engaged in private enterprises and which today is proving a blessing to almost the entire laboring force of Germany, to an extent which has not yet been realized by any other country.

What economic value to the world has a nation which for more than forty years has concentrated all its energy in peaceful industry? Does any one deny that Germany's great technical and commercial advancement has been a blessing in respect to the development of the world? Has not the commercial advancement in Germany had the effect of awakening new productive powers in all parts of the world and of adding new territories which engage in the exchange of goods with the civilized nations of the world? Since the founding of the new German

Empire, German foreign trade has increased from 5½ to approximately 20 billion marks. Germany has become the best customer of a great number of countries. Not only has the German consumption of provisions and luxuries increased in an unusual degree, also that of meat, tropical fruits, sugar, tobacco and colonial products, but above all else that of raw materials, such as coal, iron, copper and other metals, cotton, petroleum, wood, skins, &c. Germany furnishes a market for articles of manufacture also, for American machinery, English wool, French luxury articles, &c. One is absolutely wrong in the belief that the competition of German industry in the world market has been detrimental to other commercial nations. Legitimate competition increases the business of all concerned.

The United States of America has reaped especial profit from Germany's flourishing commercial condition. Germany purchases more from the United States of America than from any other country of the world. Germany buys annually from the United States or America approximately \$170,000,000 worth of cotton, \$75,000,000 worth of copper, \$60,000,000 worth of wheat, \$40,000,000 animal fat, \$20,000,000 mineral oil and the same amount of vegetable oil. In 1890 the import and export trade between Germany and the United States amounted to only \$100,000,000, in 1913 to about \$610,000,000. Germany today imports from the United States goods to the value of \$430,000,000, while she exports to the United States nearly \$180,000,000 worth. No nation therefore can judge as well as the United States what German commerce means to the world.

In what condition are the finances of Germany? In this field our opponents will be obliged to change their views. In 1912 Germany's national debt was about 14 marks per capita lower than England's. The public debt of France per capita was far more than double that of Germany. Germany, however, has large national assets which offset its liabilities. For example, the stocks of the Prussian railways alone exceed by

far the aggregate amount of the Prussian debt, the income of the railways alone is essentially greater than the amount which the interest and amortization of the entire State debt demand. The war, which, according to the French conception, was destined to bring about the financial and commercial ruin of Germany, has brought forth the astonishing result that the famous French money market was the first to fail in this crisis. As early as July 25, before the rejection of the Austrian ultimatum by Servia had been made known, the offer of 3 per cent. redeemable French notes to the French Exchange was so great that the *Chambre Syndicale des Agents de Change* in the interest of the public prohibited the quotation of a lower rate than 78 per cent., while bids of 74 per cent. had already been submitted. Sale in blank was absolutely forbidden, and in the *coulisse* business was at a standstill. A few days later the July liquidation, in the official market as well as in the *coulisse*, was postponed until the end of August, which action proved the necessity of a period of grace. On July 31 the French savings banks, at the command of the Government, suspended daily payments and paid out sums to the amount of 50 francs, fourteen days' notice being necessary. The London money market, too, has hardly stood the war test. On July 30 the Bank of England was obliged to raise its rate of discount from 3 to 4 per cent., several days later to 8 per cent., and again after a few days to the incredible rate of 10 per cent. In contrast to this the President of the German Reichsbank was able, on the 1st of August, to declare that the directorate, because of the strength of the Reichsbank and the solid constitution of the German money market, did not consider it necessary to follow England's example. The German Reichsbank has therefore not exceeded the rate of 6 per cent. Worse yet was the fact that England, on Aug. 2, was obliged to require grace on exchange, and France, on Aug. 3, grace on its accounts-current and Lombard loans. Although along with England and France, also Russia, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and other nations required temporary credit,

Germany to date has not deemed it necessary to ask for time in meeting its obligations. Savings banks, other banks and financial institutions are meeting all demands without restriction. The fact that the English money market, which up to the present time has been considered the financial centre of international trade, has failed will bring many a serious thought to all commercial men interested in the world market.

German commerce has doubtless been temporarily injured by the war, but the esprit de corps and organization which animate the German Nation are not only a firm foundation for German commerce, but also a strong support for the further development of the commerce and trade of the entire civilized world, if, as we hope, peace soon be re-established.

WHO IS TO BE VICTORIOUS?

An appeal to American friends

The American citizen who is now leaving Europe, which has been turned into an enormous military camp, may consider himself fortunate that he will soon be able to set foot in the New World, where he will be enabled again to take up his business pursuits. In the meantime old Europe is being torn asunder by a terrible war among its various peoples. It will make him happy again to greet mountain and valley, field and garden which are not threatened nor trampled down by armies or covered with blood; again to see cities in which business and traffic are not brought to a standstill by calling in all men capable of military service; and he may thank fortune that his people have been given room enough in which to expand and to permit them freely to unfold their power; that they are spared the great necessity of resisting the tightening ring of enemies in the east and west, on land and water, in a struggle for national existence.

But the American will feel the effects of the fate of the Old World. Even though he knows his own country is not directly involved, he will certainly realize

that the great net of international traffic and the progress of his country are connected by many strong ties to the life and prosperity of European peoples. He will be affected by every victory and defeat, just as by the sun and rain in his own country. He will doubtless remember that of all European countries Germany is the best customer of the United States, from which she purchases yearly over 1,000,000,000 marks in cotton, food, metal, and technical products. If Germany is economically ruined, which is the wish of Russia, France, and England and all allied friends of wretched Serbia, it would mean the loss of a heavy buyer to America, and thereby cause a serious loss to America which could not easily be made good. It would be a great blow to American export trade, of which Germany handles not less than 14 per cent. yearly.

The material loss is not the only feature. In the economic struggle in the world markets American and German commercial men have learned mutually to appreciate one another, to appreciate one another more highly than do any other two rivals. The time is long past when the American pictured the German as one of thousands, shut up in a room, surrounded by documents and parchments, speculating about the unknown outside world, and the same is true of the German's idea of the American—a money-hungry barbarian. Two nations in which so much kindred blood flows and which are connected by so many historical events understand each other better today than formerly. Above all, they have a mutual understanding regarding the ideal in commercial life: A man engaged in work not for the sake of the profit, but for the sake of the work he is doing; one who gives all his strength to his task, and who works for the general welfare of the people as a whole, considering his position as an office and his wealth as an obligation, not as the final aim, but as a basis for the realization of higher attainments. He places the value of character and the development of the creative powers of man higher than all economic success. Two

nations united by such common inclinations and ideals, boldness of enterprise, far-sightedness, quickness of decision, and admiration for intellectual achievements cannot help being exceedingly congenial to each other. What concerns one today concerns the other.

Does it sound like a paradox when I say Germany's struggle concerns not only her own destiny, but to a considerable extent that of America? Does the United States consider itself entirely immune from the warlike complications brought about by the Servian murder of Princes and Russia's breach of faith? In any event, it will be difficult for it to say: "What's Hecuba to me?" One thing should be clearly understood on the shores of the five oceans, that the cause of this most terrible war does not emanate from the dark Balkans, or from a Russian military group, but from envy and hate which healthy, young, and striving Germany has aroused in her older rivals; not because this or that demand was made by one Cabinet and refused by another, but because it was believed there was finally an opportunity to destroy the hated opponent who threatened to put the older Western European powers in the shade, and for this reason England and France put their strength into the service of criminal and brutal Servia. The following statistics will, perhaps, throw some light on the development of the foreign trade of the principal countries from 1870 to 1913 (in billions of marks):

	1870.	1913.
Great Britain	9,180	23,280
France	4,540	12,300
Russia	2,000	5,580
Germany	4,240	20,440

In these forty-three years, which have been decisive in the development of international economy, England, France, and Russia have not been able even to in-

crease their foreign trade three times, while Germany and the United States have increased theirs five times. The trade of Germany and the United States has increased from 7.6 to 38 billion marks. If these figures show nothing else, they show on which side the American sympathy will be. This war, provoked by Russia because of an outrageous desire for revenge, supported by England and France, has no other motive than envy of Germany's position in economic life, and of her people, who are fighting for a place in the sun. "Right or wrong, Germany must not grow." That is the turning point of a policy which the French Republic drilled into the Muscovites. Let us consider the adversaries of Germany. Russia, the classic land of power and terrible exploitation of the people for the benefit of a degenerated aristocracy. France, a type of a nation in which there is not even enough enterprise to increase the productiveness of the country. England, which has so long felt its glory vanishing and in the meantime has remained far behind its younger rival in financial and economic equipment. One can easily imagine the feelings of these peoples when they observe the rapid and successful growth of Germany, and wonders if these same feelings will not one day be directed against the youthful North American giant. In this war it shall be decided which is the stronger—the organized inertia of the tired and envious, or the unfolding of power in the service of a strong and sacrificing life. To know that we have American friendship in this struggle will mean a great moral support for us in the coming trying days, for we know that the country of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln places itself only on the side of a just cause and one worthy of humanity's blessing.

Speculations About Peace, September, 1914

A Report by James W. Gerard, American Ambassador
at Berlin, to President Wilson

Germany has suggested informally that the United States should undertake to elicit from Great Britain, France, and Russia a statement of the terms under which the Allies would make peace.

The suggestion was made by the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, to Ambassador Gerard at Berlin as a result of an inquiry sent by the American Government to learn whether Emperor William was desirous of discussing peace, as recently had been reported.

No reply was made by Emperor William himself, nor did the Imperial Chancellor indicate whether or not he spoke on behalf of the Emperor. Ambassador Gerard, in a cable dispatch to President Wilson, repeated the Chancellor's remarks from recollection, substantially as follows:

Germany was appreciative of the American Government's interest and offer of services in trying to make peace. Germany did not want war, but had it forced on her. Even if she defeats France, she must likewise vanquish both Great Britain and Russia, as all three have made an agreement not to make peace except by common consent. Similarly, England has announced through Premier Asquith and her diplomatists and the newspapers that she intends to fight to the limit of her endurance. In view of that determination on the part of Great Britain, the United States ought to get proposals of peace from the Allies. Germany could accept only a lasting peace, one that would make her people secure against future attacks. To accept mediation now would be interpreted by the Allies as a sign of weakness on the part of Germany, and would be misunderstood by the German people, who, having made great sacrifices, had the right to demand guarantees of security.

The above is all that Ambassador Gerard communicated as to his conversation. He added only the brief comment that he, himself, thought the way might possibly be opened to mediation. Presi-

dent Wilson did not regard the message, however, as bringing anything tangible. He referred to the Chancellor's conversation as non-committal and incidental to the acknowledgment of the American Government's inquiry. The President indicated that he rather expected a reply to the inquiry to be sent eventually from the Emperor himself, although he realizes that the Imperial Chancellor may have consulted the Kaiser by telegraph before talking informally with the American Ambassador.

President Wilson took no action as a result of the message, waiting to hear from Ambassador Gerard whether anything of a more formal character could be obtained by him which the United States might communicate to Great Britain, France, and Russia. It is understood that the British and French Ambassadors, who are in Washington, were not informed officially or unofficially by Secretary Bryan of the conversation between the Imperial German Chancellor and Ambassador Gerard.

Germany's position is that she will give her opinion on terms of peace when she has received a definite statement from the Allies of their proposals. The statement that Germany did not want war, but had it forced upon her, as well as the declaration that she wanted a lasting peace, is almost identical with the remarks which Sir Edward Grey made to Ambassador Page in London last week. The British Foreign Secretary said England wanted no temporary truce, but a permanent peace, and one that would safeguard her against sudden attacks such as Germany had made.

President's Future Course

The general belief in well-informed circles at present is that the President,

after waiting a few days for more information from Berlin, probably will instruct the American Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Petrograd to communicate what the Imperial German Chancellor has said to Ambassador Gerard. It is believed the Ambassadors will be asked to reiterate the wish of the American Government to be of service in bringing about peace and to point out the readiness of the United States to communicate to Germany and Austria any statement of terms which the Allies might care to make.

Diplomatists are disposed to believe that through such informal conversations something definite in the way of peace terms may yet be obtained as a working basis. If a concord of opinion for the discussion of peace terms were reached President Wilson then would endeavor to obtain an acceptance by all the belligerents of the original tender of good offices. This would not mean a cessation of hostilities, unless the mediating power specifically made it a condition of mediation and all the belligerents agreed to it. An armistice would not hinder military movements or preparations, serving merely as a truce while peace was discussed.

President Wilson already has indicated that he believes that the final reckoning of the war should be made in a conference of the European powers, and it would be the function of the United States to preside at such a conference if its services as a mediator were accepted.

Various reports are current that Germany has named several conditions under which she would make peace, that she has refused proposals to alter the territorial status of her empire and possessions, and would cede no territory or dismantle her fleet, but it is said authoritatively that nothing of this character was contained in any of the messages from Berlin to the American Government.

A statement made at the White House recently was the first authoritative ac-

knowledgment that any inquiry on the subject of Germany's attitude concerning peace had been made by the United States. Officials heretofore have maintained silence in regard to the effort made by the Government to get at the bottom of the expression in favor of peace reported to have been made by the German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellor and mentioned in a private conversation in New York by Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States.

What was said by Count von Bernstorff in that conversation brought Oscar S. Straus post-haste to Washington, and as a result of what he told Secretary Bryan instructions were sent to Ambassador Gerard to ascertain whether the remarks attributed to the Emperor were to be taken as an indication that the German Government would not be averse to the exercise of the good offices of the United States in an effort to end the hostilities in Europe.


The conversation at which the German Ambassador made the statement occurred at the house of James Speyer, the banker, in New York. Oscar S. Straus, a member of the Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration at The Hague, was present. In the course of a discussion of the war in Europe and the prospects of peace Count von Bernstorff, it is understood, said that, while he had no advices from the Imperial Government since he had left Berlin, he recalled that the Imperial Chancellor had told him that he believed Emperor William would be willing to discuss a proposal of peace through mediation.

With the permission of Count von Bernstorff, Mr. Straus came to Washington and told Secretary Bryan of what the German Ambassador had said. On the following day Count von Bernstorff made a trip from New York to Washington and had an interview with Secretary Bryan.

It has been understood that Mr. Bryan, in an excess of caution, desired to ask

Count von Bernstorff personally if he would consent to having Ambassador Gerard instructed to make inquiry of the German Government as to whether the conversation between the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor might be re-

garded as indicating that an offer of mediation of the United States would not be unwelcome to Germany. Count von Bernstorff is understood to have assented to Mr. Bryan's suggestion, and the instructions to Mr. Gerard followed.



WHO BEGAN THE WAR, AND WHY? CASE FOR THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

FIRST WARNINGS OF EUROPE'S PERIL

Speeches by British Ministers

*Sir John Simon, British Attorney General,
in Speech Before Altrincham Liberals,
at Manchester, July 25, 1914*

We have been so filled with our own political development that some of us may not have noticed how serious a situation is threatening on the Continent of Europe. All I will say about it this afternoon is this—if times of anxiety are coming into relationships between different European powers, we in this

country, and I think not only Liberals among us, have reason to be glad that our foreign administration is in the calm, cool hands of Sir Edward Grey.* [Cheers.] And let us all resolve that, whatever may be the difficulties and dangers which threaten the peaceful relations in Europe, the part which this country plays shall from beginning to end be the part of a mediator simply desirous of promoting better and more peaceful relations.

*On the next day Sir Edward Grey addressed to The London Times the following appeal for national unity:

To the Editor of The Times:

Sir: The Lord Chancellor, in his speech on Friday, called on every Liberal to work for the peace of Europe, but to go forward unflinchingly to civil war at home.

It is obvious that the only hope of England's effective mediation lies in the unity and solidarity of the United Kingdom.

Is it not time that the common sense of the nation asserted itself and called upon our rulers to take steps which will enable a united nation to confront with confidence the perils which encompass us?

In moments of national peril every loyal citizen should not hesitate, however painful the process may be, to burst the fetters of party allegiance in order that he may devote his whole energies to an endeavor to safeguard the higher interests of the State.

What is the cause which is dividing a so-called United Kingdom into two hostile camps? It is the endeavor of a tyrannical

House of Commons to force upon the acceptance of the people a bill which in the common belief they not only do not want but are strongly opposed to. I approach the consideration of the national crisis from no party standpoint, but from that of one who believes that the peace of Ireland, the honor of England, and the strength of the empire are all concerned in a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the Irish question.

I believe that such a settlement is to be found in a measure which will give to the peoples of Ireland powers of local self-government similar to those enjoyed by the Provinces of Canada and South Africa.

It is because the Ministerial policy of home rule is based on a principle which would not be tolerated in any one of the Legislatures of Washington, Ottawa, or Melbourne that I am so strongly opposed to it. No party, no political group, however small, could be found in Canada, Australia, or the United States which would venture to propose that the Province of Quebec, or the State of Queensland or California, should be endowed by

"A CLOUD OVER EUROPE"

London Times Report, July 27, of Speech by Under Secretary Acland

F. D. Acland, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, speaking at an open-air Liberal demonstration at Steyning, Sussex, on Saturday, [July 25,] said there was a cloud over Europe, the position there being far graver and more serious than the position in Ireland. No one could imagine the disasters which a war in which a great European power was involved might bring to the whole world. He hoped the power of accommodating the difficulties in the same way as in the Balkan trouble last year would be found effective. The whole of the influence of this country would be used in the interests of peace.

means of a measure like the Home Rule bill with separatist constitutional rights which could not be given to the other provinces and States.

I challenge his Majesty's Ministers to deny this plain, unanswerable statement.

I further challenge his Majesty's Ministers to deny that their home rule policy, if carried into effect, will make slaves of one part of Ireland or another.

If their bill for the better government of Ireland reaches the statute book without the amending bill it will make slaves of the Ulstermen. It will deprive them of half of the representation to which their population entitles them in the House of Commons, thus reducing them to a political inferiority, as compared with the peoples of Great Britain, which can hardly be distinguished from political slavery, and it will further compel them to accept the administration of a Dublin Parliament which they fear and detest in all matters relating to their local government. I have often wondered how any one rejoicing in the inheritance of old Liberal traditions could for a moment suppose that any group of free men would ever accept such dishonoring conditions.

Again, if the Home Rule bill is passed with the amending bill tacked on to it, the chains of slavery from which Ulster will be relieved will be riveted on the rest of Ireland. Ulster will have thirty-three representatives in the Imperial House of Commons, and the rest of Ireland twenty-seven! What germ of a settlement of the Irish question can any one discover in a policy which proposes that one-fourth of the people of Ireland should be able to

AUSTRO-SERVIAN CRISIS

Statement in House of Commons, July 27, by Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The House will, of course, be aware from the public press of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at the present moment. I think it is due to the House that I should give in short narrative form the position which his Majesty's Government have so far taken up. ["Hear, hear."] Last Friday morning I received from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, which has appeared in the press, and which included textually the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government upon Serbia.

In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors, and expressed the view that as long as the dispute was one between Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone I felt that we had no title to interfere, but that if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia became threatening, the question would then be one of the peace of Europe—a matter that concerned us all.

outvote the other three-fourths in matters affecting their liberties and taxation?

No! The Ministerial bills of home rule are fundamentally bad and should be withdrawn, in order that a new attempt may be made to reach a settlement by general consent in accordance, as I believe, with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people.

Is it not better to wait a little for a settlement by consent on lines which will conduce to permanent peace and prosperity than to try to force on the pages of the statute book a measure which must lead to bloodshed and civil war? If party considerations veto the withdrawal of the Ministerial measure of home rule without the aid of a general election, then let us have a general election without one moment's unnecessary delay.

The times are too perilous to allow us even to contemplate with any other feeling than that of horror and dismay the Lord Chancellor's appeal to go forward unflinchingly to civil war.

I have the honor to remain, Sir,

Yours respectfully, GREY.
22 South Street, Park Lane, July 26, 1914.

I did not then know what view the Russian Government had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things were likely to develop I could not make any immediate proposition; but I said that if relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance of peace appeared to me to be that the four powers—Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain—who were not directly interested in the Servian question, should work together both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military operations while the four powers endeavored to arrange a settlement.

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with Servia I made, by telegraph yesterday afternoon, the following proposal, as a practical method of applying the views that I had already expressed:

I instructed his Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Berlin, and Rome to ask the Governments to which they were accredited whether they would be willing to arrange that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in London should meet me in a conference to be held in London immediately to endeavor to find a means of arranging the present difficulties. At the same time I instructed his Majesty's Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorize their representatives in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade to inform the Governments there of the proposed conference and to ask them to suspend all active military operations pending the result of the conference.

To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it is of course a proposal in which the co-operation of all four powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this the efforts of one power alone to preserve the peace must be quite ineffective.

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it would be well received. But, where matters are so grave and the

time so short, the risk of proposing something that is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Servian reply as published this morning in the press is accurate, as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on which a friendly and impartial group of powers, including powers who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable.

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and Servia and becomes one in which another great power is involved, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow; no one can say what would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict; the consequences of it, direct and indirect, would be incalculable.

A GRAVE SITUATION

Statement in House of Commons, July 29, by H. H. Asquith, British Prime Minister

Mr. Bonar Law (Lancs, Bootle)—May I ask the Prime Minister whether he has any information to give the House with regard to the European situation?

Mr. Asquith—As the House is aware, a formal declaration of war was issued yesterday by Austria against Servia. The situation at this moment is one of extreme gravity and I can only say—usefully say—that his Majesty's Government are not relaxing their efforts to do everything in their power to circumscribe the area of possible conflict. ["Hear! hear!"]

RISK OF A CATASTROPHE

Declaration in House of Commons, July 30, by Prime Minister Asquith

We meet today under conditions of gravity which are almost unparalleled in the experience of every one of us. The

issues of peace and war are hanging in the balance, and with them the risk of a catastrophe of which it is impossible to measure either the dimensions or the effects. In these circumstances it is of vital importance in the interests of the whole world that this country, which has no interests of its own directly at stake, should present a united front and be able to speak and act with the authority of an undivided nation. If we were to proceed today with the first order on the paper we should inevitably, unless the debate was conducted with an artificial tone, be involved in acute controversy in regard to domestic differences whose importance to ourselves no one here in any quarter of the House is disposed to disparage or to belittle. I need not say more than that such a use of our time at such a moment might have injurious, and lastingly injurious, effects on the international situation. I have had the advantage of consultation with the leader of the Opposition, who, I know, shares to the full the view which I have expressed. We shall therefore propose to put off for the present the consideration of the second reading of the amending bill—of course, without prejudice to its future—in the hope that by a postponement of the discussion the patriotism of all parties will contribute what lies in our power, if not to avert at least to circumscribe the calamities which threaten the world. In the meantime the business which we shall take will be confined to necessary matters which will not be of a controversial character.

OPPOSITION CONCURS

Assent of Bonar Law, Leader of the British Opposition, and of Sir Edward Carson, July 30

As the Prime Minister has informed the House, it is with our concurrence that he has made the suggestion which we have just heard. At a moment like the present, when even those of us who do not share diplomatic secrets feel that the statement of the Prime Minister is true, that peace and war may be trembling in

the balance, I think it is of the utmost importance that it should be made plain to every one that, whatever our domestic differences may be, they do not prevent us from presenting a united front in the councils of the world. I am obliged to the Prime Minister for saying that in the meantime party controversial business will not be taken. I am sure that it is his intention, as it would be the wish of the whole House, that this postponement will not in any way prejudice the interests of any of the parties to the controversy. I should like to add—and I do so, not to give information to the House, the members of which quite understand the position, but in order that it may be plain outside that in what I have now said I speak not only, so far as I am entitled to speak, for the Unionist Party, but for Ulster—that in what I have just said I have the concurrence of my right honorable friend the member for Trinity College [Sir Edward Carson].

PEACE THE GREAT OBJECT

Statement by Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, July 30

I regret that I cannot say the situation is less grave than it was yesterday. The outstanding facts are much the same. Austria has begun war against Serbia. Russia has ordered a partial mobilization. This has not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other powers, so far as our information goes. We continue to pursue the one great object of preserving European peace, and for this purpose we are keeping in close touch with other powers. In thus keeping in touch we have, I am glad to say, had no difficulty so far; though it has not been possible for the powers to unite in diplomatic action as was proposed on Monday.

RUSSIA'S MOBILIZATION

Statement in House of Commons by Prime Minister Asquith, Aug. 1

We have just heard, not from St. Petersburg but from Germany, that

Russia has proclaimed a general mobilization of her army and fleet, and in consequence of this martial law is to be proclaimed in Germany.

We understand this to mean that mobilization will follow in Germany if the Russian mobilization is general and is proceeded with.

In these circumstances I should prefer not to answer any further question until Monday.

THE GERMAN INVASION

*Editorial from The London Times,
Aug. 3, 1914*

The die is cast. The great European struggle which the nations have so long struggled to avert has begun. Germany declared war upon Russia on Saturday evening, and yesterday her troops entered Luxemburg and crossed the French frontier in Lorraine without any declaration at all. It is idle to dwell upon events such as these. They speak for themselves in a fashion which all can understand. They mean that Europe is to be the scene of the most terrible war that she has witnessed since the fall of the Roman Empire. The losses in human life and in the accumulated wealth of generations which such a contest must involve are frightful to think of. That it should have come about despite the zealous efforts of diplomacy, and against the wishes of almost all the nations whom it is destined to afflict, is a grim satire upon the professions of peace yet fresh upon the lips of those who have plunged the Continent into its miseries and its calamities. The blame must fall mainly upon Germany. She could have stayed the plague had she chosen to speak in Vienna as she speaks when she is in earnest. She has not chosen to do so. She has preferred to make demands in St. Petersburg and in Paris which no Government could entertain, and to defeat by irrevocable acts the last efforts of this country and of others for mediation. She has lived up to the worst principles of the Frederician tradition—the tradition which disregards all obligations of right and wrong at the bidding

of immediate self-interest. She believes that her admirable military organization has enabled her to steal a march upon her rivals. She has been mobilizing in all but name, while their mobilization has been retarded by the "conversations" she continued until her moment had come. Then she flung the mask aside. While her Ambassador was still in Paris, while by the customs traditional with all civilized peoples she was still at peace with France, she has sent her soldiers into Luxemburg, and invaded the territory of the republic. It is hard to say which of these acts is the grosser infringement of public right. With Luxemburg she makes no pretense of quarrel. She is herself a party to the guarantee of its neutrality contained in the Treaty of 1867. The other guarantors are Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, and the Netherlands. She solemnly pledged herself with some of them, including France and ourselves, to respect this neutrality. The world sees how Germany keeps her word. She has been weak enough, or cynical enough, to issue an explanation of her breach of faith. Let Englishmen, who have been disposed to trust her, judge it for themselves. She has not, she says, committed a hostile act by crossing the frontiers, by forcibly seizing the Government offices, and by forcibly interrupting the telephonic communication. These are merely measures to protect the railways from a possible attack by the French. For the sudden invasion of France no excuse has yet been published. When it comes it will doubtless be of about equal worth.

The whole situation has been revolutionized by the events of yesterday. The doubts which many of us tried hard to cherish as to Germany's real intentions have been dispelled by her high-handed contempt for public law. The Government and the nation now realize that she has been bent on a European war—a European war to be waged in the first instance against France, and through at least one of those neutral States whose safety we have bound ourselves to defend because it is indispensable to our

own. The Cabinet, which has been sitting almost uninterruptedly since Saturday morning, reached a decision at an early hour yesterday, which shows that they know what is before us. They have called up the Naval Reserves. They would not have taken this step had they not felt that in this quarrel our interests are now directly at stake. After the example of what Germany has done in Luxemburg and on the French border we can no longer rely upon the presence of her Ambassador as a security against some sudden surprise. We have no controversy with her, it is true. We have been willing and anxious to develop those better relations with her which had of late sprung up. We were eager to work with her for mediation and for peace. Now she has shown her hand. She is resolved to crush France, and to trample upon the rights of those who happen to stand in her way. Yesterday it was Luxemburg. Today it may be Belgium or Holland, or she may treat us as she has treated our French friends, and assail us without a declaration of war. She will find the empire ready. Here at home and in the far-off dominions the sure instinct of our peoples teaches them that the ruin of France or of the Low Countries would be the prelude to our own. We can no more tolerate a German hegemony in Europe than we can tolerate the hegemony of any other power. As our fathers fought Spain and France in the days of their greatest strength to defeat their pretense to Continental supremacy, and their menace to the narrow seas, which are the bulwark of our independence, so shall we be ready, with the same unanimity and the same stubborn tenacity of purpose, to fight any other nation which shows by her acts that she is advancing a like claim and confronting us with a like threat. If any individual member of the Cabinet dissents from this view, the sooner he quits the Government the better. Mr. Asquith may find it no disadvantage to take fresh blood into his Administration, as M. Viviani has undoubtedly strengthened the French Government by the admission of M. Delcassé and M. Clemenceau. The controversy be-

tween Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that between Austria-Hungary and Russia, have passed away from the eyes of the nation. These are fixed on the German attack upon the French Republic and upon Luxemburg. In that conflict the nation know their duty. With the blessing of Heaven they will do it to the uttermost.

PEACE OF EUROPE CANNOT BE PRESERVED

*Sir Edward Grey's Speech in House of
Commons, Aug. 3*

Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. Today events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of his Majesty's Government I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all, let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as his Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the great powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labor and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their

main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the great powers generally are concerned is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which powers were most in favor of peace, which were most disposed to risk war or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honor, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace, and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honor upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple En-

tente, for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeiras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to his Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I re-

member almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought

to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22d November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government:

My dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.

Lord Charles Beresford—What is the date of that?

Sir E. Grey—The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Gov-

ernment remained perfectly free, and, a fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honor cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian alliance.

We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the Eng-

lish Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that today we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital British interests, we shall go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences

which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defense of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal

way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Among other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that—confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th of August, 1870, used these words. He said:

We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we could not think this country was bound either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honor or to the country's interests.

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:

There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance, that there is already an existing guarantee in force, is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power whatever.

The treaty is an old treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honor and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilization was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:

The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other

power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs today.

From the German Government the reply was:

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:

Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

It now appears from the news I have received today—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute infor-

mation upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George:

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," Vol. 203, Page 1,787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:

We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that

which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we

are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilization of the fleet has taken place; mobilization of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use

which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that

we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right honorable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are today, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our minds to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be

and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

GERMANY AND BELGIUM

Further Statement by Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, Aug. 3, 1914.

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect:

Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising main-

tenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honor of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means.

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which they have received. I make no further comment upon it.

UNHESITATING SUPPORT

Statement by Bonar Law, Opposition Leader, in House of Commons, Aug. 3

The right honorable gentleman has made an appeal for support and it is necessary that I should say a word or two, but they shall be very few. I wish to say in the first place that I do not believe there is a single member in this House who doubts that not only the right honorable gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve peace. [Cheers.] And I think we may be sure that if any other course is taken it is because it is forced upon them and that they have absolutely no alternative. [Cheers.] One thing only further I should like to say. The right honorable gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture which only a day or two ago was a black spot in the political horizon. Everything that he has said I am sure is true and I should like to say this further—that if the contingencies which he has not put into words, but which are in all our minds as possible, arise, then we have already had indications that there is another bright spot—that every one of his Majesty's dominions beyond the seas will be behind us in whatever act it is necessary to take. [Cheers.] This only I should add. The Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am

leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honor and security of this country they can rely upon the unhesitating support of the Opposition. [Loud Ministerial and Opposition cheers.]

CHANGED IRISH FEELING

*Statement in House of Commons, Aug. 3,
by John E. Redmond, M. P.*

I hope the House will not consider it improper on my part in the grave circumstances in which we are assembled if I intervene for a very few moments. I was moved a great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. In past times when this empire has been engaged in these terrible enterprises it is true—it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny it—the sympathy of the Nationalists of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in centuries of history, has been estranged from this country. But allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. [Ministerial cheers.] I must not touch, and I may be trusted not to touch, on any controversial topics, but this I may be allowed to say—that a wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history have, I think, altered the view of the democracy of this country toward the Irish question, and today I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may overtake it. [General cheers.] There is a possibility at any rate of history repeating itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the disastrous American war, when it might, I think, truly be said that the military power of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, and when the shores of Ireland were threatened with foreign invasion, a body of 100,000 Irish volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose of defending her shores. At first no Catholic—ah! how sad the reading of

the history of those days is—was allowed to be enrolled in that body of volunteers, and yet from the very first day the Catholics of the South and West subscribed money and sent it toward the arming of their Protestant fellow-countrymen. Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics in the South were armed and enrolled brothers in arms with their fellow-countrymen of a different creed in the North. May history repeat itself! [Cheers.] Today there are in Ireland two large bodies of volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to the Government that they may tomorrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. [General cheers.] I say that the coasts of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. [Cheers.] Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good not merely for the empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish Nation? [Cheers.] I ought to apologize for having intervened [cries of "No"], but while Irishmen generally are in favor of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war, while we would make any possible sacrifice for that purpose, still if the dire necessity is forced upon this country we offer to the Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that if it is allowed to us in comradeship with our brethren in the North we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country. [Loud cheers.]

GREAT BRITAIN'S ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY

*Prime Minister Asquith Explains Its
Nature in House of Commons,
Aug. 4, 1914*

Mr. Bonar Law—I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any

statement that he can now make to the House?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith)—In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right honorable friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect:

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to his Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understood that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:

German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

Simultaneously — almost immediately afterward—we received from the Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram:

General Staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich, (near Aix-la-Chapelle.)

Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory. We also received this morning from the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secre-

tary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms:

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

I have to add this on behalf of his Majesty's Government: We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning—which I have read to the House—should be given before midnight.

PENETRATION OF BELGIAN TERRITORY

Statement by Prime Minister Asquith in House of Commons, Aug. 5

Mr. Bonar Law—May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can give us today?

The Prime Minister—Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves.

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:

I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs [that is, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs] a note of which the following is a literal translation:

"Belgian Government regret to have to inform his Majesty's Government that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty.

"Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power.

"Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in defense of her territory.

"There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defense of her fortified places."

We have also received today from the French Ambassador here the following

telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels:

The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French Military Attaché to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian Army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing powers now being made. Orders have, therefore, been given to Belgian Provisional Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier.

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that tomorrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of £100,000,000.

Great Britain's Mobilization

Measures Taken Throughout the Empire Upon the Outbreak of War

Message from King George V. to the House of Commons, Aug. 5, 1914

Mr. Asquith then proceeded to the bar amid cheers and, on being called upon by the Speaker, announced: A message from his Majesty signed by his own hand. The announcement was received with loud cheers, which were continued as Mr. Asquith advanced up the floor and handed the document to the Speaker. All the members uncovered.

The Speaker read the message as follows:

The present state of public affairs in Europe constituting in the opinion of his Majesty a case of great emergency within the meaning of the acts of Parliament in that behalf, his Majesty deems it proper to provide additional means for the military service and, therefore, in pursuance of these acts his Majesty has thought it right to communicate to the House of Commons that his Majesty is by proclamation about to order that the army reserve shall be called out on permanent service, that soldiers who would otherwise be entitled in pursuance of the terms of their enlistment to be transferred to the reserve shall continue in army service for such period not exceeding the period for which they might be required to serve if they were transferred to the reserve and called out for permanent service as to his Majesty may seem expedient; and that such directions as may seem necessary may be given for embodying the territorial force and for making such special arrangements as may be proper with regard to units or individuals whose services may be required in other than a military capacity.—Signed by his Majesty in his own hand.

KING TO BRITAIN'S FLEET

Message from George V. to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Aug. 5..

At this grave moment in our national history I send to you, and through you to the officers and men of the fleets of which you have assumed command, the

assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the royal navy, and prove once again the sure shield of Britain and of her empire in the hour of trial.

GEORGE R. I.

NAPoleonism Once Again

Speech by Bonar Law, Opposition Leader, in House of Commons, Aug. 6.

No Minister has ever fulfilled a duty more responsible or in regard to which the responsibility was more acutely felt than that which has just been fulfilled by the right honorable gentleman. This is not a time for speech-making, and I should have been quite ready to leave the statement which he has given to the committee as the expression of the view, not of a party, but of a nation. [Cheers.] But as this, I think, will be the only opportunity which will be given for expressing the views of a large section of this House, I feel that I am bound to make it clear to the committee and to the country what is the attitude of his Majesty's Opposition on this question. There are two things which I desire to impress upon the committee. The first is that we have dreaded war and have longed for peace as strongly as any section of this committee; and the second is that in our belief we are in a state of war against our will, and that we, as a nation, have done everything in our power to prevent such a condition of things arising. [Cheers.] When this crisis first arose I confess that I was one of those who had the impulse to hope that even though a European conflagration took place we might be able to stay out. I had that hope strongly. But in a short time I became convinced that into this war we should inevitably be drawn

and that it really was a question only whether we should enter it honorably or be dragged into it with dishonor. [Cheers.]

Folly and Wickedness

I remember that on the first occasion after the retirement of my right honorable friend [Mr. Balfour] when I had to speak on foreign affairs I made this statement. It perhaps is wrong, though I do not think so even yet. I said that if ever war arose between Great Britain and Germany it would not be due to inevitable causes, for I did not believe in an inevitable war, but it would be due to human folly. [Cheers.] It is due to human folly and to human wickedness [cheers], but neither the folly nor the wickedness is here. [Cheers.] What other course was open to us? It is quite true, as the Foreign Secretary explained to the House the other day, that we were under no formal obligations to take part in such a struggle. But every member in this House knows that the Entente meant this in the minds of this Government and of every other Government, that if any of the three powers were attacked aggressively the others would be expected to step in and to give their aid. ["Hear, hear!"] The question, therefore, to my mind was this: Was this war in any way provoked by those who will now be our allies? No one who has read the "White Paper" can hesitate to answer that question. I am not going to go into it even as fully as the Prime Minister has done; but I would remind the House of this, that in this "White Paper" is contained a statement made by the German Ambassador, I think at Vienna, that Russia was not in a condition and could not go to war. And in the same letter are found these words: "As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter." Now, every one for years has known that the key to peace or war lay in Berlin, and at this crisis no one doubts that Berlin, if it had chosen, could have prevented this terrible conflict. [Cheers.] I am afraid that the miscalculation which was made about Russia was made also about us.

The dispatch which the right honorable gentleman referred to is a dispatch of a nature which I believe would not have been addressed to Great Britain if it had been believed that our hands were free and that we held the position which we had always held before the Entente. That, at least, is my belief.

Napoleonism Without a Napoleon

We are fighting, as the Prime Minister said, for the honor and, what with the honor is bound up always, the interest of our nation. But we are fighting also for the whole basis of the civilization for which we stand and for which Europe stands. [Cheers.] I do not wish, any more than the Prime Minister, to inflame passion. I only ask the House to consider one aspect. Look at the way Belgium is being treated today. There is a report—if it is not true now it may be true tomorrow—that the City of Liège is invaded by German troops and that civilians, as in the days of the Middle Ages, are fighting for their hearths and homes against trained troops. How has that been brought about? In a state of war, war must be waged. But remember that this plan is not of today or of yesterday; that it has been long matured; that the Germans knew that they would have this to face; and that they were ready to take the course which they took the other day of saying to Belgium, "Destroy your independence. Allow our troops to go through, or we will come down upon you with a might which it is impossible for you to resist." If we had allowed that to be done, our position as one of the great nations of the world and our honor as one of the nations of the world would in my opinion have been gone forever. [Cheers.] This is no small struggle. It is the greatest, perhaps, that this country has ever engaged in. It is Napoleonism once again. ["Hear, hear!"] Thank Heaven, so far as we know, there is no Napoleon.

I am not going to say anything more about the causes of the war, for I do not desire to encourage controversy on this subject. But if I may be allowed to say so, I should like to say that I read yester-

day with real pleasure an article in a paper which does not generally commend itself to me—The Manchester Guardian. ["Hear, hear!"] In that article it still held that the war ought not to have been entered upon; but it took this view, that that was a question for history, and that now we are in it there is only one question for us, and that is to bring it to a successful issue. [Cheers.]

Sir, I have full sympathy far more than at any other time for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. I can imagine nothing more terrible than that the Foreign Secretary should have a feeling that perhaps he has brought his country into an unnecessary war. No feeling could be worse. I can say this, and, whether we are right or wrong, the whole House agrees with it, I am sure, that that is a burden which the right honorable gentleman can carry with a good conscience, [cheers,] and that every one of us can put up unhesitatingly this prayer: "May God defend the right."

Trade and Food Supplies

I should like, if I may, to pass to another topic, for this is the only opportunity I can have. Consider the conditions under which this war is going to be carried on. I was pleased to hear the Prime Minister say the other day in answer to a speech of the honorable member for Merthyr Tydvil—he has developed it in describing the terms of this vote of credit—that he realized, as we all must realize, that in a country situated like ours the development of industry and the supply of food at home is just as much an operation of war as the conduct of our armed forces. [Cheers.] I do not wish to minimize our difficulties, but I am quite sure—as sure as I can be of anything—that there is no danger of a scarcity of food. ["Hear, hear!"] The only danger is the fear of a scarcity of food. ["Hear, hear!"] Every one who has been in business knows that what causes panic prices is not an actual scarcity at the time, but a fear of scarcity coming. This is a case where every one of us must do all he can to impress upon the people of this country that

there is, as I believe, no danger. [Cheers.] Here I should like to give one warning note. Remember—at least I believe it—that this war, unexpected by us, is not unexpected by our enemies; and I shall be greatly surprised if we do not find that at first on our trade routes there is a destruction of our property which might create a panic. That is inevitable, I think, at the outset. Let us be prepared for it, and let us realize that it has no bearing whatever on the ultimate course of the war. [Cheers.]

There is something else which I think it is important to say. We had a discussion yesterday about credit. That is the basis of a successful war, as it is of every branch of industry at this moment. I think the Government have taken the right course. I have followed it closely, and I know that they have been supported by those who best understand the situation. I think the danger is minimized as much as it can be. But, after all, the question of credit really depends on what we believe is going to be the effect of this war upon our trade and our industry.

The Command of the Sea

I hope the House will not think that I am too optimistic, but I do think there is a danger of our taking too gloomy a view of what the effects will be, ["Hear, hear!"] and, by taking that gloomy view, helping to bring about the very state of things which we all desire to avert. Again I wish to guard myself against seeming to be too hopeful; but let us look at the effect as if we were examining a chess problem. If we keep the command of the sea, what is going to happen? It all depends on that. I admit that if that goes the position is gloomy indeed; but of that I have no fear. [Cheers.] If we keep the command of the sea what is going to happen? Five-sixths of our production is employed in the home trade. What goes abroad is very important, and, of course, if the population which supplies this one-sixth were thrown out of work that would react on the whole. But, after all, the total amount of our exports to all the

European countries which are now at war is only a small part of our total exports. There is here no question of fiscal policy. We are far beyond that. It is a question of fact. Our total exports to all the countries which are now at war do not, in my belief—I have not looked into the figures—exceed our exports to India and Australia taken alone. Now, consider this, we shall have freedom of trade if the command of the sea is maintained, with the colonies and with the whole of the American Continent, while, unfortunately for them, both our allies and our enemies will not be competing with us in these markets. Look at it as a problem. I think we have a right to believe, not that trade will be good, but that it will be much more nearly normal than is generally supposed. [Cheers.] I hope the House will not think that that is a useless thing to say at such a time. [Cheers.]

There is one thing more only I wish to say. This is the affair of the nation. Every one would desire to help. There will be a great deal of work to be done which cannot be done by the Government. I was glad the Prime Minister has already asked the co-operation of my right honorable friends the members for West Birmingham and the Strand. They gladly came. But I am sure I speak not for this bench but for the whole of our party when I say that the Government has only got to requisition any one of us and we will serve them and our country to the best of our ability. [Loud cheers.]

PACT OF TRIPLE ENTENTE

Statement Issued by British Foreign Office, Sept. 5

DECLARATION

The undersigned duly authorized thereto by the respective Governments hereby declare as follows:

The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of

each of the other Allies. In faith whereof the undersigned have signed this declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London in triplicate the 5th day of September, 1914.

E. GREY, his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

PAUL CAMBON, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.

BENCKENDORFF, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

A COUNTERSTROKE

Semi-Official Statement in The London Times, Sept. 6

The declaration of the Allied Governments that they will not conclude peace separately during the war or demand terms of peace without previous agreement with each other is an opportune counterstroke to the campaign initiated by Germany for the purpose of detaching France from Russia and especially from Britain. Overtures in this sense have doubtless been made to France.

The German Government has not yet realized the strength of the moral forces it has ranged against itself by its wanton attack upon European civilization. It appears to imagine that, after having been sufficiently "punished" for her temerity in opposing the Kaiser's hosts, France would be open to a bargain, under which she would be "let off" lightly on condition that she should agree to become the ally of Germany.

This idea has been clearly expressed of late in the German press. It is based on the belief that the war was prepared by skillful British intrigues inspired by jealousy of Germany. German statesmen cannot conceive that nations should fight for any cause loftier than material "interests." Hence the constant mistakes of their diplomacy and its failure to foresee that little Belgium would resist German pretensions or that England would go to war for "a scrap of paper." Now they imagine that the determination

of France to fight to the last in defense of her honor and her superior civilization can be undermined by an offer to mitigate the material losses she may suffer from the war.

The German view was most clearly expressed in the remarkable dispatch to the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* from its Berlin correspondent, which was reproduced in *The Times* of yesterday. Politicians in Berlin, he wrote,

see in England the land which has brought about the outbreak of the war by finely played intrigue, in order to let dangerous Russia bleed herself to death, to the end that against Germany, even a victorious Germany, she may herself acquire great advantages, both in trade and on the sea, and in order to make France entirely dependent upon her. The consequence of this opinion is in the highest degree remarkable. Whether you speak with a politician or with a porter or shoemaker, the same wish will always be expressed. We must, when we have beaten France, offer her peace on very acceptable terms in order to make her our ally to fight—against England.

The German error, which the declaration of the Allies should go far to correct, is all the more remarkable in view of the stipulations of the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance. Concluded in 1879 by Bismarck and Andrassy, this treaty still governs the relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Its first clause runs:

Should, contrary to the hope and against the sincere wish of the two high contracting parties, one of the two empires be attacked by Russia, the high contracting parties are bound to stand by each other with the whole of the armed forces of their empires, and, in consequence thereof, only to conclude peace jointly and in agreement.

However low the German estimate of the moral cohesion of France, Russia, and England, German statesmen must be singularly lacking in shrewdness if they suppose the Allies to be less alive than were Bismarck and Andrassy to the need for complete co-operation between allies, not only in war, but also in the negotiation of peace.

The futile German campaign for the detachment of France from her allies is, indeed, the most striking indication yet

forthcoming of the misgivings with which the resolute action of the Allies is beginning to inspire the Kaiser and his Government.

IMPERIAL MESSAGE TO THE BRITISH DOMINIONS

*King George V. to the Self-Governing
Peoples and the Empire of India,
Sept. 9, 1914*

To the Governments and Peoples of my Self-Governing Dominions: During the past few weeks the peoples of my whole empire at home and overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilization and the peace of mankind.

The calamitous conflict is not of my seeking, my voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which my empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside when, in defiance of pledges to which my kingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French Nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed my honor and given to destruction the liberties of my empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the empire is with me in this decision.

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of Great Britain and of the empire.

My peoples in the self-governing dominions have shown beyond all doubt that they wholeheartedly indorse the grave decision which it was necessary to take.

My personal knowledge of the loyalty and devotion of my overseas dominions had led me to expect that they would cheerfully make the great efforts and bear the great sacrifices which the present conflict entails. The full measure in which they have placed their services and resources at my disposal fills me with gratitude and I am proud to be able to show to the world that my peoples over-

sea are as determined as the people of the United Kingdom to prosecute a just cause to a successful end.

The Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Dominion of New Zealand have placed at my disposal their naval forces, which have already rendered good service for the empire. Strong expeditionary forces are being prepared in Canada, in Australia, and in New Zealand for service at the front, and the Union of South Africa has released all British troops and has undertaken important military responsibilities the discharge of which will be of the utmost value to the empire. Newfoundland has doubled the numbers of its branch of the royal naval reserve and is sending a body of men to take part in the operations at the front. From the Dominion and Provincial Governments of Canada large and welcome gifts of supplies are on their way for the use both of my naval and military forces and for the relief of the distress in the United Kingdom which must inevitably follow in the wake of war. All parts of my oversea dominions have thus demonstrated in the most unmistakable manner the fundamental unity of the empire amid all its diversity of situation and circumstance.

Message to India

To the Princes and peoples of my Indian Empire: Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of my empire in defense of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to my throne expressed both by my Indian subjects and by the Feudatory Princes and the ruling chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched my heart, and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked my Indian subjects and myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British Nation of goodwill and fellowship which greeted my return in February, 1912, after the sol-

emn ceremony of my Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfillment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.

438,000 MEN RECRUITED

Statements in House of Commons, Sept. 10, by Prime Minister Asquith and Bonar Law

The House went into Committee of Supply, Mr. Whitley in the chair.

On the question that an additional number of land forces not exceeding 500,000 of all ranks be maintained for the service of the United Kingdom, in consequence of the war in Europe, for the year ending March 31, 1915.

Mr. Asquith (Fife E.) said: The House of Commons voted earlier in the session, before any outbreak of war was anticipated, under normal conditions, under Vote A, 186,000-odd men for the regular army. It is perhaps not necessary to point out, but it may be convenient to put it on record, that the total number of men under Vote A does not include either the army reserve, the special reserve, or the territorial forces. When we come to vote the financial provision under Vote 1 of the army estimates, which is consequential upon the passing of Vote A, we make provision not only for the 186,000 men already sanctioned for the regular army, but also for the army reserve. In the subsequent Votes 3 and 4 provision is made for the special reserve and territorial force. The army reserve and the special reserve are not called upon to serve until, under regular constitutional machinery, consequent upon the outbreak or imminence of war, they are summoned to do so. It may be convenient to the committee to know that at the time when war broke out and when the reserves were called to the colors the state of things was this: Parliament had voted 186,000-odd men—call it roughly 200,000. The army reserve and the special reserve then became available as part of the regular forces of the country, amounting also roughly to another 200,000 men. That was altogether 400,000 men. On Aug.

6, after war had been declared, I made a motion in committee, which was assented to in committee and by the House on report, for the addition of 500,000 men to the regular forces. These 500,000 men, assuming them all to have been raised, would, in addition to the 400,000 I have just mentioned, amount to a total of 900,000 men. I think it will be interesting to the committee before I state the reasons for which I am going to ask them to make this further vote to know what has actually happened in consequence of the vote of Aug. 6.

Enlistments Since the War.

The number of recruits who have enlisted in the army since the declaration of war—that is, exclusive of those who have joined the territorial force—is 438,000, [cheers.] practically 439,000. That is up to the evening of Sept. 9. The committee will therefore see that, having sanctioned, as it did, very little more than a month ago, the addition to the regular forces of the Crown of half a million of men, we are now within some 60,000 of having attained that total. The numbers enlisted in London since Sunday, Aug. 30, have exceeded 30,000 men, and the stamp and character of the recruits has been in every way satisfactory and gratifying. [Cheers.] The high-water mark was reached on Sept. 3, when the total recruits enlisted in the United Kingdom on one day was 33,204. [Cheers.] I may mention—I am sure it will be gratifying to honorable members on both sides who represent Lancashire constituencies—that on that day 2,151 men were enlisted in Manchester alone. That is a very satisfactory result, but it by no means exhausts the requirements of the case. The response to the call for recruits has been in every way gratifying. But I am aware, not only from a discussion that took place in the House yesterday, but from communications which reached us from various parts of the country, that there are complaints of grievances, causing legitimate or otherwise deeply felt dissatisfaction at the manner in which some parts—I say advisedly only some parts—of this operation of recruiting have been conducted. I

should like the committee to realize what were the conditions of the case. ["Hear, hear!"]

A Year's Recruits in a Day.

We have been recruiting during the last ten days every day substantially the same number of recruits that in past years we have recruited in every year. [Cheers.] I suppose our annual recruiting amounts to about 35,000 men for the regular army. As I pointed out a moment ago, on Sept. 3 we recruited 33,200 men. No machinery in the world which man has ever contrived or conceived could suddenly meet in an emergency and under great pressure the difficulty of bringing in to the colors and making adequate provision in a day for that in which past experience we only had to provide for in the course of a year, and that, be it observed, by a department which during the whole of this time has been engaged in superintending and executing an operation I believe unexampled in the history of war—the dispatch to a foreign country of an expeditionary force—I will not give the exact number, but roughly 150,000 men, which has had to be, as the committee I am sure is well aware, in consequence of the necessary and regrettable losses caused by the operations of war, constantly repaired by reinforcements of men, guns, supplies, transport, and every other form of warlike material. [Cheers.]

War Office's Double Task

If our critics—I do not complain of legitimate criticism even at times like this—but if they will try to imagine themselves equipped with the machinery which was possessed by the War Office at the time the war broke out, and then consider that side by side with the smooth, frictionless, and most successful dispatch of the expeditionary force [cheers] which left these shores and arrived at its destination—I am speaking the literal truth—without the loss of a horse or a man, [cheers,] the wastage day by day and week by week has had to be repaired in men and in material, repaired often at a moment's notice, and it has been necessary to keep constantly

in reserve, and not only in reserve, but ready for immediate use, the material to replace further wastage as days and weeks rolled on—if you remember that that was the primary call on the War Office, and that side by side with that they had to provide for recruits in these few weeks of no less than 430,000 men, he will be a very censorious, and, I venture to say, a very unpatriotic, critic who would make much of small difficulties and friction, and who would not recognize that in a great emergency this department has played a worthy part. [Cheers.] My tenure at the War Office was a brief one, but no one who has ever had the honor to preside over that department can possibly exaggerate the degree of efficiency to which it has been brought under the administration of recent years. Everything, as the experience of this war has shown, was foreseen and provided for in advance with the single exception of the necessity of this enormous increase in our regular forces.

Steps for Dealing with Recruits

What provision has been made for dealing with this influx of recruits? In the first place, and I think very wisely, my noble friend the Secretary of State for War appealed for the assistance of the county associations, which rendered such great and patriotic services in connection with the territorial forces. The great bulk of these county associations have responded to the call and enormously facilitated the work of providing for this large body of new recruits. Next, he, in conjunction with his advisers, has largely multiplied, and is continuing to multiply, the various training centres. There has been—unfortunately, no one can deny that there has been—a congestion of men ready and willing to recruit and actually enlisting at particular places which has produced, for the moment at any rate, a certain amount of discomfort and a certain amount of difficulty in the provision of food and all the other requirements of such a body. But in that connection I should like, although I think the difficulty is now being almost got over, to

make an appeal strongly to local authorities—county councils, town councils, urban and rural district councils—that when a situation of this kind arises in consequence of a national necessity they should show themselves—and I am sure they are most willing to do so—not only zealous, but able to provide accommodation for the moment in the public buildings which are under their charge. I think a great deal of the congestion which has taken place could have been avoided if more liberal use had been made, and could be made—I am not reproaching any one; the circumstances were exceptional and the pressure very great on our public buildings, our town halls, schools, and the other edifices which are under the control of municipal and county authorities for the purpose, at any rate at the moment, of relieving the great pressure of recruiting, and I am quite sure that appeal will not go unheeded. But we recognize fully, and no one more fully than my noble friend Lord Kitchener, the necessity of facilitating this process and rendering it more easy. We do not think the time has come in which we ought in any way to relax our recruiting efforts, [cheers,] and when people tell me, as they do every day, “These recruits are coming in in their tens of thousands; you are being blocked by them and you cannot provide adequately either for their equipment or for their training,” my answer is, “We shall want more rather than less, and let us get the men.” [Cheers.] That is the first necessity of the State—let us get the men. Knowing as we all do the patriotic spirit which now, as always—now, of course, with increased emphasis and enthusiasm—animates every class of the community, I am perfectly certain they will be ready to endure hardship and discomforts for the moment if they are satisfied that their services are really required by the State, and that in due course of time they will be supplied with adequate provision for training and equipment and for rendering themselves fit for taking their places in the field.

Two Important Steps

With that object a few days ago—and

the process is now in complete operation—a very important step was taken which I am sure will be generally welcomed by the committee and by the country—when-ever it is necessary to allow men who are recruited and have gone through the process of attestation, medical examination, and actual enrollment, so that they are not only potential but actual members of the regular army—to allow these men to go back to their own homes until the occasion arises for them to be called upon for actual training. In that way we hope to relieve—indeed, relief has already been given and will be given more amply in the near future—the undoubted block and congestion which have taken place in certain districts to the natural disappointment of the men who have come forward under an impulse of public duty to serve their country and, finding themselves sent back home and put for the time being in the reserve, have felt perhaps that their services were not duly appreciated by the country. That, I think, the committee will agree is a very important step in advance. I have to announce another step which I believe will give universal satisfaction and will go a long way to solve the practical difficulty, such as it is. We propose from today that there shall be given to those recruits for whom we are unable to find accommodation for the time being 3s. per day. [Cheers.] This is not an extravagant proposal, or anything in the nature of a bribe. A shilling a day is their pay. [An Honorable Member—1s. 3d.] I am speaking in round figures; we will call it a shilling. Then if we take the value of what we may roughly call the board and lodging of a soldier receiving 1s. a day when accommodated in barracks and price that at 2s., I do not think you are putting it extravagantly high. We think that these men who have come forward to join the colors and have been actually enrolled, and are, in fact, members of the regular army, for whom we cannot make immediate provision by way of accommodation, should be no worse off than they would be if they were actually in barracks. I believe the provision of that 3s. a day for these men will put them in a position in which they are entitled to

say that they have not been prejudiced or penalized by their patriotic desires.

Mr. Lawson (Mile End, Opp.)—And their return railway fares?

An Honorable Member—And their separation allowances?

Mr. Asquith—The separation allowance does not begin, but as the honorable member has interjected that phrase I will add—because honorable members generally have been very good in not pressing us in regard to the separation allowances to soldiers who are actually serving—that that matter is receiving our daily and constant consideration, and I hope before the session comes to an end to be able to make a further announcement. But it does not arise with regard to this vote. Having made that defense, if defense were needed—I do not think it was—having made that statement of what has actually been done by the War Office in these very anxious days, and also having indicated that in those two important respects we are endeavoring to facilitate the process of recruitment and to remove any possibility of hardship, either to the individual recruit or to recruits collectively, I hope the committee will agree to pass a vote for another 500,000 men. I am perfectly certain if they do so the response will be no less keen—keen in spirit—and no less ample in scale than it has been in the days which have just gone by.

An Army of 1,200,000

We shall then be in a position, as is apparent from the figures I have already read, to put something like—I am not giving exact figures—something like 1,200,000 men in the field.

Mr. Long (Strand)—Does that include the Indians?

Mr. Asquith—No, it is entirely exclusive of them. This is the provision made by the mother country. And, of course, it is exclusive of the territorials.

Mr. F. Hall—And of the national reserve?

Mr. Asquith—Exclusive of the territorials, exclusive of the national reserve,

and exclusive of the magnificent contributions promised from India and from our dominions, we here in these islands, this mother country, will be in a position to put into the field, enrolled as our regular army, something like 1,200,000 men. That is an effort which it is worth while making great sacrifices to attain. As regards money, I am perfectly certain that this House will be ready, willing, and even eager to grant it, if and when the occasion arises. What we want now is to make it clear to those who are showing all over the kingdom this patriotic desire to assist their country in one of the most supreme and momentous crises in the whole of its long history, that they are not going to be treated either in a niggardly or unaccommodating spirit; but that they are going to be welcomed and that every possible provision is going to be made for their comfort and well-being, so that under the best possible conditions they will take their place and play their part in that magnificent army of ours which, as every one who has read the moving dispatch Sir John French [cheers] published this morning, will realize has never done its work better, never shown itself more worthy of long centuries of splendid tradition than in the last fortnight. [Cheers.] I ask the House to pass this vote for 500,000 men.

Bonar Law's Support

Mr. Bonar Law—The right honorable gentleman in the statement he has just made has left me nothing to say except to express our hearty support of all the measures which the Government are taking in this crisis. From the point of view of the Government and of this House we welcome the putting down of this vote as showing that both the Government and the House of Commons are determined, whatever the cost, whatever the sacrifice, to see this thing through. [Cheers.] I agree entirely with the words which I heard the Prime Minister use in another place the other day, that in what has taken place so far we have every ground for encouragement and every reason for pride in what is being done by our troops. I agree entirely

with what the Prime Minister has said about the action of our soldiers on the field of battle. It does not surprise us. We knew that the old spirit was there still. But I think it has to some extent at least surprised our enemies. But while we have reason to be gratified by the action which the Government has taken and which this House has supported them in taking, I think as a nation we have quite as much reason to be proud of the spirit which is shown by our countrymen in rushing to the standard as we have even in what has been done by our soldiers on the field of battle. I never sympathized with—I always resented—the view expressed at one time that our citizens were holding back. There was no justification for it. [Cheers.] At the outset they did not realize what it meant, but the moment they did realize it they have shown that they are prepared to do their share to fight the battles of their country. I am not going to say anything about the difficulties in connection with recruiting this great force to which the Prime Minister has referred. No one could have doubted that difficulties of that kind would arise and that hardships would occur. Criticism, I am sure, is not deprecated by the right honorable gentleman, and ought not to be, if it is framed entirely with this view—to make sure that everything that can be done is being done to minimize the hardships and difficulties with which the authorities were confronted. As the Prime Minister said, the machine was not framed to deal with an emergency like this. No one could expect it to deal with it smoothly. But we have a right to expect that the difficulties are understood at the War Office, and we have the right also to ask that since they cannot be met by the central machine, every effort should be made in the direction of devolution, and that the difficulties shall be met where they locally arise. I am sure it is a satisfaction to the House, as it was to me, to find that before the discussion arose yesterday not only had Lord Kitchener realized the difficulties, but that he had taken every step possible to meet them, and that the

step which he did take was in the direction, which we all feel is a wise one, of putting the responsibility on those at a distance from the War Office and expecting them to bear it. Many of us have been asked to take part in helping the recruiting. When I was asked to join in this I had in my mind the feeling to which I gave expression the other day, that I was not satisfied that too much sacrifice was not being required from those who are going to fight our battles, and that a full share of sacrifice was being borne by those who remain behind. Nothing could be more unfair than that this country should expect all the sacrifice to come from the men who are actually going to risk their lives in our behalf. [Cheers.] We know with what splendid spirit they are coming forward. I suppose every member of the House could give instances that would surprise us all. Perhaps it would interest the House if I give one. The son of a friend of mine, who is well off, had been writing to the War Office, taking every step to try to be accepted in order to fight. He was a partner in a big business in Glasgow and with splendid prospects; he threw them all up. He came and hung about the doors of the War Office as if he was seeking some fat job, when all he wanted was to be placed, not as an officer, but as a private, in one of the most dangerous branches of the service. [Cheers.] That is a spirit which is universal. I do not say in what way further provision should be made, but I am sure the House welcomes the statement of the Prime Minister that the Government are going to reconsider the whole question of separation allowances for the families of the men and for the pensions. I am sure I am expressing the view not of our own party, but of the whole House, when I say that the country realizes that when these men risk their lives for us they are making a big enough sacrifice, and that the country will be glad that in every way every possible generosity at the expense of those who remain behind should be extended to those who go out to fight. [Cheers.]

EARL KITCHENER'S SPEECH ON RECRUITS

Delivered in the House of Lords, Sept. 17

Your lordships will expect that some statement should be made by me on the general military situation before the session ends, and I will, therefore, endeavor as briefly as possible to supplement the remarks which I had the honor to address to your Lordships' House three weeks ago.

I need not retell the story of the British expeditionary force in France, which has been read and appreciated by us all in Sir John French's dispatch. The quiet restraint of his account of their achievements only brings into relief the qualities which enabled our troops successfully to carry out the most difficult of all military operations. There is, however, one aspect of this feat of arms upon which the dispatch is naturally silent. I refer to the consummate skill and calm courage of the Commander in Chief himself, [cheers,] in the conduct of this strategic withdrawal in the face of vastly superior forces. His Majesty's Government appreciate to the full the value of the service which Sir John French has rendered to this country and to the cause of the Allies, and I may perhaps be permitted here and now, on their behalf, to pay a tribute to his leadership, as well as to the marked ability of the Generals under his command, and the bravery and endurance of the officers and men of the expeditionary force.

The German Retirement.

As your Lordships are aware, the tide has now turned, and for some days past we have received the gratifying intelligence of the forced retirement of the German armies. The latest news from Sir John French does not materially change the published statement describing the military situation. In his telegram Sir John reports that the troops are all in good heart, and are ready to move forward when the moment arrives. The gallant French armies, with whom we are so proud to be co-operating, will receive every support from our troops in

their desire effectually to clear their country of the invading foe, and the undaunted and vigilant activity of the Belgian Army in the north materially conduces to this end. I would also like to take this opportunity of offering our respectful congratulations to Russia upon the conspicuous successes which have added fresh lustre to her arms. Although, therefore, we have good grounds for quiet confidence, it is only right that we should remind ourselves that the struggle is bound to be a long one, and that it behooves us strenuously to prosecute our labors in developing our armed forces to carry on and bring to a successful issue the mighty conflict in which we are engaged.

Troops in the Field

There are now in the field rather more than six divisions of British troops and two cavalry divisions. These are being, and will be, maintained at full strength by a steady flow of reinforcements. To meet the wastage of war in this field force our reserve units are available. To augment the expeditionary force further regular divisions and additional cavalry are now being organized from units withdrawn from oversea garrisons, whose places, where necessary, will be taken by territorial troops, who, with fine patriotism, have volunteered to exchange a home for an imperial service obligation. On their way from India are certain divisions from the Indian Army, composed of highly trained and very efficient troops, and a body of cavalry, including regiments of historic fame. The dominions beyond the seas are sending us freely of their best. Several divisions will be available, formed of men who have been locally trained in the light of the experience of the South African war, and, in the case of Australia and New Zealand, under the system of general national training introduced a few years ago.

The Call to Arms

In the response to the call for recruits for the new armies which it is considered necessary to raise we have had a most remarkable demonstration of the energy and patriotism of the young men of this

country. We propose to organize this splendid material into four new armies, and, although it takes time to train an army, the zeal and good-will displayed will greatly simplify our task. If some of those who have so readily come forward have suffered inconvenience, they will not, I am sure, allow their ardor to be damped. They will reflect that the War Office has had in a day to deal with as many recruits as were usually forthcoming in twelve months. No effort is being spared to meet the influx of soldiers, and the War Office will do its utmost to look after them and give them the efficient training necessary to enable them to join their comrades in the field. The divisions of the first two armies are now collected at our training centres; the third army is being formed on new camping grounds; the fourth army is being created by adding to the establishment of the reserve battalions, from which the units will be detached and organized similarly to the other three armies. The whole of the special reserve and extra special reserve units will be maintained at their full establishments as feeders to the expeditionary force. In addition to the four new armies a considerable number of what may be designated local battalions have been specially raised by the public-spirited initiative of cities, towns, or individuals. Several more are in course of formation, and I have received many offers of this character. The territorial force is making great strides in efficiency and will before many months be ready to take a share in the campaign. This force is proving its military value to the empire by the willing subordination of personal feelings to the public good in the acceptance of whatever duty may be assigned to it in any portion of the empire. A division has already left for Egypt, a brigade for Malta, and a garrison for Gibraltar. The soldierlike qualities evinced by the force are an assurance to the Government that they may count to the full upon its readiness to play its part wherever the exigencies of the military situation may demand. Nor must I omit to refer to the assistance which we shall receive from the

division of the gallant royal marines and bluejackets now being organized by my right honorable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty; their presence in the field will be very welcome, for their fighting qualities are well known.

The Supply of Officers

The creation of the new armies referred to is fraught with considerable difficulties, one of which is the provision of regimental officers. I hope the problem of supplying officers may be solved by the large numbers coming forward to fill vacancies, and by promotions from the noncommissioned officer ranks of the regular forces. In a country which prides itself on its skill in and love of outdoor sports, we ought to be able to find sufficient young men who will train and qualify as officers under the guidance of the nucleus of trained officers which we are able to provide from India and elsewhere. If any retired officer competent to train troops has not yet applied or has not received an answer to a previous application, I hope he will communicate with me at the War Office in writing. But our chief difficulty is one of material rather than personnel. It would not be in the public interest that I should refer in greater detail to this question, beyond saying that strenuous endeavors are being made to cope with the unprecedented situation, and that, thanks to the public spirit of all grades in the various industries affected to whom we have appealed to co-operate with us, and who are devoting all their energy to the task, our requirements will, I feel sure, be met with all possible speed.

I am confident that by the Spring we shall have ready to take the field armies which will be well trained and will prove themselves formidable opponents to the enemy. The Government fully recognize the fine spirit which animates those who have come forward to fight for their country, and will spare no effort to secure that everything is done that can be done to enable them worthily to contribute to the ultimate success of our arms. [Cheers.]

The Secretary of State for War concluded his speech by giving details of

the increase in the separation allowances made to wives of soldiers, both regular and territorial, which Mr. Asquith had announced in the House of Commons.

Tribute of the Opposition

The Marquess of Lansdowne—I feel that it would be almost impertinent on my part to say a word after the extraordinarily interesting statement to which we have just listened. But I should be sorry if complete silence on our part lent itself to the interpretation that we are indifferent to the great topics which the Secretary of State for War has dealt with in his speech. May we be permitted to say that we regard with the profoundest admiration and gratitude what the noble Field Marshal described as the great feat of arms which has been accomplished by the British forces since its arrival at the seat of war, and to add also that we share the feelings which the noble and gallant lord has expressed with regard to the immense services rendered by Sir John French to this country, services which he, of course, could not bear witness to in the dispatch he sent home? [Cheers.] There are only two other remarks which, with great deference, I would venture to make. One has reference to the noble and gallant lord's statement in regard to the response made to his appeal to the country for recruits. That response has been memorable and admirable and, considering the immense influx of recruits which have come in, we can scarcely be surprised that in the early days the strain should have been rather greater than either the War Office or the local authorities were able to cope with. But we have every reason to believe that that has been corrected, and I have no doubt that all will now go smoothly and well. We have all heard with the greatest satisfaction the announcement that the separation allowances to the wives of regulars and territorials are to be considerably increased. ["Hear, hear!"] Considering what our soldiers are doing for us at the seat of war, the least we can do is to provide liberally for the relatives whom they have left behind in this country. [Cheers.]

PARLIAMENT PROROGUED

*Speech by King George V. Read Before
Both Houses, Sept. 18*

The Lord Chancellor read the King's speech, which was in the following terms:

My Lords and Gentlemen: I address you in circumstances that call for action rather than for speech.

After every endeavor had been made by my Government to preserve the peace of the world, I was compelled, in the assertion of treaty obligations deliberately set at nought, and for the protection of the public law of Europe and the vital interests of my empire, to go to war.

My navy and army have, with unceasing vigilance, courage, and skill, sustained, in association with gallant and faithful allies, a just and righteous cause.

From every part of my empire there has been a spontaneous and enthusiastic rally to our common flag.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons: I thank you for the liberality with which you have met a great emergency.

My Lords and Gentlemen: We are fighting for a worthy purpose, and we shall not lay down our arms until that purpose has been fully achieved.

I rely with confidence upon the loyal and united efforts of all my subjects, and I pray that Almighty God may give us His blessing.

Then a commission for proroguing the Parliament was read, after which the Lord Chancellor said:

My Lords and Gentlemen: By virtue of his Majesty's commission, under the great seal, to us and other lords directed, and now read, we do, in his Majesty's name and in obedience to his commands, prorogue this Parliament to Tuesday, the twenty-seventh day of October, one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, to be then here holden; and this Parliament is accordingly prorogued to Tuesday, the twenty-seventh day of October, one thousand nine hundred and fourteen.

Summons of the Nation to Arms

British People Roused by Their Leaders

Earl Curzon of Kedleston Suggests Holding of Public Meetings

Hackwood, Basingstoke, Aug. 27.

Many of us are wondering what we can do to serve our country in this crisis. We sit on local or on larger committees. We attempt, within the narrow range of our influence, to gain recruits, we organize relief, we help to provide or furnish hospitals, we subscribe both to the national and to private funds; and, apart from this, we go about our ordinary duties with as much composure as we can, wondering where, when, and how it will be open to us who are no longer young and cannot bear arms, but have perhaps had some experience of affairs, to render more effective aid.

Does not a path lie open to the class of so-called "public men," and does not the very name which is given to them indicate the nature of this duty? Surely it is to place themselves at the disposal of the public. The two great needs of the moment are more men—hundreds of thousands more men—for the army, and a clearer understanding by the masses of the population, not merely of the justice of our cause, but of the supreme issues, both for our own country and for the whole empire, that are involved.

No one would propose that jingo speeches should be shouted from public platforms, or that an attempt should be made to inflame crude or unworthy passions. But the man who, when his country is engaged in a righteous war and is fighting for her existence, preaches the cause of that war is not a jingo; and the passions to which he appeals are not unworthy, but are the noblest of which human nature is capable.

I wish, therefore, to say that if the Government, with whom the initiative

must primarily lie—since no one would wish to do anything that is contrary to their conception of sound policy—desire that public meetings should be held in our great centres of population, to explain the cause and circumstances of the war, and the duty that lies upon the manhood of the nation, I and, I am convinced, many others are ready to throw ourselves into the task.

I have told the Prime Minister that I would be proud to appear on a public platform with any member of the Government to state or defend a case in which party is dead and where we are all united. I doubt not that if they are required many others will be willing to do the same. We have no desire to deluge the country with a flood of noisy rhetoric, or to start a miniature electioneering campaign. But if in any great city where recruiting is slow or the issues are not apprehended, or the public conscience is not quick to respond to the national summons, I, or any of those who share my views, can be of any service on the platform I am sure that we are willing to respond and that we shall welcome any organization that may be set on foot for the purpose.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER

*Addressed to the Lord Mayor of London,
the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, the
Lord Mayor of Dublin, and the
Lord Mayor of Cardiff*

My Lords: The time has come for combined effort to stimulate and organize public opinion and public effort in the greatest conflict in which our people has ever been engaged.

No one who can contribute anything to the accomplishment of this supremely

urgent task is justified in standing aside. I propose, as a first step, that meetings should be held without delay, not only in our great centres of population and industry, but in every district, urban and rural, throughout the United Kingdom, at which the justice of our cause should be made plain, and the duty of every man to do his part should be enforced.

I venture to suggest to your Lordships that the four principal cities over which you respectively preside should lead the way.

I am ready myself, so far as the exigencies of public duty permit, to render such help as I can, and I should be glad, with that object, to address my fellow-subjects in your cities.

I have reason to know that I can count upon the co-operation of the leaders of every section of organized political opinion. Your faithful servant,

H. H. ASQUITH.

28th of August, 1914.

MR. ASQUITH IN LONDON

Speech at the Guildhall, Sept. 5

My Lord Mayor and Citizens of London: It is three and a half years since I last had the honor of addressing in this hall a gathering of the citizens. We were then met under the Presidency of one of your predecessors, men of all creeds and parties, to celebrate and approve the joint declaration of the two great English-speaking States that for the future any differences between them should be settled, if not by agreement, at least by judicial inquiry and arbitration, and never in any circumstances by war. [Cheers.] Those of us who hailed that great Eirenicon between the United States and ourselves as a landmark on the road of progress were not sanguine enough to think, or even to hope, that the era of war was drawing to a close. But still less were we prepared to anticipate the terrible spectacle which now confronts us of a contest which for the number and importance of the powers engaged, the scale of their armaments and armies, the width of the theatre of

conflict, the outpouring of blood and the loss of life, the incalculable toll of suffering levied upon noncombatants; the material and moral loss accumulating day by day to the higher interests of civilized mankind—a contest which in every one of these aspects is without precedent in the annals of the world. ["Hear, hear!"] We were very confident three years ago in the rightness of our position, when we welcomed the new securities for peace. We are equally confident in it today, when, reluctantly, and against our will, but with a clear judgment and a clean conscience, [cheers,] we find ourselves involved with the whole strength of this empire in a bloody arbitration between might and right. [Cheers.] The issue has passed out of the domain of argument into another field, but let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would have been our condition as a nation today if we had been base enough through timidity or through perverted calculation of self-interest, or through a paralysis of the sense of honor and duty, [cheers,] if we had been base enough to be false to our word and faithless to our friends?

Blind Barbarian Vengeance.

Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the whole civilized world to Belgium, a small State, which has lived for more than seventy years under the several and collective guarantees to which we in common with Prussia and Austria were parties, and we should have seen at the instance and by the action of two of these guaranteeing powers her neutrality violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the easiest and the most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression against France. We, the British people, would at this moment have been standing by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command while this small and unprotected State, in defense of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and overwhelming force; we should have been admiring as detached spectators the siege of Liège, the steady and manful resistance of a

small army to the occupation of their capital, with its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages inflicted by buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil population, and, finally, the greatest crime committed against civilization and culture since the Thirty Years' War, the sack of Louvain, [cries of "Shame!"] with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its unrivaled associations—a shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance. [Prolonged cheers.] What account should we, the Government and the people of this country, have been able to render to the tribunal of our national conscience and sense of honor if, in defiance of our plighted and solemn obligations, we had endured, nay, if we had not done our best to prevent, yes, and to avenge, [renewed cheers,] these intolerable outrages? For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness—which means in effect a willing accomplice—of this tragic triumph of force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of the pages of history. [Prolonged cheers.]

Germany's Aim—to Crush Freedom

That is only a phase—a lurid and illuminating phase—in the contest in which we have been called by the mandate of duty and honor to bear our part. The cynical violation of the neutrality of Belgium was, after all, but a step—the first step—in a deliberate policy of which, if not the immediate, the ultimate, and the not far distant, aim was to crush the independence and autonomy of the free States of Europe. First Belgium, then Holland, then Switzerland—countries, like our own, imbued and sustained with the spirit of liberty—were one after another to be bent to the yoke, and these ambitions were fed and fostered by a body of new doctrines and new philosophies preached by professors and learned men. The free and full self-development which to these small States, to ourselves, to our great and growing dominions over the seas, to our kinsmen

across the Atlantic, is the well-spring and life-breath of national existence—that free self-development is the one capital offense in the code of those who have made force their supreme divinity, and who upon its altars are prepared to sacrifice both the gathered fruits and the potential germs of the unfettered human spirit. [Cheers.] I use this language advisedly. This is not merely a material; it is also a spiritual conflict. [Cheers.] Upon its issues everything that contains promise and hope, that leads to emancipation and a fuller liberty for the millions who make up the mass of mankind will be found sooner or later to depend.

Our Efforts for Peace

Let me now just for a moment turn to the actual situation in Europe. How do we stand? For the last ten years, by what I believe to be happy and well-considered diplomatic arrangements, we have established friendly and increasingly intimate relations with the two powers, France and Russia, with whom, in days gone by, we have had in various parts of the world occasions for constant friction, and now and again for possible conflict. Those new and better relations, based in the first instance upon business principles of give and take, matured into a settled temper of confidence and goodwill. They were never in any sense or at any time, as I have frequently said in this hall, directed against other powers. No man in the history of the world has ever labored more strenuously or more successfully than my right honorable friend Sir Edward Grey [cheers] for that which is the supreme interest of the modern world, a general and abiding peace. It is, I venture to think, a very superficial criticism which suggests that under his guidance the policy of this country has ignored, still less that it has counteracted and hampered, the concert of Europe. It is little more than a year ago that under his Presidency, in the stress and strain of the Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of all the great powers met here day after day curtailing the area of possible differences, reconciling warring ambitions and aims, and preserving

against almost incalculable odds the general harmony. And it was in the same spirit and with the same purpose, when a few weeks ago Austria delivered her ultimatum to Servia, that our Foreign Secretary put forward the proposal for a mediating conference between the four powers who were not directly concerned—Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves. If that proposal had been accepted actual controversy would have been settled with honor to everybody, and the whole of this terrible welter would have been avoided. ["Hear, hear!"]

Germany's Responsibility.

And with whom does the responsibility rest [cries of "The Kaiser!"] for this refusal and for all the illimitable suffering which now confronts the world? One power and one power only, and that power—Germany. [Loud hisses.] That is the fount and origin of this world-wide catastrophe. We are persevering to the end. No one who has not been confronted as we were with the responsibility of determining the issues of peace and war can realize the strength and energy and persistency with which we labored for peace. We persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest, straining almost to the breaking point our most cherished friendships and obligations, even to the last making effort upon effort, and hoping against hope. Then, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realize that the choice lay between honor and dishonor, between treachery and good faith, when at last we reached the dividing line which makes or mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then, and then only, that we declared for war. [Cheers.] Is there any one in this hall or in this United Kingdom or in the vast empire of which we here stand in the capital and centre who blames or repents our decision? [Cries of "No!"] For these reasons, as I believe, we must steel ourselves to the task, and in the spirit which animated our forefathers in their struggle against the domination of Napoleon we must and we shall persevere to the end. [Cheers.]

Memorable and Glorious Example of Belgium

It would be a criminal mistake to underestimate either the magnitude, the fighting quality, or the staying power of the forces which are arrayed against us. But it would be equally foolish and equally indefensible to belittle our own resources, whether for resistance or attack. [Cheers.] Belgium has shown us by a memorable and a glorious example what can be done by a relatively small State when its citizens are animated and fired by the spirit of patriotism. In France and Russia we have as allies two of the greatest powers of the world engaged with us in a common cause, who do not mean to separate themselves from us any more than we mean to separate ourselves from them. [Cheers.] We have upon the seas the strongest and most magnificent fleet that has ever been seen. The expeditionary force which left our shores less than a month ago has never been surpassed, as its glorious achievements in the field have already made clear, not only in material and equipment but in the physical and the moral quality of its constituents. [Cheers.]

Work of the Navy

As regards the navy, I am sure my right honorable friend [Mr. Winston Churchill] will tell you there is happily little more to be done. I do not flatter it when I say that its superiority is equally marked in every department and sphere of its activity. [Cheers.] We rely on it with the most absolute confidence, not only to guard our shores against the possibility of invasion, not only to seal up the gigantic battleships of the enemy in the inglorious seclusion of his own ports [laughter] whence, from time to time, he furtively steals forth to sow the seeds of murderous snares, which are more full of menace to neutral ships than to the British fleet. Our navy does all this, and while it is thirsting, I do not doubt, for that trial of strength in a fair and open fight, which is so far prudently denied it, it does a great deal more. It has hunted the German mercantile marine from the high seas. It has kept

open our own sources of food supply and has largely curtailed those of the enemy, and when the few German cruisers which still infest the more distant ocean routes have been disposed of, as they will be disposed of very soon, [cheers,] it will achieve for British and neutral commerce passing backward and forward, from and to every part of our empire, a security as complete as it has ever enjoyed in the days of unbroken peace. Let us honor the memory of the gallant seamen who, in the pursuit of one or another of these varied and responsible duties, have already laid down their lives for their country.

Call for United Effort

In regard to the army there is call for a new, a continuous, a determined, and a united effort. For, as the war goes on, we shall have not merely to replace the wastage caused by casualties, not merely to maintain our military power at its original level, but we must, if we are to play a worthy part, enlarge its scale, increase its numbers, and multiply many times its effectiveness as a fighting instrument. [Cheers.] The object of the appeal which I have made to you, my Lord Mayor, and to the other chief Magistrates of our capital cities, is to impress upon the people of the United Kingdom the imperious urgency of this supreme duty. Our self-governing dominions throughout the empire, without any solicitation on our part, have demonstrated with a spontaneousness and a unanimity unparalleled in history their determination to affirm their brotherhood with us and to make our cause their own. [Cheers.] From Canada, from Australia, from New Zealand, from South Africa, and from Newfoundland the children of the empire assert, not as an obligation, but as a privilege, their right and their willingness to contribute money and material, and, what is better than all, the strength and sinews, the fortunes, and the lives of their best manhood. [Cheers.] India, too, with no less alacrity, has claimed her share in the common task. [Cheers.] Every class and creed, British and natives, Princes and people, Hindus and

Mohammedans, vie with one another in noble and emulous rivalry. Two divisions of our magnificent Indian Army are already on their way. [Cheers.] We welcome with appreciation and affection their proffered aid. In an empire which knows no distinction of race or cause we all alike as subjects of the King-Emperor are joint and equal custodians of our common interests and fortunes. We are here to hail with profound and heartfelt gratitude their association, side by side and shoulder to shoulder, with our home and dominion troops, under the flag which is the symbol to all of a unity that a world in arms cannot dis sever or dissolve. With these inspiring appeals and examples from our fellow-subjects all over the world, what are we doing and what ought we to do here at home?

Over a Quarter of a Million Men Enrolled

Mobilization was ordered on the 4th of August; immediately afterward Lord Kitchener issued his call for 100,000 recruits for the regular army, which has been followed by a second call for another 100,000. The response up to today gives us between 250,000 and 300,000. [Cheers.] I am glad to say that London has done its share. The total number of Londoners accepted is not less than 42,000. [Cheers.] I need hardly say that that appeal involves no disparagement or discouragement of the territorial force. The number of units in that force who have volunteered for foreign service is most satisfactory and grows every day. We look to them with confidence to increase their numbers, to perfect their organization and training, and to play efficiently the part which has always been assigned to them, both offensive and defensive, in the military system of the empire. But to go back to the expansion of the regular army. We want more men—men of the best fighting quantity, and if for a moment the number who offer themselves and are accepted should prove to be in excess of those who can at once be adequately trained and equipped, do not let them doubt that prompt provision will be made for the incorporation of all willing and able men

in the fighting forces of the kingdom. We want, first of all, men, and we shall endeavor to secure them. Men desiring to serve together shall, wherever possible, be allotted to the same regiment or corps. The raising of battalions by counties or municipalities with this object will be in every way encouraged. But we want not less urgently a larger supply of ex-non-commissioned officers, and the pick of the men with whom in past days they served, men, therefore, whom in most cases we shall be asking to give up regular employment and to return to the work of the State, which they alone are competent to do. The appeal we make is addressed quite as much to their employers as to the men themselves. The men ought to be absolutely assured of reinstatement in their business at the end of the war. [Cheers.] Finally, there are numbers of commissioned officers now in retirement who are much experienced in the handling of troops and have served their country in the past. Let them come forward, too, and show their willingness, if need be, to train bodies of men for whom at the moment no cadre or unit can be found.

Abundant Ground for Pride and Confidence

I have little more to say. Of the actual progress of the war I will not say anything, except that in my judgment in whatever direction we look there is abundant ground for pride and for confidence. [Cheers.] I say nothing more, because I think we should all bear in mind that we are at present watching the fluctuations of fortune only in the early stages of what is going to be a protracted struggle. We must learn to take long views, and to cultivate, above all other faculties, those of patience, endurance, and steadfastness. Meanwhile, let us go, each of us, to his or her appropriate place in the great common task. Never had a people more or richer sources of encouragement and inspiration. Let us realize, first of all, that we are fighting as a united empire in a cause worthy of the highest traditions of our race. Let us keep in mind the patient and indomitable seamen, who never

relax for a moment, night or day, their stern vigil of the lonely sea. Let us keep in mind our gallant troops, who today, after a fortnight's continuous fighting under conditions which would try the metal of the best army that ever took the field, maintain not only an undefeated but an unbroken front. [Cheers.] Finally, let us recall the memories of the great men and the great deeds of the past, commemorated, some of them, in the monuments which we see around us on these walls, not forgetting the dying message of the younger Pitt, his last public utterance, made at the table of one of your predecessors, my Lord Mayor, in this very hall: "England has saved herself by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example." The England of those days gave a noble answer to his appeal, and did not sheath the sword until, after nearly twenty years of fighting, the freedom of Europe was secured. Let us go and do likewise. [Prolonged cheers.]

GERMANY SPEAKS

T. von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor, in Statement to Ritzau's Danish Press Bureau, Sept. 13, 1914

The English Prime Minister, in his Guildhall speech, reserved to England the rôle of protector of the smaller and weaker States, and spoke about the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland as being exposed to danger from the side of Germany. It is true that we have broken Belgium's neutrality because bitter necessity compelled us to do so, but we promised Belgium full indemnity and integrity if she would take account of this state of necessity. If so, she would not have suffered any damage, as, for example, Luxemburg. If England, as protector of the weaker States, had wished to spare Belgium infinite suffering she should have advised Belgium to accept our offer. England has not "protected" Belgium, so far as we know; I wonder, therefore, whether it can really be said that England is such a disinterested protector.

We knew perfectly well that the French plan of campaign involved a march through Belgium to attack the unprotected Rhineland. Does any one believe England would have interfered to protect Belgian freedom against France?

We have firmly respected the neutrality of Holland and Switzerland; we have also avoided the slightest violation of the frontier of the Dutch Province of Limburg.

It is strange that Mr. Asquith only mentioned the neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, but not that of the Scandinavian countries. He might have mentioned Switzerland with reference to France, but Holland and Belgium are situated close to England on the opposite side of the Channel, and that is why England is so concerned for the neutrality of these countries.

Why is Mr. Asquith silent about the Scandinavian countries? Perhaps because he knows that it does not enter our head to touch these countries' neutrality; or would England possibly not consider Denmark's neutrality as a *noli me tangere* for an advance in the Baltic or for Russia's warlike operations.

Mr. Asquith wishes people to believe that England's fight against us is a fight of freedom against might. The world is accustomed to this manner of expression. In the name of freedom England with might and with the most recklessly egotistic policy has founded her mighty colonial empire, in the name of freedom she has destroyed for a century the independence of the Boer republics, in the name of freedom she now treats Egypt as an English colony and thereby violates international treaties and solemn promises, in the name of freedom one after another of the Malay States is losing its independence for England's benefit, in the name of freedom she tries, by cutting German cables, to prevent the truth being spread in the world.

The English Prime Minister is mistaken. When England joined with Russia and Japan against Germany she, with a blindness unique in the history of the world, betrayed civilization and handed over to the German sword the care of

freedom for European peoples and States.

GREAT BRITAIN REPLIES

Sir Edward Grey, Answering Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, London, Sept. 15

"Does any one believe," asks the German Chancellor, "that England would have interfered to protect Belgian freedom against France?" The answer is that she would unquestionably have done so. Sir Edward Grey, as recorded in the "White Paper," asked the French Government "whether it was prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates it." The French Government replied that they were resolved to respect it. The assurance, it was added, had been given several times, and had formed the subject of conversation between President Poincaré and the King of the Belgians.

The German Chancellor entirely ignores the fact that England took the same line about Belgian neutrality in 1870 that she has taken now. In 1870 Prince Bismarck, when approached by England on the subject, admitted and respected the treaty obligations in relation to Belgium. The British Government stands in 1914 as it stood in 1870; it is Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg who refused to meet us in 1914 as Prince Bismarck met us in 1870.

Scandinavian Neutrality.

The Imperial Chancellor finds it strange that Mr. Asquith, in his Guildhall speech, did not mention the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries, and suggests that the reason for the omission was some sinister design on England's part. It is impossible for any public speaker to cover the whole ground in each speech. The German Chancellor's reference to Denmark and other Scandinavian countries can hardly be considered very tactful. With regard to Denmark, the Danes are not likely to have forgotten the parts played by Prussia and England respectively in 1863-4,

when the Kingdom of Denmark was dismembered. And the integrity of Norway and Sweden was guaranteed by England and France in the Treaty of Stockholm in 1855.

The Imperial Chancellor refers to the dealings of Great Britain with the Boer republics, and suggests that she has been false therein to the cause of freedom. Without going into controversies now happily past, we may recall what Gen. Botha said in the South African Parliament a few days ago when expressing his conviction of the righteousness of Britain's cause and explaining the firm resolve of the South African Union to aid her in every possible way. "Great Britain had given them a Constitution under which they could create a great nationality, and had ever since regarded them as a free people and as a sister State. Although there might be many who in the past had been hostile toward the British flag, he could vouch for it that they would ten times rather be under the British than under the German flag."

Loyalty of the Empire

The German Chancellor is equally unfortunate in his references to the "Colonial Empire." So far from British policy having been "recklessly egotistic," it has resulted in a great rally of affection and common interest by all the British dominions and dependencies, among which there is not one which is not aiding Britain by soldiers or other contributions or both in this war.

With regard to the matter of treaty obligations generally, the German Chancellor excuses the breach of Belgian neutrality by military necessity—at the same time making a virtue of having respected the neutrality of Holland and Switzerland, and saying that it does not enter his head to touch the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries. A virtue which admittedly is only practiced in the absence of temptation from self-interest and military advantage does not seem greatly worth vaunting. To the Chancellor's concluding statement that "to the German sword" is intrusted "the

care of freedom for European peoples and States," the treatment of Belgium is a sufficient answer.

MR. ASQUITH AT EDINBURGH

Speech in Usher Hall, Sept. 18

A fortnight ago today, in the Guildhall of the City of London, I endeavored to present to the nation and to the world the reasons which have compelled us, the people of all others which have the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace, to engage in the hazards and horrors of war. I do not wish to repeat tonight in any detail what I then said.

The war has arisen immediately and ostensibly, as every one knows, out of a dispute between Austria and Servia, in which we in this country had no direct concern. The diplomatic history of those critical weeks—the last fortnight in July and the first few days of August—is now accessible to all the world. It has been supplemented during the last few days by the admirable and exhaustive dispatch of our late Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, a dispatch which I trust everybody will read, and no one who reads it can doubt that, largely through the efforts of my right honorable friend and colleague Sir Edward Grey [loud cheers] the conditions of a peaceful settlement of the actual controversy were already within sight when, on July 31, Germany [hisses] by her own deliberate act made war a certainty.

The facts are incontrovertible. They are not sought to be controverted, except, indeed, by the invention and circulation of such wanton falsehoods as that France was contemplating, and even commencing, the violation of Belgian territory as a first step on her road to Germany. The result is that we are at war, and, as I have already shown elsewhere, and as I repeat here tonight, we are at war for three reasons—in the first place, to vindicate the sanctity of treaty obligations ["Hear, hear!"] and of what is properly called the public law of Europe, ["Hear, hear!"]; in the second place, to assert and to enforce the independence

of free States, relatively small and weak, against the encroachments and the violence of the strong, [cheers,] and, in the third place, to withstand, as we believe in the best interest not only of our own empire but of civilization at large, the arrogant claim of a single power to dominate the development of the destinies of Europe. [Cheers.]

Meeting a Challenge

Since I last spoke some faint attempts have been made in Germany to dispute the accuracy and the sincerity of this statement of our attitude and aim. It has been suggested, for instance, that our professed zeal for treaty rights and for the interests of small States is a newborn and simulated passion. What, we are asked, has Great Britain cared in the past for treaties or for the smaller nationalities except when she had some ulterior and selfish purpose of her own to serve? I am quite ready to meet that challenge, and to meet it in the only way in which it could be met, by reference to history. And out of many illustrations which I might take I will content myself here tonight with two, widely removed in point of time, but both, as it happens, very apposite to the present case.

I will go back first to the war carried on first against the revolutionary Government of France and then against Napoleon, which broke out in 1793, and which lasted for more than twenty years. We had then at the head of the Government in this country one of the most peace-loving Ministers who have ever presided over our fortunes—Mr. Pitt. For three years, from 1789 to 1792, he resolutely refused to interfere in any way with the revolutionary proceedings in France or in the wars that sprang out of them, and as lately, I think, as February in 1792, in a memorable speech in the House of Commons, which shows among other things the shortness of human foresight, he declared that there never was a time when we in this country could more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace.

And what was it, gentlemen, that, with-

in a few months of that declaration, led this pacific Minister to war? It was the invasion of the treaty rights guaranteed by ourselves of a small European State, the then States General of Holland. [Cheers.] For nearly 200 years the great powers of Europe had guaranteed to Holland the exclusive navigation of the River Scheldt. The French revolutionary Government invaded what is now Belgium, and as a first act of hostility to Holland declared the navigation of the Scheldt to be open. Our interest in that matter then, as now, was relatively small and insignificant, but what was Mr. Pitt's reply?

Defense of Small States

I quote you the exact words he used in the House of Commons, they are so applicable to the circumstances of the present moment. This is in 1793:

England will never consent that another country should arrogate the power of annulling, at her pleasure, the political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent of the powers. [Cheers.]

He went on to say:

This House [the House of Commons] means substantial good faith to its engagements. If it retains a just sense of the solemn faith of treaties, it must show a determination to support them.

And it was in consequence of that stubborn and unyielding determination to maintain treaties to defend small States, to resist the aggressive domination of a single power, that we were involved in a war which we had done everything to avoid, and which was carried on upon a scale, both as to area and as to duration, up to then unexampled in the history of mankind. That is one precedent. Let me give you one more.

I come down to 1870, when this very treaty to which we are parties, no less than Germany, and which guarantees the integrity and independence of Belgium, was threatened. Mr. Gladstone was then Prime Minister of this country, [cheers,] and he was, if possible, a stronger and more ardent advocate of peace even than Mr. Pitt himself. ["Hear, hear!"]

Mr. Gladstone's Dictum

Mr. Gladstone, pacific as he was, felt so strongly the sanctity of our obligations that—though here again we had no direct interest of any kind at stake—he made agreements with France and Prussia to co-operate with either of the belligerents if the other violated Belgian territory, and I should like to read a passage from a speech ten years later, delivered in 1880, by Mr. Gladstone himself in this city, in which he reviewed that transaction and explained his reasons for it. He said: "If we had gone to war"—which he was prepared to do—"we should have gone to war for freedom; we should have gone to war for public right; we should have gone to war to save human happiness from being invaded by tyrannous and lawless power." That is what I call a good cause, though I detest war, and there are no epithets too strong if you will supply me with them that I will not endeavor to heap upon its head.

So much for our own action in the past in regard to treaties and small States. But faint as is this denial of this part of our case, it becomes fainter still, it dissolves into the thinnest of thin air, when it has to deal with our contention that we and our allies are withstanding a power whose aim is nothing less than the domination of Europe. ["Hear, hear!"]

It is, indeed, the avowed belief of the leaders of German thought—I will not say of the German people—of those who for many years past have controlled German policy, that such a domination, carrying with it the supremacy of what they call German culture [laughter] and the German spirit is the best thing that could happen to the world.

German "Culture"

Let me then ask for a moment what is this German culture, what is this German spirit of which the Emperor's armies are at present the missionaries in Belgium and in France? [Laughter.] Mankind owes much to Germany, a very great debt for the contributions she has made to philosophy, to science, and to the arts; but that which is specifically

German in the movement of the world in the last thirty years has been, on the intellectual side, the development of the doctrine of the supreme and ultimate prerogative in human affairs of material forces, and, on the practical side, taking of the foremost place in the fabrication and the multiplication of the machinery of destruction.

To the men who have adopted this gospel, who believe that power is the be-all and end-all of the State, naturally a treaty is nothing more than a piece of parchment, and all the Old World talk about the rights of the weak and the obligations of the strong is only so much threadbare and nauseating cant, for one very remarkable feature of this new school of doctrine is, whatever be its intellectual or its ethical merits, that it has turned out as an actual code for life to be a very purblind philosophy.

The German culture, the German spirit, did not save the Emperor and his people from delusions and miscalculations as dangerous as they were absurd in regard to the British Empire.

A Fantastic Dream

We were believed by these cultivated observers [laughter] to be the decadent descendants of a people who, by a combination of luck and of fraud, [laughter,] had managed to obtain domination over a vast quantity of the surface and the populations of the globe.

This fortuitous aggregation [laughter and cheers] which goes by the name of the British Empire was supposed to be so insecurely founded and so loosely knit together that at the first touch of serious menace from without it would fall to pieces and tumble to the ground. [Cheers.]

Our great dominions were getting heartily tired of the imperial connection. India, [loud cheers,] it was notorious to every German traveler, [laughter,] was on the verge of open revolt, and here at home we, the people of this United Kingdom, were riven by dissension so deep and so fierce that our energies, whether for resistance or for attack, would be completely paralyzed.

What a fantastic dream, ["Hear,

hear!" and what a rude awakening! [Laughter and cheers.] And in this vast and grotesque and yet tragic miscalculation is to be found one of the roots, perhaps the main root, of the present war.

But let us go one step more. It has been said, "By their fruits ye shall know them," and history will record that, when the die was cast and the struggle began, it was the disciples of that same creed who revived methods of warfare which have for centuries past been condemned by the common sense as well as by the humanity of the great mass of the civilized world. [Cheers.]

Branded on the Brow

Louvain, Malines, Termonde—these are names which will henceforward be branded on the brow of German culture. The ruthless sacking of the ancient and famous towns of Belgium is fitly supplemented by the story that reaches us only today from our own headquarters in France of the proclamation issued less than a week ago by the German authorities, who were for a moment, and happily for little more than a moment, in occupation of the venerable city of Rheims.

Mr. Asquith then read the concluding paragraph of the proclamation.

Do not let it be forgotten that it is from a power whose intellectual leaders are imbued with the idea that I have described, and whose Generals in the field sanction and even direct those practices—it is from that power the claim proceeds to impose its culture, its spirit, which means its domination, upon the rest of Europe. That is a claim, I say to you, to all my fellow-countrymen, to every citizen and subject of the British Empire whose ears and eyes my words can reach—that is a claim that everything that is great in our past and everything that promises hope or progress in our future summon us to resist to the end. [Loud cheers.]

The task—do not let us deceive ourselves—will not be a light one. Its full accomplishment—and nothing short of full accomplishment [cheers] is worthy of our traditions or will satisfy our re-

solve—will certainly take months. It may even take years.

I have come here tonight not to ask you to count the cost, for no price can be too high to pay when honor and freedom are at stake, but to put before you, as I have tried to do, the magnitude of the issue and the supreme necessity that lies upon us as a nation, nay as a brotherhood and family of nations, to rise to its height and acquit ourselves of our duty.

Britain's Favorable Position

The war has now lasted more than six weeks. Our supremacy at sea [great cheers] has not been seriously questioned. [Laughter.] Full supplies of food and of raw materials are making their way to our shores from every quarter of the globe. [Cheers.] Our industries, with one or two exceptions, maintain their activities.

Unemployment is so far not seriously in excess of the average. The monetary situation has improved, and every effort that the zeal and the skill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, [cheers,] with the co-operation and expert advice of the bankers and business men of the country, can devise—every effort is being made to achieve what is most essential, the complete re-establishment of the foreign exchanges.

Meanwhile, the merchant shipping of the enemy has been hunted from the seas [cheers] and our seamen are still patiently, or impatiently, [laughter,] waiting for a chance to try conclusions with the opposing fleet. Great and incalculable is the debt which we have owed during these weeks, and which in increasing measure we shall continue to owe, to our navy. [Cheers.] The navy needs no help, and as the months roll on—thanks to a far-sighted policy in the past—its proportionate strength will grow. [Cheers.]

Army's Glorious Record

If we turn to our army [cheers] we can say with equal justice and pride that during these weeks it has rivaled the most glorious records of its past. [Cheers.] Sir John French [cheers] and his gallant officers and men live in

our hearts, as they will live in the memories of those who come afterward. [Cheers.]

But splendid achievements such as these—equally splendid in retirement and in advance ["Hear, hear!"]—cannot be won without a heavy expenditure of life and limb, of equipment and supplies. Even now, at this very early stage, I suppose there is hardly a person here who is not suffering from anxiety and suspense. Some of us are plunged in sorrow for the loss of those we love; cut off, some of them, in the springtime of their young lives. We will not mourn for them overmuch. One crowded hour of glorious life is worth an age without a name. [Cheers.]

These gaps have to be filled. The wastage of modern war is relentless and almost inconceivable. We have—I mean his Majesty's Government have—since the war began dispatched to the front already considerably over 200,000 men [cheers] and the amplest provision has been made for keeping them supplied with all that was necessary in food, in stores, and in equipment. They will very soon be reinforced by regular troops from India, from Egypt, and the Mediterranean, and in due time by the contingents which our dominions are furnishing with such magnificent patriotism and liberality. [Cheers.]

Eager Territorials

We have with us here our own gallant territorials, becoming every day a fitter and a finer force, eager and anxious to respond to any call either at home or abroad that may be made upon them. [Cheers.] But that is not enough. We must do still more. Already, in little more than a month, we have 500,000 recruits for the four new armies which, as Lord Kitchener told the country yesterday, he means to have ready to bring into the field. In a single day we have had as many men enlist as we have been accustomed to enlist in the course of a whole year. It is not, I think, surprising that the machinery has been overstrained, and there have been many cases of temporary inconvenience and hardship and discomfort. With time and patience and

good organization these things will be set right, and the new scale of allowances which was announced in Parliament yesterday [cheers] will do much to mitigate the lot of wives and children and dependents who are left behind. [Cheers.]

We want more men, and, perhaps most of all, the help for training them. Every one in the whole of this kingdom, who has in days gone by, as officer or as non-commissioned officer, served his country never had a greater or more fruitful opportunity for service than is presented to him today. [Cheers.] We appeal to the manhood of the three kingdoms. To such an appeal I know well, coming from your senior representative in the House of Commons, that Scotland will **not** turn a deaf ear. [Cheers.]

Scotland is doing well, and, indeed, more than well, and no part of Scotland I believe, in proportion, better than Edinburgh. I cannot say with what pleasure I heard the figures given out by the Lord Provost and those which have been supplied to me by the gallant gentleman who has the Scottish command [cheers,] which show, indeed, as we expected, that Scotland is more than holding her own. In that connection let me repeat what I said two weeks ago in London. We think it of the highest importance that so far as possible, and subject to the accidents of war, people belonging to the same place, breathing the same atmosphere, having the same associations, should be kept together.

Our recruits come to us spontaneously, under no kind of compulsion, [cheers,] of their own free will to meet a national and an imperial need. We present to them no material inducement in the shape either of bounty or bribe, and they have to face the prospect of a spell of hard training from which most of the comforts and all the luxuries that any of them have been accustomed to are rigorously banished. But then, when they are fully equipped for their patriotic task, they will have the opportunity of striking a blow, it may be even of laying down their lives, not to serve the cause of

ambition or aggression, but to maintain the honor and the good faith of our country, to shield the independence of free States, to project against brute force the principles of civilization and the liberties of Europe. [Loud cheers.]

MR. ASQUITH AT DUBLIN

Speech in the Round Room of the Mansion House, Sept. 25

My Lord Mayor: Some weeks ago I took it upon myself to suggest to the four principal Magistrates of the United Kingdom that they should afford me an opportunity of making a personal appeal to their citizens at a great moment in our national history. I have already delivered my message in London and in Edinburgh. To the first of those great communities I was able to speak as an Englishman by birth and as a Londoner by early association and long residence. To the second, the capital of the ancient Kingdom of Scotland, I had special credentials as having been for the best part of thirty years one of their representatives in the House of Commons, ["Hear, hear!"] and now, indeed, by one of the melancholy privileges of time the senior among the Scottish members. [Laughter.] But, my Lord Mayor, tonight when I come to Dublin I can put forward neither the one claim nor the other. [A Voice—Home Rule.] I base my title, such as it is, to your hospitality and your hearing upon such service as during the whole of my political life I have tried with a whole heart and to the best of my faculties and opportunities to render to Ireland. [Cheers.] I come here, not as a partisan, not even as a politician, but I come here as for the time being the head of the King's Government, [cheers,] to summon Ireland, a loyal and patriotic Ireland, to take her place in the defense of our common cause. [Cheers.] My Lord Mayor, it is no part of my mission tonight, it is indeed at this time of day wholly unnecessary, to justify, still less to excuse, the part which the Government of the United Kingdom has taken in this supreme crisis in our national

affairs. There have been wars in the past in regard to which there has been among us diversity of opinion, uneasiness as to the wisdom of our diplomacy, anxiety as to the expediency of our policy, doubts as to the essential righteousness of our cause.

Unity of the Empire

That, my Lord Mayor, as you said, is not the case today. [Cheers.] Even in the memorable struggle which we waged a hundred years ago against the domination of Napoleon there was always a minority, respectable not merely in number, but in the sincerity and in the eminence of its adherents, which broke the front of our national unity. Again I say that is not the case today. We feel as a nation—or rather I ought to say, speaking here and looking round upon our vast empire in every quarter of the globe—as a family of nations, [prolonged cheers,] without distinction of creed or party, of race or climate, class or section, that we are united in defending principles and in maintaining interests which are vital, not only to the British Empire, but to all that is worth having in our common civilization, [cheers,] and all that is worth hoping for in the future progress of mankind. [Loud cheers.] What better or higher cause, my Lord Mayor, whether we succeed or fail? [Cries of "No failure."] We are going not to fail, but to succeed. [Enthusiastic cheers.] What higher cause than to arouse and enlist the best qualities of a free people, than to be engaged at one and the same time in the vindication of international good faith, in the protection of the weak against the violence of the strong, [cheers,] and in the assertion of the best ideals of all the free communities in all the ages of time and in every part of the world against the encroachments of those who believe and who preach and who practice the religion of force? It is not—I am sure you will agree with me—it is not necessary to demonstrate once more that of this war Germany is the real and the responsible author. [Cheers.] The proofs are patent, manifold and overwhelming. [Cheers.] Indeed, on the part of Ger-

many herself we get upon this point, if denial at all, a denial only of the faintest and the most formal kind. For a generation past she has been preparing the ground, equipping herself, both by land and sea, fortifying herself with alliances, and, what is perhaps even more important, teaching her youth to seek and to pursue as the first and the most important of all human things the supremacy of the German power and the German spirit, and all that time biding her opportunity. Gentlemen, many of the great wars of history have been almost accidentally brought about by the blindness of blundering statesmen, or by some wave of popular passion. That is not so today. ["Hear, hear!"] There was nothing in a quarrel such as this between Austria and Servia that could not have been and that would not have been settled by pacific means. [Cheers.]

Germany's Profound Mistakes.

But in the judgment of those who guide and control German policy the hour had come to strike the blow that had been long and deliberately prepared. In their hands lay the choice between peace and war, and their election was for war. In so deciding, as everybody now knows, Germany made two profound miscalculations. [Cheers.] Both of them natural enough in a man who had come to believe that in international matters everything can be explained and measured in terms of material force. What, gentlemen, were those mistakes? The first was that Belgium, [cheers,] a small and prosperous country entirely disinterested in European quarrels, guaranteed by the joint and several compacts of the great powers, that Belgium would not resent, and certainly would not resist, the use of her territory as a highroad for an invading German force into France. How could they imagine that this little country, rather than allow her neutrality to be violated and her independence insulted and menaced, was prepared that her fields should be drenched with the blood of her soldiers, her towns and villages devastated by marauders, her splendid heritage of monuments and of treasures, built up for her by the

piety, art, and learning of the past, ruthlessly laid in ruins? The passionate attachment of a numerically small population to the bit of territory, which looks so little upon the map, the pride and the unconquerable devotion of a free people to their own free State, these were things which apparently had never been dreamed of in the philosophy of Potsdam. [Laughter and "Hear, hear!"] Rarely in history has there been a greater material disparity between the invaders and the invaded, but the moral disparity was at least equally great. [Cheers.] For, gentlemen, the indomitable resistance of the Belgians did more than change the whole face of the campaign. [Cheers.] It proved to the world that ideas which cannot be weighed or measured by any material calculus can still inspire and dominate mankind. [Cheers.] And that is the reason why the whole sympathy of the civilized world at this moment is going out to these small States—Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro—that have played so worthy a part in this historic struggle. [Cheers.]

The Moral Bond of Civilization

But, my Lord Mayor, Germany was guilty of another and a still more capital blunder in relation to ourselves. ["Hear, hear!"] I am not referring for the moment to the grotesque understanding upon which I dwelt a week ago at Edinburgh, their carefully fostered belief that we here were so rent with civil distraction, [laughter,] so paralyzed by luke-warmness or disaffection in our dominions and dependencies, that if it came to fighting we might be brushed aside as an impotent and even a negligible factor. [Cheers and cries of "Never!"] The German misconception went even deeper than that. They asked themselves what interest, direct or material, had the United Kingdom in this conflict? Could any nation, least of all the cold, calculating, phlegmatic, egotistic British Nation, [laughter,] embark upon a costly and bloody contest from which it had nothing in the hope of profit to expect? ["Hear, hear!"] They forgot—they forgot that we, like the Belgians, had something at stake which

cannot be translated into what one of our poets has called "The law of nicely calculated less or more." What was it we had at stake? First and foremost, the fulfillment to the small and relatively weak country of our plighted word [cheers] and behind and beyond that the maintenance of the whole system of international good-will which is the moral bond of the civilized world. [Cheers.] Here again they were wrong in thinking that the reign of ideas, Old World ideas like those of duty and good faith, had been superseded by the ascendancy of force. My Lord Mayor, war is at all times a hideous thing; at the best an evil to be chosen in preference to worse evils, and at the worst little better than the letting loose of hell upon earth. The prophet of old spoke of the "confused noise of battle and the garments rolled in blood," but in these modern days, with the gigantic scale of the opposing armies and the scientific developments of the instruments of destruction, war has become an infinitely more devastating thing than it ever was before. The hope that the general recognition of a humaner code would soften or abate some of its worst brutalities has been rudely dispelled by the events of the last few weeks. ["Shame!"]

Shameful and Cynical Desecration

The German invasion of Belgium and France contributes, indeed, some of the blackest pages to its sombre annals. Rarely has a noncombatant population suffered more severely, and rarely, if ever, have the monuments of piety and of learning and those sentiments of religion and national association, of which they are the permanent embodiment, even in the worst times of the most ruthless warriors, been so shamefully and cynically desecrated; and behind the actual theatre of conflict with its smoke and its carnage there are the sufferings of those who are left behind, the waste of wealth, the economic dislocation, the heritage, the long heritage of enmities and misunderstanding which war brings in its train. Why do I dwell upon these things? It is to say this, that great indeed is the responsibility of those who

allow their country—as we have done—to be drawn into such a welter; but there is one thing much worse than to take such a responsibility, and that is, upon a fitting occasion, to shirk it. [Cheers.] Our record in the matter is clear. We strove up to the last moment for peace, [cheers,] and only when we were satisfied that the price of peace was the betrayal of other countries and the dishonor and degradation of our own we took up the sword. [Prolonged cheers.] I should like, if I might for a moment, beyond this inquiry into causes and motives, to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to the end which in this war we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said: "The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics." Nearly fifty years have passed. Little progress, it seems, has yet been made toward that good and beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of our European policy. The idea of public right; what does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States, and of the future molding of the European world. It means, next, that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities, [cheers,] each with a corporate consciousness of its own.

The Recognition of Nationality

Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, Greece, and the Balkan States, they must be recognized as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbors—more powerful in strength and in wealth—exactly as good a title to a place in the sun. [Prolonged cheers and some laughter.] And it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, for

grouping and alliances and a precarious equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will. [Cheers.] A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or will not be realized either today or tomorrow. If and when this war is decided in favor of the Allies, it will at once come within the range, and, before long, within the grasp of European statesmanship. [Cheers.] I go back for a moment, if I am not keeping you too long, ["Go on,"] to the peculiar aspects of the actual case upon which I have dwelt, because it seems to me that they ought to make a special appeal to the people of Ireland. Ireland is a loyal country, [cheers,] and she would, I know, respond with alacrity to any summons which called upon her to take her share in the assertion and the defense of our common interests. But, gentlemen, the issues raised by this war are of such a kind that, unless I mistake her people and misrepresent her history, they touch a vibrating chord both in her imagination and in her conscience. How can you Irishmen be deaf to the cry of the smaller nationalities to help them in their struggle for freedom [cheers] whether, as in the case of Belgium, in maintaining what she has won, or as in the case of Poland or the Balkan States in regaining what they have lost or in acquiring and putting upon a stable foundation what has never been fully theirs?

The Appeal to Ireland.

How again can you Irishmen—if I understand you—sit by in cool detachment and with folded arms while we, in company of our gallant allies of France and Russia, are opposing a worldwide resistance to pretensions which threaten to paralyze and sterilize all progress and the best destinies of mankind? [Cheers.] During the last few weeks Sir John French and his heroic forces have worthily sustained our cause. The casualties have been heavy. Ireland has had her share, although they have been increased

during the last week from the ranks of our gallant navy by one of the hazards of warfare at sea. But of those who have fallen in both services we may ask how could men die better? [Cheers.]

The Indian Contingent.

They have left behind them an example and an appeal. From all quarters of the empire its best manhood is flowing in. The first Indian contingent is, I believe, landing today at Marseilles, [loud cheers,] and in all parts of our great dominions the convoys are already mustering. Over half a million recruits have joined the colors here at home, [cheers,] and I come to ask you in Ireland, though you don't need my asking, to take your part. [Cheers and shouts of "We must."] There was a time when, through the operations of laws which every one now acknowledges to have been both unjust and impolitic, ["Hear, hear!"] the martial spirit of and the capacity for which Irishmen have always been conspicuous found its chief outlet in the alien armies of the Continent. I have seen it computed—I do not know whether with precise accuracy—but I have seen it computed upon good authority that in the first fifty years of the eighteenth century, when the penal laws were here in full swing, nearly half a million Irishmen listed under the banners of the empire of France and Spain, and we at home in the United Kingdom suffered a double loss; for, gentlemen, not only were we drained year by year of some of our best fighting material, ["Hear, hear!"] but over and over again we found ourselves engaged in battle array suffering and inflicting deadly loss upon those who might have been, and under happier conditions would have been, fellow-soldiers of our own. [Cheers.] The British Empire has always been proud, and with reason, of those Irish regiments [cheers] and their Irish leaders, [more cheers,] and was never prouder of them than it is today. [Great cheering.] We ask you here in Ireland to give us more, [cheers, and a voice, "You'll get them,"] to give them without stinting. We ask Ireland to give of her sons, the most in number, the best

in quality that a proud and loyal daughter of the empire ought to devote to the common cause. [Cheers.]

The Volunteers of Ireland.

The conditions seem to me to be exceptionally favorable for the purpose. We have of late been witnessing here in Ireland a spontaneous enrollment and organization in all parts of the country of bodies of volunteers. I say nothing—for I wish tonight to avoid trespassing upon even a square inch of controversial ground—I say nothing of the causes or motives which brought them originally into existence, [laughter,] and have fostered their growth and strength. I will only say—and this is my nearest approach to politics tonight—that there are two things which to my mind have become unthinkable. The first is that one section of Irishmen are going to fight. [Loud cheers.] The second is that Great Britain is going to fight either. [Renewed cheers.] Speaking here in Dublin, I may perhaps address myself for a moment particularly to the National Volunteers, and I am going to ask them all over Ireland—not only them, but I make the appeal to them particularly—to contribute with promptitude and enthusiasm a large and worthy contingent of recruits to the second new army of half a million, which is growing up as it were out of the ground. [Cheers.] I should like to see, and we all want to see, an Irish brigade, [cheers,] or, better still, an Irish army corps. [Loud cheers.] Do not let them be afraid that by joining the colors they will lose their identity and become absorbed in some invertebrate mass, or, what is perhaps equally repugnant, be artificially redistributed in units which have no national cohesion or character. We wish to the utmost limit that military exigencies will allow that men who have been already associated in this or that district in training and in common exercises should be kept together and continue to recognize the corporate bond which now unites them. [“Hear, hear!”] And of one thing further I am sure. We are in urgent need of competent officers, and we think that if the officers now en-

gaged in training these men are proved equal to the test, there is no fear that their services will not be gladly and gratefully retained. I repeat that the empire needs recruits, and needs them at once, that they may be fully trained and equipped in time to take their part in what may well be the decisive fields of the greatest struggle in the history of the world. That is our immediate necessity, and no Irishman in responding to it need be afraid that he is prejudicing the future of the volunteers. [Cheers.] I do not say, and I can not say, under what precise form or organization, but I trust and believe, and indeed I am certain, that the volunteers will become a permanent part, an integral and a characteristic part, of the defensive forces of the Crown. [Cheers.] I have only one more thing to say to you. [Cries of “Go on.”] If our need is great your opportunity is also great. [Cheers.] The call which I am making is, as you know well, backed by the sympathy of your fellow-Irishmen in all parts of the empire and the world. Old animosities between us are dead. [Loud and prolonged cheers.] Scattered like the Autumn leaves to the four winds of heaven, we are a united nation, [renewed cheers,] owing and paying to our sovereign the heartfelt allegiance of men who at home not only love but enjoy for themselves the liberty which our soldiers and our sailors are fighting by land and by sea to maintain and to extend for others. There is no question of compulsion or bribery. What we want we believe you are ready and eager to give as the free-will offering of a free people. [Great cheering.]

The Earl of Meath, Lord Lieutenant of County Dublin, who was next called on, declared that their gathering would be historic because for the first time in her history Irishmen of all classes, creeds, and politics had met on the same platform. The modern Attila might be known, as his predecessor was known, as the scourge of God. But for the constant vigilance of our army and our fleet Ireland might have met the fate of Belgium. He suggested that Earl Kitchener should, as far as possible, see that the Irish corps at the front should act together.

MR. ASQUITH AT CARDIFF

Speech in the Skating Rink, Oct. 2.

In the course of the last month I have addressed meetings in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, and now in the completion of the task which I set myself and which the kindness of our great municipalities has allowed me to perform I have come to Cardiff. [Cheers.] England, Scotland, and Ireland have each of them a definite and a well-established capital city, but I have always understood that there was some doubt where the capital of the Principality of Wales was to be found on the map. [Laughter.] Wales is a single and indivisible entity with a life of its own, drawing its vitality from an ancient past, and both, I believe, in the volume and in the reality of its activity, never more virile than it is today. [Cheers.] But I do not know that there is any general agreement among Welshmen as to where their capital is to be found, [laughter, and a voice, "Here,"] and without attempting as an outsider to differentiate or to reconcile competing claims I stand here tonight on what I believe to be a safe coign of vantage under the hospitality and the authority of the Lord Mayor of Cardiff.

Though I am not altogether a stranger to Wales, you may nevertheless ask why I have requested your permission to address this great audience here tonight, I am not altogether an idle man, and during the last few months I can honestly say that there has hardly been a day, indeed there have been very few hours, which have not been preoccupied with grave cares and responsibility. But throughout them all I have been, and I am, sustained by a profound and unshakable belief in the righteousness of our cause [cheers] and by overwhelming evidence that in the pursuit and the maintenance of that cause the Government have behind them, without distinction of race, of party, or of class, the whole moral and material support of the British Empire. [Cheers.] Let me take the opportunity to acknowledge and to welcome the calm, reasoned, and dignified statement of our cause which the

Christian Churches of the United Kingdom, through some of their most distinguished leaders and ministers, have this week presented to the world. [Cheers.]

The United Voice of the Empire

I will not repeat, and I certainly can not improve upon it, and indeed I am not here tonight to argue out propositions which British citizens in every part of the world today regard as beyond the reach of controversy. I do not suppose that in the history of mankind there has ever been in such a vast and diverse community agreement so unanimous in purpose and so concentrated, a corporate conscience so clear and so convinced, co-operation so spontaneous, so ardent, and so resolute. [Cheers.] Just consider what it means, here in this United Kingdom—England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales—to hear one plain, harmonious, great united voice over the seas from our great dominions. [Cheers.] Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, our crown colonies, swell the chorus.

In India [cheers]—where whatever we won by the sword we hold and we retain by the more splendid title of just and disinterested rule by the authority, not of a despot, but of a trustee [cheers]—the response to our common appeal has moved all our feelings to their profoundest depths, and has been such as to shiver and to shatter the vain and ignorant imaginings of our enemies. [Cheers.] That is a remarkable and indeed a unique spectacle.

What is it that stirred the imagination, aroused the conscience, enlisted the manhood, welded into one compact and irresistible force the energies and the greatest imperial structure that the world has ever known? [Cheers.] That is a question which, for a moment at any rate, it is well worth asking and answering. Let me say, then, first negatively, that we are not impelled, any of us, by some of the motives which have occasioned the bloody struggles of the past. In this case, so far as we are concerned, ambition and aggression play no part. What

do we want? What do we aim at? What have we to gain?

We are a great, worldwide, peace-loving partnership. By the wisdom and the courage of our forefathers, by great deeds of heroism and adventure by land and sea, by the insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and tested experience of many generations, we have built up a dominion which is buttressed by the two pillars of liberty and law. [Cheers.] We are not vain enough or foolish enough to think that in the course of a long process there have not been blunders, or worse than blunders, and that today our dominion does not fall short of what in our ideals it might and it ought and, we believe, it is destined to be. But such as we have received it and such as we hope to have it, with it we are content. [Cheers.]

Why We Are at War

We do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us. [Laughter and cheers.] All that we wished for, all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peacefully to consolidate our own resources, to raise within the empire the level of common opportunity, to draw closer the bond of affection and confidence between its parts, and to make it everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of British liberty. [Cheers.] Does it not follow from that that nowhere in the world is there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war and to seek and insure peace? Why, then, are the British people throughout the length and breadth of our empire everywhere turning their plowshares into swords? Why are the best of our able-bodied men leaving the fields and the factory and the counting house for the recruiting office and the training camp?

If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our imperial burdens, either in area or in responsibility, it is equally true that in entering this war we had no ill-will to gratify nor wrongs of our own to avenge. ["Hear, hear!"] In regard to Germany in particular [groans]

our policy—repeatedly stated in Parliament, resolutely pursued year after year both in London and in Berlin—our policy has been to remove one by one the outstanding causes of possible friction and so to establish a firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come.

We have said from the first—I have said it over and over again, and so has Sir Edward Grey—we have said from the first that our friendships with certain powers, with France, [cheers,] with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be construed as implying cold feelings and still less hostile purposes against any other power. But at the same time we have always made it clear, to quote words used by Sir Edward Grey as far back as November, 1911—I quote his exact words—"One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones." New friendships by all means let us have, but not at the expense of the ones we have. That has been, and I trust will always be, the attitude of those whom the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation describes as the treacherous English. [Laughter and "Oh, oh!"]

Germany's Demand in 1912

We laid down, and I wish to call not only your attention but the attention of the whole world to this, when so many false legends are now being invented and circulated, in the following year—in the year 1912—we laid down in terms carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually quote, what our relations with Germany ought in our view to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German Government, "Britain declares that she will neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that. ["Hear, hear!"]

But that was not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war,

and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea. They asked us, to put it quite plainly, for a free hand, so far as we were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate the European world.

To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave. [Cheers.] None the less we have continued during the whole of the last two years, and never more energetically and more successfully than during the Balkan crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe but for the creation of a better international atmosphere and a more cordial co-operation between all the powers. [Cheers.] From both points of view, that of our domestic interests as a kingdom and an empire and that of our settled attitude and policy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this, which injures the one and frustrates the other, was and could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes—among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst. [Cheers.]

“The Blackest Annals of Barbarism”

Four weeks ago, speaking at the Guildhall, in the City of London, when the war was still in its early days, I asked my fellow-countrymen with what countenance, with what conscience, had we basely chose to stand aloof, we could have watched from day to day the terrible unrolling of events—public faith shamelessly broken, the freedom of a small people trodden in the dust, the wanton invasion of Belgium and then of France by hordes who leave behind them at every stage of their progress a dismal trail of savagery, of devastation, and of desecration worthy of the blackest annals in the history of barbarism. [Cheers.] That was four weeks ago. The war has now lasted for sixty days, and every one of those days has added to the picture its share of sombre and repulsive traits. We now see clearly written down in letters of carnage and spoliation the real aims and methods of this long - prepared and well - organized

scheme against the liberties of Europe. [Cheers.]

I say nothing of other countries. I pass no judgment upon them. But if we here in Great Britain had abstained and remained neutral, forsworn our word, deserted our friends, faltered and compromised with the plain dictates of our duty—nay, if we had not shown ourselves ready to strike with all our forces at the common enemy of civilization and freedom, there would have been nothing left for our country but to veil her face in shame and to be ready in her turn—for her time would have come—to share the doom which she would have richly deserved, and after centuries of glorious life to go down to her grave, unwept, unhonored, and unsung. [Loud cheers.]

Let us gladly acknowledge what becomes clearer and clearer every day, that the world is just as ready as it ever was, and no part of it readier than the British Empire, to understand and to respond to moral issues. [Cheers.] The new school of German thought has been teaching for a generation past that in the affairs of nations there is no code of ethics. According to their doctrine force and nothing but force is the test and the measure of right. As the events which are going on before our eyes have made it plain, they have succeeded only too well in indoctrinating with their creed—I will not say the people of Germany; like Burke, I will not attempt to draw up an indictment against a nation—I will not say the people of Germany, but those who control and execute German policy. [Cheers.]

But it is one of those products of German genius which, whether or not it was intended exclusively for home consumption, [laughter,] has not, I am happy to say, found a market abroad, and certainly not within the boundaries of the British Empire. [Cheers.] We still believe here, old-fashioned people as we are, in the sanctity of treaties, [cheers,] that the weak have rights and that the strong have duties, that small nationalities have every bit as good a title as large ones to life and independence, and that freedom - for its own sake is as well worth fighting

for today as it ever was in the past. [Cheers.] And we look forward at the end of this war to a Europe in which these great and simple and venerable truths will be recognized and safeguarded forever against the recrudescence of the era of blood and iron. [Cheers.] Stated in a few words, that is the reason for our united front, the reason that has brought our gallant Indian warriors to Marseilles, that is extracting from our most distant dominions the best of their manhood, and which in the course of two months has transformed the United Kingdom into a vast recruiting ground. [Cheers.]

Greatest Emergency in Our History

Now I have come here tonight not to talk but to do business. [Laughter and cheers.] Before I sit down I want to say to you a few practical words. We are confronted, as you all know and recognize, by the greatest emergency in our history. Every part of the United Kingdom and every man and every woman in every part, of it is called upon to make his or her contribution and to do his or her share, [cheers,] and our primary business is to fill the ranks. There is, I find, in some quarters an apprehension that the recruiting for the new army and the functions to be assigned to that army when it is formed and trained may interfere with or may in some way belittle or disparage the territorial force. Believe me, no delusion could be more mischievous or more complete.

No praise could be too high for the patriotic and sustained efforts of the county associations or for the quality and efficiency of the territorial troops. It is a comparatively easy thing to make great efforts and sacrifices under the stress and strain, which we are now experiencing, of a supreme crisis. The territorials, without any such stimulus in the piping times of peace, when war and the sufferings and the struggles and glories of war were contingent and remote, these men gave their time, sacrificed their leisure—not only in their annual training, but in thousands of cases both officers and men devoted their

spare hours to preparing themselves in the study and the practice of the art of war. They have now been embodied for two months, and I am expressing the considered opinion of one of the most eminent Generals when I say that the divisions now in camp in various parts of the country, and improving every day in efficiency, have completely justified their title to play any part that may be assigned to them, either in home defense, in the manning of our garrisons, or in the battle lines at the front. [Loud cheers.]

It is, then, no want of appreciation of the patriotism and of the efficiency of the territorial forces that leads me to ask you tonight for recruits for the regular army. We wish, so far as military exigencies permit, that the new battalions and squadrons and batteries should retain their local associations and their corporate and distinctive national character. [Cheers.] Why, the freedom and the autonomy of the smaller nationalities is one of the great issues of this gigantic contest.

A Welsh Army Corps

I went a week ago to Dublin to make an appeal to Ireland. I asked Irishmen then, as I do now, on behalf of the Government and of the War Office, to enlist in and to make up the complement of an Irish army corps. I repeat that appeal tonight to the men of Wales. [Cheers.] We want that. We want you to fill up the ranks of the Welsh army corps. [Cheers.] We believe that the preservation of local and national ties, of the genius of a people which has a history of its own, is not only not hostile to or inconsistent with, but, on the contrary, fosters and strengthens and stimulates the spirit of a common purpose, of a corporate brotherhood, of an underlying and binding imperial unity throughout every section and among all ranks of the forces of the Crown. [Cheers.]

Men of Wales, of whom I see so many thousands in this splendid gathering, let me say one last word to you. Remember your past. [Cheers.] Think of the villages and the mountains which in old days were the shelter of the recruiting

ground of your fathers in the struggles which adorn and glorify your annals. Never has a stronger or a more compelling appeal been made to you of all that you as a nation honor and hold true. Be worthy of those who went before you, and leave to your children the richest of all inheritances—the memory of fathers who in a great cause put self-sacrifice before ease and honor above life itself. [Loud cheers.]

Lord Plymouth moved a resolution pledging support to the Prime Minister's appeal to the nation and to measures necessary for the prosecution of the war to a victorious conclusion, whereby alone the lasting peace of Europe could be assured.

Thomas Richards, M. P., seconded the resolution, which was carried with enthusiasm. The meeting concluded with the singing of "Men of Harlech" and the national anthem.

LORD CURZON'S EXPERIENCE

Union of All Parties Noted—The Issues Better Understood

[LETTER TO THE LONDON TIMES]

Perhaps, after an experience of ten days, in which I have had the opportunity of speaking nightly about the war to great audiences of my fellow-countrymen in places so wide apart but so populous and important as Hull, Aberdeen, Glasgow, Dundee, Reading, and other towns, I may be permitted to send you a few observations on the subject of the campaign for which I pleaded in your columns a fortnight ago, and which has been prosecuted energetically by a multitude of speakers ever since.

In the first place, the meetings have shown the absolute fusion of all parties and the disappearance of all minor issues in the face of a national crisis. In each case the chair has been taken by the Lord Mayor or Lord Provost or civic head of the town. On the platform have been seated members of all parties and denominations; and Lords Lieutenant, M. P.'s of all sides, including labor members, and representative clergy, have addressed the meetings. The interest taken by the

people has been shown by the fact that the largest halls, though sometimes holding audiences of 3,000 to 4,000 men and more, have been unable to accommodate the crowds, and in every case overflow meetings have had to be held.

I have not found anywhere the slightest misapprehension as to the causes of the war. The fears that were entertained that we should be thought to be fighting on account of Serbia or some remote international quarrel, in which we were only indirectly engaged, are groundless. The people realize clearly that we are fighting, not merely for our own honor and good faith, but for ourselves and our own national existence.

Further, I think that the policies and ideals which are represented by our opponents are becoming much more widely understood. The circulation of books such as von Bernhardt's and the clear exposition on many platforms and in the press of the objects preached with such amazing frankness by German writers for at least thirty years and treated with such characteristic indifference by ourselves are bearing fruit, and our people realize that German victory is inconsistent not merely with the continued existence of such an empire as ours, but with the conception of self-respect, humanity, and freedom upon which modern civilization and democratic government in particular take their stand.

No doubt the German proceedings in Belgium have done much to accelerate this conviction; and the mercilessness and savagery of the methods by which the war has been fought by them (and for which no vestige of an apology has been forthcoming) have taught men that here is not only an enemy to be beaten but an evil spirit to be driven out.

The response to the appeal for recruits has, on the whole, been wonderful and inspiring. Employers of labor, whether on a large or a small scale, have, as a rule, behaved with generosity both as regards releasing their employes and in making provision for them and their families. A good example has been set by families and persons in leading positions. Domestic servants have come forward in

great numbers. The working class population have awakened more slowly—as was inevitable until the nature of the war and the urgency of the call were brought clearly home to them—but are now responding with alacrity. The brave deeds of their countrymen in France have proved the surest stimulus; and disaster, as, for instance, that reported to the Gordon Highlanders, at once raised the tide of recruits. This is a very typical and encouraging feature, showing that all that is wanted to convert interest into enthusiasm and to blow the embers into flame is that the case should be brought home by the sense of patriotic achievement or national loss.

Unquestionably the two incidents that have appealed most to the public sentiment have been the heroic resistance and tragic sufferings of Belgium—to be compensated by all that our national generosity can provide and atoned for by whatever reparation the Allies think it ultimately right to exact—and the splendid contribution from India. These events excite the loudest cheers and touch the deepest chords of emotion.

In some cases, where recruiting has been slow, men have been affected by a too exclusive but quite pardonable regard for the interests of themselves and their families. The provision made from various sources for the bread winner who has joined the colors or is at the front might easily be made more generous. But the outlook for those who are wounded or disabled, or for the families of those who lose their lives, and perhaps most of all for those who on their return may find it difficult to secure re-employment, is thought by many to be insufficiently assured. Private employers and business firms have, on the whole, met the situation with liberality; and a similar attitude on the part of the Government would meet with its immediate reward. It is perhaps a selfish utterance if a man is heard to say, "How am I going to come out of it?" or still more, "What good is it going to do to me?" but if he put the same question on behalf of those who depend upon him for subsistence he is entitled to a definite and a not ungenerous reply.

Two dangers may have to be faced as the war proceeds. One is that the nation, exhilarated by smaller successes, may think that the war will soon be over, and that no excessive effort is therefore required. Traces of this feeling are sometimes visible in the published letters (how admirable, as a rule, they are!) of soldiers at the front, telling their families to expect them back in a month or two's time. The other danger is that, harassed by the continuance of the struggle, or attracted by delusive offers of peace or affected by economic or industrial conditions which have fortunately not so far developed, a section of the nation may cry out for peace before the victory has been consummated and before the peril we are fighting to avert is forever destroyed.

It may be that renewed platform activity may be required as time goes on to sustain the spirit and fortify the constancy of the nation. In the meanwhile, speakers, from my experience, cannot do better than dilate upon the immense magnitude of the stakes involved, and probable long duration of the struggle, and the supreme importance that our country should, by the strength and effectiveness of its material contribution to the common cause, exercise a powerful influence both upon the issue of the struggle and in the resettlement of territories and forces which will follow upon its conclusion. I am, Sir, yours obediently,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON,
1 Carlton House Terrace, Sept. 14, 1914.

NOW THE WAR HAS COME

*Speech by Winston Spencer Churchill,
First Lord of the Admiralty, at the
London Opera House, Sept. 11*

These are serious times, and though we meet here in an abode of diversion and of pleasure in times of peace, and although we wish and mean to rouse and encourage each other in every way, yet we are not here for purposes of merriment or jollification. I am quite sure I associate my two friends who are here tonight and who are to speak after me,

and my noble friend, your Chairman, with me when I say that we regard the cheers with which you have received us as being offered to us only because they are meant for our soldiers in the field and our sailors upon the sea, [cheers,] and it is in that sense that we accept them and thank you for them.

We meet here together in serious times, but I come to you tonight in good heart, [cheers,] and with good confidence for the future and for the task upon which we are engaged. It is too soon to speculate upon the results of the great battle which is waging in France. Everything that we have heard during four long days of anxiety seems to point to a marked and substantial turning of the tide.

German Plans Miscarried

We have seen the forces of the French and British Armies strong enough not only to contain and check the devastating avalanche which had swept across the French frontier, but now at last, not for an hour or for a day, but for four long days in succession, it has been rolled steadily back. [Cheers.] With battles taking place over a front of 100 or 150 miles one must be very careful not to build high hopes on results which are achieved even in a great area of the field of war. We are not children looking for light and vain encouragement, but men engaged upon a task which has got to be put through. Still, when every allowance has been made for the uncertainty with which these great operations are always enshrouded, I think it only fair and right to say that the situation tonight is better, far better, than a cold calculation of the forces available on both sides before the war should have led us to expect at this early stage. [Cheers.]

It is quite clear that what is happening now is not what the Germans planned, [laughter,] and they have yet to show that they can adapt themselves to the force of circumstances created by the military power of their enemies with the same efficiency that they have undoubtedly shown in regard to plans long prepared, methodically worked out, and

executed with the precision of deliberation.

The battle, I say, gives us every reason to meet together tonight in good heart. But let me tell you frankly that if this battle had been as disastrous as, thank God, it appears to be triumphant, I should come before you with unabated confidence and with the certainty that we have only to continue in our efforts to bring this war to the conclusion which we wish and intend. [Cheers.]

We did not enter upon this war with the hope of easy victory; we did not enter upon it in any desire to extend our territory, or to advance and increase our position in the world, or in any romantic desire to shed our blood and spend our money in Continental quarrels. We entered upon this war reluctantly after we had made every effort compatible with honor to avoid being drawn in, and we entered upon it with a full realization of the sufferings, losses, disappointments, vexations, and anxieties, and of the appalling and sustained exertions which would be entailed upon us by our action. The war will be long and sombre. It will have many reverses of fortune and many hopes falsified by subsequent events, and we must derive from our cause and from the strength that is in us, and from the traditions and history of our race, and from the support and aid of our empire all over the world the means to make this country overcome obstacles of all kinds and continue to the end of the furrow, whatever the toil and suffering may be.

Making Sure of Victory

But though we entered this war with no illusions as to the incidents which will mark its progress, as to the ebb and flow of fortune in this and that part of the gigantic field over which it is waged, we entered it, and entered it rightly, with the sure and strong hope and expectation of bringing it to a victorious conclusion. [Cheers.] I am quite certain that if we, the people of the British Empire, choose, whatever may happen in the interval, we can in the end make this war finish in accordance with our interests and the in-

terests of civilization. [Cheers.] Let us build on a sure foundation. Let us not be the sport of fortune, looking for victories here and happy chances there; let us take measures, which are well within our power, which are practical measures, measures which we can begin upon at once and carry through from day to day with surety and effect. Let us enter upon measures which in the long run, whatever the accidents and incidents of the intervening period may be, will secure us that victory upon which our life and existence as a nation not less than the fortune of our allies and of Europe absolutely depends. [Cheers.]

The Deeds of the Navy

I think we are building on a sure foundation. [Cheers.] Let us look first at the navy. [Cheers.] The war has now been in progress between five and six weeks. In that time we have swept German commerce from the seas. [Cheers.] We have either blocked in neutral harbors or blockaded in their own harbors [laughter] or hunted down the commerce destroyers of which we used to hear so much and from which we anticipated such serious loss and damage. All our ships, with inconsiderable exceptions, are arriving safely and punctually at their destinations, carrying on the commerce upon which the wealth and industry and the power of making war for this country depends. We are transporting easily, not without an element of danger, but hitherto safely and successfully, great numbers of soldiers across the seas from all quarters of the world to be directed upon the decisive theatre of the land struggle. [A voice, "Russians," and laughter.] And we have searched the so-called German Ocean without discovering the German flag. [Cheers.] Our enemies, in their carefully worked out calculations, which they have been toiling over during a great many years, when the people of this country, as a whole, credited them with quite different motives, ["Hear, hear!"] have always counted upon a process of attrition and the waste of shipping by mines and torpedoes and other methods of warfare of

the weaker power, by which the numbers and strength of our fleet would be reduced to such a point that they would be able to steel their hearts and come out and fight. [Cheers.] We have been at war for five or six weeks, and so far—though I would certainly not underrate the risks and hazards attending upon warlike operations and the vanity of all overconfidence—but so far the attrition has been on their side and not on ours, [cheers,] while the losses which they have suffered greatly exceed any that we have at present sustained.

I have made careful inquiries as to the condition of our sailors in the fleet under the strain put upon them, and this continued watching and constant attention to their duty under war conditions, and I am glad to say that it is reported to me that the health of the fleet has been much better since the declaration of war than it was in time of peace, [loud cheers and laughter,] both as to the percentage of sickness and the character of the sickness, [laughter,] and that there is no reason why we should not keep up the same process of naval control and have the same exercises of sea power, on which we have lived and are living, for what is almost an indefinite period.

The Nose of the Bulldog

By one of those dispensations of Providence, which appeals so strongly to the German Emperor, [laughter,] the nose of the bulldog has been slanted backward so that he can breathe with comfort without letting go. [Laughter and cheers]. We have been successful in maintaining naval control thus far in the struggle, and there are also sound reasons for believing that as it progresses the chances in our favor will not diminish but increase. In the next 12 months the number of great ships that will be completed for this country is more than double the number which will be completed for Germany, [cheers,] and the number of cruisers three or four times as great. [Cheers.] Therefore I think I am on solid ground when I come here tonight and say that you may count upon the naval supremacy of this country be-

ing effectively maintained as against the German power for as long as you wish. [Cheers.]

The Army's Share

Now we must look at the army. [Loud applause.] It has been the pride of the Government and during all periods of modern history the darling of the British Nation. On it have been lavished whatever public funds were necessary, and to its efficiency has been devoted the unceasing care and thought of successive Administrations. The result is that when the need came the navy was absolutely ready, [cheers,] and, as far as we can see from what has happened, thoroughly adequate to the task which was required from it. But we have not been in times of peace a military nation. The army has not had the facilities of obtaining the lavish supplies of men and money for its needs which have in times of peace and in the past, to our good fortune at the moment, been so freely given to the navy. And what you have to do now is to make a great army. [Cheers.] You have to make an army under the cover and shield of the navy strong enough to enable our country to play its full part in the decision of this terrible struggle. [Cheers.]

A Million Men Needed

The sure way—the only sure way—to bring this war to an end is for the British Empire to put on the Continent and keep on the Continent an army of at least 1,000,000 men. [Cheers.] I take that figure because it is one well within the compass of the arrangements which are now on foot and because it is one which is well within the scope of the measures which Lord Kitchener—[Loud cheers drowned the rest of the sentence.]

I was reading in the newspapers the other day that the German Emperor made a speech to some of his regiments in which he urged them to concentrate their attention upon what he was pleased to call "French's contemptible little army." [Laughter.] Well, they are concentrating their attention upon it, [laughter and cheers,] and that army, which has been fighting with such ex-

traordinary prowess, which has revived in a fortnight of adverse actions the ancient fame and glory of our arms upon the Continent, [cheers,] and which tonight, after a long, protracted, harassed, unbroken, and undaunted rearguard action—the hardest trial to which troops can be exposed—is advancing in spite of the loss of one-fifth of its numbers, and driving its enemies before it—that army must be reinforced and backed and supported and increased and enlarged in numbers, in power by every means and every method that every one of us can employ.

There is no reason why, if you set yourselves to it—I have not come here to make a speech of words, but to point out to you necessary and obvious things which you can do—there is no doubt that, if you set yourselves to it, the army which is now fighting so valiantly on your behalf and our allies can be raised from its present position to 250,000 of the finest professional soldiers in the world, and that in the new year something like 500,000 men, and from that again, when the early Summer begins in 1915, to the full figure of twenty-five army corps fighting in line together. The vast population of these islands and all the empire is pressing forward to serve, its wealth is placed at your disposal, the navy opens the way for the passage of men and everything necessary for the equipment of our forces. Why should we hesitate when here is the sure and certain path to ending this war in the way we mean it to end? [Cheers.]

A Decisive Weight

There is little doubt that an army so formed will in quality and character, in native energy, in the comprehension which each individual has of the cause for which he is fighting, exceed in merit any army in the world. We have only to have a chance of even numbers or anything approaching even numbers to demonstrate the superiority of free-thinking, active citizens over the docile sheep who serve the ferocious ambitions of drastic Kings. [Cheers.] Our enemies are now, at the point where we have reached, fully extended. On every front

of the enormous field of conflict the pressure upon them is such that all their resources are deployed. With every addition to the growing weight of the Russian Army, [cheers,] with every addition to the forces at the disposal of Sir John French, [cheers,] the balance must sag down increasingly against them.

Fixing a Term to the War

You have only to create steadily week by week and month by month the great military instrument of which I have been speaking to throw into the scales a weight which must be decisive. There will be no corresponding reserve of manhood upon which Germany can draw. There will be no corresponding force of soldiers and of equipment and of war material which can be brought into the line to face the forces which we in this island and in this empire can undoubtedly create. That will turn the scale. That will certainly decide the issue. Of course, if victory comes sooner so much the better. [Cheers.] But let us not count on fortune and good luck. [Cheers.] Let us assume at every point that things will go much less well than we hope and wish. Let us make arrangements which will override that. [Cheers.] We have it in our power to make such arrangements, and it is only common prudence, aye, and common humanity, to take steps which at any rate will fix some certain term to this devastating struggle throughout the whole of the European Continent.

Let me also say this. Let us concentrate all our warlike feeling upon fighting the enemy in the field and creating a great military weapon to carry out the purposes of the war. There is a certain class of person who likes to work his warlike feelings off upon the unfortunate alien enemy within our gates.

Fight Like Gentlemen

Of course all necessary measures must be taken for the security of the country and for the proper carrying out of military needs; but let us always have this feeling in our heart that after the war is over people shall not only admire our victory but they shall say they fought

like gentlemen. [Cheers.] The Romans had a motto—

Parcere subjectis at debellare superbos.

Let that be the spirit in which we conduct this war. Let all those who feel under the horrible provocations of the struggle, their hearts suffused with anger and with wrath—let them turn it into a practical channel—going to the front or, if circumstances prevent them, helping others to go, keeping them maintained in the highest state of efficiency, giving them the supplies and weapons which they require, and looking after those they have left behind.

The Eloquence of Brutal Facts

I have not spoken to you much about the justice of our cause, because it has been most eloquently set out by the Prime Minister, [cheers,] and Sir Edward Grey, [cheers,] and by Mr. Bonar Law, [cheers,] and other leaders of the Opposition; and much more eloquently than by any speakers in this or any other country the justice of our cause has been set out by the brutal facts which have occurred and which have marched upon us from day to day. [Cheers.] Some thought there would be a German war, some did not; but no one supposed that a great military nation would exhibit all the vices of military organization without those redeeming virtues which, God knows, are needed to redeem warlike operations from the taint of shame. We have been confronted with an exhibition of ruthlessness and outrage enforced upon the weak, enforced upon women and children. We have been confronted with repeated breaches of the law of enlightened warfare, practices analogous to those which in private life are regarded as cheating, and which deprive persons or country adopting them, or condoning them, of the credit and respect due to honorable soldiers.

We have been confronted with all this. Let us not imitate it. [Cheers.] Let us not try to make small retaliations and reprisals here and there. Let us concentrate upon the simple, obvious task of creating a military force so powerful that the war, even in default of any good fortune, can certainly be ended and

brought to a satisfactory conclusion. However the war began, now that it is started it is a war of self-preservation for us. Our civilization, our way of doing things, our political and Parliamentary life, with its voting and its thinking, our party system, our party warfare, the free and easy tolerance of British life, our method of doing things and of keeping ourselves alive and self-respecting in the world—all these are brought into contrast, into collision, with the organized force of bureaucratic Prussian militarism.

That is the struggle which is opened now and which must go forward without pause or abatement until it is settled decisively and finally one way or the other. On that there can be no compromise or truce. It is our life or it is theirs. We are bound, having gone so far, to go forward without flinching to the very end. [Cheers.]

"The Terror of Europe"

This is the same great European war that would have been fought in the year 1909 if Russia had not humbled herself and given way to German threats. It is the same war that Sir Edward Grey stopped last year. [Loud cheers.] Now it has come upon us. If you look back across the long periods of European history to the original cause, you will, I am sure, find it in the cruel terms enforced upon France in the year 1870 ["Hear, hear!"] and in the repeated bullyings and attempts to terrorize France which have been the characteristic of German policy ever since. [Cheers.] The more you study this question the more you will see that the use the Germans made of their three aggressive and victorious wars against Denmark, against Austria, and against France has been such as to make them the terror and the bully of Europe, the enemy and the menace of every small State upon their borders, and a perpetual source of unrest and disquietude to their powerful neighbors. [Cheers.]

Claims of Nationality

Now the war has come, and when it is over let us be careful not to make the

same mistake or the same sort of mistake as Germany made when she had France prostrate at her feet in 1870. [Cheers.] Let us, whatever we do, fight for and work toward great and sound principles for the European system. And the first of those principles which we should keep before us is the principle of nationality [cheers]—that is to say, not the conquest or subjugation of any great community or of any strong race of men, but the setting free of those races which have been subjugated and conquered, [cheers;] and if doubt arises about disputed areas of country we should try to settle their ultimate destination in the reconstruction of Europe which must follow from this war with a fair regard to the wishes and feelings of the people who live in them.

That is the aim which, if it is achieved, will justify the exertions of the war and will make some amends to the world for the loss and suffering, the agony of suffering, which it has wrought and entailed, and which will give to those who come after us not only the pride which we hope they will feel in remembering the martial achievements of the present age of Britain, but which will give them also a better and fairer world to live in and a Europe free from the causes of hatred and unrest which have poisoned the comity of nations and ruptured the peace of Christendom.

The Unity of the Empire

I use these words because this is a war in which we are all together, [cheers,] all classes, all races, all States, principalities, dominions, and powers throughout the British Empire—we are all together. [Cheers.] Years ago the elder Pitt urged upon his countrymen the compulsive invocation, "Be one people." It has taken us till now to obey his appeal, but now we are together, and while we remain one people there are no forces in the world strong enough to beat us down or break us up. [Cheers.]

I hope, even in this dark hour of strife and struggle, that the unity which has been established in our country under the pressure of war will not cease when the great military effort upon which we

are engaged and the great moral causes which we are pursuing have been achieved. I hope, and I do not think my hope is a vain one, that the forces which have come together in our islands and throughout our empire may continue to work together, not only in a military struggle, but to try to make our country more quickly a more happy and more prosperous land, where social justice and free institutions are more firmly established than they have been in the past. [Cheers.] If that is so we shall not have fought in vain at home as well as abroad.

With these hopes and in this belief I would urge you, laying aside all hindrance, thrusting away all private aims, to devote yourselves unswervingly and unflinchingly to the vigorous and successful prosecution of the war. [Loud cheers.]

ENGLAND'S DUTY

Speech by David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, at Queen's Hall, London, Sept. 19

My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have come here this afternoon to talk to my fellow-countrymen about this great war and the part that we ought to take in it. I feel my task is easier after we have been listening to the greatest war song in the world, ("The March of the Men of Harlech.") [Applause.]

Why Our National Honor Is Involved

There is no man in this room who has always regarded the prospect of engaging in a great war with greater reluctance and with greater repugnance than I have done throughout the whole of my political life. ["Hear, hear!"] There is no man either inside or outside of this room more convinced that we could not have avoided it without national dishonor. [Great applause.] I am fully alive to the fact that every nation who has ever engaged in any war has always invoked the sacred name of honor. Many a crime has been committed in its name; there are some being committed now. All the same, national honor is a reality,

and any nation that disregards it is doomed. ["Hear, hear!"] Why is our honor as a country involved in this war? Because, in the first instance, we are bound by honorable obligations to defend the independence, the liberty, the integrity of a small neighbor that has always lived peaceably. [Applause.] She could not have compelled us; she was weak; but the man who declines to discharge his duty because his creditor is too poor to enforce it is a blackguard. [Loud applause.] We entered into a treaty—a solemn treaty—two treaties—to defend Belgium and her integrity. Our signatures are attached to the documents. Our signatures do not stand alone there; this country was not the only country that undertook to defend the integrity of Belgium. Russia, France, Austria, Prussia—they are all there. Why are Austria and Prussia not performing the obligations of their bond? It is suggested that when we quote this treaty it is purely an excuse on our part—it is our low craft and cunning to cloak our jealousy of a superior civilization—[laughter]—that we are attempting to destroy. Our answer is the action we took in 1870. ["Hear, hear!"] What was that? Mr. Gladstone was then Prime Minister. [Applause.] Lord Granville, I think, was then Foreign Secretary. I have never heard it laid to their charge that they were ever Jingoists.

France and Belgium in 1870

What did they do in 1870? That treaty bound us then. We called upon the belligerent powers to respect it. We called upon France, and we called upon Germany. At that time, bear in mind, the greatest danger to Belgium came from France, and not from Germany. We intervened to protect Belgium against France, exactly as we are doing now to protect her against Germany. [Applause.] We proceeded in exactly the same way. We invited both the belligerent powers to state that they had no intention of violating Belgian territory. What was the answer given by Bismarck? He said it was superfluous to ask Prussia such a question in view of the treaties in force. France gave a

similar answer. We received at that time the thanks of the Belgian people for our intervention in a very remarkable document. It is a document addressed by the Municipality of Brussels to Queen Victoria after that intervention, and it reads:

The great and noble people over whose destinies you preside have just given a further proof of its benevolent sentiment toward our country. * * * The voice of the English Nation has been heard above the din of arms, and it has asserted the principles of justice and right. Next to the unalterable attachment of the Belgian people to their independence, the strongest sentiment which fills their hearts is that of an imperishable gratitude. [Great applause.]

That was in 1870. Mark what followed. Three or four days after that document of thanks a French army was wedged up against the Belgian frontier, every means of escape shut out by a ring of flame from Prussian cannon. There was one way of escape. What was that? Violating the neutrality of Belgium. What did they do? The French on that occasion preferred ruin and humiliation to the breaking of their bond. [Loud applause.] The French Emperor, the French Marshals, 100,000 gallant Frenchmen in arms, preferred to be carried captive to the strange land of their enemies rather than dishonor the name of their country. [Applause.] It was the last French army in the field. Had they violated Belgian neutrality the whole history of that war would have been changed, and yet, when it was the interest of France to break the treaty then, she did not do it.

"A Scrap of Paper"

It is the interest of Prussia today to break the treaty, and she has done it. [Hisses.] She avows it with cynical contempt for every principle of justice. She says: "Treaties only bind you when it is your interest to keep them." [Laughter.] "What is a treaty?" Says the German Chancellor, "A scrap of paper." Have you any five-pound notes about you? [Laughter and applause.] I am not calling for them. [Laughter.] Have you any of those neat little Treasury one-pound notes? [Laughter.] If you have,

burn them; they are only scraps of paper. [Laughter and applause.] What are they made of? Rags. [Laughter.] What are they worth? The whole credit of the British Empire. [Loud applause.] Scraps of paper! I have been dealing with scraps of paper within the last month. One suddenly found the commerce of the world coming to a standstill. The machine had stopped. Why? I will tell you. We discovered—many of us for the first time, for I do not pretend that I do not know much more about the machinery of commerce today than I did six weeks ago, and there are many others like me—we discovered that the machinery of commerce was moved by bills of exchange. I have seen some of them, [laughter,] wretched, crinkled, scrawled over, blotched, frowsy, and yet those wretched little scraps of paper move great ships laden with thousands of tons of precious cargo from one end of the world to the other. [Applause.] What is the motive power behind them? The honor of commercial men. [Applause.] Treaties are the currency of international statesmanship. [Applause.] Let us be fair—German merchants, German traders, have the reputation of being as upright and straightforward as any traders in the world, ["Hear, hear!"] but if the currency of German commerce is to be debased to the level of that of her statesmanship, no trader from Shanghai to Valparaiso will ever look at a German signature again. [Loud applause.] This doctrine of the scrap of paper, this doctrine which is proclaimed by Bernhardt, that treaties only bind a nation as long as it is to its interest, goes under the root of all public law. It is the straight road to barbarism. ["Hear, hear!"] It is as if you were to remove the magnetic pole because it was in the way of a German cruiser. [Laughter.] The whole navigation of the seas would become dangerous, difficult, and impossible; and the whole machinery of civilization will break down if this doctrine wins in this war. ["Hear, hear!"] We are fighting against barbarism, [applause,] and there is only one way of putting it right. If

there are nations that say they will only respect treaties when it is to their interest to do so, we must make it to their interest to do so for the future. [Applause.]

Germany's Perjury

What is their defense? Consider the interview which took place between our Ambassador and the great German officials. When their attention was called to this treaty to which they were parties, they said: "We cannot help that. Rapidity of action is the great German asset." There is a greater asset for a nation than rapidity of action, and that is honest dealing. [Loud applause.] What are Germany's excuses? She says Belgium was plotting against her; Belgium was engaged in a great conspiracy with Britain and France to attack her. Not merely is it not true, but Germany knows it is not true. ["Hear, hear!"] What is her other excuse? That France meant to invade Germany through Belgium. That is absolutely untrue. ["Hear, hear!"] France offered Belgium five army corps to defend her if she were attacked. Belgium said: "I do not require them; I have the word of the Kaiser. Shall Caesar send a lie?" [Laughter and applause.] All these tales about conspiracy have been vamped up since. A great nation ought to be ashamed to behave like a fraudulent bankrupt, perjuring its way through its obligations. ["Hear, hear!"] What she says is not true. She has deliberately broken this treaty, and we were in honor bound to stand by it. [Applause.]

Belgium's "Crime"

Belgium has been treated brutally. ["Hear, hear!"] How brutally we shall not yet know. We already know too much. But what had she done? Had she sent an ultimatum to Germany? Had she challenged Germany? Was she preparing to make war on Germany? Had she inflicted any wrong upon Germany which the Kaiser was bound to redress? She was one of the most unoffending little countries in Europe. ["Hear, hear!"] There she was—peaceable, industrious, thrifty, hard working,

giving offense to no one. And her cornfields have been trampled, her villages have been burned, her art treasures have been destroyed, her men have been slaughtered—yea, and her women and children too. [Cries of "Shame!"] Hundreds of thousands of her people, their neat, comfortable little homes burned to the dust, are wandering homeless in their own land. What was their crime? Their crime was that they trusted to the word of a Prussian King. [Applause.] I do not know what the Kaiser hopes to achieve by this war. [Derisive laughter.] I have a shrewd idea what he will get; but one thing he has made certain, and that is that no nation will ever commit that crime again.

"The Right to Defend Its Homes"

I am not going to enter into details of outrages. Many of them are untrue, and always are in a war. War is a grim, ghastly business at best or at worst, ["Hear, hear!"] and I am not going to say that all that has been said in the way of outrages must necessarily be true. I will go beyond that, and I will say that if you turn two millions of men—forced, conscript, compelled, driven—into the field, you will always get among them a certain number who will do things that the nation to which they belong would be ashamed of. I am not depending on these tales. It is enough for me to have the story which Germans themselves avow, admit, defend, and proclaim—the burning and massacring, the shooting down of harmless people. Why? Because, according to the Germans, these people fired on German soldiers. What business had German soldiers there at all? ["Hear, hear!" and applause.] Belgium was acting in pursuance of the most sacred right, the right to defend its homes. But they were not in uniform when they fired! If a burglar broke into the Kaiser's palace at Potsdam, destroyed his furniture, killed his servants, ruined his art treasures—especially those he had made himself, [laughter and applause,] and burned the precious manuscripts of his speeches, do you think he would wait until he got into uniform before he shot him down?

[Laughter.] They were dealing with those who had broken into their household. ["Hear, hear!"] But the perfidy of the Germans has already failed. They entered Belgium to save time. The time has gone. [Loud and continued applause.] They have not gained time, but they have lost their good name. ["Hear, hear!"]

The Case of Serbia

But Belgium is not the only little nation that has been attacked in this war, and I make no excuse for referring to the case of the other little nation, the case of Serbia. ["Hear, hear!"] The history of Serbia is not unblotted. Whose history, in the category of nations, is unblotted? ["Hear, hear!"] The first nation that is without sin, let her cast a stone at Serbia. She was a nation trained in a horrible school, but she won her freedom with a tenacious valor, and she has maintained it by the same courage. [Applause.] If any Servians were mixed up in the assassination of the Grand Duke, they ought to be punished. ["Hear, hear!"] Serbia admits that. The Servian Government had nothing to do with it. Not even Austria claims that. The Servian Prime Minister is one of the most capable and honored men in Europe. ["Hear, hear!"] Serbia was willing to punish any one of her subjects who had been proved to have any complicity in that assassination. What more could you expect? What were the Austrian demands? Serbia sympathized with her fellow-countrymen in Bosnia—that was one of her crimes. She must do so no more. Her newspapers were saying nasty things about Austria; they must do so no longer. That is the German spirit; you had it in Zabern. ["Hear, hear!" and applause.] How dare you criticise a Prussian official? [laughter,] and if you laugh, it is a capital offense—the Colonel in Zabern threatened to shoot if it was repeated. In the same way the Servian newspapers must not criticise Austria. I wonder what would have happened if we had taken the same line about German newspapers. ["Hear, hear!"] Serbia said: "Very well, we will give orders to the newspapers that they

must in future criticise neither Austria, nor Hungary, nor anything that is theirs." [Laughter.] Who can doubt the valor of Serbia, when she undertook to tackle her newspaper editors? [Laughter and applause.] She promised not to sympathize with Bosnia, she promised to write no critical articles about Austria; she would have no public meetings in which anything unkind was said about Austria.

"Serbia Faced the Situation with Dignity"

But that was not enough. She must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria should subsequently name. Those officers had just emerged from a war where they had added lustre to the Servian arms; they were gallant, brave, and efficient. ["Hear, hear!"] I wonder whether it was their guilt or their efficiency that prompted Austria's action! But, mark you, the officers were not named; Serbia was to undertake in advance to dismiss them from the army, the names to be sent in subsequently. Can you name a country in the world that would have stood for that? [Cries of "No."] Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to this country, saying, "You must dismiss from your army, and from your navy, [laughter,] all those officers whom we shall subsequently name." Well, I think I could name them now. [Laughter.] Lord Kitchener [loud applause] would go. Sir John French [applause] would be sent away. Gen. Smith-Dorrien [applause] would go, and I am sure that Sir John Jellicoe [applause] would have to go. And there is another gallant old warrior who would go, Lord Roberts. [Applause.] It was a difficult situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a great military power that could have put half a dozen men in the field for every one of Serbia's men, and that power was supported by the greatest military power in the world. How did Serbia behave? It is not what happens to you in life that matters; it is the way in which you face it, ["Hear, hear!"] and Serbia faced the situation with dignity. She said to Aus-

tria: "If any officers of mine have been guilty, and are proved to be guilty, I will dismiss them." Austria said: "That is not good enough for me." It was not guilt she was after, but capacity. ["Hear, hear!"]

Russia's Turn

Then came Russia's turn. Russia has a special regard for Serbia; she has a special interest in Servia. Russians have shed their blood for Servian independence many a time, for Servia is a member of Russia's family, and she cannot see Servia maltreated. Austria knew that. Germany knew it, and she turned round to Russia and said: "I insist that you shall stand by with your arms folded while Austria is strangling your little brother to death." What answer did the Russian Slav give? He gave the only answer that becomes a man. ["Hear, hear!"] He turned to Austria, and said: "You lay hands on that little fellow, and I will tear your ramshackle empire [loud applause and laughter] limb from limb." And he is doing it! [Loud applause.]

The Little Nations

That is the story of two little nations. The world owes much to little nations—and to little men! [Laughter and applause.] This theory of bigness, this theory that you must have a big empire, and a big nation, and a big man—well, long legs have their advantage in a retreat. [Laughter and applause.] The Kaiser's ancestor chose his warriors for their height, and that tradition has become a policy in Germany. Germany applies that ideal to nations, and will only allow six-foot-two nations to stand in the ranks. [Laughter.] But ah! the world owes much to the little five-foot-five nations. The greatest art in the world was the work of little nations; the most enduring literature of the world came from little nations; the greatest literature of England came when she was a nation of the size of Belgium fighting a great empire. The heroic deeds that thrill humanity through generations were the deeds of little nations fighting for their freedom. Yes, and

the salvation of mankind came through a little nation. God has chosen little nations as the vessels by which He carries His choicest wines to the lips of humanity, to rejoice their hearts, to exalt their vision, to stimulate and strengthen their faith; and if we had stood by when two little nations were being crushed and broken by the brutal hands of barbarism, our shame would have rung down the everlasting ages. [Loud applause.]

"The Test of Our Faith"

But Germany insists that this is an attack by a lower civilization upon a higher one. [Derisive cries.] As a matter of fact, the attack was begun by the civilization which calls itself the higher one. I am no apologist for Russia; she has perpetrated deeds of which I have no doubt her best sons are ashamed. What empire has not? But Germany is the last empire to point the finger of reproach at Russia. ["Hear, hear!"] Russia has made sacrifices for freedom—great sacrifices. Do you remember the cry of Bulgaria when she was torn by the most insensate tyranny that Europe has ever seen? Who listened to that cry? The only answer of the higher civilization was that the liberty of the Bulgarian peasants was not worth the life of a single Pomeranian grenadier. But the "rude barbarians of the North" sent their sons by the thousands to die for Bulgarian freedom. What about England? Go to Greece, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, France—in all those lands I could point out places where the sons of Britain have died for the freedom of those peoples. [Loud applause.] France has made sacrifices for the freedom of other lands than her own. Can you name a single country in the world for the freedom of which modern Prussia has ever sacrificed a single life? ["No!"] By the test of our faith, the highest standard of civilization is the readiness to sacrifice for others. [Applause.]

German "Civilization"

I will not say a single word in disparagement of the German people. They are a great people, and have great qual-

ities of head and hand and heart. I believe, in spite of recent events, that there is as great a store of kindness in the German peasant as in any peasant in the world; but he has been drilled into a false idea of civilization. It is efficient, it is capable; but it is a hard civilization; it is a selfish civilization; it is a material civilization. They cannot comprehend the action of Britain at the present moment; they say so. They say, "France we can understand; she is out for vengeance; she is out for territory—Alsace and Lorraine." [Applause.] They say they can understand Russia; she is fighting for mastery—she wants Galicia. They can understand you fighting for vengeance—they can understand you fighting for mastery—they can understand you fighting for greed of territory; but they cannot understand a great empire pledging its resources, pledging its might, pledging the lives of its children, pledging its very existence, to protect a little nation that seeks to defend herself. [Applause.] God made man in His own image, high of purpose, in the region of the spirit; German civilization would recreate him in the image of a Diesel machine—precise, accurate, powerful, but with no room for soul to operate. ["Hear, hear!"]

A Philosophy of Blood and Iron

Have you read the Kaiser's speeches? If you have not a copy I advise you to buy one; they will soon be out of print, and you will not have many more of the same sort. [Laughter and applause.] They are full of the glitter and bluster of German militarism—"mailed fist," and "shining armor." Poor old mailed fist! Its knuckles are getting a little bruised. Poor shining armor! The shine is being knocked out of it. [Applause.] There is the same swagger and boastfulness running through the whole of the speeches. The extract which was given in *The British Weekly* this week is a very remarkable product as an illustration of the spirit we have to fight. It is the Kaiser's speech to his soldiers on the way to the front:—

Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On me, the German

Emperor, the spirit of God has descended. I am His sword, His weapon, and His vicegerent. Woe to the disobedient, and death to cowards and unbelievers.

Lunacy is always distressing, but sometimes it is dangerous; and when you get it manifested in the head of the State, and it has become the policy of a great empire, it is about time that it should be ruthlessly put away. [Loud applause.] I do not believe he meant all these speeches; it was simply the martial straddle he had acquired. But there were men around him who meant every word of them. This was their religion. Treaties? They tangle the feet of Germany in her advance. Cut them with the sword! Little nations? They hinder the advance of Germany. Trample them in the mire under the German heel! The Russian Slav? He challenges the supremacy of Germany and Europe. Hurl your legions at him and massacre him! Britain? She is a constant menace to the predominancy of Germany in the world. Wrest the trident out of her hand! Christianity? Sickly sentimentalism about sacrifice for others! Poor pap for German digestion! We will have a new diet. We will force it upon the world. It will be made in Germany—[laughter and applause]—a diet of blood and iron. What remains? Treaties have gone. The honor of nations has gone. Liberty has gone. What is left? Germany! Germany is left!—"Deutschland über Alles!"

That is what we are fighting—"Hear, hear!"—that claim to predominancy of a material, hard civilization, a civilization which if it once rules and sways the world, liberty goes, democracy vanishes. And unless Britain and her sons come to the rescue it will be a dark day for humanity. [Applause.]

Have you followed the Prussian Junker and his doings? We are not fighting the German people. The German people are under the heel of this military caste, and it will be a day of rejoicing for the German peasant, artisan and trader when the military caste is broken. You know its pretensions. They give themselves the airs of demi-gods. They walk the pavements, and civilians and their wives

are swept into the gutter; they have no right to stand in the way of a great Prussian soldier. Men, women, nations—they all have to go. He thinks all he has to say is "We are in a hurry." That is the answer he gave to Belgium—"Rapidity of action is Germany's greatest asset," which means "I am in a hurry; clear out of the way." You know the type of motorist, the terror of the roads, with a sixty-horse-power car, who thinks the roads are made for him, and knocks down anybody who impedes the action of his car by a single mile an hour. The Prussian Junker is the road-hog of Europe. [Applause.] Small nationalities in his way are hurled to the roadside, bleeding and broken. Women and children are crushed under the wheels of his cruel car, and Britain is ordered out of his road. All I can say is this: If the old British spirit is alive in British hearts, that bully will be torn from his seat. [Loud applause.] Were he to win, it would be the greatest catastrophe that has befallen democracy since the day of the Holy Alliance and its ascendancy.

"Through Terror to Triumph"

They think we cannot beat them. It will not be easy. It will be a long job; it will be a terrible war; but in the end we shall march through terror to triumph. [Applause.] We shall need all our qualities—every quality that Britain and its people possess—prudence in counsel, daring in action, tenacity in purpose, courage in defeat, moderation in victory; in all things faith! [Loud applause.]

It has pleased them to believe and to preach the belief that we are a decadent and degenerate people. They proclaim to the world through their professors that we are a non-heroic nation skulking behind our mahogany counters, while we egg on more gallant races to their destruction. This is a description given of us in Germany—"a timorous, craven nation, trusting to its fleet." I think they are beginning to find their mistake out already, [applause,] and there are half a million young men of Britain who have already registered a vow to their King that they will cross the seas and hurl

that insult to British courage against its perpetrators on the battlefields of France and Germany. We want half a million more; and we shall get them. [Loud applause.]

Wales must continue doing her duty. That was a great telegram that you, my Lord, read from Glamorgan. ["Hear, hear!"] I should like to see a Welsh Army in the field. [Loud applause.] I should like to see the race that faced the Norman for hundreds of years in a struggle for freedom, the race that helped to win Crécy, the race that fought for a generation under Glendower against the greatest Captain in Europe—I should like to see that race give a good taste of its quality in this struggle in Europe; and they are going to do it.

The Sacrifice

I envy you young people your opportunity. They have put up the age limit for the army, but I am sorry to say I have marched a good many years even beyond that. It is a great opportunity, an opportunity that only comes once in many centuries to the children of men. For most generations sacrifice comes in drab and weariness of spirit. It comes to you today, and it comes today to us all, in the form of the glow and thrill of a great movement for liberty, that impels millions throughout Europe to the same noble end. [Applause.] It is a great war for the emancipation of Europe from the thralldom of a military caste which has thrown its shadows upon two generations of men, and is now plunging the world into a welter of bloodshed and death. Some have already given their lives. There are some who have given more than their own lives; they have given the lives of those who are dear to them. I honor their courage, and may God be their comfort and their strength. But their reward is at hand; those who have fallen have died consecrated deaths. They have taken their part in the making of a new Europe—a new world. I can see signs of its coming in the glare of the battlefield.

The people will gain more by this struggle in all lands than they comprehend at the present moment. ["Hear, hear!"] It is true they will be free of

the greatest menace to their freedom. That is not all. There is something infinitely greater and more enduring which is emerging already out of this great conflict—a new patriotism, richer, nobler, and more exalted than the old. [Applause.] I see among all classes, high and low, shedding themselves of selfishness, a new recognition that the honor of the country does not depend merely on the maintenance of its glory in the stricken field, but also in protecting its homes from distress. ["Hear, hear!"] It is bringing a new outlook for all classes. The great flood of luxury and sloth which had submerged the land is receding, and a new Britain is appearing. We can see for the first time the fundamental things that matter in life, and that have been obscured from our vision by the tropical growth of prosperity. ["Hear, hear!"]

"The Vision"

May I tell you in a simple parable what I think this war is doing for us? I know a valley in North Wales, between the mountains and the sea. It is a beautiful valley, snug, comfortable, sheltered

by the mountains from all the bitter blasts. But it is very enervating, and I remember how the boys were in the habit of climbing the hill above the village to have a glimpse of the great mountains in the distance, and to be stimulated and freshened by the breezes which came from the hilltops, and by the great spectacle of their grandeur. We have been living in a sheltered valley for generations. We have been too comfortable and too indulgent, many, perhaps, too selfish, and the stern hand of fate has scourged us to an elevation where we can see the great everlasting things that matter for a nation—the great peaks we had forgotten, of honor, duty, patriotism, and, clad in glittering white, the great pinnacle of sacrifice pointing like a rugged finger to heaven. We shall descend into the valleys again; but as long as the men and women of this generation last, they will carry in their hearts the image of those great mountain peaks whose foundations are not shaken, though Europe rock and sway in the convulsions of a great war. [Enthusiastic and continued applause.]

Teachings of Gen. von Bernhardi

By Viscount (James) Bryce

London, Oct. 3, 1914.

The present war has had some unexpected consequences. It has called the attention of the world outside of Germany to some amazing doctrines proclaimed there, which strike at the root of all international morality as well as of all international law, and which threaten a return to primitive savagery, when every tribe was wont to plunder and massacre its neighbors.

These doctrines may be found set forth in the widely circulated book of Gen. von Bernhardi, entitled "Germany and the Next War," published in 1911, and professing to be mainly based on the teachings of the famous professor of history, Heinrich von Treitschke. To readers in

other countries, and I trust to most readers in Germany also, they will appear to be an outburst of militarism run mad, a product of a brain intoxicated by love of war and by superheated national self-consciousness.

They would have deserved little notice, much less refutation, but for one deplorable fact, viz., that action has recently been taken by the Government of a great nation (though, as we hope and trust, without the approval of that nation) which is consonant with them and seems to imply belief in their soundness.

Acting on Bernhardi's Doctrines

This fact is the conduct of the German Imperial Government in the violation of

the neutrality of Belgium, which Prussia, as well as Great Britain and France, had solemnly guaranteed by treaty, (made in 1839 and renewed in 1870,) in invading Belgium when she refused to allow her armies to pass, although France, the other belligerent, had explicitly promised not to enter Belgium; and in treating Belgian cities and people against whom she had no cause of quarrel with a harshness unprecedented in the history of modern European warfare.

What are these doctrines? I do not for a moment attribute them to the learned class in Germany, for whom I have profound respect, recognizing their immense services to science and learning; nor to the bulk of the civil administration, a body whose capacity and uprightness are known to all the world, and least of all to the German people generally. That the latter hold no such views appears from Bernhardi's own words, for he repeatedly complains of and deplores the pacific tendencies of his fellow-countrymen.

[Note—See Pp. 10-14 of the English translation and note the phrase: "*Aspirations for peace seem to poison the soul of the German people.*"]

Nevertheless, the fact that the action referred to, which these doctrines seem to have prompted, and which cannot be defended except by them, has been actually taken and has thus brought into this war Great Britain, whose interests and feelings made her desire peace, renders it proper to call attention to them and to all that they involve.

I have certainly no prejudice in the matter, for I have been one of those who for many years labored to promote good relations between the German and English peoples, that ought to be friendly; and that never before had been enemies; and I had hoped and believed till the beginning of August last that between them at least there would be no war, because Belgian neutrality would be respected.

Nor was it only for the sake of Great Britain and Germany that English friends of peace sought to maintain good feeling. We had hoped, as some leading German

statesmen had hoped, that a friendliness with Germany might enable Great Britain, with the co-operation of the United States, our closest friends, to mitigate the long antagonism of Germany and of the French, with whom we were already on good terms, and to so improve their relations as to secure the general peace of Europe.

Into the causes which frustrated these efforts and so suddenly brought on this war I will not enter. Many others have dealt with them; moreover, the facts, at least as we in England see and believe them, and as the documents seem to prove them to be, appear not to be known to the German people, and the motives of the chief actors are not yet fully ascertained.

One thing, however, I can confidently declare: It was neither commercial rivalry nor jealousy of German power that brought Great Britain into the field, nor was there any hatred in the British people for the German people, nor any wish to break their power. The leading political thinkers and historians of England had given hearty sympathy to the efforts made by the German people, from 1815 to 1866 and 1870, to attain political unity, and they had sympathized with the parallel efforts of the Italians. The two nations, German and British, were of kindred race and linked by many ties. To the German people even now we feel no sort of enmity. In both countries there were doubtless some persons who desired war and whose writings, apparently designed to provoke it, did much to misrepresent general national sentiment; but these persons were, as I believe, a small minority in both countries.

So far as Great Britain was concerned, it was the invasion of Belgium that arrested all efforts to avert war and made the friends of peace themselves join in holding that the duty of fulfilling their treaty obligations to a weak State was paramount to every other consideration.

Bernhardi's Praise of War

I return to the doctrines set forth by von Bernhardi and apparently accepted by the military caste to which he belongs. Briefly summed up, they are as

follows—his own words are used except when it becomes necessary to abridge a lengthened argument:

* * * War is in itself a good thing. It is a biological necessity of the first importance. (P. 18.)

* * * The inevitableness, the idealism, the blessing of war as an indispensable and stimulating law of development must be repeatedly emphasized. (P. 37.)

* * * War is the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. Efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily detrimental as soon as they influence politics. (P. 28.)

* * * Fortunately these efforts can never attain their ultimate objects in a world bristling with arms, where healthy egotism still directs the policy of most countries. God will see to it, says Treitschke, that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race. (P. 36.)

* * * Efforts directed toward the abolition of war are not only foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race. (P. 34.)

* * * Courts of arbitration are pernicious delusions. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most disastrous consequences for humanity generally. (P. 34.)

* * * The maintenance of peace never can be or may be the goal of a policy.

* * * Efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in nature where the struggle for existence is eliminated. (P. 35.)

* * * Huge armaments are in themselves desirable. They are the most necessary precondition of our national health. (P. 11.)

* * * The end-all and be-all of a State is power, and he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle with politics, (quoted from Treitschke's "Politik.")

* * * The State's highest moral duty is to increase its power. (Pp. 45, 46.)

* * * The State is justified in making conquests whenever its own advantage seems to require additional territory. (P. 46.)

* * * Self-preservation is the State's highest ideal and justifies whatever action it may take if that action be conducive to that end. The State is the sole judge of the morality of its own action. It is, in fact, above morality, or, in other words, whatever is necessary is moral. Recognized rights (i. e., treaty rights) are never absolute rights; they are of human origin, and, therefore, imperfect and variable. There are conditions in

which they do not correspond to the actual truth of things. In this case infringement of the right appears morally justified. (P. 49.)

* * * In fact, the State is a law unto itself. Weak nations have not the same right to live as powerful and vigorous nations. (P. 34.)

* * * Any action in favor of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and nationality is impossible. (P. 25.)

A Doctrine 2,200 Years Old

These are startling propositions, though propounded as practically axiomatic. They are not new, for twenty-two centuries ago the sophist Thrasymachus in Plato's "Republic" argued—Socrates refuting him—that justice is nothing more than the advantage of the stronger; might is right.

[*Note.—Plato laid down that the end for which the State exists is justice.*]

The most startling among them are (1) denial that there are any duties owed by the State to humanity, except that of imposing its own superior civilization upon as large a part of humanity as possible, and (2) denial of the duty of observing treaties which are only so much paper to modern German writers.

The State is a much more tremendous entity than it is to Englishmen or Americans; it is the supreme power, with a sort of mystic sanctity—a power conceived of, as it were, self-created; a force altogether distinct from and superior to the persons who compose it. But a State is, after all, only so many individuals organized under a Government. It is no wiser, no more righteous than the human beings of whom it consists, and whom it sets up to govern it. If it is right for persons united as citizens into a State to rob and murder for their collective advantage by their collective power, why should it be wicked for citizens, as individuals, to do so? Does their moral responsibility cease when and because they act together? Most legal systems hold that there are acts which one man may lawfully do which become unlawful if done by a number of men conspiring together; but now it would seem that what would be a crime in persons as individuals is high policy for those persons united in a

State. Has the State, then, no morality, no responsibility? Is there no such thing as a common humanity? Are there no duties owed to it? Is there none of that "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" which the framers of the Declaration of Independence recognized? No sense that even the greatest States are amenable to the sentiment of the civilized world?

How Weaker States Are Affected

Let us see how these doctrines affect smaller and weaker States which have hitherto lived in comparative security beside great powers. They will be absolutely at the mercy of the stronger, even if protected by treaties guaranteeing their neutrality and independence. They will not be safe, for treaty obligations are worthless "when they do not correspond to facts," i. e., when the strong power finds that they stand in its way its interests are paramount.

If a State hold valuable minerals, as Sweden has iron, and Belgium coal, and Rumania oil; or if it has abundance of water power, like Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland; or if it holds the mouth of a navigable river, the upper course of which belongs to another nation, a great State may conquer and annex that small State as soon as it finds that it needs minerals or water power or river mouth. It has the power, and power gives right. The interests, sentiments of patriotism, and love of independence of the small people go for nothing. Civilization has turned back upon itself; culture is to expand itself by barbaric force; Governments derive their authority, not from the consent of the governed, but from the weapons of the conqueror; law and morality between nations have vanished. Herodotus tells us that the Scythians worshipped as their god a naked sword; that is the deity to be installed in the place once held by the God of Christianity, the God of righteousness and mercy.

States—mostly despotic States—have sometimes applied parts of this system of doctrine; but none have proclaimed it. The Roman conquerors of the world

were not a scrupulous people, but even they stopped short of these principles; certainly they never set them up as an ideal; neither did those magnificent Teutonic Emperors of the Middle Ages, whose fame Gen. von Bernhardi is fond of recalling. They did not enter Italy as conquerors, claiming her by right of the strongest; they came on the faith of a legal title which, however fantastic it may seem to us today, the Italians themselves, and, indeed, the whole of Latin Christendom, admitted. Dante, the greatest and most patriotic of Italians, welcomed the Emperor Henry VII. into Italy, and wrote a famous book to prove his claims, vindicating them on the ground that he, as heir of Rome, stood for law and right and peace. The noblest title which these Emperors chose to bear was that of Imperator Pacificus.

In the Middle Ages, when men were always fighting, they appreciated the blessings of war much less than does Gen. von Bernhardi, and they valued peace, not war, as a means to civilization and culture. They had not learned in the school of Treitschke that peace means decadence and war is the true civilizing influence.

Great Achievements of Small States

The doctrines above stated are, as I have tried to point out, well calculated to alarm small States which prize their liberty and their individuality, and have been thriving under the safeguard of treaties; but there are other considerations affecting those States which ought to appeal to men in all countries, to strong nations as well as to weak nations.

The small States whose absorption is now threatened have been a potent and useful—perhaps the most potent and useful—factor in the advance of civilization. It is in them and by them that most of what is most precious in religion, in philosophy, in literature, in science, and in art has been produced.

The first great thoughts that brought man into true relation with God came from a tiny people inhabiting a country smaller than Denmark. The religions of mighty Babylon and populous Egypt

have vanished; the religion of Israel remains in its earlier as well as in that later form which has overspread the world.

The Greeks were a small people, not united in one great State, but scattered over coasts and among hills in petty city communities, each with its own life. Slender in numbers, but eager, versatile, and intense, they gave us the richest, most varied, and most stimulating of all literatures.

When poetry and art reappeared after the long night of the Dark Ages, their most splendid blossoms flowered in the small republics of Italy.

In modern Europe what do we not owe to little Switzerland, lighting the torch of freedom 600 years ago and keeping it alight through all the centuries when despotic monarchies held the rest of the European Continent? And what to free Holland, with her great men of learning and her painters surpassing those of all other countries save Italy?

So the small Scandinavian nations have given to the world famous men of science, from Linnaeus downward; poets like Tegner and Björnson; scholars like Madvig; dauntless explorers like Fridtjof Nansen.

Culture Decayed in Imperial Rome

England had in the age of Shakespeare, Bacon, and Milton a population little larger than that of Bulgaria to-day. The United States in the days of Washington and Franklin and Jefferson and Hamilton and Marshall counted fewer inhabitants than Denmark or Greece. In the most brilliant generations of German literature and thought, the age of Kant and Lessing and Goethe, of Hegel and Schiller and Fichte, there was no real German State at all, but a congeries of principalities and free cities—independent centres of intellectual life in which letters and science produced a richer crop than the two succeeding generations have raised, just as Great Britain also, with eight times the population of the year 1600, has had no more Shakespeares or Miltons.

No fiction is more palpably contra-

dicted by history than that relied on by the school to which von Bernhardt belongs—that culture, literary, scientific, and artistic, flourishes best in great military States. The decay of art and literature in the Roman world began just when Rome's military power had made that world one great and ordered State. The opposite view would be much nearer the truth, though one must admit that no general theory regarding the relations of art and letters to Governments and political conditions has ever yet been proved to be sound.

[*Note—Gen. von Bernhardt's knowledge of current history may be estimated by the fact that he assumes (1) that trade rivalry makes war probable between Great Britain and the United States; (2) that he believes that the Indian Princes and peoples are likely to revolt against Great Britain should she be involved in war, and (3) that he expects her self-governing colonies to take such an opportunity of severing their connection with her.*]

The world is already too uniform and is becoming more uniform every day. A few leading languages, a few forms of civilization, a few types of character, are spreading out from the seven or eight greatest States and extinguishing weaker languages, forms, and types. Although great States are stronger and more populous, their peoples are not necessarily more gifted, and the extinction of the minor languages and types would be a misfortune for the world's future development.

We may not be able to arrest the forces which seem to be making for that extinction, but we certainly ought not strengthen them. Rather we ought to maintain and defend the smaller States and to favor the rise and growth of new peoples. Not merely because they were delivered from the tyranny of Sultans like Abdul Hamid did the intellect of Europe welcome the successively won liberations of Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro; it was also in the hope that those countries would in time develop out of their present crude conditions new types of culture, new centres of productive intellectual life.

Gen. von Bernhardi invokes history as the ultimate court of appeal. He appeals to Caesar; to Caesar let him go. "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht," ("World history is world tribunal.") History declares that no nation, however great, is entitled to try to impose its type of civilization on others. No race, not even the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon, is entitled to claim the leadership of humanity. Each people has in its time contributed something that was distinctively its own, and the world is far richer thereby than if any one race, however gifted, had established its permanent ascendancy.

We of the Anglo-Saxon race do not claim for ourselves, any more than we admit in others, any right to dominate by force or to impose our own type of civilization on less powerful races. Perhaps we have not that assured conviction of its superiority which the school of von Bernhardi expressed for the Teutons of North Germany. We know how much we owe, even within our own islands, to the Celtic race; and, though we must admit that peoples of Anglo-Saxon stock have, like others, made some mistakes and sometimes abused their strength, let it be remembered what have been the latest acts they have done abroad.

Praises American Altruism

The United States have twice withdrawn their troops from Cuba, which they could easily have retained; they have resisted all temptations to annex any part of the territories of Mexico, in which the lives and property of their citizens were for three years in constant danger. So Great Britain also six years ago restored the amplest self-government to two South African republics, having already agreed to the maintenance on equal terms of the Dutch language; and the citizens of those republics, which were in arms against her thirteen years ago, have now spontaneously come forward to support her by arms under the gallant leader who then commanded the Boers; and I may add that one reason why the Princes of India have rallied so promptly and heartily to Great Britain in this war is be-

cause for many years past we have avoided annexing the territories of those Princes, allowing them to adopt heirs when the successors of their own families failed, and leaving to them as much as possible of the ordinary functions of government.

Service the Test of Greatness

It is only vulgar minds that mistake bigness for greatness; for greatness is of the soul, not of the body. In the judgment which history will hereafter pass upon the forty centuries of recorded progress toward civilization that now lie behind us, what are the tests it will apply to determine the true greatness of a people? Not population, not territory, not wealth, not military power; rather will history ask what examples of lofty character and unselfish devotion to honor and duty has a people given? What has it done to increase the volume of knowledge? What thoughts and what ideals of permanent value and unexhausted fertility has it bequeathed to mankind? What works has it produced in poetry, music, and other arts to be an unfailing source of enjoyment to posterity? The small peoples need not fear the application of such tests.

The world advances, not, as the Bernhardi school supposes, only or even mainly by fighting; it advances mainly by thinking and by the process of reciprocal teaching and learning; by the continuous and unconscious co-operation of all its strongest and finest minds. Each race—Hellenic, Italic, Celtic, Teutonic, Iberian, Slavonic—has something to give, each something to learn; and when their blood is blended the mixed stock may combine gifts of both. Most progressive races have been those who combined willingness to learn with strength, which enabled them to receive without loss to their own quality, retaining their primal vigor, but entering into the labors of others, as the Teutons who settled within the dominions of Rome profited by the lessons of the old civilization.

Let me disclaim once more before I close any intention to attribute to the German people the principles set forth by the school of Treitschke and Bern-

hardi—the school which teaches hatred of peace and arbitration, disregard of treaty obligations, scorn for weaker peoples. We in England would feel even deeper sadness than weighs upon us now if we could suppose that such principles had been embraced by the nation whose thinkers have done so much for human progress and who have produced so many shining examples of Christian saintliness; but when those principles have been ostentatiously proclaimed, when a peaceful neutral country which the other belligerent had solemnly and repeatedly undertaken to respect has been invaded and treated as Belgium has been treated, and when attempts are made to justify these deeds as incidental to a campaign for civilization and culture, it becomes necessary to point out how untrue and how pernicious such principles are.

Most Wars Needless and Unjust

What are the teachings of history to which Gen. Bernhardi is fond of appealing? That war has been the constant handmaid of tyranny and the source of more than half the miseries of man; that, although some wars have been necessary and have given occasion for a display of splendid heroism—wars of defense against aggression or to succor the oppressed—most wars have been needless or unjust; that the mark of an advancing civilization has been the substitution of friendship for hatred and of peaceful for warlike ideals; that small peoples have done and can do as much for the common good of humanity as large peoples; that treaties must be observed, (for what are they but records of national faith, solemnly pledged, and what could bring mankind more surely and swiftly back to that reign of vio-

lence and terror from which it has been slowly rising for the last ten centuries than the destruction of trust in the plighted faith of nations?)

No event has brought out that essential unity which now exists in the world so forcibly as this war has done, for no event has ever so affected every part of the world. Four continents are involved, the whole of the Old World, and the New World suffers grievously in its trade, industry, and finances. Thus the whole world is interested in preventing the recurrence of such a calamity, and there is a general feeling throughout the world that the causes which have brought it upon us must be removed.

We are told that armaments must be reduced; that the baleful spirit of militarism must be quenched; that peoples must everywhere be admitted to a fuller share in the control of foreign policy; that efforts must be made to establish a sort of league of concord—some system of international relations and reciprocal peace alliances by which weaker nations may be protected and under which differences between nations may be adjusted by courts of arbitration and conciliation of wider scope than those that now exist.

All these things are desirable, but no scheme for preventing future wars will have any chance of success unless it rests upon the assurance that the States which enter into it will loyally and steadfastly abide by it, and that each and all of them will join in coercing by their overwhelming united strength any State which may disregard obligations it has undertaken. The faith of treaties is the only solid foundation on which the temple of peace can be built up.

JAMES BRYCE.

Entrance of France Into War

By President Poincaré and Premier Viviani

*Proclamation Issued to the People of
France by President Poincaré,
Paris, Aug. 1*

For some days the condition of Europe has become considerably more serious in spite of the efforts of diplomacy. The horizon has become darkened.

At this hour most of the nations have mobilized their forces.

Some countries, even though protected by neutrality, have thought it right to take this step as a precaution.

Some powers, whose constitutional and military laws do not resemble our own, have without issuing a decree of mobilization begun and continued preparations which are in reality equivalent to mobilization and which are nothing more or less than an anticipation of it (*qui n'en sont que l'exécution anticipée*).

France, who has always declared her pacific intentions, and who has at the darkest hours (*dans des heures tragiques*) given to Europe counsels of moderation and a living example of prudence (*sagesse*), who has multiplied her efforts for the maintenance of the world's peace, has herself prepared for all eventualities and has taken from this moment the first indispensable measures for the safety of her territory.

But our legislation does not allow us to complete these preparations without a decree of mobilization.

Careful of its responsibility and realizing that it would be failing in a sacred task to leave things as they were, the Government has issued the decree which the situation demands.

Mobilization is not war. In the present circumstances it appears, on the contrary, to be the best means of assuring peace with honor.

Strong in its ardent desire to arrive at a peaceful solution of the crisis, the Government, protected by such precautions as are necessary, will continue its

diplomatic efforts, and it still hopes to succeed.

It relies upon the calm of this noble nation not to give rein to emotions which are not justified. It relies upon the patriotism of all Frenchmen, and it knows that there is not one who is not ready to do his duty.

At this moment parties no longer exist; there remains only France, the eternal, the pacific, the resolute. There remains only the fatherland of right and of justice, entirely united in calm vigilance and dignity.

NEUTRALIZED STATE RESPECTED

*Telegram from M. Viviani, French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Ministry in Luxembourg, Published
Aug. 3*

Please declare to the President of the Council that, in accordance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Republic intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, as it has shown by its attitude. The violation of this neutrality by Germany is, however, of a nature which compels France to take henceforth the measures in this respect required by her defense and interests.

The Prime Minister of Luxembourg has protested to the German Government, and has brought this protest to the notice of the German Embassy in Paris, stating the following facts:

On Sunday, Aug. 2, early in the morning, the Germans entered Luxembourg territory by the bridges of Wasserbourg (?) and Remleh, proceeding toward the south of the country and Luxembourg, its capital. They have also brought toward this point armored trains, with troops and munitions of war. Further,

the special French Commissioner at Petitcroix has announced to the Sûreté Générale that the Germans have just opened fire on the frontier station of Delle-Petitcroix. Two German cavalry officers have just been killed at Roncray and Boxson, ten kilometers on our side of the frontier.

THE NATION IN ARMS

Address to the French Parliament by President Poincaré, Aug. 4

Our nation is in arms and trembling with eagerness to defend the land of our fathers.

France is faithfully supported by her ally, Russia. She is upheld by the loyal friendship of England, and, already, from all points of the civilized world, go out to her expressions of sympathy and goodwill, for she represents today, once again before the universe, liberty, justice, and reason.

Lift up your hearts! Long live France!

POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC

Address of Premier Viviani to the French Senate and House of Deputies, Aug. 4

This speech has been called by M. Jusserand, French Ambassador to the United States, "the chief document printed up to now [Nov. 1] in which the French situation, with reference to the present war, has been expounded."

Gentlemen, the German Ambassador left Paris yesterday, after having notified us of the existence of a state of war.

The Government is in duty bound to give Parliament a truthful recital of the events which, within less than ten days, have brought about war in Europe and obliged France, peaceful and strong, to defend her frontier against an attack the premeditated suddenness of which emphasizes its odious injustice.

This attack, entirely inexcusable and begun before any declaration of war notified us of it, is the last act in a

plan whose origin and aim I intend to lay bare before our republic and before civilized public opinion.

After the abominable crime which cost the lives of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and of the Duchess of Hohenberg, trouble arose between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade.

Most of the great powers were not informed of this except semi-officially up to Friday, the 24th day of July, on which day the Ambassadors of Austria-Hungary sent them a circular note, which has been published in the newspapers.

The object of this note was to explain and justify an ultimatum sent the evening before to Serbia, through the Austrian Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum asserted that a number of Servian subjects and associations were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, and implied that members of the Servian Government themselves were not without complicity in it. It demanded a reply from Serbia, giving Saturday, July 25, at 6 in the evening, as the time limit.

Austria Amazes Allies

The reparations demanded, or, at least, some among them, unquestionably were derogatory to the rights of a sovereign nation. But in spite of their extreme character Serbia, on July 25, declared that she submitted to them almost without a reservation of any sort.

The advice transmitted by France, Russia, and Great Britain from the very first to Belgrade was not without its effect in bringing about this submission, which was a success for Austria-Hungary and likewise a guarantee toward the maintenance of European peace.

This advice was all the more valuable in view of the fact that Austria-Hungary's demands had been inadequately foreshadowed to the Governments of the Triple Entente, to whom, during the three preceding weeks, the Austro-Hungarian Government had repeatedly given assurances that its demands would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with justified astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg, and London heard, on July 26, that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after an examination lasting only a few minutes, had declared the Servian reply unacceptable and broken off diplomatic relations.

Germany the Stumbling Block

This astonishment was rendered greater by the fact that, on Friday, the 21st, the German Ambassador had visited the French Minister of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of reading to him a note to the effect that the Austro-Servian dispute should be localized and not made the subject of intervention by the great powers, and that, unless such were the case, "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. Like action was taken on Saturday, the 25th, at London and St. Petersburg.

Is it necessary, gentlemen, to point out to you the difference between the menacing methods employed by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments of which the powers of the Triple Entente had just given proof by their advice to Servia to submit?

Nevertheless, passing over the abnormal character of the German action, we, in conjunction with our allies and friends, immediately instituted measures of conciliation and invited Germany to take part in them.

From the very first we were chagrined to find that our acts and efforts found no echo at Berlin.

Not only did Germany seem unwilling to give Austria-Hungary the amicable advice which her situation authorized her to give, but, from that very time and even more in the ensuing days, she seemed to place herself between the Vienna Cabinet and the propositions of a compromise emanating from the other powers.

On Tuesday, July 28, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. This declaration of war, complicating forty-eight hours after the situation brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations,

lent color to the assumption that there had been a premeditated plan to make war, a systematic programme for the subjugation of Servia.

Thus not only the independence of a brave nation became involved, but also the balance of power in the Balkans, set forth in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, and sanctioned by the moral adhesion of all the great powers.

Notwithstanding, at the suggestion of the British Government, always interested in the most steadfast manner in the maintenance of European peace, the negotiations continued, or, to be more exact, the powers constituting the Triple Entente tried to continue them.

To their common desire was due the proposition for quadruple action, viz., by England, France, Germany, and Italy, with the object of assuring to Austria all legitimate reparation and bringing about an equitable arrangement of the difficulty. On Wednesday, the 24th, the Russian Government, noting the persistent blocking of these attempts, Austria's mobilization and her declaration of war, and fearing that Servia would be crushed by military force, decided, as a preventive measure, to mobilize her troops in four military zones, namely, only those stationed along the Austro-Hungarian frontier.

In doing this it took care to notify the German Government that this step, limited in character and not constituting an offensive move against Austria, was not in any way directed against Germany.

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs showed no objection to recognizing this.

Germany Becomes Warlike

On the other hand, all the attempts of Great Britain, backed by Russia and with the support of France, for establishing contact between Austria and Servia under the moral auspices of Europe, were met in Berlin by a premeditated negative attitude, the existence of which is absolutely proved by the diplomatic communications.

This made a troublous state of affairs which pointed to the existence at Berlin of certain mental reservations. A few hours later these suppositions and fears were destined to be changed into certainties.

For the negative attitude of Germany was transformed thirty-six hours later into truly alarming initiative. On July 31, Germany, by declaring a state of war, cut off the communication between herself and the rest of Europe, and gave herself perfect freedom to make military preparations against France, in complete secrecy, which nothing, as you have seen, could justify.

During several days and under conditions difficult to explain Germany had been preparing to change her army from a peace to a war footing.

From July 25 in the morning, that is even before the expiration of the time limit set Serbia by Austria, she had brought to their full strength the garrisons in Alsace-Lorraine. On the same day she had placed the works close to the frontier in a state of effective armament. On the 26th she had prescribed for the railroads the preparatory measures for concentration. On the 27th she had made requisitions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th the summoning of individual reservists began, including those distant from the frontier.

Could we be left in doubt as to Germany's intentions after her taking all these measures with relentless thoroughness?

France Forced to Act

This, then, was the situation when, on July 31, in the evening, the German Government, which had not taken any positive part since the 24th in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, sent to the Russian Government an ultimatum alleging that Russia had ordered the general mobilization of her armies, and demanding the cessation of this mobilization within twelve hours.

This demand, all the more offensive as to form when it is borne in mind that a few hours earlier Emperor Nicholas,

actuated by a spontaneous feeling of confidence, had asked the German Emperor to mediate, was made at the moment when, at the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government was accepting a proposition of a kind calculated to bring about an amicable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by means of the simultaneous cessation of military operations and preparations.

On the same day there were added to this unfriendly step toward Russia acts of distinct hostility toward France; rupture of communications by roads, railways, telegraph, and telephone, seizure of French locomotives upon arrival at the frontier, placing of rapid-fire guns in the middle of railway lines which had been torn up, and concentration of troops on our frontier.

From that moment it was impossible for us to believe any longer the sincerity of the pacific protestations which the representative of Germany continued to lavish upon us.

We were aware that, under the shelter of the declaration of a state of war which Germany had made, she was mobilizing.

We learned that six classes of reservists had been summoned and that concentration of army corps was under way, even of those corps stationed a long distance from the frontier.

In proportion as these events developed, the Government, alert and vigilant, took day by day, even hour by hour, the precautionary measures made necessary by the situation; general mobilization of our land and sea forces was ordered.

The same evening, at 7:30, Germany, ignoring the acceptance by the St. Petersburg Cabinet of the English proposition to which I have already referred, declared war upon Russia.

Denies Hostile Acts by French

The next day, Sunday, Aug. 2, despite the extreme moderation of France and the pacific statements of the German Ambassador in Paris, and scorning the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867 guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, of which Prussia was a signatory, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy, thus evoking a protest from the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, even the neutrality of Belgium was menaced. On the evening of Aug. 2 the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum demanding that military operations against France be facilitated by Belgium under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us.

The Belgian Government refused, announcing that it had resolved to defend energetically its neutrality respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, especially by the King of Prussia.

Since then, gentlemen, acts of aggression have been repeated, multiplied, and accentuated. Our frontier has been crossed at more than fifteen places. Rifle shots have been fired at our soldiers and customs officials. There have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Lunéville.

The German Ambassador, to whom, as well as to the other great powers, we communicated these acts did not deny them, nor even express regret. On the contrary, he came to me yesterday evening to ask for his passport and notify us of the existence of a state of war, alleging without justification hostile acts committed by French aviators on German territory in the Eiffel region, and even on the railway from Karlsruhe to Nuremberg. Here is the letter on this subject which he handed to me:

Mr. President: German civil and military authorities have taken note of a certain number of acts of a hostile character committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of the latter have clearly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that nation. One tried to destroy buildings near Wesel, others were seen over the Eiffel region, another threw bombs on the railway line between Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I have been charged with informing your Excellency, and now have the honor

of doing so, that in view of these acts of aggression the German Empire now considers itself in a state of war with France as a result of the acts of the latter power.

I have at the same time the honor of bringing to your Excellency's knowledge that the German authorities will detain French merchant vessels in German ports, but will release them if within forty-eight hours complete reciprocity is assured.

My diplomatic mission having terminated, all that remains for me to do is to request your Excellency to provide me with my passports and take whatever measures your Excellency may deem necessary to effect my return to Germany with the personnel of the embassy and of the Bavarian Legation and the Consulate General of Germany at Paris.

With sentiments of my highest consideration.
SCHOEN.

Is it necessary, gentlemen, that I should call attention to the absurdity of the pretexts brought forward as grievances? Never at any time has any French aviator gone into Belgium; no French aviator has committed an act of hostility either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany. European public opinion has already done justice to these miserable inventions.

We immediately took all needed steps against this attack, which violates all laws of equity and rules of public law. The carrying out of these is progressing with thorough system and absolute calm.

The mobilization of the Russian Army is also being continued with remarkable energy and boundless enthusiasm.

The Belgian Army, mobilized up to 250,000 men, is preparing with magnificent spirit to defend the neutrality and independence of its country.

The English fleet is entirely mobilized, and the order has been given for the mobilization of the land forces.

Since 1912 there have been consultations between the English and French General Staffs. These had resulted in an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State made these known yesterday in the House of Commons, and, in accordance with the wishes of the British Government, I shall have the honor of reading these two documents to this Parliament:

London, Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My Dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

M. PAUL CAMBON TO SIR EDWARD GREY.

London, Nov. 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward: You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22d November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event

of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

Government's Acts Beyond Reproach

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke of France, amid the applause of the members, in lofty and impassioned words, which have already elicited genuine response from all French hearts.

In the name of the Government of the Republic I wish, from this rostrum, to thank the British Government for the cordiality of its words, and the French Parliament will join me in this.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made this declaration particularly:

That in case the German fleet entered the Channel or steamed northward in the North Sea to go around the British Isles with the purpose of attacking the French Coast or the French Navy, and to harass the French merchant marine, the English fleet would interfere by giving the French fleet its entire protection, in such manner that from that moment England and Germany would be in a state of war.

Thus, from the present moment, the English fleet is guarding our northern and western coast against German aggression.

Gentlemen, those are the facts. I think that, taken as a close-knit whole, they are sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. Nevertheless, I wish to conclude by giving the true meaning of this unprecedented aggression of which France is the victim.

The victors of 1870, as you know, have felt at various times the desire of renewing the blows which they had dealt us. In 1875 the war for finishing vanquished

France was prevented only by the intervention of the two powers destined to be united to us later by the ties of alliance and friendship—by the intervention of Russia and Great Britain.

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of its strength and the making of diplomatic agreements, invariably lived up to, has succeeded in freeing itself from the yoke which Bismarck had been able to impose upon Europe even in days of peace.

It re-established the European balance of power, that guarantee of the liberty and dignity of each nation.

Gentlemen, I do not know whether I am deceiving myself, but it seems to me that it is this work of pacific reparation, liberation, and dignity, definitely sealed in 1904 and 1907 with the support of King Edward VII. of England and of the royal Government, which the German Empire desires to destroy today by an audacious piece of violence.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

We have made an unprecedented sacrifice to peace by bearing in silence for half a century the wound inflicted by Germany.

We have acquiesced in other sacrifices in all the disputes which, since 1904, imperial diplomacy has systematically provoked either in Morocco or elsewhere, in 1905 as well as in 1906, in 1908 as well as in 1911.

Italy's Attitude

Russia also has given proof of great moderation, both in the events of 1908 and the present crisis. She acted with the same moderation—and the Triple Entente with her—when, in the Eastern crisis of 1912, Austria and Germany formulated against Serbia and Greece demands amenable to discussion, as the result proved.

Useless sacrifices, sterile compromises, futile efforts—today, while actually engaged in efforts at conciliation, we and our allies are suddenly attacked.

Nobody can believe in good faith that we are the aggressors; in vain the sacred principles of law and liberty, which rule

nations as well as individuals, are assailed. Italy, with the clear conscience of Latin genius, has informed us that she will remain neutral.

This decision has aroused the sincerest joy throughout France. I made myself the spokesman of this to the Italian *Changé d'Affaires*, telling him how delighted I was that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and ideals, and a glorious past in common, are not opposed to each other.

What is being attacked, I repeat, gentlemen, is that independence, dignity, and security which the Triple Entente has restored to the balance of power in the service of peace.

What is being attacked are the liberties of Europe, whose defenders France, her allies, and her friends are proud to be.

We shall defend these liberties, for it is they which are in jeopardy; all else is merely a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war. She has done everything to prevent it. But since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany, and against every power which has not as yet announced its position but which should later on take sides with Germany in the war between the two.

A free and strong nation, strengthened by venerable ideals, firmly united in defense of its existence, a democracy which has known how to discipline its military acts, and which did not fear last year to impose upon itself additional military burdens to offset those of neighboring countries, an armed nation fighting for its own life and for the independence of Europe—that is the spectacle which we are proud to show the witnesses of this formidable struggle, which has been in preparation for some days amid methodical quiet.

We are without reproach. We shall be without fear.

France has often proved, under less favorable conditions, that she is the most formidable adversary when she fights, as she now does, for liberty and right.

In placing our acts before you, gentlemen, who are our judges, we have the

comfort of a clear conscience and the certainty of having done our duty to help us bear the weight of our heavy responsibility.

BEFORE THE MARNE BATTLE

Proclamation by the Government Announcing Transfer of Capital to Bordeaux, Sept. 3

People of France: For several weeks relentless battles have engaged our heroic troops and the army of the enemy. The valor of our soldiers has won for them, at several points, marked advantages; but in the north the pressure of the German forces has compelled us to fall back.

This situation has compelled the President of the Republic and the Government to take a painful decision.

In order to watch over the national welfare it is the duty of the public powers to remove themselves temporarily from the City of Paris.

Under the command of an eminent chief, a French Army, full of courage and zeal, will defend the capital and its patriotic population against the invader.

But the war must be carried on at the same time on the rest of its territory.

Without peace or truce, without cessation or faltering, the struggle for the honor of the nation and the reparation of violated right must continue.

None of our armies is impaired. If some of them have sustained very considerable losses, the gaps have immediately been filled up from the reserves, and the appeal for recruits assures us of new reserves in men and energy tomorrow.

Endure and fight! Such must be the motto of the allied British, Russian, Belgian and French Armies.

Endure and fight, while at sea the British aid us, cutting the communication of our enemy with the world.

Endure and fight, while the Russians continue to advance to strike the decisive blow at the heart of the German Empire.

It is the duty of the Government of the republic to direct this stubborn resistance.

Everywhere Frenchmen will rise for their independence; but to insure the utmost spirit and efficacy in the formidable fight it is indispensable that the Government shall remain free to act. At the request of the military authorities, the Government is therefore temporarily transferring its headquarters to a place where it can remain in constant touch with the whole of the country.

It requests members of Parliament not to remain away from it, in order that they may form, with their colleagues, a bond of national unity.

The Government only leaves Paris after having assured the defense of the city and of the intrenched camp by every means in its power.

It knows that, it does not need to recommend to the admirable population of Paris that calm, resolution and coolness which it is showing every day, and which is on a level with its highest traditions.

People of France, let us all be worthy of these tragic circumstances. We shall gain the final victory; we shall gain it by unflagging will, endurance, and tenacity.

A nation which refuses to perish, and which, in order to live, does not flinch either from suffering or sacrifice, is sure of victory.

The manifesto is signed by President Poincaré and all the Ministers.

Russia to Her Enemy

The Slav Emperor Announces New Policies

*Pledge of Czar Nicholas II. to Russia's
Statesmen and Soldiers, in Winter
Palace, St. Petersburg,
Aug. 2, 1914*

War has been forced upon us. I hereby take a solemn pledge not to conclude peace so long as a single enemy remains on Russian soil.

I wish godspeed to my soldiers represented here by the St. Petersburg military district, and I am sure that they will fully justify my confidence in them.

A MANIFESTO

*Czar Outlines Events Leading to War,
St. Petersburg, Aug. 3*

By the grace of God, we, Nicholas II., Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, King of Poland, and Grand Duke of Finland, &c., to all our faithful subjects make known that Russia, related by faith and blood to the Slav peoples and faithful to her historical traditions, has never regarded their fates with indifference.

But the fraternal sentiments of the Russian people for the Slavs have been awakened with perfect unanimity and extraordinary force in these last few days, when Austria-Hungary knowingly addressed to Servia claims unacceptable for an independent State.

Having paid no attention to the pacific and conciliatory reply of the Servian Government and having rejected the benevolent intervention of Russia, Austria-Hungary made haste to proceed to an armed attack, and began to bombard Belgrade, an open place.

Forced by the situation thus created to take necessary measures of precaution, we ordered the army and the navy put on a war footing, at the same time using every endeavor to obtain a peaceful solution. Pourparlers were begun amid friendly relations with Germany and her

ally, Austria, for the blood and the property of our subjects were dear to us.

Contrary to our hopes in our good neighborly relations of long date, and disregarding our assurances that the mobilization measures taken were in pursuance of no object hostile to her, Germany demanded their immediate cessation. Being rebuffed in this demand, Germany suddenly declared war on Russia.

Today it is not only the protection of a country related to us and unjustly attacked that must be accorded, but we must safeguard the honor, the dignity, and the integrity of Russia and her position among the great powers.

We believe unshakably that all our faithful subjects will rise with unanimity and devotion for the defense of Russian soil; that internal discord will be forgotten in this threatening hour; that the unity of the Emperor with his people will become still more close, and that Russia, rising like one man, will repulse the insolent attack of the enemy.

With a profound faith in the justice of our work, and with a humble hope in omnipotent Providence in prayer, we call God's blessing on holy Russia and her valiant troops. NICHOLAS.

CZAR AT THE KREMLIN

*Response to Deputies of Moscow,
Aug. 18*

At this stormy, warlike hour, which, suddenly and against my wishes, has fallen upon my peaceful people, I seek, according to the custom of my ancestors, to strengthen the forces of my soul in the sanctuaries of Moscow.

Within the walls of the old Kremlin I greet in you, inhabitants of Moscow, my beloved ancient capital, all my people, who everywhere, in the villages of their

birth, in the Duma, and in the Council of the Empire, unanimously replied to my appeal and rose with vigor throughout the country, forgetting all private differences, to defend the land of their birth and the Slav race.

In a powerful common impulse all nationalities, all tribes of our vast empire, have united. Russia, like myself, will never forget these historic days.

This union of thought and sentiment in all my people affords me deep consolation and a calm assurance for the future. From here, from the heart of the Russian land, I send a warm greeting to my gallant troops and to our brave allies who are making common cause with us to safeguard the downtrodden principles of peace and truth. May God be with us.

APPEAL TO THE POLES

By Grand Duke Nicholas, Generalissimo of the Russian Forces, St. Petersburg, Aug. 15

Poles: The hour has sounded when the sacred dream of your fathers and your grandfathers may be realized. A century and a half has passed since the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but the soul of the country is not dead. It continues to live, inspired by the hope that there will come for the Polish people an hour of resurrection, and of fraternal reconciliation with Great Russia. The Russian Army brings you the solemn news of this reconciliation which obliterates the frontiers dividing the Polish peoples, which it unites conjointly under the sceptre of the Russian Czar. Under this sceptre Poland will be born again, free in her religion and her language. Russian autonomy only expects from you the same respect for the rights of those nationalities to which history has bound you. With open heart and brotherly hand Great Russia advances to meet you. She believes that the sword with which she struck down her enemies at Grünwald is not yet rusted. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the Russian

armies are marching. The dawn of a new life is beginning for you, and in this glorious dawn is seen the sign of the cross, the symbol of suffering and of the resurrection of peoples.

THE POLISH RESPONSE

Statement Issued by Four Political Parties, Aug. 16

The representatives of the undersigned political parties, assembled in Warsaw on the 16th of August, 1914, welcome the Proclamation issued to the Poles by his Imperial Highness the Commander in Chief of the Russian forces as an act of the foremost historical importance, and implicitly believe that upon the termination of the war the promises uttered in that proclamation will be formally fulfilled, that the dreams of their fathers and forefathers will be realized, that Poland's body, torn asunder a century and a half ago, will once again be made whole, that the frontiers severing the Polish Nation will vanish.

The blood of Poland's sons, shed in united combat against the Germans, will serve equally as a sacrifice, offered upon the altar of her resurrection.

THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PARTY.

THE POLISH PROGRESSIVE PARTY.

THE REALIST PARTY.

THE POLISH PROGRESSIVE UNION.

NO ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY

Editorial Appeal in the Gazeta Warszawska, Aug. 15

Fellow-countrymen! A danger threatens us, greatest, perhaps, among the many calamities which war brings to a country; the misdirection of the nation's mind and understanding.

Various instigations are pressing the Poles to go against their own instinct and the dictates of political reason in their attitude toward the armies now invading our Polish lands, armies ringing with German words of command,

which even resound through Galician detachments lured into belief that Poland may be saved through alliance with the Germans. Various agitators on both the German and Austrian sides, having their own interests at stake, are seeking to make our people take active part in the terrific conflicts now to be fought out upon our soil.

To attain this end by throwing dust into our eyes, various manifestos signed by the leaders of the armies beyond the frontier have promised the Poles extensive liberties and privileges at the close of the war. Certain Polish organizations having lost, in the general excitement, their healthy sense of judgment, are doing likewise. Do not let yourselves be hoodwinked by these promises. They are lies. Neither of the invading armies has any intention of fighting for Poland's sake. Each is fighting in the interests of its own empire, and to those empires we are of no account. They only want, in a moment of necessity, to make the Poles passive instruments serving their own ends. Whoever tells you that Austria in alliance with Prussia intends to build up Poland once again is a blinded dreamer. The result of a victory for the Germans and Austrians would mean a new partitioning of Poland, a yet greater wreckage of our nation. Grasp this, listen to no seducers. Remain passive, watchful, insensible to temptation.

During the coming struggle the Kingdom of Poland will be the marching ground of various armies, we shall see temporary victors assuming lordship for a while; but change of authority will follow, and inevitable retaliation; this several times, perhaps, in the course of the campaign. Therefore every improvident step will meet with terrible revenge. By holding firm through the present conflict you best can serve the Polish cause. In the name of the love you bear your country, of your solicitude for the nation's future, we entreat you, fellow-countrymen, to remain deaf to evil inspirations, unshakable in your determination not to expose our land to yet greater calamities, and Poland's whole future incalculable perils.

POLISH AMERICAN OPINION

By Kazimirz Jaworowski, Manager Polish National Alliance, New York, Aug. 16

The Poles are treated better in Russia now than they are in Germany. Although Russia has done its best to Russianize Poland by crushing the Polish national feeling, imprisoning Polish patriots, and attempting even to suppress the Polish language, Germany has gone still further in its efforts to Germanize its Polish territory.

Bismarck's idea was to force German civilization upon the world and the most extreme measures have been taken to enforce this policy in German Poland. Taking advantage of every possible pretext, the Germans have dispossessed the Germans. The Russians have not gone so far as this. They, as a general rule, have allowed the Poles to keep their land.

For my own part, I would do anything to defeat Germany, and I think the Poles of Germany and Austria for the most part wish to see France and Russia successful. The Poles are Slavs. The fight is between the Germans and the Slavs.

I hope that if the Czar is successful he carries out his promise to reunite Poland and grant it autonomy. That would not mean Poland would be free, but it would enjoy more freedom than now. The Czar would be the King of Poland and the Government of Poland undoubtedly would be carried on largely by men appointed by the Czar. However, if Poland got the right to have a share in its Government, even if the Czar remained supreme, the country would be greatly benefited.

Autonomy would mean that efforts to suppress the Polish language, the Polish national spirit, and the Polish traditions would be at an end. Under a despotic Government in Russia and under more despotic Governments still in Germany and Austria, the Polish race has existed under the most crushing of burdens. Reunited and granted partial liberty and the right to live under fair conditions, it would flourish and again take its place as a great race.

RUSSIA AGAINST GERMANY

*By Prince Eugene Troubetskoi, Ex-Member of the Imperial Cabinet,
St. Petersburg, Aug. 15*

Russia against Germany is an instance of real patriotism against the curse of nationalism. Our people are athrill now, not from hate but from an ardent desire to serve and protect. Our war cry does not result from the ancient pagan conception of the self-sufficiency of the State, but from the desire for the well-being of all men.

Our people are not filled by that fierce and implacable lust for power which leads a nation into the gulf whose depths reach down to hell. With us God is not conceived as merely a tribal deity, but the father of all. Upon these things, upon this supernatural impulse which has now set our people on fire, we rely for victory, and in our victory we expect to see a great step taken in the coming freedom of the world.

DUMA'S MESSAGE TO BRITAIN

*President Rodzianko of the Imperial
Duma's Telegram to the House of
Commons, Aug. 26*

The Duma of the empire, assembled in extraordinary session in view of the exceptional events passing in the civilized world, begs the House of Commons of Great Britain to accept their warm and sincere greeting and sentiments of profound friendship which unite our two great nations. The whole of Russia has welcomed with enthusiasm the resolution of the British people to give their support to the friendly nations in the historic struggle which is developing at this moment. May God bless the armies of the friendly nations of the Triple Entente! Long live his Majesty King George and his valiant people! Long live the British Parliament, and long live Great Britain!

NEW POLICY AND THE JEWS

*Prospects of Equal Civil and Political
Rights*

LONDON, Aug. 18, 1914.

Ever since the Czar's promise of autonomy to Poland reports have been current that the next step likely to be taken by the Russian Government along the same lines of initiative will be a proclamation assuring the Jews of equal civil and political rights. A Paris dispatch today goes the length of stating that such a proclamation is shortly to be issued.

From inquiries made in authoritative quarters THE NEW YORK TIMES is able to state that, while there is no official authority for such a prediction, there is good reason to believe that some measure of reform along the lines indicated is likely. Both in France and England, Russia's reactionary policy is the only element which has aroused any misgivings regarding what it is hoped in the two first-named countries will be the results of the war.

The enthusiasm aroused in France by the decree affecting Poland gives the measure of relief caused by the removal of these misgivings, so far as one section of the non-orthodox subjects of the Czar are concerned. Equal relief would be felt among a large and representative body of the British public were definite action taken by the Russian Government to remove the disabilities under which the Jews in Russia labor. I have authority for stating that steps have been taken to bring this point of view to the attention of the Russian Government.

Officially, the British Government can take no action which could be regarded as an interference with the domestic affairs of a friendly power, and certain overzealous representations which have been made to Sir Edward Grey overshoot the mark. Sir Edward Grey's liberal principles are sufficiently well recognized to make it certain that what he is able to do he is doing to remove all causes for the misgivings with which a good number of his fellow-citizens regard

the Russian alliance in its moral aspect and its possible ultimate developments.

Great hopes are felt that these very delicate representations will meet with success. Predictions are made that the final outcome of the combined grant of autonomy to Poland and the removal of at least some of the civil and religious disqualifications now weighing upon the Jews in Russia will be the growth of a new State, in which the Jew and the Pole will find an equal place in the sun and flourish exceedingly.

WAR ON GERMAN TRADE

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to a Press Correspondent at Petrograd, Sept. 15

The eyes of the world just now are fixed on the fortunes of the armies in the field. It is, perhaps, not spectacular from the point of view of the average newspaper reader to speak at this time of mere business and trade relations. I quite well realize that it is accounts of victories and routs, acts of heroism and magnificent assaults by troops, that sell the newspapers, but beyond and above all this there now exists a situation and an opportunity in trade and commerce with Russia which to England and America may mean more in decades to come than it is easy to realize.

For years past Germany has been steadily and vigorously pushing her trade into all quarters of the Russian Empire, and now sells us above £60,000,000 worth of products yearly. The ground has been broken by Germany, and these enormous markets for machinery, chemicals, and all sorts of manufactured products are now suddenly cut off from the avenues through which they have been supplied. Herein lies the greatest commercial opportunity for England and America that has ever been offered.

It has been said in the *Maxims of Pascal* that to govern is to foresee. This is not only true of politics and affairs of government, but applies as well to trade relations. It is that country which foresees the situation commer-

cially in Russia that will reap the enormous benefits that these markets now offer.

It is not merely sufficient that merchants and manufacturers should offer their goods here. They that would profit permanently by the new trade conditions of this empire must take up the task seriously. Experts should be sent here now, even while the war is still in progress, to study and examine the wants of our country. Our duties, our manner of doing business, our present and future wants and growing demands, should be studied scientifically and fundamentally, so that when peace comes those channels which have for decades flowed deeply with German products may continue to flow with products from America and England.

For America especially does Russia open an opportunity for an industrial outlet such as can hardly be overestimated. We have an empire of 170,000,000 souls, and the £60,000,000 yearly that we have been paying Germany is but the beginning of a demand that will soon make Russia among the most desirable and valuable markets in the world. Railroad building and new developments everywhere are a prelude to an era of prosperity in this country such as has never been seen here before.

I cannot too emphatically express the hope that merchants abroad will realize this wonderful opportunity and act promptly, for when the war is over will come realization of this situation everywhere, and he who would profit should take the first steps with the least possible delay.

FOE TO GERMAN MILITARISM

Statement to Americans by Prince Imeretinsky, Sept. 10

We are a peace-loving people as you in America are, but, of course, the people of Russia are not so well educated as you are.

Russia did not want this war, but she has known for years that it was coming and consequently was preparing for it.

It is her determination, now that it has been brought on by Germany, to see it through, no matter how long it takes or how much it costs.

Russia is waging war against militarism. If continued, this militarism would economically cripple all Europe. The burden is too heavy for people to bear, and Russia means to put an end to militarism as expounded by Germany.

NOT A QUESTION OF SLAV PREDOMINANCE

Statement by Baron Korff, Imperial Russian Vice Consul, New York, Sept. 6

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria at Serajevo, in the light of present conditions, appears to be the pretext which led to the present great European war, involving the Empires of Germany and Russia, the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Belgium, and the Republic of France. It is rather difficult for the average American to find the real causes that have led to this struggle of nations, as they lie solely in the conditions and latest developments of the political life of Middle Europe generally, and Germany and Austria particularly.

In order to ascertain the real cause it will be necessary for me to explain the policy of the above-named two Governments on one side and the evolution of the character of the German Nation on the other side. In glancing at the map of Germany, and particularly her frontiers and geographical position, she being wedged in between two powerful neighbors, Russia in the east and France backed up by England in the west, it is apparent that her situation is very delicate, owing to the lack of marked natural boundaries.

Tremendous military power and highly developed diplomatic ability are the two necessary elements to create friendly relations with her neighbors. After the creation of the great German Empire in 1870, Prince Bismarck succeeded in establishing and maintaining for Germany friendly relations with the other great

powers. It was his policy to acquire colonies for Germany outside of Europe, and to carefully avoid any territorial encroachments on the neighboring States. He sounded his warning to his countrymen not to try to increase German territory at the expense of Russian territory.

Germany's colonial acquisitions created a new era in her policy, and, if I may be permitted to so express myself, changed completely the face of the German Empire. The protection and development of her colonial possessions and her commerce required a strong navy. England's competition of the commerce controlled by Germany started the tremendous growth of England's naval power, and gave Germany second place. Her rivalry with England compelled Germany to increase her army, too, and we observed how from a quiet, inoffensive, modest State Germany gradually became very strong and endeavored to play the first violin in the concert not only of all Europe, but also of the whole world. Such seems to be the fate of all nations that acquire sudden power—they get conceited and aggressive.

The political events of the last ten years prove sufficiently the aggressiveness of the German policy—the events at Agadir, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, the ultimatum sent by the latter to Serbia are only passing instances in the growing conceit of the German policy. It should be remembered that in March, 1909, Chancellor von Bülow announced to the German Reichstag that Germany would support Austria in her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by force, even if the whole of Europe were to oppose it.

Europe at that time did not oppose the Germans, but it seems to me that just then Europe began to realize how dangerous and unsafe it was to have in the heart of that Continent a power with such bellicose and driving intentions. Her political acts were too uncanny and alarmed the whole of Europe, which began to seek ways and means to get rid of this German hegemony, coupled with its rough militarism and unscrupulous ways of acting.

The military and economical developments of Germany induced her to go further in her tendency to enlarge her territory. Emperor William feels that his empire is not big enough to suit his ambition and for the part which he intends to play in Europe. He therefore endeavors to enter into an agreement with the heir of the Austrian throne, Franz Ferdinand, a man of great energy and wide political views, to the effect to mold out of Austria an exclusive Slavish power and to surrender to Germany the Archduchy of Austria with Vienna and Tyrol, and annex Serbia and Austria.

Franz Ferdinand could afford to agree to this plan most readily, because he knew that Austria in her present state could not continue her existence, as she was on the brink of an insurrection of 25,000,000 Austrian Slavs against the continuance of a Government over them of 9,000,000 Austrian Germans. There is no doubt that this question was fully discussed at the conference at Konopish, where the German Emperor, accompanied by Admiral von Tirpitz, went to pay a visit to Franz Ferdinand one month before the latter was assassinated.

The tragedy of Serajevo found Germany after a course of action already had been agreed upon, and the sending of the ultimatum by Austria to Serbia can be explained only by the desire of the two nations to fully complete their preparations.

Now, why do we find at this important moment of the world's history such opposition not only against Germany but also an upheaval of other nations?

The German press of the United States endeavors to prove that the underlying reason for the struggle is the eventual triumph in Europe either of Teutonic or Slavish civilization, and denounces Russian barbarism and extols German culture.

I will not discuss the respective merits of Teutonic and Slavic culture and civilization, as in my opinion these are questions absolutely foreign to the events leading up to the war. The Russian, French, English, and Servian Nations are not fighting against German culture, as

represented by intellectual giants, such as Goethe, Wagner, and many others, but against German militarism, accompanied by systematic oppression of the individual residing in German territory.

This internal German policy created a national spirit against which the Allies now are fighting—the national spirit of Germany, which the whole world knows, and which is rough, conceited, arrogant, and intolerant toward foreigners beyond all measures, and admits nothing good unless it is German or made in Germany. This kind of German national spirit is in the majority in the empire of Germany and particularly in Prussia; the real cultured, good-hearted, sentimental German is about to die out completely, and the few remaining representatives of this type have no voice in Germany.

The pronounced antipathy to the above-described present majority type of Germans united all European nations against Germany, and supports their respective Governments in their efforts to put a stop to the furor teutonicus of the twentieth century.

For this reason the task of the allied Governments will find unlimited support of the nations and this war against Germany in Europe will prove to be most popular.

RUSSIA'S "LITTLE BROTHER"

Statement by George Bakhmeteff, Russian Ambassador to the United States, New York, Oct. 11

It will be a long time, I suppose, before the American will be able fully to understand Russia's reasons for entering the present war and the great racial thought that lies back of it. The whole situation in a nutshell is that Germany entered the war from racial hate and motives of commercial greed, while Russia drew her sword out of motives of humane and kindly sympathy for a small and oppressed nation of her own kindred. Germany had been grabbing and wished to grab more; Russia rose in arms to stand by and protect her "little brother."

Indeed you are quite right when you say that there are spiritual forces back

of Russia's deeds in battle far more than there can be in the case of any other of the warring nations. The reasons lie deep within our national life, and I doubt if any American will be able fully to comprehend them without coming to see us in our own country and seeing us as we are. The great and really wonderful achievements of the German are visible and material, while ours are things of the spirit—invisible, modest, resigned. The representative spirit of Germany's materialism and heartless aggressiveness is that of the megalomaniac Nietzsche and his followers, Treitschke and von Bernhardt. The spokesmen of what is more truly Russian today are Tolstoy and Dos-toievski, who have recorded forever the spirit of self-sacrifice, humility and piety in the Russian soul.

Yes, it is true that those who have learned to know us in Russia are aware that the epithets of "Hun" and "barbarian" used against us are stark lies promulgated by bitter enemies who take ignoble advantage of the tradition in America fostered by the melodramatic

exploitation of the Jewish problem and the occasional brutalities by our drunken soldier to make you believe that a Russian is a sort of treacherous bandit with a knife in his teeth ready to betray and slay. We regret exceedingly that that tradition has taken root in the United States. We admire and emulate Americans because they have mellowed and complemented their industrial and political achievements with national charity and religious ideals.

In Russia the Jewish question, as such, has not arisen since the opening of the war. Political promises have been made to Poland and these promises will be kept. It is a mistaken idea here that any overtures have been made to the Jews as a class. You think we are as anxious as all that to have them enlist as soldiers? No. We do not wish to make them any special inducements to enlist. You are well aware that nobody hates the Jews more cordially than the Pole himself. Our offer was to the Poles, who have a national entity and a country and home of their own. The Jews have none of these things.

"The Facts About Belgium"

Statement Issued by the Belgian Legation at Washington

The Belgian Legation at Washington has compiled the following statement of the Belgian case, in the present European War, in answer to the many inquiries that have been received on the subject:

By the treaty of April 19, 1839, Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between the King of the Belgians and the King of the Netherlands. This treaty provides:

Belgium forms an independent State of perpetual neutrality.

That is to say, Belgium was forbidden, in case of war, to take the part of any of the belligerents.

Since then Belgium has fulfilled all her neutrality obligations; she has acted

in a spirit of absolute impartiality. She has left nothing undone to maintain and make respected her neutrality. Germany's obligation to respect Belgian neutrality was even more emphatically affirmed by one of Germany's greatest men, by the creator of the empire. Prince, then Count, Bismarck wrote to Baron Nothomb, Belgian Minister in Berlin, on the 22nd of July, 1870, as follows:

In confirmation of my verbal assurances, I have the honor to give in writing a declaration which, in view of the treaties in force, is quite superfluous, that the Confederation of the North and its allies will respect the neutrality of Belgium on the understanding, of course, that it is respected by the other belligerents.

On July 31 of the present year the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary General of the Foreign Office had a long conversation with the German Minister in Brussels. It was pointed out to him that in the course of the controversy raised in 1911 by the introduction of the Dutch project for the fortification of the Scheldt that his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, had assured the Belgian Government that in the event of a Franco-German war Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality; that Mr. Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, had given similar assurance; that in 1913 Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, had made similar statements of a reassuring character in the budget committee of the Reichstag concerning the neutrality of Belgium; to which the German Minister replied that he was aware of the conversation with his predecessor, and that "he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that epoch had not changed."

On Aug. 2, in the course of the day, the German Minister in Brussels, M. De Below Saleske, gave an interview to the newspaper *Le Soir*, and declared that Belgium had nothing to fear from Germany. He went so far as to employ this expression:

You will see, perhaps, your neighbor's house on fire, but your house will remain intact.

The same day, at 7 o'clock in the evening, he communicated the following note to the Belgian Government:

The German Note

The German Government has received unimpeachable news to the effect that the French forces have the intention of marching on the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This news leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march upon Germany from Belgian territory. The Imperial Government of Germany cannot help fearing that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, will not be in a position to repulse without help an incursion by the French of such great magnitude. In this case it is sufficiently certain that Germany is seriously threatened. It is the urgent business of Germany to forestall this attack on the part of the enemy. The German Government would be filled with lively regret if Belgium were to regard as an act of hostility against her

the fact that her precautionary measures oblige her to violate on her side Belgian territory.

In order to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government makes the following comment:

1st. Germany contemplates no act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents to assume in the war which is about to commence the attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government on its side engages, when peace is restored, to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and its possessions.

2d. Germany engages herself, on the aforesaid conditions, to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.

3d. If Belgium observes a friendly attitude, Germany is ready, in co-operation with the authorities of the Government of Belgium, to buy for cash everything that is necessary for her troops, and to pay indemnities for damage done in Belgium; but if Belgium behaves in a hostile manner against the troops, and in particular places difficulties in the way of their advance by opposition by the fortifications of the Meuse, or by the destruction of roads, railways, tunnels, or other works, Germany will be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In that case Germany will enter into no agreement with the kingdom, but will allow the further relationship of the two States to be left to the decision of arms. The German Government feels that it is justified in hoping that this eventuality will not materialize and that the Belgian Government will know how to take appropriate measures to prevent its materialization. In that case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring States will become closer and more lasting.

Such is the German note. It will be noticed that there is no question of the alleged entry of French aviators and officers into Belgium, as has been stated in several papers here. The document, in fact, knocks that fable on the head. The only reason given for the violation of Belgian territory is the alleged intention of the French Army to march upon Givet and Namur. This assertion is supported by no proof, and is denied by the French Government, which officially declared to Belgium and England its intention of not violating Belgian territory. On the contrary, the premeditated intention of Germany to violate Belgian neutrality is proved in the most irrefutable way, namely, by the affirmation of the German Secretary of State himself, and by that of the German Chancellor.

To the request of Sir William Goschen, the English Ambassador in Berlin, to be allowed to know if Germany would pledge herself to respect the neutrality of Belgium, the German Secretary of State replied that "this neutrality had already been violated by Germany." Herr von Jagow went again into the

reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death to them, for, if they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of the roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would mean time gained by the Russians for the bringing up of their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was the inexhaustible supply of troops. [Official report of the British Ambassador in Berlin to the British Government.]

"A Scrap of Paper"

This conversation preceded by a few minutes that in which the German Chancellor, giddy at the sight of the abyss into which Germany was falling, uttered these celebrated words:

Just for a word, NEUTRALITY, a word which in wartimes has been so often disregarded; just for A SCRAP OF PAPER, Great Britain is going to make war on a kindred nation. At what price would that compact [neutrality] have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?

Sir William Goschen replied that fear of consequences would hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking a solemn engagement. [Official report of the British Ambassador in Berlin to his Government.]

It is very clear from these documents that Germany had for a long time premeditated the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and that she has even reconciled herself to the terrible danger of war with Great Britain rather than renounce the advantages she thought she would gain by not respecting the treaty. In the face of these confessions the alle-

gations that France wished to violate the neutrality of Belgium, an allegation supported by no proof, falls to the ground.

To continue the analysis of the German note:

If Belgium consents to assume in the war which is about to commence the attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government, on its side, engages, when peace is restored, to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and its possessions.

Could Belgium, without being false to her duties of neutrality, take up the position which the German Government calls "friendly neutrality"? That is to say, could she allow the German armies to pass without opposition through her territory? Can the German Government itself answer that question?

It is enough to reread the conversation given above between the British Ambassador and the German Secretary of State to come to a clear conclusion in that respect. If the violation of Belgian territory was to procure so signal an advantage to Germany that she had no fear of bringing on war with England to attain it, then for Belgium to lend herself to the passage of German troops must have meant the certainty of fatal consequences for France. Thus for Belgium to have yielded to the German ultimatum would *ipso facto* have conferred a considerable advantage to Germany, to the detriment of the other belligerent, and would have constituted a breach of neutrality.

Germany concludes her note by threats. She engages, on the condition already defined, to evacuate Belgian territory at the conclusion of peace. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner [*that is to say, if she does her duty*] Germany will be obliged to consider Belgium as an enemy. She would then leave the ultimate arrangements of the relations of the two States to the decision of arms. In other words, if Belgium does not agree to violate the treaty, Germany will treat her as an enemy, and she adds a veiled threat of annexing a part or the whole of her territory.

The moral fibre of nations is not always measured by their size or power. Belgium is small and weak, but her answer bears witness to her love of justice and to her respect of the right. She would rather die with honor than live dishonored.

That was made clear by the answer of her Government. The answer was as follows:

Reply to German Note

The German note has been a painful surprise to the Belgian Government. The intentions which the note attributes to France are in contradiction to the formal declarations which were made to us on the 1st of August in the name of the republic. Besides, if contrary to our expectations, France is about to violate the neutrality of Belgium, Belgium would be prepared to fulfill its neutrality obligations, and her army would offer to the invader the most vigorous resistance. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, commit to the guarantee of the powers and notably to the Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia the independence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium.

The Chancellor of the German Empire said in a sitting of the Reichstag on the 4th of August:

We are in a state of legitimate defense. *Necessity knows no law.* Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already penetrated into Belgium. This is against the law of nations. France, it is true, has declared to Brussels that she is determined to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her adversary respects it, but we know that France was ready to invade Belgium. France can afford to wait; we cannot. A French attack on our flank in the region of the lower Rhine might have been fatal. It is for that reason we have been compelled to ignore the just protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The *injustice* which we thus commit we will *repair* as soon as our military object has been attained.

It has been shown how much value can be attached to the assertion of the alleged intention of France to invade Belgium. That intention, and the realization of that intention belongs exclusively to Germany, and they must be left in her possession. This is especially the case in view of the fact that the military dispositions undertaken by France absolutely refute the allegations of the Ger-

man Chancellor. So true is this that when the violation of Belgian territory became an accomplished fact, and when the King of Belgium appealed under the terms of the treaty of 1839 for support in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium which these powers had guaranteed, France was so little prepared to invade Belgium that it took her more than ten days to get her troops into the country.

The world is familiar with the way Germany has repaired in Belgium the injustice of which she was guilty, to use the words of the German Chancellor.

Atrocities in Belgium

Under the pretext that her troops were attacked by civilians, and even under no pretext at all, whole villages have been razed to the ground. Important towns whose boast it was to represent part of the common inheritance of civilization were not spared. Their monuments, which have been respected during the centuries in all of the constant wars of which Belgium has been the theatre, were deliberately destroyed. Open cities were bombarded. Exorbitant taxation was imposed upon conquered towns, and when the inhabitants were unable to pay the taxes, a large number of their houses were set on fire. That is what happened to Wavre, among other cities, whose 8,500 inhabitants were unable to pay a tax of \$600,000. Termonde, with 10,000 inhabitants, was utterly destroyed. On the 15th of September, there only remained in that town 282 houses out of 1,400. The town of Aerschot, with 8,000 inhabitants, is now nothing but a mass of ruins and more than 150 of its inhabitants have been shot. Dirigible balloons have thrown bombs at night upon Antwerp. It cannot be maintained by those who were in the balloons that they were trying to hit the forts, as the forts are outside the boundaries of the town, and a good distance outside them as well. Nor could the bombs thrown have had any effect upon the forts, which are even stronger than those of Liège. There was no warning of this bombardment, a fact which constitutes a violation of Article 26 of the Fourth Convention of The Hague, and more than a dozen peo-

ple were killed, all of them noncombatants and several of them women and children.

The town of Louvain, with its 42,000 inhabitants, was one of the centres of Belgian culture. It had no mercy shown to it and has been nearly obliterated. Several quarters of the town were set on fire, the Church of St. Pierre, a marvelous example of Gothic art; the buildings of the University, including the Library with more than 70,000 volumes, of which a large number were ancient manuscripts, the collections belonging to the University; nearly all the scientific institutions, and nearly all the houses of the town were *deliberately* burned. They are now nothing more than heaps of ashes. Their destruction has been a loss to the whole civilized world.

Numbers of absolutely innocent women and children lost their lives in the fire which was started by order of the German military officials. Of those who were saved, several thousand, including women enfeebled by age and children in arms, are today wandering homeless over the roads, without food or clothing. They are not to blame for anything, unless it is because they belong to a nation which has refused to purchase peace at the price of dishonor. That can be the only crime accounted to them, and it is for that they

have lost all their possessions upon the earth.

From the declaration made by the Imperial German Chancellor it may be seen that the German Government is conscious of its wrongdoing. As one of the guarantors of Belgium's neutrality, it wanted to force Belgium to relinquish its neutrality for Germany's benefit. Because Belgium would not consent to this injustice and because Germany could not reproach her with anything else, Germany invaded and covered with blood and ruin a small peaceful country of hard-working and honest people, a country which it had promised to protect.

This attack upon her neutrality is the first violation for which Belgium asks judgment from the universal conscience.

The entire Belgo-German question today is dominated by the fact of this violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Therefore, there is not a single shot fired by a German soldier in Belgium which is not manifestly and avowedly belying most sacred things: the keeping of a solemn pledge, and the right for an honest nation that never wanted war, nor showed aggressive dispositions, to be allowed to live its peaceful and neutral life.

Such is the Belgian case. Humanity will judge it.

Belgo-British Plot Alleged by Germany

A statement issued by German Embassy at Washington, Oct. 13, 1914

The German Ambassador drew special attention today to the telegram which came from German headquarters. This telegram proves the German contention that the Allies did not intend to respect Belgian neutrality. It even proves more, namely, that Belgian neutrality practically did not exist and that the Belgian Government was conspiring with the Allies against Germany. Notwithstanding the denials coming from French sources it is a fact that French prisoners were taken at Liège and Namur, who

acknowledged that they had been in those fortresses before the German troops entered Belgium.

On the French side it has been asserted that the German Chancellor in Parliament had acknowledged that Germany was doing wrong in violating Belgian neutrality. It must, however, not be overlooked that the Chancellor further said:

We know that the Allies do not intend to respect Belgian neutrality, and Germany, in the position she is in, attacked

from three sides, cannot wait, while the Allies can wait.

At that time the Belgian archives were not at the disposal of the German Government. If the Chancellor had known at the time he made his speech that Belgium was not neutral he would certainly have spoken of the alleged Belgian neutrality in a different way.

Germany has violated the frontiers of no really neutral country, while the Allies are on record for disregarding all obligations toward China.

Text of Wireless Message

Headquarters report German military authorities, searching archives of Belgian General Staff at Brussels, found portfolio inscribed "Intervention Anglaise-Belgique," containing important documents:

1. Report to Belgian War Minister, dated April 10, 1906, containing result detailed negotiations between Chief of Belgian General Staff and British Military Attaché at Brussels, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston. Plan of English origin sanctioned by Major Gen. Grierson, Chief English General Staff, contains strength, formation, landing places, expeditionary force 100,000 men; continuing, settles plan Belgian General Staff transport accommodations, feeding in Belgium, Belgian interpreters, gendarmerie, landing places at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne. Details Barnardiston remarks for present Holland cannot be relied upon. Further confidential communication that English Government after destruction of German Navy will direct supply provision via Antwerp. Finally suggestion from England Military Attaché that Belgian espionage service should be organized in Prussian Rheinland.

2. Map showing strategical drawing up of French Army demonstrating existence of French-Belgian agreement.

3. Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister to Berlin, to Belgian Foreign Office, dated Dec. 23, 1911. Greindl, commenting on plan of Belgian General Staff for defense of Belgo-German frontier in Franco-German war, points to threatening violation of neutrality by France, saying: "Danger French attack threatening us, not only near Luxemburg, but on whole length of common frontier. This assertion no guess work, but founded upon positive facts."

Minister further thoroughly discusses Entente's plans for passage through Belgium, Calais, and England. France doubtful protectors, Barnardiston's insinuations

relative Flushing question, both perfidious and naïve postulates dressing plan of battle against threatening Franco-British invasion into Belgium in Franco-German war.

GREAT BRITAIN'S DENIAL

Statement Issued by British Foreign Office, London, Oct. 14

The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906, published in the German press and based on documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a press edition of a story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed, as Germans well know. Gen. Grierson is dead and Col., now Gen., Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tau.

In 1906 Gen. Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office and Col. Barnardiston was Military Attaché at Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Col. Barnardiston, have taken place between Gen. Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British Army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbors violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude toward France with regard to Morocco, and in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agreement of the nature indicated or to any design for violation of Belgian neutrality is clearly shown by reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever

quarter and in whatever form such violation might come. It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other powers are made by Germany who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago.

REPLY TO GREAT BRITAIN

Statement of Count von Bernstorff, German Ambassador, Washington, Oct. 15

Concerning the Anglo-Belgian military agreement existing since 1906, a formal denial has been issued by England, which proves nothing. The documents are in the hands of the German authorities, and will be published in full. The facts remain that a so-called "neutral" country concluded a military agreement with England, which provided for landing of British troops in this "neutral" country. The document proves that by its own free will "neutral Belgium" accepted the British offer and decided to fight on the side of the Allies.

England instigated Belgium to go to war, and when the time came to protect the unfortunate little country it was left to its own resources. Germany, on the other hand, which had heard of Belgium's agreement with England at the beginning of this war, offered to protect Belgium and to pay full indemnity for all her losses. Germany would have religiously kept promise.

The documents found in Brussels further prove that as far back as 1906 England was systematically trying to bring about the coalition which has now forced war on Germany.

GRAY BOOK'S TESTIMONY

Statement by E. Havenith, Belgian Minister to the United States, Washington, Oct. 22

The Belgian Legation has just received the copies of the "Gray Book." It is

evident from these documents that there has never existed any military agreement between Belgium and England, either offensive or defensive, such as the German Government asserts to have been in existence since 1906. The following extracts speak for themselves:

No. 28—Offer of intervention by England.

Note handed to Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister to Belgium, to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that, if Germany exercises pressure for the purpose of compelling Belgium to abandon her position of a neutral country, the Government of his Britannic Majesty expects Belgium to resist by every possible means.

The Government of his Britannic Majesty is ready in that event to join with Russia and France, if desired by Belgium, to offer to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against Belgium and at the same time to offer a guarantee to maintain the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future.

No. 37—Offer of England for an alliance for the object of assuring the neutrality of Belgium against the pressure of Germany.

London, Aug. 4, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist the pressure of Germany and maintain neutrality. They will be supported in their resistance by England, who in such a case is ready to co-operate with France and Russia, if such is the desire of these three Governments, in offering an alliance to the said Governments to repel the employment of force against them by Germany and a guarantee for the future maintenance of the independence and the integrity of the three kingdoms.

I pointed out that Belgium is neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied: "It is for the event of neutrality being violated."

(Signed) LALAING,

Belgian Minister in London.

No. 40—Belgium appeals to the powers after the invasion of Belgium.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre—The Belgian Government regrets to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory, violating the engagements which they have undertaken by treaty.

The Belgian Government are firmly decided to resist by all means in their power.

Belgium appeals to England, to France, and to Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defense of her territory.

There should be a concerted and common action, having as its object to resist the measures of force employed by Germany against Belgium and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium for the future.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defense of the fortified places. I am, &c.,

(Signed) DAVIGNON,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium.

Where is to be found the alleged military convention said to have been concluded in 1906 with England? Where is the agreement said to have existed since 1906 between the Allies to force war on Germany? These documents clearly prove that such compact never existed.

The Belgian Nation preferred ruin and death to the shameful perjury proposed to her by Germany. For this reason Germany has devastated and immersed in blood a peaceful little country. Today she seeks to rob her of honor, her only remaining treasure.

The official documents, the confessions of the German statesmen, the ruins of Louvain, Malines, Aerschot, Termonde, and of so many villages burned and razed to the ground, the blood of her children unjustly massacred are the testimonies which the Belgian people cite before the tribunal of public conscience. To this tribunal, without fear, the Belgian Nation confides the cause of her honor.

BELGIUM'S ANSWER

*Transmitted to London and Published
Oct. 23*

The London Times of Oct. 14 reproduces a long article from The North German Gazette commenting on the discovery in the archives at Brussels of a map entitled "English Intervention in Belgium" and of a memorandum to the Belgian Minister of War which goes to prove that in the month of April, 1906, the Chief of the General Staff, on the suggestion of the British Military Attaché and with the approval of Gen.

Grierson, had worked out a plan of co-operation between British expeditionary forces and the Belgian Army against Germany in the event of a Franco-German war. This agreement is assumed to have been preceded in all probability by a similar arrangement with the French General Staff.

The North German Gazette also publishes certain passages of a report of the Belgian Minister at Berlin in December, 1911, relating to another plan of the Belgian General Staff, in which the measures to be taken in case of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany are discussed. Baron Greindl pointed out that this plan dealt only with the precautions to be taken in the event of an aggression on the part of Germany, while, owing to its geographical situation, Belgium might just as well be exposed to an attack by France and England. The North German Gazette draws from this discovery the strange conclusion that England intended to drag Belgium into the war, and at one time contemplated the violation of Dutch neutrality.

We have only one regret to express on the subject of the disclosure of these documents, and that is that the publication of our military documents should be mangled and arranged in such a way as to give the reader the impression of duplicity on the part of England and adhesion by Belgium, in violation of her duties as a neutral State, to the policy of the Triple Entente. We ask the North German Gazette to publish in full the result of its search among our secret documents. Therein will be found fresh and striking proof of the loyalty, correctness, and impartiality with which Belgium for eighty-four years has discharged her international obligations.

It was stated that Col. Barnardiston, the military representative at Brussels of a power guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, at the time of the Algeiras crisis, questioned the Chief of the Belgian General Staff as to the measures which he had taken to prevent any violation of that neutrality. The Chief of the General Staff, at that time Lieut. Gen. Ducarne, replied that Bel-

gium was ready to repel any invader. Did the conversation extend beyond these limits, and did Col. Barnardiston, in an interview of a private and confidential nature, disclose to Gen. Ducarne the plan of campaign which the British General Staff would have desired to follow if that neutrality were violated? We doubt it, but in any case we can solemnly assert, and it will be impossible to prove the contrary, that never has the King or his Government been invited, either directly or indirectly, to join the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German war. By their words and by their acts they have always shown such a firm attitude that any supposition that they could have departed from the strictest neutrality is eliminated *a priori*.

As for Baron Greindl's dispatch of Dec. 23, 1911, it dealt with a plan for the defense of Luxemburg, due to the personal initiative of the Chief of the First Section of the War Ministry. This plan was of an absolutely private character and had not been approved by the Minister of War. If this plan contemplated above

all an attack by Germany, there is no cause for surprise, since the great German military writers, in particular T. Bernhardt, V. Schlivfeboch, and von der Goltz, spoke openly in their treatises on the coming war of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies.

At the outbreak of hostilities the Imperial Government, through the mouth of the Chancellor and of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, did not search for vain pretexts for the aggression of which Belgium has been the victim. They justified it on the plea of military interests. Since then, in face of the universal reprobation which this odious action has excited, they have attempted to deceive public opinion by representing Belgium as bound already before the war to the Triple Entente. These intrigues will deceive nobody. They will recoil on the head of Germany. History will record that this power, after binding itself by treaty to defend the neutrality of Belgium, took the initiative in violating it, without even finding a pretext with which to justify itself.

WHO BEGAN THE WAR, AND WHY? ATROCITIES OF THE WAR

By Pope Pius X., Kaiser Wilhelm II., President Poincaré, and
King Albert of Belgium

*Official Message from Pope Pius X. at
the Vatican, Aug. 2, 1914*

At this moment, when nearly the whole of Europe is being dragged into the vortex of a most terrible war, with its present dangers and miseries and the consequences to follow, the very thought of which must strike every one with grief and horror, we whose care is the life and welfare of so many citizens and peoples cannot but be deeply moved and our heart wrung with the bitterest sorrow.

And in the midst of this universal confusion and peril we feel and know that both Fatherly love and the Apostolic ministry demand of us that we should with all earnestness turn the thoughts of Christendom thither "whence cometh help"—to Christ, the Prince of Peace, and the most powerful mediator between God and man.

We charge, therefore, the Catholics of the whole world to approach the throne of Grace and Mercy, each and all of them, and more especially the clergy, whose duty furthermore it will be to make in every parish, as their Bishops shall direct, public supplication so that the merciful God may, as it were, be wearied with the prayers of His children and speedily remove the evil causes of war, giving to them who rule to think the thoughts of peace and not of affliction.

From the palace of the Vatican, the second day of August, 1914.

PIUS X.
Pontifex Maximus.

THE POPE'S DYING WORDS

*Pronounced by Pius X. at the Vatican,
Aug. 20*

In ancient times the Pope, with a word, might have stayed the slaughter. Now I am impotent and forced to see the spectacle of my own children, even those who yesterday worked here with me, leaving for the war and abandoning their cassocks and cowls for soldiers' uniforms. Yesterday, although belonging to different nationalities, we were here studying in sympathetic companionship. Now we are in different fields, armed against each other and ready to take each other's lives.

GERMAN KAISER'S PROTEST

*Addressed to Woodrow Wilson, President
of the United States, Aug. 7*

I consider it my duty, Sir, to inform you, as the most notable representative of the principles of humanity, that after the capture of the French fort of Longwy my troops found in that place thousands of dum dum bullets, which had been manufactured in special works by the French Government. Such bullets were found not only on French killed and wounded soldiers and on French prisoners, but also on English troops. You know what terrible wounds and awful suffering are caused by these bullets, and that their use is strictly

forbidden by the generally recognized rules of international warfare.

I solemnly protest to you against the way in which this war is being waged by our opponents, whose methods are making it one of the most barbarous in history. Besides the use of these awful weapons, the Belgian Government openly incited the civil population to participate in the fighting, and has for a long time carefully organized their resistance. The cruelties practiced in this guerrilla warfare, even by women and priests, toward wounded soldiers, and doctors and hospital nurses—physicians were killed and lazarets fired on—were such that eventually my Generals were compelled to adopt the strongest measures to punish the guilty and frighten the bloodthirsty population from continuing their shameful deeds.

Some villages and even the old town of Louvain, with the exception of its beautiful Town Hall, (Hôtel de Ville,) had to be destroyed for the protection of my troops.

My heart bleeds when I see such measures inevitable and when I think of the many innocent people who have lost their houses and property as a result of the misdeeds of the guilty.

WILHELM I. R.

REPLY TO THE KAISER

Made by President Wilson at Washington, Sept. 16

I received your Imperial Majesty's important communication of the 7th and have read it with the gravest interest and concern. I am honored that you should have turned to me for an impartial judgment as the representative of a people truly disinterested as respects the present war and truly desirous of knowing and accepting the truth.

You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. Presently, I pray God very soon, this war will be over. The day of accounting will then come, when, I take it for granted, the nations of Europe will assemble to determine a settlement. Where wrongs have been committed,

their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed.

The nations of the world have fortunately by agreement made a plan for such a reckoning and settlement. What such a plan cannot compass the opinion of mankind, the final arbiter in all such matters, will supply. It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single Government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which, like this, has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.

I speak thus frankly because I know that you will expect and wish me to do so as one friend speaks to another, and because I feel sure that such a reservation of judgment until the end of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in their entirety and in their true relations, will commend itself to you as a true expression of sincere neutrality.

WOODROW WILSON.

CHARGE AGAINST GERMANY

President Poincaré of the French Republic to President Wilson, Sept. 11

Mr. President: I am informed that the German Government is attempting to abuse your Excellency's good faith by alleging that dum-dum bullets are manufactured in French State workshops, and are used by our soldiers. The calumny is nothing but an audacious attempt to reverse the rôles. Germany has since the beginning of the war employed dum-dum bullets, and has daily committed violations of the laws of nations.

On Aug. 18 and on several occasions since then we have had to report crimes to your Excellency as well as to the powers signatory to the Convention of The Hague. Germany, which was aware of our protests, is now trying to deceive and to make use of pretexts and lies in order to indulge in further acts of barbarity in the name of right. Outraged civilization sends your Excellency an indignant protest.

RAYMOND POINCARE.

M. DELCASSE'S NOTE

French Cabinet Minister Addresses the Danish Government, Sept. 10

The French Government protested on Aug. 18 to the Permanent Bureau of The Hague Court of Arbitration against the use of dum-dum bullets by the Germans, producing proof obtained by surgeons that French soldiers had been killed or wounded by these bullets. The German General Staff has countered this by alleging that it was the French and English who used the bullets, and the Imperial Chancellor has announced in fiery tones that in the presence of the example given by the English and French the German soldiers would henceforth use dum-dum bullets; the responsibility for this procedure, which he himself describes as an act of cruelty and a violation of an international convention signed by Germany, will rest, he says, upon the powers of the Triple Entente.

By my Government's orders I have the honor to protest in the most formal manner to the Danish Government against the lying German allegations. French soldiers have never used dum-dum bullets. The French Government has never authorized, nor will authorize, its troops to use such barbarous means of warfare, whatever be the infringements of law and the cruelties committed by its adversaries. The "Instructions for French Officers in Wartime" also lay down, and will continue to lay down, that they are to forbid their men to use bullets at variance with the stipulations of the Geneva and Hague conventions.

THE BELGIAN MISSION

Officially Explained to President Wilson at the White House, Washington, Sept. 16

His Majesty the King of the Belgians has appointed a special envoy for the purpose of acquainting the President of the United States of America with the deplorable state of affairs prevailing in Belgium, whose neutrality has been unjustly violated, and who since the begin-

ning of hostilities has been the theatre of the worst outrages on the part of the invading German Army, in defiance of rules solemnized by international treaty and customs consecrated by public right and law of nations.

Mr. Henry Carton de Wiart, Minister of Justice, has been chosen for this mission. He is accompanied by Messrs. de Sadeleer, Hymans, and Vandervelde, Ministers of State. Count Louis Lichtervelde is attached to the mission as Secretary.

M. DE WIART'S ADDRESS

Made to the President at the White House, Washington, Sept. 16

Excellency: His Majesty the King of the Belgians has charged us with a special mission to the President of the United States.

Let me say to you how much we feel ourselves honored to have been called upon to express the sentiments of our King and of our whole nation to the illustrious statesman whom the American people have called to the highest dignity of the Commonwealth.

As far as I am concerned, I have already been able, during a previous trip, to fully appreciate the noble virtues of the American Nation, and I am happy to take this opportunity to express all the admiration with which they inspire me.

Ever since her independence was first established, Belgium has been declared neutral in perpetuity. This neutrality, guaranteed by the powers, has recently been violated by one of them. Had we consented to abandon our neutrality for the benefit of one of the belligerents, we would have betrayed our obligations toward the others. And it was the sense of our international obligations as well as that of our dignity and honor that has driven us to resistance.

The consequences suffered by the Belgian Nation were not confined purely to the harm occasioned by the forced march of an invading army. This army not only seized a great portion of our territory, but it committed incredible acts of

violence, the nature of which is contrary to the law of nations.

Peaceful inhabitants were massacred, defenseless women and children were outraged, open and undefended towns were destroyed, historical and religious monuments were reduced to dust, and the famous library of the University of Louvain was given to the flames.

Our Government has appointed a judicial commission to make an official investigation, so as to thoroughly and impartially examine the facts and to determine the responsibility thereof, and I will have the honor, Excellency, to hand over to you the proceedings of the inquiry.

In this frightful holocaust which is sweeping all over Europe, the United States has adopted a neutral attitude.

And it is for this reason that your country, standing apart from either one of the belligerents, is in the best position to judge, without bias or partiality, the conditions under which the war is being waged.

It is at the request, even at the initiative, of the United States that all civilized nations have formulated and adopted at The Hague a law regulating the laws and usage of war.

We refuse to believe that war has abolished the family of civilized powers, or the regulations to which they have freely consented.

The American people has always displayed its respect for justice, its search for progress, and an instinctive attachment for the laws of humanity. Therefore, it has won a moral influence which is recognized by the entire world. It is for this reason that Belgium, bound as she is to you by ties of commerce and increasing friendship, turns to the American people at this time to let it know the real truth of the present situation. Resolved to continue unflinching defense of its sovereignty and independence, it deems it a duty to bring to the attention of the civilized world the innumerable grave breaches of rights of mankind of which she has been a victim.

At the very moment we were leaving Belgium, the King recalled to us his trip to the United States and the vivid and strong impression your powerful and virile civilization left upon his mind.

Our faith in your fairness, our confidence in your justice, in your spirit of generosity and sympathy—all these have dictated our present mission.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S REPLY

*Addressed to the Royal Belgian Commission in the White House,
Washington, Sept. 16*

Permit me to say with what sincere pleasure I receive you as representatives of the King of the Belgians, a people for whom the people of the United States feel so strong a friendship and admiration, a King for whom they entertain so sincere a respect, and express my hope that we may have many opportunities of earning and deserving their regard.

You are not mistaken in believing that the people of this country love justice, seek the true paths of progress, and have a passionate regard for the rights of humanity.

It is a matter of profound pride to me that I am permitted for a time to represent such a people and to be their spokesman, and I am proud that your King should have turned to me in time of distress as to one who would wish on behalf of the people he represents to consider the claims to the impartial sympathy of mankind of a nation which deems itself wronged.

I thank you for the document you have put in my hands containing the result of an investigation made by a judicial committee appointed by the Belgian Government to look into the matter of which you have come to speak. It shall have my utmost attentive perusal and my most thoughtful consideration.

You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. Presently, pray God very soon, this war will be over. The day of accounting will then come, when, I take it for granted, the nations of Europe will assemble to determine a settlement.

Where wrongs have been committed their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed.

The nations of the world have, fortunately, by agreement made a plan for such a reckoning and settlement. What such a plan cannot compass, the opinion of mankind, the final arbiter in such matters, will supply. It would be unwise, it would be premature for a single Government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation, which, like this, has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.

I need not assure you that this conclusion, in which I instinctively feel that you will yourselves concur, is spoken frankly because in warm friendship, and as the best means of perfect understanding between us, an understanding based upon mutual respect, admiration, and cordiality.

You are most welcome and we are greatly honored that you should have chosen us as the friends before whom you could lay any matter of vital consequence to yourselves, in the confidence that your cause would be understood and met in the same spirit in which it was conceived and intended.

OFFICIAL SUMMARY

Findings Presented by the Belgian Royal Commission to President Wilson at Washington, Sept. 16

I.

Acts at Linsmeau and Orsmael

Belgium, which wanted peace, has been obliged by Germany to resort to arms and to oppose a legitimate defense to an aggression which nothing can justify, and which is contrary to the solemn pledges of treaties.

Belgium is bound in honor to fight loyally and to observe all the rules, laws, and customs of war.

From the beginning of the invasion of its territory by German troops, the Bel-

gian Government had posted each and every day, in all the towns, and the papers have each day repeatedly printed, instructions warning the noncombatant civilians not to offer any resistance to the troops and soldiers invading the country.

The information on which the German Government believes today that it can base its contention that the Belgian population contravenes the law of nations and is not worthy of respect is absolutely unfounded.

The Government protests most vigorously against these allegations and against the odious threats of retaliation. If any deed contrary to the rules of warfare should ultimately be proved, to understand such fact it is only necessary to realize the well-founded excitement which the cruelties of the German soldiers are provoking among the Belgian population—a population which is thoroughly honest but energetic in the defense of its rights and in its respect for humanity.

If we were to publish a list of these atrocities, of which the first ones are here recorded, this would indeed be a long list.

Whole regions have been ravaged and abominable deeds perpetrated in the towns.

A committee attached to the Department of Justice is drawing up a list of these horrors with scrupulous impartiality.

As an example, a few facts are here published, facts which will depict the state of mind and the procedure of certain German troops:

1. German cavalry, occupying the village of Linsmeau, were attacked by some Belgian infantry and two gendarmes. A German officer was killed by our troops during the fight, and subsequently buried at the request of the Belgian officer in command. None of the civilian population took part in the fighting at Linsmeau. Nevertheless the village was invaded at dusk Aug. 10 by a strong force of German cavalry, artillery, and machine guns. In spite of formal assurances given by the Burgomaster that none of the peasants had taken part in the previous fighting, two farms and six outlying houses were destroyed by gunfire and burned. All the male population were

then compelled to come forward and hand over whatever arms they possessed. No recently discharged firearms were found. Nevertheless the invaders divided these peasants into three groups. Those in one group were bound and eleven of them placed in a ditch, where they were afterward found dead, their skulls fractured by the butts of German rifles.

2. During the night of Aug. 10 German cavalry entered Velm in great numbers; the inhabitants were asleep. The Germans without provocation fired on Mr. Deglimme-Gever's house, broke into it, destroyed furniture, looted money, burned barns, hay, corn stacks, farm implements, six oxen, and the contents of the farmyard. They carried off Mme. Diglimme half-naked to a place two miles away. She was then let go and fired upon as she fled; without being hit. Her husband was carried away in another direction and fired upon; he is dying. The same troops sacked and burned the house of a railway watchman.

3. Farmer Jef Dierchx of Neerhespen bears witness to the following acts of cruelty committed by German cavalry at Orsmael and Neerhespen on Aug. 10, 11, and 12. An old man of the latter village had his arm sliced in three longitudinal cuts; he was then hanged head downward and burned alive. Young girls have been raped and little children outraged at Orsmael, where several inhabitants suffered mutilations too horrible to describe. A Belgian soldier belonging to a battalion of cyclist carbineers, who had been wounded and made prisoner, was bound to a telegraph pole on the St. Trond road and shot.

4. On Aug. 12, after an engagement at Haelen, Commandant Van Damme, so severely wounded that he was lying on his back, was finally murdered by German infantrymen firing their revolvers into his mouth.

5. On Aug. 9, at Orsmael, the Germans picked up Commandant Knappen very seriously wounded, propped him against a tree and shot him. Finally they hacked his corpse with swords.

6. Numerous soldiers, disarmed and unable to defend themselves, have been ill-treated or killed by certain German soldiers. The inquiry brings forth new facts of this kind every day.

7. In different places, notably at Hel-longe-sur-Geer, at Barchon, at Pontisse, at Haelen, at Zelk, German troops have fired on doctors, nurses, ambulances, and ambulance wagons.

8. At Boncelles a body of German troops went into a battle carrying a Belgian flag.

9. On Aug. 6, before a fort at Liège, German soldiers continued to fire on

a party of Belgian soldiers, who were unarmed and had been surrounded while digging a trench, after these had hoisted the white flag.

10. Aug. 10, at Vootem, near the fort of Loncin, a group of German infantry hoisted the white flag. When Belgian soldiers approached to take them prisoners the Germans suddenly opened fire on them at close range.

II.

Report on Aerschot

ANTWERP, Aug. 28, 1914.

The commission of inquiry on violation of the laws of nations and the laws and customs of warfare, after an impartial and careful investigation, can make the following report of its findings:

It appears from precise and concurring testimony that in the entire region of Aerschot the Germans have committed veritable atrocities. The majority of the population fled in terror. On their passage the German troops set fire to farms and houses and furniture, shooting inoffensive citizens whom they found along the road or who were working in the field.

At Hersselt, north of Aerschot, thirty-two houses of the village were set on fire; the miller and his son, who fled, and about twenty-one other persons were killed; and all this while no Belgian troops were visible.

The German troops penetrated into Aerschot, a town of 8,000 inhabitants, on Wednesday, Aug. 19, in the morning. No Belgian forces remained behind. No sooner did the Germans enter the town than they shot five or six inhabitants whom they caused to leave their houses. In the evening, pretending that a superior German officer had been killed on the Grand Place by the son of the Burgomaster, or, according to another version of the story, that a conspiracy had been hatched against the superior commandant by the Burgomaster and his family, the Germans took every man who was inside of Aerschot; they led them, fifty at a time, some distance from the town, grouped them in lines of four men, and, making them run ahead of them, shot them and killed them afterward

with their bayonets. More than forty men were found thus massacred.

They gave up the town to be pillaged, taking from private residences all they could take, breaking furniture, and forcing safes. The following day they lined up, three by three, the villagers whom they had arrested the day before, taking one man out of each line. These they led to a distance of about 100 meters from the town, taking with them the Burgomaster of the town, Mr. Tielmans, and his son, aged 15½ years, and his brother, and shot them.

Later on they forced the remaining villagers to dig holes to bury their victims.

For three whole days they continued to pillage and set fire to everything in sight.

About 150 inhabitants of Aerschot are supposed to have been thus massacred.

The largest part of the city is totally destroyed. Five times the Germans tried to set fire to the large church, the interior of which has been sacked. The records of the town have been carried away.

The ambulance attendants, although wearing the Red Cross badge, were not respected. One of them reports that German troops fired upon him while he was collecting his wounded, and that they continued to fire, even though he displayed his Red Cross armband. Moreover, during the entire day of the 19th, while he was engaged in hospital service, he was threatened and ill-used. A German officer, among others, took him by the head, thrusting against his forehead the butt of a revolver. A collector, wearing the insignia of the Red Cross, was killed in the Rue de l'Hospital on the evening of Aug. 19 by Germans.

Deny Any Civilian Attack

From all the testimony taken it appears that the civil population of Aerschot has in no wise participated in the hostilities, that no shot was fired by them; that all the witnesses agree in pointing out the improbability of the German version, according to which the Burgomaster's son, a youth of 15½ years, and of extremely gentle dis-

position, is said to have fired upon a superior German officer during the night of Aug. 19. Still more improbable is the version of the conspiracy organized by the Burgomaster. It is to be remarked that if—a thing which is not known—a German officer has been hit on the Grand Place, it might have happened by a stray bullet, German soldiers being engaged in shooting in the neighboring streets in order to frighten the populace.

Moreover, the Burgomaster, a very quiet man, had repeatedly warned his fellow-citizens, by means of posters and circulars addressed to every inhabitant of the town, that in case of invasion they were to abstain from any hostility. These posters were still in evidence when the Germans entered the city, and they were shown to them.

The German troops which were traversing localities situated on this side of Aerschot indulged in the same horrors. They shot fleeing citizens and set fire to and sacked private houses, all this without provocation.

At Rotselaar, for instance, they set fire to about fifteen houses. A German officer, addressing an inhabitant whose house was afire, wanted to make him declare, at the point of a pistol, that the fire had been started by the Belgians. When this inhabitant protested, claiming that the Belgians had left the town the previous evening, this officer declared that if the Germans had set fire to the town it was due probably to the fact that the civilians had fired at them, a fact which is also denied by all the witnesses.

There, too, the German troops pillaged everything they could lay their hands on during their passage.

Up to this writing the Commission of Inquiry has been unable to obtain the testimony of inhabitants of Diest and Tirlemont, which towns were occupied by the Germans on the 18th and 19th of August, 1914, and which are cut off from communication.

However, the inhabitants of Schaffen, a town near Diest, have stated that the same abominations were committed in

their locality and in the adjoining communities, Lummen and Molenstede. The whole region has been laid waste. German troops, at an hour's distance from Diest, had begun their work of destruction all along the highway from Diest to Beeringen. Turning upon Diest, they set fire to everything they could lay hands on—farms, houses, furniture. Arriving at the village of Schaffen, the Germans set fire to the town, massacring the few inhabitants who remained behind, and whom they found in their houses or in the streets.

The witness gives the names and addresses of eighteen persons whom he knows to have been massacred.

Among them are:

The wife of François Luyck, 45 years old, and her 12-year-old daughter, who were discovered in a sewer and shot.

The daughter of Jean Ouyen, 9 years old, who was shot.

André Willem, 23 years old, sexton, who was tied to a tree and burned alive.

Joseph Reynders, 40 years old, who was killed, together with his nephew, a lad of 10 years.

Gustave Lodt, 40 years old, and Jean Marken, also aged 40, probably buried alive.

The witness testifies that he personally proceeded to exhume these two bodies, and that he afterward buried them in the town cemetery.

The village of Rethy, near Turnhout, was the object of devastation and shooting during the day of Aug. 22 by seventeen cavalymen who had penetrated into the village. A young woman of 15 years was killed by a bullet.

Still more horrible crimes, if that were possible, have been committed by the German troops on account of their defeat at the hands of the Belgian Army before Malines. The City of Louvain, with its artistic and scientific riches, has not been spared.

New reports will be submitted very shortly.

GOOREMAN, President,
ERNST DE BUNSWYCK,
Secretary of the Commission.

III.

Destruction of Louvain

ANTWERP, Aug. 31, 1914.

To the Minister of Justice:

Sir: The Commission of Inquiry begs to make the following report on the deeds of which the City of Louvain and the surrounding localities and the vicinity of Malines have been the theatre.

The German Army penetrated into Louvain on Wednesday, Aug. 19, after having set fire to the towns through which it had passed.

From the moment of their entrance into the City of Louvain the Germans requisitioned lodgings and victuals for their troops. They entered every private bank of the city and took over the bank balances. German soldiers broke the doors of houses abandoned by their inhabitants, pillaged them and indulged in orgies.

The German authorities took hostages—the Mayor of the city, Senator Vander Kelm, the Vice Rector of the Catholic University, the Dean of the city; Magistrates and Aldermen were also detained. All arms, down to fencing foils, had been handed over to the town administration and deposited by the said authorities in the Church of St. Peter.

In a neighboring village, Corbeek-Loo, a young matron, 22 years old, whose husband was in the army, was surprised on Wednesday, Aug. 19, with several of her relatives, by a band of German soldiers. The persons who accompanied her were locked in an abandoned house, while she was taken into another house, where she was successively attacked by five soldiers.

In the same village, on Thursday, Aug. 20, German soldiers were searching a house where a young girl of 16 years lived with her parents. They carried her into an abandoned house, and while some of them kept the father and mother off, others went into the house, the cellar of which was open, and forced the young woman to drink. Afterward they carried her out on the lawn in front of the house and attacked her successively. She continued to resist, and they pierced

her breast with their bayonets. Having been abandoned by the soldiers after these abominable attacks, the girl was carried off by her parents, and the following day, owing to the gravity of her condition, she was administered the last rites of the Church by the priest of the parish and carried to the hospital at Louvain. At that time her life was in danger.

On Aug. 24 and 25 Belgian troops, leaving the intrenched camp in Antwerp, attacked the German Army which was outside of Malines.

The German troops were driven back as far as Louvain and Vilvorde.

Penetrating the towns which had been occupied by the enemy, the Belgian Army found the whole country devastated. The Germans, while retiring, had ravaged and set fire to the villages, taking with them all the male inhabitants, driving them before them.

Old Woman Killed by Bayonets

Upon entering Hofstade, on Aug. 25, the Belgian soldiers found there the corpse of an old woman who had been killed by bayonet thrusts; she still held in her hands the needle with which she was sewing when she was attacked; one mother and her son, aged about 15 or 16 years, lay there, pierced with bayonets; one man was found hanging.

In Sempst, a neighboring village, were found the corpses of two men partially burned. One of them was found with his legs cut off at the knees, the other was minus his arms and legs. A workman (whose charred body several witnesses have seen) had been pierced with bayonets, and afterward, while still living, the Germans soaked him with petroleum and locked him in a house, which they set on fire. An old man and his son had been killed by bullets; a woman coming out of her house had been stricken down in the same manner.

A witness whose declaration has been received by Edward Hertslet, son of Sir Cecil Hertslet, Consul General of Great Britain in Antwerp, testifies to have seen not far from Malines on Aug. 26

(that is, during the last attack of the Belgian troops) an old man attached by the arms to a beam of a barn. The body was completely burned; the head, the arms, and the feet were intact. Further on was a body all over stabbed with bayonet thrusts. Numerous corpses of peasants were found in positions of supplication, arms lifted and hands folded in prayer. The Belgian Consul to Uganda, who had entered the Belgian Army as a volunteer, reports that everywhere the Germans had passed through the country was devastated. The few inhabitants who remained in the villages told of horrors committed by the enemy. Thus in Wacherzeel seven Germans are said to have consecutively attacked a woman, afterward killing her. In the same village they had stripped a young boy, threatening him with death by pointing a revolver at his breast, piercing him with their lances, and chasing him into the open fields and shooting after him, without, however, hitting him.

Everywhere there was ruin and devastation. At Bulcken numerous inhabitants, including the priest, a man more than 80 years old, were killed.

Between Impde and Wolverthem two wounded Belgian soldiers were lying near a house which was burning. The Germans threw these two unfortunate men into the raging fire.

The German troops repulsed by our soldiers entered Louvain in full panic. Various witnesses assure us that at that moment the German garrison occupying Louvain was advised erroneously that the enemy was entering the town. Immediately the German garrison withdrew toward the station, where it met with the German troops that had been repulsed and pursued by the Belgian troops. Everything seems to indicate that a collision took place between the two German regiments. From that moment, under pretext that the Louvain civilians had fired upon them, (a fact which is contradicted by all witnesses, and which would hardly have been possible inasmuch as all the inhabitants of Louvain, for several days past, had been obliged to hand their arms over to the local

authorities, the German soldiers began to bombard the city. Moreover, not one of the witnesses has seen the body of a single civilian at the place where the affray happened. The bombarding lasted until 10 o'clock at night. Afterward the Germans set fire to the city.

Burning of the Town

The houses which had not taken fire were entered by German soldiers, who threw fire grenades, which seem to have been provided for the occasion. The largest part of the City of Louvain, especially the quarters of the Ville Haute, comprising the modern houses, the Cathedral of St. Peter, the University Halls, with the whole library of the university, its manuscripts, its collections, the largest part of the scientific institutions, and the town theatres, were at the moment being consumed by flames.

The commission deems it necessary, in the midst of these horrors, to insist on the crime of lèse humanity which the deliberate annihilation of an academic library—a library which was one of the treasures of our time—constitutes.

Numerous corpses of civilians covered the street and squares. On the route from Louvain to Tirlemont alone one witness testifies having seen more than fifty of them. On the thresholds of houses were found burned corpses of people who, surprised in their cellars by the fire, had tried to escape and fell into the heap of live embers. The suburbs of Louvain have been completely annihilated.

A group of seventy-five persons, among whom were several notables of the city, such as Father Coloboet and a Spanish priest, and also an American priest, were conducted during the morning of Wednesday, Aug. 26, to the square in front of the station. The men were brutally separated from their wives and children, and after having received the most abominable treatment, and after repeated threats of being shot, they were driven in front of the German troops as far as the village of Campenhout. They were locked in the church during the night. The following day at 4 o'clock a German officer came to inform them

that they might all confess themselves, and that they would be shot half an hour later. But at 4:30 o'clock they were allowed to go, and shortly afterward they were again arrested by a German brigade, which forced them to march in front of them to Malines. Answering a question on the part of one of the prisoners, a German officer told them that they were going to taste some of the Belgian grapes before Antwerp. At last they were liberated on Thursday afternoon at the entrance of Malines.

Further testimony shows that several thousand male inhabitants of Louvain who had escaped the shooting and burning were sent toward Germany. We do not at this writing know for what purpose.

The fire continued for several days. An eyewitness, who on Aug. 30 left Louvain, describes the state of the city as follows: "From Weert St. Georges," he says, "I have seen nothing except burned towns and crazed villagers lifting to each comer their arms as a mark of submission. From each house was hanging a white flag, even from those that had been set on fire, and rags of them were found hanging from the ruins.

"At Weert St. Georges I inquired from the inhabitants the cause of the German reprisals. They all assured me that absolutely none of the inhabitants had fired; that all arms had been previously given up, and that the Germans had taken vengeance on the population because a Belgian soldier of the Gendarme Corps had killed a Uhlan.

"The population which remained in Louvain took refuge in the suburb of Heverle, where they are all piled up, the population having been driven from the town by the troops and by the fire.

"The fire in Louvain began a little above the American College, and the city is entirely destroyed, with the exception of the Town Hall (Hôtel de Ville) and the depot. Today the fire continued, and the Germans—far from trying to stop it—seem rather to maintain it by throwing straw into the fire, as I have myself seen in the streets behind the Hôtel de Ville. The cathedral and the

theatres have been destroyed and have fallen in, also the library. The town resembles an old city in ruins, in the midst of which drunken soldiers are circulating, carrying bottles of wine and liquor; the officers themselves being installed in armchairs, sitting around tables and drinking like their own men.

"In the streets dead horses are decaying, horses which are already inflated, and the smell of the fire and of the decaying animals is such that it has followed me for a long time."

The commission up to this writing has been unable to obtain any information regarding the fate of the Burgomaster of Louvain, nor regarding the prominent persons taken for hostages.

Conclusions of the Commission

By facts which have thus far been brought to its attention, the commission reaches the following conclusions:

In this war, German occupation of territory is systematically followed by (and is at times preceded by and accompanied by) acts of violence against the civil population, which acts of violence are contrary to the conventional laws of war and to the most elementary principles of humanity.

The procedure of the Germans is everywhere the same. They advance along the roads, shooting inoffensive passers-by, particularly cyclists and even peasants occupied in the fields which the Germans traverse.

In the towns and villages where they stop, the Germans first of all requisition victuals and drinks which they consume to the point of drunkenness; then they begin to shoot wildly, sometimes from the interior of empty houses, declaring that the inhabitants have fired the shots. It is then that the firing scenes begin, and murder and especially pillage accompanied by acts of cold cruelty set in, acts which respect neither sex nor age. Even where they claim to know the perpetrator of the deeds which they allege, they do not content themselves with executing the culprits summarily,

but take advantage of the occasions to decimate the population, to pillage all the inhabitants, and to set fire to them.

After a first massacre, somewhat at random, they shut the men into the church of the town and order all women to go back to the houses and leave the doors open during the night.

In several localities the civil population has been sent to Germany, to be compelled there, it appears, to labor in the fields, as was done in the slave days of olden times. Numerous cases are known where the inhabitants were forced to serve as guides and to make trenches for the Germans. Numerous depositions reveal that in their march, and even in their attacks, the Germans put before them civilians, men and women, in order to prevent our soldiers from firing. Other testimony proves that German detachments do not hesitate to fly either a white flag or a Red Cross flag, so as to approach our troops without being suspected. On the other hand, they fire on our ambulances and ill-treat our ambulance nurses. They ill-treat and even kill our wounded. Clergymen seem to be particularly the object of their attacks. Last, but not least, we have in our possession explosive bullets left behind them by the enemy at Wechter, and we are also in receipt of medical certificates testifying that the wounds must have been inflicted by bullets of the variety mentioned above.

Documents and testimonials in support of these facts will be published.

(Signed)

GOOREMAN, President.

COUNT GOBLET D'ALVIELLA.

ERNST DE BUNSWYCK,
ORTS,

Secretaries.

FURTHER REPORTS

Cabled to Royal Commission at Washington from Belgian Foreign Office.

Cablegram Received Sept. 8

You have received the reports of the commission of Aug. 25 and 31. Since

then a great many localities, situated in the Vilvorde-Malines-Louvain triangle, an extremely fertile and densely populated district, have been partially pillaged and totally destroyed by fire. Their inhabitants have fled, while a number of them, among others women and children, were arrested and shot without trial, and without apparent reason, except to inspire the population with terror. This was done in Sempst, Weerde, Elewytt, Hofstade, Wespelaer, Wilese, Bucken, Eppegheem, Houtehm, Tremeloo, Tistelt, Gelrode, Herent. At Wavre, where the population was unable to pay a levy of 3,000,000 francs, fifty-six houses were set on fire. The largest part of Cortenberg is burned. To excuse these attacks the Germans allege that an army of civilians resisted them. According to trustworthy testimony, no provocation can be proved at Visé, Aerschot, Louvain, Wavre, and in other localities situated in the Malines-Louvain-Vilvorde district, where fire was set and massacres committed several days after the German occupation.

Cablegram Received Sept. 15

Inform the Belgian Commission that the Belgian Committee on Inquiry continues to report ruins and devastations and pillage, systematically organized by German troops in the towns invested by them. The City of Termonde was destroyed without any hostile participation on the part of the civilian population. Out of 1,400 houses, only 295 remain standing, others were destroyed by fire and razed to the ground, after the Germans entered the city. Several civilians were imprisoned and executed with bayonets in the presence of their relatives and fellow-citizens. In Melle nine civilians were killed and forty-five properties destroyed, without any reason.

The reoccupation of Aerschot by the Belgian Army reveals disastrous deeds. Dwellings which were not destroyed by fire were completely sacked and pillaged on Sept. 6 before the return of the Belgian troops. Four hundred civilians, among them thirty clergymen, were locked since Aug. 30 in the church with-

out food, carried off, and sent to destinations unknown. Localities in the neighborhood are completely destroyed, and everywhere along the road are corpses. Women and young girls were outraged. Systematic pillage.

A SUPPLEMENT

Published by Belgian Commission of Inquiry on Sept. 10 to Complete Its Report of Aug. 31

Of the two reports, dated Aug. 28 and 31, which the commission has had the honor of addressing to you, the former recounted more particularly the events which occurred at Aerschot and in the neighboring district, while the latter dwelt with the destruction of the town of Louvain by the German troops. In order to complete its report of Aug. 31, the commission thinks it its duty to record that after the burning of Louvain the houses which remained standing, the inhabitants of which had been forced to flee, were pillaged under the eyes of German officers. On Sept. 2 the Germans were seen setting fire to four houses.

The "Chastisement" of Louvain

Another fact which emphasizes the ruthless character of the treatment to which the peaceable population of Louvain was subjected has also been established. On Aug. 28 a crowd of 6,000 to 8,000 persons, men, women, and children, of every age and condition, was conducted under the escort of a detachment of the 162d Regiment of German infantry to the riding school of the town, where they spent the whole night. The place of confinement was so small in proportion to the number of the occupants that all had to remain standing, and so great were their sufferings that in the course of this tragic night several women lost their reason and children of tender years died in their mother's arms.

A communiqué from the German Great General Staff, the text of which is published in the Cologne Gazette of Aug. 29, declares that the "chastisement" inflicted

ed upon Louvain was justified by the fact that a battalion of Landwehr, which had been left unsupported in the town in order to guard the communications, had been attacked by the civil population, which was under the impression that the main German Army had definitely retired. The same journal has published a narrative purporting to come from a person who was a witness of the occurrence.

The inquiry has established that this statement must be considered false. It is, in fact, ascertained that the people of Louvain, who, moreover, had been disarmed by the Communal Authority, did not provoke the Germans by any act of hostility.

The commission has resumed the inquiry begun at Brussels on the subject of the occurrences at Visé.

This place was the first Belgian town destroyed in pursuance of the system applied subsequently by the invader to so many other of our cities and villages. It is for this reason that we have been careful to determine what truth there is in the German version according to which the civilian population of Visé took part in the defense of the town or rose against the Germans after the town had been occupied.

Several witnesses now at Antwerp have been heard, notably soldiers belonging to the detachment which disputed with the Germans the passage of the Meuse, north of Liège, and a lady of German nationality, who belongs to the religious community of the Sisters of Notre Dame at Visé.

Innocent Visé

The result is to prove that the inhabitants took no part whatever in the fighting which took place on Aug. 4 at the ford of Lixhe and at Visé itself.

Moreover, it was only in the night of Aug. 15-16 that the destruction of the town began, the signal being given by several shots fired on the evening of the 15th. The Germans asserted that the inhabitants had fired upon them, particularly from a house the owner of which gave evidence before the commission.

The Germans discovered no arms in this house, any more than they did in neighboring buildings, which, nevertheless, were burned after being pillaged, and the male occupants of which were carried off to Germany.

The evidence has brought to light the improbability of any rising among a disarmed population against a numerous German garrison at a time when the last Belgian troops had for eleven days evacuated the district, and the witnesses have declared that the first shots were fired by intoxicated German infantry soldiers at their own officers. This fact appears not to be exceptional. It is, indeed, notorious that at Maestricht, either by mistake or in consequence of a mutiny, Germans about this same time killed one another during the night at a cavalry camp which they had established at Mesch, close to the Dutch frontier in Limbourg.

It is confirmed that the town of Visé was entirely burned, with the exception, it appears, of a religious establishment which seems to have been respected, and that several citizens, both of the town and of the village of Canne, were shot.

A Deliberate System

A large number of places situated in the triangle between Vilvorde, Malines, and Louvain—that is to say, in one of the most populous and, a few days ago, one of the most prosperous regions in Belgium—have been given over to plunder, partially or entirely destroyed by fire, their population dispersed, while the inhabitants were indiscriminately arrested and shot without trial and without apparent reason, the sole object being, it seems, to inspire terror and to compel the migration of the population.

This was notably the case in the communes or hamlets of Sempst, Weerde, Elewynt, Holstade, Wespelaar, Wilsele, Bueken, Eppeghem, Wackerzeele, Rotse-laer, Werchter, Thildonck, Boortmeerbeek, Houghten, Tremeloo. In this last village only the church and the presbytery remained standing. On the few houses which have been spared may be seen the following inscriptions: "Nicht

abbrennen," (do not burn,) "Bitte schonen," (please spare,) "Gute leute, nicht plundren," (good people, do not plunder.) These houses, however, were sacked afterward.

In all these villages the women who have been unable to escape are exposed to the brutal instincts of the German soldiers.

The district immediately adjoins that of Aerschot, the devastation of which was described in an earlier report. It extends at present to the northwest of Brussels, where the important towns of Grimberghen and Wolverthem have been sacked, while southeast of the capital, more than twenty-five kilometers from the scene of military operations, the town of Wavre, which was unable to furnish the exorbitant war levy of 3,000,000 francs (£120,000) imposed by the General Staff of the enemy, has seen fifty-six of its houses destroyed by fire.

We must also record that on Sept. 4 and 5 bombs were hurled from an aeroplane upon Ghent and Escloo, which are open and undefended towns.

Finally, you are aware, M. le Ministre, that the town of Malines, after it had been completely evacuated by Belgian troops on Aug. 27, was subjected for several days to a bombardment which has seriously damaged the cathedral church of St. Rombaut, the pride of this ancient city. The town of Heyst-opden-Berg was also bombarded without mercy, though there was no strategic interest to warrant such an act.

The Plea of Armed Resistance

The Germans, in order to excuse their violence, declare that, wherever they have shot civilians or burned and pillaged towns and villages, armed resistance has been offered by the inhabitants. While there may possibly have been isolated instances of this kind, that is nothing more than occurs in all wars, and if they had confined themselves to executing the guilty persons we could only have bowed before the rigor of military law. But in no case could individual and absolutely exceptional acts of aggression

justify the wholesale measures of repression which have been adopted against the persons and the property of the inhabitants of our towns and villages—the shooting, the burning, the pillaging which has proceeded pretty well everywhere in our country, not only by way of reprisals, but with a refinement of cruelty. Moreover, no provocation has been proved at Visé, Marsage, Louvain, Wavre, Termonde, and other places which have been entirely and deliberately destroyed several days after being occupied, not to mention the systematic burning of isolated buildings situated in the line of march of the troops, and the shooting of the unfortunate inhabitants who fled.

The Germans have asserted in their newspapers that the Belgian Government distributed to the civil population arms which were to be used against the invaders. They add that the Catholic clergy preached a sort of holy war and incited their flock everywhere to massacre the Germans. Finally, they have declared, in order to justify the massacres of women, that women showed themselves as ferocious as the men, and went so far as to pour boiling oil from their windows upon the troops on the march.

A Tissue of Falsehoods

All these allegations are so many falsehoods. Far from having distributed arms, the authorities everywhere on the approach of the enemy disarmed the inhabitants. The Burgomasters everywhere warned the townspeople against acts of violence, which would involve reprisals. The clergy have unceasingly preached calm to their flock. As for the women, if we accept a story in a foreign newspaper, the source of which is suspected, everything shows that their only anxiety was to escape the horrors of a ruthless war.

The true motives for the atrocities the moving evidence of which we have gathered can only be, on the one hand, the desire to terrorize and demoralize the people in accordance with the inhuman theories of German military writers, and,

on the other hand, the desire for plunder. A shot fired, no one knows where, or by whom, or against whom, by a drunken soldier, or an excited sentry, is enough to furnish a pretext for the sack of a whole city. Individual plunder is succeeded by war levies of a magnitude which it is impossible to satisfy and by the taking of hostages who will be shot or kept in confinement until payment of the ransom in full, according to the well-known procedure of classic brigandage. It must also be stated that in order to establish the German case all resistance offered by detachments of the regular army is laid to the account of the civilian population, and that the invader invariably avenges himself upon the civilians for the checks or even the disappointments which he suffers in the course of the campaign.

In the course of this inquiry we use only facts supported by trustworthy evidence. It should be noted that up to the present we have been able to record only a small part of the crimes committed against law, humanity, and civilization, which will constitute one of the most sinister and most revolting pages in contemporary history. If an international inquiry, like that which was conducted in the Balkans by the Carnegie Commission, could be conducted in our country, we are convinced that it would establish the truth of our assertions.

[Signed by M. Gooreman, Minister of State, President.]

"NOT A WORD OF TRUTH"

Denial of Belgian Charges by Count von Bernstorff, German Ambassador at Washington, Sept. 17

All that I care to say about the Belgian charges is that I have officially informed the State Department in Washington that there is not one word of truth in the statements made to the President yesterday by the Belgian Commission.

GERMANY'S VERSIONS

Official Dispatch from Berlin to German Embassy at Washington, Aug. 29

In consequence of a sudden attack of Belgian troops from Antwerp the German garrison at Louvain meets the enemy, leaving only one battalion of the last reserve and army service corps in Louvain. Thinking that this meant the retreat of the German troops, priests at Louvain gave arms and ammunition to the civilians, who began, at different places, suddenly to shoot out of windows at unsuspecting German troops, of whom many were wounded. A fight of twenty-five hours between German soldiers and the civil population of Louvain took place. Parts of Louvain were burning. Civilians met with arms are killed. The manifesto of the Chief General speaks of bestial cruelties committed on wounded and makes the Magistrates responsible for the provocation and for providing people with arms.

The German Army protests against the news spread out by enemies about the cruelty of German warfare. The German troops had to take severe measures sometimes when provoked, the population making treacherous attacks upon them and bestial atrocities against the wounded. The responsibility for the recourse of warfare falls entirely upon the authorities of the occupied territories who gave arms to the civil population and stirred them up to take part in the war wherever the population was not hostile. The German troops never did harm people or property. The German soldier is not an incendiary nor pillager. He only fights against a hostile army. The news published in foreign papers about the Germans chasing the population means the characterizing immorality of the authors.

Official Communication of the German General Staff

BERLIN, Aug. 30, 1914.

The City of Loeven (Louvain) had surrendered and was given over to us by the Belgian authorities. On Monday,

Aug. 24, some of our troops were shipped there and intercourse with the inhabitants was developing in a quite friendly manner.

On Tuesday afternoon, Aug. 25, our troops, hearing about an imminent Belgian sortie from Antwerp, left in that direction, the Commanding General ahead in a motor car, leaving behind only a Colonel with soldiers to protect railroad, (Landsturm battalion "neuss.")

As the rest of the Commanding General's staff, with the horses, was going to follow, and collected on the market place, suddenly rifle fire opened from all the surrounding houses, all the horses being killed and five officers wounded, one of them seriously.

Simultaneously fire opened at about ten different places in town, also on some of our troops, just arrived and waiting on the square in front of the station, and on incoming military trains. A designed co-operation with the Belgian sortie from Antwerp established beyond doubt. Two priests caught in handing out ammunition to the people were shot at once in front of the station.

Street fights lasted till Wednesday, the 26th, in the afternoon, (twenty-four hours,) when stronger forces, arrived in the meantime, succeeded in getting the upper hand. Town and northern suburbs were burning at different places and by this time have probably burned down altogether.

On the part of the Belgian Government a general rising of the population against the enemy had been organized for a long time; depots of arms were found where to each gun was attached the name of the citizen to be armed.

A spontaneous rising of the people has been recognized, at the request of the smaller States at The Hague Conference, as being within the law of nations as far as weapons are carried openly and the laws of civilized warfare are being observed; but such rising was only admitted in order to fight the attacking.

In the case of Loewen the town had already surrendered and the population renounced, without any resistance, the

town being occupied by our troops. Nevertheless the population attacked on all sides and with a murderous fire the occupying forces and newly arriving troops, which came in trains and automobiles, considering the hitherto peaceful attitude of the population.

Therefore there can be no question of means of defense allowed by the law of nations, neither of a warlike guet-apens, (ambush,) but only of a treacherous attempt of the civil population all along the line, and all the more to be condemned as it was apparently planned long beforehand with simultaneous attack from Antwerp, as arms were not carried openly, as women and young girls took part in the fight and blinded our wounded, sticking their eyes out.

The barbarous attitude of the Belgian population in all parts occupied by our troops has not only justified our severest measures, but forced them on us for the sake of self-preservation. The intensity of the resistance of the population is shown by the fact that in Loewen twenty-four hours were needed to break down their attack.

We ourselves regret deeply that during these fights the town of Loewen has been destroyed to a great extent. Needless to say that these consequences are not intentional on our part, but cannot be avoided in this infamous franc-tireur war being led against us.

Whoever knows the good-natured character of our troops cannot seriously pretend that they are inclined to needless or frivolous destruction.

The entire responsibility for these events rests with the Belgian Government, who with criminal frivolity have given to the Belgian people instructions contrary to law of nations and incited the resistance, and who, in spite of our repeated warnings, even after the fall of Luettich, (Liège,) have done nothing to induce them to a peaceful attitude.

Official German Statement Published in Berlin, Sept. 7

Belgium is officially spreading false representations about the occurrences

through which the City of Louvain was made to suffer. It is claimed that German troops, having been repulsed by Belgians making a sortie from Antwerp, were fired upon by mistake by the German garrison of Louvain and that in this way fighting occurred there. But events prove incontestably that the Germans repulsed the Belgian sortie.

During this battle before Antwerp an undoubtedly organized attack was made upon the German troops at many places in Louvain, after apparently friendly relations between the Germans and the citizens of the town had seemed for twenty-four hours to be beginning. The attack was at first against a Landwehr battalion composed of older men of quiet disposition and themselves mostly fathers of families; also against sections of the General Staff that had remained in the city, and upon moving columns of troops. The Germans had many wounded and killed. They won the upper hand, however, owing to the arrival of fresh troops by rail, who were fired upon at the station. The truth of the foregoing statements is established beyond all cavil. The City Hall was saved, but further attempts to extinguish the fire were unsuccessful.

LOUVAIN'S ART TREASURES

Official Report by Superior Confidential Councilor von Falke After Inspection of Louvain, Sept. 17

The ancient Tuchhalle, which was used for university and library purposes, was completely destroyed by fire, with the exception of the front and rear façades in Gothic and Renaissance style. The library, with its very valuable treasures of manuscripts and books, was therefore a total loss. Officials of the library who might have called attention to the saving of the imperiled treasures were not present when the adjoining houses on both sides of the hall caught fire, and no hope exists that any of the books or manuscripts, or even parts thereof, might be found in the ruins.

Apart from this—by far the worst

damage—and the partial destruction by fire of the Cathedral of St. Peter no other losses of extraordinary importance took place at Louvain.

The Rathous, or City Hall, in late Gothic style, under reconstruction for several years and on which work has not been finished yet, was saved, thanks to the orders of the commander, Major von Manteuffel, who ordered that the burning houses on the right side of the City Hall be leveled to the ground. The military removed from a cellar of the City Hall a quantity of ammunition which threatened to explode through extreme heat of the fire. Four soldiers were severely injured thereby. The Rathaus, thanks to the precautions taken by the German military, and in spite of its nearness to the conflagration, was not damaged in the interior, nor did its rich outer architecture suffer any at all.

The roof of the Cathedral of St. Peter, which was set afire by sparks from adjoining buildings, was very considerably damaged, however only to such an extent as to allow its restoration to the original condition. The roof frame is burned to the beginning of the curve of the dome. The inner ceiling has prevented the fire from spreading to the inner part of the church, containing rich art treasures. Above the choir, however, the inner ceiling gave way, thereby partially damaging the upper part of the rococo altar of stone which was without any particular artistic value.

The small sacrament house standing next to the altar—a very fine and rich stonework of late Gothic style by the builder of the City Hall, M. de Layens—has been slightly damaged by the collapse of the ceiling, which chipped off the upper phiales. These broken pieces have been collected without any substantial loss and can easily be replaced. The damaged part of sacrament house can therefore be replaced. Close to the main portal of the cathedral, following the fire in the bell tower, the falling bells pierced the roof. Near the entrance in the southerly part of the church at the

right side the fire did some damage to the walls and the stone balustrades in the side chapel. Notable art treasures have, however, not been damaged. Only the ventilator in the main portal, a beautiful Renaissance carving, (of wood,) was burned. An ancient glass painting of the seventeenth century remained undamaged.

The left side chapel to the north of the entrance, with its Gothic bronze baptismal and the iron arm in Gothic style, (the cover being missing for many years,) with its rococo carved altars and heavy sideboards, are untouched, as well as the organ of the year 1556 in a beautiful carved oak inclosure of the Renaissance period in the northerly centre chapel.

The paintings in the choir chapels, to which belong the most precious art treasures of Louvain, such as the works of Dierik Bouts and the Master of Flemalle, together with all movable art treasures of St. Peter's Church, were saved by Lieut. Col. of Reserves Thelemann and transferred to a hall in the Rathaus, where they are now under the supervision of the Mayor. Here can be found "The Holy Communion" by Dierik Bouts, and his "Martyrdom of the Holy Erasmus," the "Kreuzabnahme" ("Removal from the Cross") by the Master of Flemalle, and two side paintings representing the donors (apparently by another artist). Three paintings by J. v. Rillaerz and several later paintings of lesser value are stored there.

The oaken church treasure chest containing eight silver Holy Virgins, some of them from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a Gothic incense bowl, Gothic Renaissance monstrances of silver, highly artistic and valuable ciboriums of the eighteenth century, also chandeliers, candlesticks, swinging lamps, and other church regalia have been stored in the City Hall. The report continues that an architect of Louvain has been ordered to temporarily repair the damage of the roof regardless of cost.

Thus of the old art works of the Church of St. Peter only the ventilator is destroyed; the stone structure of the building itself remains intact. Until the framework of the roof is rebuilt a temporary roof should be constructed to shelter the interior of the church. A Louvain architect has been authorized by the Mayor to do this work.

The semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, after publishing this report, says:

"The disastrous accidental fire, called forth by the revolt of the populace and then spread further through the storm wind, devastated especially the rows of houses near the railroad station, in the Bahnhofstrasse and in the centre of the city. The remaining churches lie outside of the zone touched by the fire, which comprised about one-sixth the area of the city; they were therefore not touched by the fire. Thus there remained undamaged the Church of St. Michael, the Church of St. Jacob, the Church of St. Gertrude, with all their notable art works; likewise the College du Saint Esprit, with its library."

Bombardment of Rheims Cathedral

Protest Issued to Neutral Powers from
French Foreign Office, Bordeaux,
Sept. 21, 1914

Without being able to invoke even the appearance of military necessity, and for the mere pleasure of destruction, German troops have subjected the Cathedral of Rheims to a systematic and furious bombardment. At this hour the famous basilica is but a heap of ruins.

It is the duty of the Government of the republic to denounce to universal indignation this revolting act of vandalism, which, in giving over to the flames this sanctuary of history, deprives humanity of an incomparable portion of its historic patrimony.

POPE BENEDICT SILENT

Authorized Dispatch to The London Daily News, Sept. 27

Although the Pope is greatly shocked and deeply grieved at the destruction of the Rheims Cathedral, which he is convinced was entirely unnecessary, and could easily have been averted, he still declines to make a public statement. I am merely authorized to state that the Pope's sorrow at the destruction of the magnificent cathedral is so great that it is impossible for him to express it.

The Pope is convinced that his sorrow is shared not only by Catholics, but by all Christians, since all believers in God mourn the destruction of His temples, which even war does not justify.

A member of the Pope's entourage explained the reasons why a public statement was not issued. He said:

The Pope's sorrow is understood, if not publicly announced. It is inconceivable that even if the destruction of the cathedral was necessary for strategical reasons the intensity of the Pope's sorrow would be lessened, but a public statement implies blame, which the Pope thinks now is inopportune and inexpedient, hence he

refrains from any comment. God's mercy is undoubted; His justice inevitable. Time will show whether the criminal destruction of one of the most famous of the world's cathedrals will remain unpunished. Vengeance is God's.

ATTACK NOT WILLFUL

Statement by Count von Bernstorff, German Ambassador at Washington, Sept. 23

It would seem from certain published reports that the destruction of this grand old edifice was the result of malice or envy. This is ridiculous. All that I have to say on this matter is that I am positive that the attack on the cathedral at Rheims was not willful.

For my part, I feel much more for the thousands of men who have sacrificed their lives, although I regret as much as any man the destruction of such a beautiful work of art.

"SPARE THE CATHEDRAL"

German Government Disclaimer Issued by Count von Bernstorff, Washington, Sept. 23

The German Government states officially in contradiction of the report made by the Havas Agency that German artillery purposely destroyed important buildings at Rheims, that, on the contrary, orders were given to spare the cathedral by all means.

THE FRENCH ARE BLAMED

Official German Dispatch from Berlin, Received in Amsterdam, Sept. 23

The Cathedral of Rheims was not used as a mark for a systematic bombardment. During the last few days the French had

strengthened the fortress to defend their present position, and consequently the German bombardment became necessary. Orders had been given to spare the cathedral.

If it should prove true that during the fire the cathedral suffered, which cannot be yet ascertained, nobody would deplore it more than ourselves, but the French who made Rheims a fortress in support of their defense line are alone to blame.

THE DAMAGE DONE

Official Report Made by Whitney Warren to the French Government, Sept. 28

On Friday, Sept. 25, I received word from the embassy that the French Government had made arrangements to take me to Rheims in order that I might make a report on general conditions and especially upon the cathedral. So at 8 o'clock the next morning I started off with two automobiles under the escort of Capt. Henri Charbonnel, accompanied by two soldiers; one automobile, conducted by Mr. Hall of New York, containing Major Morton Henry, Major Cosby, and Lieut. Boyd of the embassy.

We followed the route direct to Meaux, then to La Ferte-sur-Jouarre, from there to Château-Thierry, where we picked up a third automobile containing Capt. Perrin, with authority from Gen. Joffre to conduct us anywhere we chose to go, providing it was safe.

From there to Epernay, where we had luncheon, and then to Chalons-sur-Marne, where was stationed the chef d'état-major. There they told us it was possible to go to Rheims, although the bombardment had been rather severe the day before. So we turned northwest and proceeded to Rheims, passing by Conde-sur-Marne and Verzy. Here we passed many troops, who, although fagged, seemed to be in very good condition, and we arrived at Rheims at 4:30, proceeding directly to the cathedral, where I remained until dark, talking and visiting the monument with the Curé Landrieux and the Abbé Thinot, who

had been in charge of the cathedral from the commencement.

The next day I was again at the cathedral, from 7:30 in the morning until 4:30 in the afternoon, visiting it in every particular, endeavoring to realize the damage done, whether intentionally inflicted or not. The following is as near as I am able to ascertain the different phases of the bombardment:

Four Bombs on First Day

On Sept. 4, when the Germans first entered Rheims, there was a first bombardment by their guns, interpreted by the Germans themselves as either a mistake or caused by the jealousy of some corps not allowed that privilege. Four bombs fell upon the cathedral—one on the north transept—doing but little damage, however.

On Sept. 14 and 15, after the Germans had evacuated the city and the French had entered, the bombardment recommenced, but without touching the cathedral. On Sept. 17 two bombs struck, one on the apse and the other on the north transept.

On the 18th the cathedral was again hit on the southern flying buttresses and on the roof, killing a gendarme and several German wounded.

On Sept. 19 the cathedral was fairly riddled by bombs during the entire day, and at about 3:45 the scaffolding surrounding the north tower caught fire. This fire lasted about one hour, and during that time two further bombs struck the roof, setting it also on fire. The curé claims that one of these bombs must have been incendiary, otherwise it would be impossible to explain the extraordinary quickness with which the fire spread throughout the roof timbers.

The fire from the scaffolding descended until it reached the north door of the main façade, which caught rapidly, burned through and communicated to the straw with which the floor of the cathedral was covered. This straw had been ordered on Sept. 12 by the German commander in order to prepare the cathedral to receive 3,000 German wounded, but the evacuation of the city by the Germans

had prevented the cathedral being used for that purpose.

When the French came back the straw was gathered together with the intention of removing it, but on the 17th the French General ordered it to be respread, the flag of the Red Cross hoisted on the north tower and the German wounded placed there, in the hopes that this might save the cathedral.

As I have said, on Sept. 19 the straw caught from the fire originating in the scaffold, burning through the doors and destroying what was known as the very fine wooden tambours, or vestibules, surrounding these doors on the inside, and also calcinating the extraordinary stone sculptures decorating the entire interior of this western wall. These sculptures were peculiar to Rheims, being in high, full relief, and cut out of the mass of the stone itself, instead of being applied. This is one of the irreparable destructions occasioned.

All the wonderful glass of the nave is absolutely gone; that of the apse still exists, though greatly damaged.

Decorative Motifs Lost

The fire on the outside calcinated the greater part of the façade, the north tower and the entire clerestory, with the flying buttresses and the turret crowning each of them. This stone, as far as its surface is concerned, is irreparably damaged, and when touched detaches itself; consequently all decorative motifs wherever the flames reached are lost.

The tresor was saved at the commencement of the fire by the priests, and the tapestries for which Rheims is so greatly renowned had been fortunately removed before. Half the stalls have been destroyed. The organ is intact and several crucifixes and pictures in the apse are untouched.

That anything remains of the monument is owing to the strong construction of what might be called the carcass of the cathedral and, I am firmly convinced, through no desire on the part of the bombarding forces to spare this monument. The walls and vaults are of a robustness

which can resist even modern implements of destruction, for even on Sept. 24, when the bombardment was again taken up, three bombs landed on the cathedral, but the vaults resisted absolutely, not even being perforated.

Had the Cathedral of Amiens received the same punishment, because of the lightness of its construction the vaults would undoubtedly have given way, the flying buttresses would have crushed in the walls and nothing would have remained but a mass of crumbled stone, with the exception of perhaps the ruins of the towers. If anything therefore remains of Rheims Cathedral it is due, as I have already said, to the robustness of its construction and not to any desire on the part of those bombarding it to spare it from utter destruction.

The monument, about which no troops were massed, towers above the rest of the town; to avoid it, in view of the uselessness of destroying it and because it was serving as a hospital, would have been an easy matter. The entire quarter of the city situated between it and the enemy is destroyed, including the Episcopal Palace, which contained the Archaeological Museum, the Episcopal Chapel, and what was known as the "Apartment of the Kings." This quarter also contained the principal commercial houses.

"Blind Rage" Causes Attack

It would seem that the only explanation which can be offered was blind rage upon the part of the besieging army.

There are two monuments of almost equal importance to the world which are in jeopardy of the same fate as the Cathedral of Rheims, viz., the Cathedrals of Noyon and Laon. That these will be respected is to be hoped, in spite of the ruthless and miserable attempt to reduce the glorious monuments of Rheims to ruins.

On Friday, Sept. 25, the Germans further shelled the Abbey of Rémy at Rheims, one shell exploding in the interior and destroying an immense quantity of glass. The civil hospital, which occupies the cloisters of St. Rémy, re-

ceived as its quota nine bombs, one of which killed four of the patients in the beds, and another one of the attendants. Needless to say that over this building also were flying flags of the Red Cross.

On Sunday, Sept. 27, I spent about two hours on top of the north tower of the cathedral, behind the parapets, where I could not be seen, watching the bombardment of the French forces, which was going on in the suburbs of the town, situated at about two kilometers from my point of vantage. It was most interesting, the precision with which the German shells arrived in groups of six at intervals of, I should say, three to five minutes. The French troops were all wonderfully covered so that they could not be seen, their guns being concealed under straw or beet leaves, according to the character of the ground upon which the battery was established.

No smoke came from their guns, their powder being absolutely smokeless, and yet the Germans seemed to have located them very thoroughly and kept up a continual bombardment, their shells landing repeatedly over the same place, seemingly, without any deviation whatever.

Shot Proclaims "Lights Out"

We all slept the Saturday and Sunday nights in Rheims, which was in a state of siege, all lights being out at 8 o'clock. One of our party foolishly left his window open while he had his light on; a pistol shot from the police drew attention to the fact, and the entire electric light of the hotel was immediately cut off.

In the daytime great numbers of the population would leave the city and go out in the suburbs on the safe side to watch the combat, returning at night to their homes to see what destruction had been occasioned and, if possible, to get a night's rest. I had a large quantity of tobacco with me, which was received by the troops and by the civilians with great joy, for they had seen none for a month, the Germans having taken everything.

While the commercial part of the city had been absolutely destroyed, in other parts one would find places where stray

shells had fallen, doing great damage. It all seemed absolutely ruthless and useless. The curé of the cathedral told me that the Germans during their occupation had established an observation post in the north tower with an electric searchlight. This they took away with them, and some of the French officers, during the first days of reoccupation, occasionally went up there to have a look, but the curé had strongly objected and they had given it up.

I know that the two days that I was there nobody but myself went into the tower and I did so unbeknown to the authorities, being very careful not to show myself, as I was assured it would draw fire if the Germans saw anybody moving about on it. I think, myself, that this is an exaggeration, as their line of observation must be at least seven or eight miles removed, and at that distance, even with a very strong glass, it would be almost impossible to distinguish a human silhouette.

We left Rheims at 7 o'clock on Monday morning, proceeding to Villers-Cotterets and stopping at Lafere-en-Tardenois, which was the headquarters of the English. The village had been bombarded before the arrival of the Germans, and the Mayor had taken refuge in the cellar of the Mairie. When the Germans arrived at about 3 o'clock they dragged him out and took him to a little place about three kilometers from Senlis, where he is supposed to have been questioned, together with other hostages. At 10 o'clock that night he was shot and buried where he fell.

The next day seven other hostages were shot in view of the fact that some civilians were accused of having fired upon the military. Three days after this the Acting Mayor and a party of citizens recovered the body of the Mayor, which had been buried under a very thin covering of earth in a very shallow grave—so much so that his hands and feet were uncovered. He had one bullet hole in his forehead, which would seem to indicate that the execution was not a military one, but that some officer had, for some

reason, shot him—perhaps in a moment of impatience.

From Senlis we went to Clermont, which is the headquarters of the left wing. There I had the great good fortune to be introduced to Gen. Castelnau, who showed me his maps and the way a battle was fought on paper. This is one of the greatest privileges I think I have ever enjoyed, and the curious part of it was that their way of working in the military art is very similar to the way we plot and scheme as architects. The General interested me as a very fine, simple citizen. Among other things he said to me:

“My dear Sir, how is it possible to fight with these people? They seem to have no mercy, no decency. It really seems impossible to know how to meet them.”

He had with him several of his staff officers, and one of them was charged with making a report upon the atrocities committed. He allowed me to read several of these reports and showed me photographs of one incident that impressed

me greatly. These photographs this officer had taken himself, and in order to prove that he had seen the incident and was on the ground he was himself in the photograph. This special happening was as follows:

In some little town to the east the Germans had taken out sixteen peasants and field laborers. They bound their hands either in front or at the back, tied them in bunches of five, cut their suspenders and unbuttoned their trousers so that escape was impossible and shot them in an open field. The report contained the names and ages of these poor chaps. The oldest, I remember, was 67, and several were over 50. The French had been able to get no explanation whatever of what had occurred, as the village was absolutely deserted. The persecution of women seems to be quite prevalent.

From here we returned to Paris, passing by Creil and Chantilly without any incident, arriving in Paris at about 8 o'clock at night.

WHITNEY WARREN.

WHO BEGAN THE WAR, AND WHY? THE SOCIALISTS' PART

HOW INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS ARMED AGAINST EACH OTHER

*Concluding Remarks of Emil Vandervelde, Belgian Minister of State,
Chairman International Socialist
Bureau, in Harlem Casino,
New York, Sept. 21*

You in the United States represent the International within a nation. You have undertaken to do what no nation of Europe has ever accomplished. You have taken the men and women and children of all nationalities and molded of them one uniform nation of peace.

This meeting here tonight is a demonstration of this. The International, unfortunately divided by war, has not been seen in Europe in weeks. I find it again in the United States—these United States, which are to be, not merely the United States of America, or the United States of capitalism, but the United States of the Socialism of the world.

At the last meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in Paris I can see gathered at the same table, Hugo Haase, the Chairman of the Parliamentary group of the German Social Democracy, drafting resolutions of peace on behalf of the entire International. And at the same table sat our unforgettable Jean Léon Jaurès, who fell at the first mad rush of the war tide. What a frightful succession of events have taken place since that time!

Jaurès dead; Guesde, the uncompromising, the Marxist, the Socialist, a member of the French Cabinet; Dr. Ludwig Frank, one of the most promising of the

young German Socialists, shot dead in battle! Socialists become national! French, Russian, Belgian, German, Austrian Socialists fighting one another, destroying one another!

Who was right, who wrong? Did the majority of the German Socialists, under the leadership of David, do right in voting the war credits asked by the Kaiser? Or did the minority do right, under the direction of Dr. Liebknecht, in refusing these credits? Who can pass judgment? But this we do know and can truthfully say—not a single capitalistic Government of all Europe but shares in the guilt.

“ENVOY OF MY PARTY”

*Statement by Jules Guesde, Minister in
France's War Cabinet and Exponent
of French Socialism,
at Paris, Aug. 29*

I go into the Cabinet as an envoy of my party, not to govern, but to fight. If I were younger, I would have shouldered a gun. But as my age does not permit this I will, nevertheless, face the enemy and defend the cause of humanity.

I am confident of final victory, and without hesitation as to its subsequent rôle in France, the party will never deviate from the line of conduct laid out. As the solidarity of workmen does not shut out the right to defend themselves against traitor workmen, so international

solidarity does not exclude the right of one nation to defend itself against a Government traitor to the peace of Europe.

France has been attacked, and she will have no more ardent defenders than the workmen's party.

MINISTER JULES GUESDE

Editorial Article in the New Yorker Volkszeitung, Aug. 28

Who would have suspected in 1904 that Jules Guesde would come to be once more a member of a Ministry, popular in its majority? Who would have thought then—it was in the time of the memorable debates over socialistic “ministerialism” in the Amsterdam Congress of the International—that there ever could come a time when this clear-headed and unswerving exponent of academic socialism would be forced by the need of the hour to take a step which in ordinary circumstances would be absolutely inconceivable for him?

And now this has actually happened. Jules Guesde, who has been called—in contrast to the easily moved emotional Jaurès—the stiff-necked dogmatist, is not only become Minister, but with him another proved Socialist champion, Marcel Sembat, who for his part, too, would rather have split the party than to have approved the entrance of Millerand into the Cabinet of Waldeck Rousseau.

But now these two are sitting on the same Ministerial bench, not only with this self-same Millerand, but with the much more deeply despised renegade Briand, with the anti-Socialist abettor Ribot, and the disgusting reactionary and favorite of the Czar, Pelcassi. The world seems to be unhinged.

Yet the incomprehensible is under the existing circumstances only too easily understood, Guesde and Sembat have taken this difficult step because there was no other choice for them, they had to take it. They, as representatives of a party which had sent 102 members to the Chamber of Deputies, could not refuse, when this was the question, to create a Ministry for Defense.

That was the question! It was demanded of all the larger parties that they put up their best—that is, their intellectually strongest—men for a Cabinet whose sole task was the defense of France. When this task is accomplished, when the war is ended in one way or the other, then the Ministry will undoubtedly dissolve, and the Ministerial magnificence of Comrades Guesde and Sembat will be at an end until the opportunity offers of creating a Socialist Ministry.

France, according to all news emanating from the scene of hostilities, is in an extraordinarily difficult situation. Should the German Army succeed, as seems already to have been the case in two places, in breaking through the French-Belgian-English chain of defense, then the way to Paris is as good as open. If nothing more, at least the reported preparations of the Parisians indicate that a siege is expected there in the very near future; and since Paris is still the heart of France, the taking of that city would be one with the fall of the French Republic.

If in such an hour of danger a nation calls upon its sons, there is for them no choice; they must answer the call.

Jules Guesde and Marcel Sembat did no more than their duty!

“REVOLUTION!”

Cry Raised by Jean Jaurès at Session of International Socialist Bureau, Brussels, July 29

The diplomats negotiate. It seems that they will be satisfied to take from Servia a little of its blood. We have, therefore, a little rest to insure peace. But to what lesson is Europe submitted? When after twenty centuries of Christianity, when after 100 years of the triumph of the principles of the rights of men, how is it possible that millions of persons, without knowing why, can kill each other?

And Germany? If she knew of the Austrian note, it is inexcusable to have permitted such a step. And if she did not know of this Austrian note, what is

her Governmental wisdom? You have an agreement which drags you into war and you do not know what you have been dragged for? I ask, What people have shown so much anarchy?

Nevertheless the authorities hesitate. Let us profit by it and organize. For us, French Socialists, our duty is simple. We do not need to impose on our Government a policy of peace. They are practicing it. I, who have never hesitated to bring upon my head the hatred of our patriots by my desire to bring about a Franco-German understanding, have the right to say that at this time the French Government desires peace.

The French Government is the best ally for peace of the English Government, which has taken the initiative in conciliation and gives to Russia advice of prudence and patience.

As for us, it is our duty to insist that it shall speak with force that Russia may abstain. If unfortunately Russia does not abstain, it is our duty to say, "We do not know of any other treaty except the one which binds us to the human race."

This is our duty, and in expressing it we find ourselves in accord with our German comrades who demand of their Government to see to it that Austria moderates its acts. It is possible that the telegram of which I spoke is due partly to that desire of the German workers. One cannot go against the wish of four millions of enlightened consciences.

Do you know what the proletariat is? They are the men who have collectively an affection for peace and a horror for war. The chauvinists, the nationalists, &c., are men who have collectively an affection for war and carnage. When they feel, however, over their heads the menace of conflicts, or wars which may put an end to their capitalist existence, then they remind themselves that they have friends who seek to reduce the storm. But for the supreme masters the ground is mined. In the drunkenness of the first battles they succeed in pulling along the masses. In proportion as

typhus completes the work of death and misery these men will turn to the masters of Germany, France, Russia, Austria, Italy, and so on, and will demand what reason they can give for all those corpses. And then the revolution will tell them: Go and demand grace from God and men.

COMPOSURE IS NECESSARY

Editorial Article for l'Humanite, Written by Jean Jaures on the Night He Was Assassinated, July 31

If we put things at their worst, if we take, in view of the most formidable hypothesis, the necessary precautions, let us keep the lucidity of our spirit, the firmness of our reason. To judge from all the common elements, it does not seem that the international situation is desperate. To be sure, it is grave, but all chances of an amicable adjustment have not disappeared. On one side it is evident that if Germany had a design to attack us she would have proceeded according to the famous sudden attack. On the contrary, she has allowed days to pass, and France, like Russia, could have put to profit this delay, the one, Russia, in order to proceed to a partial mobilization, the other, France, to take precautions compatible with the maintenance of peace.

On the other hand, Austria and Russia have entered into direct negotiations. Russia demands of Austria what treatment she reserves for Serbia. Austria answers that she will respect her "territorial integrity." Russia figures that it is not enough and that it must also include that "the sovereign rights of Serbia are guaranteed."

Even if discord comes between the views of Austria and those of Russia, one could measure the distance of the ideas and work on a solution of a problem whose points are determined. It is then, it seems, that the English idea of mediation which seeks a form, its means of expression, but which in the end will prevail, for it embodies the profound sentiments of the people, and without

doubt the desire of the rulers who feel rising toward them, like punishment, this peril of war, with which for a moment they thought of playing like a diplomatic toy.

If we judge what war itself will be and the effects it will produce by panic, sinister rumors, economic difficulties, monetary difficulties, and the financial disasters which the mere possibility of a conflict creates; when we think that even now we must postpone payments, and prepare to decree a forced circulation for the paper certificates, one asks if the most crazy or the sanest of men are capable to open such a crisis.

The greatest danger at this time is not, if I can say it, in the events themselves. It is not even in the real dispositions of the Chancelleries, however guilty they may be; it is not in the real will of the people; it is in the nervousness which is gaining, in the worry which is spread, in the sudden impulse which grows from fear, of the growing uncertainty, prolonged anxiety. To these crazy panics the crowd may give in, and it is not sure that the Governments, too, may give in. They spend their time (delicious occupation) to frighten and to reassure each other. And this, do not mistake, can last for weeks. Those who imagine that a diplomatic crisis must be or can be settled in a few days are mistaken. Just as the battles of modern war develop on an immense front, last seven or eight days, the same way the diplomatic battles, placing now in the game entire Europe and involving a number of powerful nations, will spread necessarily over several weeks. To resist this test one must have nerves of steel, or, better still, they need a firm reasoning, clear and calm. It is to the intelligence of the people, it is to their reasoning, that we must now make an appeal if we wish them to remain masters of themselves, escape the panics, dominate the excitement, and supervise the march of men and things, to spare the human race from the horror of war.

The danger is great, but it is not unavoidable if we preserve clearness of mind and a strong will, if we have both heroism of patience and heroism of action. The clear view of our duty will give us the power to accomplish it.

All the militant Socialist members of the Federation of the Seine are called, for next Sunday morning, to Wagram Hall, to a meeting where the situation will be explained, where the action which the International expects of you will be defined.

A number of meetings will keep in action the thought and will of the proletariat and will prepare the magnificent demonstration which will be a prelude to the labors of the International Congress.

What counts now is the continuity of action, the constant awakening of the reason and conscience of the workers. There lies true salvation. There lies the guarantee of the future.

PRESSURE FOR PEACE

Resolutions of International Socialist Bureau at Brussels, July 29

In assembly of July 29 the International Socialist Bureau has heard declarations from representatives of all nations threatened by a world war, describing the political situation in their respective countries.

With unanimous vote, the bureau considers it an obligation for the workers of all nations concerned not only to continue but even to strengthen their demonstrations against war in favor of peace and of a settlement of the Austro-Servian conflict by arbitration.

The German and French workers will bring to bear on their Governments the most vigorous pressure in order that Germany may secure in Austria a moderating action, and in order that France may obtain from Russia an undertaking that she will not engage in the conflict. On their side the workers of Great Britain and Italy shall sustain these efforts with all the power at their command.

The congress urgently convoked in Paris [it was never held] will be the

vigorous expression of the absolutely peaceful will of the workers of the whole world.

It is further resolved that the International Socialist Bureau congratulates the Russian workers on their revolutionary attitude, and invites them to continue their heroic efforts against Czardom as being one of the most effective guarantees against the threatened world war.

HUGO HAASE AT BRUSSELS

Speech of German Social Democratic Leader on July 30, Five Days Before His Declaration in the Reichstag

For twenty-five years Austria-Hungary has been attempting to strangle Serbia economically. Therefore, the ultimatum sent to Serbia must be regarded as a provocation to long desired war. As you know, Serbia's answer was so conciliatory in tone that if Austria had had the honest desire peace could have been brought about. Austria wanted war.

The most fearful thing about it all is that this criminal sport may deluge all Europe with blood. A telegram says that Austria does not wish to carry on a long war with Serbia, but only intends taking the capital city, Belgrade, by way of teaching Serbia a lesson. This rôle of the teacher punishing the pupils is both reprehensible and dastardly.

Austria seems to count upon Germany's help. Nevertheless, the German Socialists declare that secret negotiations have very little weight with the proletariat. The German proletariat says that Germany is not to involve herself, even if Russia enters in. The German capitalists, on the other hand, demand that Germany step in because Austria makes war with Serbia. And on the same illogical, reprehensible grounds the French capitalists are demanding war with Germany. The French proletariat is one with the German proletariat.

The people, sunk deep in want and despair, will at last awake and establish socialism. Yesterday thousands and

tens of thousands of them in Berlin protested against the war. Their slogan was: "Long live peace, and down with war!"

HAASE IN THE REICHSTAG

Speech of Aug. 4—"We Do Not Desert Our Fatherland"

We are face to face with a great crisis. The consequences of the imperialistic policy by means of which an era of competitive preparation for war has been inaugurated, and which has served to intensify hostile feeling between nations, have swept down over Europe like a torrent. The responsibility lies with those who have upheld this policy; we refuse it. [Applause from the Socialists.] Social Democracy has fought this disastrous development with all its strength, and even up to the very last hour, by means of prodigious public demonstrations, particularly in close co-operation with its brothers in France, [applause from the Socialists,] it has labored for the maintenance of peace. Its endeavors have been in vain. We now stand before the brazen facts of actual war; the horrors of hostile invasion threaten us. It is not for us today to decide for or against war, but to deliberate on the problem of the available means of national defense. We have now to think of the millions of our fellow-countrymen who, through no fault of theirs, have been drawn into this disaster. [Applause.] They will be the ones to suffer most heavily from the devastation of this war.

Our warmest sympathy, accorded without reference to party, accompanies all our brothers who have been called to the front. [Vigorous applause from all sides of the House.] We are thinking also of the mothers who must give up their sons, of the women and children robbed of their mainstay and support, of those whom, to the anxiety of their loved ones, the pangs of hunger threaten. To these will very soon be added tens of thousands of wounded and crippled soldiers. To stand by them all, to ease their misfortune, to alleviate their im-

measurable need—this we consider our compelling duty. [Vigorous applause.]

With a victory of the Russian despotism, which is stained with the blood of the best of its own people, much, if not all, which concerns our people and their future in freedom will be at stake. [Storm of applause.]

It is necessary to ward off the danger in order to render secure the culture and the independence of our own country. [Vigorous applause.]

Thus do we actualize what we have always claimed—in the hour of danger we do not desert our Fatherland! [Vigorous demonstrations of approval.]

In this regard we feel ourselves in perfect accord with the International, which has at all times recognized the right of every people to natural independence and self-defense, just as we agree with it in denouncing every war of conquest.

We demand that as soon as this purpose of securing national safety is achieved, and the combatants shall be disposed toward peace, that an end be made to the war through a peace which shall facilitate friendship between neighboring peoples. We demand this not only in the interests of that international solidarity for which we have continually fought, but also in the interests of the German people. We hope that the grisly lessons learned from suffering in this conflict will waken in new millions of hearts the horror of war, and will win them over to the ideal of Socialism and peace between nations.

Guided by these principles, we approve the proposed appropriations. [Vigorous applause.]

GERMAN SOCIALISTS DIVIDED

Letter From Dr. Carl Liebknecht, Social-Democratic Member of the Reichstag, in the Burger Zeitung, Bremen, Sept. 18

I understand that several members of the Socialist Party have written all sorts of things to the press with regard to the

deliberations of the Socialist Party in the Reichstag on Aug. 3 and 4.

According to these reports there were no serious differences of opinion in our party in regard to the political situation, and our own position and decision to assent to war credits are alleged to have been arrived at unanimously.

In order to present the dissemination of an inadmissible legend I feel it to be my duty to put on record the fact that the issues involved gave rise to diametrically opposite views within our parliamentary party, and these opposing views found expression with a violence hitherto unknown in our deliberations.

It is also entirely untrue to say that assent to the war credits was given unanimously.

SOCIALISTS STILL GERMANS

Letter From Philipp Scheidemann, Ex-Vice President of the Reichstag, in the New Yorker Volkszeitung, Sept. 10

BERLIN, Aug. 21.

—, I send you a few facts.

No one in Germany wanted this war. The fact that Germany declared war on Russia and finally on France does not contradict this statement. If Germany, who was exactly informed as to the preparations being made by her neighbors, had delayed for ever so short a time, Russia would have completed her mobilization which she had secretly been carrying on for some time, and with her Cossacks would have swept down on our eastern country, which was only moderately well protected. And then woe to us!

That the Government, after the failure of all its efforts to maintain peace, promptly took the initiative, disturbed not a little the Czar of Russia. This was perhaps indicated most dramatically by his manifesto to the Jews. This same Czar, whose hands are stained with the blood of many thousands of the Jews whom his servants of slaughter have murdered during the pogroms, this same Czar who has degraded and abused the

Jews in the most inhuman fashion, has now, in order to create an agreeable impression, issued a manifesto "to my beloved Jews!" Now when he has to fear that the Poles and those Jews living in Russian Poland may rise up against his army of shame, now does he begin to make bright promises for the future!

Russia to Blame

Upon Russia rests the entire responsibility for the present war. While the Czar was still negotiating with the German Kaiser for the declared purpose of bringing about peace, he was arming his troops not only against Austria but against Germany.

That France, republican France, has allied herself with Russian absolutism for the purpose of murder and destruction is an almost inconceivable fact. And that England, parliamentary England, democratic England, is fighting side by side with the Russians for "freedom and culture," that is a truly gigantic and shameless piece of hypocrisy.

I do not need to place before those of our readers who are schooled in socialism any comments on the causes of this war—the fact itself as it stands is of a stupendous, terrifying magnitude. And it is with this fact that we have now to reckon. Russia, France, Belgium, England, Servia, Montenegro, and Japan are now involved in this battle for "freedom and culture," which means fighting against Germany, against the world which has given birth to Goethe, to Kant, and to Karl Marx! It would be laughable were the situation not so desperately grave.

Socialism in each of the West European powers has done all it could to prevent the war. Its strength could not sufficiently prevail—it was not enough. On Aug. 1, 1914, socialism in each country found itself confronted with the hideous certainty of war. What was to be done?

On the 1st of August there was no longer any possibility whatsoever of sending a letter or telegram across the German frontier. The telegram of condolence which we sent to Paris on the assassination of Jean Jaurès never ar-

rived. Socialism in each country was forced back entirely upon itself.

At the time when I am writing this letter, Aug. 21, we in Germany know absolutely nothing concerning the details of the action taken in the Belgian and French Parliaments. Only this much has penetrated to us, that our comrades in all of the countries under consideration have come to the same conclusion as we in Germany. The French have approved the war credits, the Belgians have admitted Vandervelde to the Ministry for Defense. That our comrades in England have come out for the strictest neutrality is easily understood. Any other attitude on their part would be a crime against socialism. No one would be so ignorant as to find analogies between the situation of the German and the English Socialists. We in Germany had to perform the duty of protecting ourselves against Czarism, we had to accomplish the task of saving the country in which Social Democracy has reached its highest point of development, from impending subjection to Russia. In England the decision had to be made only as to whether sides should be taken in the conflict between Russia and Germany, or whether neutrality should be preserved.

A Germany under the yoke of the Czar would have set back a century the Socialist movement not only of Germany itself but of the whole world.

Moreover, we Social Democrats have never ceased to be Germans, because we belong to the Socialist International. And if we in the Reichstag have unanimously approved the war credit, we have done no more after all than to carry out what has often been repeated by our greatest Socialists from the Reichstag platform.

Quotes Bebel and Elder Liebknecht

The words of Bebel and of the elder Liebknecht have always been heard with favor in America. And what, for example, has Bebel said in this connection?

In the preservation of Germany's independence all the laboring classes, to the very least among them, are just as much concerned as those who consider themselves the chosen leaders and rulers

of the people, and the working class in nowise desires to bend its back under any sort of foreign rule.

Still more fully did Bebel declare himself during the session of the Reichstag of March 7, 1904. At that time he said:

Gentlemen: You cannot in the future carry on any successful wars without our aid. ["Very true!" "Right!" from the Socialists.] If you conquer you will conquer with us and not against us; without our help you can no longer subsist. ["True!" "Right!" from the Socialists.] I will go still further, we would have the greatest possible interest were we to be involved in a war—a war in which the existence of Germany was threatened, for—and I give you my word for it—we are ready to the last and the oldest man among us to shoulder arms and protect German soil not in service to you but to ourselves—as far as I am concerned, in fact in defiance of you. ["True indeed!" "Right!" from the Socialists.]

We live and fight on this soil, the land of our fathers, as much if not more our Fatherland than yours, to the end that it will be a joy even for the last and least among us to live therein. ["Very good!" from the Socialists.]

That is our endeavor and that it is which we are laboring to achieve, and it is for this reason that we shall repulse with all the power at our command and to our very last breath every attempt to snatch from this Fatherland one inch of land. ["Very good!" from the Socialists.]

There are numerous declarations of similar nature which have been uttered by our great friend, Wilhelm Liebknecht has also spoken in similar fashion. On the 28th of November, 1888, he addressed the Reichstag as follows:

What the opponents of German consolidation over there in France and Russia fear is a German people united for the defense of their land. And in this regard—that I can assure you—I have personally removed for our part every doubt, if any existed, among influential French politicians; if France attacks, straightway there is no party in Germany on which she can rely, and straightway every Socialist in Germany is pledged and prepared to march against the invader.

For years we have been slandered by our enemies in Germany as traitors and worse. The imperial anti-Socialist association has had an excellent example of this alleged treachery of ours. Our vote has stretched the anti-Socialists in

the dust, together with all the other political vultures who have lived by slandering us.

As Socialists of firm conviction we have voted for the war credit and moved this vote through a declaration from the party representative, Haase. In our programme we have demanded that a volunteer army replace the standing army. Why do we demand the volunteer army? Because we consider it the best protection against every attack on the Fatherland. This is it, then! We, too, wish to defend the Fatherland. Suppose that instead we had said in the hour of need: Yes, we want to protect our Fatherland against the knout regiments of the Czar all right enough, but we demand that protection from the militia! Since we do not as yet have the militia, we shall make no use of the standing army, for we would rather let the Cossacks into the country!

From whatever side we consider the situation, we German Socialists could not have acted otherwise than we have. A party like that of Social Democracy, the strongest in the country, cannot avoid the facts by hiding its head in the sand; it must act! It is no exaggeration to state that in the present crisis the entire German people is united. That the whole nation is determined, cost what it may, to end the war as speedily as possible, but at the same time victoriously. There is no one here who feels any resentment toward France, and every one wishes that a worthy peace will be established between Germany and France as soon as possible.

England's Shameful Role

England is playing a perfectly shameful rôle in this war. Even though France were allied to Russia by an unfortunate treaty, England was not so allied! But England, who has ever been jealous of the industrial development of our country, used the violation of our treaty of neutrality with Belgium, which was incurred only in dire need and which was yielded openly and honestly in the Reichstag by the Chancellor, as a pretext to declare war against us. And England crowned this abhorrent action by mobil-

izing against us an east Asiatic nation. Japan, whose sons have enjoyed the most genuine and far-reaching hospitality at our hands, whose culture has been enriched through us, who has won from us our industrial secrets, shows herself suddenly as the most despicable, the most treacherous nation of this whole world. I do not need to go into details over the demands which Japan has presented to Germany, for I assume that your readers are already in full possession of the facts.

Germany will perhaps lose a part of her colonial possessions in this war. Germany is in no position to protect these against many enemies during the war. Germany has steadily counted upon some colonial losses in the struggle. We Socialists especially have in our opposition to capitalistic colonial policy continually pointed to the fact that in the event of war colonies cannot be retained.

For the rest, however, Germany is of good courage. No one has the slightest doubt that our country will claim victory against the hostile oppression from without. In the meantime you in America have long since learned that all announcements of defeats which Germany is said to have suffered in the east, in the west, and on the sea, are lies. It is true that at Schirmek in Alsace a few cannon were lost by our troops. But, on the other hand, the fact is established that in the very first days after mobilization all the enemies' troops were completely driven from Germany, and further, that during the mobilization of our troops victorious battles occurred at Mülhausen and Lagarde in Alsace; that in the east they have made sharp inroads on the Russians; that they overcame Lüttich with all its forts and captured Brussels on the 20th of August.

Here in Germany we are expecting every moment news of the taking of Namur. The quicker decisive battles take place, by so much sooner will there be some possibility of establishing peace with France.

PHILIPP SCHEIDEMANN.

"CRITIQUE OF WEAPONS"

Karl Kautsky, in the Neue Zeit, Berlin, Aug. 8

Kautsky has for over a quarter of a century been one of the foremost Socialist leaders in Germany; the founder and present editor of the Neue Zeit. The present article on the war appeared before the periodical was suppressed by the Government.

War, with all its attendant horrors, has broken loose, the "Critique of Weapons" has been set up, and the weapons of criticism are consequently broken. This is not merely the inevitable result of the automatic limitations which would be imposed by any state of war, but rather—though this is but a transitory phase—because of an absolute lack of interest in any sort of critical estimate of the whole situation. In breathless suspense, every man is concentrating the whole of his mental energy on the news of the next moment, news concerning which none can make even fairly clear surmise, and about which one fact only is known in advance, that whatever it is, it is sure to be horrible. For relief from this wretched suspense men are looking to dispatches and decisions of battles, not to critical speculation.

Yet by the time these lines come before the reader this stage may already be giving way, and in all probability there will be beginning to be felt the need of regaining our usual attitude, of taking account of this monstrous event which has broken in on us so suddenly—so unexpectedly that for the moment it has stunned us—of making ourselves clear concerning the end toward which we are moving.

Of course, to discuss the chances of each or any of the combatants involved is out of the question; indeed, it would be a difficult task for the shrewdest military expert to establish a sound estimate, for there are probably few, perhaps none, to whom the armies under consideration are sufficiently well known for that. Besides all this, moreover, the present conflict is taking place under conditions absolutely different from any we have before known, totally new to our experience.

Formerly, when the situation was more simple than at present, there were always at the outbreak of war a few experienced experts who could correctly estimate the prospects for each side in the struggle, for it was usually fairly clear from the very beginning what each side wanted to gain and what in the case of victory each would gain. But in the present situation there is not a word of prophecy which can be uttered in face of the fact that the most terrible war known to history has broken out without any of the powers involved in the least wishing it. It was in Russia first that at the last moment the war party seemed to have gained the upper hand and to have set in motion the whole bloody sport. We may rely on it that the statesmen of Austria were of the honest belief that they could localize the conflict with Serbia.

But it is impossible any longer to consider this world war as a continuation of that conflict. Serbia has vanished completely from the horizon, and in the moment when that end disappeared from view each nation found itself suddenly fighting for nothing else save its own national integrity. The real purposes in this war will not come to the surface until the balance of the power becomes a little more sharply defined. Then in the victors' camp all manner of purposes and desires will suddenly spring up wide awake.

When Everything Is Over

Meanwhile, little as may be affirmed today concerning the prospects for the parties in this struggle and the manner of the war's conclusion, this assertion may safely be put forth: this world will wear a vastly different appearance when everything is over.

We hope, and may reasonably expect, that the war will be relatively short. The Franco-Prussian war lasted from the middle of July to the end of February; military operations began early in August and closed with the truce of Jan. 28. That the present war will be dragged out to so great a length, involving so incredible a number of men, demanding so severe a straining of energies—especially the financial—on the

part of all the nations, is hardly conceivable. But however short a time it may last, we shall emerge a world very different from before.

The time is long since past when a great war brings in its train no changes other than the ceding of a few square miles of conquered territory. Under the capitalistic method of production, continual changes, irreconcilable situations, constantly new problems pile up so rapidly that no great war is any longer possible which does not bring with it a prolonged breaking down as well as a building up of industrial organisms.

Especially is it clear that the non-European world will undergo a powerful change. The non-European nations are already in the ascendancy; more and more they are becoming a strong opposition force to Europe. Their advance must win tremendous impetus from a war which in every case will weaken seriously the European nations, no matter how it may swing the balance of power among them.

The United States particularly will derive the greatest profit from the struggle. Without any exertion whatsoever she is already able to control the entire American market, and in the Far East it is possible for her to exercise considerable restraint on her European competitors. In time she will be in a position to constitute herself the only great money power of that section of the world which employs the use of free capital. Already there is a colossal stream of European securities flowing to the United States, who is acquiring them at the very lowest prices. The remedy for the economic wrongs of Europe which will be created by this war as well as the fixing of indemnities will not be possible without the aid of America. At the very least, the conquered nations will be wholly dependent on American capital.

Next to the United States in this amazingly swift advance stand the nations of Asia and of Islam—Japan, China, India, Persia, Turkey with her tributary possessions. The progress of these nations has been considerably hampered by the control—both financial and military—exerted over them by the

European powers. In the free States this control has been suddenly lifted; in the dependencies, such as India, Persia, and Egypt, it has been materially weakened, and it will be long before it can again operate with the same force. We must reckon with the possibility of revolt among these nations and of their entrance into the world war. Russia, England, France—these could be considerably weakened by such a turn of affairs. Colonial policy would then show the obverse side of the medal. It might well prove a decided source of military and economic strength for Germany that her colonial possessions are relatively unimportant.

World Imperialism Doomed

The stronger the non-European nations become, the fewer grow the possibilities for a continuation of the policy of empire. This world war, born in the very midst of imperialism, can readily end in circumstances which knock the supports from under the imperialistic policy.

It may be said similarly of our world-wide preparation for war, that it, too, has been a direct consequence of imperialism; and our own party has steadily maintained that it would create an atmosphere in which powder would finally go off of itself—a spontaneous combustion.

The burdens imposed by this war will be so terrible that from the financial point of view it may be extremely difficult if not absolutely impossible when peace shall at length have been concluded to add thereto the burden of renewed preparation for war, especially in the face of competition with America, strong and industrially intact.

These changes must inevitably give an entirely new aspect to our external as well as to our internal political state. To what extent will follow changes in the political relations of the different classes it is too early yet to surmise. But here also there is every assurance for the assertion that political life will become stronger than ever before.

As soon as the "Critique of Weapons" ceases, immediately the weapons of criticism are bound to take on a sharper edge. What forms critical effort will

assume, against what it will direct its force, what circumstances will bring it to maturity, all of this lies in the lap of Time. In any case, Social Democracy, like any other party, will in that time need the full measure of its strength to assert itself and to protect the interests of the class of which it is made up. To preserve this strength through the vicissitudes which the future has in store is presently to be the most important problem of our internal politics.

We must hold intact the organizations and the party organs together with the trade unions; we must guard their members from imprudences as well as from defection. This goes without saying, and there is no true comrade who will not act in this spirit.

No less necessary, however, is unity within the party, the absolute relinquishing of all petty individual grievances. We are a party committed to self-criticism, but in time of a great crisis criticism must become mute. Never has it been more difficult, never, in fact, less possible, to adopt and to maintain a position which would satisfy every Socialist without exception. Every war brings Social Democracy into the fatal dilemma between the necessity for defending our individual homes on the one hand and, on the other, for preserving international solidarity. The present war confronts us as well as the army staff with particular difficulties, for it is a war possessing many faces. It is not only a war against the Czar of Russia, but also against the democracies of France and England, whose Governments felt themselves forced out of fear of isolation and later subjection to stand by the Russian Czar.

We can very easily understand how to many this or that decision by our party may seem a false step, but it would be still more false, still more disastrous, were we, through any difference of opinion, to allow an internal disagreement to arise. In time of war discipline is not for the army alone; for a party it, too, is the first requirement. Under its rule we must all stand together, more courageous, more firmly united than ever

before. Not criticism but faith is now the essential condition of our success.

KARL KAUTSKY.

SOCIALISTS OF ITALY FIRM

Manifesto Resenting German Mission of Herr Sudekum Issued by Socialist Party at Rome, Sept. 3

We are Socialists, and we do not hesitate to proclaim that the sending of a Socialist mission from Germany to Italy at this moment cannot be free from insidious suspicion; and as such it offends the dignity and the independence of Italian socialism, and offends it so much more because international socialism knows that on German Socialists depended the lesser or greater efficacy in the action of international socialism to arrest the provocative struggle of armaments promoted by Germany, and thus to prevent war.

It offends it so much more because the German Socialist Party, assuming for the justification of the aggressive policy of Germany and Austria the same arguments as the Kaiser's diplomacy, has lost the right to attach itself to the ties of international socialism.

We have thus far kept silent, not to disturb the neutrality proclaimed since the outbreak of the war by the Italian people, irrevocably decided not to dishonor themselves before the world and before history in giving aid to Austria and Germany, and requiring peace after two years of war in Lybia.

Today, however, we are no longer able to be silent in the presence of German Socialist activity encouraging the obscure play of diplomatic intrigues on the part of the Governments of the ex-Triple Alliance, which tends to move Italian neutrality toward the tortuous and perilous paths of indirect co-operation. We want to affirm that our wishes are for the immediate cessation of the war without conquerors or conquered.

But if now this hope is vain, we express our desire that this infamous war may be concluded by the defeat of those who have provoked it; the Austrian and German Empires, since the empires of

Austria and Germany form the rampart of European reaction, even more than Russia, which is shaken by democratic and Socialist forces, which have shown that they know how to attempt a heroic effort of liberation; since if the German and Austrian Empires emerge victorious from the war it will mean the triumph of military absolutism in its most brutal expression, of a barbarian horde massacring, devastating, destroying, and conquering in violation of every treaty and right of law.

Nor do the German Socialists give us any confidence of knowing how to restrain this; in the past they have only been able to realize advantageous contrasts of labor and to attain gigantic election results without exercising any influence in the policy of their own country.

The defeat of the German Empire may instead offer German socialism the opportunity of emerging from its voluntary impotence and redeem itself by breaking down the feudal political régime of the empire, taking away from Russian absolutism the assistance it has hitherto enjoyed, and contributing to alter decisively the aims of all European policy.

Since, finally, the victory of the French Republic, now imbued with genuine socialism, and that of England, where the truest democracy flourishes, signifies the victory of a European political régime open to all social conquests and desiring peace, it signifies the agreement between States at last free and nationally reinforced by the limitation of armaments and the substitution of a system of national militia for defense in the place of hordes professionally organized for aggression, which would imply the liberation as well of the German people.

Therefore, under actual conditions, while nearly the whole of Europe is at war, we may well raise our cry of horror and of protest; but our protest strikes only those who desired the war, not those who submit to it to defend themselves against oppression.

In this war is outlined on one side the defense of European reaction, on the other the defense of all revolutions, past and future, brought about by historical

necessity stronger than the intentions of Governments. And because of this we must confirm that there remains for us only one way of being internationalists—namely, to declare ourselves loyally in favor of whoever fights the empires of reaction, just as the Italian Socialists residing in Paris have understood that one way only remains to be anti-militarist—to arm and fight against the empires of militarism.

This is our answer as Italian Socialists to the German Socialists.

BRITISH MANIFESTO

Issued by Keir Hardie and Arthur Henderson, July 31, 1914

The long-threatened European war is now upon us. For more than 100 years no such danger has confronted civilization. It is for you to take full account of the desperate situation and to act promptly and vigorously in the interest of peace. You have never been consulted about the war.

Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of the sudden, crushing attack made by the militarist Empire of Austria upon Serbia, it is certain that the workers of all countries likely to be drawn into the conflict must strain every nerve to prevent their Governments from committing them to war.

Everywhere Socialists and the organized forces of labor are taking this course. Everywhere vehement protests are made against the greed and intrigues of militarists and armament mongers.

We call upon you to do the same here in Great Britain upon an even more impressive scale. Hold vast demonstrations against war in every industrial centre. Compel those of the governing class and their press who are eager to commit you to co-operate with Russian despotism to keep silence and respect the decision of the overwhelming majority of the people, who will have neither part nor lot in such infamy. The success of Russia at the present day would be a curse to the world.

There is no time to lose. Already, by

secret agreements and understandings, of which the democracies of the civilized world know only by rumor, steps are being taken which may fling us all into the fray.

Workers, stand together, therefore, for peace! Combine and conquer the militarist enemy and the self-seeking imperialists today, once and for all.

Men and women of Britain, you have now an unexampled opportunity of rendering a magnificent service to humanity and to the world!

Proclaim that for you the days of plunder and butchery have gone by; send messages of peace and fraternity to your fellows who have less liberty than you. Down with class rule! Down with the rule of brute force! Down with war! Up with the peaceful rule of the people! (Signed on behalf of the British Section of the International Socialist Bureau,)

J. KEIR HARDIE,
ARTHUR HENDERSON.

KEIR HARDIE'S QUESTIONS

Directed at Sir Edward Grey, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, in House of Commons, Aug. 27

Mr. Keir Hardie (Merthyr Tydvil, Lab.) asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made by the German Ambassador, ["White Paper," Page 66, Item No. 123,] together with his invitation to the Foreign Secretary to put forward proposals of his own which would be acceptable as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered by the Cabinet; and, if not, why proposals involving such far-reaching possibilities were thus rejected.

Sir E. Grey, (Northumberland, Berwick)—These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador on Aug. 1, and without authority to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85 in the "White Paper"—Miscellaneous, No. 6, [1914.]

The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next morning—that is, Sunday, Aug. 2—the conditions on

which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. ["Hear, hear!"] The German Chancellor had already been told on July 30 that we could not bargain that way.

On Monday, Aug. 3, I made a statement in the House accordingly. I had seen the German Ambassador again at his own request on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning, and I had no time to record the conversation, and therefore it does not appear in the "White Paper"; but it was impossible to withdraw that condition [loud cheers] without becoming a consenting party to the violation of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the communication described in No. 153 in the "White Paper" about the neutrality of Belgium. Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that communication had not been received when the "White Paper" was printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the "White Paper."

I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123 in the "White Paper" when I spoke in the House on Aug. 3. If I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality I must have referred to No. 85, the proposals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister subsequently, and this would have made the case against the German Government much stronger than I did make it in my speech. ["Hear, hear!"] I deliberately refrained from doing that then.

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German Ambassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his Government. He worked for peace; but real authority at

Berlin did not rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace failed. [Loud cheers.]

Mr. Keir Hardie—May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up negotiations with Germany on the basis of suggestions here set forth by the German Ambassador?

Sir E. Grey—The German Ambassador did not make any basis of suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal initiative and without authority, asked whether we would formulate conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, and those conditions were stated to the House and made known to the German Ambassador.

Mr. Keir Hardie [who was received with cries of "Oh!" from all parts of the House]—May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated the suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort at all [renewed cries of "Oh!" and "Order!"] was made to find out how far the German Government would have agreed to the suggestions put before them by their own Ambassador?

REPLY TO MINISTER GREY

Made by J. Ramsay Macdonald, Member of Socialist Labor Party, in House of Commons, Aug. 4

I would have preferred to remain silent this afternoon, but circumstances do not permit of it. I shall model what I have to say upon the two speeches to which we have just listened. The right honorable gentleman has delivered a speech the echoes of which will go down in history. However much we may resist the conclusions to which we have come, we have not been able to resist the moving character of his appeal. ["Hear, hear!"]

I think, however, he is wrong, and I think the Government for which he speaks is wrong. I think the verdict of history will be that they are wrong.

The effect of the right honorable gentlemen's speech in this House will not be its final effect. There may or may not be opportunities for us to go into details, but I want to say to the House, and without provocation, that if the right honorable gentleman had come here today and told us that our country was in danger, then I do not care what party he appealed to or to what class, we would be behind him. We would vote him what money he wants, and we would go further, for we would offer him ourselves—if the country was in danger. [Cries of "But it is!"] He has not persuaded me that it is, and he has not persuaded honorable friends with me that it is.

I am perfectly certain that when the right honorable gentleman's speech gets into cold print tomorrow he will not persuade a large section of the country. If the nation's honor were in danger we would be with them. There has been no crime committed by statesmen of this character without those statesmen appealing to the nation's honor.

We went into the Crimean war because of our honor; we rushed into the South African war because of our honor, and the right honorable gentleman is appealing to us today because of our honor.

If the right honorable gentleman would come to us and say that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger [cries of "It is invaded!"] and would assure us that he is going to confine the conflict to that quarter, then we will support him. But what is the use of talking about going to the aid of Belgium when you are really going into a European war which will not leave the map of Europe as it was before?

The right honorable gentleman said nothing about Russia. We want to know about that and try and find out what is going to happen after this is all over. We are not going to go blindly into this conflict without having at least some rough idea of what is going to happen afterward.

At all events, so far as France is concerned, we can say solemnly and definitely that no such friendship as is de-

scribed by the right honorable gentleman between one nation and another can ever justify one of those nations going into war on behalf of the other.

If France is really in danger, if as the result of all this we are going to have the power, civilization and genius of France removed in European history, let the right honorable gentleman say so. It is an absolutely impossible conception.

So far as we are concerned, whatever attacks may be made upon us, whatever may be said about us, we will take the action that he will take by saying that this country ought to have remained neutral [Labor cheers] because in the deepest parts of our hearts we believe that that was right and that that alone was consistent with the honor of the country and the traditions of the party that are now in office.

HOW ENVER PASHA LED TURKEY INTO WAR

*By Sir Louis Mallet, British Ambassador
to Turkey*

Sir Louis Mallet, British Ambassador to Turkey, sent a long dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, published in London on Dec. 11, 1914, describing the events in Constantinople which culminated in Turkey's rupture with the allied countries. Sir Louis tells how the Grand Vizier remained confident of his ability to keep Turkey out of the conflict, but how eventually the power of the war party proved too strong for him to struggle against. The dispatch in part reads as follows:

"In pursuance of a long-prepared policy the greatest pressure was exercised by Germany to force Turkey into hostilities. German success in the European war was said to be assured. The perpetual menace to Turkey from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be recovered, for the empire of India and other Moslem countries were represented as groaning under Christian rule and might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibility for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey

would emerge from war the one great power of the East, even as Germany would be the one great power of the West.

"Enver Pasha, dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal of political pan-Islamism and by the conviction of the superiority of German arms, was from the first a strong partisan of the German alliance. How far his several colleagues and other directing spirits outside of the Ministry entered into his views is to some extent a matter of speculation, but it may be taken as certain that the Sultan, the heir apparent, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, a majority of the Ministry, and a considerable section of the Committee of Union and Progress were opposed to so desperate an adventure as a war with the Allies.

"At what moment Talaat Bey, the most powerful civilian in the Cabinet and most conspicuous of the committee leaders, finally threw in his lot with the war party cannot be ascertained precisely. His sympathies were undoubtedly with them from the beginning, but the part which he actually played in the earlier stages is shrouded in mystery. I have reason to think that for some time he may have thought it possible by steering a middle course to postpone the decision until it was clearer what would be the result of the European war, and he may well have been anxious to gain time and to secure in exchange for Turkey's adhesion to the German cause something more solid than promises.

"These were tendered, indeed, on a lavish scale, but I am not aware that they were given in a form which could be considered binding. It is certain, in any case, that Talaat Bey's hesitations were overcome and that he had definitely joined the conspiracy to bring about war this Autumn some three weeks before the crisis was precipitated."

Sir Louis goes on to recount the steps which the war party, with German help and unchecked by the Cabinet, took to complete plans for military operations until the rupture was finally precipitated by the incursion of Bedouins into

the Sinai Peninsula and the bombardment of Russian ports in the Black Sea. Following these events, Sir Louis had another interview with the Grand Vizier, which he described as of a painful nature. The Grand Vizier besought him to believe the situation even then was not irretrievable, but Sir Louis replied that the time had passed for assurances, and unless some adequate satisfaction was immediately given by the dismissal of the German missions war with the Allies was inevitable. The Vizier informed him there would be a council that day, at which he would call upon his colleagues to support him in the determination to avoid such a result. The dispatch continues:

"The council was duly held, and, as he had predicted, the majority of the Ministers supported the Grand Vizier, who made a strong appeal in favor of peace, and was seconded by Djavid Bey, but the powerlessness of the Ministers to do more than vote in the council chamber was evident. The question of dismissing the German naval officers was discussed, but no decision was taken, and no Minister ventured even to propose the expulsion of the military mission.

"In the interval the war party had sealed their resolution to go forward by publishing a communiqué in which it was stated that the first acts of hostility in the Black Sea had come from the Russian side. Untrue and grotesque as it was, this invention succeeded in deceiving many of the public. It is not possible to establish by proof which of the Ministers had pre-knowledge of the German Admiral's coup, but it may be regarded as certain that Enver Pasha was aware of it, and it is highly probable that Talaat Bey was also an accomplice."

The dispatch further pays a warm tribute to the members of the United States Embassy for services rendered to British and French subjects, whose departure from the capital was being hindered by the Turkish military authorities. The assistance which Sir Louis received from Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador, particularly, he states, could not be exaggerated.

PERIOD III.

The Supreme Court of Civilization—Defense of the Dual Alliance—Woman and War—Might or Right—Possible Benefits From the Conflict—The Eucken and Haeckel Charges—Culture Versus Kultur—A New World Map—Verdict of the American People—Militarism and Christianity—Influence of Nietzsche on Germany—The Bitter Need of Belgium.

In the Supreme Court of Civilization

Argued by James M. Beck

THE NEW YORK TIMES submitted the evidence contained in the official "White Paper" of Great Britain, the "Orange Paper" of Russia, and the "Gray Paper" of Belgium to James M. Beck, late Assistant Attorney General of the United States and a leader of the New York bar, who has argued many of the most important cases before the Supreme Court. On this evidence Mr. Beck argued in the following article the case of Dual Alliance vs. Triple Entente.

LET us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, Nineteen Hundred and Fourteen, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous and less effective appeal to the arbitrament of arms.

Let us further suppose that each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of Christianity to have its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon or the rifle, but by the eternal criterion of justice.

What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?

Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start with the assumption that there is an international morality.

This fundamental axiom, upon which the entire basis of civilization necessarily rests, is challenged by a small class of intellectual perverts.

Some hold that moral considerations must be subordinated either to military necessity or so-called manifest destiny. This is the Bernhardi doctrine.

Others teach that war is a beneficent

fatality and that all nations engaged in it are therefore equally justified. On this theory all of the now contending nations are but victims of an irresistible current of events, and the highest duty of the State is to prepare itself for the systematic extermination, when necessary or expedient, of its neighbors.

Notwithstanding the clever platitudes under which both these doctrines are veiled, all morally sane minds are agreed that this war is a great crime against civilization, and the only open question is, which of the two contending groups of powers is morally responsible for that crime?

Was Austria justified in declaring war against Serbia?

Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?

Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?

As the last of these questions is the most easily disposed of, it may be considered first.

England's Justification.

England's justification rests upon the solemn Treaty of 1839, whereby Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia "became the guarantors" of the "perpetual neutrality" of Belgium, as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck, then Chancellor of the North German Confederation, on July 22, 1870, and as even more recently reaffirmed in the striking fact disclosed in the Belgian "Gray Book."

In the Spring of 1913 a debate was in progress in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag with reference to the Military Budget. In the course of the debate the German Secretary of State said:

"The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international conventions, and Germany is resolved to respect these conventions."

To confirm this solemn assurance, the Minister of War added in the same debate:

"Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the German scheme of military reorganization. The scheme is justified by the position of matters in the East. Germany will not lose sight of

the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties."

A year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the German Minister at Brussels, assured the Belgian Department of State that he knew of a declaration which the German Chancellor had made in 1911, to the effect "that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality," and "that he was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that time *had not changed.*" (See Belgian "Gray Book," Nos. 11 and 12.)

Apart from these treaty stipulations, which are only declarations of Belgium's rights as a sovereign nation, The Hague Conference, in which forty-four nations (including Germany) participated, reaffirmed as an axiom of international law the inherent right of a nation to the sanctity of its territory.

It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn obligations and protestations, when the present Chancellor of the German Empire, in his speech to the Reichstag and to the world on Aug. 4, 1914, frankly admitted that the action of the German military machine in invading Belgium was a wrong. He said:

"We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. *Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law.* It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. *The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing* we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought—how he is to hack his way through."

This defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a plea of "Guilty" at the bar of the world. It has one merit, that it does not add to

the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually rests the case of Germany upon the gospel of Treitschke and Bernhardi, that each nation is justified in exerting its physical power to the utmost in defense of its selfish interests and without any regard to considerations of conventional morality. Might as between nations is the sole criterion of right. There is no novelty in this gospel. Its only surprising feature is its revival in the twentieth century. It was taught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his treatise, "The Prince," wherein he glorified the policy of Cesare Borgia in trampling the weaker States of Italy underfoot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled ferocity, and the basest deception. Indeed, the wanton destruction of Belgium is simply Borgiasism amplified ten-thousandfold by the mechanical resources of modern war.

This Answer Cannot Satisfy.

Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism; unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind after uncounted centuries has made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Germany's contention that a treaty of peace is "a scrap of paper," to be disregarded at will when required by the selfish interests of one contracting party, is the negation of all that civilization stands for.

Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of any offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will "plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation of its taking off." On that issue the Supreme Court could have no ground for doubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable.

The remaining two issues, above referred to, are not so simple. Primarily, and perhaps exclusively, the ethical ques-

tion turns upon the issues raised by the communications which passed between the various Chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is the amazing feature of this greatest of all wars that it was precipitated by diplomats and rulers, and, assuming that all these statesmen sincerely desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian ultimatum, (which is by no means clear,) it was the result of ineffective diplomacy, and clumsy diplomacy at that.

I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war and the anterior and more fundamental causes; nevertheless, with the world in a state of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely affecting the integrity of nations and the balance of power in Europe, is suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and for the space of about a week a series of diplomatic communications passed between the Chancelleries of Europe, designed on their face to prevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and the fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly, the nature of the differences between the Governments involved. The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the record that has been made up by the official communications which can, therefore, be treated as documentary evidence in a litigated cases.

A substantial part of that record is already before the court of public opinion in the British and German "White Papers," the Russian "Orange Paper," and the Belgian "Gray Paper," and the purpose of this article is to discuss what judgment an impartial and dispassionate court would render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted.

Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the record as thus made up discloses, *but also by the significant omissions of documents known to be in existence.*

The official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any

failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their possession, but the German "*White Paper*" on its face discloses the suppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession.

We know from the German "*White Paper*"—even if we did not conclude as a matter of irresistible inference—that many important communications passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable that some communications must also have passed between those two countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies had commenced an *aggressive* war, which released her from any obligation under the Triple Alliance.

The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"

"we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the *utmost* and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy."

[German "*White Paper*."]

This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving other diplomatic documents had only added the *text* of the advice which it thus gave Vienna.

The same significant omission will be found when the same official defense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria "to begin the

conversation with Mr. Sazonof." But here again the *text* is not found among the documents which the German Foreign Office has given to the world. The communications, which passed between that office and its Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given *in extenso*, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German official defense it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna and only two that passed from Vienna to Berlin.

This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them.

Until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world, remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of Germany's mediatory efforts.

Austria's Case Against Servia.

To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take us outside the documentary record and into the realm of disputed facts and would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.

Let us therefore suppose *arguendo* that our imaginary court would commence its consideration with the assumption that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June 28, 1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of Servian sympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspiration and encouragement in the political activities either of the Servian Government or of political organizations of that country.

The question for decision would then be not whether Austria had a just grievance against Servia, but whether having regard to the obligations which Austria, as well as every other country, owes to civilization, she proceeded in the right manner to redress her grievance.

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo. For nearly a month there was no action by Austria and no public statement whatever of its intentions. The world profoundly sympathized with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch, who, like King Lear, was "as full of grief as years and wretched in both."

The Servian Government had formally disclaimed any complicity with the assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen implicated therein.

From time to time, from June 28 to July 23, there came semi-inspired intimations from Vienna that that country intended to act with great self-restraint and in the most pacific manner. In his speech to the French Chamber of Deputies Viviani says that Europe had in the interval preceding July 23 express assurances from Austria that its course would be moderate and conciliatory. Never was it even hinted that Germany and Austria were about to apply in a time of profound peace a match to the powder magazine of Europe.

This is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English "White Paper" from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumhold, dated July 20, 1914. It is one of the most significant documents in the entire correspondence. At the time this letter was written it is altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and most unreasonable ultimatum had already been framed and approved in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he

"asked the German Ambassador today [July 20] if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia." The German Ambassador replied "that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step."

Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,

"in speaking to the Italian Ambassador

in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up."

The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the German Ambassador that he "assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial," and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.

[English "White Paper," No. 1.]

Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, on the theory that the true function of an Ambassador is "to lie for his country," or the thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that even the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in progress.

The British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir Edward Grey:

"The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the note to Servia was preceded by a period of *absolute silence* at the Ballplatz."

He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at Vienna—note the significance of the exception—not a single member of the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that the French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on July 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the impression that its tone was moderate. Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's confidence.

[Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.]

No better proof of this sense of security need be adduced than that the French President and her Foreign Minister were thousands of miles from Paris, and the

Russian Minister had, after the funeral of the Austrian Archduke, left Vienna for his annual holiday.

The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express assurance that

"the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening attitude."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 18.]

This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the two allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war without first consulting Germany.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private information that the German Ambassador [at Vienna] knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador himself "indorses every line of it." [English "White Paper," No. 95.] As he does not disclose the source of his "private information," this testimony would not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official defense in the German "White Paper," we find that the German Foreign Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and not only approved of Austria's course but

literally gave her a carte blanche to proceed.

This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's attitude and pacific protestations that we quote *in extenso*. After referring to the previous friction between Austria and Serbia, the German "White Paper" says:

"In view of these circumstances, Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ally."

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact that the British Ambassador at Berlin, in his letter of July 22 to Sir Edward Grey, states that *on the preceding night* [July 21] he had met the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was made to a possible action by Austria.

"His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries."

He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country should approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had

"on several occasions in conversation with the Servian Minister emphasized

the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing."

[English "White Paper," No. 2.]

Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to which Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse continuing through many centuries a United European State exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against Serbia without interference from any other power, even though, as was inevitable, the humiliation of Serbia would destroy the status of the Balkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.

No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which it gave either Serbia or Europe. Serbia had forty-eight hours to answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty and virtually admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the full text of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly twenty-four hours after its service upon Serbia, the other European nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.

[English "White Paper," No. 5; Russian "Orange Paper," No. 3.]

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the fact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in

Paris, London, and St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments that

"the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon as justified."

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the substance of the ultimatum?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P. M. Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also at least of the substance thereof.

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for Austria's action—a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of the whole business—yet the more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this conclusion for a moment.

The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to anticipates that Serbia "will refuse to comply with these demands"—why, if they were justified?—and Germany suggests to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left to it."

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned," and he added that Germany strongly desired

"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure."

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war upon Serbia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated Governments of Germany a *confidential communication* in which he recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the part of Serbia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added that

"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Serbia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"

but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone—

"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, *which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize.*"

In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor declares the strong interest which Germany

had in the punishment of Serbia by Austria. He says "*our closest interests therefore summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary,*" and he adds that

"if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the entire might of the German Empire."

[German "White Paper," Annex 2.]

In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be betrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.

No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending that his nation wished nothing but peace and invoking Divine aid for its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted occasion when Sir Joseph Surface talked "much of "honor," it might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.

Let us, then, analyze the record as already made up; and for the sake of clearness the events which preceded the war will be considered chronologically.

Immediately upon the receipt of the ultimatum in St. Petersburg on July 24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a formal communication to Austria-Hungary, suggested that the abrupt time limit "leaves to the powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have arisen," and added:

"To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the powers, which can follow the method of action of the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us that, above all, the delay given to Serbia to reply should be extended."

Sazonof further suggested that time should be given for the powers to ex-

amine the results of the inquiry that the Austro-Hungarian Government had made in the matter of the Serajevo assassination, and stated that if the powers were convinced

"of the well-groundedness of certain of the Austrian demands they would find themselves in a position to send to the Servian Government consequential advice."

He justly observes that "a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum * * * would be in contradiction with the very bases of international relations."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 4.]

Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done to preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the uttermost farthing.

Concurrently with Sazonof's plea for a little time to preserve the peace of the world, Sir Edward Grey had seen the German Ambassador on July 24 and had suggested to him that the only method of preventing the catastrophe was

"that the four powers, Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, (England,) should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg."

[English "White Paper," No. 11.]

Germany had only to intimate to Austria that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," as well as common courtesy to great and friendly nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Serbia, but to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially as the period was one of Summer dullness and many of the leading rulers and statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.

Under these circumstances was it not natural that Russia should announce on July 24

"that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia would not leave Russia indifferent,"

and that on the same day the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna suggested to the Austrian Foreign Office

"that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was

both unusual and peremptory in its terms"?

To which the only reply of the Austrian Foreign Minister was that their representative of Serbia

"was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted in their integrity by 4 P. M. tomorrow."

[English "White Paper," No. 7.]

Austria's only concession then or subsequently to the cause of peace was the assurance that Austria would not *after its conquest* of Serbia demand any territory.

The action of Germany on this day, July 24, is most significant. Its Ambassador in England communicated a note to Sir Edward Grey in which it justified Austro-Hungarian grievances and ultimatum by saying that

"under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate."

The note added:

"The Imperial Government [Germany] want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned."

[English "White Paper," No. 9.]

On July 25, probably to the great surprise of both Germany and Austria, which had definitely calculated upon Serbia's non-compliance with the ultimatum, the latter country, under the conciliatory advice of Russia and England, made a reply in which, at some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign State, it substantially accepted all but one of the demands of Austria, and as to that it did not, in terms, refuse it, but expressed its willingness to refer it either to arbitration or to a conference of the powers.

[English "White Paper," No. 39.]

No court would question for a moment the conclusion that the reply was a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands, nor indeed did either Germany or Austria seriously contend that

it was not. They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances, calling the concessions "shams," and of this it is enough to say that if Germany and Austria had accepted Serbia's reply as sufficient, and Serbia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises thus made in the utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Serbia, and no general war. Indeed, both Russia and England pledged their influence to compel Serbia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of Austria. The outstanding question, which Serbia agreed to arbitrate or leave to the powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem. Austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily attained by having the neutral powers appoint a commission of jurists to make such investigation.

On July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the German Ambassador to use his good influences at Vienna to secure an extension of time. To this most reasonable request the answer and action of the German Government was disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to "pass on" the suggestion, but the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that as the Austrian Prime Minister was away from Vienna there would be delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended, and

"he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government *wished to give the Servians a lesson and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that the Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.*"

He added that Germany did not want a general war and "he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity."

[English "White Paper," Nos. 11 and 18.]

Immediately on the issuance of the ultimatum the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, had most inopportunistically taken himself to Ischl, where he remained until after the expiration of the

time limit. Access to him proved difficult, and the Russian Chargé at Vienna, having lodged a pacific protest with the Acting Foreign Minister in order to take no chances, telegraphed it to Berchtold at Ischl. Nevertheless, Berchtold's apparently designed absence from the capital was Germany's excuse for its failure to get the time limit extended.

If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to Vienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace. Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.

Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on the morning of July 25 offered "to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy."

[English "White Paper," No. 17.]

As Russia was the member of the Triple Entente most interested in the fate of Serbia, what proposal could have been more conciliatory or magnanimous?

On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four powers (including Germany) should unite

"in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier and to give time for the four powers, acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate."

[English "White Paper," Nos. 24 and 25.]

To this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied:

"First and last, we take the ground that this question must be localized by the abstention of all the powers from intervention in it,"

but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,

"co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between Russia and Austria."

[German "White Paper," Annex 13.]

This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the difference be-

tween tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's difference with Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Serbia. Germany would not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract proposition mediate between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes the two things were indistinguishable.

How she "co-operated" we shall presently see.

All that Germany *did* on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was to "pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any indorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally's request for more time if it had ever been made?

The Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the ultimatum, absented himself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna, as already stated, succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request verbally to the Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit it to Count Berchtold, *but that he could predict with assurance a categorical refusal*. Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely advised that no time extension would be granted.

[Russian "Orange Paper," Nos. 11 and 12.]

Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted. A colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats. A timely word from the German Chancellor would have saved the flower of the youth of Germany and Austria from perishing. It would be difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a friendly power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.

Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France, and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily arresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Rus-

sia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and Serbia not to cross the frontier "until we had had time to try and arrange matters between them," but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign Office that "once she [Austria] had launched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw back."

[English "White Paper" No. 25.]

As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession. Its attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany approved its point of view,

"and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not allow herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally."

This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that its duties to civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria, whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war may be defensible, but to support it in times of peace in an iniquitous demand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of international morality.

On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in common of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. *To this Austria never even replied*. The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in reply to a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to Vienna to meet Serbia in the same conciliatory spirit which Serbia had shown, the Ambassador answered that

that "was not possible in view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict."

On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace of Europe, the German Chancellor replied with the pitiful quibble that "it is impossible to bring our ally before a European court in its difference with Serbia," although it affected to accept "in principle" the policy of mediation.

Germany's acceptance "in principle" of a policy which she in practice thwarted suggests the law-abiding tendencies of that Maine statesman who was "for the Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its enforcement."

[English "White Paper," No. 46.]

Germany's refusal to have Serbia's case submitted to the powers even for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that the German Ambassador at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German Secretary of State as saying

"that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept," thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust. Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Serbia and marched into that country "it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved."

He added that the Servian reply

"should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause,"

and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna, but the German Secretary of State on July 27 replied that such a conference "was not practicable," and that it "would practically amount to a court of arbitration," and could not, in his opinion, be called together "except at the request of Austria and Russia."

[English "White Paper," Nos. 43 and 46.]

That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had actually commenced its military operations. Germany's attitude is best indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27 he called at the German Foreign Office and asked it

"to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 38.]

Why not? Russia had advised Serbia to yield, and Serbia had conceded nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace were sincere? All that Russia and England desired was that a little time and consideration should be given, without prejudice to the rights or claims of Austria, before the peace of the world was hopelessly shattered.

Before this interview took place the French Ambassador had called at the German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany, Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that Austria and Serbia

"should abstain from any act which might aggravate the situation at the present hour."

By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no invasion of Serbia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. *To this the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal.*

On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had "a long and earnest conversation" with the Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that

"something would be done before Serbia was actually invaded. Baron Machio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on

the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors."

The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it could to keep the Servians quiet,

"and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to gain time."

He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

"who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent power."

The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[English "White Paper," No. 56.]

On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French Foreign Office and strongly insisted on the "*exclusion of all possibility of mediation or of conference*," and yet contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had

"started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna."

What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for that country, after stating his conviction "that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair,"

claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged

"either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations";

but the Austro-Hungarian Government—playing the rôle of the wicked partner of the combination—"in full appreciation of our mediatory activity," (so says the German "White Paper" with sardonic humor,) replied to this proposition that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, "*it was too late*."

Does any reasonable man question for

a moment that, if Germany had done something more than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?

On the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any possibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs

"said, quietly but firmly, *that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Servian note*; that war would be declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned."

To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of Austria's quarrel the British Ambassador suggested "the larger aspect of the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger aspect," which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he

"had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement and which could no longer be postponed."

[English "White Paper," No. 62.]

The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with Berchtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of Europe and the desirability of good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

To this Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet at St. Petersburg.

"He told me that, on the other hand,

the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Serbia, *could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.*"

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 45.]

On the same day, July 28, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposal of conference of the neutral powers, on the ground that he did not think it would be effective, "because such a conference would in his opinion have the appearance of an 'Areopagus' consisting of two powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers."

After engaging in this pitiful and insincere quibble, and when reminded of Serbia's conciliatory reply, amounting to a virtual surrender,

"his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia was a purely Austrian concern, *with which Russia had nothing to do.*"

[English "White Paper," No. 71.]

At this point the rulers of the countries intervened in the dispute. The Kaiser, having returned from Norway, telegraphed the Czar, under date of July 28, that he was

"exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia,"

and invoked the Czar's aid.

[German "White Paper," Annex 20.]

If the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been, *his attitude was not that of his Foreign Office.* Upon the face of the record we have only his own assurance that he was doing everything to preserve peace, but the steps that he took or the communications he made to influence Austria *are not found in the formal defense which the German Government has given to the world.* The Kaiser can only convince the world of his innocence of the crime of his Potsdam camorra by giving the world the *text* of any advice he gave the Austrian officials. He has produced his telegrams to the

Czar. *Where are those he presumably sent to Francis Joseph or Count Berchtold? Where are the instructions he gave his own Ambassadors or Foreign Minister?*

It is significant that on the same day Sazonof telegraphed to Count Benckendorff:

"My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is rather favorable to the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria,"

and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that

"the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action on its ally."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 43.]

On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had that night seen the German Chancellor, who had "just returned from Potsdam," where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor then showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral Germany would agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When asked about the French colonies, no assurance was given.

[English "White Paper," No. 85.]

Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador, and expressed regret

"that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion."

[English "White Paper," No. 75.]

On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. [Russian "Orange Paper," No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German Government

"to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, *could be applied.*"

To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like pressure it might "*cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and present a fait accompli.*" [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 29—English "White Paper," No. 70.]

This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war, as though the declaration of war against Serbia had not been planned and expected from the first.

As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications.

To this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced, but, as usual, *nothing whatever was done.* [English "White Paper," No. 76.] It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was assured by the German Ambassador that the German Foreign Office was "endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Serbia,"

but again the communications which the German Foreign Office sent to Vienna on this point *have never yet been disclosed to the world.*

[English "White Paper," No. 84.]

In this same conference Sir Edward Grey

"urged that the *German Government should suggest any method* by which the influence of the four powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation *by any method that Germany could suggest* if mine were not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace."

[English "White Paper," No. 84.]

The difficulty was, however, that Germany never "pressed the button," although obviously it would have been easy for her to do so, as the stronger and more influential member of the Double Alliance.

On the same day the Austrian Government left a memorandum with Sir Edward Grey to the effect that Count Mensdorff said that the war with Serbia must proceed.

On the night of July 29 the British Ambassador at Berlin was informed that the German Foreign Office "*had not had time to send an answer yet*" to the proposal that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but that the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian Government with a request as to "what would satisfy them."

[English "White Paper," No. 107.]

On the following day the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that the German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, to promise not to advance further, while the powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if Germany ever exercised any such pressure upon Vienna, *no evidence of it has ever been given to the world.* Certainly it was not very effective, and for the reasons mentioned it is impossible to conclude that the advice of Germany, if in good faith, would not have been followed by its weaker ally.

From all that appears in the record, Austria made no reply to this most conciliatory suggestion of England, but, in the meantime, the irrepressible Kaiser made the crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar that the mobilization of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria was affecting his position of mediator, to which the Czar made a conciliatory reply, stating that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against Austria.

The Czar, to put at rest any anxiety of the Kaiser as to Russia's intentions with respect to Germany, added:

"I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. *As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon.* I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe."

What more could Russia do? If Austria continued to mobilize, why not Russia?

On this day, July 30, the German Ambassador had two interviews at St. Petersburg with Sazonof, and it was then that Sazonof drew up the following formula as a basis for peace:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, *Russia engages to stop all military preparations.*"

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 60.]

At this stage King George telegraphed Prince Henry of Prussia that

"the English Government was doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparation."

The King adds a hope that the Kaiser "will use his great influence to induce

Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe."

[Second German "White Paper."]

This last proposition, however, was never accepted or declined, for the impetuous Kaiser gave his twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize, and this was an arrogant demand which no self-respecting power, much less so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept.

While this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey was making his last attempt to preserve peace by asking Germany to sound Vienna, as he would sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would

"undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory."

Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that if this was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that

"his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the consequences," which obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf of Germany and Austria.

On the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin besought the German Foreign Office to

"put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis."

And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied that last night he had

"begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter."

Again the text of the letter in which Germany "begged" Austria to be conciliatory is not found in the record.

The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to mobilize does not justify the war. Mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but simply preparation. If Russia had the right to mobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of the three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to demobilize. Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities. It is the right of the sovereign State and by no code of ethics a *casus belli*. The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend itself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has few, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery. It treated Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State.

It must be observed that, while Germany insisted that Russia should demobilize, the Kaiser offered no reciprocal promise. On his theory Germany and Austria were to be left free to complete their preparations, but Russia was to tie her own hands and leave herself "naked to her enemies." This is shown by the last telegrams which passed between the Czar and Kaiser. The Czar telegraphed:

"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long-trying friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply."

To this the Kaiser replied:

"I thank you for your telegram. I have shown yesterday to your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the

subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you, without delay, order your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

This impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist from military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunistically, for on Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador *for the first time* declared to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and it was then suggested that the form of the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in London. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English Ambassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible to maintain peace.

"if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war."

[English "White Paper," No. 131.]

but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred on by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he "let slip the dogs of war." After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the Czar telegraphed King George:

"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more I have done all in my power to avert war."

Such will be the verdict of history.

The Judgment.

These are the facts as shown by the record, and upon them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following judgment:

1—That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Serbia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportion-

tionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Serbia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

- 2—That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.
- 3—That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria, but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.
- 4—That Austria having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.
- 5—That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war.
- 6—That Belgium as a sovereign State has as an inherent right the power to determine when and under what conditions an alien can cross her frontiers. This right exists independently of treaties, but is, in the case of Belgium, reinforced by the Treaty of 1839 and The Hague Convention, whereby the leading European nations (including Germany) guarantee its "perpetual neutrality." The invasion of Belgium by Germany was in violation of these rights, and England only respected its own solemn covenant when, in defense of that neutrality, it declared war against Germany.

In Conclusion.

The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with reluctance, as he

has a feeling of deep affection for the German people and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more he admires the magnificent courage with which the German Nation, beset on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as a nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any considerations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the German Nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen and its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on earth, and therefore infallible.

In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should therefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the German people.

The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the failure to disclose to the German people the diplomatic communications hereinbefore quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not merely a crime against civilization, but also against the deceived and misled German people. They have a vision and are essentially progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while the ideals of their military caste are those of the Dark Ages.

One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble and peace-loving nation into this fathomless chasm of misfortune.

"Though the mills of God grind slowly,
Yet they grind exceeding small,
Though with patience He stands waiting,
With exactness grinds He all."

Critics Dispute Mr. Beck

By George E. Bernheimer

IT is regrettable that President Wilson's admirable policy of strict neutrality is not more sincerely and carefully observed by the press and public of this country.

We are a cosmopolitan nation. Citizens of the five great warring countries and their descendants, to a very great extent, constitute our population. Partiality of any kind tends to destroy the elemental ties which bind us together, to disrupt our Union, and to make us a house divided against itself. James M. Beck's article in last Sunday's *TIMES* is of the kind which, serving no good purpose, helps to loosen, if not sever, our most vital domestic ties. While not for an instant doubting Mr. Beck's sincerity, we must take issue with his inadvertent ill-timed expression of opinion.

The article in question is based on the following statement: "Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start with the assumption that there is such a thing as international morality." How does Mr. Beck define "international morality"? How can he assume that to exist which each of the contending nations by their diverse actions prove to be non-existent? How can he claim that there is an "international morality" of accepted form when each nation claims that its interpretation must be accepted by the others?

Mr. Beck's allegation that the question "Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?" is more easily disposed of than the questions "Was Austria justified in declaring war against Serbia?" and "Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?" proves two things—first, that his interest lies primarily in the vindication of England; second, that he disregards the fundamental causes and recognizes only the precipitating causes of the war.

The precipitating cause of the war between England and Germany is verbosely

if inadequately covered by his article. We must admit that a treaty was broken by Germany, yet we contend that this broken agreement was a pretext for a war fomented and impelled by basic economic causes. At the outset, let us distinguish between a contract and a treaty. A contract is an agreement between individuals contemplating enforcement by a court of law; punishment by money damages in the great majority of cases, by a specific performance in a very few. A treaty is an agreement between nations contemplating enforcement by a court of international public opinion; punishment by money indemnity in the great majority of cases, by specific performance (i. e., force of arms) in a very few.

Germany's Existence Threatened.

Germany contends that her breach of treaty obligation is punishable by the payment of money indemnity to the aggrieved party. This she has offered to do in the case of Belgium, as she has already done in the case of Luxemburg. Germany's existence was so seriously threatened that her action seems justifiable, and there remains a sole moral obligation to compensate any neutral country injured by her.

The mere fact that Belgium had made an unfortunate alliance with England is deplorable in that Belgium has suffered terribly; but this suffering is not attributable to Germany. When Japan violated Chinese neutrality, China protested. Though she was entitled to a money indemnity, there is no valid reason under the sun why the United States as a guarantor of the integrity of China should declare war against Japan. England's justification, in so far as there can be any justification for adding to the toll of death, is the same as that of Germany, the preservation of national sovereignty.

Further: "It seems unnecessary to

discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn obligations." There can be nothing wanton in a struggle for existence, and that this European war is such a struggle is the only possible explanation of its magnitude, ferocity, and vast possible consequences. Then, too, though deplorable, treaty obligations are not solemn, as Italy has proved to the complete satisfaction of so many. Italy's contention that this is an aggressive war on the part of Germany and Austria is as untenable as the German contention that it is an aggressive war on the part of England. For this war was not an aggressive war on the part of any nation, but an unavoidable war caused by the simultaneous bursting of the long-gathering economic storm clouds.

Again: "The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the record that has been made up by the official communications." This is similar to a contention that the ethical rights in a case in court must depend upon the astuteness of counsel in summing up to the jury. "A court would be deeply impressed * * * by the significant omissions of documents known to be in existence." A court of law, as our former Assistant Attorney General of the United States surely knows, compels no one to give testimony that tends to incriminate, and, furthermore, does not construe failure to testify on the grounds that it will tend to incriminate against the defendant. In the law the defendant is entitled to every reasonable doubt. It is also conceivable that a reasonable time for the defense to present its case would be granted before passing judgment.

Passing on: "To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Serbia would take us * * * into the realm of disputed facts." This seems a delectable bit of humor. We respectfully submit that Mr. Beck's other assertions might also be considered as "in the realm of disputed facts." Mr. Beck admits that Austria had a just grievance against Serbia, though he questions her method of redress. Though we conceive that in the unfortunate European tangle Austria relied on German support in the event of international conflict, we submit

that reliance on Russian support was a bigger factor in encouraging little Serbia to defy her big neighbor than the remoter help that Germany would furnish Austria in the event of the conflict spreading.

Austria, in the exercise of her right to engage in a punitive expedition against Serbia, guaranteed that she would do nothing to generalize the conflict by her assurances to Russia and to the world that there would be no annexation of Servian territory or annihilation of the Servian Kingdom. Whether these assurances were genuine or not is impossible of determination. We have no right to constitute ourselves arbiters of their sincerity.

No European Solidarity.

Mr. Beck speaks of "the solidarity of European civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse * * * a United European State exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate." This solidarity is conspicuous only by its utter non-existence. Whatever may have been achieved by policy and diplomatic intercourse has been marred and rendered useless by the lines of demarkation of the spheres of influence of the great powers of Europe and by the racial and temperamental incongruities of Europe's population.

We read: "Serbia had forty-eight hours to answer; * * * the other European nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe. Why should an Austro-Servian war compromise the peace of Europe?" Was it not because of the tangled web of international diplomacy, the Triple Entente as well as the Triple Alliance?

Referring to a German warning in regard to Austria's demands on Serbia, "the German Foreign Office anticipates that Serbia 'will refuse to comply with these demands'—why, if they were justified?" We grieve at the shattered ideal of Mr. Beck, who, in the face of the international calamity which has befallen the world, still can believe that all justifiable demands are complied with.

Again, quoting German "White Pa-

per," Annex 1B, Germany desired "that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure." The explanation of this statement is not—an aggressor threatens his adversary, but, rather, a prudent man begs opposing factions to keep cool.

Great space is devoted in the article in question to Germany's unwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of France, England, Germany, and Italy. As Germany disavows all interest in the controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to dictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except by force of arms. Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be expected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a court of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia, Austria's real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events have shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have been a deadlock.

Further: "The Russian Minister * * * called at the German Foreign Office and asked it 'to urge upon Vienna * * * to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'" Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian questions "for all practical purposes * * * were indistinguishable." This inconsistency of having Serbia in the light of a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the war. The logical explanation of Serbia's position is that of Russia's agent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on an allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.

It is true that Germany engaged in many blundering diplomatic quibbles in the final stages of preparation for the war; but it is also true that England quibbled, though with greater diplomatic finesse; for instance, "Sir Edward Grey

went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that * * * if Germany would make any reasonable proposal to preserve peace, and Russia and France rejected it, that 'his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the consequences.'" Here it is apparent to every one that the word "reasonable" begs the questions.

Slav and Teuton.

The German people were encouraged to relish the idea of a war against Russia once that war became likely, for sooner or later it seemed inevitable that Slav and Teuton would clash, and Germany felt confident that at the present time she outmatched her enemy. The Russians, too, were encouraged to desire the Slav provinces of Austria, which racially are a part of the Russian domain. The English people were made to relish this opportunity to strike their great commercial competitor, especially when they could do so with little likelihood of unfavorable criticisms. Finally, the impressionable French people were stirred to thoughts of revenge and recovery of their lost provinces.

Sympathy with any country in this most disgraceful yet most inevitable of wars brands the sympathizer as a party to the material and lustful purposes of at least one of the combatants. There is no ethical justification of this war from any standpoint. There is only an explanation of the war from an economic standpoint. All these specious arguments on the precipitating causes of the war can be but for the display of brilliant forensic oratory and matchless diction. Let us thrust aside in these dark moments of peril and horror all subterfuge.

England, overburdened with taxation, was on the verge of civil war. Russia, whose masses were overriden roughshod by a bureaucracy weighting down the peasants with onerous national burdens, expected sooner or later the cataclysmic upheaval with which the Nihilistic societies have long been threatening its tyrannical Government. France, seriously financially embarrassed because of crop impoverishment and bad foreign invest-

ments in Brazil, in Russia, and in the Balkans, was subject to continued internal political upheavals, with ever-changing Ministries and a growing Socialist Party.

Austria, "the ramshackle empire," was in danger of disintegrating from a variety of causes, not the least of which was the infusibility of its racially different elements. Germany, in a blind race for commercial supremacy, suffered from industrial overproduction, thus creating an unhealthy financial condition which fortified the Socialist Party to an

extent which threatened her imperialistic form of government itself.

So these monarchies whose days were numbered, because of dissatisfaction at the waste and extravagance of a world gone mad with national excesses committed in the name of civilization, in reality the price of our modernization, in a final desperate effort to rally their waning fortunes stampeded their awakening masses into a ruinous interracial war in order to stave off the torch and the guillotine.

New York, Oct. 30, 1914.

Russia to Blame

By Frank Seggebruch

ALLOW me to submit the following in answer to the article of James M. Beck, entitled "Case of the Double Alliance vs. the Triple Entente," published in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 25, 1914:

The case of "Russian Mobilization vs. German Mediation." Q.—Upon whom was the duty to yield?

Mr. Beck has spent considerable time and effort to prove, at least by inference, that Germany must have been informed beforehand of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Personally, I am convinced that the ultimatum in question was sent with the full knowledge and consent of Germany; and, whether this is true or not, I maintain that it was Austria's duty to inform her ally before taking a step which was likely to endanger the peace of Europe.

The concession of this point takes me immediately to the ultimatum itself and to the question, "Was the tenor of the ultimatum justified?" Mr. Beck, in his judgment, says: "The ultimatum is grossly unreasonable and inappropriate to any grievance that Austria had." Perhaps Mr. Beck is right, but I have good reasons to think that the tenor of the ultimatum was fully justified, in view of Serbia's former conduct.

Austria was dealing here with a Government the real spirits of which had come into power by the commission of one of the most dastardly crimes of modern times. A crime which, at the time of its commission, sent a shock of horror through the entire civilized world, to wit, "the outrageous murder of the former King and Queen of Serbia," outrageous because it was perpetrated by the so-called aristocracy of Serbia. The long-continued agitation carried on by Serbia against Austria, at the instigation of Russia, which finally culminated in another no less outrageous assassination, that of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort, to my idea fully justified Austria in making demands which under ordinary circumstances might have been termed "unreasonable."

The question whether Austria was justified in going to war against Serbia is a debatable one, but I respectfully refer to the fact that our own country, the United States, was only very recently on the verge of precipitating war with a "much weaker" nation than ours, on account of the latter's refusal to salute the American flag. Neither did we stop on that occasion with the ultimatum, but we followed it up with dispatching a fleet of warships, the landing of troops, and the seizure of Vera Cruz.

From the time Austria's ultimatum was sent all the great powers seemed to have professed a great eagerness for the preservation of peace. Mr. Beck asserts that Germany was not sincere in its desire for peace and could have avoided the war if it had seriously tried to exert its influence over Austria. This finding is based on the inference drawn from the fact that Germany failed to achieve any results.

To determine whether Mr. Beck is justified in finding as he does, it is necessary, first of all, to examine the exact status of the powers at the time the ultimatum was sent. We find that Austria had a just grievance against Serbia, for which it was seeking redress. An issue was therefore raised between Austria and Serbia. Germany, although Austria's ally, immediately defined its attitude by declaring emphatically that "the question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone."

Why Did Russia Mobilize?

I beg to ask Mr. Beck to answer the following question: By what right—moral, legal, or equitable—did Russia make Serbia's cause its own? Did Russia have any alliance with Serbia? I further ask: What privity existed between Austria, Serbia, and Russia?

Suppose Mr. Beck can justify the action of Russia, although a "rank outsider," in taking Serbia's part, how can he possibly justify the positively unreasonable and, under the circumstances, most dangerous step of "actual mobilization" on the part of Russia?

Mr. Beck has tried to justify the mobilization by quoting the Russian excuse "that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against Austria." On close examination what does this amount to? It resolves itself into a situation somewhat like this: A sends an ultimatum to B seeking redress for a wrong committed by B upon A, whereupon C mobilized "for defense against A." I leave it to the average American of ordinary intelligence to find a reason for C's mobilization "for defense against A." Mr. Beck might as well try to justify a mobilization on the part of Japan if the

United States was preparing to invade Mexico for the purpose of redressing an insult to the American flag. Does Mr. Beck realize the seriousness of actual mobilization by Russia at that critical moment? Not one of the other powers dared to take this one step which among nations is regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war.

And what did the Kaiser do at this moment? He did the only thing he could do, and, I dare say, the only thing our American Nation could have done under the same circumstances. He wired the Czar and stated: "I am willing to bring my influence to bear upon Austria, provided you agree to cease mobilization." Was this demand unreasonable? What else could Germany have done, I ask, with the Russian bear standing on the border with the sword already drawn? This moment was the crucial and decisive one in the prologue to this awful world drama.

The only question therefore and the all-important one to be submitted to the Court of Civilization, is, Whose duty was it to yield? Was it Russia's, with the sword already drawn against a country which had not attacked it, not even threatened it, or was it Germany's, with the sword in the sheath?

In his "conclusion," Mr. Beck speaks of Germany as "beset on every hand by powerful antagonists." Does he really mean to deprive the German Emperor of the right to demand as a condition precedent to mediation on his part the discontinuance of mobilization by Russia?

Mr. Beck in his "judgment" under Paragraph 4 says "that Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces." The use of the qualifying word "reasonably" seems to indicate that even Mr. Beck is not quite certain that Russia was in fact justified in mobilizing its forces.

Is it reasonable, just, and fair of Mr. Beck to expect Germany, "beset on every hand by powerful antagonists," to permit Russia to continue mobilizing its 18,000,000 soldiers and have Germany believe that Russia was sincere in its

"peaceful intentions" in the face of actual mobilization? At this moment the German Kaiser made a very reasonable demand upon Russia to cease mobilization, and I ask every fair-minded American, whether lawyer or layman, "Whose duty was it to yield" at this moment? The answer to the question will settle the much-disputed point as to the actual cause of the war.

In conclusion, I beg to ask Mr. Beck: Why expect so much of Germany and nothing of Russia, when Germany had not merely professed her peaceful intentions, but actually maintained peace for over forty years, during which period not a foot of territory had been acquired by her through conquest? This is a fact.

Coming into a court of law supported by such a reputation, does Mr. Beck really believe that the decision of the court would have been in favor of Russia? Does Mr. Beck really believe that the decision would have been against Germany, whose war lord was begging the Czar almost on his knees to avoid the awful calamity by the discontinuance of mobilization?

Picture the United States about to invade Mexico to redress an insult to the American flag. Picture England as the ally of the United States, and Japan sup-

porting Mexico, without any alliance existing between the two latter countries. To make this example conform to the actual facts under discussion, we must, of course, assume that both Japan and England are situated in the North American Continent, and across the border from the United States and England. Japan, with an army of 18,000,000 soldiers, (assumed for the purpose of argument,) mobilizes her army, professedly for defense against the United States. Could any fair-minded American possibly expect England to intercede with her ally, the United States, without first demanding the demobilization of Japan? Whose duty was it to yield?

The actual fact is that Germany even then did not declare war against Russia until Russian soldiers had actually crossed not the Austrian but the German border.

I may add that in writing the above I am prompted only by the very natural desire, viz., to impress upon the jury composed of the American people the one fact which should be given the most careful consideration in order to enable it to arrive at a just verdict in the case submitted, and this fact is "the mobilization of Russia."

New York, Oct. 29, 1914.

In Defense of Austria

By Edward Pick

REFERRING to your editorial, "The Evidence Examined," in your Sunday edition, I wish to protest emphatically against your assertion that a "Court of Civilization" must inevitably come to the conclusion that Germany precipitated the war. There are still millions of civilized people who see these things quite differently.

Mr. Beck makes out a case from the viewpoint of the accusing party—of course, nobody will doubt the legal abilities of Mr. Beck—but before the Su-

preme Court of Civilization there is also a law: *audiatur et altera pars*. Mr. Beck, as he presents the case to the court, has not mentioned very important points which, for the decision of the Supreme Court, would be most vital ones.

At first the breach of Belgian neutrality, admitted and regretted by the German Government, has nothing to do with the question—Who precipitated the war? It constituted only an action of the war itself. On the other hand, you call in your editorial the Austrian ultimatum a savage one and take it for

granted that this ultimatum started the stone rolling and brought finally the general clash in Europe about. This presumption, when presented to the court, will have to be thoroughly proved, because there are many people, fair and just, as you consider yourself, who are convinced of the ample justification of this ultimatum.

It is hardly describable how many criminal acts have been committed by Servians against the very existence of the Dual Monarchy for the last six years, under the eyes of the Servian Government and approved by it, by intriguing against Austria's right to cultivate her own territory, Bosnia, spreading secret societies all over the empire, &c.

The awful crime, the assassination of the heir to the throne, was only the finish of a long chain of like acts. These facts, which immediately lead up to the ultimatum, ought to be considered in the first place by judging Austria's justification for sending this ultimatum to Serbia. A just Judge in the Court of Civilization will, I am convinced, carefully study the ante-history and in all probability arrive at the conclusion that the ultimatum was amply justified and Serbia fully deserved the severest punishment possible.

Mr. Beck presents to the court the Russian interference with this intended punishment and forgets to tell the Judge that Russia had not the least right to this interference. No foreign power had. Therefore, Austria was entirely within

her right to decline any negotiations with Russia about this punishment before its completion. Nevertheless, the German Government brought these negotiations about, and, while these negotiations proceeded satisfactorily, Russia mobilized, mobilized all along her western frontier against Austria and Germany, notwithstanding the fact that she had promised not to do so and officials in Petrograd had pledged their words to the contrary.

Russia knew there could be no such thing as a war with Austria alone, as well as Germany knew that a war with Russia meant a war with France. If the laws of morality rule in the Court of Civilization, they should above all be applied to the conduct of Serbia and Russia. Austria was in a state of self-defense, when she decided not to bear any longer Serbia's treacherous and murderous attacks against her existence; this is entirely within the boundaries of the laws of morality. Russia, however, without the slightest right, moral or legal, attacked Austria from the back by interfering with Austria's own affairs.

Therefore I wish to point out that a careful student of the papers, by considering the ante-history of the war, which, as you will admit, is very essential, may come to a quite different conclusion and Mr. Beck as State's attorney will have a hard stand against the counsel of the defendant.

New York, Oct. 27, 1914.



Defense of the Dual Alliance—A Reply

By Dr. Edmund von Mach.

Instructor of Fine Arts, Harvard, 1899-1903; Instructor in History of Art, Wellesley College, 1899-1902; Lecturer in History of Art, Bradford Academy, Cambridge, Mass. Author of many books on Greek and Roman sculpture and the history of painting. Served in the German Army, 1889-91.

HON. JAMES M. BECK has eloquently argued the case of the Allies against Germany and Austria-Hungary, and submitted his findings with confident assurance of their acceptance by the Supreme Court of Civilization. Carried away by his zeal he has at times used terms not warranted by the evidence, such as "the irrepressible Kaiser," "stupid falsehood," "duplicity," and the like, but since the court can be trusted to disregard such expressions no further attention will be paid to them.

To a certain extent this article is not a reply but a continuation of Mr. Beck's argument, for, wherever our personal sympathies may lie, we are all equally interested in discovering the truth. In the final settlement of peace American public opinion may, nay, will, have a prominent voice. If it is exerted on the strength of a true understanding of European events, it will contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace.

As to the evidence submitted Mr. Beck seems to err in believing that Governments are accustomed to publish in their various white, gray, or orange papers "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." This is nowhere done, for there are many bits of information which come to a Government through its diplomatic connections which it would be indelicate, discourteous, or unwise to give to the public. The official documents on American foreign relations and all white, gray, or orange papers are "edited." They are understood to be so by Congress, Parliament, the Reichstag, the Duma, &c., and no charge of dishonesty can be maintained against the respective Governments on that score.

If the Chancellor says that Germany

was using her good offices in Vienna, this is as valuable a bit of evidence as the reprint of a dispatch in the "White Paper," unless we wish to impugn his veracity, and in that case the copy of a dispatch would be valueless, for he might have forged it. The entire argument, therefore, against Germany and Austria, based on what Mr. Beck calls the "suppression of vitally important documents," is void, unless you will apply it equally to Great Britain and the other countries.

In Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" Mr. Beck has missed no important documents because he looked at England's well-prepared case through sympathetic eyes, and it did not occur to him to ask, "Where are all the documents bearing on Italian neutrality?" Does he believe that England was so little interested in the question whether she would have to fight two or three foes, and whether her way to Egypt and India would be safe or threatened? There are many dispatches to and from Rome included in the "White Paper," but not a mention of Italy's position.

The first paper contains a letter to the British Ambassador in Berlin concerning the Austro-Servian relations. Is it not probable that Sir Edward Grey's attention was called to this question by his Ambassador in Vienna? Where is his letter? Or, if Sir Edward thought of it himself, why did he not mention his conversation also to Sir M. de Bunsen in Vienna? Where is this note? Are we to assume that Sir M. de Bunsen made his first report on July 23, although Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin had an interesting report to make a day earlier.

We can thus go through the whole British "White Paper" and discover the

omission of many interesting documents.

No. 38 is a letter from Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome, dated on July 23 and received on July 27. He had no doubt sent also a telegram. What did it contain, and why was it not published under the date of its arrival instead of the letter which had been delayed in transit?

Where Is No. 28?

In No. 29 Sir Edward Grey refers in a telegram to Sir R. Rodd to what "I had said to the German Ambassador." Such a reference could have a meaning for Sir R. Rodd only if he had been informed of this conversation. There is no dispatch printed in the "White Paper" containing this information. Possibly it was so entwined with other instructions, which Sir Edward Grey did not care to have known, that it could not be published. Was it perhaps sent to the printer first as No. 28, and removed at the last moment when it was too late to change the subsequent numbers? Or, if this assumption is wrong, what was printed originally as No. 28? Where is No. 28? There are other omissions, and an especially noteworthy one between Nos. 80 and 106 which will be discussed later.

Viewed in this light, the English "White Paper" loses much of the value of a complete record, which it has had in the eyes of many. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of those dispatches which have been printed, but it becomes incumbent upon the searcher after the truth to inquire whether the existence of unprinted (in the case of the German "White Paper" Mr. Beck uses the term "suppressed") papers may not at times alter the interpretation which should be given to those that are printed.

Since we have no published records anywhere concerning the advice given to Italy by the Allies, and the gradual steps leading up to Italy's decision to remain neutral, nor any hint as to the day when her decision was communicated to England and the other powers, it would be futile to speculate on this subject. Since, however, the Queen of

Italy and the wife of the Commander in Chief of the Russian forces are sisters, and since it was in the interest of the Allies to keep Italy neutral, it is not unreasonable to assume that an exchange of opinion took place between Italy and the Allies concerning the conditions under which Italy would remain neutral.

If the actual opening of hostilities could be so managed that Germany could be called the aggressor, then Italy probably declared that she would not enter the war. This is a very important phase of the case, and the omission from Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" of all dispatches dealing with Italian neutrality is much to be regretted.

Since we are dealing with the Italian dispatches here, it may be advisable to consider at once all the communications which are published as having passed between Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassador, Sir Rennell Rodd, in Rome. They are numbered 19, (perhaps 28,) 29, 35, 36, 38, 49, 57, 63, 64, 80, 81, 86, 92, 100, and 106, of which the important numbers are 38, 57, 64, 80, and 86.

On July 23 Sir Edward Grey was informed that "the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusionings which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success." (No. 38.)

Austria, in other words, believed that to let the murder of her heir-apparent pass unpunished would have meant a deathblow to her prestige, and consequently, as any one familiar with her conditions will agree, to her existence. Russia, on the other hand, on July 25 said (see No. 17, report from Sir G. Buchanan) that she could not "allow (note the word) Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war."

These two dispatches to Sir Edward Grey tell the whole story in a nutshell. Austria believed, rightly or wrongly, that it was a question of life or death for her, while Russia claimed the right of

preventing Austria from becoming the predominant power in the Balkans, and actually threatened war. Russia did not claim to be concerned with the justice of Austria's demands on Serbia.

No such definite word of Russia's intention was sent to Germany, for on July 26 Sir M. de Bunsen reported Germany's confident belief that "Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Serbia." (No. 32.)

On the next day Sir Rennell Rodd reports from Rome (No. 57) that the Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that "if Serbia will even now accept it (the Austrian note) Austria will be satisfied" and refrain from a punitive war. He, moreover, believes—and this is very important—"that Serbia may be induced to accept the note in its entirety on the advice of the four powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone." Since Italy was to be one of the four powers, the Minister's belief was doubtless based on accurate information. There is then as late as July 27 no claim made by Serbia that Austria's demands are unreasonable. She only hates to yield to Austria alone. Austria, in the meanwhile, (No. 57,) repeats her assurance that she demands no territorial sacrifices from Serbia.

On the next day, July 28, Sir Rennell Rodd reports (No. 64) that "Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian note, if some explanation were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene." Austria, on her part, had explained that "the co-operation of the Austrian agents in Serbia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Serbia was said to have willfully misinterpreted this." (No. 64.)

From these reports it appears that the differences between Austria and Serbia were on the way to a solution. Austria claimed that her demands were just, and Serbia did not deny this. Austria further claimed that her prestige, her very existence, demanded the prompt compliance with her requests by Serbia. She ex-

plained in a satisfactory way the one point on which Serbia had taken exceptions, and Serbia was on the point of complying, and would have complied, if the powers had been willing to let her do so. Such a conclusion of the incident would have strengthened Austria's prestige and assured the punishment of the murderers of Serajevo.

Russia's Remark About Austria.

The reason why Serbia was not allowed to submit was Russia's remark, quoted above, that she would not "allow" Austria to become the predominant power in the Balkans. It was, therefore, Russia's task to prevent Serbia from accepting Austria's note. Since war was her alternative, baldly stated to England from the first, she had to do three things—first, to secure as many allies as possible; secondly, to weaken her enemies, preferably by detaching from them Italy, and, thirdly, to get as much of a start in her mobilization as possible.

The treaties between Russia, France, and Great Britain, unlike those between Germany, Austria, and Italy, have never been published. Whatever their wording may be, Russia was at first apparently not absolutely sure of the support of France, (No. 17,) and France, it would seem, was unwilling to tempt fate without the help of England. That England should be willing to join such a combination for such a cause seemed so preposterous to Germany that she did not believe it. Without England no France, without France no war, for alone Russia could not measure herself against Austria. Austria would not have attacked her of her own free will, but if Russia had attacked Austria, the whole world knew from the published treaties that Germany was bound to come to the assistance of her ally. It would have been two against one, and the two could have waited until Russia had finished her cumbersome mobilization. For even if she had her whole army of many million men on the frontier, Austria and Germany together were strong enough to stem her advance.

Russia's only chance, therefore, when Serbia was on the point of yielding, and

Austria had almost re-established her prestige, was to secure the help of France, but this meant also the promise of England.

The demands made on England by Russia, some of which are quoted in the "White Paper," are too well known to deserve repetition. This was the chief thing that counted, to get England's promise. The next was to detach Italy from her allies, (but of this there are no documents available,) and the third to gain time for her mobilization. All the other suggestions and counter-suggestions which fill the English "White Paper" are insignificant, as soon as the fundamental positions of Austria and Russia are understood.

Germany has claimed that England promised her support to Russia and France on July 30, or in the night of July 29, and, to prove it, has published the letter from the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in translation in *THE NEW YORK TIMES* on Oct. 7. This letter, which has not been officially denied by the Allies, states that the promise of England's support gave the Russian war party the upper hand and resulted in the order of complete mobilization.

English "White Paper's" Testimony.

Strangely enough, and doubtless by an oversight, the English "White Paper" contains two dispatches (Nos. 80 and 106) which seem to confirm the accuracy of M. de l'Escaille's statement, viz., that England promised the Russian-French combination her support.

On July 29 Sir Rennell Rodd wrote to Sir Edward Grey (No. 80) that the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him "there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect."

In a later dispatch of the same day (No. 86) he deprecates Russia's partial mobilization, which he fears has spoiled

the chances of Germany's exerting any pressure on Austria.

But on the next day, July 30, these remarkable words occur: "He [the Italian Minister] had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us." (No. 106.)

Readers of the "White Paper" will look in vain for an explanation of such a change of heart on Germany's part. What does "now" mean in the last letter? And why does Germany seem "convinced" that England will act with Russia—if not that she has heard of the promise mentioned by M. de l'Escaille, as given early on July 30 or late the 29th? The dates agree, and unless Sir Edward Grey publishes further papers to explain the change that had taken place between July 29, and July 30 one seems forced to accept this explanation.

What is Germany's attitude? Does she rush into war? Not at all, for she is "most anxious to avoid issue" with England. (No. 106.) Germany knew that Russia had begun to mobilize. Every day, every hour, counted; for against the masses of Russia she had only her greater speed to match. She knew that England had gone over to Russia, although she was probably hoping that the alliance between the Saxon and the Slav was not yet irrefragable. Still, the prospects were dark. But in spite of this the efforts were renewed to see what could be done in Vienna.

The famous exchange of telegrams between royalty began in the evening of July 29; and here it is wise to halt for a moment. On July 30 the Czar telegraphed to the Emperor in reply to the Emperor's expression of regret that Russia should be mobilizing, as follows: "The military measures in force now were decreed five days ago." That is, according to the Czar, the Russian mobilization had begun on July 25. On July 27, however, the Russian Minister of War, M. Suchomlinow, had declared to the Germany Military Attaché "on his word of honor" that no mobilization order had

been issued. July 25, however, it will be remembered, was the day on which Sir G. Buchanan had reported from St. Petersburg that Russia will "face all risks of war" if she can feel sure of the support of France.

On July 31 Russia mobilized her entire army, which led to Germany's ultimatum that Russia demobilize within twelve hours. No reply was received to the request, and orders for the mobilization of the German Army were issued at 5:15 P. M., Aug. 1, after the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg had been instructed to declare that, owing to the continued mobilization of the Russian Army, a state of war existed between the two countries.

Kaiser Tried to Keep Peace.

In order to understand this step one should read the book "*La France Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain*," ("France Victorious in the Next War,") by Col. Arthur Boucher, published in 1911. Col. Boucher has stated the case baldly and so simply that every one can understand it. In substance his argument is this: "Alone France has no chance, but together with Russia she will win against Germany. Suppose the three countries are beginning mobilization on the same day. Germany finishes first, France second, and Russia last. Germany must leave some of her troops on her eastern frontier, the rest she throws against France. All France has to do is to hold them for a few days. [Col. Boucher mentions the exact number of days. This book is not at hand, and the writer prefers not to quote from memory.] Then Russia comes into play, more German troops will be needed in the East, the French proceed to an attack on their weakened enemy, and *La France sera victorieuse*."

Everything hinges on just a couple of days or so. A couple of days! And how much of a start had Russia? She had begun on July 25; on July 27 definite news of the Russian mobilization was reported in Berlin, although the Minister of War denied it "on his honor." On July 30 England was understood to have promised her support

to Russia, and the Czar acknowledged that Russia had been mobilizing for the past five days. Five days! And Col. Boucher, expressing the opinion of military experts, had counted on victory on a much smaller margin!

Do the Judges of the Supreme Court of Civilization realize the almost superhuman efforts in the interest of peace made by the German Emperor? Russia has a start of five days, and on July 31 a start of six days. Can we not hear all the military leaders imploring the Emperor not to hesitate any longer? But in the interest of peace the Emperor delays. He has kept the peace for Germany through the almost thirty years of his reign. He prays to his God, in Whom he has placed his trust through all his upright life, with a fervor which has often brought him ridicule. Also, he still believes in England, and hopes through her efforts to be able to keep the peace. He waits another day. A start of seven days for Russia! The odds against Germany have grown tremendously. At last he orders mobilization. For a longer delay he would not have been able to answer to his country. As it is, there are many people who blame him severely for having waited so long.

But William II. was right, for when the world will begin to realize the agonies through which he must have passed during these days of waiting, and the sacrifices he made in his effort to preserve peace, it will judge Germany rightly, and call the Emperor the great prince of peace that he is.

But, it has been said, why did he not avoid war, either by forcing Austria to yield to Russia, or, if she refused, by withdrawing from her? In common with the whole of Germany, he probably felt that Austria's position was right. Servia herself, as has been seen above, did not claim that she was unjustly treated, whatever outsiders thought of Austria's demands; and Austria was fully justified by past events in believing that it was with her a question of life and death. Should Germany sacrifice her faithful friend under such circumstances, and for what? For the arrogance of Russia, who

would not "allow" her to re-establish her prestige in a righteous cause? The word "righteous" is used advisedly, because in the early stages of the controversy nobody, not even Russia nor Servia herself, denied the justice of Austria's demands. The writer is informed that even the liberal English press found no fault with the course taken by Austria, although it commented adversely on the language used in the note.

What would have been the result of peace bought by Germany at such a cost? It would have alienated her only faithful friend without laying the foundations for a lasting friendship with her opponents. This at least was Germany's honest belief. She may have been wrong. History more probably will call her right. To desert Austria might have postponed the war, but when it would have come Germany would have stood alone, and, worse, she would have lost her self-respect.

This claim may sound strange in the ears of those who have just witnessed and will never forget the suffering of that beautiful little country, Belgium. They hold that, since Germany invaded Belgium, it is Germany who broke a treaty and who is to blame.

Mr. Beck considers this to be so self-evident that he deems it unnecessary to advance any proof. He quotes the Chancellor's speech, and, moving for a quick verdict, declares his motion of guilty carried. The matter, however, is not quite so simple for the man who is seeking for the whole truth. Let us look at the facts.

Belgium was a neutral country, just as any country has the right to declare itself neutral, with this difference: that in 1839 she had promised to five powers—Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia—that she would remain perpetually neutral. These five powers in their turn had promised to guarantee her neutrality. She was, however, a sovereign State, and as such had the undoubted right to cease being neutral whenever she chose by abrogating the Treaty of 1839. If the other high contracting parties did not agree with her,

it was their right to try to coerce Belgium to keep to her pledges, although this would undoubtedly have been an infringement of her sovereignty.

The Treaty of 1839 contains the word "perpetual," but so does the treaty between France and Germany, in which Alsace and Lorraine are ceded by France to be perpetually an integral part of the German Empire. Does this mean that France, if the Allies should win, could not retake these provinces? Nobody probably will believe this.

The Treaty of 1839 was a treaty just like the Treaty of 1871, with this difference, that the latter treaty was concluded between two powers, and the earlier one between five powers on one side and Belgium and Holland on the other. This gave certain rights to all the signatory powers, any one of whom had the right to feel itself sufficiently aggrieved to go to war if any other power disregarded the treaty.

Rights of Neutrals.

There was once another neutral State, the city and district of Cracow, also established by a treaty to which Great Britain was a signatory. Three of the signers considered the conditions developing in Cracow to be so threatening that they abolished Cracow as an independent State. Great Britain sent a polite note of protest, and dropped the matter.

Since that time, however, two Hague Conferences have been held and certain rules agreed upon concerning the rights and duties of neutrals. The Belgian status of inviolability rests on these rules, called conventions, rather than on the Treaty of 1839. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 Mr. Gladstone very clearly stated that he did not consider the Treaty of 1839 enforceable. Great Britain, therefore, made two new treaties, one with France and one with Prussia (quoted and discussed in Boston Evening Transcript, Oct. 14, 1914) in which she promised to defend Belgian neutrality, by the side of either France or Prussia, against that one of them who should infringe the neutrality.

These treaties were to terminate one

year after peace had been concluded between the contestants. A treaty like the one of 1839, however, which was considered unenforceable in 1870, can hardly be claimed to have gained new rights in 1914. In calm moments nobody will claim that a greater sanctity attaches to it than to the treaty in which Alsace and Lorraine are ceded forever to Germany.

No, it is The Hague Conventions to which we must look. The first convention (1899) contained no rules forbidding belligerents from entering neutral territory. In the second conference it was thought desirable to formulate such rules, because it was felt that in war belligerents are at liberty to do what is not expressly forbidden. At the request of France, therefore, a new set of rules was suggested, to which Great Britain and Belgium offered valuable amendments. The rules were finally accepted, and are today parts of international law. They read: "Article I. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Article II. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power."

These articles, together with the whole convention called "Rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land," have been ratified and therefore accepted as law by the United States of America, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia and other minor powers. Great Britain experienced a change of heart, and, although her own delegates had moved these articles, she refused to ratify them, when she ratified most of the other conventions on Nov. 27, 1909. (A table showing the ratifications of conventions has been published by The World Peace Foundation, Boston.)

The Case of Belgium.

Since Great Britain did not accept these articles as law, she was not bound by them, for the principle of The Hague Conferences is that a nation is bound only by those laws which it accepts. The remarkable fact, therefore, appears that the only one of the big nations

which had refused to accept these articles, and which, therefore, might have moved her troops across a neutral country and have claimed that she could do so with a clear conscience because she broke no law which was binding on her, was Great Britain. And the world now sees the spectacle of Great Britain claiming to have gone to war because another power did what she herself could have done, according to her own interpretation, with impunity. Japan has broken the international law by infringing the neutrality of China, but Great Britain can claim that she did not break a law by doing exactly what Japan did.

It is not asserted here that the citizens of Great Britain are not absolutely sincere in their belief of the causes which have allied them with the Russians and the Japanese, and the Indians and the Zouaves, and the negroes and the French and the Belgians against Germany. Their Government, however, should have known that the presumption of insincerity exists when one charges against others a crime which one would have felt at liberty to commit one's self. Yet, more, the British Government knew better than anybody else that Germany had not even committed this crime; for, according to all laws of justice, no person or nation can claim the inviolability of a neutral when he has committed "hostile acts against a belligerent, or acts in favor of a belligerent." (Article XVII. of The Hague Conference of 1907.)

The question, therefore, arises, "Did Belgium commit acts in favor of one of Germany's opponents if not actually hostile acts against Germany?" In order to understand Germany's charge that Belgium had committed such acts, attention must be directed to one of the most unfortunate stipulations of the Treaty of 1839, which compelled Belgium to maintain several fortresses. This meant that a small neutral people, sandwiched in between two great powers, had to keep itself informed on military affairs. Instead of being able to foster a peaceful state of mind, which is the surest guarantee of neutrality, the Belgians were forced to think military thoughts.

In the eighties and early nineties they suspected France of designs on their integrity. Since then a change in the popular feeling has taken place, and in recent years the instruction of the Belgian artillery, for instance, was intrusted to French officers in active service. These officers were constantly at home and very properly concerned with solving military problems such as a future war with Germany might present. What was more natural than that these same officers, when they were detached for a few months or years to Liège or Namur or Huy, taught their Belgian charges to prepare against a German attack, and to look upon the French as their friends and the Germans as their enemies? If conditions had been different, and German officers had been in charge of Belgian fortresses, the Belgian guns in practice would always have been trained on imaginary French invaders.

French Officers in Belgian Forts.

If this is understood it will be seen that in the case of war the actual neutrality of the Belgian garrisons would naturally be determined by the position taken by that nation whose officers had been in charge of the Belgian fortresses. And this might be entirely independent of the professed wishes of the Belgian people or their Government. If French officers in active service remained in the several fortresses, or even only in one after the beginning of hostilities, and if the French campaign plans contemplated an attack through Belgium, then Belgium had committed an "act in favor of France" by not forcing the French officers to leave, and had forfeited the rights and privileges granted by The Hague Convention of 1907 to a neutral State.

Did French officers remain in Liège or in any other Belgian fortress after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to go through Belgium? Germany has officially made both claims. The first can easily be substantiated by the Supreme Court of Civilization by an investigation of the prisoners of war taken

in Belgium. Until an impartial investigation becomes possible no further proof than the claim made by the German Government can be produced.

The second charge is contained in No. 157 of the English "White Paper" in these words of instruction from the German Foreign Secretary to the German Ambassador in London: "Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information."

Sir Edward Grey has attacked Germany for invading Belgium, but has nowhere denied that Germany had the unimpeachable evidence she said she had, and which of course nullified any previous assurance from France.

It is not known whether Sir Edward Grey was shown this evidence or not, but if the preservation of Belgian neutrality was Great Britain's chief concern, why did she not offer to negotiate treaties with Germany and France as she had done in 1870? It will be remembered that then she bound herself to join with either of the contestants in defending Belgian neutrality against the attacks of the other.

As the case stands today, on the evidence of Sir Edward Grey's own "White Paper" and speeches, Great Britain is making war on Germany because:

1. She broke the Treaty of 1839, although her own Gladstone had declared this treaty to be without force, and although the status of neutral States had been removed by The Hague Convention from the uncertainty of treaties to the security of international law.

2. Great Britain makes war against Germany because Germany has broken Articles I. and II. of Chapter 1 of The Hague Convention referring to neutrals, although Great Britain herself has refused to recognize these articles as binding upon her own conduct.

3. She makes war on Germany, although she has never denied the correctness of Germany's assertion that she had unimpeachable proof of France's intentions of going through Belgium, which,

together with the sojourn of French officers in Belgium, constitutes the offense which, according to The Hague Convention, deprives a so-called neutral State of the privileges granted in Articles I. and II.

It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are which Germany possesses, and which for military reasons she has not yet been able to divulge. She has published some of them, namely, the proof of the continued presence of French officers on Belgian soil, and has given the names and numbers of the several army corps which France had planned to push through Belgium.

The case then stands as follows:

1. Was the inviolability of Belgium guaranteed by Articles I. and II. of The Hague Convention? Yes.

2. Had Germany ratified these articles? Yes.

3. Had Great Britain ratified these articles? No.

4. Would Belgium have forfeited the right of having her country held inviolable if she had committed "acts in favor of France," even if these acts were not actually hostile acts? Yes, according to Article XVII. of The Hague Convention.

5. Did Belgium commit "acts in favor of France," and was Germany, therefore, justified in disregarding the inviolability of her territory?

The Main Question.

This is the important question, and the answer must be left to the Supreme Court of Civilization. The weight of the evidence would seem to point to a justification of Germany. Yet no friend of Germany can find fault with those who would wish to defer a verdict until such a time when Germany can present her complete proof to the world, and this may be when the war is over.

Throughout this argument the famous passage of the Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag has been disregarded. It reads:

Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the

French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as her opponents respect it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavor to make good.

This has been understood to mean that the Chancellor acknowledged that Germany was breaking the Treaty of 1839 without warrant, and that Germany, therefore, deserved the contempt of the world. May it not bear another interpretation? Thus:

The Chancellor, like Gladstone in 1870, did not consider the 1839 Treaty enforceable, but saw the guarantee for Belgium in The Hague Convention. He did not wish to offend Belgium by announcing to the world that she had lost her rights as a neutral because of her acts favorable to France, for when he spoke he was still of the opinion that she would accept the German offer which guaranteed to her both her independence and integrity.

And just as Servia would have accepted Austria's note if Russia had permitted her, so Belgium would not have resisted the German demand if it had not been for England.

This can be proved by the British "White Paper," Nos. 153 and 155. In the former the King of the Belgians appeals "to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium," being apparently of the impression that Germany wished to annex parts, if not the whole, of his country. The London reply advises the Belgians "to resist by any means in their power, and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years."

Has Mr. Beck really not noticed in this promise the omission of the word neutrality? By the Treaty of 1839 Bel-

gium enjoyed not only independence and integrity, but also perpetual neutrality. Does Great Britain offer to fight Germany for the enforcement of the Treaty of 1839? No! Because hereafter the word neutrality is dropped from her guarantee, and since she alone of all the great powers has not ratified the articles of The Hague Convention concerning neutrals she alone will be able to disregard the inviolability of Belgian soil, even though Belgium kept strictly neutral in a future war.

And what, finally, does she guarantee her? Independence and integrity! That is exactly the same that Germany had promised her. For this Belgium had to be dragged through the horrors of war, and the good name of Germany as that of an honest nation had to be dragged through the mire, and hatred and murder had to be started, that Belgium might get on the battlefield, from the insufficient support of Russia and France and England, what Germany had freely offered her—*independence and integrity*.

Casual readers would not miss the word neutrality from Sir Edward Grey's guarantee, because they do not differentiate between the words integrity, independence, and neutrality. Great Britain and her ally Japan, marching through China into Kiao-Chau, may be said to have violated China's neutrality, but not her independence, nor, so long as they refrain from annexing any Chinese territory, her integrity.

Fixing the Blame.

Nobody familiar with the careful work of Sir Edward Grey can for one moment believe that Sir Edward inadvertently dropped the word, just as little as J. Ramsay Macdonald and other British leaders believe that he inadvertently dropped one of the two remaining words, integrity and independence, when he told Parliament of Germany's guarantee, and why Great Britain should not accept it, but go to war.

When the blame for the horrors committed in Belgium are assessed these facts must be remembered:

1. Belgium was by treaty bound to maintain fortresses.

2. France tempted her to commit "acts friendly" to herself, by which Belgium forfeited her rights to the protection of The Hague articles governing the rights and duties of neutrals.

3. England urged her to take up arms, when she had only asked to have her integrity guaranteed by diplomatic intervention. (Nos. 153, 155.)

4. Germany promised her independence and integrity and peace, while England, quietly dropping her guarantee of neutrality "in future years," promised her independence and integrity and war.

5. And Sir Edward Grey was able to sway Parliament, according to one of the leaders of Parliament himself, only because he misrepresented Germany's guarantee, and, having dropped, in his note to Belgium, the word "neutrality," dropped yet another of the two remaining words, integrity and independence.

This is the case as it appears on the evidence contained in the various "White Papers." Austria was attending properly to her own affairs; Servia was willing to yield; Russia, however, was determined to humiliate Austria or to go to war. Germany proved a loyal friend to her ally, Austria; she trusted in the British professions of friendship to the last, and sacrificed seven valuable days in the interest of peace. France was willing to do "what might be required by her interests," while Great Britain yielded to Russia and France, promising them their support without which France, and therefore Russia, would not have decided on war.

As to Belgium, Germany told Sir Edward Grey that she had unimpeachable evidence that France was planning to go through Belgium, and she published her evidence concerning the French officers who remained in Belgium. Although Belgium had thus lost any rights attaching to her state of neutrality, Germany promised to respect her integrity and independence, and to pay for any damage done. She preferred, however, to lis-

ten to Great Britain, who promised exactly the same except pay for any damage done.

Unlike Mr. Beck, who in the same article pleads his case as the counsel for the Allies and casts his verdict as the Supreme Court of Civilization, the present writer prefers to leave the judgment to his readers as a whole, and, further still, to the whole American people—yea, to all the peoples of the world. Nor is he in a hurry, for he is willing to wait and have the Judges weigh the

evidence and call for more, if they consider insufficient what has already been submitted.

Snap judgments are ever unsatisfactory. They have often to be reversed. The present case, however, is too important to warrant a hasty decision. The final judgment, if it is based on truth, will very strongly influence the nature of the peace, which will either establish good-will and stable conditions in the world, or lead to another and even more complete breakdown of civilization.

What Gladstone Said About Belgium

By George Louis Beer

Historian; winner of the Loubat Prize, 1913, for his book on the Origins of the British Colonial System

IN the course of his solemn speech of Aug. 8, 1914, in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey quoted some remarks made by Gladstone in 1870 on the extent of the obligation incurred by the signatory powers to the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Shorn from their context as they were, these sentences are by no means illuminating, and it cannot be said that their citation in this form by Sir Edward Grey was a very felicitous one. During the paper polemics of the past months these detached words of Gladstone have been freely used by Germany's defenders and apologists to maintain that Great Britain of 1870 would not have deemed the events of 1914 a *casus belli*, and that its entrance into the present war on account of the violation of Belgium's neutrality was merely a pretext. During the course of this controversy Gladstone's attitude has in various ways been grossly misrepresented, Dr. von Mach of Harvard even stating in the columns of THE NEW YORK TIMES that Gladstone had declared the Treaty of 1839 "to be without force." But, apart from such patent distortions,

Gladstone's real position is apparently not clearly defined in the mind of the general public, which is merely seeking for the unadulterated truth, regardless of its effect upon the case of any one of the belligerents.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 the Prussian Ambassador in London informed Gladstone, then Prime Minister, that some time prior to the existing war France had asked Prussia to consent to the former country's absorption of Belgium, and that there was in the possession of the Prussian Government the draft of a treaty to this effect in the handwriting of M. Benedetti, then French Ambassador at Berlin. This communication was obviously made, as Lord Morley tells us, with the object of prompting Gladstone to be the agent in making the evil news public and thus of prejudicing France in the judgment of Europe. Gladstone thought this "no part of his duty," and very shortly thereafter, at the direct instance of Bismarck, this draft treaty of 1866-7 was communicated by Baron Krause of the Prussian Embassy in London to Delane, the editor of The Times.

On July 25, 1870, it was published in the columns of that paper and aroused considerable anxiety in England.

It immediately became imperative upon the British Government to take some action. As Gladstone wrote to Bright, the publication of this treaty

has thrown upon us the necessity of doing something fresh to secure Belgium, or else of saying that under no circumstances would we take any step to secure her from absorption. This publication has wholly altered the feeling of the House of Commons, and no Government could at this moment venture to give utterance to such an intention about Belgium. But neither do we think it would be right, even if it were safe, to announce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms and see actions done which would amount to a total extinction of the public right in Europe.

The Special Identical Treaties.

A simple declaration of Great Britain's intention to defend the neutrality of Belgium by arms in case it were infringed seemed to Gladstone not to meet the special requirements of the case as revealed by the proposed Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and France. His main object was to prevent the actual execution of such an agreement, by means of which the two belligerent powers would settle their quarrels and satisfy their ambitions at the expense of helpless Belgium. Hence, on July 30, the British Government opened negotiations with France and Prussia and within a fortnight had concluded separate but identical treaties with each of these powers. According to these treaties, in case the neutrality of Belgium were violated by either France or Germany, Great Britain agreed to co-operate with the other in its defense. The preamble of these treaties states that the contracting powers

being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium,

as provided in the Treaty of 1839, have concluded this separate treaty, which,

without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it.

Article III. further provided that these Treaties of 1870 were to expire twelve

months after the conclusion of the existing war, and that thereafter the independence and neutrality of Belgium would "continue to rest, as heretofore," on the Treaty of 1839.

These documents tell a plain tale, which is amply confirmed by the proceedings in Parliament in connection with this matter. On Aug. 5, 1870, while the negotiations leading to the above-mentioned treaties were still pending, questions were raised in the House of Commons about the recently published abortive Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and France. In reply Gladstone stated that

the Treaty of 1839 is that under which the relations of the contracting powers with Belgium are at present regulated;

and that, while he could not explain the intentions of the Government "in a matter of this very grave character in answer to a question," he hoped to be able to communicate some further information in an authentic manner. Three days later, as these treaties with France and Prussia had been virtually concluded, Gladstone was able to satisfy the anxiety of the House and outlined their terms. He explicitly stated that, after their expiration,

the respective parties, being parties to the Treaty of 1839, shall fall back upon the obligations they took upon themselves under that treaty.

After Gladstone had finished speaking the leader of the opposition, Disraeli, took the floor and pointed out that, as a general proposition,

when there is a treaty guarantee so explicit as that expressed in the Treaty of 1839, I think the wisdom of founding on that another treaty which involves us in engagements may be open to doubt.

But he accepted Gladstone's statement

as the declaration of the Cabinet, that they are resolved to maintain the neutrality and independence of Belgium, I accept it as a wise and spirited policy, and a policy, in my opinion, not the less wise because it is spirited.

Gladstone then replied, saying that the reason the Government had not made a general declaration of its intentions regarding Belgium was that much danger might arise from such a declaration and

that inadvertently they might have given utterance to words

that might be held to import obligations almost unlimited and almost irrespectively of circumstances.

"We had made up our minds," he continued, "that we had a duty to perform, and we thought a specific declaration of what we thought the obligations of this country better than any general declaration." Referring to the two treaties in process of ratification, he concluded:

We thought that by contracting a joint engagement we might remove the difficulty and prevent Belgium from being sacrificed.

The policy of the Government continued, however, to be criticised, mainly on the ground that the Treaty of 1839 amply covered the case. On Aug. 10 Gladstone defended his policy in the House of Commons in a speech pitched on a high moral plane, in which he dilated upon Belgium's historic past and splendid present and on Great Britain's duty to this little nation irrespective of all questions of its own self-interest. With genuine fervor, he exclaimed:

If, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right and public law in Europe. * * * We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in answer to the question whether under the circumstance of the case this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.

What Gladstone Had in Mind.

What Gladstone had in mind was the scheme of 1866-7, by which France was to absorb Belgium, with Prussia's consent and aid. He distinctly stated that the Treaties of 1870 were devised to meet the new state of affairs disclosed by the publication of this incomplete treaty. It was in order to prevent the revival of such a conspiracy that Gladstone made separate and identical treaties in 1870 with France and Prussia. They were a practical device to secure an effectual

enforcement of the Treaty of 1839 under unforeseen and difficult circumstances. The agreement of 1870 was, as Gladstone said, a cumulative treaty added to that of 1839, and the latter treaty

loses nothing of its force, even during the existence of this present treaty.

During the course of this speech defending the Government's action against those critics who claimed that the Treaty of 1839 adequately met the situation, Gladstone made some general remarks about the extent of the obligation incurred by the signatories to the Treaty of 1839.

It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty, but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.

It is, of course, impossible to state precisely what were those unuttered thoughts that passed through Gladstone's mind as he spoke these characteristically cautious words, but what in general they were can be satisfactorily gleaned from a letter that he had written six days before this to John Bright:

That we should simply declare we will defend the neutrality of Belgium by arms in case it should be attacked. Now, the sole or single-handed defense of Belgium would be an enterprise which we incline to think quixotic; if these two great military powers [France and Prussia] combined against it—that combination is the only serious danger; and this it is which by our proposed engagements we should, I hope, render improbable to the very last degree. I add for myself this confession of faith: If the Belgian people desire, on their own account, to join France or any other country, I for one will be no party to taking up arms to prevent it. But that the Belgians, whether they would or not, should go "plump" down the maw of another country to satisfy dynastic greed is another matter. The accomplishment of such a crime as this implies would come near to an extinction of public right in Europe, and I do not think we could look on while the sacrifice of freedom and independence was in course of consummation.

Andrew Carnegie on the War

Retired ironmaster and philanthropist; builder of the Peace Temple at The Hague; founder of the Carnegie Institution at Washington; founder and patron of a chain of libraries in the United States and Great Britain, and benefactor of many societies and institutions.

By Edward Marshall

HERE is the report of a truly remarkable statement by Mr. Carnegie. He is the world's most notable peace advocate, and in this interview he voices the reflections suggested to him by the great European war.

"Has war ever settled anything which might not have been settled better by arbitration?" I asked Mr. Carnegie.

"No; never," he replied. "No truer inference was ever made than may be found in Milton's query, penned three centuries ago and never answered: 'What can war but wars breed?'"

"War can breed only war. Of course, peace inevitably must follow war, but, truly, no peace ever was born of war. We all revere the memory of him who voiced the warning: 'In time of peace prepare for war'; but, as a matter of fact, we all know that when one nation prepares for war others inevitably must follow its dangerous lead.

"Hence, and hence only, the huge armaments which have oppressed the world, making its most peaceful years a spectacle of sadness—a spectacle of men preparing and prepared to fight with one another. Sooner or later men prepared to fight will fight; huge armaments and armies mean huge battles; huge battles mean huge tragedies.

"This never has been otherwise, and never can be. Peace can come only when mankind abandons warful preparation. And so I seem to have replied to your inquiry with an answer with a tail to it; and the tail is more important than the answer, for the answer merely says that war never settled anything which might not have been settled better by arbitration, while the tail proclaims the folly of a world prepared for war.

How to Prevent War.

"Armament must mean the use of armament, and that is war. If we are to prevent war we must prevent preparation for war, just as if we are to prevent burglary we must prevent preparation for burglary by prohibiting the carrying of the instruments of burglary. The only cure for war" [Mr. Carnegie in speaking italicized the word "cure"] "is war which defeats some one; but two men who are unarmed are certain not to shoot at one another. Here, as in medicine, prevention is much better than cure.

"Plainly it must be through such prevention, not through such a cure as victory sometimes is supposed to represent, that warfare can be stopped. Warfare means some one's defeat, of course, and that implies his temporary incapacity for further war, but it goes without saying that all conquered nations must be embittered by their defeat.

"Few nations ever have fought wars in which the majority of at least their fighting men did not believe the side they fought for to be in the right. Defeat by force of arms, therefore, always has meant the general conviction throughout conquered nations that injustice has been done.

Nations Like Individuals.

"In such circumstances nations must be like individuals under similar conditions. The individual believing himself to have been in the right, yet finding himself beaten in his efforts to maintain it, will not accept the situation philosophically; he will be angry and rebellious; he will nurse what he believes to be his wrong.

"To nurse a wrong, whether it be real or fancied, is to help it grow in the imag-

ination, and that must mean at least the wish to find some future means of righting it, either by strategy or increased strength.

"There are two things which humanity does not forget—one is an injury, and, no matter how strongly some may argue against the truth of this contention, the other is a kindness.

"In the long run both will be repaid. And nations, like individuals, prefer the coin which pays the latter debt. Military force never has accomplished kindness. Kindness means industrial armies decked with the garlands of peace; military armies, armed and epauletted, must mean minds obsessed with the spirit of revenge or conquest, hands clenched to strike, hearts eager to invade.

"Every military implement is designed to cut or crush, to wound and kill. Nations at peace help one another with humanity's normal tenderness of heart at times of pestilence, of famine, of disaster. Nations at war exert their every ounce of strength to force upon their adversaries hunger, destruction, and death. Starvation of the enemy becomes a detail of what is considered good military strategy in war time, just as world-embracing charity has become a characteristic of all civilization during times of peace. Must we not admit flotillas carrying grain to famine-stricken peoples to be more admirable than fleets which carry death to lands in which prosperity might reign if undisturbed by war?"

"But do you not admit that wars sometimes have helped the forces of civilization in their conquest against barbarism?"

"War has not been the chief force of civilization against barbarism," Mr. Carnegie replied with emphasis. Then he continued more thoughtfully:

"That is one way of saying it. Another is, no effort of the forces of civilization against barbarism is war in the true sense of the word.

"Such an armed effort is a part of the force pushing barbarism backward, and therefore, in the last analysis, tends toward kindness and peace; while, in the sense in which we use the word, war

means the retrogression of civilization into barbarism. It is usually born of greed—greed for territory or for power.

"Such war as that of which we all are thinking in these days is war between civilized men. One civilized man cannot improve another civilized man by killing him, although it is not inconceivable that a civilized man may do humanity a service by destroying human savages, for with the savages he must destroy their savagery.

"But a war in civilized Europe destroys no savagery; it breeds it, so that it and its spawn may defile future generations.

"There has been much balderdash in talk about unselfish motives as the origin of warfare. It is safe to say that 99 per cent. of all the slaughter wrought by civilization under the cloak of a desire to better bad conditions really has been evil. It is impossible to conceive of general betterment through general slaughter. There have been few altruistic wars."

"But how about our Spanish war?" I asked. "Surely it was not greed which sent our men and ships to Cuba."

"No," said Mr. Carnegie, "that was not war, but world-police work.

"Our skirmish with Spain was a most unusual international episode. We harmed none of the people of the land wherein we fought, but taught them what we could of wise self-government and gave them independence. To battle for the liberation of the slave is worthy work, and this of ours was such a battle.

"Our Spanish war was not the outgrowth of our rivalry with any one or any one's with us; it was the manifestation of our high sense of responsibility as strong and healthy human beings for the welfare of the weak and oppressed.

That Was Police Work.

"It did not make toward militarism on this continent, but the reverse; in a few months it established permanent peace where peace had been a stranger. It was police work on the highest plane, substituting order for disorder."

"But did it not emphasize the need for the maintenance, even here, of a com-

petent and efficient naval and military force?" I asked.

Mr. Carnegie shook his head emphatically.

"That is the old, old argument cropping up again," said he, "the argument that a provocative is a preventive. For us to maintain a great army for the purpose of preventing war thereby would be as sensible as for each of us to be afraid to walk about except with a lightning rod down his back, since men have been struck by lightning. No nation wants to fight us. We have friends throughout the world.

"Millions now resident in military nations are hoping that some day they may be able to become citizens of our beloved republic, principally because it now is not, nor is it ever likely to be, military. Humanity loves peace. Here peace abides, and, if we follow reason, will remain unbroken.

"Note the advantages of our own position. Imagine what the task would be of landing seventy thousand hostile soldiers on our shores! First they would need to cross three thousand miles of the Atlantic or five thousand miles of the Pacific.

"And what if they should come? My plan of operation would be to bid them welcome as our visitors, considering them as men, not soldiers; to take them to our great interior, say, as far west as Chicago, and there to say to them:

"Here we shall leave you. Make yourselves at home, if that thought pleases you; fight us if it does not. If you think you can conquer us, try it."

"They would make themselves at home and, learning the advantages of staying with us, would become applicants for our citizenship, rather than our opponents in warfare.

"And if they tried to fight us, what would happen to them? Our nation is unique in an important respect. Its individuals are the best armed in the world. Not only, for example, are its farmers armed, but they can shoot, which is far more than can be said of those of Britain or any other nation.

"The Governments of Europe cannot

afford to give their citizenry arms, and, as for the European citizenry, it not only cannot afford to purchase arms, but cannot afford even to pay the license fees which Government demands of those possessing arms with the right to use them.

"But ours? Most Americans can afford to and do own guns with which to shoot, and, furthermore, most Americans, when they shoot, can hit the things at which they shoot.

"Combine this powerful protective influence with the fact that thousands of any army coming to invade us would not want to fight when once they got here, but would want to settle here and enjoy peace, and we find that we thus are protected as no nation in the world ever has been protected or can be.

"Imagine the effect upon the European fighting man's psychology if he found that an army transport had conveyed him to a land where one man's privilege is every man's right! Learning this, it is not a joke to say, but is a statement of the probable fact, that the invading soldiery would not want to fire its first volleys, but would want to file its first papers. They would not ask for cartridges, but for citizenship.

"America is protected by a force incomparable, which I may call its peaceful militia, and the man who, above all other men, I most should wish to see appointed to its command would be Gen. Leonard Wood were it not for the fact that there would be some danger that in such an eventuation his professional training would carry him beyond the rule of reason.

"That is likely to be the most serious trouble with the trained soldier. The doctor wants to dose, the parson to preach, and the soldier to fight. Professional habit may make any of us dangerous.

"But if it came to fighting I do not consider it within the bounds of possibility that we could lose. I once asked Gen. Sherman how the troops which he commanded during the civil war compared for efficiency with European troops. His answer was:

"The world never has seen the army that I would be afraid to trust my boys with, man for man."

Would Surprise the Enemy.

"That thought of welcoming an invading army appeals strongly to me. The hostile General would be amazed by the ease with which he got his forces in, but he would be more startled by the difficulty he would find if he tried to get them out. If they once learned the advantages of our liberties they would find it hard not to get away, but to go away. I restrain my temper with difficulty when I contemplate the foolishness of the people who discuss with gravity the possibility of a successful invasion of these United States by a foreign foe. The thought always arises when I hear these cries from our army and naval officers for a greater armament: 'Are these men cowards?' I don't believe it. It is their profession which makes them alarmists.

"Not only are the physical difficulties which would hamper an invasion practically insuperable, but the reception enemies would get, if any of them landed, would be wholly without parallel in the world's history.

"If our liberties really were threatened, every man, and very nearly every woman, in our vast population would rise to their defense as never any people yet has risen to any national defense. Americans, young and old, en masse, would sweep to the protection of what they know, and what the world knows, would be the cause of right and human liberty.

"I, myself, should wish to be invited to advance and meet invading forces if they came. I would approach them without any weapons on my person. I would not shoot at them. I would make a speech to them.

"Gentlemen, I would say, 'here's the chance of your life to win life's chief prize. Now you are peasant soldiers. You have the opportunity to become citizen kings. We are all kings here. Here the least of you can take a rank much higher than that of any General in your army. He can become a sovereign in a republic.'

"I think they would hurrah for me, not harm me, after they had heard my speech.

"Striving for peace, we shall become so powerful that if war comes we shall be invincible. Peace, not war, makes riches; the rich nation is the powerful nation.

"Perhaps I was as much a peace man in my youth as I am now, but when I was asked, during the civil war, to organize a corps of telegraph operators and railroad conductors and engineers and take them to Washington, I considered it the greatest of all privileges to obey the order.

"I was the last man to get on the last train leaving Burkes Station, after Bull Run, and, now, if the country ever should be invaded, I would be, I hope, one of the first to rush to meet the enemy—but I think my haste would be to convert, not to kill, him.

"The man who has done well in business, however, learns to abhor all waste, and I must admit that it does pain me to see hundreds of millions of our dollars spent on battleships which will but rust away, and thousands of our able men vegetating on them or in an army.

"The men who urge this vast waste of our money and men mean well, no doubt, but they do not know the nation of which they have the good fortune to be citizens—they do not realize how very potent a force we have become in the wide world, nor the fact that one of the great reasons why we have become a force lies in the circumstance that our national development has not been hampered by the vast expense of militarism."

Mr. Carnegie paused.

Some weeks ago Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, predicted that the present war would find its final outcome in the establishment of the United States of Europe. I asked Mr. Carnegie to express his view upon this subject.

"Nothing else could occur which would be of such immense advantage to Europe," he replied.

"United we stand, and divided they fall. If the territory now occupied by

the homogeneous and co-operative federation known as the United States of America were occupied instead by a large number of small, independent competitive nations, that is, if each section of our territory which now is a State were an independent country, America would be constantly in turmoil.

"Europe has been set back a century because she substituted the present war of nations for the promotion of a federation plan. The latter would have meant peace and prosperity, the former means ruin.

"If in Europe this year such a federation as Dr. Butler regards as a future probability had been a present actuality, 1914 would have left a record very different from that which it is making.

"For instance, it would have been as difficult for the State of Germany to fight the State of Russia, or the State of France, or that of England, or all of them, and to trample neutral Belgium, as it now would be, here, for the State of Pennsylvania to declare war on the States of New York and Connecticut and to wreck New Jersey as she sent her troops to the invasion.

"Originally we had thirteen States, and thirteen only, but there was other territory here, and the attractive force of the successful union of the thirteen States brought the other territory in as it was organized.

"Thus we started right. Europe had begun before men had become so wise, and, having begun wrong, has found herself, through the centuries, unable to correct old errors.

"Certainly I hope that out of the great crime of this vast war some good will come. The greatest good which could come would be a general European federation. I do not believe that this will come at once; but the world will be infinitely the better if it comes at length—if the natural law of mutual attraction for mutual advantage draws these nations now at war into a union which shall make such wars impossible in future, as wars between our States, here, are impossible.

"But before this can come peace must come, and before peace can come one or the other of the nations now at war must at least ask for an armistice.

"If I were in the place of that great General, Lord Kitchener, and should receive the news that such a request had been made by the commander of the opposing forces, I should say: 'No armistice! Surrender!'

"But, then, if the surrender should be made, I should say, in effect:

"Gentlemen, we have made up our minds that these terrible explosions must mark the end of war between our civilized nations. Our sacrifices in this war have been too great to permit us to be satisfied with less than this.

"If we now cannot feel assured of such a federation of nations as will result in the settlement of all future disputes by peaceful arbitration at The Hague, then we shall keep on fighting till the day comes when we can achieve that end.

"Upon the other side of the Atlantic,' I should continue if I were Lord Kitchener and should be confronted by such a situation, 'we see in the United States of America an example which must satisfy us that world peace now can be maintained.

"There,' I should go on, 'thirteen States were banded into union in 1776. Their total population was less than the present population of their largest city and their area has spread until it links two oceans and offers homes in forty-eight States to one hundred millions, and the population still increases rapidly. An experiment of world significance was tried, and is a success, for the aggregated nation has grown and now is growing in power more rapidly than any other nation on the surface of the earth.

Would Mean World Peace.

"It is plain to me and should be plain to all of us,' I should continue, if I were Lord Kitchener, so placed, 'that we in Europe have but to follow this example which America has set for us in order to achieve an ultimate result as notably desirable. When we have accomplished it

world peace will be enthroned and all the peoples of the earth will be able safely to go about the pleasant and progressive business of their lives without apprehension of their neighbors. Humanity, thus freed of its most dreadful burden, will be able to leap forward toward the realization of its ultimate possibilities of progress.'"

"And do you really think there is the immediate possibility of an effective European league for permanent peace and general disarmament?" I asked Mr. Carnegie.

"Naturally my mind has dwelt much on this problem," he replied. "The culmination of the European situation in the present war is very dreadful, but no good ever came out of crying over spilled milk. However, it seems safe to conclude that a majority of the people of the civilized world will presently decide that a step forward must be taken.

"Everywhere in Europe, when the present conflict ends, this fact will be emphasized by shell-wrecked, fire-blackened buildings; by the vacant chairs of sons and fathers who have fallen victims; by innumerable graves and by a general impoverishment, the inevitable result of war's great waste, which will touch and punish every man, every woman, every child.

"In the face of such an emphasis no denial of the facts will be among the possibilities, and I scarcely think that any even will be attempted. If the federation Dr. Butler has predicted does not come about at once, it will be admitted almost universally that future disputes occurring between the Governments of Europe shall be settled, not by force of fighting men, but by arbitration at The Hague.

"And now a serious question obtrudes itself. Must there not be a carefully considered and cautiously worked out understanding, which may be considered the preliminary of peace? Later on the foremost men of every nation can meet in conference to consider with an earnestness hitherto unknown the great problems which will be involved in the permanent abolition of war and establish-

ment of peace; but for this the way must be prepared.

"Here, again, I think The Hague Tribunal is the proper body to assemble for the purpose of devising means for the accomplishment of the great end, which must be such legislation as will accomplish, at the end of this war, the ending of all war among the nations.

"An important duty of the conference would be some arrangement for a union of the forces of the nations now at war, charged with and qualified to perform the duty of maintaining peace pending the completion of the final comprehensive plan.

For One Purpose Only.

"It is possible and even probable that as a part of the accomplishment of this it may be found to be desirable and even necessary to organize and provide for the maintenance of a joint naval and military body of strength sufficient to enforce world peace during the period necessary for the preparation of a plan to be submitted to all powers. But if this force is to be established, it must be done with the clear understanding that it is designed for one thing only, the maintenance of peace, and must not be used at any time for any other service.

"In the selection of the commanding officer to be intrusted with this task, it will be conceded that the victors in this war, or those who have a notable advantage at the time of the beginning of the armistice, shall have the right of his appointment.

"No protest ever will arise from the mass of the people of Europe against the abolishment of militarism. Even the people of Germany, as a whole, have not found militarism attractive. It has been the influence of the military aristocracy of Germany, the most powerful caste in the world, which not only has encouraged the national tendency, but has forced the Emperor, as I believe, to action against his will and judgment.

"But a change was notable in Germany before the war began, and will be far more notable after it has ended. The socialistic movement waxes strong throughout the nation, and the proceed-

ings of the Reichstag show us that the nation is marching steadily, though perhaps slowly, toward a real democracy.

"I believe the first election to follow peace will result in a demand by the Reichstag that it, alone, shall be given power to declare war. It will be argued, and it is evident that it then will be amply provable, that it is the people who suffer most through war, and that, therefore, their representatives should utterly control it.

"That itself would be a most important step toward peace, and I feel certain that it is among the probabilities.

"As things stand in Germany, although the Reichstag has its powerful influence in regard to war expenditure and might accomplish important results by refusing to vote amounts demanded, the fact remains that until it has been given the power of making or withholding declaration of war the most important results cannot be accomplished."

"In Fried's volume," I suggested to Mr. Carnegie, "you are credited with saying that Emperor William, himself and by himself, might establish peace. Granting that that might have been the fact before this war began, is it your opinion that he, or any other one man,

could now control the situation to that extent?"

"Assuming that the Germans should come out victorious," Mr. Carnegie replied, "the Emperor would become a stronger power than ever toward the maintenance of peace among the nations. At one time I believed him to be the anointed of God for this purpose, and did not fail to tell him so.

"Even if his forces should be defeated in this present carnage, I am sure he would be welcomed by the conference I have suggested as the proposer of the great world peace, thus fulfilling the glorious destiny for which at one time I considered that he had been chosen from on high."

I asked Mr. Carnegie what part he thought this country, the United States, should play in the great movement which he has in mind and thoroughly believes is even now upon its way.

"The United States," he answered, "although, happily, not a party to the world crime which is now in progress, seems entitled to preference as the one to call the nations of the world to the consideration of the greatest of all blessings—universal, lasting peace."

New York, January, 1915.



Woman and War

"SHOT. TELL HIS MOTHER."

By W. E. P. French, Captain, U. S. Army

WHAT have I done to you, Brothers,—War-Lord and Land-Lord and Priest,—
That my son should rot on the blood-smeared earth where the raven and buzzard
feast?

He was my baby, my man-child, that soldier with shell-torn breast,
Who was slain for your power and profit—aye, murdered at your behest.
I bore him, my boy and my manling, while the long months ebbed away;
He was part of me, part of my body, which nourished him day by day.
He was mine when the birth-pang tore me, mine when he lay on my heart,
When the sweet mouth mumbled my bosom and the milk-teeth made it smart,
Babyhood, boyhood, and manhood, and a glad mother proud of her son—
See the carrion birds, too gorged to fly! Ah! Brothers, what have you done?

You prate of duty and honor, of a patriot's glorious death,
Of love of country, heroic deeds—nay, for shame's sake, spare your breath!
Pray, what have you done for your country? Whose was the blood that was shed
In the hellish warfare that served your ends? My boy was shot in your stead.

And for what were our children butchered, men makers of cruel law?
By the Christ, I am glad no woman made the Christless code of war!
Shirks and schemers, why don't you answer? Is the foul truth hard to tell?
Then a mother will tell it for you, of a deed that shames fiends in hell:—
Our boys were killed that some faction or scoundrel might win mad race
For goals of stained gold, shamed honors, and the sly self-seeker's place;
That money's hold on our country might be tightened and made more sure;
That the rich could inherit earth's fullness and their loot be quite secure;
That the world-mart be wider opened to the product mulct from toil;
That the labor and land of our neighbors should become your war-won spoil;
That the eyes of an outraged people might be turned from your graft and greed
In the misruled, plundered home-land by lure of war's ghastly deed;
And that priests of the warring nations could pray to the selfsame God
For His blessing on battle and murder and corpse-strewn, blood-soaked sod.
Oh, fools! if God were a woman, think you She would let kin slay
For gold-lust and craft of gamesters, or cripple that trade might pay?

This quarrel was not the fighters':—the cheated, red pawns in your game:—
You stay-at-homes garnered the plunder, but the pawns,—wounds, death, and "Fame"!
You paid them a beggarly pittance, your substitute prey-of-the-sword,
But, ye canny beasts of prey, they paid, in life and limb, for your hoard.
And, behold! you have other victims: a widow sobs by my side,
Who clasps to her breast a girl-child. Men, she was my slain son's bride!

I can smell the stench of the shambles, where the mangled bodies lie;
I can hear the moans of the wounded; I can see the brave lads die;
And across the heaped, red trenches and the tortured, bleeding rows
I cry out a mother's pity to all mothers of dear, dead "foes."
In love and a common sorrow, I weep with them o'er our dead,
And invoke my sister woman for a curse on each scheming head.

Nay, why should we mothers curse you? Lo! flesh of our flesh are ye;
But, by soul of Mary who bore the Christ-man murdered at Calvary,
Into our own shall the mothers come, and the glad day speed apace
When the law of peace shall be the law of the women that bear the race;
When a man shall stand by his mother, for the worldwide common good,
And not bring her tears and heart-break nor make mock of her motherhood.

Responsibility for the War

By Jacob H. Schiff

One of the leading American financiers and philanthropists, founder of the Jewish Theological Seminary and of the Semitic Museum at Harvard University; a native of Germany and senior partner of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., bankers.

AMERICAN as I am in every fibre, and in accord as I feel with every interest of the country of my adoption, I cannot find myself in agreement with what appears to be, to a considerable extent, American opinion as to the origin and responsibility for the deplorable conflict in which almost all of Europe has become involved.

For many reasons my personal sympathies are with Germany. I cannot feel convinced that she has been the real aggressor; I believe that war was forced upon her, almost as if by prearrangement among the nations with whom she now contends; I cannot but believe that they had become jealous and envious of her rapid and unprecedented peaceful development and had concluded that the moment had arrived when all was favorable for a union against her.

Although I left Germany half a century ago, I would think as little of arraying myself against her, the country of my birth, in this the moment of her struggle for existence, as of arraying myself against my parents.

But while I steadfastly believe this war to have been forced upon Germany against her will, I also believe that circumstances which were stronger than the Governments of England and France, her present enemies, were necessary to overcome an equally definite reluctance upon their part.

In other words, I cannot wholly blame the English Government, or the French Government, any more than I can wholly blame the German Government.

Let us see how the great tragedy came about. It is safe to pass rapidly

over the Servian-Bosnian-Herzegovinian-Austro-Hungarian complication which served as the immediate precipitant of hostilities. It has been detailed repeatedly in *THE TIMES* and other American publications.

It had reached a point at which the Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to take extreme measures by means of which to safeguard the integrity of the empire.

The firm but fatal ultimatum to Serbia followed, the reply to which, suffice it to say, was unsatisfactory to Austria, who could not accept the suggestion of an investigation into the circumstances attending the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand through a commission or court on which she was not represented.

Like Maine Case.

The situation really was analogous to that which existed between the United States and Spain when the Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor. In order to fix the responsibility for this dastardly affair we then similarly demanded an investigation by Spain, to be carried out with the assistance of representatives of this Government. Spain, too, then offered to conduct an investigation, but she presumably declined to allow us to take part in it.

This attitude on her part quickly brought about our declaration of war against her. It is important that Americans should realize the similarity in the two situations and the likeness of the Austrian action of 1914 to that which our own Government took in 1898.

As soon as Austria had rejected as unsatisfactory Serbia's reply to her ulti-

matum she prepared to undertake a punitive armed expedition against Serbia, and Russia at once declared that she would rank herself as Serbia's protector.

Indeed, without any further parley, and to give effect to this threat, Russia immediately mobilized her army. Since then it has been averred that this mobilization had been in progress for several weeks previous to Serbia's rejection of the Austrian ultimatum.

This made it obligatory upon Germany to go to Austria's aid, under the provisions of their treaty of alliance, although she was well aware that such an action would bring France into the conflict under the terms of her alliance with Russia. Indeed, an unsatisfactory reply had been received from France as to the latter's intentions, but Germany endeavored to secure at least an assurance of England's neutrality. This proved to be impossible.

How the German Government could indulge for a moment in the hope that in a war with Russia and France on the one side and Germany and Austria on the other, England could be induced to remain neutral passes comprehension, but that it did believe this seems a certainty.

The English Government, no doubt, correctly felt that without the aid of its immense resources, and particularly without the operations of its great navy against Germany and Austria, the latter nations would find it not so very difficult a task to dispose of both Russia and France.

English statesmen very promptly must have become alive to the probability that a Germany which had subdued Russia and France, and thus had made itself master of the Continent, would be unlikely long to tolerate a continuance of England's world leadership.

So, even if the neutrality of Belgium had not been violated, other reasons would have been found by England for joining France and Russia in the war against Germany, for England would not risk, without any effort to protect them, the loss of her continued domination of

the high seas and her undisputed possession of her vast colonial empire.

Germany Fighting for Life.

I am not defending the violation of Belgian neutrality. This undeniably was a most unjustifiable action, in spite of German claims that she was forced into it by the necessities of the situation. But I am explaining that, even had it not occurred, still England would have gone to war.

That was the situation.

Germany is now fighting for her very existence, and I, who am not without knowledge of German conditions, am convinced that never has there been a war more wholly that of a whole people than is this present conflict, as far as Germany is concerned.

Any one who has been in even superficial touch with German public opinion and individual feeling in any part of the empire, since the war began, must know that there is hardly a man, woman, or child throughout the empire who would hesitate if called upon to sacrifice possessions or life in order to insure victory to the Fatherland. Seventy million people who are animated by unanimous sentiment of this sort cannot be crushed, probably not subdued.

And England is confronted by the certainty that her world leadership is the stake for which she is fighting; that her defeat would mean the end of the vast dominance which she has exercised throughout the world, since the time of the Armada, through the power of her great navy.

Is it not apparent, therefore, that these nations, if left to themselves, inevitably must continue the war until one side or the other, or both, shall become exhausted—an eventuation which may be postponed not for mere months but for years?

In our own civil war Grant for almost two years stood within a hundred or a hundred and fifty miles of Richmond, the heart of the Confederacy, and was not able to sufficiently subdue Lee's forces to enable him to get possession of the city until the complete exhaustion

of the Confederacy's resources in men and money had been accomplished.

While that situation may not offer a true parallel in all respects to that in which we find the belligerent forces in the present European war, it nevertheless may be taken as a precedent proving that frontal encounters of powerful opponents generally do not yield final results until actual exhaustion compels one side or the other to abandon hope.

Such an exhaustion hardly can be expected within measurable time on the part of either one or the other of the combatants in the existing European conflict, and this means the probable continuation for a long period of the merciless slaughter which has marked the last few months. We hold up our hands in horror at the stories of human sacrifices in the early ages when, after all, these were, perhaps, less brutal and less appalling than the wholesale slaughter of the flower of these warring peoples of which we now read almost daily.

As I see the situation there really are only three contestants in the war—England, Russia, and Germany. France, Belgium, and Austria are important auxiliaries, but they are playing to a certain extent secondary rôles.

England's real object is the utter defeat of Germany—nothing more nor less than that—and if this is accomplished England will have control of Europe. It must be remembered that the English Government and English people frequently have asserted that they would not be satisfied with mere defeat of Germany's armed forces, but that her power must be permanently paralyzed.

If England should accomplish this, with Germany, its army and its navy, thus wholly out of the way, no one would be left for England to fear in future upon the high seas.

That might be the chief significance of England's complete victory, and its complete significance would be that every nation in the world would have to do the British bidding, for should any one refuse she could completely destroy its commerce and shut off its overseas supplies.

In the cases of most nations overseas supplies include material vital to the continuance of life and happiness; to every nation, in these days of a developed and habitual foreign trade, overseas supplies are actually essential, even when they do not necessarily include meats and wheat and other foodstuffs.

The effect upon the United States of such an English victory would be most disastrous.

The alliance between England and Japan is likely to be permanent. That is something which Americans cannot afford to forget for a moment.

England needs Japan in the Far East, especially as an ally in case of need, which at some time is certain to arrive, against Russia; and Japan for many reasons needs the strength of English backing, without which her financial and political situation soon would become most dangerous, if not collapse.

Such a permanent alliance would have this consequence upon us, that without even the probability of difficulties with either England or Japan—and, personally, I do not believe that such a probability need be feared—we nevertheless year after year would be compelled to increasingly prepare for what may be defined as the disagreeable possibility of the eventuation of a disagreeable possibility.

Certainly we should be under the necessity of notably and, therefore, very expensively increasing our naval armament; we should be under the necessity of large expenditures for coast defense.

Corollary military cost would be enormous and burdensome. The preparation which would be imposed on us as a necessity by such a permanent alliance would be sufficiently extensive and expensive to burden our people heavily and handicap our national progress.

It might involve, perhaps, even a greater hardship in our case than militarism has involved in Germany. It is improbable that the average American realizes the part which absence of such burdens has played in our national de-

velopment so far; it would be difficult for the average American who has not studied the whole subject carefully to estimate accurately the part which the imposition of such a burden would be sure to play in our future.

We have been measurably a free people. If we were under the necessity of supporting vast military and naval establishments we should be that no longer, no matter how completely we adhered to our democratic political system and ideals. It is not Kings, but what they do, which burdens countries, and the most burdensome act of any King is to load his country up with non-productive, threatening, and expensive war machinery.

The Real Peril.

I fear that the American people as a whole have visualized only slightly, if at all, the real peril involved in this contingency; but cannot feel otherwise than sure that soon they must awake to the great danger that militarism and navalism may be imposed upon them through no fault of their own.

American impulses trend away from armament toward peaceful development along industrial lines, but even now political leaders in Washington begin to see what may be coming. The propositions which already have been made for considerable increases in our naval and military forces may be regarded as only the forerunners of what is to be expected later.

My sympathies and interests, in other words my patriotic sentiments, are definitely American. I must repeat that I am of German origin, and that as regards the present struggle I am pro-German, yet it would be impossible for me to say that I am anti-English, although I am anti-Russian for reasons that are obvious.

I already have expressed the belief that the complete humiliation of England would be disastrous to us. Now, it seems to me that if Germany should be completely successful, if she should be able to wear out the Allies, break down France, hold Russia in check, and cripple

or even invade England, (which many German leaders actually believe can be done, incredible as it may seem to us,) Germany would acquire a position such as never has been held by any nation since the beginning of history. Not even the power of the Roman Empire would approach it.

The advance which has marked the development of every means of communication, transportation, manufacturing, &c., since Rome's day would give Germany, in the case of such an eventuation, a power which would have been inconceivable to the most ambitious Roman Emperor. It would make her a menace not only to her immediate neighbors, but to the entire globe.

Could she be trusted with such power? Notwithstanding my personal sympathies, which I have taken pains to clearly outline, I must admit that I cannot think so. The German character is not only self-reliant, which is admirable, but it readily becomes domineering, particularly when in the ascendancy.

In the rôle of a world conqueror Germany would become a world dictator—would indulge in a domination which would be almost unbearable to every other nation. Particularly would this be the case in respect to her relations with the United States, a nation with which she always has had and always must have intimate trade and commercial relations.

Should Germany make England impotent and France powerless we should become more or less dependent upon German good-will, and it is highly probable, indeed I regard it as a certainty, that before long, in such an event, the Monroe Doctrine would cease to exercise any important influence on world events. It would become a thing of the past—a "scrap of paper."

You see that while I am not neutral to the extreme, while I fervently hope and pray that Germany may not be wrecked and that she may emerge from the war with full ability to maintain her own, I cannot believe that it would be good for her or good for the world in general if she found herself ab-

solutely and incontrovertibly victorious at the end of the great struggle. In other words, I wish Germany to be victorious, but I do not wish her to be too victorious.

This brings us definitely to the question as to what can be done to stop this war. Its continuance is infinitely costly of men and treasure; its prosecution to the bitter end would mean complete disaster for one contestant and only less complete destruction for the other, and it would give to the victor, no matter what his sufferings and losses might have been, a power dangerous to the entire world.

How shall it end? We do not want its end to mean a new European map. Anything of the sort would include the seed of another European war, to be fought out later and at even greater probable cost, with all the world-disturbance implied in such an eventuation.

What the United States should desire and does desire is an understanding between these nations, of just what they are fighting for, which I almost believe they no longer know themselves, and a conference between them now, a pause to think, which at least may help toward stimulating each side to make concessions, before the ultimate of damage has been done.

Such a conference might be called even without any interval in warfare and induced without definite outside intervention from ourselves or any one else. I believe it not to be beyond the bounds of possibility that if this course could be brought about importantly enough, a way out of this brutal struggle and carnage might be discovered even now, and I know I am not alone in this belief.

The situation is unprecedented. No congress such as in former times more than once has settled wars and brought about peace by the give-and-take process could be of avail in the existing circumstances. Something far higher than such a conference is needed. This peace must not be temporary. It must mark not the ending of this war alone but the ending of all war.

Some means must be devised and

generally agreed to which, after the re-establishment of peace, will do away with jealousies among European nations, so that the continual increase of armament on land and sea no longer will be necessary, and humanity will be freed from its tremendous burden.

It is not at present possible to point out any concrete means by which these things may be accomplished, but it is not impossible that, when reason shall be returned to the Governments now at war, they themselves may suggest to one another plans and ways and means how this may be effectuated.

Toward this end America may help tremendously, and herein lies, it seems to me, the greatest opportunity ever offered by events to the American press.

Let the newspapers of America stop futile philosophizing upon the merits and demerits of each case, let them measurably cease their comment upon what each side has accomplished or failed to accomplish during the tragic four months which have traced their bloody mark on history.

Let them begin to stimulate public opinion in favor of a rational adjustment of the points at issue—such an adjustment as will leave each contestant unhumiliated and intact, such an adjustment as will avoid, as far as may be possible, the complete defeat of any one, such an adjustment as will do what can be done toward righting wrongs already wrought, and such an adjustment as will let the world return as soon as may be to the paths of peace, productiveness, prosperity, and happiness.

In suggesting that America should regard this effort as an obligation I am assuming for this country no rights which are not properly hers. We, a nation of a hundred million people, laboring constantly for peace and human progress, have a right to make our voice heard, and if we raise it properly it will find listeners among those who can help toward the accomplishment of what we seek. But if we would make it heard we must be earnest, be honest, and be ceaseless in the reiteration of our demand.

Have we not the right to insist that the interests of neutral nations, of whom, with our South American cousins, (for the better intercourse with whom we have just spent several hundred millions upon the construction of the Panama Canal,) we form so large a percentage, shall before long be given some consideration by the nations whose great quarrel is harming us incalculably?

Americans Should Speak Out.

The interruption of our economic development already has become marked and the war's baneful influence upon moral conditions in our midst shows itself through constantly increasing unemployment and, as a logical consequence of that, the rapid filling of our eleemosynary and penal institutions. May we not reasonably demand that this shall speedily be brought to an end?

It probably is true that under the rules of the game the President of the United States cannot offer his good offices again to the belligerents without first being invited by one or the other side to do this, but the people of the United States have a voice even more

powerful than his; if that of the people of South America should be joined with it, and if the combined sound should be made unquestionably apparent to the warring nations, it could not pass unheeded.

Public opinion in the United States should firmly seek to impress upon the warring nations the conviction that nothing can secure a lasting peace except assurance of conditions under which not mighty armies and tremendous navies are held to be the factors through which trade expansion and the conquest of the markets of the world are to be obtained, but that this can be accomplished better and more lastingly through rigid adherence to the qualities and methods which generally make for success in commercial or any other peaceful competition—fairness, thorough efficiency, and hard work.

The concentrated power of the American press and people would be tremendous. I am sure that, in this instance, it is possible to concentrate it for righteousness and the future good of all humanity.

January, 1915.

Did the German People Want War?

By Frederic William Wile

[FORMER BERLIN CORRESPONDENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, AUTHOR OF "MEN AROUND THE KAISER"]

IF I had been asked any time in 1914 up till the night of Saturday, July 25, whether the German people, the empire's teeming, hard-working, prosperity-drunk millions, wanted war I should have unhesitatingly said no. That was the night when word came from Vienna that Serbia had "rejected" Austria's provocative ultimatum—which, be it noted in passing, Serbia did not at all do—and when war between those two States at last became inevitable.

The memory of that turbulent night in Berlin will never fade from my memory. The Kaiser's beautiful capital was converted in the twinkling of an eye from a

phlegmatic, pleasure-seeking Summer metropolis into a community raging mad for war. Unter den Linden filled, as if by magic, with shrieking, singing processionists. "War! war!" they shouted. "Down with Russia! War with Russia!" they yelled between verses of "God save Franz, the Kaiser," (the Austrian national anthem,) and "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles," Germany's boastful battle song. I knew then that the German people did want war, and I was convinced forthwith that they would have it. Any lingering doubts one may have cherished regarding Germany's latent thirst for war with England were

dissipated by the anti-British fury which burst upon Berlin the night war became an actuality.

For months before the crime of Serejevo—which will live in history not as the cause of but the official pretext for the war of the nations—German public opinion had been skillfully and sedulously prepared to believe that war with Russia was "inevitable." The officially inspired press campaign, which began in March, continued intermittently throughout the Spring and Summer. When Serbia declined to yield to Austria's outrageous demands for reparation at the expense of surrendering all vestige of sovereign independence, Russia was represented to the German people—"the Russia which had been stealthily crouching for the attack on Germany"—as the real enemy. It was St. Petersburg's hand, the Germans were told, which dictated Belgrade's "refusal" to bend the knee to Vienna. That was why the Berlin demonstrators on the night of July 25 cheered for "*Krieg mit Russland*," and almost forgot the existence of Serbia in their belligerent fervor.

War with Russia, the Germans knew, meant war with France, too. Another "reckoning" with the western neighbor was also written in the stars, the Kaiser's people had been taught to believe. When Armageddon was kindled, it found the nation in the frame of mind of a man who has been led to believe that the sword of Damocles, long dangling over his head, was now at last about to fall, and who, fearing the blow with childlike confidence in the inexorable, says to himself: "It must come some time. Let it come now."

Hypnotized and Terrorized.

To that extent the German people unquestionably and unqualifiedly did want war. They had been hypnotized into believing that it was their only salvation. They had been terrorized into a conviction that, without war, their national existence was on the brink of obliteration. In the midst of the most bounding prosperity in their imperial history, the overwhelming majority, like the inhabitants of other countries, sighed

far more fervently for the prosaic blessings of peace than the glories of war. But they had ceased to be the masters of their senses. Their dominating emotions now were their fears. And so the people once proud to be known as a race of thinkers and poets, and latterly as a nation of business giants, threw off the mask and became a community of war-makers.

Let me put it in terser terms. Let us suppose that you and I are children—the Germans are political children. Our parents and mentors—Germany has never known anything but paternal Government—come along and tell us the wolves are upon us; that we must fight for our lives or perish. We have been real children hitherto—with no more belligerent interests than our schoolbooks and our toys. But we have been trained to believe implicitly in the admonitions of our elders, and, docile and harmless as we have been in the past, we yield blindly to the instinct of self-preservation and become warriors. We do not want to be eaten by the wolves.

The Real Cause.

Having seen the effect on the German popular mind of what the Berlin Professors of Psychology would call "national hallucination"—a positive conviction that the Fatherland was in peril—let us seek the cause. The search will not take us far afield. Germans have been frightened into the "inevitability of war" obsession by their conscienceless all-powerful military party. That sect, which, speaking broadly, embraces the 1,000,000 most influential men in the empire, is the real maker of this war. Popular opinion, both in Germany and abroad, has always designated William II. as the archpriest of the war party. I myself am not fully persuaded of the accuracy of that assumption. William has long lusted for Napoleonic glory, but I never thought he hankered to achieve it at the price of risking his throne. Vainglorious autocrat that he is, he is too jealous of the power he usurps to desire wantonly to place it in jeopardy. The war party, during the Morocco crisis of 1911, openly called the Kaiser a

coward. For years I have heard German officers, in bursts of convivial confidence, assert that the "Supreme War Lord" lacked the moral courage to sign a mobilization order. They averred that when "The Day" arrived he would have to be coerced into inditing the signature necessary to start the German war machine. He has told us the sword was "forced" into his hand. That would bear out what a good many people have always said of Attila's "martial" character.

Yet, omnipotent and all-pervading as the military party is, Germany's army, to be an effective instrument in their hands, must be imbued with the idea that the cause is just. The energies of the party for the past fifteen years, therefore, have been bent exclusively in the direction of educating the nation along corresponding lines. It has been a long process, but it has achieved the desired end. A great polemical literature, of which Bernhardi is only the newest and the best-known apostle, has accumulated in the course of the war party's siege of German public opinion. The 17½-inch mortars which reduced Liège, Namur, and Antwerp did no more for the attainment of their sanguinary ambitions than the pens of men like Reventlow, Keim, Frobenius, and a host of contemporaries who have been preaching

day in and day out the doctrine of German expansion and the holiness of Germany's ambitions for more room in the sun. They have had, of course, a valiant ally in the braggart Kaiser, who, in one breath, anoints himself head keeper of the world's peace and ally of Deity, and in the next shrieks that "the trident must be in our hands," and "Germany's future lies upon the water." His son and heir, the nebulous Crown Prince, who turns out to be a buccaneer as well as a fop, has been a far more important asset for the war party than Emperor William, for the Crown Prince is a truly popular figure in Germany, which his father never has been, and his martial ebullitions, always a success with the crowd, are water on militarism's mill.

Blind when the war began, and blind yet as to its real causes, Germans trooped off to the firing line in their millions, happy and singing. I never dreamed men could march to death so cheerfully. They fervidly believed "The Kaiser's Cause" was unassailably just, and they leaped to defend it. Their wakening will come. It will be for the historian to tell us whether, in the reasoned light of their ultimate fate, the German people still felt that the war on which they entered so joyfully was, after all, a conflict which they really wanted.

Military Events on All Fronts

Russians Penetrate Galicia to the Carpathians---Japanese Capture Tsing-tau

[PERIOD ENDED DEC. 26, 1914]

THE month of November was marked by incessant German attacks on the western front, all of which failed to make any impression on the allied lines. In the region east of Paris the advantage has remained steadily with the Allies since the great battle on the Marne in September, though the Germans have sacrificed enormous

masses of men in a futile effort to break through.

The most vital engagements in November, however, took place on the eastern front. The Russians, after their victory before Warsaw, threw the Germans and Austrians back, penetrated into East Prussia on the north, and cleared Galicia to the Carpathians in the south. In Po-

land the Germans, after being driven back close to their own frontier, used the railways to execute a rapid concentration, and delivered a fierce counterattack between the Vistula and the Warta. The Russians, unable to manoeuvre so quickly, were at first driven back, then held the enemy, and finally drove him back by a crushing victory to his own frontier. Another desperate German effort had failed.

Japan has accomplished her first task in this great war. The siege of Tsing-tau, which lasted nearly eleven weeks, ended in the surrender of that German stronghold on Nov. 7. Thus Germany has lost one of her most precious colonial possessions, and is finally banished from the East. Tsing-tau did not surrender, however, until most of its defenses had been silenced by the long bombardment from the guns of British and Japanese ships in the harbor and by the Japanese forces on land. The terrific nature of the bombardment by the British and Japanese naval guns is indicated by the fact that there were only 2,300 of the garrison left to surrender. The Bismarck fort was silenced with seven shots of the British battleship *Triumph*. The Shias Chou Chan fort was set aflame, and the German gunboat, after losing her funnels, disappeared from the surface of the water. Five of these forts were carried at once, and then the Germans raised the white flag. Captain Meyer Waldeck, the German commander, afterward told the Kaiser that lack of ammunition prevented his making a longer defense. Besides, the walls of the city had been practically demolished when the Japanese infantry entered. Before surrendering the Germans blew up the Austrian cruiser, the *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, and the big floating dock, to prevent their falling into the hands of the Japanese. The German defense was a gallant one, and the official reports of both sides are full of praise for the bravery and consideration of the other. It is evident that the Japanese conducted the siege in a thoroughly businesslike and scientific manner, and with as much humanity as is possible in warfare.

The Germans spent last year on this

colony \$100,000,000 for strengthening the forts and making a fine harbor with nearly three miles of massive structures—piers, docks, and jetties—which greatly surpassed the Russian accommodations at Dalny. Six hundred Krupp guns of various calibres were mounted in positions that included every strategic point.

Foiled in their attempt to prevent the Japanese from reaching this objective, the Germans have pursued the policy of trying to stir up China against her neighbors. To allay the nervous feeling in China and to prove that she does not mean to dominate Chinese territory, Japan has handed over the captured island to the Australian fleet.

Turks Attack Odessa.

Another important event of the month was Turkey's action in joining the Central Powers. Without any known grievance against the Allies, she entered the arena suddenly, fully equipped and with a well-organized army of 725,000 men, commanded by 3,000 German officers. Her first blow was delivered on the Black Sea. Though she had not previously declared war on Russia, her two German-built battleships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, with all searchlights on, and flying the Turkish neutral flag, passed peacefully the Russian patrols, steamed within range of Odessa, attacked the city and discharged 200 shells, most of which were directed against the petroleum tanks, the merchant ships, and the grain elevators. They set fire to fifty white oil reservoirs at Novo Rossisk, sunk fourteen transports there and five at Odessa, also setting fire to five white oil reservoirs at the latter place. They also fired 100 shells on Theodosia. The Russian guardship *Donez*, which was anchored at the Golden Horn, was sunk by artillery fire. Great Britain, which had felt sure of Turkish sympathy, at once issued from the Foreign Office a strong protest equivalent to an ultimatum, and, not receiving a satisfactory explanation, immediately declared war on Turkey, (Nov. 5.) Thus Turkey had chosen her place on the side of the Central Powers.

From German sources it was an-

nounced that a holy war had been proclaimed at Constantinople, but of any immediate rising of Mussulman subjects in the allied dominions there was no sign; in fact, quite the reverse. The leaders of the Mussulmans in India proclaimed their steadfast intention to support Great Britain. Aga Khan denounced Turkey as the tool of Germany. The Nizam of Hyderabad declared on Nov. 2 that the British Government was Islam's best friend.

In actual fighting the Turk has accomplished nothing in the first months. He is being driven back by the Russians in the Caucasus; he has already lost Basra on the Persian Gulf to the British, Bayazid, Ardost, and Id to the Russian forces, and as yet has made no serious advance on Egypt. In the latter country, in spite of the utmost endeavors of German agents, all is quiet.

Turkey's action has placed her immediate neighbors in a very awkward position, tending toward a revival of the Balkan League, with the adhesion of Rumania. This league feels that if Germany were to triumph Turkey would certainly demand all the territories lost in the Balkan wars. The Rumanian Premier, Take Jonescu, has declared that his country should no longer remain neutral, but should join the Entente. Italy is beginning to feel that Tripoli would be jeopardized if the Mussulmans were to rise in a holy war. Her press is showing fear that Italy's hope to establish a sphere of influence in Albania would be lost should Germany and Turkey come out triumphant. There are signs that she also will be forced by Turkey's action to join the Allies.

Britain's Growing Armies.

The month of December has brought little progress to either side; the main interest is centred in the creation of an efficient army in England, which is the only belligerent nation that has no conscription and therefore no trained reserve to draw upon.

Arrangements are now being made by the British Government to place and maintain in the field six separate armies, two of which already are at the front, while the other four are still under train-

ing in England, or behind the fighting lines in France. Each of these armies is to be composed of about three army corps. The commanders of these six armies have been named, as also has the constitution of the four new armies; but it had not yet been told how the divisions at the front have been distributed between General Haig, who commands the First Army, and General Smith-Dorrien, who commands the Second.

The figures of the French forces have not been made public. The world does not even know how many French armies have been formed. The Commander in Chief is taking every precaution to conceal all his preparations and hide his intentions, lest the enemy should profit by the information.

Difficulties of Equipment.

Upon Lord Kitchener falls the task of organizing England's new land forces, and he is urging the need of swift action upon his people; they respond loyally, but regarding the equipment, the Times says:

It is impracticable even for an angel from heaven to meet all the wants of these new and vast forces with the desirable rapidity. With all the good-will in the world, and with no stint of money, time is required before the necessary output can be obtained.

It is the same with regard to boots, clothing, and equipment. If we take boots, our normal peace issue for one year is only 245,000 pairs, but at present 6,500,000 pairs are ordered for first outfit and upkeep for six months only, and it may be imagined that the bootmakers in this island are busily employed. Similarly, we usually issue 114,000 pairs of woolen drawers a year, and have now 7,000,000 pairs on order for half a year. Instead of 43,000 great coats we have 1,500,000 in hand; instead of 250,000 service dress jackets, 5,250,000 are coming along, not to speak of 5,000,000 pairs of trousers, 4,500,000 pairs of puttees, 11,000,000 pairs of socks, besides caps, Highland shoes, cardigans, towels, field dressings, and so on, in the same relative proportions.

Up to the present date, the military issues, apart from those made lately, amount to over 1,000,000 pairs of boots, over 2,000,000 pairs of socks, 1,000,000 shirts, 500,000 caps, and so on. There are huge numbers of contracts, and naturally the prices of wool and other raw materials went up when the demand increased

so much. It was difficult for some contractors to fulfill their engagements without losing money, and some have possibly gone slow on this account. The recruiting boom has also seriously affected certain employers, who have lost skilled hands engaged in their trades, and this is a consideration that must not be overlooked.

We need 100,000 men at once. For these accommodations are ready, and there is every reason why the necessary number should be forthcoming at once. In the ordinary course, at the present rate of recruiting, we should take the 100,000 men in a month, but if we can get them sooner, so much the better. But after these 100,000 men come in we may have to go slow, and it would be sufficient if we took 20,000 men a month until the Spring, when a fresh batch of armies must begin to form and the season will be more suitable for training them.

We require three men at our depots for every five in the field, and as each unit goes off to fight it must leave behind it a reserve upon which to draw. We must not proceed without method; or enlist men for the mere pleasure of swelling numerical totals.

Austria began a destructive attack upon Servia on Nov. 11 in the direction of the Gutcheno Mountains. Additional heavy guns were brought up by the Austrians from Serajevo and other points in Bosnia. Six times did the Austrians attack the Servians, and every time they were thrown back with great losses. At the seventh attack the Serbs had to give way, and the Gutcheno Mountains passed into Austrian possession. This temporary victory also gave the Austrians the possession of the whole country lying to the north of the Loznitza-Shabatz road. They then directed their eighth attack against the hills lying to the southeast of Shabatz, where they repeated the same tactics with massed attacks and with indifference to loss of life, but this time they were halted. The Austrians entered Belgrade on Dec. 2, but on Dec. 14 the Servians retook their capital and administered a complete defeat to the invaders.

The South African Rebellion

How It Flared Up and How It Was Quickly Suppressed Under General Botha

By Dr. D. Goldblatt

[EDITOR OF THE ADVOCATE, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA]

OF Germany's many hopes for rebellions in the British Empire—hopes on which she has counted heavily—only one has thus far materialized. That is the Boer rebellion in South Africa. The arrangements for it were made a year before the outbreak of the war, as shown by circumstantial and material evidence. Maritz, the first Boer commander, who went over with his commando of about a thousand men into German Southwest Africa to join the Germans and fight against his own country, sent a letter to General De Wet, General Herzog, General Byers, and President Stein, asking them to join him as per arrangements. This letter was intercepted by the United Government of South Africa. In it Maritz says that

Germany promised him that in the event of the Boers joining him to drive the English out of South Africa Germany would allow the Boers to establish a republic. General De Wet, who was one of those who signed the peace treaty between the Boers and Great Britain at Vereeniging, and who proved himself loyal to this treaty up to the last moment, joined Maritz. So, too, did General Byers, who resigned his position a few months ago as chief commander of the South African forces, and a few other prominent Boer commanders with him. This could not have happened so suddenly without a previous arrangement. Its appearance has made the impression of a well-arranged plan.

General Byers's resignation of his of-

fice as Commandant General of the Citizen Forces of the South African Union and his subsequent turn to the German side against his own people have explained also a mystery that appeared in his report to both houses of Parliament in 1913, on his mission (August, 1912) to attend army manoeuvres and military institutions in Switzerland, France, Germany, and England. In this report he described the manoeuvres in all the named countries except Germany, passing over the latter as if he had never visited there. Newspaper reports showed that he had been received in Berlin officially; that he was invited to dine with the Kaiser, and that the Kaiser had been especially kind to him, giving him every facility to see what he had come for; yet not a word of all this was mentioned in his report. He did not even say whether he was there or not, or why he was not there, since it was his duty to have been there.

No one at that time suspected him and his friends of treachery against the flag that gave their people absolute local independence over an area five times as large as it ever had, with \$40,000,000 to develop it. In fact, however, they had been in a pact with Germany against Great Britain for years, pledged to rebel at any given time. They had systematically and peacefully worked their way into the administration. When General Byers came in as chief commanding officer of all the South African forces, with General De Wet as first adviser in the War Department and General Herzog as Minister of Justice, the conspirators became acquainted with all the confidential relations between Great Britain and South Africa. They all managed to look innocent and honest in the eyes of the world until the moment came for hostile action. General Botha's first bulletin in connection therewith speaks of the position of the rebellion almost up to November. It is as follows:

Cape Town and Pretoria, Oct. 26, 1914.

The Government have to announce with deep regret that at the instigation of certain prominent individuals a number of burghers in the northern districts of the Orange Free State and the western districts of the Transvaal have been mis-

guided enough to defy the authority of the Government of the Union of South Africa to make preparations for armed resistance and rebellion. The Government, although they have been for some days aware of these rebellious preparations and have been taking steps to deal with the situation that has arisen, have spared no effort to preserve the peace without bloodshed. Now, however, the Government learns that in the Northern Orange Free State burghers and military requirements are being commandeered, under the authority of General Christian De Wet, and in the Western Transvaal under the authority of General Byers. Armed rebellious commandoes are already in existence, and the town of Heilbron has been seized and the officials of the Government therein made prisoners. A train has been stopped at Reitz and armed citizens of the defense force taken therefrom and disarmed.

Under these circumstances the duty of the Government is clear. They are determined to deal with the matter with a firm hand and are taking all the necessary steps to that end. The very great majority of citizens in every province of the Union are thoroughly loyal and detest the very idea of rebellion. When they are aware of the situation they will undoubtedly give the Government every assistance in restoring order and will be careful to abstain from giving the rebellion movement any encouragement or support. All loyal citizens of the Union must therefore be especially on the alert and prepared to give the Government all information and, when called upon to do so, every assistance in their power. Citizens who have been, for some reason or other, guilty of disobedience under the Defense act need not fear any action against them on that account on the part of the Government so long as they remain quietly at home and abstain from acts of violence or hostility against the authority of the Government of the Union.

This was published in English and in Dutch, and was circulated as far as the Government could reach, but the rebel leaders did their best to prevent their reaching the affected lines. Deserters from the rebellious army said they had been assured by the rebel leaders that the Government was with them; they also declared that those who refused to credit such a statement had been forced to join the rebels at the muzzle of a revolver. The success of these methods among the Boers is explained by the fact that they were all farmers, living miles apart one

from another, and knowing very little of the outside world.

General Smuts had taken over the command of the loyal forces immediately after General Byers resigned, but General Botha, for a reason explained below, wanted to move against the rebels himself. He had just been released from the doctor's care and had been ordered to take a few months' rest. His decision, therefore, gave anxiety to his friends, and on John X. Merriman's persistent request to let General Smuts go he replied: "I cannot send loyal Boers against their disloyal brothers without my being with them."

This move was dramatic and had its effect upon all that were doubtful in their loyalty. Every party responded accordingly, and a chorus of condemnation against the rebels resounded from almost every city or village in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

Another document issued by General Botha to the natives was as follows:

I desire it to be known to you that circumstances have arisen which render it necessary, in the public interest, that martial law be proclaimed throughout the Union. A proclamation giving effect to this decision has been issued today. This proclamation will be read to you at an early date. I shall myself leave Pretoria to take personal charge of the operation against the King's enemies in the German Southwest and on our borders. In my absence the administration will, of course, be carried on as usual, and I look to you to continue to give prompt obedience to my officers, and together with the European population cheerfully to submit to any inconvenience which this proclamation of martial law may entail. I take this opportunity of expressing appreciation of your attitude hitherto, and the many messages of loyalty and of assistance which have come in from every hand.

The next day after these proclamations were issued reports began to come in from the Union forces pursuing the rebels. Colonel Brits came in contact with Maritz's whole force, which was already supplemented with a German contingent and with artillery and machine guns at Keimos. Keimos was held by Captain von Rooyens with a garrison of 150. He held out until 200 of the

Natal Light Horse under Major Wats and 200 of the Imperial Light Cavalry under Major Panchand arrived on the scene. A strong attack was started by the rebels, but broke down when General Maritz was shot off his horse by one of the Imperial Light Cavalry. His commando dispersed in all directions, and among the rebels captured was the notorious Count von Schwerin. Colonel Brits followed the main column and forced it to battle, and again the rebels lost their head and ran in all directions.

Soon after that General Botha left Rustenberg in the direction in which General Byers's commando was supposed to be, and he actually came in contact with it. Botha soon drove the enemy forces into headlong flight, pursuing them all day, and capturing many of them fully armed. He followed up his pursuit with all the speed he could until the whole of Byers's commando dispersed in many directions. Colonel Camp, one of Byers's Lieutenants, managed to retreat with his commando into the district of Lichtenberg.

On Nov. 4 General De Wet entered Vrede with about 150 mounted men. The Postmaster succeeded in flashing a signal to the Transvaal before the rebels seized the Post Office. When they entered he was knocked down and brutally kicked. General De Wet ordered all inhabitants to assemble in front of the Dutch church, where he mounted the pedestal of the monument and ordered the Magistrate to be brought out to him, by force if necessary. The Magistrate was brought by six men, and De Wet said:

Magistrate, I want you to get a shorthand writer to take down every word that I am going to say, because, whatever I may do in the future, I can never commit a greater act of rebellion than I have already committed. I am going through Maritz, where we will receive arms and ammunition, and from there we are going to Pretoria to pull down the British flag and proclaim a Free South African republic. All those who side with me must follow me, and those that side with the Government may stay. I signed the Vereeniging Treaty and swore to be faithful to the British flag, but we have been so downtrodden by the miserable and pestilential English that

we can endure it no longer. His Majesty King Edward VII. promised to protect us, but he has failed to do so, and has allowed a magistrate to be placed over us who is an absolute tyrant and has made it impossible for us to tolerate him any longer. I was charged before him with beating a native boy. I only did it with a small shepherd whip, and for that I was fined 5 shillings, [\$1.25.] I am going through the town; I will take horses, saddles, bridles, halters, arms and ammunition, and if any one should refuse to hand these articles to my men I will give him a thrashing. I am here with my eight sons and son-in-law. I left on my farm my wife and my daughter, and I request the magistrate to go over and help them.

They got what they wanted and left. In an attack with 2,000 rebels upon Commandant Cronje, General De Wet lost his son Daniel, who was shot dead. Reports of the success of Botha's armies came in from all around; hundreds of rebels were captured, killed, or wounded, but they recruited by force many thousands more than they lost. Thereupon Botha proclaimed the following amnesty:

Pretoria, Nov. 11, 1914.

The Government, with a view to preventing bloodshed, have spared no effort to avoid internal strife, and have afforded ample opportunity to those who have joined in the rebellion to lay down their arms and return to their allegiance. In spite of these efforts a large number of persons still continue forcibly to resist the authority of the State, are now actually engaged in organizing armed resistance to the Government, are in conflict with the military forces of the Union, and are the cause not only of considerable loss of life, but also of great loss and damage to the property of loyal and peaceful citizens. In order to remove doubts, which apparently have arisen among those who have entered into rebellion, as to the manner in which these are likely to be dealt with should they surrender voluntarily, the following public notification is issued:

(1) All persons in rebellion on and after the date hereof are hereby called upon to surrender themselves voluntarily with their arms and any Government property which they possess at the office of the nearest Magistrate or resident Justice of the Peace, or to any officer of the South African Police, or Union Defense Force, on or before Saturday, Nov. 21, 1914.

(2) All persons who do so surrender will

not be criminally prosecuted at the instance of the Government, but will be allowed to return to their homes and remain there on condition that they take no further part in the rebellion, give no information or any other assistance whatever to the rebels, and do nothing or say nothing whatever which is likely further to disturb the peace or to prolong the rebellion.

(3) This amnesty will not, however, apply to persons who have taken a prominent or leading part in the rebellion, or who while in rebellion have committed acts in violation of rules of civilized warfare.

(4) All rebels who fail to comply with this notification will be liable to be dealt with according to the rigor of the law.

(5) The private property, movable or immovable, of rebels who do not voluntarily surrender in terms of this notification will be liable to be charged with the direct loss and damage incurred by loyal and peaceful citizens as the result of acts committed by such rebels themselves or by any other person in rebellion, whether before or after the 21st of November, 1914.

It is to be most clearly understood that nothing above contained will in any way limit or restrict the Government in continuing from the date of this notification to take the most vigorous and forcible military measures to deal with all persons who are in armed rebellion, or to treat, as the Government may think fit, all rebels captured by the forces of the Government.

(Signed) LOUIS BOTHA.

The next day Botha defeated De Wet, and the rebels began to surrender from many sides. The Government forces went for them at full swing; victory over victory disheartened the rebels; Byers and De Wet were defeated as often as contact was established by either side. White-flag tricks on the part of the rebels often saved them from annihilation. A son of De Wet was captured on Nov. 22, and on Dec. 1 General De Wet himself was captured by Colonel Brits, and 120 rebels with him.

On Dec. 7 the rebel member of the Union Parliament, Piet Grabler, was captured after a stubborn fight, and on the 9th General Byers was shot and killed while swimming across a river. After this the rebellion fizzled out to the last man. The amnesty had contributed much to the success of the Government.

January, 1915.

I.

Probable Causes and Outcome of the War

By Charles W. Eliot

President Emeritus of Harvard University; Officer Legion d'Honneur (France); Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, first class (Japan); Royal Prussian Order of the Crown, first class; Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy; Member of the General Education Board, and an original investigator for the cause of international peace.

THE American people without distinction of party are highly content with the action of their National Administration on all the grave problems presented to the Government by the sudden outbreak of long-prepared war in Europe—a war which already involves five great States and two small ones. They heartily approve of the action of the Administration on mediation, neutrality, aid to Americans in Europe, discouragement of speculation in foods, and, with the exception of extreme protectionists, admission to American registry of foreign-built ships, although the legislation on the last subject, which has already passed Congress, is manifestly inadequate.

Our people cannot see that the war will necessarily be short, and they cannot imagine how it can last long. They realize that history gives no example of such a general interruption of trade and all other international intercourse as has already taken place, or of such a stoppage of the production and distribution of the necessities of life as this war threatens. They shudder at the floods of human woe which are about to overwhelm Europe.

Hence, thinking Americans cannot help reflecting on the causes of this monstrous outbreak of primitive savagery—part of them come down from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and

part developed in the nineteenth—and wondering what good for mankind, if any, can possibly come out of the present cataclysm.

The whole people of the United States, without regard to racial origin, are of one mind in hoping that mankind may gain out of this prodigious physical combat, which uses for purposes of destruction and death all the new forces of nineteenth-century applied science, some new liberties and new securities in the pursuit of happiness; but at this moment they can cherish only a remote hope of such an issue. The military force which Austria-Hungary and Germany are now using on a prodigious scale, and with long-studied skill, can only be met by similar military force, and this resisting force is summoned more slowly than that of Austria-Hungary and Germany, although the ultimate battalions will be heavier.

In this portentous physical contest the American people have no part; their geographical position, their historical development, and their political ideals combine to make them for the present mere spectators, although their interests—commercial, industrial, and political—are deeply involved. For the moment, the best thing our Government can do is to utilize all existing neutrality rights, and, if possible, to strengthen or develop those rights, for out of this war ought to

come more neutral States in Europe and greater security for neutralized territory.

The Need for Discussion.

The chances of getting some gains for mankind out of this gigantic struggle will be somewhat increased if the American people, and all other neutral peoples, arrive through public discussion at some clear understanding of the causes and the possible and desirable issues of the war, and the sooner this public discussion begins, and the more thoroughly it is pursued, the sounder will probably be the tendencies of public sentiment outside of the contending nations and the conclusions which the peace negotiations will ultimately reach.

When one begins, however, to reflect on the probable causes of the sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than primitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and widespread evils in Europe from which America has been exempt for at least 150 years. The first is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine events, and the second is autocratic national Executives who can swing the whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without consulting the people or their representatives.

The actual catastrophe proves that secret negotiations like those habitually conducted on behalf of the "concert of Europe," and alliances between selected nations, the terms of which are secret, or at any rate not publicly stated, cannot avert in the long run outrageous war, but can only produce postponements of war, or short truces. Free institutions, like those of the United States, take the public into confidence, because all important movements of the Government must rest on popular desires, needs, and volitions. Autocratic institutions have no such necessity for publicity. This Government secrecy as to motives, plans, and purposes must often be maintained by disregarding truth, fair dealing, and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to force comes, one Government may secure the advantage of taking the other by surprise. Duplicity during peace and the breaking of

treaties during war come to be regarded as obvious military necessities.

The second great evil under which certain large nations of Europe—notably Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary—have long suffered and still suffer is the permanent national Executive, independent of popular control through representative bodies, holding strong views about rights of birth and religious sanctions of its authority, and really controlling the national forces through some small council and a strong bureaucracy. So long as Executives of this sort endure, so long will civilization be liable to such explosions as have taken place this August, though not always on so vast a scale.

Americans now see these things more clearly than European lovers of liberty, because Americans are detached from the actual conflicts by the Atlantic, and because Americans have had no real contact with the feudal or the imperial system for nearly 300 years. Pilgrim and Puritan, Covenanter and Quaker, Lutheran and Catholic alike left the feudal system and autocratic government behind them when they crossed the Atlantic. Americans, therefore, cannot help hoping that two results of the present war will be: (1) The abolition of secret diplomacy and secret understandings, and the substitution therefor of treaties publicly discussed and sanctioned, and (2) the creation of national Executives—Emperors, Sultans, Kings, or Presidents—which cannot use the national forces in fight until a thoroughly informed national assembly, acting with deliberation, has agreed to that use.

Opposite Tendencies.

The American student of history since the middle of the seventeenth century sees clearly two strong though apparently opposite tendencies in Europe. First, the tendency to the creation and maintenance of small States such as those which the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized and for two centuries secured in a fairly independent existence, and, secondly, a tendency from the middle of the nineteenth century toward larger national units, created by combin-

ing several kindred States under one executive. This second tendency was illustrated strongly in the case of both Germany and Italy, although the Prussian domination in Germany has no parallel in Italy. Somewhat earlier in the nineteenth century the doctrine of the neutralization of the territories of small States was established as firmly as solemn treaties could do it. The larger national units had a more or less federative quality, the components yielding some of their functions to a central power, but retaining numerous independent functions. This tendency to limited unifications is one which Americans easily understand and appreciate. We believe in the federative principle, and must therefore hope that out of the present European horror will come a new development of that principle, and new security for small States which are capable of guaranteeing to their citizens "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—a security which no citizen of any European country seems today to possess.

Some of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American people are now watching from afar are commercial and economic. Imperial Germany's desire for colonies in other continents—such as Great Britain and France secured earlier as a result of keen commercial ambitions—is intense. Prussia's seizure of Schleswig in 1864-5 had the commercial motive; and it is with visions of ports on the North Sea that Germany justifies her present occupation of Belgium. The Russians have for generations desired to extend their national territory southward to the Aegean and the Bosphorus, and eastward to good harbors on the Pacific. Later they pushed into Mongolia and Manchuria, but were resisted successfully by Japan. Austria-Hungary has long been seeking ports on the Adriatic, and lately seized without warrant Herzegovina and Bosnia to promote her approach toward the Aegean, and is now trying to seize Serbia with the same ends in view. With similar motives Italy lately descended on Tripoli, without any excuse except this

intense desire for colonies—profitable or unprofitable. On the other hand, the American people, looking to the future as well as to the past, object to acquisitions of new territory by force of arms; and since the twentieth century opened they have twice illustrated in their own practice—first in Cuba, and then in Mexico—this democratic objection. They believe that extensions of national territory should be brought about only with the indubitable consent of the majority of the people most nearly concerned. They also believe that commerce should always be a means of promoting goodwill, and not ill-will, among men, and that all legitimate and useful extensions of the commerce of a manufacturing and commercial nation may be procured through the policy of the "open door"—which means nothing more than that all nations should be allowed to compete on equal terms for the trade of any foreign people, whether backward or advanced in civilization. No American Administration has accepted a "concession" of land in China. They also believe that peaceable extensions of territory and trade will afford adequate relief from the economic pressure on a population too large for the territory it occupies, and that there is no need of forcible seizure of territory to secure relief. It is inevitable, therefore, that the American people should hope that one outcome of the present war should be—no enlargement of a national territory by force or without the free consent of the population to be annexed, and no colonization except by peaceable commercial and industrial methods.

Aggressive Force a Failure.

One of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present outbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the minds of thinking people that the whole process of competitive armaments, the enlistment of the entire male population in national armies, and the incessant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is not a trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the military preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have

resulted in the most terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate outbreak is the only probable result of the system. For the future of civilization this is a lesson of high value. It teaches that if modern civilization is to be preserved, national Executives—whether imperial or republican—must not have at their disposal immense armaments and drilled armies held ready in the leash; that armaments must be limited, an international Supreme Court established, national armies changed to the Swiss form, and an international force adequate to deal with any nation that may suddenly become lawless agreed upon by treaty and held always in readiness. The occasional use of force will continue to be necessary even in the civilized world; but it must be made not an aggressive but a protective force and used as such—just as protective force has to be used sometimes in families, schools, cities, and Commonwealths.

At present Americans do not close their eyes to the plain fact that the brute force which Germany and Austria-Hungary are now using can only be overcome by brute force of the same sort in larger measure. It is only when negotiations for peace begin that the great lesson of the futility of huge preparations for fighting to preserve peace can be given effect. Is it too much to expect that the whole civilized world will take to heart the lessons of this terrible catastrophe and co-operate to prevent the recurrence of such losses and woes? Should Germany and Austria-Hungary succeed in their present undertakings, the whole civilized world would be obliged to bear continuously, and to an ever-increasing amount, the burdens of great armaments, and would live in constant fear of sudden invasion, now here, now there—a terrible fear, against which neither treaties nor professions of peaceable intentions would offer the least security.

It must be admitted, however, that the whole military organization, which has long been compulsory on the nations of Continental Europe, is inconsistent in the highest degree with American ideals of

individual liberty and social progress. Democracies can fight with ardor, and sometimes with success, when the whole people is moved by a common sentiment or passion; but the structure and discipline of a modern army like that of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia has a despotic or autocratic quality which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of democratic society. To make war in countries like France, Great Britain, and the United States requires the widespread, simultaneous stirring of the passions of the people on behalf of their own ideals. This stirring requires publicity before and after the declaration of war and public discussion; and the delays which discussion causes are securities for peace. Out of the present struggle should come a check on militarism—a strong revulsion against the use of force as means of settling international disputes.

America Cannot Be Indifferent.

It must also be admitted that it is impossible for the American people to sympathize with the tone of the imperial and royal addresses which, in summoning the people to war, use such phrases as "My monarchy," "My loyal people," "My loyal subjects"; for there is implied in such phrases a dynastic or personal ownership of peoples which shocks the average American. Americans inevitably think that the right way for a ruler to begin an exhortation to the people he rules is President Wilson's way: "My fellow-countrymen."

It follows from the very existence of these American instincts and hopes that, although the people of the United States mean to maintain faithfully a legal neutrality, they are not, and can not be, neutral or indifferent as to the ultimate outcome of this titanic struggle. It already seems to them that England, France, and Russia are fighting for freedom and civilization. It does not follow that thinking Americans will forget the immense services which Germany has rendered to civilization during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least abridged in

the outcome of this war upon which she has entered so rashly and selfishly and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated Americans hope and believe that by defeating the German barbarousness the Allies will only promote the noble German civilization.

The presence of Russia in the combination against Germany and Austria-Hungary seems to the average American an abnormal phenomenon; because Russia is itself a military monarchy with marked territorial ambitions; and its civilization is at a more elementary stage than that of France or England; but he resists present apprehension on this score by recalling that Russia submitted to the "Concert of Europe" when her victorious armies were within seventeen miles of Constantinople, that she emancipated her serfs, proposed The Hague Conferences, initiated the "Duma," and has lately offered—perhaps as war measures only—autonomy to her Poles and equal rights

of citizenship to her Jews. He also cannot help believing that a nation which has produced such a literature as Russia has produced during the last fifty years must hold within its multitudinous population a large minority which is seething with high aspirations and a fine idealism.

For the clarification of the public mind on the issue involved, it is important that the limits of American neutrality should be discussed and understood. The action of the Government must be neutral in the best sense; but American sympathies and hopes cannot possibly be neutral, for the whole history and present state of American liberty forbids. For the present, thinking Americans can only try to appreciate the scope and real issues of this formidable convulsion, and so be ready to seize every opportunity that may present itself to further the cause of human freedom, and of peace at last.

Sept. 1, 1914.

Appreciation from Lord Bryce

By James Bryce

Late Ambassador at Washington from Great Britain; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 1905-6; author of "The American Commonwealth."

IT has been a great pleasure to see from your published letter, which has just reached us, that you so clearly understand the motive and feelings with which Great Britain has entered on the present war. Neither commercial rivalry nor any fancied jealousy of Germany's greatness has led us into it, and to the German people our people bear no ill-will whatever. Along with many others I have worked steadily during long years for the maintenance of friendship with Germany, admiring the splendid gifts of the German race, and recognizing their enormous services to science, philosophy, and literature. We had hoped, as some thoughtful statesmen in Germany had also hoped, that by a cordial feeling between Germany and Britain the peace of Europe might be

secured and something done to bring about permanently better relations between Germany and her two great neighbors with whom we found ourselves on friendly terms; and we had confidently looked to the United States to join with us in this task. But the action of the German Government in violating the neutrality of Belgium when France had assured us that she would respect it, the invasion of a small State whose neutrality and independence she and England had joined in guaranteeing, evoked in this country an almost unanimous sentiment that the faith of treaties and the safety of small States must be protected. There has been no war for more than a century—perhaps two centuries—into which the nation has entered with so general a belief that its action is justi-

fied. We rejoice to be assured that this is the general feeling of the people of the United States, whose opinion we naturally value more than we do that of any other people.

Most persons in this country, including all those who work for peace, agree with you in deploring the vast armaments which European States have been piling up, and will hope with you that after this war they may be reduced—and safely reduced—to slender dimensions. Their existence is a constant menace to peace. They foster that spirit of militarism which has brought these horrors on the world; for they create in the great countries of the Continent a large and powerful military and naval caste which

lives for war, talks and writes incessantly of war, and glorifies war as a thing good in itself.

It is (as you say) to the peoples that we must henceforth look to safeguard international concord. They bear the miseries of war, they ought to have the power to arrest the action of those who are hurrying them into it.

To get rid of secret diplomacy is more difficult in Europe than in America, whose relations with foreign States are fewer and simpler, but what you say upon that subject also will find a sympathetic echo here among the friends of freedom and of peace. I am always sincerely yours.

Forest Row, Sussex, Sept. 17, 1914.

A Reply by Dr. Francke

By Kuno Francke

(Died—1918)

Professor of the History of German Culture at Harvard University
and Curator of the Germanic Museum.

IN his letter of Sept. 1 President Eliot expresses the opinion that in the present war "England, France, and Russia are fighting for freedom and civilization." And he adds:

It does not follow that thinking Americans will forget the immense services which Germany has rendered to civilization during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least abridged in the outcome of this war, upon which she has entered so rashly and selfishly and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated Americans hope and believe that by defeating the German barbarousness the Allies will only promote the noble German civilization.

In other words, German military and political power is to be crushed in order to set free the German genius for science, literature, and art. It is interesting to contrast with such views as these the following words of Goethe, uttered in 1813:

I have often felt a bitter grief at the thought of the German people, which is so noble individually and so wretched as

a whole. A comparison of the German people with other nations gives us painful feelings, which I try to overcome by all possible means; and in science and art I have found the wings which lift me above them. But the comfort which they afford is, after all, only a miserable comfort, and does not make up for the proud consciousness of belonging to a nation strong, respected, and feared. However, I am comforted by the thought of Germany's future. Yes, the German people has a future. The destiny of the Germans is not yet fulfilled. The time, the right time, no human eye can foresee, nor can human power hasten it on. To us individuals, meanwhile, is it given, to every one according to his talents, his inclinations, and his position, to increase, to strengthen, and to spread national culture. In order that in this respect, at least, Germany may be ahead of other nations and that the national spirit, instead of being stifled and discouraged, may be kept alive and hopeful and ready to rise in all its might when the day of glory dawns.

If I am not mistaken, these words of Germany's greatest poet express accurately what the German people during the last hundred years has been striving

for—national culture and national pre-eminence in every field of human activity. To advocate the reduction of Germany to a land of isolated scientists,

poets, artists, and educators is tantamount to a call for the destruction of the German Nation.

Sept. 5, 1914.

II.

The Stout and Warlike Breed

By Charles W. Eliot

THERE is nothing new in the obsession of the principal European nations that, in order to be great and successful in the world as it is, they must possess military power available for instant aggression on weak nations, as well as for effective defense against strong ones.

When Sir Francis Bacon wrote his essay on "The True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates" he remarked that forts, arsenals, goodly races of horses, armaments, and the like would all be useless "except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and warlike." He denied that money is the sinews of war, giving preference to the sinews of men's arms, and quoted Solon's remark to Croesus, "Sir, if any other come that hath better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold"—a truly Bismarckian proposition. Indeed, Sir Francis Bacon says explicitly "that the principal point of greatness in any State is to have a race of military men."

Goethe, reflecting on the wretchedness of the German people as a whole, found no comfort in the German genius for science, literature, and art, or only a miserable comfort which "does not make up for the proud consciousness of belonging to a nation strong, respected, and feared."

Because Germany in his time was weak in the military sense, he could write, "I have often felt a bitter grief at the thought of the German people, which is so noble individually, and so wretched as a whole"; and he longed for the day when the national spirit, kept alive and

hopeful, should be "ready to rise in all its might when the day of glory dawns."

"The day of glory" was to be the day of military power. Carlyle said of Germany and France in November, 1870, "that noble, patient, deep, pious, and solid Germany should be at length welded into a nation, and become Queen of the Continent, instead of vamping, vain-glorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and oversensitive France, seems to me that hopefulest public fact that has occurred in my time." How did Germany attain to this position of "Queen of the Continent"? By creating and maintaining, with utmost intelligence and skill, the strongest army in Europe—an army which within six years had been used successfully against Denmark, Austria, and France. Germany became "Queen" by virtue of her military power.

In the same paper Carlyle said of the French Revolution, of which he was himself the great portrayer: "I often call that a celestial infernal phenomenon, the most memorable in our world for a thousand years; on the whole, a transcendent revolt against the devil and his works, (since shams are all and sundry of the devil, and poisonous and unendurable to man.)" Now, the French Revolution was an extraordinary outbreak of passionate feeling and physical violence on the part of the French Nation, both at home and abroad; and it led on to the Napoleonic wars, which were tremendous physical struggles for mastery in Europe.

In a recent public statement two leading philosophical writers of modern Ger-

many, Profs. Eucken and Haeckel, denounce the "brutal national egoism" of England, which they say "recognizes no rights on the part of others, and, unconcerned about morality or immorality, pursues only its own advantage"; and they attribute to England the purpose to hinder at any cost the further growth of German greatness. But what are the elements of that German greatness which England is determined to arrest by joining France and Russia in war against Germany and Austria-Hungary? The three elements of recent German greatness are the extension of her territory; contiguous territories in Europe and in other continents colonial possessions; the enlargement of German commerce and wealth, and to these ends the firm establishment of her military supremacy in Europe. These are the ideas on the true greatness of nations which have prevailed in the ruling oligarchy of Germany for at least sixty years, and now seem to have been accepted, or acquiesced in, by the whole German people. In this view, the foundation of national greatness is fighting power.

This conception of national greatness has prevailed at many different epochs—Macedonian, Roman, Saracen, Spanish, English, and French—and, indeed, has appeared from time to time in almost all the nations and tribes of the earth; but the civilized world is now looking for better foundations of national greatness than force and fighting.

The partial successes of democracy in Europe have much increased the evils of war. Sir Francis Bacon looked for a fighting class; under the feudal system when a Baron went to war he took with him his vassals, or that portion of them that could be spared from the fields at home. Universal conscription is a modern invention, the horrors of which, as now exhibited in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France, much exceed those of earlier martial methods. There has never been such an interruption of agricultural and industrial production, or such a rending of family ties in consequence of war as is now taking place in the greater part

of Europe. Moreover, mankind has never before had the use of such destructive implements as the machine gun, the torpedo, and the dynamite bomb. The progress of science has much increased the potential destructiveness of warfare.

Thinking people in all the civilized countries are asking themselves what the fundamental trouble with civilization is, and where to look for means of escape from the present intolerable conditions. Christianity in nineteen centuries has afforded no relief. The so-called mitigations of war are comparatively trivial. The recent Balkan wars were as ferocious as those of Alexander. The German aviators drop aimless bombs at night into cities occupied chiefly by noncombatants. The North Sea is strewn with floating mines which may destroy fishing, freight, or passenger vessels of any nation, neutral or belligerent, which have business on that sea. The ruthless destruction of the Louvain Library by German soldiers reminds people who have read history that the destroyers of the Alexandria Library have ever since been called fanatics and barbarians. The German Army tries to compel unfortified Belgian cities and towns to pay huge ransoms to save themselves from destruction—a method which the Barbary States, indeed, were accustomed to use against their Christian neighbors, but which has long been held to be a method appropriate only for brigands and pirates—Greek, Sicilian, Syrian, or Chinese.

What Is Wrong with Civilization?

How can it be that the Government of a civilized State commits, or permits in its agents, such barbarities? The fundamental reason seems to be that most of the European nations still believe that national greatness depends on the possession and brutal use of force, and is to be maintained and magnified only by military and naval power.

In North America there are two large communities—heretofore inspired chiefly by ideals of English origin—which have never maintained conscripted armies, and have never fortified against each other their long frontier—Canada

and the United States. Both may fairly be called great peoples even now; and both give ample promise for the future. Neither of these peoples lacks the "stout and warlike" quality of which Sir Francis Bacon spoke; both have often exhibited it. The United States suffered for four years from a civil war, characterized by determined fighting in indecisive battles, in which the losses, in proportion to the number of men engaged, were often much heavier than any thus far reported from the present battlefields in Belgium and France. There being then no lack of martial spirit in these two peoples, it is an instructive phenomenon that power to conquer is not their ideal of national greatness. Much the same thing may be said of some other self-governing constituents of the British Empire, such as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. They, too, have a better ideal of national greatness than that of military supremacy.

What are the real ambitions and hopes of the people of the United States and the people of Canada in regard to their own future? Their expectations of greatness certainly are not based on any conception of invincible military force, or desire for the physical means of enforcing their own will on their neighbors. They both believe in the free Commonwealth, administered justly, and with the purpose of securing for each individual all the freedom he can exercise without injury to his neighbors and the collective well-being. They desire for themselves, each for itself, a strong Government, equipped to perform its functions with dignity, certainty, and efficiency; but they wish to have that Government under the control of the deliberate public opinion of free citizens, and not under the control of any Praetorian Guard, Oligarchic Council, or General Staff, and they insist that the civil authority should always control such military and police forces as it may be necessary to maintain for protective purposes.

True National Greatness.

They believe that the chief object of government should be the promotion of

the public welfare by legislative and administrative means; that the processes of government should be open and visible, and their results be incessantly published for approval or disapproval. They believe that a nation becomes great through industrial productiveness and the resulting internal and external commerce, through the gradual increase of comfort and general well-being in the population, and through the advancement of science, letters, and art. They believe that education, free intercourse with other nations, and religious enthusiasm and toleration are means of national greatness, and that in the development and use of these means force has no place. They attribute national greatness in others, as well as in themselves, not to the possession of military force, but to the advance of the people in freedom, industry, righteousness, and goodwill.

They believe that the ideals of fighting power and domination should be replaced by the ideals of peaceful competition in production and trade, of generous rivalry in education, scientific discovery, and the fine arts, of cooperation for mutual benefit among nations different in size, natural abilities, and material resources, and of federation among nations associated geographically or historically, or united in the pursuit of some common ends and in the cherishing of like hopes and aspirations. They think that the peace of the world can be best promoted by solemn public compacts between peoples—not Princes or Cabinets—compacts made to be kept, strengthened by mutual services and good offices, and watched over by a permanent International Judicial Tribunal authorized to call on the affiliated nations for whatever force may be necessary to induce obedience to its decrees.

Will not the civilized world learn from this horrible European war—the legitimate result of the policies of Bismarck and his associates and disciples—that these democratic ideals constitute the rational substitute for the imperialistic ideal of fighting force as the foundation of national greatness? The new ideals will still need the protection and support,

both within and without each nation, of a restrained public force, acting under law, national and international, just as a sane mind needs as its agent a sound

and strong body. Health and vigor will continue to be the safeguards of morality, justice, and mercy.

Asticou, Me., Sept. 14, 1914.

III.

Why Is America Anti-German?

By Charles W. Eliot

THE numerous pamphlets which German writers are now distributing in the United States, and the many letters about the European war which Americans are now receiving from German and German-American friends, are convincing thoughtful people in this country that American public opinion has some weight with the German Government and people, or, at least, some interest for them; but that the reasons which determine American sympathy with the Allies, rather than with Germany and Austria-Hungary, are not understood in Germany, and are not always appreciated by persons of German birth who have lived long in the United States.

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that Americans feel any hostility or jealousy toward Germany, or fail to recognize the immense obligations under which she has placed all the rest of the world, although they now feel that the German Nation has been going wrong in theoretical and practical politics for more than a hundred years, and is today reaping the consequences of her own wrong-thinking and wrong-doing.

There are many important matters concerning which American sympathy is strongly with Germany: (1) The unification of Germany, which Bismarck and his co-workers accomplished, naturally commended itself to Americans, whose own country is a firm federation of many more or less different States, containing more or less different peoples; while most Americans did not approve Bis-

marck's methods and means, they cordially approved his accomplishment of German unification; (2) Americans have felt unqualified admiration for the commercial and financial growth of Germany during the past forty years, believing it to be primarily the fruit of well-directed industry and enterprise; (3) all educated Americans feel strong gratitude to the German Nation for its extraordinary achievements in letters, science, and education within the last hundred years. Jealousy of Germany in these matters is absolutely foreign to American thought, and that any external power or influence should undertake to restrict or impair German progress in these respects would seem to all Americans intolerable, and, indeed, incredible; (4) all Americans who have had any experience in Governmental or educational administration recognize the fact that German administration—both in peace and in war—is the most efficient in the world, and for that efficiency they feel nothing but respect and admiration, unless the efficiency requires an inexpedient suppression or restriction of individual liberty; (5) Americans sympathize with a unanimous popular sentiment in favor of a war which the people believe to be essential to the greatness, and even the safety, of their country—a sentiment which prompts to family and property sacrifices very distressing at the moment, and irremediable in the future; and they believe that the German people today are inspired by just such an overwhelming sentiment.

How is it, then, that, with all these strong American feelings tending to make them sympathize with the German people in good times or bad, in peace or in war, the whole weight of American opinion is on the side of the Allies in the present war? The reasons are to be found, of course, in the political and social history of the American people, and in its Governmental philosophy and practice today. These reasons have come out of the past, and are intrenched in all the present ideals and practices of the American Commonwealth. They inevitably lead Americans to object strongly and irrevocably to certain German national practices of great moment, practices which are outgrowths of Prussian theories, and experiences that have come to prevail in Germany during the past hundred years. In the hope that American public opinion about the European war may be a little better understood abroad it seems worth while to enumerate those German practices which do not conform to American standards in the conduct of public affairs:

(a) Americans object to the committal of a nation to grave measures of foreign policy by a permanent Executive—Czar, Kaiser, or King—advised in secret by professional diplomatists who consider themselves the personal representatives of their respective sovereigns. The American people have no permanent Executive, and the profession of diplomacy hardly exists among them. In the conduct of their national affairs they utterly distrust secrecy, and are accustomed to demand and secure the utmost publicity.

(b) They object to placing in any ruler's hands the power to order mobilization or declare war in advance of deliberate consultation with a representative assembly, and of co-operative action thereby. The fact that German mobilization was ordered three days in advance of the meeting of the Reichstag confounds all American ideas and practices about the rights of the people and the proper limits of Executive authority.

(c) The secrecy of European diplomatic

intercourse and of international understandings and terms of alliance in Europe is in the view of ordinary Americans not only inexpedient, but dangerous and unjustifiable. Under the Constitution of the United States no treaty negotiated by the President and his Cabinet is valid until it has been publicly discussed and ratified by the Senate. During this discussion the people can make their voice heard through the press, the telegraph, and the telephone.

(d) The reliance on military force as the foundation of true national greatness seems to thinking Americans erroneous, and in the long run degrading to a Christian nation. They conceive that the United States may fairly be called a great nation; but that its greatness is due to intellectual and moral forces acting through adequate material forces and expressed in education, public health and order, agriculture, manufacturing and commerce, and the resulting general well-being of the people. It has never in all its history organized what could be called a standing or a conscripted army; and, until twenty years ago, its navy was very small, considering the length of its sea coasts.

There is nothing in the history of the American people to make them believe that the true greatness of nations depends on military power.

Object to Extension by Force.

(e) They object to the extension of national territory by force, contrary to the wishes of the population concerned. This objection is the inevitable result of democratic institutions; and the American people have been faithful to this democratic opinion under circumstances of considerable difficulty—as, for example, in withdrawing from Cuba, the rich island which had been occupied by American troops during the short war with Spain, (1898,) and in the refusing to intervene by force in Mexico for the protection of American investors, when that contiguous country was distracted by factional fighting. This objection applies to long-past acts of the German Government as well as to its proceedings in the present war—as, for example,

to the taking of Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine, as well as to the projected occupation of Belgium.

(f) Americans object strenuously to the violation of treaties between nations on the allegation of military necessity or for any other reason whatever. They believe that the progress of civilization will depend in future on the general acceptance of the sanctity of contracts or solemn agreements between nations and on the development by common consent of international law. The neutralization treaties, the arbitration treaties, The Hague Conferences, and some of the serious attempts at mediation, although none of them go far enough, and many of them have been rudely violated on occasion, illustrate a strong tendency in the civilized parts of the world to prevent international wars by means of agreements deliberately made in time of peace. The United States has proposed and made more of these agreements than any other power, has adhered to them, and profited by them. Under one such agreement, made nearly a hundred years ago, Canada and the United States have avoided forts and armaments against each other, although they have had serious differences of opinion and clashes of interests, and the frontier is 3,000 miles long and for the most part without natural barriers. Cherishing the hope that the peace of Europe and the rights of its peoples may be secured through solemn compacts, (which should include the establishment of a permanent international judicial tribunal, supported by an international force,) Americans see, in the treatment by the German Government of the Belgian neutralization treaty as nothing but a piece of paper which might be torn up on the ground of military necessity, evidence of the adoption by Germany of a retrograde policy of the most alarming sort. That single act on the part of Germany—the violation of the neutral territory of Belgium—would have determined American opinion in favor of the Allies, if it had stood alone by itself—the reason being that American hopes for the peace and order of the world are based on the sanctity of treaties.

(g) American public opinion, however, has been greatly shocked in other ways by the German conduct of the war. The American common people see no justification for the dropping of bombs, to which no specific aim can be given, into cities and towns chiefly inhabited by non-combatants, the burning or blowing up of large portions of unfortified towns and cities, the destruction of precious monuments and treasuries of art, the strewing of floating mines through the North Sea, the exacting of ransoms from cities and towns under threat of destroying them, and the holding of unarmed citizens as hostages for the peaceable behavior of a large population under threat of summary execution of the hostages in case of any disorder. All these seem to Americans unnecessary, inexpedient, and unjustifiable methods of warfare, sure to breed hatred and contempt toward the nation that uses them, and therefore to make it difficult for future generations to maintain peace and order in Europe. They cannot help imagining the losses civilization would suffer if the Russians should ever carry into Western Europe the kind of war which the Germans are now waging in Belgium and France.

They have supposed that war was to be waged in this century only against public, armed forces and their supplies and shelters.

These opinions and prepossessions on the part of the American people have obviously grown out of the ideals which the early English colonists carried with them to the American wilderness in the seventeenth century, out of the long fighting and public discussion which preceded the adoption of the Constitution of the United States in the eighteenth century, and out of the peculiar experiences of the free Commonwealths which make up the United States, as they have spread across the almost uninhabited continent during the past 125 years.

The experience and the situation of modern Germany have been utterly different. Germany was divided for centuries into discordant parts, had ambitious and martial neighbors, and often

felt the weight of their attacks. Out of war came accessions of territory for Prussia, and at last German unity. The reliance of intelligent and patriotic Germany on military force as the basis of national greatness is a natural result of its experiences. Americans, however, believe that this reliance is unsound both theoretically and practically. The wars in Europe since 1870-71, the many threatenings of war, and the present catastrophe seem to Americans to demonstrate that no amount of military preparedness on the part of the nations of Europe can possibly keep the peace of the Continent, or indeed prevent frequent explosions of destructive warfare. They think, too, that preparation for war on the part of Germany better than any of her neighbors can make will not keep her at peace or protect her from invasion, even if this better preparation include advantages of detail which have been successfully kept secret. All the nations which surround Germany are capable of developing a strong fighting spirit; and all the countries of Europe, except England and Russia, possess the means of quickly assembling and getting into action great bodies of men. In other words, all the European States are capable of developing a passionate patriotism, and all possess the railroads, roads, conveyances, telegraphs, and telephones which make rapid mobilization possible. No perfection of military forces, and no amount of previous study of feasible campaigns against neighbors, can give peaceful security to Germany in the present condition of the great European States. In the actual development of weapons and munitions, and of the art of quick intrenching, the attacking force in battle on land is at a great disadvantage in comparison with the force on the defensive. That means indecisive battles and ultimately an indecisive war, unless each party is resolved to push the war to the utter exhaustion and humiliation of the other—a long process which involves incalculable losses and wastes and endless miseries. Americans have always before them the memory of their four years' civil war, which, although resolutely prosecuted on both sides, could not

be brought to a close until the resources of the Southern States in men and material were exhausted. In that dreadful process the whole capital of the Southern States was wiped out.

But One Possible Issue.

Now that the sudden attack on Paris has failed, and adequate time has been secured to summon the slower-moving forces of Russia and England, and these two resolute and persistent peoples have decided to use all their spiritual and material forces in co-operation with France against Germany, thoughtful Americans can see but one possible issue of the struggle, whether it be long or short, namely, the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary in their present undertakings, and the abandonment by both peoples of the doctrine that their salvation depends on militarism and the maintenance of autocratic Executives intrusted with the power and the means to make sudden war. They believe that no human being should ever be trusted with such power. The alternative is, of course, genuine constitutional government, with the military power subject to the civil power.

The American people grieve over the fruitless sacrifices of life, property, and the natural human joys which the German people are making to a wrong and impossible ideal of national power and welfare. The sacrifices which Germany is imposing on the Allies are fearfully heavy, but there is reason to hope that these will not be fruitless, for out of them may come great gains for liberty and peace in Europe.

All experienced readers on this side of the Atlantic are well aware that nine-tenths of all the reports they get about the war come from English and French sources, and this knowledge makes them careful not to form judgments about details until the events and deeds tell their own story. They cannot even tell to which side victory inclines in a long, far-extended battle until recognizable changes in the positions of the combatants show what the successes or failures must have been. The English and French win some advantage so far as

the formation of public opinion in this country is concerned, because those two Governments send hither official reports on current events more frequently than the German Government does, and with more corroborative details. The amount of secrecy with which the campaign is surrounded on both sides is, however, a new and unwelcome experience for both the English and the American public.

German Ignorance of Events.

The pamphlets by German publicists and men of letters which are now coming to this country, and the various similar publications written here, seem to indicate that the German public is still kept by its Government in ignorance about the real antecedents of the war and about many of the incidents and aspects of the portentous combat. These documents seem to Americans to contain a large amount of misinformation about the attack of Austria-Hungary on Serbia, the diplomatic negotiations and the correspondence between the sovereigns which immediately preceded the war, and the state of mind of the Belgian and English peoples. American believers in the good sense and good feeling of the common people naturally imagine, when an awful calamity befalls a nation, that the people cannot have been warned of its approach, else they would have avoided it. In this case they fear that the Emperor, the Chancellery, and the General Staff have themselves been misinformed in important respects, have made serious miscalculations which they are proposing to conceal as long as possible, and are not taking the common people into their confidence. American sympathies are with the German people in their sufferings and losses, but not with their rulers, or with the military class, or with the professors and men of letters who have been teaching for more than a

generation that might makes right. That short phrase contains the fundamental fallacy which for fifty years has been poisoning the springs of German thought and German policy on public affairs.

Dread of the Muscovite does not seem to Americans a reasonable explanation of the present actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary, except so far as irrational panic can be said to be an explanation. Against possible, though not probable, Russian aggression, a firm defensive alliance of all Western Europe would be a much better protection than the single might of Germany. It were easy to imagine also two new "buffer" States—a reconstructed Poland and a Balkan Confederation. As to French "revenge," it is the inevitable and praiseworthy consequence of Germany's treatment of France in 1870-71. The great success of Germany in expanding her commerce during the last thirty years makes it hard for Americans to understand the hot indignation of the Germans against the British because of whatever ineffective opposition Great Britain may have offered to that expansion. No amount of commercial selfishness on the part of insular England can justify Germany in attempting to seize supreme power in Europe and thence, perhaps, in the world.

Finally, Americans hope and expect that there will be no such fatal issue of the present struggle as the destruction or ruin of the German Nation. On the contrary, they believe that Germany will be freer, happier, and greater than ever when once she has got rid of the monstrous Bismarck policies and the Emperor's archaic conception of his function, and has enjoyed twenty years of real peace.

Asticon, Me., Sept. 28, 1914.

Dr. Dernburg's Reply

By Bernhard Dernburg

Late German Secretary of State for the Colonies

PROF. ELIOT is conferring a great favor on the exponents of the German side in the present struggle in explaining to them what he thinks of the so-called anti-German feeling in the United States. I am sure his views will be read also in Germany with a great deal of attention, although he will certainly not remain unchallenged in nearly all essential points. The compliment that Prof. Eliot pays to the German people as a whole must be specially appreciated, the more so as it comes from a scientist whose great authority is equally recognized on both sides of the Atlantic.

The anti-German feeling, according to Prof. Eliot, takes its source from the American objection to the committal of a nation to grave mistakes by a permanent Executive. But then, with the exception of France, all the warring nations have permanent Executives, professional diplomatists; all their affairs are conducted in secret, and all their rulers have the power, including the President of France, to embroil their nations in war. The German Emperor is in this respect certainly more restricted than the other heads of State, and I have not read that the declaration of war has been expressly sanctioned by the English Parliament, and certainly the mobilization of the English fleet that took place in July, and the mobilization of the Russian Army that took place at the same time, have not even been brought to the knowledge of the respective Parliaments. When, therefore, the same conditions prevail in all the warring States, how can they be made the reason for such an anti-German feeling?

The same objection holds good with the American antipathy against the power of rulers to order mobilization or declare war in advance without consultation of Parliament, to which I have only

to say that the English fleet was mobilized without consulting the English Parliament, while in Germany the Bundesrat, the representatives of the Federal States, as well as of the Federal Diets, has been duly consulted. I may add that also the party leaders of the Reichstag, which could not be convoked earlier than two days after the declaration of the war, have been continuously informed and consulted.

Against the next paragraph, where Prof. Eliot complains of the secrecy of European diplomacy and of international treaties and understandings, the same objection must be made. The state described here as particular to Germany prevails in all European countries, and neither the treaty of the Russian-French alliance, nor the arrangements of the Triple Entente have ever been submitted to the French or British Parliaments. As regards the American attitude toward armaments, I purposely refrain from adverting the American example into my argument, much as I could show that with a very large part of the American Nation the idea of defending the American coast against any invader and the maintenance of a strong Pan-American policy, if need be by arms, is just as fixed a tenet as the German idea that the Fatherland should be held safe from invasion or destruction by the will and the strength of its people. England has always held the same, if not through her army, so through her navy, and so did the rest of Europe; and there is no argument to be gotten from that for an anti-German feeling.

No Seizure of Schleswig-Holstein.

Americans object to the extension of territory by force. Germany has never done that, even if one goes back as far as Prof. Eliot wishes to go. Mr. Eliot is absolutely mistaken as to the

history of the incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein into Prussia. Schleswig-Holstein was a Dual-Dukedom that never belonged to Denmark, but having as its Duke the King of Denmark as long as he belonged to the elder line of the House of Oldenburg. This elder line was extinct when King Christian VIII. died without male issue. His successor wanted to incorporate the two German Dukedoms into Denmark. Then the people stood up and expressed the desire to remain with the German Federation, to which it had always belonged, and there it is now, of its own free will. The natural dividing line between Denmark and Germany, however, is the River Eider. There are about 30,000 Danes south of the Eider, who have been absorbed against their will, a thing that can never be avoided, and that has sometimes given Prussia a little trouble.

Alsace-Lorraine Originally German.

As to Alsace-Lorraine, the facts are known to be that it had belonged to Germany until it had been taken against the will of the people, by France under Louis XIV., and it was returned to Germany as a matter of right, more than three-quarters of the population being of German descent and speaking the German language.

But let me ask in return, Mr. Eliot, when did ever in her political career England consult the will of the people when she took a country? Can he say that, when England tore the treaty of Majuba Hill, like a "scrap of paper," and made war on the Boers? Did she consult the people of Cyprus in 1878? Does he know of any plebiscite in India? Has she consulted the Persian, or has France consulted the people of Morocco, or of Indo-China, Italy the people of Tripoli? Since Germany has not acted here in any other way forty years ago than all the other nations, why does Dr. Eliot consider the American people justified in taking anti-German views for reasons of such an old date, while he forgives the nations of the party he favors for much more recent infringement of his rule?

"Americans object to the violation of

treaties." So do the Germans. We have always kept our treaties, and mean to do so in the future. The fact with Belgium is that her neutrality was very one-sided; that, as can be proved, as early as the 25th of June, Liège was full of French soldiers, that Belgian fortifications were all directed against Germany, and that for years past it was the Belgian press that outdid the French press in attacks against Germany. But I can give Mr. Eliot here some authority that he has so far not challenged. When Sir Edward Grey presented the English case in the House of Commons on the 3d of August he declared that the British attitude was laid down by the British Government in 1870, and he verbally cited Mr. Gladstone's speech, in which he said he could not subscribe to the assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee was binding on every party, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. He called that assertion a "stringent and impracticable" view of the guarantee and the whole treaty a "complicated question." So Mr. Gladstone, and with him Sir Edward Grey, has held the Belgian neutrality treaty not binding on every party, when it was against the interest which the particular situation dictated, when the war broke out. It was the interest of Great Britain to maintain the treaty, and that is why she acted. It was against German interest to maintain the treaty, and that is why she broke it. That is the British and not the German theory, and I could very well rest my case here. My theory is with the German Chancellor, that I greatly regret the necessity of violating the Belgian neutrality, after Belgium had chosen to repel the German overtures for a free passage.

It is quite certain that the breach of the Belgian neutrality by Germany was used in Great Britain as a powerful instrument to influence the public sentiment. Every war must be borne by national unity, and it is the duty of the nation's leaders to secure such unity by all practicable means. But has it been forgotten

that the attitude of Sir Edward Grey caused such excellent men as Lord Morley, John Burns, and Sir John Trevelyan to leave the Cabinet, where they were looked upon as the best and most liberal members of the ruling combination? Bernard Shaw says of Great Britain that she has never been at a loss for an effective moral attitude. Such an attitude is a powerful weapon in diplomatic and actual warfare, and it must be resorted to, if the necessity arises. But that cannot blind us to the fact that the British Government allowed the political interest to be the paramount consideration in this Belgian neutrality matter. The German interest for not acting on the guarantee was just as strong as the English to act for it.

The proof is found in the English "White Paper." I cite the famous reprint of THE TIMES, (Dispatch No. 148 of Aug. 2 to Paris.) Here Sir Edward Grey says: "We are considering * * * whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*."

"Treaties Must Not Be Overrated."

I am an ardent believer in all international arrangements to prevent difficulties and wars between nations, and I rejoice with the American people in the signal success this policy is now having in this country. But international treaties must not be overrated. There are questions which cannot be settled by them. It is too difficult to explain just the nature of such situations as arose in Europe, so I may be permitted for once to ask this question: Does Prof. Eliot believe that the majority of the American people think that the unwritten Monroe Doctrine could be made the subject of arbitration, whether it had a right to exist or to be enforced? I must emphatically say, No, it could not. It can be as little arbitrated upon as a matter of religion or of personal morals.

Mr. Eliot thinks a happy result of the war would be that American institutions should prevail in Germany thereafter. Why should Germany only become a representative republic? Does he not demand the same regarding Russia, Eng-

land, Italy, Austria, and Japan? And if not, why not?

From all this I fail to see the point in the reasons given by Prof. Eliot why fair-minded Americans should side with the Allies because the objections made against German procedure, down to the breach of the Belgian neutrality, must be made against all other European States. British history is just teeming with examples of broken treaties and torn "scraps of paper." The chasing of German diplomatic representatives out of neutral Egypt is a case in point.

I must insist that whatever anti-German feeling there is is not fully explained by Prof. Eliot, and his article cannot be made a code by which German behavior could be regulated in the future. Prof. Eliot is a scholar; business interests do not come very near him. So he is especially concerned with the ethical aspect of the matter. He believes the Germans think that "might is right." This is very unjust. Our history proves that we have never acted on this principle. We have never got or attempted to get a world empire such as England has won, all of which, with a very few exceptions, by might, by war, and by conquest. The German writers who have expounded this doctrine have only shown how the large world empires of England and France were welded together, what means have been adopted for that purpose, and against what sort of political doctrines we must beware.

Our Sympathy for the Under Dog.

As Dr. Eliot makes his remarks for the benefit of his German confrères, may I be permitted to say to them what I consider the reason for the American attitude? That is, in the first place, the ethical side. Americans have a very strong sense of generosity, and are, as a rule, very good sports. They think Belgium a small nation, brutally attacked by a much bigger fellow; they feel that the little man stands up bravely and gamely, and fights for all he is worth. Such a situation will always command American sympathy and antagonism against the stronger. Then there is the

business side. Americans feel that this war is endangering their political and commercial interests, so they are naturally angry against the people who, they believe, have brought the war about.

As Germany has not had an opportunity to make herself heard as amply as her adversaries, they think that it was Germany which set the world afire, and that is what they resent, and in which they were justified, if it were true. But the question of the hour is not the question of the past, but of the present and of the future, and the people on this side who will give Germany fair play because it is just in them will examine the situation in the light of their interests. Then they will find that Belgium had been in league with the Allies long before the conflagration broke out, only to be left to its own resources when the critical hour arose. They will further find that it is not Germany but England and her allies that are throt-

ling commerce, maiming cables, stopping mails, and breaking neutrality and other treaties to further their aims; that, finally, today England has established a world rule on the sea to which even America must submit. They will then soon come to the conclusion that, no matter what happened in the past, the peace of the world can only be assured by a good understanding between Germany and the United States as a sort of counterbalance against the unmeasured aggrandizement of English sea power. Then the feeling toward Germany will be considerably better, and I may add that even now it is not so very bad after all.

I make these remarks with due respect to Prof. Eliot and his views, and with great reluctance for being compelled to enter the field against a personality whose undoubted superiority I wish to be the first to acknowledge.

New York, Oct. 4, 1914.

Dr. Jordan's Reply to Dr. Dernburg

By Daniel Jordan

Assistant Professor of Romance Languages and Literature at Columbia University.

PRESIDENT ELIOT is as fair a judge of the present European situation as can be found anywhere, and is well qualified to explain the almost unanimous attitude of thoughtful Americans in regard to Germany. Dr. Dernburg, on the other hand, has been officially sent from Germany to expound the German official version; both his point of view and his treatment of facts are essentially un-American.

He says: "Americans object to the extension of territory by force. Germany has never done that." Apparently he believes that the Poles asked Prussia to become her subjects. The facts are that they have fought and begged for autonomy for nearly 150 years, and that at the present time high German officials are members of the Anti-Polish League.

Dr. Dernburg, when he comes to Schleswig-Holstein, states that 30,000 Danes south of the Eider River (this is in Holstein) have been absorbed against their will, "a thing that can never be avoided, and that has sometimes given Prussia a little trouble." But what about the Danes north of the Eider River? Schleswig and Holstein are really two provinces. Holstein is German, but the northern part of Schleswig, north of Fiensburg, is inhabited by Danes who are longing to join Denmark and who number about 200,000. Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, signed on Aug. 23, 1866, after Sadowa, between Prussia and Austria, states that the inhabitants of Northern Schleswig shall be given a chance to join Denmark, "if they should so express the desire by a free vote."

Prussia has not respected this solemn promise any more than former promises concerning Schleswig. The frequently renewed protests of the annexed Danes have remained unanswered. The best proof that Prussia's title to Danish Schleswig was not considered as very substantial is that in October, 1878, Prussia finally obtained from Austria the annulment of Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, which dealt with the taking of a plebiscite in Danish Schleswig.

To decide the fate of a province without consulting the inhabitants seems perfectly natural to German Kultur, but to Americans it is not; the days of slavery have gone, and wherever slavery still exists it is time to make a change.

As to Alsace-Lorraine, says Dr. Dernburg, "the facts are known that it had belonged to Germany until it was taken by Louis XIV., against the will of the people, and that it was returned to Germany as a matter of right." Such an argument is mediaeval, and it might just as well be argued that Germany should now belong to France, because Germany was once conquered, civilized, and organized by inhabitants of France, led by their Frankish King. And it is not sure that in 1648 Alsace was not glad to become French, because Louis XIV., by the Treaty of Westphalia, then granted perfect religious freedom to the Alsations, who, unlike their neighbors, lived ever since without fear of religious persecutions. Lorraine itself was not annexed by Louis XIV., nor by force, as it was peacefully united to France at the death of Stanislas, father of the Queen of France, Marie-Lesinszka. As for the inhabitants of Metz, they were considered long ago as French. Metz was annexed to France in 1552, with the full consent of the then allies of the French King, Henri II., the German Princes, who recognized by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, (1559,) that Metz, Toul, and Verdun were French cities, and could not be considered as a part of the German Con-

federation. So there were at one time German Princes who accepted the dogma of the consent of the governed!

Attacking the record of England in order to defend the record of Germany, as Dr. Dernburg does, is no justification for the necessary German aggression of today. Even granting that the English record is poor, which is a matter open to discussion, two wrongs would not make things right.

Dr. Dernburg also compares the policy of aggrandizement of Germany in Schleswig, Alsace, &c., with that of other countries in Morocco, Tripoli, &c. Even school children know that two things which are entirely unlike must not be compared. Northern Africa had too long been a den of pirates and brigands, and Latin Europe has rendered an immense service to the world in establishing order there. Algeria has been conquered in the same way as Morocco is now being conquered, and her natives enjoy more genuine liberty than they ever did before; they are even willing to fight as volunteers for the country they consider now as their own. Neither Danish Schleswig nor Alsace-Lorraine, which were as civilized as any other European country when they were last annexed, can be compared to Morocco any more than to the Philippines. So this comparison made by Dr. Dernburg also falls to pieces.

The case of the German point of view is not entirely without hope. In *THE TIMES* of Oct. 5 Dr. Dernburg approves the annexation of Holstein because the Germans of Holstein wanted to belong to Germany. This is a sound conclusion, and Dr. Dernburg will doubtless acknowledge later—better late than never—that the Alsations and the Danish of Schleswig should have had their say, just like the Germans of Holstein. It cannot be possible that to him the wish of the inhabitants of a province is the voice of God when it suits Germany and the voice of the devil when it suits somebody else.

Nov. 6, 1914.

Dr. Irene Sargent's Reply to Dr. Dernburg

By Irene Sargent

Professor of the History of Fine Arts, Syracuse University

CONTRADICTING Dr. Eliot, Dr. Bernhard Dernburg says:

"Schleswig-Holstein was a dual Dukedom that never belonged to Denmark; but, having as its Duke the King of Denmark, as long as he belonged to the elder line of the House of Oldenburg * * * Frederick VII. wanted to incorporate the two German Dukedoms into Denmark. * * * Then the people stood up and expressed the desire to remain with the German Federation."

Such an assertion is a summary, inaccurate, and unfair manner of dealing with perhaps the most complex series of diplomatic, legal, and racial questions that arose in the nineteenth century. It would appear from the best evidence that Schleswig was indissolubly united with the Crown of Denmark. To maintain this principle Christian VIII. in 1846 issued letters patent declaring that the royal line of succession (female) was in full force, as far as Schleswig was concerned. As to Holstein, the King stated that he was prevented from giving an equally clear decision, and the reason of his hesitation lay in the assumption that the law of the Salic Saxons excluding women from the throne would naturally prevail in Holstein, where the Germans, their customs, and their language were dominant. Two years later, Prussia sought to restore her prestige, lost in the Revolution of 1848, by sending troops into the Duchies in order to enforce the principle that this territory constituted two independent and indivisible States, the government of which was hereditary in the male line alone. The Prussian troops were afterward withdrawn by the hesitating Frederick William, and there followed a succession of protocols, constitutions, and compacts until the time of Bismarck, who, in his

"Reflections," Volume II., Page 10, in writing of the Duchies, acknowledges: "From the beginning I kept annexation steadily before my eyes."

The master of statecraft conquered. But did the people "stand up and express their desire to remain with the German Federation," as Dr. Dernburg asserts?

If his assertion be true, why were the Danish "optants" subjected to domiciliary visits, perquisitions, arrest, and expulsion? And why—only to mention one instance of espionage—did the Prussian police confiscate the issue of a Danish newspaper published in Schleswig because it contained a reference to that Duchy under its historic name of South Jutland?

The truth stands that the whole Schleswig-Holstein question is one that involves the modern principle of "nationality," and, as such, enters of necessity into the present European crisis. It is broadly understood by Dr. Eliot and willfully misapprehended by his critic.

Passing on to consider Alsace-Lorraine, Dr. Dernburg declares that "it had belonged to Germany until it was taken, against the will of the people, under Louis XIV."

In this statement, as in the treatment of the previous question, facts are mutilated and wrong impressions are given. Alsace, it is well known, was included within the confines of ancient Gaul, its original population was Celtic, and it passed, late in the fifth Christian century, under the rule of the Franks, one of whose chieftains, Clovis, became the founder of the first French monarchy. In dealing with its later history Dr. Dernburg confuses the Holy Roman (Germanic) Empire with Germany, considered in its modern sense. He appears to for-

get that the reign of Louis XIV. was an age of absolutism and not of plebiscites. He also ignores that the most strenuous efforts on the part of Germany to strangle the French nationality and language

in the imperial territory (Alsace-Lorraine) have proved useless, although they have been exerted constantly for almost a half century.

Nov. 3, 1914.

IV.

Germany and World Empire

By Charles W. Eliot

EACH one of the principal combatants in Europe seems to be anxious to prove that it is not responsible for this cruelest, most extensive, and most destructive of all wars. Each Government involved has published the correspondence between its Chief Executive and other Chief Executives, and between its Chancellery or Foreign Office and the equivalent bodies in the other nations that have gone to war, and has been at pains to give a wide circulation to these documents. To be sure, none of these Government publications seems to be absolutely complete. There seems to be in all of them suppressions or omissions which only the future historian will be able to report—perhaps after many years. They reveal, however, the dilapidated state of the Concert of Europe in July, 1914, and the flurry in the European Chancelleries which the ultimatum sent by Austria-Hungary to Servia produced. They also testify to the existence of a new and influential public opinion, about war and peace, to which nations that go to war think it desirable to appeal for justification or moral support.

These publications have been read with intense interest by impartial observers in all parts of the world, and have in many cases determined the direction of the readers' sympathy and good-will; and yet none of them discloses or deals with the real sources of the unprecedented calamity. They relate chiefly to the question who struck the match, and not to

the questions who provided the magazine that exploded, and why did he provide it. Grave responsibility, of course, attaches to the person who gives the order to mobilize a national army or to invade a neighbor's territory; but the real source of the resulting horrors is not in such an order, but in the Governmental institutions, political philosophy, and long-nurtured passions and purposes of the nation or nations concerned.

German Desire for World Empire.

The prime source of the present immense disaster in Europe is the desire on the part of Germany for world empire, a desire which one European nation after another has made its supreme motive, and none that has once adopted it has ever completely eradicated. Germany arrived late at this desire, being prevented until 1870 from indulging it, because of her lack of unity, or rather because of being divided since the Thirty Years' War into a large number of separate, more or less independent, States. When this disease, which has attacked one nation after another through all historic times, struck Germany it exhibited in her case a remarkable malignity, moving her to expansion in Europe by force of arms, and to the seizure of areas for colonization in many parts of the world. Prussia, indeed, had long believed in making her way in Europe by fighting, and had repeatedly acted on that belief. Shortly before the achievement of German unity by Bismarck she had obtained by war in 1864 and 1866

important accessions of territory and leadership in all Germany.

With this desire for world empire went the belief that it was only to be obtained by force of arms. Therefore, united Germany has labored with utmost intelligence and energy to prepare the most powerful army in the world, and to equip it for instant action in the most perfect manner which science and eager invasion could contrive. To develop this supreme military machine universal conscription—an outgrowth of the conception of the citizens' army of France during the Revolution—was necessary; so that every young man in Germany physically competent to bear arms might receive the training of a soldier, whether he wished it or not, and remain at the call of the Government for military duty during all his years of competency, even if he were the only son of a widow, or a widower with little children, or the sole support of a family or other dependents. In order to the completeness of this military ideal the army became the nation and the nation became the army to a degree which had never before been realized in either the savage or the civilized world. This army could be summoned and put in play by the Chief Executive of the German Nation with no preliminaries except the consent of the hereditary heads of the several States which united to form the empire in 1870-71 under the domination of Prussia, the Prussian King, become German Emperor, being Commander in Chief of the German Army. At the word of the Emperor this army can be summoned, collected, clothed, equipped and armed, and set in motion toward any frontier in a day. The German Army was thus made the largest in proportion to population, the best equipped, and the most mobile in the world. The German General Staff studied incessantly and thoroughly plans for campaigns against all the other principal States of Europe, and promptly utilized—secretly, whenever secrecy was possible—all promising inventions in explosives, ordnance, munitions, transportation, and sanitation. At the opening of 1914 the General Staff believed that

the German Army was ready for war on the instant, and that it possessed some significant advantages in fighting—such as better implements and better discipline—over the armies of the neighboring nations. The army could do its part toward the attainment of world empire. It would prove invincible.

A Great German Navy.

The intense desire for colonies, and for the spread of German commerce throughout the world, instigated the creation of a great German navy and started the race with England in navy building. The increase of German wealth, and the rapid development of manufactures and commercial sea power after 1870-71, made it possible for the empire to devote immense sums of money to the quick construction of a powerful navy, in which the experience and skill of all other shipbuilding nations would be appropriated and improved on. In thus pushing her colonization and sea-power policy Germany encountered the wide domination of Great Britain on the oceans; and this encounter bred jealousy, suspicion, and distrust on both sides. That Germany should have been belated in the quest for foreign possessions was annoying; but that England and France should have acquired early ample and rich territories on other continents, and then should resist or obstruct Germany when she aspired to make up for lost time, was intensely exasperating. Hence chronic resentments, and—when the day came—probably war. In respect to its navy, however, Germany was not ready for war at the opening of 1914; and, therefore, she did not mean to get into war with Great Britain in that year. Indeed, she believed—on incorrect information—that England could not go to war in the Summer of 1914. Neither the Government nor the educated class in Germany comprehends the peculiar features of party government as it exists in England, France, and the United States; and, therefore, the German leaders were surprised and grievously disappointed at the sudden popular determination of Great Britain and Ireland to lay aside party strife and take stren-

uous part in the general European conflict.

The complete preparation of the German Army for sudden war, the authority to make war always ready in the hands of the German Emperor, and the thorough studies of the German Staff into the most advantageous plans of campaign against every neighbor, conspired to develop a new doctrine of "military necessity" as the all-sufficient excuse for disregarding and violating the contracts or agreements into which Prussia or the new Germany had entered with other nations. To gain quickly a military advantage in attacking a neighbor came to be regarded as proper ground for violating any or all international treaties and agreements, no matter how solemn and comprehensive, how old or how new. The demonstration of the insignificance or worthlessness of international agreements in German thought and practice was given in the first days of the war by the invasion of Belgium, and has been continued ever since by violation on the part of Germany of numerous agreements concerning the conduct of war into which Germany entered with many other nations at the Second Hague Conference.

Sanctity of National Contracts.

This German view of the worthlessness of international agreements was not a cause of the present war, because it was not fully evident to Europe, although familiar and of long standing in Germany; but it is a potent reason for the continuance of the war by the Allies until Germany is defeated; because it is plain to all the nations of the world, except Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey at the moment, that the hopes of mankind for the gradual development of international order and peace rest on the sanctity of contracts between nations and on the development of adequate sanctions in the administration of international law. The new doctrine of military necessity affronts all law, and is completely and hopelessly barbarous.

World empire now, as always, is to be won by force—that is, by conquest and

holding possession. So Assyria, Israel, Macedonia, Athens, Rome, Islam, England, and France have successively believed and tried to accomplish in practice. United Germany has for forty years been putting into practice, at home and abroad, the doctrine of force as the source of all personal and national greatness and all worthy human achievements. In the support of this doctrine, educated Germany has developed and accepted the religion of valor and the dogma that might makes right. In so doing it has rejected with scorn the Christian teachings concerning humility and meekness, justice and mercy, brotherhood and love. The objects of its adoration have become Strength, Courage, and ruthless Will-power; let the weak perish and help them to perish; let the gentle, meek, and humble submit to the harsh and proud; let the shiftless and incapable die; the world is for the strong, and the strongest shall be ruler. This is a religion capable of inspiring its followers with zeal and sustained enthusiasm in promoting the national welfare at whatever cost to the individual of life, liberty, or happiness, and also of lending a religious sanction to the extremes of cruelty, greed, and hate. It were incredible that educated people who have been brought up within earshot of Christian ethics and within sight of gentle men and women should all be content with the religion-of-valor plan. Accordingly, the finer German spirits have invented a supplement to that Stone Age religion. They have set up for worship a mystical conception of the State as a majestic and beneficent entity which embraces all the noble activities of the nation and guides it to its best achievements. To this ideal State every German owes duty, obedience, and complete devotion. The trouble with this supplement to the religion of valor is that it dwells too much on submission, self-sacrifice, and discipline, and not enough on individual liberty and self-control in liberty. Accordingly, when the valiant men got control of the Government and carried the nation into a ferocious war, they swept away with them all the devotees of this romantic and spiritual State. The mod-

ern German is always a controlled, directed, and drilled person, who aspires to control and discipline his inferiors; and in his view pretty much all mankind are his inferiors. He is not a free-man in the French, English, or American sense; and he prefers not to be.

What German Domination Would Mean.

The present war is the inevitable result of lust of empire, autocratic government, sudden wealth, and the religion of valor. What German domination would mean to any that should resist it the experience of Belgium and Northern France during the past three months aptly demonstrates. The civilized world can now see where the new German morality—be efficient, be virile, be hard, be bloody, be rulers—would land it. To maintain that the power which has adopted in practice that new morality, and in accordance with its precepts promised Austria its support against Serbia and invaded Belgium and France in hot haste, is not the responsible author of the European war, is to throw away memory, reason, and common sense in judging the human agencies in current events.

The real cause of the war is this gradually developed barbaric state of the German mind and will. All other causes—such as the assassination of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, the sympathy of Russia with the Balkan States, the French desire for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, and Great Britain's jealousy of German aggrandizement—are secondary and incidental causes, contributory, indeed, but not primary and fundamental. If any one ask who brought the ruling class in Germany to this barbaric frame of mind, the answer must be Bismarck, Moltke, Treitschke, Nietzsche, Bernhardt, the German Emperor, their like, their disciples, and the military caste.

Germany Never Dreaded Russia.

Many German apologists for the war attribute it to German fear of Russia. They say that, although Germany committed the first actual aggression by invading Belgium and Luxemburg on the way to attack France with the utmost

speed and fierceness, the war is really a war of defense against Russia which might desirably pass over, after France has been crushed, into a war against Great Britain, that perfidious and insolent obstacle to Germany's world empire. The answer to this explanation is that, as a matter of fact, Germany has never dreaded, or even respected, the military strength of Russia, and that the recent wars and threatenings of war by Germany have not been directed against Russia, but against Denmark, Austria, France, and England. In her colonization enterprises it is not Russia that Germany has encountered, but England, France, and the United States. The friendly advances made within the last twenty years by Germany to Turkey were not intended primarily to strengthen Germany against Russia, but Germany against Great Britain through access by land to British India. In short, Germany's policies, at home and abroad, during the last forty years have been inspired not by fear of Russia or of any other invader, but by its own aggressive ambition for world empire. In the present war it thinks it has staked its all on "empire or downfall."

Germany Should Be Defeated.

Those nations which value public liberty and believe that the primary object of Government is to promote the general welfare by measures and policies founded on justice, good-will, and respect for the freedom of the individual cannot but hope that Germany will be completely defeated in its present undertakings; but they do not believe that Germany is compelled to choose between a life of domination in Europe and the world and national death. They wish that all her humane culture and her genius for patient and exact research may survive this hideous war and guide another Germany to great achievements for humanity.

If the causes of the present immense catastrophe have been correctly stated, the desirable outcomes of the war are, no world empire for any race or nation, no more "subjects," no Executives, either permanent or temporary, with

power to throw their fellow-countrymen into war, no secret diplomacy justifying the use for a profit of all the lies, concealments, deceptions, and ambushes which are an inevitable part of war and assuming to commit nations on international questions, and no conscription armies that can be launched in war by Executives without consulting independent representative assemblies. There should come out from this supreme convulsion a federated Europe, or a league of the freer nations, which should secure the smaller States against attack, prevent the larger from attempting domination, make sure that treaties and other international contracts shall be public and be respected until modified by mutual consent, and provide a safe basis for the limitation and reduction of armaments on land and sea, no basis to be considered safe which could fail to secure the liberties of each and all the federated States against the attacks of any outsider or faithless member. No one can see at present how such a consummation is to be brought about, but any one can see already that this consummation is the only one which can satisfy the lovers of liberty under law, and the believers in the progress of mankind through loving service each to all and all to each.

Extreme pacifists shrink from fight-

ing evil with evil, hell with hell, and advise submission to outrage, or at least taking the risk of being forced into resigned submission. The believers in the religion of valor, on the other hand, proclaim that war is a good thing in itself, that it develops the best human virtues, invigorates a nation become flaccid through ease and luxury, and puts in command the strong, dominating spirit of a valid nation or race. What is the just mean between these two extremes? Is it not that war is always a hideous and hateful evil, but that a nation may sometimes find it to be the least of two evils between which it has to choose? The justifiable and indeed necessary war is the war against the ravager and destroyer, the enemy of liberty, the claimant of world empire. More and more the thinkers of the world see, and the common people more and more believe instinctively, that the cause of righteous liberty is the cause of civilization. In the conference which will one day meet to settle the terms of peace, and therefore the future conditions of life in Europe, the example of the American Republic in regard to armaments and war, the publicity of treaties, and public liberty, security and prosperity may reasonably have some influence.

Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 14, 1914.

V.

A Hopeful Road to Lasting Peace

By Charles W. Eliot

THE great war has now been going on long enough to enable mankind to form approximately correct views about its vast extent and scale of operations, its sudden interference with commerce and all other helpful international intercourse, its unprecedented wrecking of family happiness and continuity, its wiping out, as it proceeds, of the accumulated savings of many former generations in structures,

objects of art, and industrial capital, and the huge burdens it is likely to impose on twentieth century Europe. From all these points of view, it is evidently the most horrible calamity that has ever befallen the human race and the most crucial trial to which civilization has been exposed. It is, and is to be, the gigantic struggle of these times between the forces which make for liberty and righteousness and those which make for

the subjection of the individual man, the exaltation of the State, and the enthronement of physical force directed by a ruthless collective will. It threatens a sweeping betrayal of the best hopes of mankind.

Each of the nations involved, horrified at the immensity of the disaster, maintains that it is not responsible for the war; and each Government has issued a statement to prove that some other Government is responsible for the outbreak. This discussion, however, relates almost entirely to actions by monarchs and Cabinets between July 23 and Aug. 4—a short period of hurried messages between the Chancelleries of Europe—actions which only prove that the monarchs and Ministers for Foreign Affairs could not, or at least did not, prevent the long-prepared general war from breaking out. The assassination of the Archduke and Duchess of Hohenberg on the 28th of June was in no proper sense a cause of the war, except as it was one of the consequences of the persistent aggressions of Austria-Hungary against her southeastern neighbors. Neither was Russian mobilization in four military districts on July 29 a cause of the war; for that was only an external manifestation of the Russian state of mind toward the Balkan peoples, a state of mind well known to all publicists ever since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. No more was the invasion of Belgium by the German Army on Aug. 4 a true cause of the war, or even the cause, as distinguished from the occasion, of Great Britain's becoming involved in it. By that action Germany was only taking the first step in carrying out a long-cherished purpose and in executing a judicious plan of campaign prepared for many years in advance. The artificial panic in Germany about its exposed position between two powerful enemies, France and Russia, was not a genuine cause of the war; for the General Staff knew they had crushed France once, and were confident they could do it again in a month. As to Russia, it was, in their view, a huge nation, but very clumsy and dull in war.

The real causes of the war are all of

many years' standing; and all the nations now involved in the fearful catastrophe have contributed to the development of one or more of these effective causes. The fundamental causes are: (1) The maintenance of monarchical Governments, each sanctioned and supported by the national religion, and each furnished with a Cabinet selected by the monarch—Governments which can make war without any previous consultation of the peoples through their elected representatives; (2) the constant maintenance of conscript armies, through which the entire able-bodied male population is trained in youth for service in the army or navy, and remains subject to the instant call of the Government till late in life, the officering of these permanent armies involving the creation of a large military class likely to become powerful in political, industrial, and social administration; (3) the creation of a strong, permanent bureaucracy within each nation for the management of both foreign and domestic affairs, much of whose work is kept secret from the public at large; and, finally, (4) the habitual use of military and naval forces to acquire new territories, contiguous or detached, without regard to the wishes of the people annexed or controlled. This last cause of the war is the most potent of the four, since it is strong in itself, and is apt to include one or more of the other three. It is the gratification of the lust for world empire.

Of all the nations taking part in the present war, Great Britain is the only one which does not maintain a conscript army; but, on the other hand, Great Britain is the earliest modern claimant of world empire by force, with the single exception of Spain, which long since abandoned that quest. Every one of these nations except little Serbia has yielded to the lust for empire. Every one has permitted its monarch or its Cabinet to carry on secret negotiations liable at any time to commit the nation to war, or to fail in maintaining the peace of Europe or of the Near East. In the crowded diplomatic events of last July, no phenomenon is more striking than the exhibition of the power which the British

people confide to the hands of their Foreign Secretary. In the interests of public liberty and public welfare no official should possess such powers as Sir Edward Grey used admirably—though in vain—last July. In all three of the empires engaged in the war there has long existed a large military caste which exerts a strong influence on the Government and its policies, and on the daily life of the people.

These being the real causes of the terrific convulsion now going on in Europe, it cannot be questioned that the nation in which these complex causes have taken strongest and most complete effect during the last fifty years is Germany. Her form of government has been imperialistic and autocratic in the highest degree. She has developed with great intelligence and assiduity the most formidable conscript army in the world, and the most influential and insolent military caste. Three times since 1864 she has waged war in Europe, and each time she has added to her territory without regard to the wishes of the annexed population. For twenty-five years she has exhibited a keen desire to obtain colonial possessions; and since 1896 she has been aggressive in this field. In her schools and universities the children and youth have been taught for generations that Germany is surrounded by hostile peoples; that her expansion in Europe and in other continents is resisted by jealous powers which started earlier in the race for foreign possessions, and that the salvation of Germany has depended from the first, and will depend till the last, on the efficiency of her army and navy and the warlike spirit of her people. This instruction, given year after year by teachers, publicists, and rulers, was first generally accepted in Prussia, but now seems to be accepted by the entire empire as unified in 1871.

The attention of the civilized world was first called to this state of the German mind and will by the triumphant policies of Bismarck; but during the reign of the present Emperor the external aggressiveness of Germany and her passion for world empire have grown to much more formidable proportions. Al-

though the German Emperor has sometimes played the part of a peacemaker, he has habitually acted the war lord in both speech and bearing, and has supported the military caste whenever it has been assailed. He is by inheritance, conviction, and practice a Divine-right sovereign whose throne rests on an "invincible" army, an army conterminous with the nation. In the present tremendous struggle he carries his subjects with him in a rushing torrent of self-sacrificing patriotism. Mass fanaticism and infectious enthusiasm seem to have deprived the leading class in Germany, for the moment, of all power to see, reason, and judge correctly—no new phenomenon in the world, but instructive in this case because it points to the grave defect in German education—the lack of liberty and, therefore, practice in self-control.

The twentieth century educated German is, however, by no means given over completely to material and physical aggrandizement and the worship of might. He cherishes a partly new conception of the State as a collective entity whose function is to develop and multiply, not the free, healthy, and happy individual man and woman, but higher and more effective types of humanity, made superior by a strenuous discipline which takes much account of the strong and ambitious, and little of the weak or meek. He rejects the ethics of the Beatitudes as unsound, but accepts the religion of valor, which exalts strength, courage, endurance, and the ready sacrifice by the individual of liberty, happiness, and life itself for Germany's honor and greatness. A nation of 60,000,000 holding these philosophical and religious views, and proposing to act on them in winning by force the empire of the world, threatens civilization with more formidable irruptions of a destroying host than any that history has recorded. The rush of the German Army into Belgium, France, and Russia and its consequences to those lands have taught the rest of Europe to dread German domination, and—it is to be hoped—to make it impossible.

The real cause of the present convul-

sion is, then, the state of mind or temper of Germany, including her conception of national greatness, her theory of the State, and her intelligent and skillful use of all the forces of nineteenth century applied science for the destructive purposes of war. It is, therefore, apparent that Europe can escape from the domination of Germany only by defeating her in her present undertakings; and that this defeat can be brought about only by using against her the same effective agencies of destruction and the same martial spirit on which Germany itself relies. Horrible as are the murderous and devastating effects of this war, there can be no lasting peace until Europe as a whole is ready to make some serious and far-reaching decisions in regard to Governmental structures and powers. In all probability the sufferings and losses of this widespread war must go further and cut deeper before Europe can be brought to the decisions which alone can give securities for lasting peace against Germany on the one hand and Russia on the other, or to either of these nations, or can give security for the future to any of the smaller nations of Continental Europe. There can, indeed, be no security for future peace in Europe until every European nation recognizes the fact that there is to be no such thing in the world as one dominating nation—no such thing as world empire for any single nation—Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, or China. There can be no sense of security against sudden invasion in Europe so long as all the able-bodied men are trained to be soldiers and the best possible armies are kept constantly ready for instant use. There can be no secure peace in Europe until a federation of the European States is established, capable of making public contracts intended to be kept, and backed by an overwhelming international force subject to the orders of an international tribunal. The present convulsion demonstrates the impotence toward permanent peace of secret negotiations, of unpublished agreements of treaties and covenants that can be broken on grounds of military necessity, of international law if without sanctions, of pious wishes, of economic and

biological predictions, and of public opinion unless expressed through a firm international agreement, behind which stands an international force. When that international force has been firmly established it will be time to consider what proportionate reductions in national armaments can be prudently recommended. Until that glorious day dawns, no patriot and no lover of his kind can wisely advocate either peace in Europe or any reduction or armaments.

The hate-breeding and worse than brutal cruelties and devastations of the war, with their inevitable moral and physical degradations, ought to shock mankind into attempting a great step forward. Europe and America should undertake to exterminate the real causes of the catastrophe. In studying that problem the coming European conference can profit by the experience of the three prosperous and valid countries in which public liberty and the principle of federation have been most successfully developed—Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States. Switzerland is a democratic federation which unites in a firm federal bond three different racial stocks speaking three unlike languages, and divided locally and irregularly between the Catholic Church and the Protestant. The so-called British Empire tends strongly to become a federation; and the methods of Government both in Great Britain itself and in its affiliated Commonwealths are becoming more and more democratic in substance. The war has brought this fact out in high relief. As to the United States, it is a strong federation of forty-eight heterogeneous States which has been proving for a hundred years that freedom and democracy are safer and happier for mankind than subjection to any sort of autocracy, and affords far the best training for national character and national efficiency. Republican France has not yet had time to give this demonstration, being incumbered with many survivals of the Bourbon and Napoleonic régimes, and being forced to maintain a conscript army.

It is an encouraging fact that every one of the political or governmental

changes needed is already illustrated in the practice of one or more of the civilized nations. To exaggerate the necessary changes is to postpone or prevent a satisfactory outcome from the present calculated destructions and wrongs and the accompanying moral and religious chaos. Ardent proposals to remake the map of Europe, reconstruct European society, substitute republics for empires, and abolish armaments are in fact obstructing the road toward peace and good-will among men. That road is hard at best.

The immediate duty of the United States is presumably to prepare, on the basis of its present army and navy, to furnish an effective quota of the international force, servant of an international tribunal, which will make the ultimate issue of this most abominable of wars not a truce, but a durable peace.

In the meantime the American peoples cry with one voice to the German people, like Ezekiel to the House of Israel: "Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die?"

Cambridge, Mass., Dec. 8, 1914.

THE LORD OF HOSTS

By JOSEPH B. GILDER.

"He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh."

THE warring hosts that gather
To ravage, burn, and slay,
Turn first to that dread Father
To whom the nations pray:

"O God, our hearts Thou knowest,
Our minds Thou readest clear;
Where we go, there Thou goest—
With Thee we have no fear.

"The folk that harm and hate us—
Thy enemies, O Lord—
Thou knowest how they bait us:
Make brittle their strong sword!

"Against the foe that goaded
We heed Thy call to fight:
Our guns are primed and loaded,
Our swords, how keen and bright!

"Make strong our hearts to serve Thee,
Uphold our lifted hands;
Let no petition swerve Thee
To succor alien bands.

"So shall we burn and slaughter,
Spread desolation wide,
If still, by land and water,
Thou fightest on our side."

The Lord of Hosts had listened—
Had heard the rivals' prayer,
Upraised where bayonets glistened
And banners dyed the air;

And as His people waited
An answer to their cry,
Two bolts with lightning freighted
Flashed from the angry sky.

To left, to right they darted,
Impartially they fell:
The host in terror started
As they envisaged hell.

For wide their ranks were riven,
Night blotted out the sky,
As prostrate, dazed or driven,
They caught their God's reply.

Then, as the blinding levin's
Twin bolts were buried deep,
Who dwelleth in the heavens
Was heard to laugh—and weep!

A War of Dishonor

By David Starr Jordan

Late President of Leland Stanford Junior University; Chief Director
of the World Peace Foundation since 1910

IN this war what of right and what of wrong? Not much of right, perhaps, and very much of wrong. But there are degrees in wrong, and sometimes, by comparison, wrong becomes almost right.

The armed peace, the peace of guns and dreadnoughts and sabre rattlers, has come to its predestined end. Its armaments were made for war. Its war makers and war traders, the Pan-Germanists in the lead, have done their worst for the last nine years. They have been foiled time after time, but they have their way at last. Their last and most fatal weapon was the ultimatum. If Serbia had not given them their chance they would have found their pretext somewhere else. When a nation or a continent prepares for war it will get it soon or later. To prepare for war is to breed a host of men who have no other business, and another host who find their profits in blood.

When the war began it had very little meaning. It was the third Balkan war, brought on, as the others were, by intrigues of rival despotisms. The peoples of Europe do not hate each other. The springs of war come from a few men impelled by greed and glory. Diplomacy in Europe has been for years the cover for robbery in Asia or Africa. Of all the nations concerned not one had any wish to fight, and Belgium alone could fight with clean hands.

And this fact gave the war its meaning. The invasion of Belgium changed the whole face of affairs. As by a lightning flash the issue was made plain: the issue of the sacredness of law; the rule of the soldier or the rule of the citizen; the rule of fear or the rule of law. Germany stands for army rule. This was made clear when, a year ago, she passed under the yoke at Zebern. However

devious her diplomacy in the past, Britain stands today for the rule of law. The British soldier is the servant of the British people, not their master.

The highest conception of human relations is embodied in the word law. Law is the framework of civilization. Law is the condition of security, happiness, and progress. War is the denial of all law. It makes scrap paper of all the solemn agreements men and nations have established for their mutual good.

The rape of Belgium made scrap paper of international law. The sowing of mines in the fairways of commerce made scrap paper of the rights of neutral nations. The torture of the Belgian people made scrap paper of the rights of non-combatants.

War may be never righteous, but it is sometimes honorable. In honorable war armies fight against armies, never against private citizens. If armies give no needless provocation, they will receive none. The sacking of Malines, Aerschot, Dinant—these are not acts of honorable war. The wreck of Louvain, historic Louvain, the venerable centre for 500 years of Catholic erudition, at the hands of blood-drunk soldiers was an act of dishonorable war. It marks a stain on the record of Germany which the ages will not efface.

"A needed example," say the apologists for this crime. The Duke of Alva gave the same "needed example" to these same people in his day. For centuries the words "Spanish blood" struck terror into peoples' hearts throughout the Netherlands. For centuries to come the word Prussian will take its hated place.

The good people of Germany do not burn universities. Neither do they make war for war's sake. They are helpless

in the hands of a monster of their own creation. The affair at Zabern a year ago testifies to their complete subjugation. All the virtues are left to them, save only the love of freedom. This the mailed fist has taken away.

The Germany of today is an anachronism. Her scientific ideals are of the twentieth century. Her political ideals hark back to the sixteenth. Her rulers have made her the most superb fighting machine in a world which is soul-weary of fighting. For a nation in shining armor the civilized world has no place. It will not worship them, it will not obey

them. It will not respect those who either worship or obey. It finds no people good enough to rule other people against their will.

A great nation which its own people do not control is a nation without a Government. It is a derelict on the international sea. It is a danger to its neighbors, a greater danger to itself. Of all the many issues, good or bad, which may come from this war, none is more important than this, that the German people should take possession of Germany.

Berkeley, Cal., Sept. 19, 1914.

Might or Right

Address by John Grier Hibben

President of Princeton University; delivered at the opening of the Laymen's Efficiency Convention in New York City, Oct. 16, 1914

WE are all of us sadly conscious of our failure to realize in any adequate measure the standards of right conduct which we set for ourselves. Attainment falls far short of purpose and desire. Through want of courage, or it may be of inclination, or of sheer inertia, we fail to obey perfectly the law of duty which we recognize as imperatively binding upon us. There is, however, a more subtle kind of failure as regards our moral endeavor and achievement which is due to the unconscious shifting of these standards of right and wrong themselves. It is not merely that we fail to do that which we know to be right, but at times the very idea of right itself is strangely altered. The good insensibly assimilates to itself certain elements of evil which we allow and accept without full realization of the significance of this moral alchemy to which the most fundamental of our ideas are oftentimes subjected. The idea of right no longer stands in its integrity, but is compromised and even

neutralized by conflicting thoughts and sentiments. The things which at one time held first place in our estimate of life become secondary. Our attitude toward men, and manners, and affairs experiences a radical change. This in most cases takes place unconsciously, or, if conscious of it, we refrain from confessing it even to ourselves.

There are some, however, who are both frank enough and bold enough to announce their belief in the radical doctrine which demands a complete transformation of essential values. For them, good is evil and evil good, and they seem not ashamed to avow it. The conspicuous German philosopher of later years, Nietzsche, with a naïve simplicity insists that the great need of our modern civilization is that which he designates as "the transvaluation of all values." By this he means the complete transformation of certain ideas of supreme value into their direct opposites. He declares, for instance, that the central virtues of Christianity, such as those

of self-sacrifice, pity, mercy, indicate an inherent weakness of the human race, and that the strong man dissipates his energies through the offices of kindness and helpfulness. Thus the law which commands us to bear one another's burdens must be regarded as obsolete. Every man should be strong enough to bear his own burdens. If not, he is a drag to the onward progress of humanity, and to assist him is to do evil and not good. If you help the weak, you so far forth assist in perpetuating an inferior type of manhood.

Nietzsche's "Moralic Acid."

From this point of view, the definition of religion given in the Old Testament should be revised, "Do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly before thy God." In doing justice we must first be just to self; in loving mercy it must not be at the expense of our own interests and advantage, and we must not walk so humbly before our God as to give to the world the appearance of weakness or lack of independence. As Nietzsche insists, "The man who loves his neighbor as himself must have an exceedingly poor opinion of himself." If the race is to be perfected, everything and every person must be sacrificed in order to produce and preserve the strong man at all hazards. There is a kind of "moralic acid," as Nietzsche styles it, which is corroding the strength of humanity in our modern day. We have discoursed too much of character, too little of power; too much of self-sacrifice and too little of self-assertion; too much of right, too little of might. Conscience not only interferes with success, but also prevents the evolution of a superior type of man, that superman who is not constrained by duty nor limited by law, living his life "beyond good and evil."

The serious question which presents itself to our minds at this time is whether our modern world has not been unconsciously incorporating these ideas into its living beliefs—that is, those beliefs which reveal themselves in actual living and doing, in daily purpose, in the adaptation of means to ends, in the deeds which the world honors, and in the achieve-

ments which it crowns with glory. There are many persons who would not have the frankness of Nietzsche to say that might makes right, and that a moral sense is the great obstacle to progress, and that in "vigorous eras noble civilizations see something contemptible in sympathy, in brotherly love, in the lack of self-assertion and self-reliance." Our modern world may not explicitly subscribe to such doctrines in their extreme and exaggerated expression, but nevertheless may be unconsciously influenced by them. Our real opinions, however, are to be tested by our sense of values as revealed by the things which we crave, which we set our hearts upon, which we strive early and late to gain, and sacrifice all else in order to secure. Have we not offered our prayers to the God of might rather than the God of righteousness, to the God of power rather than the God of justice, the God of mercy and of love?

The time has come, in my opinion, for us to take account of the things which we really believe, and of the God whom we really worship. If we have been following false gods, let us honestly endeavor to re-establish fundamental and essential values, to discover anew what is of supreme worth and set our faces resolutely toward its realization. The need of our modern world today is the same as that of the ancient world at the time of the coming of Christ. His message to the world as indicated by His teaching, and His life was an arraignment of the ancient régime as regards three crucial points.

The Brotherhood of Man.

First, the religious and moral beliefs of that age had become purely formal. There was the letter of conviction, but not the spirit of it. The creed, the ritual, the ceremony were there, but the life had departed. And so today our beliefs have lost vitality to a large extent because we have been content to indulge in formulas oft repeated, which have ceased to have significance for our thoughts or for our feelings. We have allowed ourselves to be betrayed by words which are mere sounds without substance. We have

verbalized our beliefs, and have depotentialized them of vital significance. Take, for instance, the phrases, "The fatherhood of God" and "The brotherhood of man." They have been so often upon our lips as to become trite; their real meaning has disappeared. It is easy to repeat the words, and to be satisfied with the repetition, and nevertheless remain wholly insensible to their profound import, and under no compulsion whatsoever to obey their sublime command. We assent to the formula; but it does not become a determining factor in our purposes and plans. There is perhaps no age in the history of the world which has so emphasized the idea of the brotherhood of man as our own, and never in all history has there been such a denial of this idea as by the present European war. If the brotherhood of man had been the living, dominant idea of our civilization, could this present tragedy of the nations have occurred? If the world had believed profoundly in the idea of God, would we now be daily reading of the ghastly scenes where human life is no longer sacred, where love gives place to hate, where the constructive forces of the world are superseded by the destructive, and all the passions of man's brute inheritance are given full play and scope?

Second—In the teachings of Christ there was a remarkable expansion of the idea of God. Instead of the tribal God worshipped as the God of Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, He substituted the idea of God, as the God of all peoples and all races, the God of the Jew and Gentile, of the Greek and barbarian, of the bond and the free. It was the great apostle of the Gentiles who at the centre of Greek civilization announced this fundamental conception of Christianity to the old world:

God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth.

This was the sublime idea of the God of a united humanity. The God of the tribe had given place to the God of the whole world. That conception was very foreign to the popular religious notions current at the time of Christ, and it

seems still further away from our ideas of the present day. It is a very narrow and circumscribed view of God to regard Him as concerned merely for our little insular affairs, to regard Him simply as a God of the individual or of the home, or even one's nation. He transcends all these limitations of particular interests and particular needs. He is not merely our God but the God of all mankind. The children of Israel called Him the God of battle, the God of hosts, that is, the one who would give victory to them in their battles, and who would prove the leader of their hosts. But Christ came to the world in God's name to universalize this narrow tribal idea of God, proclaiming peace on earth and good will to men. It was the dawn of a new era, the Christian era. That light which shone upon the old world is darkened by the cloud hanging low over Europe at the present time. We cannot think, however, that it is permanently extinguished. To that light the nations of the earth must again return.

The Area of Moral Obligation.

Third—Christ gave to the world of His day an enlarged idea of the area of moral obligation. He insisted most stoutly upon the expansion of the scope of individual responsibility. This freeing of the idea of duty from the limitations of race prejudice is a natural corollary to the idea of the universality of God's relation to the world. Corresponding to the tribal view of God there is always an accompanying idea of the restricted obligation of the individual. To care for one's own family or one one's clan or tribe and present a hostile front to the rest of mankind has always been the characteristic feature of primitive morality. It was peculiar to the teaching of Christ which brought to the world the idea that the area of moral obligation is co-extensive with the world itself. There are no racial or national lines which can limit the extent of our responsibility. The world today needs to learn this lesson anew, and it is evident that it must acquire this knowledge through bitter and desperate experiences. We must interpret in this large sense the great

moral dictum of the German philosopher, Kant, that every one in a particular circumstance should act as he would wish all men to act if similarly circumstanced and conditioned. This is the complete universalizing of our moral obligations—stripping our sense of duty of everything that is particular and local and isolated. The natural tendency of human nature is to particularize our relations to God and bound our relations to our fellow-men; to narrow our relations to God so as to embrace only our direst needs, and to circumscribe our relations to man so as to include in the field of responsibility only those who are our kin or our own kind. The time has certainly come for us to take larger views of the world, of man, and of God.

After the great calamity of this present war is passed there must necessarily follow a period of reconstruction. It will not be merely the reconstruction of national resources and international relations, but it must be also a reconstruc-

tion of our fundamental conceptions of man and of the relation of man to man the world over, and to the relation also of man to God. We must ask anew the question, Who is our neighbor? In this great moral enterprise you will naturally play a large and significant part, for you belong to the class of men who are expected to have strong and decided opinions in the face of a great world crisis, and are capable of leading others toward the goal of a regenerated humanity. To know the right and to maintain it, to fight against the wrong, to impart courage to the timid, strength to the weak, and hope to the faint-hearted; to forget self in the service of others and extend a human sympathy to the ends of the earth, this is your vocation. It is the call of the world, it is the voice of one calling to you out of a distant past across the nineteen Christian centuries; it is the "spirit of the years to come," summoning you to establish the Kingdom of God upon earth.

JEANNE D'ARC—1914.

By ALMA DURANT NICOLSON.

RISE from the buried ages, O thou Maid,
 Rise from thy glorious ashes, unafraid,
 And wheresoe'er thy Brothers need thee most,
 Arise again, to lead thy tireless host.
 France calls thee as she called in days gone by!
 She calls thy spirit where her soldiers die;
 She knows thy courage and thy sacrifice,
 And wills today to pay the selfsame price,
 All-confident that when the work is done,
 She shall behold her Honor saved and Victory won.

God calls thee, Maid, from out the Past—
 The Past of France where thy strange lot was cast—
 And bid'st thee fling about this fearful hour
 Thy dauntless Faith, that was thy magic Power.
 And Freedom calls, with all-impelling voice,
 She calls the Sons of France, and leaves no choice,
 No waver and no alternating will;
 Where Freedom calls, all other calls are still,
 All-confident that when her work is done
 Ye shall behold your Country saved and Victory won.

The Kaiser and Belgium

By John W. Burgess

Dean of the Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure Science, and the Fine Arts at Columbia University; Roosevelt Professor of American History and Institutions at Friedrich Wilhelms University, Berlin, 1906-7; Visiting American Professor to Austrian Universities, 1914-15.

I.

IT is often said by historians that no truly great man is ever really understood by the generation, and in the age, for which he labors. Many instances of the truth of this statement can be easily cited. Two of the most flagrant have come within the range of my own personal experience. The first was the character of Abraham Lincoln as depicted by the British press of 1860-64 and as conceived by the British public opinion of that era. Mr. Henry Adams, son and private secretary of Mr. Charles Francis Adams, our Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain during that critical era in our history, writes, in that fascinating book of his entitled "The Education of Henry Adams,"

that "London was altogether beside itself on one point, in especial; it created a nightmare of its own, and gave it the shape of Abraham Lincoln. Behind this it placed another demon, if possible more devilish, and called it Mr. Seward. In regard to these two men English society seemed demented. Defense was useless; explanation was vain. One could only let the passion exhaust itself. One's best friends were as unreasonable as enemies, for the belief in poor Mr. Lincoln's brutality and Seward's ferocity became a dogma of popular faith."

Adams relates further that the last time he saw Thackeray at Christmas of 1863 they spoke of their mutual friend Mrs. Frank Hampton of South Carolina, whom Thackeray had portrayed as Ethel Newcome, and who had recently passed

away from life. Thackeray had read in the British papers that her parents had been prevented by the Federal soldiers from passing through the lines to see her on her deathbed. Adams writes that

in speaking of it Thackeray's voice trembled and his eyes filled with tears. The coarse cruelty of Lincoln and his hirelings was notorious. He never doubted that the Federals made a business of harrowing the tenderest feelings of women—particularly of women—in order to punish their opponents. On quite insufficient evidence he burst into reproach. Had he (Adams) carried in his pocket the proofs that the reproach was unjust he would have gained nothing by showing them. At that moment Thackeray, and all London society with him, needed the nervous relief of expressing emotions; for if Mr. Lincoln was not what they said he was, what were they?

Mr. Lincoln sent over our most skillful politician, Thurlow Weed, and our most able constitutional lawyer, William M. Evarts, and later our most brilliant orator, Henry Ward Beecher, followed, for the purpose of bringing the British people to their senses and correcting British opinion, but all to little purpose. Gettysburg and Vicksburg did far more toward modifying that opinion than the persuasiveness of Weed, the logic of Evarts, or the eloquence of Beecher, and it took Chattanooga, the March to the Sea, and Appomattox to dispel the illusion entirely.

Today we are laboring under a no less singular illusion than were the

English in 1862. The conception prevailing in England and in this country concerning the physical, mental, and moral make-up of the German Emperor is the monumental caricature of biographical literature. I have had the privilege of his personal acquaintance now for nearly ten years. I have been brought into contact with him in many different ways and under many varying conditions, at Court and State functions, at university ceremonies and celebrations, at his table, and by his fireside surrounded by his family, when in the midst of his officials, his men of science, and his personal friends, and, more instructive than all, alone in the imperial home in Berlin and at Potsdam and in the castle and forest at Wilhemshöhe.

With all this experience, with all this opportunity for observation at close range, I am hardly able to recognize a single characteristic usually attributed to him by the British and American press of today.

In the first place, the Emperor is an impressive man physically. He is not a giant in stature, but a man of medium size, great strength and endurance, and of agile and graceful movement. He looks every inch a leader of men. His fine gray-blue eyes are peculiarly fascinating. I saw him once seated beside his uncle, King Edward VII., and the contrast was very striking, and greatly in his favor.

In the second place, the Emperor is an exceedingly intelligent and highly cultivated man. His mental processes are swift, but they go also very deep. He is a searching inquirer, and questions and listens more than he talks. His fund of knowledge is immense and sometimes astonishing. He manifests interest in everything, even to the smallest detail, which can have any bearing upon human improvement. I remember a half hour's conversation with him once over a cupping glass, which he had gotten from an excavation in the Roman ruin called the Saalburg, near Homburg. He always appeared to me most deeply concerned with the arts of peace. I have never heard him speak much of war, and then

always with abhorrence, nor much of military matters, but improved agriculture, invention, and manufacture, and especially commerce and education, in all their ramifications, were the chief subjects of his thought and conversation. I have had the privilege of association with many highly intelligent and profoundly learned men, but I have never acquired as much knowledge, in the same time, from any man whom I have ever met, as from the German Emperor. And yet, with all this real superiority of mind and education, his deference to the opinions of others is remarkable. Arrogance is one of the qualities most often attributed to him, but he is the only ruler I ever saw in whom there appeared to be absolutely no arrogance. He meets you as man meets man and makes you feel that you are required to yield to nothing but the better reason.

A Man of Warm Affections.

In the third place, the Emperor impressed me as a man of heart, of warm affections, and of great consideration for the feelings and well-being of others. He can not, at least does not, conceal his reverence for, and devotion to, the Empress, or his love for his children, or his attachment to his friends. He always speaks of Queen Victoria and of the Empress Friedrich with the greatest veneration, and once when speaking to me of an old American friend who had turned upon him he said that it was difficult for him to give up an old friend, right or wrong, and impossible when he believed him to be in the right. His manifest respect and affection for his old and tried officials, such as Lucanus and zu Eulenburg and von Studt and Beseler and Althoff, give strong evidence of the warmth and depth of his nature. His consideration for Americans, especially, has always been remarkable. It was at his suggestion that the exchange of educators between the universities of Germany and of the United States was established, and it has been his custom to be present at the opening lecture of each new incumbent of these positions at the University of Berlin, and to greet

him and welcome him to his work. He is also the first to extend to these foreign educators hospitality and social attention. To any one who has experienced his hearty welcome to his land and his home the assertion that he is arrogant and autocratic is so far away from truth as to be ludicrous. Again I must say that I have never met a ruler, in monarchy or republic, in whom genuine democratic geniality was a so predominant characteristic.

But the characteristic of the Emperor which struck me most forcibly is his profound sense of duty and his readiness for self-sacrifice for the welfare of his country. This is a general German trait. It is the most admirable side of German nature. And the Emperor is, in this respect especially, their Princeps. I remember sitting beside him one day, when one of the ladies of his household asked me if I were acquainted with a certain wealthy ultra-fashionable New York society leader. I replied, by name only. She pressed me to know why not more nearly, why not personally. And to this I replied that I was not of her class; that I could not amuse her, and that I did not approve of the frivolous and demoralizing example and influence of one so favorably circumstanced for doing good. The Emperor had heard the conversation, and he promptly said: "You know in Germany we do not rate and classify people by their material possessions, but by the importance of the service they render to country, culture, and civilization."

One of his sons once told me that from his earliest childhood his father had instilled into his mind the lesson that devotion to duty and readiness for sacrifice were the cardinal virtues of a German, especially of a Hohenzollern. His days are periods of constant labor and severe discipline. He rises early, lives abstemiously, and works until far into the night. There is no day laborer in his entire empire who gives so many hours per diem to his work. His nature is manifestly deeply religious and, in every sentence he speaks, evidence of his consciousness that the policeman's club cannot take the place of religious

and moral principle is revealed. His frequent appeal for Divine aid in the discharge of his duties is prompted by the conviction that the heavier the duty the more need there is of that aid.

His Passion for German Greatness.

He undoubtedly has an intense desire, almost a passion, for the prosperity and greatness of his country, but his conception of that prosperity and greatness is more spiritual and cultural than material and commercial. More than once have I heard him say that he desired to see Germany a wealthy country, but only as the result of honest and properly requited toil, and that wealth acquired by force or fraud was more a curse than a blessing, and was destined to go as it had come. His conception of the greatness of Germany is as a great intellectual and moral power rather than anything else. Its physical power he values chiefly as the creator and maintainer of the conditions necessary to the production and influence of this higher power. I have often heard him express this thought.

And in spite of this terrible war, the responsibility for which is by so many erroneously laid at his door, I firmly believe him to be a man of peace. I am absolutely sure that he has entered upon this war only under the firm conviction that Great Britain, France, and Russia have conspired to destroy Germany as a world power, and that he is simply defending, as he said in his memorable speech to the Reichstag, the place which God had given the Germans to dwell on. For seven years I myself have witnessed the growth of this conviction in his mind and that of the whole German Nation as the evidences of it have multiplied from year to year until at last the fatal hour at Serajevo struck. I firmly believe that there is no soul in this wide world upon whom the burden and grief of this great catastrophe so heavily rests as upon the German Emperor. I have heard him declare with the greatest earnestness and solemnity that he considered war a dire calamity; that Germany would never during his reign wage an offensive war, and that he hoped God would spare him

from the necessity of ever having to conduct a defensive war. For years he has been conscious that British diplomacy was seeking to isolate and crush Germany by an alliance of Latin, Slav, and Mongol under British direction, and he sought in every way to avert it. He visited England himself frequently. He sent his Ministers of State over to cultivate the acquaintance and friendship of the British Ministers, but rarely would the British King go himself to Germany or send his Ministers to return these visits. More than once have I heard him say that he was most earnestly desirous of close friendship between Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, and had done, was doing, and would continue to do, all in his power to promote it; but that while the Americans

were cordially meeting Germany half way, the British were cold, suspicious, and repellent.

I know that the two things which are giving him the deepest pain in this world catastrophe, excepting only the sufferings of his own kindred and people, are the enmity of Great Britain and the misunderstanding of his character, feelings, and purposes in America. To remedy the first we here can do nothing, but to dispel the second is our bounden duty; and I devoutly hope that other evidence may prove sufficient to do this to the satisfaction of the minds of my countrymen than was necessary to convince the British Nation that the great-hearted Abraham Lincoln was not a brute nor the urbane William H. Seward a demon of ferocity.

Reply to Prof. Burgess

By James H. Ecob

Of the American Institute of Social Science

THE Burgess Kaiser is a truly admirable person. Every right-minded man will be only too glad to believe all that Prof. Burgess affirms of him. To be sure, there is a lurking sense that the professor "doth protest too much." But let that go. In the present topsy-turvy state of the world it is refreshing to hear of a man who loves his wife and children in the good old way. But just now the world is not interested in the private, personal, peculiarly German characteristics of the Kaiser. We outsiders must take him as he is known to the international world. We of course trust that he is an able, cultivated, attractive gentleman. There are many such in the world. But this gentleman happens to be the head of one of the great nations. Our interest in him centres in his relations to his neighbor nations.

An English friend of mine was appointed to duty in a tribe of savages in Africa. I dislike to call them savages

after the testimony of my friend. But they were just plain, naked folk, living in primitive simplicity in their native land. The chief of this little tribe was, as my friend asserts, a superior man, and, in spite of his undress, a good deal of a gentleman. In physique he was superb. A sculptor's heart would have leaped for joy at sight of him. My friend said to see him teaching his young son to throw a spear was a sort of physical music. He himself could throw a spear to an incredible distance with the precision of a rifle shot. He ruled his little kingdom with surprising wisdom and fairness. He was welcomed everywhere among his people as the friend and counselor. His family relations were unimpeachable. The same was true throughout the tribe. He was devoutly pious. In short, he was a Burgess Kaiser in the small. But he was the war lord of all that region. He was fiercely jealous of all the neighboring tribes. He kept his own people armed and drilled to

the top of efficiency, ready for attack or defense. He was noted for his hatred and contempt for his people except his own. His forays were marked by savage cruelty. His military necessities stopped at nothing.

Need it be said that the surrounding tribes were in nowise interested in this chief's physique or domestic virtues, or in his fidelity to his own people? It is safe to affirm that the British Government did not ask whether he had the body of a Michael Angelo's David or of a baboon from the jungle. It did not

ask whether he was good to his wife and children. Most animals are. It did not care how devoted he was to his fetiche. The sole question was, What sort of public citizen is he? How does he stand related to surrounding peoples? On what terms does he propose to live with them? That precisely is what we want to know about the Kaiser.

Fortunately, we do not have to ask Prof. Burgess, or any group of savants, or the German people. The Kaiser's record is known and read of all men.

New York, Oct. 21, 1914.

II.

The Guarantee of Belgian Neutrality

By John W. Burgess

SO much has been said about Belgian neutrality, so much assumed, and it has been such a stumbling block in the way of any real and comprehensive understanding of the causes and purposes of the great European catastrophe, that it may be well to examine the basis of it and endeavor to get an exact idea of the scope and obligation.

Of course, we are considering here the question of guaranteed neutrality, not the ordinary neutrality enjoyed by all States not at war, when some States are at war; the difference between ordinary neutrality and guaranteed neutrality being that no State is under any obligation to defend the ordinary neutrality of any other State against infringement by a belligerent, and no belligerent is under any special obligation to observe it. Guaranteed neutrality is, therefore, purely a question of specific agreement between States.

On the 19th day of April, 1839, Belgium and Holland, which from 1815 to 1830 had formed the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed a treaty of separation from, and independence of, each other.

It is in this treaty that the original pledge of Belgian neutrality is to be found. The clause of the treaty reads: "Belgium in the limits above described shall form an independent neutral State and shall be bound to observe the same neutrality toward all other States." On the same day and at the same place, (London,) a treaty, known in the history of diplomacy as the Quintuple Treaty, was signed by Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, approving and adopting the treaty between Belgium and Holland. A little later, May 11, the German Confederation, of which both Austria and Prussia were members, also ratified this treaty.

In the year 1866 the German Confederation was dissolved by the war between Austria and Prussia, occasioned by the Schleswig-Holstein question. In 1867 the North German Union was formed, of which Prussia was the leading State, while Austria and the German States south of the River Main were left out of it altogether. Did these changes render the guarantees of the Treaty of 1839 obsolete and thereby abrogate them, or at least weaken them and make them an

uncertain reliance? The test of this came in the year 1870, at the beginning of hostilities between France and the North German Union. Great Britain, the power most interested in the maintenance of Belgian neutrality, seems to have had considerable apprehension about it. Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister, said in the House of Commons: "I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises."

A One-Year Treaty.

Proceeding upon this view, the British Government then sought and procured from the French Government and from the Government of the North German Union separate but identical treaties guaranteeing with the British Government the neutrality of Belgium during the period of the war between France and the North German Union, the so-called Franco-Prussian war, which had just broken out, and for one year from the date of its termination. In these treaties it is also to be remarked that Great Britain limited the possible operation of her military force in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium to the territory of the State of Belgium.

These treaties expired in the year 1872, and the present German Empire has never signed any treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Moreover, between 1872 and 1914 Belgium became what is now termed a world power; that is, it reached a population of nearly 9,000,000 people, it had a well-organized, well-equipped army of over 200,000 men and powerful fortifications for its own defense; it had acquired and was holding colonies covering 1,000,000 square miles of territory, inhabited by 15,000,000 men, and it had active commerce, mediated by its own marine, with many, if not all, parts of the world. Now, these things are not at all compatible in principle with a specially guar-

anteed neutrality of the State which possesses them. The State which possesses them has grown out of its swaddling clothes, has arrived at the age and condition of maturity and self-protection, and has passed the age when specially guaranteed neutrality is natural.

From all these considerations, I think it extremely doubtful whether, on the first day of August, 1914, Belgium should have been considered as possessing any other kind of neutrality than the ordinary neutrality enjoyed by all States not at war, when some States are at war. In fact, it remains to be seen whether Belgium itself had not forfeited the privilege of this ordinary neutrality before a single German soldier had placed foot on Belgian soil. A few days ago I received a letter from one of the most prominent professors in the University of Berlin, who is also in close contact with the Prussian Ministry of Education, a man in whose veracity I place perfect confidence, having known him well for ten years. He writes: "Our violation of the neutrality of Belgium was prompted in part by the fact that we had convincing proof that there were French soldiers already in Belgium and that Belgium had agreed to allow the French Army to pass over its soil in case of war between France and us." Moreover, in the British "White Paper" itself, No. 122, is to be found a dispatch from the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, to Sir Edward Grey, containing these words: "It appears from what he [the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs] said that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already." The date of this dispatch is July 31, days before the Germans entered Belgium.

But placing these two things entirely aside, as well as the new evidence, said to have just been found in the archives at Brussels, that Belgium had by her agreements with Great Britain forfeited every claim to even ordinary neutrality

in case of a war between Germany and Great Britain, I find in the British "White Paper" itself, No. 123, not only ample justification, but absolute necessity, from a military point of view, for a German army advancing against France, not only to pass through Belgium, but to occupy Belgium. This number of the "White Paper" is a communication dated Aug. 1 from Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin. In it Sir Edward Grey informed Sir E. Goschen that the German Ambassador in London asked him "whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we, Great Britain, would remain neutral," and that he [Grey] replied that he "could not say that," that he did not think Great Britain "could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone"; further Sir Edward Grey says: "The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

The Necessary Invasions.

After this Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament, according to newspaper reports, that Great Britain stood, as to Belgian neutrality, on the same ground as in 1870. With all due respect, I cannot so understand it. In 1870 Great Britain remained neutral in a war between the North German Union and France, and, with the North German Union, guaranteed Belgium against invasion by France, and, with France, guaranteed Belgium against invasion by the North German Union. On Aug. 1, 1914, the German Empire asked Great Britain to do virtually the same thing, and Great Britain refused. It is, therefore, Germany who stood in 1914 on the same ground, with regard to Belgian neutrality, as she did in 1870, and it is Great Britain who shifted her position and virtually gave notice that she herself would become a bel-

ligerent. It was this notice served by Sir Edward Grey on the German Ambassador in London on Aug. 1, 1914, which made the occupation of Belgium an absolute military necessity to the safety of the German armies advancing against France. Otherwise they would, so far as the wit of man could divine, have left their right flank exposed to the advance of a British army through Belgium, and there certainly was no German commander so absolutely bereft of all military knowledge or instinct as to have committed so patent an error.

Belgium has Great Britain to thank for every drop of blood shed by her people and every franc of damage inflicted within her territory during this war. With a million of German soldiers on her eastern border demanding unhindered passage through one end of her territory, under the pledge of guarding her independence and integrity and reimbursing every franc of damage, and no British force nearer than Dover, across the Channel, it was one of the most inconsiderate, reckless, and selfish acts ever committed by a great power when Sir Edward Grey directed, as is stated in No. 155 of the British "White Paper," the British Envoy in Brussels to inform the "Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their power."

It is plain enough that Great Britain was not thinking so much of protecting Belgium as of Belgium protecting her, until she could prepare to attack Germany in concert with Russia and France. She was willing to let Belgium, yea almost to command Belgium, to take the fearful risk of complete destruction in order that she might gain a little time in perfecting the co-operation of Russia and France with herself for the crushing of Germany, and in order to hold the public opinion of neutral powers, especially of the United States of America, in leash under the chivalrous issue of protecting a weaker country, which she has done little or nothing to protect,

but which she could have effectively protected by simply remaining neutral herself.

We Americans have been greatly confused in mind in regard to the issues of this war. We have confounded causes and occasions and purposes and incidents until it has become almost impossible for any considerable number of us

to form a sound and correct judgment in regard to it. But we shall emerge from that nebulous condition. We are beginning to see more clearly now, and it would not surprise me greatly if the means used for producing our confusion would some day come back, if not to plague the consciences, at least to foil the purposes of their inventors.

Reply to Prof. Burgess

By Frank Jewett Mather, Jr.

Of Princeton University

PROF. BURGESS'S amazing communication on Belgian neutrality omits an essential piece of evidence. Granting, for the sake of argument, that the German Empire might repudiate all treaty obligations of the earlier German confederations, (very odd law, this;) granting also the still more novel plea that Belgium had outgrown the need and the privilege of neutralization, Germany had agreed to treat all neutral powers under the following provisions of The Hague Conventions of 1907 concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers:

1. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.

2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power.

* * * * *

5. A neutral power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.

This pledge the German Empire had solemnly made only seven years ago. It

would seem that Prof. Burgess may accept the distinction ably made by Prof. Münsterberg between "pledges of national honor" and mere "routine agreements," placing Hague treaties in the latter category.

The allegation that France and England secretly did unneutral acts in Belgium is as yet without proof of any sort, and must be interpreted by the common-sense consideration that a neutral Belgium was a defensive bulwark for France and England. To have tampered with her neutrality would have been motiveless folly. How much more decent and moral than Prof. Burgess's meticulous weighing of national reincorporation as a means of evading national obligations is Chancellor Hollweg's robust plea of national necessity! Prof. Burgess's whole moral and mental attitude in this case seems to be that of a corporation lawyer getting a trust out of a hole under the Statute of Limitations or by some reorganizing dodge.

Princeton, N. J., Nov. 4, 1914.

America's Peril in Judging Germany

By William M. Sloane

Late Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University; ex-President National Institute of Arts and Letters and of the American Historical Association; secretary of George Bancroft, the historian, in Berlin, 1873-75.

THE American public has been carefully trained to avoid entanglement with foreign affairs. This European war was so unexpected, so entirely unforeseen, that we were at first bewildered, and then exasperated, by our unreadiness to meet our own emergencies.

In our effort to fix responsibility we then became partisan to the verge of moral participation and had to be called to our senses by the wise proclamation and warning of our Chief Magistrate.

Western Europe is a nearer neighbor than either Central or Eastern, and what stern censors permit us to know is nicely calculated to arouse our prejudice on one side or the other. Believing that, owing to cable cutting and neutrality restrictions of wireless, as yet the plain truth is not available, we ask for a suspension of judgment on both sides in order that our Government may enjoy the undivided support of all American citizens in its desire to secure a minimum of disturbance to the normal course of our commercial, industrial, and agricultural life by convulsions that are not of our making.

Fairness to ourselves means justice in the formation and expression of opinion about not one or two but all the participants in a struggle for European ascendancy, with which we have nothing to do except as overwhelming victory for either side might bring on a struggle for world ascendancy, with which, unhappily, we might have much to do. To contemplate such a terrible event should sober us; the best preparation for it is absolute neutrality in thought, speech, and conduct.

Our own history since independence is an unbroken record of expansion and imperialism. Our contiguous territories have been acquired by compulsion, whether of war, of purchase, of occupation, or of exchange. We have taken advantage of others' dire necessity in the case of Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, and Mexico.

To rectify our frontier we compelled the Gladsden Purchase within the writer's lifetime. As to our non-contiguous possessions, we hold them by the right of conquest or revolution, salving our consciences with such cash indemnity as we ourselves have chosen to pay, and even now we are considering what we choose to pay, not what a disinterested court might consider adequate, for the good-will of the United States of Colombia, a good-will desired solely and entirely for an additional safeguard to the Panama Canal and a prop to the policy or doctrine substituted by the present Administration for the moribund Monroe Doctrine.

In no single instance of virtual annexation or protectorate have we consulted by popular vote either the desires of those inhabiting the respective territories annexed or The Hague Tribunal. In every case we have had one single plea and one only—self-interest.

The entire American Continent south of our frontier we have closed to all European settlement, thereby maintaining for more than a century in a magnificent territory an imperfect civilization which makes a sorry use of natural resources which could vastly improve the condition of all mankind if properly used.

This is the light in which European na-

tions see us; our identity in this policy from the dawn of our national existence onward they consider a proof of our national character. It differs in no respect from their own policies except in one.

But for them this exception is basic. We are a composite folk and they are homogeneous, their blend being approximately complete. They have one language, one tradition, one set of institutions and laws; a unity of literature, habits, and method in life. Some European States are composite, but each component part claims and cultivates its own style and its own principles; each announces itself as a nationality with a life to be maintained and a destiny to be wrought out somehow, either in peace or in conflict.

With perhaps a single exception, they have an overflow of population, due to natural generation, for the comfort and happiness of which they seek either an expansion of territory or an improvement in the productivity of their home lands; for those who must emigrate they passionately desire the perpetuation of their nationality, with all it implies.

In these respects they do not differ from us, except that perhaps we are more determined and imperious. We cannot think politically in any other terms than those of democratic government, either direct or representative.

At the present hour we are engaged in the very dubious experiment of direct popular legislation and administration. We are trying to change our Government radically, discarding its representative form for that of delegation. The remotest cause of this is the desire to amalgamate all our elements into homogeneity. So far this policy has resulted in a demand, not for equality of political and civil rights, but for its overthrow, substituting laws intended to create social and economic equality by means of class legislation.

These facts are not to the edification of other civilized States, and subject us to harsh and contemptuous criticism.

It is likewise very interesting that apparently the American people believe in a monarchical democracy. One of our

typical first citizens has recently expressed his antipathy to the phrases "My monarchy," "My loyal people," "My loyal subjects," used by one of the German monarchs in summoning the nation to war, as implying a dynastic or personal ownership of men.

Averse from Militarism.

The American masses dislike the sound of supreme war lord, but gladly admit their own Chief Magistrate to be Commander in Chief of the army and navy. To our ears the three German words are offensive, and well they may be, for in the treacherous literal translation they are willful perversion; but the much stronger English words are a delight to our democracy.

The phrases of monarchy are constantly used in Great Britain by its King and its Emperor, but give no offense to his "loyal subjects," even the most radical, who delight in them, as apparently do our people of British origin. Why do they give such deep offense when employed by the German Government through its King and Emperor? The social stratification of Germany is not as marked as that of Great Britain; its aristocracy is far less powerful; and Edward VII. proved that an adroit and willful English monarch could involve his "loyal people" deeper in harmful, secret alliances than William II., whose alliances and policies were and are unconcealed.

One of our greatest historians has earned a brilliant reputation in the conclusive proof that oceans are the world's highways, while its continents are its barriers. To the term "militarism" we attach an opprobrious meaning; militarism is the more infamous in exact proportion to its efficiency. We have been at little pains to define it, and as to certain of its aspects are curiously conspicuous.

The basic principle of our own nationality has long been the very vague Monroe Doctrine, by the assertion of which we have prevented the establishment on our nearest and remotest frontiers of strong military powers, which might in

certain events compel us to maintain a powerful and numerous standing army, or even introduce the compulsory military service of all voters, (women, of course, excepted.)

Yet we propose to fight if necessary in order to prevent fighting, and to this end maintain the second strongest and, for its size, the most efficient fleet in the world. This is our militarism; that of Great Britain has been to maintain a fleet double our own or any other in size, for it is her basic principle to maintain an unquestioned supremacy on the highways of commerce. To this we have meekly assented, while other nations absorb our carrying trade and our flag waves over a fleet of perhaps a dozen respectable oceangoing trading and passenger ships.

It is under her rather patronizing protection that we fight our foreign wars and by pressure from her that we manage the Panama Canal with nice and honorable attention to her interpretation of a treaty capable of quite a different one. Whether or not this be "militarism" of the utmost efficiency by sea is not difficult to decide. But we have never styled it infamous.

While I am writing, Germans, whose basic principle is the most efficient "militarism" by land, are publishing all abroad that the "militarism" of France must be forever stamped out, so that they may dwell at peace in the lands which are their home.

Within a generation France has accumulated a colonial empire second only to that of Great Britain, while she has incessantly demanded the reintegration of German lands, and especially a German city which she arbitrarily annexed and held by "militarism" for about five generations. The "militarism" of a republic and a democracy which retains the essential features of Napoleonic administration has been quite as efficient as that of a monarchical democracy like Great Britain, and may easily prove more efficient than that of a monarchy like Germany.

Why should it be more infamous or barbarous in one case than the other?

And with what is this efficient military democracy allied in the closest ties?

With Russia, an Oriental despotism which by the aid of French money has developed a "militarism" by land so portentous in numbers, dimension, and efficiency that its movements are comparable to those of Attila's Huns. Escaped Russians in Western lands are denouncing German "militarism" as the incubus of the world.

Which of the two should Americans regard as the greater danger?

Menaces to Our Neutrality.

It has wrung our hearts to consider the violation of Belgian neutrality, for which both France and eventually even Great Britain have long been prepared, but the latter has with little or no protest arranged with the "bear that walks like a man" to disregard contemptuously the neutrality of Persia in arranging spheres of influence, exactly as Japan, another ally, is contemptuously disregarding the neutrality of China, the new "republic" we were in such haste to recognize that we had to use the cable. And what about Korea? It is a Japanese province in contravention of the most solemn guarantees of its integrity.

Leaving aside for the moment certain considerations like these, and they might easily be indefinitely amplified, which should compel Americans to unbiased consideration for others and preclude a dangerous partiality, let us ask ourselves how in the event of mediation we could be an impartial pacificator, behaving as we have hitherto done. The attitude of our Government has been strictly neutral, neutral to the verge of utter self-abnegation; and, as some regard it, timidity.

But rock-fast as any democratic magistrate may be, public opinion must and does influence him. Rightly or wrongly his agents would be even more completely dominated, and rightly or wrongly they would be suspect in view of our terrific partisanship on both sides since the commencement of hostilities.

The efficiency of Government organs in "producing the goods," the terrific power of organization on one side and

mass on the other, have been considered a menace to world equilibrium.

Whichever way the decision falls, the scrutiny of Europe will be turned to us. Unless observation and instinct be utterly at fault, we have for more than a decade been, after Germany, the worst-hated nation of all that are foremost.

It is pre-eminently our affair to mind our own business, as others have minded theirs. Without cessation of noise and fury in America this is impossible.

Indeed, our emotional storms have already furnished proof of how we are incapacitated from either enforcing our rights as neutrals or seizing by the forelock the opportunity afforded to us as neutrals and from enjoying the unquestioned privileges of neutrality.

It is not altogether edifying to think that the close of the European struggle, be it long or short, will probably find our ocean commerce substantially where it was at the beginning, and that conflicts which were not of our making will have been fought out before we are able to secure our share of the world markets. Apparently the leaders in commerce, industry, and trade, like the lawmakers and administrators, are paralyzed by the imperative necessity of aiding panic-stricken tourists and panic-stricken stay-at-homes. Apparently, too, our people are suffering more in purse and general comfort than the actual combatant nations.

Clamorous for American sympathy and cash, we have on our shores embassies from the belligerents, pleading their respective virtues and sorrows.

Why, after all, should our chiefest concern be with them? Surely we may be good Samaritans without a total disregard of our own interests and a blindness to opportunity verging on impotency. There is no immorality in the proper play of self-interest. It is the conflict of interests which creates morality. But the spectators, even the maddest baseball "fans," do not play the game nor train for it. It is high time we ceased wasting our energies in emotions and vain babble.

At this writing the first line of defense against the Oriental deluge is en-

dangered. The Slav individually and in his primitive culture is altogether charming. He is a son of the soil, picturesque in life and creative; he is minstrel and poet, seer. But so far he is the carrier of a low civilization, the prophet, priest, and king of autocracy and absolutism. Never has there been a time in history when the higher civilization was not in a savage struggle for existence. It is almost the first time in three centuries that the highest civilizations were in alliance with the lowest; not since the pugnacious Western powers of Europe sued for favor at the Sublime Porte.

In Peril of the Whirlwind.

This ought to be a very sobering spectacle, but it seems to arouse the delighted enthusiasm of an American majority. For such an aberration there is but a single and efficient remedy: absorption in our own affairs, the discriminating study of efficient methods to prevent our being caught up by a whirlwind, even the outer edges of which may snatch us into the vortex.

To change the metaphor, we revel in the pleasant propulsion of the maelstrom's rim, unaware that every instant brings us closer to dangers, escape from which would demand herculean effort. Irresponsible emotions are, like those of the novel and the stage, when intensified to excess utterly incompatible with action. And just such a paralysis seems for six long weeks to have lamed the highest powers of America.

The proportionate increase in population among the European powers is overwhelmingly in favor of the Slavs. Their rate of increase by natural generation is nearly three times that of even the Germans, with the result that by the introduction of enforced military service into Eastern Europe, (excepting Hungary and perhaps Rumania,) the military balance of power has been completely changed.

The wars among the Balkan States, including Turkey, have put on foot armies of a dimension hitherto undreamed of among the South Slavs, and the army of Russia is probably two and a half

times larger than it could have been thirty-five years ago.

The method by which Eastern Europe has succeeded in financing itself is rather mysterious. We know, of course, that the original Franco-Russian Alliance was based on reciprocal interests, and that large sums of French money flowed into Russia, which partly developed the natural resources of Russia and were partly in the shape of loans that in all likelihood were used for war material.

Slavs in Germany.

The conflict between the Slavs and the Teutons all along the line on which they border has therefore been in two ways intensified. In the first place, just in proportion as Germany has become an industrial State, the field work has been intrusted to immigrant Slavs, some of whom come only for the season and return, but a very large number of them—estimated at the present moment at close to a million—have substantially settled within the borders of the German Empire. That is to say, there is a constant injection of 1½ per cent. of Slavic blood into the territories of the German Empire.

Suppose now that Russia should succeed in establishing the protectorate over all Slavs which she desires, and at the same time should press back the Germans on that border line, something very closely approximating a new migration of peoples in Europe will take place.

As far as I know the German feeling, expressed both privately and publicly, officially and unofficially, they have hoped to maintain their complete consanguinity, if not homogeneity, within the lands they regard as their home; and their preparations for war, their increase of their military strength, have been made, professedly at least, solely in the interest of defense. Americans can simply not realize—it is impossible for them to realize—the difference in the degree of civilization and culture on either side of a purely artificial boundary line.

Very fortunately it has entered the minds of several people lately to write to the newspapers about the unhappy confusion that comes from the use of

words in a meaning which at home they do not connote at all. Take, for example, the whole question of militarism. As we see it, it is a matter altogether of degree. For defense against what the German considers the most terrible danger that he personally has to confront, it has been necessary from time to time to change both the size and the composition of his forces, whether offensive or defensive, and they therefore have introduced compulsory military service, an idea which has always been very offensive to Anglo-Saxons, but which in cases of dire necessity they have been compelled to utilize themselves, as, for example, during our own civil war, the abandonment of voluntary enlistment and the introduction of the draft.

Now, the compulsory military service of the German means that every man is for a period of his life drafted and trained as a soldier. Forty years ago there were a great many men who escaped by reason of one or another provision of the law. That number was steadily diminished until within eighteen months, when finally it was proclaimed that every German who could endure the severity of that training must undergo it, and that was due to the fact that the military balance of power of which I spoke had been so completely changed by the re-arming of Russia and by the formation of the South Slav armies in the Balkan Peninsula.

As a parallel we might imagine, not one troublesome neighbor, but four. We might imagine a tremendous military power developed in Canada, and we might imagine a hostile military power on the Atlantic side and another one on the Pacific side, in which case we would beyond a question have to expand our inchoate militarism, just in proportion as we came to feel the necessity for a strong physical defensive or offensive in the way of a great standing army, and we probably would do it without any hesitation.

Now, Germany has not any really bitter foe on the north, although there is no love lost between the Germans and the Scandinavians; but it has an embittered foe on the east, and another one on the

west, and what has proved to be an embittered foe upon the water and a very lukewarm neutral State on the south, a State which had joined in alliance with her.

Italy had joined what Italy considered a defensive alliance, but not an offensive alliance, and chose to regard the outbreak of this war as an offensive movement on the part of Germany, and for that reason has refused to participate in the struggle.

I say for that reason because, having been accustomed to reading, all my life, long diplomatic documents, really having been trained, you might say, almost in the school of Ranke, who was the inaugurator of an entirely new school of historical writing based on the criticism of historical papers, I have come to realize that the dispatches of trained diplomats are for the most part purely formal, and that while these respective publications of Great Britain and of Germany have a certain value, yet nevertheless the most important plans are laid in the embrasures of windows, where important men stand and talk so that no one can hear, or they are arranged and often times amplified in private correspondence which does not see the light until years afterward, and that the most important historical documents are found in the archives of families, members of which have been the guiding spirits of European policy and politics.

So that what the secret diplomacy of the last years may have been is as yet utterly unknown, and certainly will not be known for the generation yet to come and perhaps for several generations. The student in almost any European capital is given complete access to everything on file in the archives, including secret documents, only down to a certain date. That date differs in various of these storehouses, but I think in no case is it later than 1830.

If you ask why, there are the sensibilities of families to be considered, there is the question of hidden policies which they do not care to reveal, and then there is the whole matter of who the examining student is. For instance,

certain very important papers were absolutely denied to me, as an American, in Great Britain—or at least excuses were made if they were not absolutely denied—which were opened to an Englishman who was working upon the same subject at about the same time.

The reason for such observations at the present hour is plain enough. Public opinion is formed upon what the public is permitted to know, and is not formed upon the actual facts which the public is not permitted to know. And for that reason Americans, remote as we are from the sources of information, and especially remote from that most delicate of all indications, the pulse of public opinion in foreign countries, ought to be extremely slow to commit themselves to anything.

Attack on Sir Edward Grey.

Now, we have just had a very interesting incident. THE NEW YORK TIMES printed recently what the British call their "White Paper," as well as the German "White Paper." The editors of our most important journals announced that they had read and studied those papers with care, and that on the face of those papers, beyond any peradventure, Germany was the aggressor. German militarism had flaunted itself as an insult in the face of Europe. Germany had violated neutrality, Germany had committed almost every sin known to international law, and therefore the whole German procedure was to be reprobated.

Within a very short time a Labor member of Parliament, J. Ramsay MacDonald, rises in his place, able and fearless, and, on the basis of the "White Paper," as published and put in the hands of the British public, attacks Sir Edward Grey for having so committed Great Britain in advance to both Russia and France that, in spite of the representations of the German Ambassador, he dared not discuss the question of neutrality. This member of Parliament manifestly belongs to the powerful anti-war party of Great Britain, a party two of whose members, John Burns and Lord Morley, resigned from the Cabinet rather than condone

iniquity; a party which before the outbreak of the war made itself heard and felt, and protested against the participation of Great Britain, desiring localization of the struggle.

Mr. Macdonald says that in his opinion this talk about the violation of Belgian neutrality, from the point of view of British statesmen, is absurd, because as long ago as 1870 the plans for the use of Belgium, both by France and by Germany—in other words, the violation of its neutrality—were in the British War Office, and that Mr. Gladstone rose in his place and said he was not one of those whose opinion was that a formal guarantee should stand so far in thwarting the natural course of events as to commit Great Britain to war; and that has been the announced and avowed policy of Great Britain all the way down since 1870, and that therefore talk about the violation of Belgian neutrality is a mere pretext.

That is another instance of this secret agreement that goes on, which so commits a man like Sir Edward Grey that in the pinch, when the German Ambassador substantially proposed to yield everything to him and asked him for his proposition, he cannot make any.

These facts are in the "White Paper." As far as I know, no editor in the United States who claims to have studied thoroughly that "White Paper" has ever brought this out, and they had not been published in that paper at the time when Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith made their respective speeches and committed the British Nation to the war.

Another unhappy use of language which has been noted in the public press is due to the literal translation of words. Americans simply do not know what the word Emperor means. To most of them it connotes the later Roman Emperors, or the autocratic Czar of Russia, or the short-lived but autocratic quality of Napoleon III., so that when we use the word Emperor we are thinking of an absolutely non-existing personage, unless it be the Czar of Russia.

We like very much to make sport of phrases from languages unfamiliar to us,

and we enjoy the jokes of ludicrous translations, and so we take the term "Oberster Kriegsherr" and we translate it "Supreme War Lord." What conception the average American forms of that is manifest. Whereas, as a matter of fact—and this has already been pointed out both in conversation and in public prints—the term means nothing in the world but Commander in Chief of the German Empire, has not any different relation whatsoever in the substance of its meaning than that which Presidents of the United States have been in time of supreme danger to the country. Mr. Lincoln was just as much an "Oberster Kriegsherr" at one period of his term as the German Emperor could ever be; in fact, rather more.

Sherman's March to the Sea.

In truth, the sense of outrage which Americans feel over the horrors of war, while most creditable to them, is very often based upon an ignorance of the rules and regulations of so-called civilized warfare, and upon a sentimentality, which, though also very creditable, is unfortunately not one of the factors in the world's work. It would not hurt Americans occasionally to recall Sherman's march to the sea, during which every known kind of devastation occurred, or to recall Gen. Hunter's boast that he had made the Valley of Virginia such a desert that a crow could not find sustenance enough in it to fly from one side to the other, and yet at that time, in what we considered the supreme danger to our country, the conduct of those men was approved, and they themselves were almost deified for their actions.

While parallels are dangerous and the existence of one wrong does not make another action right, yet at the same time a very considerable amount of open-mindedness must be exercised in a neutral country when regarding the passionate devotions of combatant nations to their culture, to their safety, to their interest; and it should be recalled that in the heats and horrors of war it is extremely difficult, however trained or disciplined troops may be, to prevent outrages, and that so far as we have gone

in accurate information the least that can be said is that it is slowly dawning upon us that horror for horror and outrage for outrage there has been no overwhelming balance on either side.

The Allies (this interview was received Tuesday morning) firmly believe that the struggle on the west is so indecisive up to this time that what will count for them is the duration of the war. Lloyd George has just said, not in the exact language, but virtually, what Disraeli said in 1878: "We don't want to fight; but, by jingo, if we do we have got the ships, we have got the men, we have got the money, too." Those are the words that brought into use the expression "jingoists."

Now, Lloyd George said the other day that it was the money which in the long run would count, and that Great Britain had that; and the meetings that are held to induce Englishmen to enlist are addressed by speakers who meet with lots of applause when they say: "We may not be able to put the same number of men into the field immediately that Germany was able to put or Russia was able to put, but in the long run, considering the attitude of all the different parts of our empire, we will be able to put just as many men, and therefore time is on our side both as regards force in the field and money to sustain it." (The London Times confesses that enlistment in Ireland is a failure.)

Lloyd George says that for a comparatively short time England's enemies can finance themselves and be very efficient, but that as time passes they unquestionably will exhaust not only their pecuniary means but their resources of men as well. That is his position at this time. Therefore, it does appear as if the long duration of the war was a thing desired, at least in Great Britain, as being their hope of victory. Both Great Britain and France are wealthy countries. Just how wealthy Germany is I do not think they realize, nor do we know, nor what its ultimate resources can be.

Now, looking at the allied line as a whole, we will suppose that the German

forces were overwhelmingly triumphant in France, and suppose, likewise, which is by no means as strong a hypothesis, that Russia is overwhelmingly victorious against Austria and the Eastern German Army; then, of course, you have the situation in which that one of the Allies which is triumphant will assert its leadership in the terms of peace that will be reached, and would have the hegemony, as we call it, of all Europe.

Russia's Position.

So that the defeat of the Allies in the west and their overwhelming success in the east would compel the acceptance, in any peace that might be made, of such terms as Russia chose to dictate. She would have to be satisfied, otherwise there would only be one outcome of it; that is, of course, if Great Britain and France could not accept those terms, there would be a rupture, and stranger things have been seen than Germany, France, and Great Britain fighting against Russia.

Stranger things than that have been seen; such changes in the alliances between States have occurred at intervals from the seventeenth century onward in Europe, a phase of the subject that is too lengthy to discuss here, but which every student of history knows all about. And it is thinkable that they might occur again.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the Germans should imitate Frederick the Great, which is not so preposterous as appears on the face of it, because of comparatively easy means of transportation, and should be able to make successive victorious dashes, first in the east and then in the west, backward and forward; leadership would be hers, and France would be a minor power for years to come.

Probably peace might come more quickly if neither side should be absolutely victorious than otherwise. But for the moment I think that the agreement among the Allies is a very portentous thing, as far as the duration of the war is concerned.

"Do you think that any secret agreement may exist; that France even now

may have made an agreement with Germany?" Mr. Sloane was asked.

I cannot think so. I think it very evident there is no such secret agreement. If one existed it would be much more likely to be between Russia and Germany. You remember the development of Prussia, which is, of course, the commanding State in the German Empire, occurred by its careful conservation of the policy which was laid down in the political will of Frederick the Great, that of keeping friends with Russia.

The fact of the matter is, Prussia was saved in the Napoleonic wars by the act of Gen. Yorck at Tauroggen, when he suddenly abandoned the French and went over to the Prussians, and while Russia has within half a generation become intensely bitter against Germany, yet it is true that the Baltic Provinces, in which the gentry and the burghers are Germans, have furnished most of the important administrators to the Russian Empire, a fact that causes much of the jealousy in Russia on the part of the native-born Russians against the Germans of the Baltic Provinces. Nevertheless, self-interest is a very important thing, and if Russia thought for a moment that France was going to abandon her I think she would turn to Germany right away.

As time has developed the nations of today, it has come to be understood by hard-headed statesmen that those who conduct their respective affairs can have no other guiding principle than the interest of their own State, no other.

There is a persistent feeling throughout the world that there is an analogy between the individual man and organized society. There are books written to show that States must and do pass through the various stages through which an individual passes, namely, infancy, childhood, youth, middle age, old age, decay. By a perfectly natural parallel the majority of men apply the same morality to the State which they apply to the individual, and they insist upon it that a State must be moral in every respect; that it must have a conscience; that it must have virtue; that it must practice self-denial; that it must not lay

its hands on what does not belong to it. In short, that it must as a State or as a nation be "good," in exactly the same sense in which a person is "good." In other words, they personify the State.

I have never heard of any speaker or writer who would not approve of that as an ideal, and who would not desire that the millennium should come upon earth now, and that exactly the same virtues that are held up for personal ideals should be held up for national ideals.

I think we all believe that, but, as a matter of fact, in a world constituted as ours is, the one test of a good Government, applied by every individual, is the material prosperity of the people who live under it, and for that reason if the people do not at first put in power men who can give them material prosperity they will put such failures out and try another set of rulers, and they will go on and on that way until necessarily the policies of statesmen must be based upon the interest of that State whose destinies are in their hands. So that the only hope of relations between nations similar to those that exist between good men and good women is that the individuals of that nation, its population, its inhabitants, should consent to exercise the self-denying virtues; and until that point is reached there can be no good State in the sense in which there can be a good man. We ought all to work for it, but it is not here now, and there are no signs on the horizon of its approach.

In a war, therefore, every statesman studies the resources of his nation, and when the time comes that it is manifestly his duty to put an end to warfare, it is only by the public approval that he dares to do it, by showing that it is to their advantage to give up the things for which they went to war, in greater or less degree.

Armed Peace Not Disarmament.

And the man of shrewd insight, who knows when that point is reached, is the leader who saves the face, so to speak, of these nations and steps in and says:

"Now, the whole moral force of the civilized world must be brought to bear

upon you to make a peace, the terms of which, if possible, shall not discredit any of you, but at the same time shall be as elastic and as proportionate to your respective gains and losses as will insure at least a considerable period of peace, not an armistice, not an armed armistice, though it may be an armed peace."

We see no signs anywhere in Europe that disarmament has any substantial body of advocates in any nation. The basic principle hitherto of the German people has been to have not the largest but the strongest army; the basic principle of Great Britain, which sneers at militarism, has been not only to have the most powerful fleet but twice the most powerful fleet.

And what is the basic principle of the United States? The Monroe Doctrine, to have no armed neighbor which shall compel us to violate by its presence our dislike for compulsory military service or to expend great sums for armament.

These are basic principles in each of us. Now, we have been able to maintain the Monroe Doctrine by simply showing our teeth, but whether we could

maintain it in the future without an armed force sufficient to give it sanction I think is doubtful, and for that reason the Monroe Doctrine has undergone quite a number of modifications which I do not need to explain here.

But this basic principle of ours that from Patagonia to the Mexican frontier we will suffer no armed nation of Europe to make permanent settlement and endanger our peace is exactly the same sort of principle that the German holds when he says, "We must have the strongest army," and the same which the Englishman holds when he says, "We must have the strongest fleet."

I want it distinctly understood that I am not a partisan. I am not pro this or pro that or pro anything except pro-American, and the principal impulse I have in trying to clarify my mind is my hope that there may be an end to these hysterical exhibitions of partisanship, in which (throughout this neutral nation) men indulge who still hold too strongly, as I think, to the glory, honor, dignity, and traditions of the lands of their origin.

Reply to William M. Sloane

By George Trumbull Ladd

Emeritus Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Yale University; Lecturer on Philosophy in India and Japan; ex-President of American Psychological Association.

IT seems strange to me that a student of history with the training and acumen of Prof. Sloane should overlook or minimize the important distinction that must hold the chief place in enabling us to understand the issues and appreciate the merits of the war now raging in Europe. This distinction is that between the German people and Germanic civilization, on the one hand, and, on the other, the present Constitution and cherished ambitions of the German Empire under the dominance of Prussia, the German people, by genuine processes

of self-development, have worked out for themselves a veritable spiritual unity which manifests itself in language, laws, customs, and a large measure of substantial uniformity in moral and religious ideals. Germanic civilization, with its love of order, its high estimate of education, its notable additions to science, philosophy, and art, constitutes one of the most noble and beneficent contributions to the welfare of mankind.

But the case is not at all the same with the German Empire as at present constituted. It is not a historical develop-

ment, a truly national affair, as are the Empire of Great Britain, the Republics of France and the United States, or the Empires of Russia and Japan. It is a modern combination of politically divergent unities, forced by the ruthless but infinitely shrewd policy of Bismarck and his coadjutors, misdirected and perhaps driven to ruin by the man and his entourage, who, even if he is King of Prussia "by the grace of God," is only Emperor of Germany "by the will of the Princes."

We are diligently given to understand that all these "Princes" and all the German people have entered heart and soul into this war, and without the slightest doubt as to its righteousness and as to the destiny of the empire, this modern military autocracy, ultimately to be completely victorious. This is hard to believe, although it must be admitted that the cowardice of the Socialists and the obsession of the professors are remarkable phenomena. As to the latter, however, we must remember their dependence on the Government, not only for their information and their "call" to speak, but also for their positions in the Government system of education.

As to the significance of the two names most prominently quoted in this connection, I am not at all impressed, as so many of my colleagues appear to be. An intimate friend of mine some twenty years ago was several weeks en pension in the same house where Haeckel had his apartment, and even then he was notorious for his hatred of foreigners and of women. Those of us who have followed closely his career know how often he has written with more than German professorial virulence against those who differed from his theory of evolution, and that he is at present scarcely more abusive of England than he has several times been of his own Government and of the State Church because his system was not made a matter of compulsory teaching. As to Eucken, the reasons for his obsession are quite different. In his case the feeling and the utterance are

due to intellectual weakness rather than to virulence of passion.

After all, however, the temper of military and imperial Germany under the dominance of Prussia has been essentially the same from the beginning. In illustration of this, let me quote for your readers from a poem of Heine, written as long ago as 1842. I do this the more readily because I have recently seen, to my astonishment, Heine placed beside Goethe as representing the better temper of the Germanic civilization as opposed to the blinded judgment and immoral hatred of the modern German Empire:

Germany's still a little child,
But he's nursed by the sun, though
tender;

He is not suckled on soothing milk,
But on flames of burning splendor.

One grows apace on such a diet;
It fires the blood from languor;
Ye neighbor's children, have a care,
This urchin how ye anger!

He is an awkward infant giant,
The oak by the roots uptearing;
He'll beat you till your backs are sore,
And crack your crowns for daring.

He is like Siegfried, the noble child,
That song-and-saga wonder,
Who, when his fabled sword was forged,
His anvil cleft in sunder!

To you, who will our Dragon slay,
Shall Siegfried's strength be given;
Hurrah! how joyfully your nurse
Will laugh on you from heaven!

The Dragon's hoard of royal gems
You'll win, with none to share it;
Hurrah! how bright the golden crown
Will sparkle when you wear it!

But it would not be stranger than many other things which have happened in human history if the defeat of German military imperialism should result in restoring to Europe and spreading more widely over the world the beneficent influence of Germanic civilization. Certainly they are not the same thing, and they do not stand or fall together.

Yale University, Oct. 20, 1914.

Possible Profit From the War

INTERVIEW WITH DR. FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

Professor of Sociology and the History of Civilization at Columbia University; President of the Institut International de Sociologie, 1913.

By Edward Marshall

NO man in the United States is better entitled to estimate the probable social and economic outcome of the present European débâcle than Prof. Franklin H. Giddings of Columbia, one of the most distinguished sociologists and political economists in the United States.

"Today all Europe fights," he said to me, "but, also, today all Europe thinks."

That is an impressive sentence, with which he concluded our long talk, and with which I begin my record of it.

He believes that this thinking of the men who crouch low in the drenched trenches and of the women who tragically wait for news of them will fashion a new Europe.

He agrees with the remarkable opinions of President Butler, that that new Europe will be marked by the rise of democracy.

He sees the probability of broadened individual opportunity in it, accompanied by the breaking down of international suspicions; and he thinks that all these processes, which surely make for peace, will surely bring a lasting peace.

In the following interview, which Prof. Giddings has carefully reread, will be found one of the most interesting speculative utterances born of the war.

"The immediate economic cause of the war," said Prof. Giddings, "lay in the affairs of Servia and Austria. Servia had been shut in. She had been able to get practically nothing from, and sell practically nothing to, the outside world, save by Austria's permission, while Austria, with Germany professing fear of

Slavic development, for years had been taking every care to prevent the Balkan peoples from having free access to the Adriatic.

"Some financial profit arose from this internment of the little States, but it is probable that the desire for this was all along entirely secondary to the fear of Balkan, especially Servian, political and economic development.

"In the larger economic question Germany felt especial interest.

"In a comparatively few years she had made the greatest progress ever made by any nation in an equal time, with the possible exception of that made by the United States in a similar period after our civil war, and it is probable that not even our own advance has equaled hers in rapidity or extent, if all could be tabbed up.

"She had worked out a great manufacturing scheme, she had developed an immense internal commerce by means of her railroads and her Rhine and other waterways, she had built up an enormous trade with Eastern Europe, Western Asia, South America, and the United States.

"She had highly specialized in and become somewhat dependent on the production of articles like dyestuffs and the commodities of the pharmacopoeia.

"Her shipping had advanced until it closely crowded England's; her finances, on the whole, were well handled and her credit was excellent, while her wonderful system of co-operation between the Government and manufacturing pro-

ducers and commercial distributors of all kinds had become the admiration of all nations. The extent to which her Government facilitated foreign trade through obtaining and distributing costly information might well be taken as the world's model.

"Whatever claims be made or contested about her contributions to culture and theoretical science, there can be no argument about her material achievements.

German Achievements.

"Along every line her social organization of co-operation between the Government and the people successfully handled problems feared by all the outside world. While, as a result of the development of humane feeling, England and the United States have been saying that ignorance, vagabondage, and misery ought to be abolished, Germany has said, 'They shall be!' And, saying it, she had actually commenced to abolish them.

"She had cut down enormous wastes of human energy and, for the first time in the history of the world, had established an economic minimum below which men and families were not permitted to sink.

"The cost of this was large; for insurance, colonies for tramps and vagabonds, employment agencies, and the like; but Germany made it pay in the creation of a nation built of loyal and efficient people. Both their loyalty and their efficiency have been proved and re-proved in the course of the present struggle. They had accomplished marvels, they were ready for amazing sacrifices.

"Now, one of the principal reasons why Germany was able to do these things, although she probably ignored it and possibly would deny it, is to be found in the free-trade policy of England.

"At any time during the past twenty years England could have checked German progress effectively by the establishment of a protective tariff system designed to encourage her own colonies and other nations with whom she had long been on friendly and influential terms, to the utmost development of ex-

clusive trade privileges designed to shut out Germany. Except for the long-established English policy of commercial freedom Germany could not have accomplished for herself what she has.

"Germany has been growing rapidly. Her birth rate has been high, but of late it has been falling, and when the war began there were indications that she soon would approach the low ratio of population increase already characteristic of France, of New England and the Middle West in the United States, and lately of England. But Germany's population was still a growing one and, in a sense, a restive one.

"The Malthusian theory has not worked out in the civilized world as Malthus supposed it would, for the application of science to manufacturing, agriculture, &c., has prevented increasing populations from pressing upon the means of subsistence; but in all parts of the Western World the standards of living have been raised, the ambitions of the average man and woman have expanded. They have lived better than their parents lived, and they have wished their children to live better still.

"However, we can place no limit upon the probable expansion of human desires, and it is true that a population unchecked by the intelligent action of the human will tends to increase at a rate more rapid than that at which it is possible to raise the actual plane of human living.

"The speed of the working of the two rules is different, perhaps, but both are dynamic, and the population of Germany tended to grow more rapidly than betterment of conditions could be provided, even under the nation's splendid Governmental and commercial efficiency.

"The natural yearning of the nation, therefore, was toward colonial expansion, and, although note that I make no charges against either the German Government or German people, the nation probably has wished sovereignty over Western Europe, through Belgium and Holland to the sea. Its narrow outlet through Hamburg and Bremen was insufficient for its needs.

"Of course, its trade and economic advance has sometimes conflicted with that of other nations. It is natural for Germany to suppose that England tried to block it. However, I think that all the evidence which Germany has brought forward in proof of this is weak and improbable, because England's great source of revenue has been her foreign trade, and, above all, her carrying trade, and I am not partisan but stating the obvious when I say that England prospers when the rest of the world prospers, and that she has profited mightily through Germany's commercial advance.

"These facts point to the conclusion that Germany really had everything to gain by avoiding war and continuing her prosperous expansion along commercial lines, increasing the strength of her grip in foreign countries, as, for example, in South America.

Germany's Prosperous Commerce.

"In South America we Americans were not really competing with her. She had studied the market and adopted the methods necessary to its satisfaction; we had not. England was relatively losing her hold there. In another twenty years Germany surely would have been one of the greatest commercial and manufacturing nations which the world has ever known. So it was not economic necessity, nor pressure approaching economic necessity, which precipitated this war.

"I think the German people, as they professed to do, did become greatly alarmed over a possibility, magnified into a probability, that Russia, taking up the cause of the Balkan peoples, would obtain Constantinople, that Servia would make her way to the Adriatic, and that all possibility of the expansion of Germany to the southeast would be blocked, and Germany probably became alarmed over England's intentions—there were many indications of something close to panic in Germany after it was generally understood that King Edward figured in the pact with France.

"I, for one, do not believe that the German fears of England were well grounded; I do not believe that in the excitement the German mind worked dis-

criminately or that it is working with discrimination today. I think that Germany has presented an extraordinary example of nation-wide mobmindedness in a situation which offered nothing but ruin through war and boundless advantages if she sat tight and waited for some one else to strike the first blow, which, then, probably never would have been struck.

"So, although I have outlined what I think may fairly be regarded as some of the economic conditions contributing to the war, I do not think that it is entirely to be explained by economic causes.

"They fail to account for the actual precipitation of the conflict. I think that there is no explanation of that, short of recognition of an abnormal reaction of the German mind to a situation the nature of which was mistaken, or, at least, exaggerated.

"And, of course, there were other factors concerning which we shall not know the truth for years, such as the personal influence of individual minds in the German and other Governments. It will be long before the complete history of the acts and negligence of diplomats and other responsible Ministers will be written."

I asked Prof. Giddings if, in his opinion, the struggle is likely to result in any wide and profound change in the economic life of the world.

"Yes," he replied, "I think it is sure to. In the first place, for at least half a generation, and perhaps longer, the producing capital of the world will be much smaller than it was before the war.

"But in this speculation we must be cautious, because, so far, the costly war material which has been consumed, such as fortresses destroyed, guns worn out, ammunition consumed, soldiers' clothing, and in general food, were principally accumulated and paid for long ago. They have come out of the world's past production, and their cost already has been written off.

"The real loss, the new waste, over and above the devastation of Belgium and other lands, has been of labor, productive activity which would have been

carried on during the period of the war had the struggle been avoided, the destruction of the lives of men in their economic prime, the maiming of others to the depletion of their future usefulness and the loss to European fatherhood.

"But if the war lasts a long time, necessitating the general renewal of ships, fortresses, weapons, and stores, the waste will be enormous, for the actual money expenditure will then come out of funds newly accumulated or charged against the future, and not out of those set aside in the past for war purposes.

One Great Change Occurring.

"Thus one great economic change already is occurring—the devastation wrought, the destruction of hoarded funds and supplies and of useful human life.

"There are others which are probable, but also problematical, although I think we fairly may take them into account.

"Will the European nations, in settlement of their differences through final terms of peace, simply endeavor to restore the old order, drawing their lines of demarkation very strictly, enacting, for example, higher tariffs, thinking that along that line will lie the easiest way of re-establishing national finances?

"If so, the old contentions will be perpetuated. It will be the old order of things over again.

"We shall again have the spirit of exclusiveness fostered and the old suspicions bred. The old intense competition of nation with nation for trade to the exclusion of other nations from the markets of the world will return with its attendant inefficiency.

"But, on the other hand, the world will be an immense gainer through the war if it is followed by a broad and rational review of the whole situation and an adjustment of the map of Europe with due regard to the ambitions and legitimate economic opportunities and capabilities of the various peoples.

"This war may be the greatest good the world has ever known if it leaves Europe in a mental state disposed to broaden opportunity, to break down sus-

picious, to eliminate barriers, and make commerce much freer than it has been.

"Then Europe's economic recovery will be repaid, animosities will die quickly away, and every nation which is now involved will progress with a new speed, seeing that opportunity is created only through superiority in fair competition.

"The next possibility, one far more nearly a probability, I think, than the somewhat Utopian speculation in which I have just indulged, is that after the war the world will have been deeply impressed by the tremendous activity of Germany, whether she be victor or vanquished.

"What is the secret of her efficiency as manifested in the mobilization of her vast army, in her use of science in new military devices, in her holding of the elements of her national life together during the struggle, in her keeping her industries going in the face of unprecedented difficulties—all to a degree never before dreamed of? will be a general query.

"Other nations will study the German plan, asking whether it is true, as has been taught in America, that that Government is best which governs least.

"It may be that this war will result, entirely apart from the urgency of the labor problem which it will magnify, and wholly on the grounds of general efficiency, in a general inquiry as to whether or not the time has come for quasi-socialistic national developments.

"I think it unlikely that the war will give impetus to that proletarian socialism which is founded on class consciousness and class struggle; but it may urge forward a socialistic movement based upon the large and fruitful idea that the best hope for the future is offered by the most complete and highly organized co-operation of all elements, all interests, all agencies which in their combination make up national structures.

"As a matter of fact, I am an optimist, and I believe that this is about what will come after this war ends.

"To put my theory in slightly different terms, I believe that the conflict will greatly further the development of what

perhaps may be called 'public socialism,' and I mean by that the highest attainable organization of whole peoples for the production of commodities, the furtherance of enterprise, and the promotion of the general well-being.

"I think that when the world sobers up it will ask: 'How did Germany do it?'"

"Whether she wins or loses that must be the universal query, for whether she wins or loses her achievement has been in many ways unprecedented.

"There can be but one answer to this query: She did it by an organization which brought together in efficient co-operation the individual, the quasi-private corporation, the public corporation, and the Government upon a scale never before seen.

"The world is bound to take notice of this."

Will Fear Loss of Liberty.

I asked Prof. Giddings to go beyond economics and to consider the war's probable results in their broader sociological aspects.

"If what I have predicted happens," he replied, "the democratic elements of society in all nations will become apprehensive of the loss of liberty.

"They will fear that in the interests of efficiency the perfected social order will impose minute and unwelcome regulations upon individual life and effort, and that a degree of coercive control will be established which will end by making individuals mere cogs in the machine, diminishing their importance, curtailing their usefulness and initiative far more than is done by the great industrial corporations against which the working classes already are protesting so loudly.

"And not only the working people but a large proportion of all other classes will develop these fears, especially in those nations which, during the last century, have built up popular sovereignty and democratic freedom, as the terms are understood in England and America.

"We shall hear the argument that the loss of individual initiative and personal self-reliance is too great a price to pay even for supreme efficiency and the

maximum production of material comforts.

"The problem which such a conflict of interests and opinions will present may be speculatively defined as that of trying to find a way to reconcile a maximum of efficiency organization with a maximum of individual freedom.

"So stating it, we have to recognize that this has been the biggest problem, in fact the comprehensive problem, that man has faced throughout human history, and the one which, really, he has been trying to solve by the trial and error method in all his social experiments.

"It is the sociological as distinguished from the merely economic problem.

"Human society exists because early in his career man discovered that mutual aid, or team work, is, on the whole, in the struggle for existence and the pursuit of happiness, a more effective factor than physical strength or individual cleverness.

"Natural selection has acted not only upon individuals, but, in the large sense, upon groups and aggregates of groups. The restrictions upon individual life have developed in the interests of groups, or collective efficiency.

"On the other hand, collective efficiency has no meaning, it serves no purpose apart from the amelioration of individual life and the development of individual personality.

"So long as groups fear one another and fight with one another the restrictions upon individual liberty must be extreme in the interests of the collective fighting efficiency of each group as a whole.

"All the possibilities of personal development, of individual freedom, are involved in the larger possibilities of friendly relations between nation and nation.

"Already the co-operative instinct has so grown that if war and the fear of war could be eliminated, mankind would have relatively little difficulty in working out ways and means of combining Governmental action with individual initiative for purposes of economic production, edu-

cation, the promotion of the public health, and the administration of justice.

"All those principles and rules which we call Morality are, in fact, mere rules of the game of life. We play the game or do not play it; we are fair or unfair.

"On the whole, most of us try to be fair because it has been found that playing the game with a sense of fairness is the only way in which we can succeed in working together for common ends without the necessity of imposing upon ourselves coercive rules to hold our organization together for possible mass attack upon the end in view.

"Social life, in this sense of playing the game fairly, has made man the superior of the brutes he sprang from. There is nothing mysterious or recondite about it.

"In order to work together men must understand one another. Therefore, natural selection has picked out the intelligent for survival in the social world; and in order to work together intelligent men must depend on one another, abiding by their covenants.

"Therefore, again, natural selection has picked out what we call Morality for survival in the social world. The whole further progress of mankind would seem to hang upon the possibility that we can find a way to limit and, if possible, to terminate wars between nations, for only in that contingency can we hope to develop a social system in which a supreme efficiency with a maximum of individual liberty can be combined upon a working basis.

Application of the Facts.

"These are incontrovertible facts, and they find their application to the existing European situation in various ways, the most important of which will appear in the discovery that, valuable as conventions and covenants of nation with nation may be, and intolerable as any violation of them surely is, we cannot hope for general and unflinching observance of them until the feeling of mankind and the whole attitude of the world in respect to international as well as private conduct shall be that the cov-

enants and conventions shall become, in a degree, unnecessary.

"Already it is apparent that the entire world, including the peoples of the nations at war as well as the peoples of the nations remaining happily at peace, have begun to think these thoughts and reflect upon their momentous importance.

"Shocked and stunned as never before by a calamity for which we find no measure in part human experience, mankind is bound to take at this moment a more sober view, a broader and more rational view, of the problems of responsibility and collective conduct than it hitherto has been able even to attempt.

"The world is sure to ask what things make for sobriety of judgment and integrity of purpose. It is sure in future more carefully to weigh relative values, and will be disposed to count as unimportant many things for which hitherto the armed men of nations have rushed into war.

"In a word, this war has made the whole world think as no one thing ever has made it think before, and, after all, it is upon the habit of thought that we must depend for all rational progress.

"Other wars and other great events have fostered sentiment, much of which has been hopeful and useful; they have accomplished far-reaching economic changes, many of them necessary.

"But the reactions of this war will surely go beyond all previous experience. They already are and must be, in a far greater measure, profoundly intellectual, and one of the consequences of this fact inevitably will be the broadening and deepening of the democratic current.

"When peace returns it will be seen that democracy has received a hitherto unimagined impetus. Then it will be understood that democracy, in one of its most important aspects, is popular thinking, that it is the widest possible extension of the sense of responsibility.

"A democratic world will be, all in all, a peace-loving world.

"We may confidently expect far-reaching changes in the internal political or-

ganization of the nations now involved. In every nation of Europe the people are asking: What, after all, is this conflict all about?

"They will ask this many times, and however they may answer it they will, by consequence, follow the question with another: Shall we go on fighting wars about the necessity, expedience, and righteousness of which we have not been consulted?

"And to this query they will find only one answer—an emphatic negative.

"Sooner or later there will be a comprehensive political reorganization of Europe, and when its day comes the rearrangement will be along the lines of a republic rather than along the lines of any monarchy, however liberal.

"Then international agreements will be unnecessary and there will be no treaties to be broken—no 'scraps of paper' to be disregarded.

"Apparently Germany has been as successful in training her people to think accurately along economic lines as she has been in training them to work efficiently along such lines; and that accurate thought undoubtedly is bearing startling fruit among the men today crouched in the trenches on the firing lines.

Era of Individual Thought.

"England, on the other hand, and France have encouraged the free and spontaneous life of democratic peoples. France and England, like the United States, have been training their peoples to think efficiently of and to appreciate and use liberty and initiative. And the

men of these two nations are, in turn, exercising that ability as they crouch in their trenches.

"In other words, this war has precipitated an era of sober individual thought about the individual's rights and responsibilities. It will everywhere bring about a wider political organization of mankind, a greater freedom of trade and opportunity, a more serious and thorough education, a more earnest attention and devotion to the higher interests of life, giving such thought preference above that overemphasis of material comforts which has been so marked a feature of recent human history.

"All these things will make for peace; and another potent influence will be the exhaustion of the weakened nations which will follow the conflict. Because of that very weakness Europe will turn its unanimous attention to the things of peace rather than to the things of war.

"The new Europe is being fashioned by those questioning men who now are lying in the trenches.

"They are searching in the universe for answers to such inquiries as they never dreamed about before, and the women, worrying at home—they, too, are busy with a search for answers to hitherto undreamed-of questions.

"They are all pondering great things for the first time. Their pondering will be fruitful.

"Today all Europe fights, but, also, today all Europe thinks. And, thinking, perhaps it may devise a better order, so that it may not ever fight again."



"To Americans Leaving Germany"

A Farewell Word by the Representatives of German Industries at Berlin

AMERICANS!

Citizens of the United States!

IN this earnest moment in which you are leaving the soil of Germany and Berlin, take with you from German citizens, from representatives of trade and industry, who are proud to entertain friendly commercial relations with the United States, a hearty farewell coupled with the desire of a speedy return.

Together with this farewell we beg you to do us a favor. As our guests, whom we have always honored and protected, we ask you to take this paper with you as a memorial and to circulate the same among your authorities, press, friends, and acquaintances.

For we are well aware that the enemies of Germany are at work to make you the instruments to lower Germany's people and army in the face of the whole world in order to deceive foreign nations as to Germany's policy and economical power. We ask you, as free citizens face to face with free citizens, to circulate the real truth about Germany among your people as compared to the lies of our enemies.

We beg you to take the following main points to heart:

1. The German Emperor and the German Nation wanted peace. The cunning and breach of faith of our opponents have forced the sword into the hands of Germany.

2. After war has been forced on us the German Nation, Emperor, and Reichstag have granted everything in the most brilliant unanimity for the war. No difference prevails in Germany any longer, no difference between party, confession, rank or position, but we are a united nation and army.

3. Our military organization and our mobilization have proceeded with splendid precision. The mobilization was accomplished during the course of a few days.

In addition to those who are compelled to serve, more than 1,200,000 volunteers have offered their services. All civil organizations, from the head of industry and finance to the smallest man downward, vie with each other in works of voluntary aid and welfare.

4. In the field German arms have had splendid successes in the first days of mobilization.

In the east the Russian enemy has been driven from the German frontier, in numerous small fights by our troops in conjunction with those of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. By successful coup de mains our navy has been successful in damaging and alarming our Russian opponent in her Baltic naval ports. The Russian port of Libau has been burned down and in Russian Poland revolution has already begun. Russian mobilization is a long way from being accomplished, the troops are badly, poorly nourished, and many deserters sell their weapons and horses.

In the west the German Army has gained imposing victories over Belgium and France.

In Belgium, where the population unfortunately committed the most barbarous atrocities against peaceful Germans before the war broke out, comparatively weak German forces conquered the strong fortress of Liège a few days after the mobilization, inflicting severe damage on the enemy and opening up the way via Belgium to France.

Valuable victories have been obtained over France on the Alsatian frontier toward the strong French fortress of Belfort as well as in the direction of the fortress Lunéville. At Mülhausen one and a half French Army divisions were overthrown and driven back over the frontier with heavy losses.

The strong and effective German fleet is on the watch against the English fleet.

England's risk is great in staking her reputation as the strongest naval power on one throw against the German fleet. Further, England runs the danger that her large colonies, such as India and Egypt, will seize a moment that has been long desired to revolt.

It is for the United States to utilize the present moment to frustrate by powerful initiative England's endeavors to keep down all nations, including America, in the trade and traffic of the world.

Citizens of the United States! Take the conviction with you to your homes that Germany will stake her last man and her last penny for victory. Germany must conquer and will conquer.

Remember! That after a successful victory Germany will make new political and economical progress, and that America, as a shrewd businesslike State and

as a friend of Germany, will participate in such progress.

Today we beg you earnestly to convey to your fellow-citizens that the German Nation, as the safe refuge of civilization and culture, has always protected the loyal citizens of its enemies in every manner in contrast to Russia, France, and Belgium. By circulating this short memorial among your fellow-citizens you are likewise insuring that also in the future the United States will learn the truth about Germany's battles and victories. Your friends here will always do the best in their power to supply you with genuine news. We wish you a happy voyage toward your home, so appreciated by all Germans, and hope to see you again in a victorious and prosperous Germany.

REPRESENTATIVES OF GERMAN
INDUSTRY.

Berlin, Aug. 13, 1914.

German Assault on England

By Rudolf Eucken and Ernst Haeckel

Dr. Eucken, Privy Councilor and Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena; winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1908.

Ernst Haeckel, Privy Councilor and late Professor of Zoology at the University of Jena; called the German Darwin.

THE whole German world of letters is today filled with deep indignation and strong moral resentment at the present behavior of England. Both of us, for many years bound to England by numerous scientific and personal ties, believe ourselves prepared to give open expression to this inward revulsion. In close co-operation with like-minded English investigators we have zealously exerted ourselves to bring the two great peoples closer together in spirit and to promote a mutual understanding. A fruitful reciprocal interchange of English and German culture seemed to us worth while, indeed necessary, for the spiritual advance of

mankind, which today confronts such great problems. Gratefully we recall in this connection the friendly reception which our efforts received in England. So great and noble were the traits of English character which revealed themselves to us that we were permitted to hope that in their sure growth they would come to be superior to the pitfalls and seamy sides of this character. And now they have proved inferior, inferior to the old evil of a brutal national egotism which recognizes no rights on the part of others, which, unconcerned about morality or unmorality, pursues only its own advantage.

History furnishes in abundance exam-

ples of such an unscrupulous egotism; we need recall here only the destruction of the Danish fleet (1807) and the theft of the Dutch colonies in the Napoleonic wars. But what is taking place today is the worst of all; it will be forever pointed at in the annals of world history as England's indelible shame. England fights in behalf of a Slavic, half-Asiatic power against Germanism; she fights on the side not only of barbarism but also of moral injustice, for it is indeed not forgotten that Russia began the war because she would permit no radical reparation for a shameful murder.

It is England whose fault has extended the present war into a world war, and has thereby endangered our joint culture. And all this for what reason? Because she was jealous of Germany's greatness, because she wanted to hinder at any price a further growth of this greatness. For there cannot be the least doubt on this point that England was determined in advance to cast as many obstacles as possible in the way of Germany's great struggle for national existence, and to hinder her as much as possible in the full development of her powers. She (England) was watching only for a favorable opportunity when she could break out suddenly against Germany, and she therefore promptly seized on the necessary German invasion

of Belgium in order that she might cover with a small cloak of decency her brutal national egotism. Or is there in the whole wide world any one so simple as to believe that England would have declared war on France also if the latter had invaded Belgium? In that event she would have wept hypocritical tears over the unavoidable violation of international law; but as for the rest she would have laughed in her sleeve with great satisfaction. This hypocritical Pharisaism is the most repugnant feature of the whole matter; it deserves nothing but contempt.

The history of the world shows that such sentiments lead the nations not upward but downward. For the present, however, we trust firmly in our just cause, in the superior strength and the unyielding victorious spirit of the German people. Yet we must at the same time lament deeply that the boundless egotism we have referred to has disturbed for an immeasurable period of time the spiritual co-operation of the two peoples which promised so much good for the development of mankind. But they wished it so on their side—on England alone falls the monstrous guilt and the historical responsibility.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

ERNST HAECKEL.

Jena, Aug. 18, 1914.

Eucken-Haeckel Appeal to the Universities of America

To the Universities of America:

IN a time when half of the world falls upon Germany full of hatred and envy, we Germans derive great benefit from the idea of our being sure of the friendly feeling of the American universities. If from any quarter in the world, it must be from them that we expect the right comprehension of the

present situation and present attitude of Germany. Numerous American scholars who received their scientific training at our universities have convinced themselves of the quality and the peaceful tendency of German work, the exchange of scientists has proved of deepening influence on the mutual understanding, the lasting intercourse of scholarly research

gives us the feeling of being members of one great community. This is why we entertain the hope that the scientific circles of America will not give credit to the libels our enemies propagate against us.

These libels, above all, accuse Germany of having brought about the present war, she being responsible for the monstrous struggle which is extending more and more over the whole world. The truth points to the contrary. Our foes have disturbed us in our peaceful work, forcing the war upon us very much against our desire. We are at a righteous war for the preservation of our existence and at the same time of sacred goods of humanity. The murder of *Serajevo* was not our work; it was the outcome of a widely extending conspiracy pointing back to *Servia*, where for many years already a passionate agitation against *Austria* had been carried on, supported by *Russia*. It was *Russia*, therefore, that took the assassins under her wings, and some weeks already before the war broke out she promised her assistance to that blood-stained State. Nobody but *Russia* has given the dangerous turn to the conflict; nobody but *Russia* is to blame for the outbreak of the war. The German Emperor, who has proved his love of peace by a peaceful reign of more than twenty-five years, in face of the imminent danger, tried to intermeddle between *Austria* and *Russia* with the greatest zeal, but while he was negotiating with the Czar *Russia* was busy with the mobilization of a large army toward the German frontier. This necessitated an open and decisive inquiry that led to the war. This only happened because *Russia* wanted it so, because she wanted to raise the *Muscovites* against the Germans and the Western Slavs and to lead *Asia* into the field against Europe.

France, too, might have kept the peace, the decision resting solely with her. The security of Germany demanded that she should inquire what *France* would do in the impending war; the answer of *France* unmistakably betrayed her intention to join in the war. As a matter of fact, it

was not Germany but *France* who commenced the war.

England already before the war stood in close relations to *France*. From the very beginning she has clearly shown that she by no means wanted to keep absolutely neutral. From the very beginning she made endeavors to protect *France* against Germany. Undoubtedly the German invasion in *Belgium* served *England* as a welcome pretext to openly declare her hostility. In reality, before the German invasion, already the neutrality of *Belgium* had been given up in favor of the French. It has been officially stated, e. g., that not only before but also after the outbreak of the war French officers have been at *Liège* in order to instruct the Belgian soldiers as to the fortification service. *England's* complaints of the violation of international law, however, are the most atrocious hypocrisy and the vilest Pharisaism. At all times English politics have unscrupulously disregarded all forms of law as soon as their own interest was touched. During the last few weeks the same method has been quite sufficiently manifested in the unlawful capture of the Turkish warships, and still more so in the instigation of the Japanese to undertake the detestable raid upon the German territory in *China*, which needs must end in strengthening the power of that Mongolian nation at the costs of Europeans and Americans.

How is it possible for a nation that in such a way has betrayed precious interests of Western culture as soon as it seems to benefit them, how is it possible for these accomplices of the Japanese robbery to put on the air of being the guardians of morality?

We Germans did not want this war, but as it has been forced upon us we shall carry it on bravely and vigorously. In the face of all envy and hatred, all brutality and hypocrisy, Germany feels unshakably conscious of serving a righteous cause and of standing up for the preservation of her national self as well as for sacred goods of humanity; indeed, for the very progress of true culture. It is from this conviction that

she draws her unrelenting force and the absolute certainty that she will beat back the assault of all her enemies. This conviction does not stand in need of any encouragement from abroad; our country absolutely relies upon itself and confides in the strength of its right.

Nevertheless, the idea of our American friends' thoughts and sympathies being with us gives us a strong feeling of comfort in this gigantic struggle. We

both of us feel especially justified in pronouncing this as being the conviction of all German scientists, as so many scientific and personal relations connect us both with the universities of America. These universities know what German culture means to the world, so we trust they will stand by Germany.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

ERNST HAECKEL.

Jena, Aug. 31, 1914.

Reply to Eucken and Haeckel

By John Warbeke

Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at Mount Holyoke College.

THE approval of President Wilson for neutrality of language can hardly be construed into complacency in the face of monstrous evil. If a judicial attitude of mind be not jeopardized a discussion of the issues raised by Profs. Eucken and Haeckel ought to help us in the attainment of impartial judgment. A long acquaintance with both these men makes it hard for the present writer to give expression to such negative criticism as he is constrained to do. But his plea can be only this: Not truth but only passion can separate, and truth is greater even than friendship.

The charge of "brutal national egoism" is laid at England's door. She is declared to be the instigator of the present world war. "Upon her alone falls the monstrous guilt and the judgment of history." Such language from two benevolent philosophers, one of them a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for Idealistic Literature, seems to suggest a lack of information among the German people, including its most enlightened exponents, of not only their own published "White Paper" dispatches, but also of the events of the last two months. It seems hardly possible that in the case of these two gentlemen a deliberate campaign of vi-

tuperation could have been inaugurated with determination to blind themselves to facts clearly stated in the reports of both contending parties—

First—That Serbia, in reply to ten urgent demands on the part of Austria, acquiesced in nine and proposed to submit the tenth, as concerning her national integrity, to The Hague Tribunal. Austria, nevertheless, declared war, with Germany's self-confessed assurances of support.

Secondly—Germany was the second to declare war, the mobilization of Russia being assigned as the reason for this step. The objection of Germany's initial campaign, as shown by events, was not defense against the confessedly slowly mobilizing Russians, however, but the humiliation and subjugation of France. And the means employed to that end included the treaty-breaking invasion, and more than invasion, of Belgium, who is suffering because of this step "so necessary for Germany."

Thirdly—England, as is repeatedly demonstrated by the official documents of both sides, strained every means to bring about a common understanding. The appeals of Sir Edward Grey for more time in the Servian ultimatum and for a council of Ambassadors were

met by the Austrian and German Governments respectively with evasion. And England was the last of the great powers to enter the conflict, her plea being the moral obligation of supporting treaties in which she guaranteed the integrity of a weak neighbor and undertook to defend her ally, France, when attacked.

The Case of England.

We may justifiably ask, then, What basis is there for the charge that England's "brutal, national egoism" provoked the world war? The answer is a twofold one. Historically, England has exhibited aggression in the extension of her interests; morally, England supports the Russian aggressor, who declined "to allow Austria the thoroughgoing punishment of an ignominious murder," cloaking her real intentions behind the mantle of a "contemptible sanctimoniousness" and "hypocrisy" concerning treaty obligations.

The first charge against England is unfortunately true. History records instances of British aggression in the extension of her interests and the cases cited (destruction of the Danish fleet and the taking of Dutch colonies) are good examples. The implication, however, involved in the statement is that such aggression is not to be found in the history of Prussia. This is clearly an error.

From the time of the Markgrafen even unto the Agadir incident it has been characteristic of Prussia to extend her boundaries and interests under the plea of military necessity. Aggression is the only word to characterize Frederick's seizure of Silesia and part of Poland. South and East Prussia were added by the same forcible means (1793-1795). In the Napoleonic wars Swedish Pomerania fell as the booty of military necessity. Schleswig-Holstein was filched from Denmark (1866) by the same "extension of her greatness." Once more it was the plea in Alsace-Lorraine—"so necessary for Germany."

Nor are we here urging immunity of criticism for ourselves. It is sadly true that the history of many nominally Christian States, including that of the United States, and not excluding the

Papacy, includes chapters of aggression. But the point involved, namely, the charge of England's aggression in the present instance, is clearly an *a priori* one, based on a presupposition of monopoly which lacks material support. No evidence is presented to justify the statement, nor do the facts seem to allow of any such construction.

The second argument, England's support of Russia's unwillingness to permit the expiation of an ignominious murder, is a strange and unfortunate commentary on how even in philosophic minds a preconceived idea will distort the most unmistakable evidence. For Serbia in her reply to the Austrian demands agreed to have just punishment inflicted upon the murderers, even going so far as to cause the arrest of those perhaps unjustly suspected by the Austrian committee and to suggest an international court. How, then, did Russia stand in the way of the punishment? Austria declared war, with the self-confessed assurances of German support, all too obviously for reasons other than the ones mentioned in the ultimatum to which Serbia acquiesced. The charge of Russian mobilization in view of such a situation suggests the temper of the man who, when caught in his own bear trap, tries to find his neighbor at fault. Suppose Germany had remained on the defensive, would war have been likely? Suppose Germany had not backed up the entirely unjustifiable military movement of Austria, would the general war have been probable?

Where Nietzsche Comes In.

It seems more likely when one passes in review the extant data that at least one and a crucial cause for the present situation is the "overwhelming power and unbending will to victory in the German people" when confronted with an opportunity for the "further expansion of their greatness." That such phrases should be in the mouths of our apologists for the war is significant. And that the invasion of Belgium "so necessary for the Germans" is treated by the spokesmen of morality solely and confessedly from the standpoint of military expediency seems to indicate the permeation

of the Nietzsche superman into the very stronghold of idealistic philosophy.

It would, of course, be as absurd to suppose Nietzsche a direct cause of this war as it would be to regard the Serravallo murderers as the sole cause. Nietzsche was and is an exponent of his time, as well as one reciprocally fostering such movements as Bernhardi militarism and the Crown Prince's war book. Perhaps it will not be inappropriate here to cite from "War and the People of War," in "Also Sprach Zarathustra," (Pages 67-68,) the magnum opus of Nietzsche:

You should love peace as a means to new war and brief peace more than a long one. Do you say, "It is a good cause by which a war is hallowed"? I say unto you, it is a good war which hallows every cause. War and courage have done greater things than the love of one's neighbor. "What, then, is good?" you ask. To be brave is good. Let young maidens say, "Good is to be pretty and touching." But you are hateful? Well, so be it, my brethren! Cast about you a mantle of the sublimely hateful. And when your soul has become great it will become wanton; in your greatness there will be malice, I know, and in malice the proud heart will meet the weakening.

This, we are told, is not to be taken literally—all is symbolism and has a meaning other than the more direct one. But the fact remains, as can be testified by the present writer from three years' residence as a university student in Germany, that the rank and file as well as the artistocracy—from laborers and small shopkeepers, petty officials, and students to Judges of the Supreme Court and university professors who have become "secret councilors" (Geheimrat)—not only in Berlin and Bonn but in Munich and Heidelberg, all have become ominously full of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest and the consequent expediency of power, not only in intellectual rivalry but in Krupps and high explosives.

The Nietzsche fire may, perhaps, serve a purpose on the hearthstone of our inmost life if it be to rescue us from complacency and secure inanity, but in the form of electrically connected lyddite stores and gasoline bombs it drives those

who believe in a supnation to a literal interpretation of the above widely popular philosophy. And, as demonstrated at Louvain and Rheims, it goes far to obliterate the memorials of a past which Nietzsche thought so contemptible a check upon the prowess of the "blonde Bestie" as he progressed toward—toward the superman.

It was wide of the mark, therefore, to attribute that which bears the stamp "made in Germany" to England. Bernhardi and the Crown Prince with their thousands of officers and the multitudes in the ranks to whom Nietzsche has become an inspiring motive are not to be construed as English surely. Nor does the English "culture," so far as the present writer is informed, contain a superman, unless it be Bernard Shaw! English people have to import "beyond good and evil" philosophy, and as historians of thought Profs. Eucken and Haeckel must know that it has never had a foothold there. Had it been "brutal national egoism, knowing no rights of others," which motivated Britain, she would not now have gone to war—in order that she might profit finally by the inevitable exhaustion of the Continent. And having taken the clear stand she has, what but good-will and the consciousness of a just cause brought support and sacrifice from the hands and lives of her grateful peoples all over the earth? Would brutality have done it? The same question might be asked concerning France's empire from which she derives chiefly the consciousness of an extending civilization.

The Claims of German Culture.

A word more should be added concerning the condescending tone generally of the exponents of German culture and more specifically that of the distinguished writers of the circular letter. They had up to the present continued to hope for growth in English literary and scientific development. Before this dismal egoism got the upper hand the English people really and truly possessed some noble traits and so forth. As for Russian culture, supposedly including its science and literature, music, architecture

and the rest, it is all effaced by a single "barbarism"! The implication of such an attitude and such words is that the Kremlin or Rheims, Shakespeare and Rembrandt, Michelangelo, Darwin, Spinoza and the treasures of Louvain might be easily paralleled or surpassed by German cathedrals, German sculpture, German paintings, German literature, and so forth. It is not our present purpose to dispute the claim, but only to remind the Teutons that in France and Belgium they have declared war, not indeed upon supermen, but upon many gentlemen and some worthy fruits of their spirits, and that they have destroyed much which formerly enriched the life of the world.

It is the claim of some objective German writers that a modicum of modesty would prove the most substantial contribution to Teutonic civilization. Defeat of German arms might, therefore, prove a blessing to the self-lauded culture as well as call a halt to the brutal science of Krupps. As instances of authors mentioned above, a passage from the lamented Friedrich Paulsen's "System der Ethic" (Page 582) may, justly, be cited: "Insolence still continues to impress the average German. The spirit of English scientific intercourse forms a highly pleasing contrast to the German habit. Take such writers as Mill and Darwin; they speak to the reader as though he did them a favor by listening to them, and whenever they enter upon a contro-

versy, they do it in a manner which expresses respect and a desire for mutual understanding. The German scholar believes that it will detract from the respect due him if he does not assume a tone of condescension or overbearing censure. Examine the first scientific journal you may happen to pick up; even the smallest anonymous announcement breathes the air of infinite superiority."

A second passage is quoted from the great work of Wilhelm Scherer, "Geschichte der Deutschen Litteratur" (Pages 20-21: "Recklessness seems to be the curse of our spiritual development * * * obstinacy in good and in evil. Beauty we have not often served, nor long at a time." These are, of course, not the judgments of the present writer.

Conviction does not flow from the argument concerning England's brutal egoism and reckless immorality under the cloak of sanctimoniousness, nor is there strength in the appeal for Teuton culture. All has the tone of special pleading and makes doubly significant a sentence from Nietzsche when he pleads for an overcoming of our ideals of veracity: "'I have done this thing,' says my memory; 'I could not have done this thing,' says my pride and remains inexorable. Finally memory yields." ("Beyond Good and Evil," Page 94.)

Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley,
Sept. 23, 1914.



Concerning German Culture

By Brander Matthews

Professor of Dramatic Literature at Columbia University

IN the earnest and sincere appeals of various distinguished Germans, Prof. Eucken, Prof. Haeckel, and the several authors of "The Truth About Germany," we find frequent references to "German culture" as though it was of a superior quality to the culture of every other nationality; and we seem to perceive also a sustaining belief that Germany is not only the defender of civilization, but its foremost exponent. We have no right to question the good faith of scholars of the high character of Eucken and Haeckel; and we cannot doubt their being honestly possessed of the conviction that Germany is the supreme example of a highly civilized State and the undisputed leader in the arts and sciences which represent culture. It is plain that these German writers take this for granted and that they would be indignantly surprised if it should be questioned.

To an American who feels himself a sharer of the noble heritage of English literature, and who has sat for more than forty years at the feet of the masters of French literature, this claim cannot but come as a startling surprise.

The most obvious characteristic of a highly civilized man is his willingness to keep his word, at whatever cost to himself. For reasons satisfactory to itself, Germany broke its pledge to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg and of Belgium. It is another characteristic of civilization to cherish the works of art which have been bequeathed to us by the past. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany destroyed Louvain, more or less completely. It is a final characteristic of civilized man to be humane and to refrain from ill-treating the blameless. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany dropped bombs in the unbesieged City of Antwerp and caused the death of inno-

cent women and children. Here are three instances where German culture has been tested and found wanting.

The Standard Bearer of Culture.

But it may be urged that war has its own exigencies and that these three instances of uncivilized conduct partook of the nature of military necessities. Turning from the outrages of war to the triumphs of peace, let us make a disinterested attempt to find out just what foundation there may be for the implicit assertion that Germany is the standard bearer of civilization.

Perhaps it is too petty to point out that manners are the outward and visible sign of civilization, and that in this respect the Germans have not yet attained to the standard set by the French and the English. But it is not insignificant to record that the Germans alone retain a barbaric mediaeval alphabet, while the rest of Western Europe has adopted the more legible and more graceful Roman letter; and it is not unimportant to note that German press style is cumbrous and uncouth. Taken collectively, these things seem to show German culture is a little lacking in the social instinct, the desire to make things easy and pleasant for others. It is this social instinct which is the dominating influence in French civilization and which has given to French civilization its incomparable urbanity and amenity. It is to the absence of this social instinct, to the inability to understand the attitude of other parties to a discussion, to the unwillingness to appreciate their point of view, that we may ascribe the failure of German diplomacy, a failure which has left her almost without a friend in her hour of need. And success in diplomacy is one of the supreme tests of civilization.

The claim asserted explicitly or implicitly in behalf of German culture seems to be based on the belief that the Germans are leaders in the arts and in the sciences. So far as the art of war is concerned there is no need today to dispute the German claim. It is to the preparation for war that Prussia has devoted its utmost energy for half a century—in fact, ever since Bismarck began to make ready for the seizing of unwilling Schleswig-Holstein. And so far as the art of music is concerned there is also no need to cavil.

But what about the other and more purely intellectual arts? How many are the contemporary painters and sculptors and architects of Germany who have succeeded in winning the cosmopolitan reputation which has been the reward of a score of the artists of France and of half a dozen of the artists of America?

Since Goethe, Who?

When we consider the art of letters we find a similar condition. Germany has had philosophers and historians of high rank; but in pure literature, in what used to be called "*belles-lettres*," from the death of Goethe in 1832 to the advent of the younger generation of dramatists, Sudermann and Hauptmann and the rest, in the final decade of the nineteenth century—that is to say, for a period of nearly sixty years—only one German author succeeded in winning a worldwide celebrity—and Heine was a Hebrew, who died in Paris, out of favor with his countrymen, perhaps because he had been unceasing in calling attention to the deficiencies of German culture. There were in Germany many writers who appealed strongly to their fellow-countrymen, but except only the solitary Heine no German writer attained to the international fame achieved by Cooper and by Poe, by Walt Whitman and by Mark Twain. And it was during these threescore years of literary aridity in Germany that there was a superb literary fecundity in Great Britain and in France, and that each of these countries produced at least a score of authors whose names are known throughout the world. Even sparsely

settled Scandinavia brought forth a triumvirate, Björnson, Ibsen, and Brandies, without compeers in Germany. And from Russia the fame of Turgenev and of Tolstoy spread abroad a knowledge of the heart and mind of a great people who are denounced by Germans as barbarous.

It is probably in the field of science, pure and applied, that the defenders of the supremacy of German culture would take their last stand. That the German contribution to science has been important is indisputable; yet it is equally indisputable that the two dominating scientific leaders of the second half of the nineteenth century are Darwin and Pasteur. It is in chemistry that the Germans have been pioneers; yet the greatest of modern chemists is Mendeleef. It was Hertz who made the discovery which is the foundation of Marconi's invention; but although not a few valuable discoveries are to be credited to the Germans, perhaps almost as many as to either the French or the British, the German contribution in the field of invention, in the practical application of scientific discovery, has been less than that of France, less than that of Great Britain, and less than that of the United States. The Germans contributed little or nothing to the development of the railroad, the steamboat, the automobile, the aeroplane, the telegraph, the telephone, the phonograph, the photograph, the moving picture, the electric light, the sewing machine, and the reaper and binder. Even those dread instruments of war, the revolver and the machine gun, the turreted ship, the torpedo, and the submarine, are not due to the military ardor of the Germans. It would seem as though the Germans had been lacking in the inventiveness which is so marked a feature of our modern civilization.

In this inquiry there has been no desire to deny the value of the German contributions to the arts and to the sciences. These contributions are known to all; they speak for themselves; they redound to the honor of German culture; and for them, whatever may be their number,

the other nations of the world are eternally indebted to Germany. But these German contributions are neither important enough nor numerous enough to justify the assumption that German culture is superior or that Germany is entitled to think herself the supreme leader of the arts and of the sciences. No one nation can claim this lofty position, although few would be so bold as to deny the superior achievement of the French in the fine arts and of the English in pure science.

Nations are never accepted by other nations at their own valuation; and the Germans need not be surprised that we are now astonished to find them asserting their natural self-appreciation, with the apparent expectation that it will pass unchallenged.

The world owes a debt to modern Germany beyond all question, but this is far less than the debt owed to England and to France. It would be interesting if some German, speaking with authority, should now be moved to explain to us Americans the reasons which underlie the insistent assertion of the superiority of German civilization. Within the past few weeks we have been forced to gaze at certain of the less pleasant aspects of the German character; and we have been made to see that the militarism of the Germans is in absolute contradiction to the preaching and to the practice of the great Goethe, to whom they proudly point as the ultimate representative of German culture.

Columbia University in the City of New York, Sept. 18, 1914.

Culture vs. Kultur

By Frank Jewett Mather, Jr.

Of the Faculty of Princeton University

CURRENT discussion of the worth of German culture has been almost hopelessly clouded by the fact that when a German speaks of Kultur he means an entirely different thing from what a Latin or Briton means by culture. Kultur means the organized efficiency of a nation in the broadest sense—its successful achievement in civil and military administration, industry, commerce, finance, and in a quite secondary way in scholarship, letters, and art. Kultur applies to a nation as a whole, implying an enlightened Government to which the individual is strictly subordinated. Thus Kultur is an attribute not of individuals—whose particular interests, on the contrary, must often be sacrificed to it—but of nations.

Culture, for which nearest German equivalent is *Bildung*, is the opposite of all this. It is an attribute not of nations as a whole but of accomplished individuals. It acquires national import only through the approval and admiration of

these individuals by the rest, who share but slightly in the culture they applaud. The aim of culture is the enlightened and humane individual, conversant with the best values of the past and sensitive to the best values of the present. The open-mindedness and imagination implied in culture are potentially destructive to a highly organized national Kultur. A cultured leader is generally too much alive to the point of view of his rival to be a wholly convinced partisan. Hence he lacks the intensity, drive, and narrowness that make for competitive success. He keeps his place in the sun not by masterfully overriding others, but by a series of delicate compromises which reconcile the apparently conflicting claims. Moreover, he has too great a respect for the differences between men's gifts to formulate any rigid plan which requires for its execution a strictly regimented humanity. He will sacrifice a little efficiency that life may be more various, rich, and delightful.

Hence nations with cultured leaders have generally been beaten by those whose leaders had merely Kultur. The Spartans and Macedonians had abundant Kultur; they generally beat the Athenians, who had merely very high culture. The Romans had Kultur, and the Hellenistic world wore their yoke. Germany unquestionably has admirable Kultur, and none of the mere cultured nations who are leagued against her could hope to beat her singly.

She Does Not Desire Culture.

On the other hand, Germany has singularly little culture, has less than she had a hundred years ago, does not apparently desire it. She has willingly sacrificed the culture of a few leading individuals to the Kultur of the empire as a whole. Thus it is not surprising that Germany, as measured by the production of cultured individuals, takes a very low place today. Not only France and England, Italy and Spain, but also Russia and America, may fairly claim a higher degree of culture. Here the fetich of German scholarship should not deceive us. Culture—a balanced and humanized state of mind—is only remotely connected with scholarship or even with education. A Spanish peasant or an Italian waiter may have finer culture than a German university professor. And in the field of scholarship, Germany is in the main chiefly laborious, accurate, and small-minded. Her scholarship is related not to culture, but is a minor expression of Kultur. Such scholarly men of letters as Darwin, Huxley, Renan, Taine, Boissier, Gaston Paris, Menendez y Pelayo, Francis J. Child, Germany used to produce in the days of the Grimms and Schlegels. She rarely does so now. Her culture has been swallowed up in her Kultur.

The claim of Germany to realize her Kultur at the expense of her neighbors is at first sight plausible. Her Kultur is unquestionably higher than theirs. She has a sharply realized idea of the State, and she has justified it largely in practice. In a certain patience, thoroughness, and perfection of political

organization her pre-eminence is unquestionable. The tone of her apologists shows amazement and indignation over the fact that the world, so far from welcoming the extension of German Kultur, is actively hostile to that ambition. Yet, even if it be conceded that Germany's Kultur is wholly good for herself—surely a debatable proposition—it does not follow that it is or would be a universal benefit. Nations may deliberately and legitimately prefer their culture, with its admitted disadvantages, to the Kultur which pleases Germany. England is often mocked for the way in which she "muddles through" successive perils, yet she may feel that the stereotyping of her people in a rigid administrative frame might be too high a price to pay for constant preparedness. As for us Americans, we have made a virtue, perhaps overdone it, of avoiding a mechanical Kultur. We prefer the greatest freedom for the individual to the perfectly regimented state. We will move toward culture and cheerfully assume the necessary risks of the process.

Unlovely and Impressive.

In a broader view, the war may be regarded as a contest between the metallic, half-mechanical Kultur of Prussianized Germany and the more flexible civilizations of States that have inherited culture or aspire to it. Germany herself has rejected the humane and somewhat hazardous ideal of culture, so she cannot wonder or complain when she sees that the culture of the world is almost unanimously hostile to her. There is no quarrel with German Kultur itself; merely a feeling that it has its drawbacks, that it is, on the whole, as unlovely as it is impressive, that there is quite enough of it in the world already, and that its broad extension would be disastrous.

Meanwhile the nations of culture have much to learn from Germany's Kultur. Flexibility may mean weakness. The United States, for example, could well have a standing army and an army reserve commensurate with its history and prospects without incurring any danger of militarism. There is, finally, some disadvantage in being merely a

culture nation, for such a nation can add a large measure of Kultur without belying itself. On the contrary, so highly developed a Kultur nation as the German Empire puts itself in a position where it is almost impossible to acquire any considerable degree of culture. Culture is the enemy of such a state—it must remain in the Spartan or Macedonian stage. Rome began to decline as soon as Hellenistic culture got the ascendancy over the old Latin Kultur. Kultur, in short, galvanizes; culture liberates. A survey of modern Germany hardly warrants a desire for her world dominion.

If any reader is still unclear about the distinction between culture and Kultur, let him examine his most-gifted friends as to their sympathies in the present war, choosing, of course, persons who have no racial reasons for taking sides. Almost without exception he will find they fall into two sharply defined classes. The mental characteristics of his pro-German friends will pretty certainly illustrate Kultur quite concretely, while he may read the meaning of culture in his more-gifted friends who favor the Allies.

Princeton, Nov. 6, 1914.

The Trespass in Belgium

By John Grier Hibben

President of Princeton University

SOME time ago I received with many others an appeal "To the Civilized World!" from certain distinguished representatives of German science and art. I at once wrote to Prof. Eucken, whom I know, and who is one of the signers of this document. I wished to draw his attention particularly to the second statement of this appeal, which is as follows:

It is not true that we trespassed in neutral Belgium. It has been proved that France and England had resolved on such a trespass, and it has likewise been proved that Belgium had agreed to their doing so,

and I stated to him that "It is naturally to be expected of a group of scholars that where reference is made to proof, some citation should be given both of the sources of the proof and of its nature. I am sure you will agree with me that it is of the very essence of scholarly method in the treatment of any subject whatsoever that one should cite his authority as regards every important and significant statement that is made. No one of the distinguished group of schol-

ars signing their names to this letter would think of writing an article in his own specialty and not add in the text or in a footnote the complete list of authorities for his several assertions.

"In your appeal, however, the most important statement by far which you make, and the one bearing most intimately upon the honor and integrity of your nation, is left without even the attempt to support it, save the bare assertion by you and your colleagues. In the interests of a fair understanding of Germany's position, I feel that it is incumbent upon you to give us who are under such a deep debt of gratitude to German scholarship in our own lives the opportunity of a full knowledge of all the facts which definitely bear upon this present situation."

At the time of writing Prof. Eucken, I also wrote to a friend of mine, Dr. A. E. Shipley, the Master of Christ's College, Cambridge, England, asking him if he could get for me some authoritative statement from the British Foreign Office concerning the assertion that "it has been proved that France and England

had resolved on such a trespass, and it has likewise been proved that Belgium had agreed to their doing so." I have just received a letter from Mr. Shipley, stating that Lord Haldane had prepared a statement in answer to this question. Thinking that your readers would be interested in seeing this, I am sending it to you.

Princeton, N. J., Nov. 24, 1914.

(Inclosure from Lord Haldane to the Master of Christ's College, Cambridge.)

10 Downing St., Whitehall, S. W., Nov. 14.

Dear Master of Christ's: The inclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to your question. Yours truly,

HALDANE.

(MEMORANDUM.)

It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever military discussions have taken place before this war have been limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium.

The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany.

The Germans have stated that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium and Belgium had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the British Government.

The extract inclosed, which is taken from an official publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement by the Belgian Min-

ister of War, prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to connive, at the breach of the treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger that this treaty might be violated the British Government made an appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been drawn in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be found in our first "White Paper" after the outbreak of the war.

The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin; and it is recorded in the second "White Paper" that we published. The attitude of the British Government throughout has been to endeavor to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded it and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the international treaty.

We have known for some years past that in Holland, in Denmark, and in Norway the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbors. This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs that she herself entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack France through Belgium. A statement is inclosed, which was issued by us on Oct. 14 last, dealing with this point.

This memorandum and its inclosures should provide ample material for a reply to the German statements.

Foreign Office, Nov. 9, 1914.

Belgian Official Denials.

Here is inclosed a copy of the note of Aug. 3 sent by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister at Brussels, included in the Belgian "Gray Paper," and printed in full in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 18 and reprinted in THE TIMES pamphlet of the war's diplo-

matic papers. This is the note expressing the "profound and painful surprise" caused to King Albert's Government by the German invitation to it to abandon Belgian neutrality and denying that France had, as alleged by Germany, manifested any such intention.

A second inclosure gives this clipping from *The London Times* of Sept. 30:

OFFICIAL STATEMENT.

The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality, France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that "before Aug. 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and, again, "it is untrue that on Aug. 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds:

"For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian Army would oppose by force a 'preventive' disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crisis to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter."

The "Agreement" of 1903.

The third inclosure is this British official communiqué:

14 October, 1914.

The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906 published in the German press, and based on documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a fresh edition of a story which has been


reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.

As the Germans well know, Gen. Grierson is dead and Col. (now Gen.) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tau. In 1906 Gen. Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office, and Col. Barnardiston was Military Attaché at Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Col. Barnardiston, have taken place between Gen. Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British Army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbors violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude toward France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agreement of the nature indicated or to any design for the violation of Belgian neutrality is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such violation might come.

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium, which was carried out two months ago.



Apportioning the Blame

A Pro-German View

By Arthur v. Briesen

Of the law firm of Briesen & Knauth; Doctor of Laws, New York University

AS an American citizen I am, of course, under obligations to be neutral and to send no ammunition to either belligerent. At the same time the German blood in my veins naturally causes me to sympathize with Germany in this conflict. But even if we leave out of consideration any matter of sympathy, if we look upon the situation in an entirely unbiased spirit, the conclusion which I propose to lay before you appears to be irresistible.

The questions that seem to have agitated the American public mostly in connection with this awful conflict have been:

First—Who is to blame for bringing about this war, and,

Second—Assuming that Germany was not to blame for beginning the war, is she to blame for violating the neutrality of Belgium?

If we should find the fault regarding the first question to lie primarily with England and secondarily with Russia, we should at once clear the German people and their Government from the charge that has heretofore been brought against them for having incited the war. And if we should find that the neutrality of Belgium was not binding upon any country whose existence or whose interests were threatened by other countries, that fact would then absolve either country from a charge which thus far seems to have been brought against one of them.

How was the war brought about? As far back as 1906 it is known, and can be proved by the files of New York

papers, to say nothing of official correspondence now found in Brussels and elsewhere, that measures were started by England to circumscribe or isolate the German Empire, and treaties were entered between England, France, and Russia (the Triple Entente) to insure joint action against Germany when necessary.

Germany herself has been peaceful, progressive, and anxious to retain her position as a nation undisturbed by others, as a nation that should advance in art, in science, in population, and in all things that make happiness through peace. What was the situation in other countries?

Since 1870 *France* had cried for revenge (*revanche*). Its school books, newspapers, public speakers, and political leaders were all charged with the one great idea of seeking revenge against Germany for having retaken Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, which France had wrongfully occupied since the time of Louis XIV. Alsace and Lorraine had been German for centuries before; they were wrested from Germany without even a semblance of an excuse at the close of the seventeenth century, and were largely German in language and in spirit in 1870. Goethe's studies in Strassburg and his visits to Frederica von Sesenheim in the eighteenth century show that he was living in a German country whenever he was in Alsace. A united Germany did not exist prior to 1870. However, the cry for revenge was there, and France distinctly declared it to be her policy to take her revenge as

soon as opportunity offered. France was, therefore, a pronounced enemy of Germany ever since 1870, and when asked by the German Government on July 31, 1914, whether she would remain neutral in a Russian-German war (Annex 25, German "White Paper") she answered: "France would do that which might be required of her *by her interests*." This answer was given on Aug. 1, 1914, (Annex 27, German "White Paper.") Today we may well ask France whether, since Aug. 1, 1914, she has done that which was required by her interests.

Russia may next be looked at. How did Russia become involved in this contest? The little kingdom of Serbia, which had familiarized itself with the fine art of disposing of crowned heads by throwing its King and Queen, Alexandra and Draga, out of the window of their castle, caused through its officials and its followers to have the heir to the Austrian throne and his wife cruelly assassinated on June 28, 1914. This assassination was an act of enmity toward Austria and a step toward the enlargement of Serbia. Deeming her existence threatened and her national dignity offended, Austria sent a rather sharp demand under date of July 23, 1914, to Serbia, requiring prompt and thorough satisfaction for the gross attack made upon her and her reigning family through Serbia's official directions.

Strange to say, however, the British "White Book" shows that three days before, on July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey (Paper 1, British "White Book") wrote to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, a letter in which he states:

In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. *I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.*

On July 24, 1914, the Austrian message to Serbia became known to all countries, and on the same day Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, wrote that he had been

asked by Mr. Sazonof, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austria's step clearly meant that war was imminent. He wrote that Mr. Sazonof expressed himself as follows (British Paper 6):

He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to *proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France*. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

Later, on July 29, 1914, Sir George Buchanan wrote to Sir Edward Grey (Paper 72, English "White Book") as follows:

I made it clear to his Excellency that, *Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria.*

Sir George Buchanan would not have said that if he had not been authorized to do so. He would not have said a "general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria"; and by "general war" he meant, and we all understand he meant, a war between England, France, and Russia on one side and Germany and Austria on the other.

Servia's reply to the demand of Austria, which was dated July 25, 1914, not being deemed satisfactory, Austria proceeded to a punitive expedition against Serbia, and she repeatedly asserted and assured all the other powers that the expedition was merely punitive and that neither the independence nor the territorial integrity of Servia were at all involved or in any danger.

But all this had no effect upon Russia. In fact, when Russia was first informed of the Austrian demand (Annex 4, German "White Book") Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonof made wild complaints on July 24, 1914, against Austria-Hungary. What he said most definitely was this:

That Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

This was the keynote of the Russian situation and of the Russian intention.

Russia wanted, of course, to expand its realm as far westward as possible, and it wanted to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the necessary consequences of the dreadful insult and cruelty practiced by Serbia on Austria, not only to prevent the punishment of Serbia, but also to proceed against Germany, for, as Paper 4 says: "Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned."

Who, then, was to blame for not allowing the war to be confined, for not permitting Austria to punish the murderers of her King, but utilizing this opportunity for the purpose of bringing about the great war which Russia and France had carefully prepared long ago? The great war which should involve all the civilized nations in a conflict, and threaten to extinguish Austria and to carry barbarism into the heart of Europe! She *did* not permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the parties concerned.

Again, in Paper 56, (English "White Book,") we find the English Ambassador to Austria writing to Sir Edward Grey on July 27, 1914, the following:

If actual war broke out with Serbia it would be *impossible* to localize it, for *Russia* was not prepared to give way again.

Again, in Paper 72, (English "White Book,") dated July 28, 1914, from the English Ambassador in Russia to Sir Edward Grey:

I made it clear to his Excellency (German Ambassador) that, *Russia being thoroughly in earnest*, a general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria.

Paper 121, (English "White Book,") British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey under date of July 31, 1914:

He (the German Secretary of State) again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but *Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything*.

I could repeat, *ad infinitum*, quotations

from these books to show that Russia not only wanted this war if Austria wanted to punish Serbia for her misdeeds, but started it against the protest of Germany, and started it, I sincerely believe, largely because encouraged by Great Britain.

England: The letter written by the Belgian Chargé at St. Petersburg to his Government on July 30, 1914, which letter was published in THE NEW YORK TIMES on Oct. 7, 1914, and which letter, nearly a month before, had been published abroad and never disavowed by the Belgian Government, states distinctly on the part of Belgium:

What is incontestable is that Germany has striven here, as well as at Vienna, to find some means of avoiding a general conflict. * * * M. Sazonof, Russian Foreign Minister, has declared that it would be impossible for Russia not to hold herself ready and to mobilize, but that these preparations were not directed against Germany. This morning an official communiqué to the newspapers announces that "the reserves have been called under arms in a certain number of Governments." Knowing the discreet nature of the official communiqué, one can without fear assert that *mobilization is going on everywhere*.

* * * One can truly ask one's self whether the whole world does not desire war and is trying merely to retard its declaration a little in order to gain time. England began by allowing it to be understood that she did not want to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador) said that openly. Today one is firmly convinced at St. Petersburg—one has even the assurance of it—that England will support France. This support is of enormous weight, and has contributed not a little to give the upper hand to the war party.

The German Emperor during these times believed England to be really and honestly striving to avoid the war; he went so far as to announce in one of his letters published in the "White Book" that "he had shoulder to shoulder with England tried to bring about a peaceful solution." It certainly now appears that all this while England had made her arrangements with France and with Russia, and had strengthened the war party in Russia to such an extent that Russia's desire to set Europe afire was rendered possible.

Belgian neutrality. It is charged that Germany violated an alleged treaty with Belgium, which treaty is supposed to have guaranteed the integrity of Belgium. When Germany found her efforts to maintain peace frustrated, Russian troops having crossed the German frontier on the afternoon of Aug. 1, while France opened hostilities on Aug. 2, she announced to Belgium on Aug. 2, 1914, that she found herself under obligation, to prevent a French attack through Belgium, to pass through Belgian territory; she expressed her readiness to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and its possessions and to pay any damage caused if Belgium would, in a friendly way, permit such a passage of troops through it.

The English "White Book" contains, Paper 151, dated Aug. 3, 1914, which paper we repeat in full:

(British Minister to Belgium to Sir Edward Grey.)

French Government have offered through their Military Attaché the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been received today: We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, *we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers.* Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take.

In short, Belgium says in the foregoing notice to France that she does not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers.

Was Germany justified in disregarding any previous treaty which related to Belgium if her interests required her so to do?

United States Supreme Court: In its unanimous opinion in the Chinese exclusion cases, reported on Pages 581 to 611 of Vol. 130 of United States Reports, the Supreme Court of the United States had this very question before it. A treaty had been entered into by the United States and China, allowing Chinese subjects the right to visit and reside in the United States and to there enjoy the same privileges that are enjoyed by citizens of the United States. After that

treaty an act of Congress was passed in violation of the treaty, providing it to be unlawful thereafter for Chinese laborers to enter the United States. The question was, whether we had the right to violate a treaty solemnly entered into with another country? On this subject the court said (Page 600):

The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations was elaborately considered in *THE HEAD MONEY CASES*, and it was there adjudged "that so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal," 112 U. S: 580, 599. This doctrine was affirmed and followed in *WHITNEY v. ROBERTSON*, 124 U. S. 190, 195. It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country; *but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country.*

In the same opinion the Supreme Court calls attention to an act passed in 1798, declaring that the United States was freed and exonerated from the stipulations of previous treaties with France. This subject was fully considered by Justice Curtis, who held, as the Supreme Court says (Page 602): "That whilst it would always be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no nation could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence."

We observe, therefore, that under our own ideas of international law the United States claims the right to disregard its stipulations if the interests of the country should require it. And the same right we should concede to other nations. Particularly to Germany in the present instance, when we find her battling for her very existence against enemies that seek to destroy her, against enemies that surround her on all sides, against enemies that do not hesitate to bring troops into the conflict from the wilds of Africa

and Asia, and who do not hesitate to drag Japan into this war, causing her to disregard Chinese neutrality in her effort to capture a small settlement, lawfully occupied in China by a handful of German soldiers.

In this connection I quote the British sentiment, as expressed by Gladstone regarding Belgian neutrality in the year 1870:

But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to the assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding to every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for *acting on the question arises*.

This shows that England herself reserved the right, whenever her interests required her to do so, to act in violation of the treaty with Belgium. That, at least, is my understanding of Gladstone's language. England did not respect Danish neutrality a hundred years ago, when she destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen because her interests required, and England does not now, through its Asiatic ally, and directly, respect Chinese neutrality, claiming the right primarily to consult her own interests. Should this right, asserted by our own Supreme Court, and actually assumed by England and Japan, be denied to Germany? Finally, I understand that The Hague Conference of 1907 drafted a convention which reads:

The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power. Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy refused to sign it and did not sign it. Russia was not represented.

MILITARISM. There is one more subject which many people in this country have failed to understand, and that is the matter of militarism. German militarism is supposed to be something dreadful, and many good people believe that it would be a great advance toward eternal peace if that militarism could be wiped out. Well, now, let us see.

If Germany did not require every one of her sons to spend a year, or at most

two years, in the army, and if she had not provided for all these men sufficient arms and accoutrements for immediate use in case of war, what would have happened when Russia entered her territory, or when France came on a like errand?

And one who lives among enemies is expected to be sufficiently prepared to defend himself should they attack him, be he ever so peaceful.

At the time the United States of America was born there was no such thing as Germany. Every country around it had a slice of it. Napoleon took the larger western part of Germany as his property, England held Hanover, the former Kingdom of Poland held Saxony, Austria held Silesia, and so there was no Germany. The Teutonic races had no home in which they could develop and live without interference by others. To prevent such interference Germany of all nations needed an army; to prevent similar interference at sea England of all nations needed a navy. That great British Navy bears precisely the same relation to the protection of Great Britain at sea which the German Army bears to the protection of Germany on land.

To sum up, what are the countries fighting for? Russia for her enlargement; she has no grudge whatever against Germany except that it exists. France for revenge; she has no grudge whatever against Germany except that she wants revenge for 1870. What grudge has England against Germany, except that Germany has grown commercially, financially, and industrially to a position which threatens to crowd England into a second rank? Jealousy appears to control the English attitude.

The position apparently assumed by England is best expressed by the King of England in his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, dated July 30, 1914:

My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to *suspend further military preparations* if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war prepara-

tions. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe.

On July 31, the very next day, Sir Edward Grey wrote the telegram, No. 111, (English "White Book,") to the British Ambassador at Berlin, in which we find the following:

I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. *As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them.*

(Established by Paper 3, July 24, and Paper 5, July 26, German "White Book.")

Hence, we find that all King George said he wanted had been granted, and yet England entered into the war. Why? Probably because she thought, as France had expressed it, that she acted in pursuance of her interests.

And what is Germany fighting for? Does she want anything from anybody? She wants to be left alone; she always wanted to be left alone; she prospered while she was left alone; she grew while she was left alone. Not being left alone, she has to defend herself. Hence, I bespeak for Germany and for her side fair play, just judgment on behalf of the American people.

ARTHUR v. BRIESEN.

New York, Oct. 17, 1914.

PARTING

By LOUISE VON WETTER

SODGER lad, O sodger lad,
The dawn will see ye marchin'—
The nicht drags on—its dark is out
Wi' searchlichts, shiftin', archin'.

Sodger lad, O sodger lad,
D'ye mind our Summer meetin'?
And noo, ye'll gang. The heather's dead * * *
I canna keep frae greetin'.

Sodger lad, my sodger lad—
D'ye mind, my time is nearin'?
Alone—alone—wi'out yer hand!
How shall I keep frae fearin'?

Sodger lad, O sodger lad,
Far, far awa' ye're goin'—
I'll not dare count the leagues an' days—
Gude God! The cocks are crowin'!

Sodger lad, my luve, my dear,
Awake! The morn is grayin'!
E'en tho' my heart drags, sick wi' dread,
I wouldna have ye stayin'.

French Hate and English Jealousy

By Kuno Francke

Of Harvard University

IT is easy to see why American public opinion should have condemned by an overwhelming majority the diplomatic acts of Austria and Hungary which have been the immediate occasion of the terrific explosion which now shakes the foundations of the whole civilized world. Austria's break with Servia and Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality—the one leading to war between Russia and Germany, the other bringing England into the fray—must appear to the uninitiated as reckless and indefensible provocations and as wanton attacks upon the laws of nations.

The thoughtful observer, however, should look beyond the immediate occasion of this world conflict and try to understand its underlying causes. By doing so he will, I believe, come to the conclusion that fundamental justice is to be found on the German side, and that Germany has been forced to fight for her life.

It is an unquestionable fact that the unification of Germany and the establishment of a strong German Empire, half a century ago; were brought about against the bitter opposition of France, and that the defeat incurred by France in 1870, in her attempt to prevent German unification, is at the bottom of the constant irritation that has agitated Europe during the last forty-three years. Germany's policy toward France during these forty-three years has been one of utmost restraint and forbearance, and has been dictated by the one desire of making her forget the loss of the two provinces, German until the seventeenth century and inhabited by German stock, which were won back from France in 1870. Whether the acquisition of these provinces was a fortunate thing for Germany may be doubted. The possession

of Alsace-Lorraine has certainly robbed Germany of the undivided sympathy of the world, which she otherwise would have had. But it is probably true that from the military point of view Alsace-Lorraine was needed by Germany as a bulwark against the repetition of the many wanton French invasions from which Germany has had to suffer since the time of the Thirty Years' War and the age of Louis XIV.

Sought to Heal the Breach.

However this may be, Germany has done her best during the last four decades to heal the wounds struck by her to French national pride. She abetted French colonial expansion in Cochinchina, Madagascar, Tunis. She yielded to France her own well-founded claims to political influence in Morocco. In Alsace-Lorraine itself she introduced an amount of local self-government and home rule such as England has not accorded even now to Ireland. While Ireland still is waiting for a Parliament at Dublin, Strassburg has been for years the seat of the Alsace-Lorraine Diet, a provincial Parliament based on universal suffrage. And even in spite of the incessant and inflammatory French propaganda which last year led to such unhappy counterstrokes as the deplorable Zabern affair, there can be no reasonable doubt that the people of Alsace-Lorraine have been gradually settling down to willing co-operation with the German administration—an administration which insures them order, justice, and prosperity. Nothing is a clearer indication of the peaceable trend which affairs have lately taken in Alsace-Lorraine than the fact that the Nationalists, i. e., French party, in the Strassburg Diet has never been able to rise above insignifi-

cance, and that, on the other hand, a considerable number of responsible officers in the civil administration, including the highest Governmental positions, have been occupied by native Alsatians.

While Germany has thus repeatedly shown her willingness and desire to end the ancient feud, France has remained irreconcilable; and particularly the intellectual class of France cannot escape the charge that they have persistently and willfully kept alive the flame of discord.

It surely cannot be said that the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is a vital necessity to France. Without Alsace-Lorraine France has recovered her prosperity and her prestige in a manner that has been the admiration of the world. It is a mere illusion to think that the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine would add to her glory. It would have been a demand of patriotism for the intellectual class to combat this illusion. Instead of this, every French writer, every French scholar, every French orator, except the Socialists, year in and year out, has been dinning into the popular ear the one word revenge.

France to Blame.

There can be little doubt that Prof. Gustave Lanson, the distinguished literary historian, voiced the sentiments of the vast majority of his countrymen when in a lecture, delivered some years ago at Harvard, he stated that France could not and would not recognize the peace of Frankfurt as a final settlement, and that the one aim of the French policy of the last forty years had been to force Germany to reopen the Alsace-Lorraine question.

If there were people in Germany inclined to overlook or to minimize this constantly growing menace from France, their eyes must have been opened when in 1912 the French Government, having previously abolished the one-year volunteers, raised the duration of active military service for every Frenchman from two years to three, and, in addition to this, called out in the Autumn of 1913 the recruits not only of the year whose turn

had come, namely, the recruits born in 1892, but also those born in 1893. This was a measure nearly identical with mobilization; it was a measure which clearly showed that France would not delay much longer striking the deadly blow. For no nation could possibly stand for any length of time this terrific strain of holding under the colors its entire male population from the twentieth to the twenty-fourth year. No wonder that the Paris papers were speaking as long ago as the Summer of 1912 of the regiments stationed in the Eastern Departments as the "vanguard of our glorious army," and were advocating double pay for them, as being practically in contact with the enemy.

The second foe now threatening the destruction of Germany is England. Can it truly be said that England's hostility has been brought about by German aggression. True, Germany has built a powerful navy; but so have Japan, the United States, France, and even Italy. Has England felt any menace from these? Why, then, is the German Navy singled out as a specially sinister threat to England? Has German diplomacy during the last generation been particularly menacing to England? Germany has acquired some colonies in Africa and in the Far East: But what are Kamerun and Dar-es-Salaam and Kiao-Chau compared with the colonial possessions of the other great powers? Where has Germany pursued a colonial aggressiveness that could in any way be compared with the British subjugation of the South African republics or the Italian conquest of Tripoli or the French expansion in Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco, or the American acquisition of the Philippines?

Her Open-Door Policy.

Wherever Germany has made her influence felt on the globe she has stood for the principle of the open door. Wherever she has engaged in colonial enterprises, she has been willing to make compromises with other nations and to accept their co-operation, notably so in the Bagdad railway undertaking. And yet, the colonial expansion of every other nation is hailed by England as "bene-

ficial to mankind," as "work for civilization"; the slightest attempt of Germany to take part in this expansion is denounced as "intolerable aggression," as evidence of the "bullying tendencies of the War Lord."

What is the reason for this singular unfairness of England toward Germany, of this incessant attempt to check her and hem her in? Not so much the existence of a large German Navy as the encroachment upon English commerce by the rapidly growing commerce of Germany has made Germany hateful to England. The navy has simply added to this hate of Germany the dread of Germany. But if there had been no German Navy, and consequently no dread of Germany, this hate of Germany might have come to an explosion before now. For the history of the last 300 years proves that England has habitually considered as her mortal enemy any nation which dared to contest her commercial and industrial supremacy—first Spain, then Holland, then France, and now Germany. As long as German firms, by the manufacture of artificial indigo, keep on ruining the English importation of indigo from India, and as long as the German steamship lines keep on outstripping the prestige of the English boats, there can be no real friendship between England and Germany. Although England has repeatedly proposed to Germany naval agreements, these agreements were avowedly meant to perpetuate the overwhelming preponderance of England's fighting power, so that she would at any moment be in a position to crush German commercial rivalry for all time. She apparently thinks that this moment has now come.

That Germany's third implacable enemy, Russia, is clearly the aggressor, and not the defender of her own national existence, need hardly be demonstrated. She poses as the guardian of the Balkan States. But is there any case on record where Russia has really protected the independence of smaller neighboring countries? Has she not crushed out provincial and racial individuality wherever she has extended her power? Is it not the sole aim of her national policy to

Russianize forcibly every nationality under her sway?

In Finland she has gone back on her solemnly pledged word to maintain the Finnish Constitution, and is ruthlessly reducing one of her most highly developed provinces to the dead level of autocratic rule. In her Baltic provinces she is trying to destroy, root and branch, whatever there is left of German culture. Wherever the Russian Church holds dominion intellectual blight is sure to follow.

To think, therefore, that Russia would promote the free development of a number of independent Balkan States under her protectorate is to shut one's eyes to the whole history of Russian expansion. No, Russian expansion in the Balkans means nothing less than the extinction of all local independence and the establishment of Russian despotism from the Black Sea to the Adriatic.

Why Germany Supports Austria.

Not Russia, but Austria, is the natural protector of the equilibrium between the existing States on the Balkan Peninsula and their natural guardian against Russian domination. Austria is their nearest neighbor; indeed, the possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes her a Balkan State herself.

Being herself more than half of Slavic stock, she has every reason for living on good terms with the various Slav kingdoms south of her. Being herself forced, through the conglomerateness of her population, to constant compromises in her internal affairs between conflicting nationalities within her borders, she could not possibly absorb a large additional amount of foreign territory. She is bound to respect the existing lines of political demarkation in the Balkans, and her sole object can be through commercial treaties and tariff legislation to open up what used to be European Turkey to her trade and her civilizing influence.

In this she must clearly be supported by Germany. For only if Austria is left free to exercise her natural protectorate over the Balkan States can the passage between Germany and the Near Orient,

one of the most important routes of German commerce, be kept open.

Russia's unwillingness, then, to allow Austria a free hand in her dealings with Servia was an open menace to Germany, a challenge which had to be accepted unless Germany was prepared to abdicate all her influence in the Near Orient and to allow Russia to override the legitimate claims and aspirations of her only firm and faithful ally.

This formidable coalition of the three greatest European powers, threatening

the very existence of Germany, has now been joined by Japan, openly and boldly for the purpose of snatching from Germany her one Asiatic possession.

If any additional proof had been needed to make it clear that, if Germany wanted to retain the slightest chance of extricating herself from this worldwide conspiracy against her, she had to strike the first blow, even at the risk of offending against international good manners, this stab in the back by Japan would furnish such proof.

Reply to Dr. Kuno Francke

By R. L. Sanderson

Of the Faculty of Yale University

ALTHOUGH I hate to enter into a controversy with Professor Kuno Francke, who was once my excellent friend, I cannot refrain from answering his article.

How can any one say, in all fairness, that Germany's policy toward France during the last forty-three years has been one of the utmost restraint and forbearance, and has been dictated by the one desire to make her forget the loss of the two provinces? What are the facts? We know that not once, but again and again, since 1878, Germany has tried to provoke France into war. We know that on one occasion Queen Victoria herself threatened the Kaiser with Great Britain's intervention if he did not desist from his intended attack on France. And to cite only the two most recent instances, the Agadir affair and the enforced resignation of the French Premier, Delcassé! Would Germany have swallowed such insults?

This may be the German conception of "utmost restraint and forbearance," but it appeared to the French, as it did to the rest of the world, that it required their utmost restraint and forbearance to remain calm under the affronts.

The fact that Alsace-Lorraine was German up to the seventeenth century, and inhabited by German stock, cannot

be brought forward today, after more than 200 years, to justify the retaking of those provinces by the Germans. The whole world would be in a State of continual warfare if nations claimed provinces or States that belonged to them once upon a time. Richelieu's idea was that the Rhine was the natural and geographical frontier between France and Germany, and the war was undertaken to carry out that plan. Since then the inhabitants have become French, and the attempts to re-Germanize them have proved futile. Professor Francke may well doubt if the acquisition of these provinces was a fortunate thing for Germany. It was undoubtedly the most unfortunate thing not only for Germany but for France and the rest of Europe, for it kept open a wound which might have been healed either by a return of the lost provinces, with or without compensation, or by granting them autonomy, or, better still, by leaving it to the inhabitants to choose for themselves, as France did with Nice and Savoy.

The ruthless methods of a Bismarck are no longer of this age. They are too odious, and the human conscience revolts at them. What a preposterous idea, in this twentieth century, to compel by force millions of people to renounce their traditions and even their language! If

Great Britain had followed the same method in dealing with the French Canadians, instead of loyal subjects she would have made rebels of them all.

It is neither right nor just nor truthful to say that Germany has done her best during the last four decades to heal the wounds struck by her to French national pride. On the contrary, Germany's attitude has been all along one of studied provocation; and if the instances already mentioned are not sufficient, many others could be added.

Germany abetted French colonial expansion. Well, by what right should she have opposed it? And if she yielded to France in Morocco, it was only after France had given Germany part of her African possessions rather than go to war with her.

It will be news to the world to be informed that there can be no reasonable doubt that the people of Alsace-Lorraine have been gradually settling down to willing co-operation with the German administration. Certainly such a statement is in violent contradiction with all we hear and read and know of the state of mind, the feelings, and aspirations of the inhabitants of those two provinces.

To argue that the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is not a vital necessity to France; that without these provinces she has recovered her prosperity and her prestige, and that it is mere illusion to think that the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine would add to her glory is pure sophistry. It is just as if you said to a man whom you had robbed of some valuable property: "What does it matter? You are just as well off without it." Yes, Professor Larson did voice the sentiment of the vast majority of his countrymen when he stated that France could not and would not recognize the treaty of Frankfurt. If I have an enemy who takes me by surprise and with revolver leveled at my head compels me to sign a paper by which I despoil myself to his advantage, what is the validity of such a document?

That is the way that all Frenchmen of all classes look upon the treaty of Frankfurt, wrung from them under duress.

The term "revanche" is a slogan. It

simply typifies in one word the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but it does not carry with it the idea of willfully laying waste the enemy's country, burning and pillaging, shooting inoffensive noncombatants, and cleaning banks of all the gold they contain.

Another statement which is misleading in Professor Francke's article is the one which refers to the "growing menace from France," in which he speaks of the increasing armament that has been going on in that country since 1912. But what is called in Germany "the menace from France" is called in the latter country "the menace from Germany." Who started these enormous armaments? Each time Germany increased her army France was forced to do the same; and when France recently increased from two to three years the duration of military service, it was her only way of meeting Germany's increase of 500,000 men.

The attempt to change the rôles and present France to the world as the aggressor, or even as premeditating an attack upon Germany, is futile. It is a strange and yet not uncommon psychological fact that the hate of the conqueror is often greater than that of the conquered; and it is German, not French, hate which has forced Germany into this savage war. France had recovered too rapidly from her disasters; she was too rich; her colonies were too vast and too prosperous; she must be crushed. What right had she to have large colonies when Germany, the superior nation, had none worth mentioning? There you have the key to the Kaiser's repeated provocations and to his final attack.

In regard to England and Russia, the writer will simply confine himself to the statement that if the German Imperial Government can produce as clean a bill of health as the "White Paper" of the British Foreign Office, just published, it will do more to convince American public opinion of the justice of its cause than anything that has yet been written in the press by Germans and their sympathizers.

Yale University, New Haven, Conn.,
Sept. 5, 1914.

In Defense of Austria

Letter to Col. Theodore Roosevelt

By Baron L. Hengelmüller

Late Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States

ABBAZIA, Sept. 25, 1914.

My Dear Mr. Roosevelt:

OUR correspondence has suffered a long interruption. Your last letter was from July of last year. I do not know whether you ever received my answer, by which I thanked you for your preface to my book. You were in Arizona when I wrote it, and soon after your return you started for Brazil. At the occasion of your son's wedding I sent him a telegram to Madrid, but I had no chance to write to you because I had no information with regard to the length of your stay and your whereabouts in Europe.

Now I write to you at the time of a most momentous crisis in the world's history, and I do so impelled by the desire to talk with you about my country's cause and to win your just and fair appreciation for the same. I wish I could address my appeal to the American people, but having no standing and no opportunity to do so, I address it to you as to one of America's most illustrious citizens with whom it has been my privilege to entertain during many years the most friendly relations.

Since the outbreak of the war our communications with America are slow and irregular. In the beginning they were nil. From the end of July to the middle of August we received neither letters, telegrams, nor papers. I suppose it was the same with you concerning direct news from us. Our adversaries held the field all for themselves and they seem to have made the most of it. To judge from what I have learned since and from what I can glean in our

papers, the New York press seem to have written about us and Germany very much in the same tone and spirit as they did about you during your last Presidential campaign. I have seen it stated that The Outlook published an article in which Austria-Hungary was accused of having brought about the war through her greed of conquest and the overbearing arrogance of her behavior toward Serbia. I do not know whether I cite correctly, as I have not seen the article, and I am aware that you have severed your connection with The Outlook after your return from Brazil. I only mention the statement as an illustration of what I have said above, for if a review of the standing of The Outlook opens its columns to such a glaringly false accusation the daily papers have certainly not lagged behind.

It is natural that our adversaries should be anxious to win the sympathies of the American people. So are we. But it is not for this purpose that I now write to you. Sympathy is a sentiment and, as a rule, not to be won by argument. What I want to discuss with you are the causes of this war and the issues at stake.

The Cause of the War.

Undoubtedly the war broke out over our conflict with Serbia, but this conflict was not of our seeking. We had no wish of aggrandizement or extension of power at the expense of Serbia, but Serbia covets territory which belongs to us, and for years has pursued her ends by the most nefarious and criminal means. The assassination of our heir to the crown and his consort was not an isolated fact, but only the most glaring

link in a long chain of plotting and agitating against us. This attitude of Serbia toward us dates back to the day when the gang of officers who murdered their own King came to power, and when it became their policy to keep a hold over their own people by exciting their ambitions against us. This policy reached its first climax when we declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we had occupied and developed for thirty years. You were in office then, and the events of the time are familiar to you. The crisis ended then by Serbia's formal acknowledgment that our annexation violated none of her rights, and by her promise to cultivate henceforth correct and friendly relations with us. This promise was not kept. The plotting continued, lies were disseminated about a pretended oppression of our South Slav population, and associations were formed for the purpose of stirring them to discontent and, if possible, to treason.

Things came to a second climax with the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The plot for this crime was hatched in Serbia, the bombs and revolvers for its execution were furnished there, and Serbian officers instructed the murder candidates in their use. At last we could stand it no longer. What we wanted from Serbia was the punishment of the plotters and accomplices and a guarantee for normal relations in the future. This was the object of our ultimatum. Serbia made a show of complying with some of our demands, but in reality her answer was evasive.

These facts are exposed and authenticated in the note which we sent to the powers after having presented our ultimatum in Belgrade and in the memorandum which accompanied it. I do now know whether the American papers published these documents at the time. Today they are outstripped by greater events, but for the just appreciation of our proceedings in regard to Serbia they are indispensable.

In reality, however, our conflict with Serbia was not the cause of the great war now raging, but only the spark

which brought the overloaded powder barrel to explosion. Who talks of Serbia today, and who believes that France, England, and Japan are making war on Germany and on us because of Serbia? The war broke out because Russia decided to shield Serbia against the consequences of her provocations and because, owing to preconcerted arrangements, the situation in Europe was such that the action of one great power was bound to bring all or nearly all the others into the field. And again those preconcerted arrangements were the outcome of a mass of pent-up passions, of hatred, envy, and jealousy, the like of which—all Hague conferences and pacific unions notwithstanding—the world has never seen before.

We are fully aware of the danger which threatened us from Russia when we formulated our demands in Belgrade. Russia's population is three times as large as ours and it was not with a light heart that our Emperor-King took his final resolution. But our national honor and our very existence as a self-respecting power were at stake. We could not hesitate. Now we are in a struggle for life or death, and we mean to carry it through with full confidence in the rightfulness of our cause and in the force of our arms. In one respect events have already belied the calculations of our enemies, who counted on internal dissensions within our own borders. I am happy to say that Croatians, Slovenes, and a large majority of our own Servians are fighting in our ranks with the same valor and enthusiasm as Czechs, Rumanians, Poles, Magyars, and Germans.

But why did Russia decide to assail us? During the whole nineteenth century she has shown herself a very shifty and unreliable protectress of Serbia. She made use of the smaller country when it suited her own aggressive purposes against others, and she dropped it whenever it served her ends. It was so at the time of the Turkish war of 1877 and of the Berlin Congress, and it remained so until with the advent of the present dynasty Serbia offered a sure prospect of becoming and remaining a permanent

tool in Russia's hands and a thorn in our flesh.

Russia is an aggressive power. For 200 years she has extended her dominions at the cost of Sweden first, of Poland and Turkey afterward. Now she thinks our turn has come. Finding us to be in the way of her ultimate aims in the Balkan Peninsula, she began to regard us as her enemy. For years the propaganda for undermining the bases of our empire has been carried on in the name of Pan-Slavism. It seems that she judged that now the time had come to draw the consequences and to bring things to a final issue. With what result remains to be seen.

Germany Bound to Aid Austria.

By the terms of our treaty of alliance Germany was bound to come to our assistance if we were attacked by Russia. There was no secrecy about that treaty. Its text had been made public long ago and its purely defensive character brought to the knowledge of the world. No more than we did Germany entertain hostile intentions or nourish hostile feelings against Russia. There were no clashing interests to excite the first, no historical reminiscences to justify the second. If it is otherwise in Russia, it is because her present leaders find German power in the way of their conquering aspirations against us. Germany, true to her obligations, hastened to our side when she saw us menaced, and when she declared war she did it because she had positive information that in spite of formal and solemn assurances to the contrary Russian mobilization was proceeding.

The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public. Whether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive purposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword in the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise. But there is no mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no doubt about the greed for revenge which during the last forty-four years has swayed the overwhelming majority of her people and been the dom-

inant factor of her foreign policy. It was for this object that she entered into her alliances and agreements, and it is for this cause that she is fighting now.

It is simple hypocrisy to talk about German aggressiveness against France. France stood in no danger of being attacked by Germany if she had chosen to remain neutral in the latter's war with Russia. Asked whether she would do so, she replied that her actions would be guided by her interests. The meaning of this reply was clear, and left Germany no choice. The formal declaration of war became then a mere matter of political and military convenience, and has no bearing on the moral issue of the case.

But why has England plunged into this war? Officially and to the world at large she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of Belgium neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was solemnly declared that England could not stand by and passively tolerate such a breach of international law and obligations.

No Austrian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful smile. Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of standing and renown have put to their Government, viz., whether they would equally have declared war on France if that violation of neutrality had first come from her side. In face of this question having remained unanswered, and in face of what has come to light since about French preparations in Belgium, there is no need to expiate on this subject. All that there is to be said about it has been said by the German Chancellor in open session of the Reichstag, and all that may be added is the remark that, considering England's history and what she did before Copenhagen in 1807, she of all nations should be the last to put on airs of moral indignation over the application of the principle that in time of war "*salus reipublicae suprema lex est.*"

The existence of a convention binding England to France in case of war has—as far as I know—never been admitted officially by England. As I see now

from manifestations of Englishmen disapproving of their country's participation in the war, the belief exists nevertheless that such a convention had been concluded. But whether England's declaration of war was the consequence of previously entered obligations or the outcome of present free initiative, the main fact remains that in the last resort it sprang from jealousy of Germany's growing sea power and commercial prosperity. This feeling was the dominant factor in English foreign policy, just as greed for revenge was in France. It was the propelling power for the agreements which England has made and for others which she has endeavored but did not succeed in bringing about.

England claims the dominion over the seas as her native right, and, what is more, she holds it. Her title is no better and no worse than that of the Romans when they conquered the world, or of the Turkish Sultans in the days of their power. Like them, she has succeeded in making good her claim. For three centuries the nations of Continental Europe have been hating, fighting, and devastating each other for the sake of strips of frontier land and a shadowy balance of power. These centuries were England's opportunity, and she has made the most of it. That she should mean to keep what she has and hold to her maritime supremacy as to the apple of her eye is natural. Whether it is for the benefit of mankind that it should be so, and whether the world in general would not be better off if there existed a balance of power on sea as well as on land, does not enter into the present discussion. What is more to the purpose is that in reality England's sea power stood in no danger at all. To any thinking and fair-minded observer it must be clear that Germany, hemmed in by hostile neighbors in the east and west, and obliged, therefore, to keep up her armaments on land, would not have been able to threaten England's maritime superiority for generations to come. If the issue has been thrown into the balance, it has been done so by England's own doing.

But it is not only the nascent German Navy that excited the distrust and envy of England. German colonies and every trading German vessel seem equally to have become thorns in English eyes. The wish to sweep those vessels from off the seas, to destroy all German ports, in one word, to down Germany, has long been nourished and lately openly avowed in England. Norman Angell's theories about the great illusion of the profitability of modern warfare seem to have made mighty small impression on his countrymen.

Russian lust of conquest, French greed of revenge, and English envy were the forces at work in the European powder magazine. The Servian spark ignited it, but the explosion was bound to come sooner or later. What alone could have stopped it would have been England's stepping out of the conspiracy. That she did not do so, in fact became its really directing power, will forever remain a blot on her history.

About Japan's motives and methods I do not think it necessary to write. American public opinion will hardly need any enlightenment on this subject. America forced Japan out of the isolation in which she had lived during centuries. I hope the day may not come when she will wish that she had not done so.

The issues of the war stand in relation to its causes and the same attempts have been made to distort and falsify them in the eyes of the American public. I have seen it stated in a New York paper that this war is a fight between civilization and barbarism, and I have seen a member of the present English Cabinet quoted as having said that the issue was one between militarism and freedom, civilization and freedom standing, of course, in both cases on the side of our enemies.

Not a War for Civilization.

More idiotic rot—excuse the expression—I have never read in my life. What has civilization to do with Serbia's murderous plotting against us? What with Russia's desire to shield her from the consequences of her aggressions and to demonstrate to the world that we are of

no account in the Balkans and to establish her own—more or less veiled—protectorate there? And if the case of civilization is advanced by Japan's ousting Germany from Kiao-Chau, why should it not be equally furthered if Japan did the same to England in Hongkong, Singapore, or, if the opportunity offered, in India itself? And a person must be indeed at his wits' end for arguments to proclaim Russia as a standard bearer of freedom in her war against us. Compare her treatment of Poles, Finns, Ukrainians (small Russians) and Hebrews with the freedom which the different nationalities enjoy in our empire! And England herself. Is it for freedom's sake that she holds Gibraltar and that she subjugated the Boers?

No! Civilization and freedom have nothing to do with the issues at stake now, least of all in the sense that our enemies have drawn the sword for their cause. It is a war for conquest and supremacy stirred up by all the hateful passions in human nature, fully as much as any war that has ever been waged before. But we did not stir it up. We are fighting for our existence, right and justice are

on our side, and so we trust will victory be.

The causes of the war are clear. To make its issues still clearer, imagine for a moment and merely for argument's sake the consequences of our adversaries being successful. Russia, England, and Japan would remain masters of the field. Is this a consummation any thinking American can wish for?

These are the considerations I wished to lay before you, and I ask your assistance to bring them before the American people. I ask for no reply, no manifestation of feelings or opinion from you. What I ask you is to publish this letter as an open letter addressed by me to you, signed with my full name. How to do this I leave entirely to you. It goes without saying that your private reply, if you favor me with one, will be treated as such.

Hoping to meet you in better times, and sending our kindest regards to Mrs. Roosevelt, believe me, yours most sincerely,

BARON L. HENGELMULLER.

Abbazia, Sept. 25, 1914.

Russian Atrocities

By George Haven Putnam

Publisher, Veteran of the Civil War; Chevalier of the Legion of Honor, France

IT is possible that the letter presented herewith from a German neighbor (who is a stranger to me) may be of interest to your readers as an example of a curious confusion of thought into which have fallen Germans on both sides of the Atlantic in regard to the issues of the present struggle and the conduct and the actions of the German Army. I am inclosing a copy of my reply to Mr. Thienes.

GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM.

New York, Nov. 4, 1914.

THE LETTER.

NEW YORK, Oct. 28, 1914.

Mr. George Haven Putnam.

DEAR SIR: Now that you have shown your "true" spirit of neutrality toward Germany, would you not be kind enough to give us a similar piece of your wisdom and describe in detail the way the Russians acted in East Prussia during their short stay there, and how they murdered, tortured, and assaulted women and girls, and cut children and infants to pieces without

even the provocation of "sniping"?

This, your new article in *THE TIMES*, I anticipate with the greatest interest.

RUDOLF F. THIENES.

MR. PUTNAM'S REPLY.

Rudolf F. Thienes, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 28th inst., intended as a rejoinder to a letter recently printed by me in *THE TIMES*, is written under a misapprehension in regard to one important matter.

The Americans, who are in a position to judge impartially in regard to the issues of the war, have criticised the official acts which have attended the devastation of Belgium, not because these acts were committed by Germans, but because they were in themselves abominable and contrary to precedents and to civilized standards.

If the Russians had, under official order, burned Lemberg, including the university and the library, and executed the Burgomaster, they would have come under the same condemnation from Americans that has been given to Germans for the burning of Louvain and Aerschot and the shooting of the Aerschot Burgomaster. I am myself familiar with Germany. I am an old-time German student, and I have German friends on both sides of the Atlantic, and I am in a position to sympathize with legitimate aspirations and ideals of these German friends.

I am convinced, however, that no nation can secure in this twentieth century its rightful development unless its na-

tional conduct is regulated with a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." The references made in my *TIMES* letters were restricted to official actions, things done under the direction of the military commanders acting in accord with the instructions or the general policy of the Imperial Government.

The misdeeds of individual soldiers are difficult to verify. While these are always exaggerated, it remains the sad truth that every big army contains a certain percentage of ruffians, and that when these ruffians are let loose in a community, with weapons and with military power behind them, bad things are done. It is my own belief that the material in the German Army (which is the best fighting machine that the world has ever seen) will compare favorably with that of any army in the world, and that the percentage of wrongful acts on the part of the German soldiers has been small. Such misdeeds, sometimes to be characterized as atrocities, are the inevitable result of war, and they bring a grave responsibility upon a Government which (to accept as well founded the frank utterances of the leaders of opinion in Germany) has initiated this war for the purpose of "crushing France and of breaking up the British Empire."

You appear to think that it is in order for Germany to visit upon offending Belgians reprisal for the misdeeds (as far as such misdeeds may be in evidence) committed by Russians in East Prussia. I cannot see that this contention is in accord with justice or with common sense.

GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM.

New York, Oct. 28, 1914.

The United States of Europe

Interview With Nicholas Murray Butler

President of Columbia University; President of American Branch of Conciliation Internationale; President American Historical Association.

THE United States of Europe.

Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, firmly believes that the organization of such a federation will be the outcome, soon or late, of a situation built up through years of European failure to adjust government to the growth of civilization.

He thinks it possible that the ending of the present war may see the rising of the new sun of democracy to light a day of freedom for our transatlantic neighbors.

He tells me that thinking men in all the contending nations are beginning vividly to consider such a contingency, to argue for it or against it; in other words, to regard it as an undoubted possibility.

Dr. Butler's acquaintance among those thinking men of all shades of political belief is probably wider than that of any other American, and it is significant of the startling importance of what he says that by far the greater number of his European friends, the men upon whose views he has largely, directly or indirectly, based his conclusions, are not of the socialistic or of any other revolutionary or semi-revolutionary groups, but are among the most conservative and most important figures in European political, literary, and educational fields.

This being unquestionably true, it is by no means improbable that in the interview which follows, fruit of two evenings in Dr. Butler's library, may be found the most important speculative utterance yet

to appear in relation to the general European war.

Dr. Butler's estimate of the place which the United States now holds upon the stage of the theatre of world progress and his forecast of the tremendously momentous rôle which she is destined to play there must make every American's heart first swell with pride and then thrill with a realization of responsibility.

The United States of Europe, modeled after and instructed by the United States of America! The thought is stimulating.

Said Dr. Butler:

"The European cataclysm puts the people of the United States in a unique and tremendously important position. As neutrals we are able to observe events and to learn the lesson that they teach. If we learn rightly we shall gain for ourselves and be able to confer upon others benefits far more important than any of the material advantages which may come to us through a shrewd handling of the new possibilities in international trade.

"I hesitate to discuss any phase of the great conflict now raging in Europe. By today's mail, for example, I received long, personal letters from Lord Haldane, from Lord Morley, from Lord Weardale, and from Lord Bryce. Another has just come from Prof. Schieman of Berlin, perhaps the Emperor's most intimate adviser; another from Prof. Lammasch of Austria, who was the Presiding Judge of the British-American arbitration in relation to the Newfoundland fisheries a

few years ago, and is a member of the Austrian House of Peers. Still others are from M. Ribot, Minister of Finance in France, and M. d'Estournelles de Constant. These confidential letters give a wealth of information as to the intellectual and political forces that are behind the conflict.

"You will understand, then, that, without disloyalty to my many friends in Europe, I could not discuss with freedom the causes or the progress of the war, or speculate in detail about the future of the European problem. My friends in Germany, France, and England all write to me with the utmost freedom and not for the public eye; so you see that my great difficulty, when you ask me to talk about the meaning of the struggle, arises from the obligation that I am under to preserve a proper personal reserve regarding the great figures behind the vast intellectual and political changes which really are in the background of the war.

"If such reserve is necessary in my case, it seems to me that it also is necessary for the country as a whole. The attitude of the President has been impeccable. That of the whole American press and people should be the same.

"Especially is it true that all Americans who hope to have influence, as individuals, in shaping the events which will follow the war, must avoid any expression which even might be tortured into an avowal of partisanship or final judgment.

"Even the free expression of views criticising particular details of the war, which might, in fact, deserve criticism, might destroy one's chance of future possible usefulness. A statement which might be unquestionably true might also be remembered to the damage of some important cause later on.

"There are reasons why my position is, perhaps, more difficult than that of some others. Talking is often a hazardous practice, and never more so than now.

"The world is at crossroads, and everything may depend upon the United States, which has been thrust by events into a unique position of moral leader-

ship. Whether the march of the future is to be to the right or to the left, up hill or down, after the war is over, may well depend upon the course this nation shall then take, and upon the influence which it shall exercise.

"If we keep our heads clear there are two things that we can bring insistently to the attention of Europe—each of vast import at such a time as that which will follow the ending of this war.

"The first of these is the fact that race antagonisms die away and disappear under the influence of liberal and enlightened political institutions. This has been proved in the United States.

"We have huge Celtic, Latin, Teutonic, and Slavic populations all living here at peace and in harmony; and, as years pass, they tend to merge, creating new and homogeneous types. The Old World antagonisms have become memories. This proves that such antagonisms are not mysterious attributes of geography or climate, but that they are the outgrowth principally of social and political conditions. Here a man can do about what he likes, so long as he does not violate the law; he may pray as he pleases or not at all, and he may speak any language that he chooses.

"The United States is itself proof that most of the contentions of Europeans as to race antagonisms are ill-founded. We have demonstrated that racial antagonisms need not necessarily become the basis of permanent hatreds and an excuse for war.

Hyphens Are Going.

"If human beings are given the chance they will make the most of themselves, and, by living happily—which means by living at peace—they will avoid conflict. The hyphen tends to disappear from American terminology. The German-American, the Italo-American, the Irish-American all become Americans.

"So, by and large, our institutions have proved their capacity to amalgamate and to set free every type of human being which thus far has come under our flag. There is in this a lesson which may well be taken seriously to heart by the

leaders of opinion in Europe when this war ends.

"The second thing which we may press, with propriety, upon the attention of the people of Europe after peace comes to them is the fact that we are not only the great exponents but the great example of the success of the principle of federation in its application to unity of political life regardless of local, economic, and racial differences.

"If our fathers had attempted to organize this country upon the basis of a single, closely unified State, it would have gone to smash almost at the outset, wrecked by clashing economic and personal interests. Indeed, this nearly happened in the civil war, which was more economic than political in its origin.

"But, though we had our difficulties, we did find a way to make a unified nation of a hundred million people and forty-eight Commonwealths, all bound together in unity and in loyalty to a common political ideal and a common political purpose.

"Just as certainly as we sit here this must and will be the future of Europe. There will be a federation into the United States of Europe.

"When one nation sets out to assert itself by force against the will, or even the wish, of its neighbors, disaster must inevitably come. Disaster would have come here if, in 1789, New York had endeavored to assert itself against New England or Pennsylvania.

"As a matter of fact, certain inhabitants of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania did try something of the sort after the Federal Government had been formed, but, fortunately, their effort was a failure.

"The leaders of our national life had established such a flexible and admirable plan of government that it was soon apparent that each State could retain its identity, forming its own ideals and shaping its own progress, and still remain a loyal part of the whole; that each State could make a place for itself in the new federated nation and not be destroyed thereby.

"There is no reason why each nation

in Europe should not make a place for itself in the sun of unity which I am sure is rising there behind the war clouds. Europe's stupendous economic loss, which already has been appalling and will soon be incalculable, will give us an opportunity to press this argument home.

"True internationalism is not the enemy of the nationalistic principle.

"On the contrary, it helps true nationalism to thrive. The Vermonter is more a Vermonter because he is an American, and there is no reason why Hungary, for example, should not be more than ever before Hungarian after she becomes a member of the United States of Europe.

"Europe, of course, is not without examples of the successful application of the principle of federation within itself. It so happens that the federated State next greatest to our own is the German Empire. It is only forty-three years old, but their federation has been notably successful. So the idea of federation is familiar to German publicists.

"It is familiar, also, to the English, and has lately been pressed there as the probable final solution of the Irish question.

"It has insistently suggested itself as the solution of the Balkan problem.

"In a lesser way it already is represented in the structure of Austria-Hungary.

America's Great Work.

"This principle of nation building, of international building through federation, certainly has in it the seeds of the world's next great development—and we Americans are in a position both to expand the theory and to illustrate the practice. It seems to me that this is the greatest work which America will have to do at the end of this war.

"These are the things which I am writing to my European correspondents in the several belligerent countries by every mail.

"The cataclysm is so awful that it is quite within the bounds of truth to say that on July 31 the curtain went down

upon a world which never will be seen again.

"This conflict is the birth-three of a new European order of things. The man who attempts to judge the future by the old standards or to force the future back to them will be found to be hopelessly out of date. The world will have no use for him. The world has left behind forever the international policies of Palmerston and of Beaconsfield and even those of Bismarck, which were far more powerful.

"When the war ends conditions will be such that a new kind of imagination and a new kind of statesmanship will be required. This war will prove to be the most effective education of 500,000,000 people which possibly could have been thought of, although it is the most costly and most terrible means which could have been chosen. The results of this education will be shown, I think, in the process of general reconstruction which will follow.

"All the talk of which we hear so much about, the peril from the Slav or from the Teuton or from the Celt, is unworthy of serious attention. It would be quite as reasonable to discuss seriously the red-headed peril or the six-footer peril.

"There is no peril to the world in the Slav, the Teuton, the Celt, or any other race, provided the people of that race have an opportunity to develop as social and economic units, and are not bottled up so that an explosion must come.

"It is my firm belief that nowhere in the world, from this time on, will any form of government be tolerated which does not set men free to develop in this fashion."

I asked Dr. Butler to make some prognostication of what the United States of Europe, which he so confidently expects, will be. He answered:

Has Advanced Much.

"I can say only this: The international organization of the world already has progressed much further than is ordinarily understood. Ever since the Franco-Prussian war and the Geneva Arbitra-

tion, both landmarks in modern history, this has advanced inconspicuously, but by leaps and bounds.

"The postal service of the world has been internationalized in its control for years. The several Postal Conventions have been evidences of an international organization of the highest order.

"Europe abounds in illustrations of the international administration of large things. The very laws of war, which are at present the subject of so much and such bitter discussion, are the result of international organization.

"They were not adopted by a Congress, a Parliament, or a Reichstag. They were agreed to by many and divergent peoples, who sent representatives to meet for their discussion and determination.

One of the Examples.

"In the admiralty law we have a most striking example of uniformity of practice in all parts of the world. If a ship is captured or harmed in the Far East and taken into Yokohama or Nagasaki, damages will be assessed and collected precisely as they would be in New York or Liverpool.

"The world is gradually developing a code for international legal procedure. Special arbitral tribunals have tended to merge and grow into the international court at The Hague, and that, in turn, will develop until it becomes a real supreme judicial tribunal.

"Of course the analogy with the federated States fails at some points, but I believe the time will come when each nation will deposit in a world federation some portion of its sovereignty.

"When this occurs we shall be able to establish an international executive and an international police, both devised for the especial purpose of enforcing the decisions of the international court.

"Here, again, we offer a perfect object lesson. Our Central Government is one of limited and defined powers. Our history can show Europe how such limitations and definitions can be established and interpreted, and how they can be modified and amended when necessary to meet new conditions.

"My colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore, is now preparing and publishing a series of annotated reports of the international arbitration tribunals, in order that the Governments and jurists of the world may have at hand, as they have in the United States Supreme Court, reports, a record of decided cases which, when the time comes, may be referred to as precedents.

"It will be through graded processes such as this that the great end will be accomplished. Beginning with such annotated reports as a basis for precedents, each new case tried before this tribunal will add a further precedent, and presently a complete international code will be in existence. It was in this way that the English common law was built, and such has been the admirable history of the work done by our own judicial system.

"The study of such problems is at this time infinitely more important than the consideration of how large a fine shall be inflicted by the victors upon the vanquished.

The Chief Result.

"There is the probability of some dislocation of territory and some shiftings of sovereignty after the war ends, but these will be of comparatively minor importance. The important result of this great war will be the stimulation of international organization along some such lines as I have suggested.

"Dislocation of territory and the shifting of sovereigns as the result of international disagreements are mediaeval practices. After this war the world will want to solve its problems in terms of the future, not in those of the outgrown past.

"Conventional diplomacy and conventional statesmanship have very evidently broken down in Europe. They have made a disastrous failure of the work with which they were intrusted. They did not and could not prevent the war because they knew and used only the old formulas. They had no tools for a job like this.

"A new type of international statesman is certain to arise, who will have

a grasp of new tendencies, a new outlook upon life. Bismarck used to say that it would pay any nation to wear the clean linen of a civilized State. The truth of this must be taught to those nations of the world which are weakest in morale, and it can only be done, I suppose, as similar work is accomplished with individuals. Courts, not killings, have accomplished it with individuals.

"One more point ought to be remembered. We sometimes hear it said that nationalism, the desire for national expression by each individual nation, makes the permanent peace and good order of the world impossible.

"To me it seems absurd to believe that this is any truer of nations than it is of individuals. It is not each nation's desire for national oppression which makes peace impossible; it is the fact that thus far in the world's history such desire has been bound up with militarism.

"The nation whose frontier bristles with bayonets and with forts is like the individual with a magazine pistol in his pocket. Both make for murder. Both in their hearts really mean murder.

"The world will be better when the nations invite the judgment of their neighbors and are influenced by it.

"When John Hay said that the Golden Rule and the open door should guide our new diplomacy he said something which should be applicable to the new diplomacy of the whole world. The Golden Rule and a free chance are all that any man ought to want or ought to have, and they are all that any nation ought to want or ought to have.

"One of the controlling principles of a democratic State is that its military and naval establishments must be completely subservient to the civil power. They should form the police, and not be the dominant factor of any national life.

"As soon as they go beyond this simple function in any nation, then that nation is afflicted with militarism.

"It is difficult to make predictions of the war's effect on us. As I see it, our position will depend a good deal upon the outcome of the conflict, and what that will be no one at present knows.

"If a new map of Europe follows the war, its permanence will depend upon whether or not the changes are such as will permit nationalities to organize as nations.

"The world should have learned through the lessons of the past that it is impossible permanently and peacefully to submerge large bodies of aliens if they are treated as aliens. That is the opposite of the mixing process which is so successfully building a nation out of varied nationalities in the United States.

"The old Romans understood this. They permitted their outlying vassal nations to speak any language they chose and to worship whatever god they chose, so long as they recognized the sovereignty of Rome. When a conquering nation goes beyond that, and begins to suppress religions, languages, and customs, it begins at the very moment to sow the seeds of insurrection and revolution.

"My old teacher and colleague, Prof. Burgess, once defined a nation as an ethnographic unit inhabiting a geographic unit. That is an illuminating definition. If a nation is not an ethnographic unit, it tries to become one by oppressing or amalgamating the weaker portion of its people. If it is not a geographic unit, it tries to become one by reaching out to a mountain chain or to the sea—to something which will serve as a real dividing line between it and its next neighbors.

"The accuracy of this definition can hardly be denied, and we all know what the violations of this principle have been in Europe. It is unnecessary for me to point them out.

"Races rarely have been successfully mixed by conquest. The military winner of a war is not always the real conqueror in the long run. The Normans conquered Saxon England, but Saxon law and Saxon institutions worked up through the new power and have dominated England's later history. The Teutonic tribes conquered Rome, but Roman civilization, by a sort of capillary attraction, went up into the mass above and presently dominated the Teutons.

"The persistency of a civilization may

well be superior in tenacity to mere military conquest and control.

"The smallness of the number of instances in which conquering nations have been able successfully to deal with alien peoples is extraordinary. The Romans were unusually successful, and England has been successful with all but the Irish, but perhaps no other people have been successful in high degree in an effort to hold alien population as vassals and make them really happy and comfortable as such.

"One of the war's chief effects on us will be to change our point of view. Europe will be more vivid to us from now on. There are many public men who have never thought much about Europe, and who have been far from a realization of its actual importance to us. It has been a place to which to go for a Summer holiday.

"But, suddenly, they find they cannot sell their cotton there or their copper, that they cannot market their stocks and bonds there, that they cannot send money to their families who are traveling there, because there is a war. To such men the war must have made it apparent that interdependence among nations is more than a mere phrase.

"All our trade and all our economic and social policies must recognize this. The world has discovered that cash without credit means little. One cannot use cash if one cannot use one's credit to draw it whenever and wherever needed. Credit is intangible and volatile, and may be destroyed over night.

"I saw this in Venice.

"On July 31 I could have drawn every cent that my letter of credit called for up to the time the banks closed. At 10 in the morning on the 1st of August I could not draw the value of a postage stamp.

"Yet the banker in New York who issued my letter of credit had not failed. His standing was as good as ever it had been. But the world's system of international exchange of credit had suffered a stroke of paralysis over night.

"This realization of international in-

terdependence, I hope, will elevate and refine our patriotism by teaching men a wider sympathy and a deeper understanding of other peoples, nations, and languages. I sincerely hope it will educate us up to what I have called 'The International Mind.'

"When Joseph Chamberlain began his campaign after returning from South Africa his keynote was, 'Learn to think imperially.' I think ours should be, 'Learn to think internationally,' to see ourselves not in competition with the other peoples of the world, but working with them toward a common end, the advance of civilization.

A Note of Optimism.

"There are hopeful signs, even in the midst of the gloom that hangs over us. Think what it has meant for the great nations of Europe to have come to us, as they have done, asking our favorable public opinion. We have no army and navy worthy of their fears. They can have been induced by nothing save their conviction that we are the possessors of sound political ideals and a great moral force.

"In other words, they do not want us to fight for them, but they do want us to approve of them. They want us to pass judgment upon the humanity and

the legality of their acts, because they feel that our judgment will be the judgment of history. There is a lesson in this.

"If we had not repealed the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption act last June they would not have come to us as they are doing now. Who would have cared for our opinion in the matter of a treaty violation if, for mere financial interest or from sheer vanity, we ourselves had violated a solemn treaty?

"When Congress repealed the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption act it marked an epoch in the history of the United States. This did more than the Spanish war, than the building of the Panama Canal, or than anything else I think of, to make us a true world power.

"As a nation we have kept our word when sorely tempted to break it. We made Cuba independent, we have not exploited the Philippines, we have stood by our word as to Panama Canal tolls.

"In consequence we are the first moral power in the world today. Others may be first with armies, still others first with navies. But we have made good our right to be appealed to on questions of national and international morality. That Europe is seeking our favor is the tribute of the European nations to this fact."

A New World Map

By Wilhelm Ostwald

Late Visiting Professor to Harvard and Columbia Universities from the University of Leipsic

Letter written by Professor Ostwald to Edwin D. Mead, Director of the World Peace Foundation.

THE war is the result of a deliberate onslaught upon Germany and Austria by the powers of the Triple Entente—Russia, France, and England. Its object is on the part of Russia an extension of Russian supremacy over the Balkans, on the side of France revenge, and on the side

of England annihilation of the German Navy and German commerce. In England especially it has been for several centuries a constant policy to destroy upon favoring occasion every navy of every other country which threatened to become equal to the English Navy.

Germany has proved its love of peace for forty-four years under the most trying circumstances. While all other States have expanded themselves by conquest,

Russia in Manchuria, England in the Transvaal, France in Morocco, Italy in Tripoli, Austria in Bosnia, Japan in Korea, Germany alone has contented itself with the borders fixed in 1871. It is purely a war of defense which is now forced upon us.

In the face of these attacks Germany has until now (the end of August) proved its military superiority, which rests upon the fact that the entire German military force is scientifically organized and honestly administered.

The violation of Belgian neutrality was an act of military necessity, since it is now proved that Belgian neutrality was to be violated by France and England. A proof of this is the accumulation of English munitions in Maubeuge, aside from many other facts.

According to the course of the war up to the present time, European peace seems to me nearer than ever before. We pacifists must only understand that unhappily the time was not yet sufficiently developed to establish peace by the peaceful way. If Germany, as everything now seems to make probable, is victorious in the struggle not only with Russia and France, but attains the further end of destroying the source from which for two or three centuries all European strifes have been nourished and intensified, namely, the English policy of world dominion, then will Germany, fortified on one side by its military superiority, on the other side by the eminently peaceful sentiment of the greatest part of its people, and especially of the German Emperor, dictate peace to the rest of Europe, I hope especially that the future treaty of peace

will in the first place provide effectually that a European war such as the present can never again break out.

I hope, moreover, that the Russian people, after the conquest of their armies, will free themselves from Czarism through an internal movement by which the present political Russia will be resolved into its natural units, namely, Great Russia, the Caucasus, Little Russia, Poland, Siberia, and Finland, to which probably the Baltic provinces would join themselves. These, I trust, would unite themselves with Finland and Sweden, and perhaps with Norway and Denmark, into a Baltic federation, which in close connection with Germany would insure European peace, and especially form a bulwark against any disposition to war which might remain in Great Britain.

For the other side of the earth I predict a similar development under the leadership of the United States. I assume that the English dominion will suffer a downfall similar to that which I have predicted for Russia, and that under these circumstances Canada would join the United States, the expanded republic assuming a certain leadership with reference to the South American republics.

The principle of the absolute sovereignty of the individual nations, which in the present European tumult has proved itself so inadequate and baneful, must be given up and replaced by a system conforming to the world's actual conditions and especially to those political and economic relations which determine industrial and cultural progress and the common welfare.



The Verdict of the American People

A Sermon Delivered at Plymouth Church, Brooklyn,
Dec. 20, 1914

By Newell Dwight Hillis

Pastor of Plymouth Church

N EARLY five months have now passed by since the German Army invaded Belgium and France. These 140 days have been packed with thrilling and momentous events. While from their safe vantage ground the American people have surveyed the scene, an old régime has literally crumbled under our very eyes. Europe is a loom on whose earthen framework demiurgic forces like Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Napoleon once wove the texture of European civilization. Now the demon of war has, with hot knife, shorn away the texture, and a modern Czar and Kaiser, King and President, with Generals and Admirals, are weaving the warp and woof of a new world. One hundred years ago the forces that bred wars were political forces; today the collision between nations is born of economic interests. The twentieth century influences are chiefly the force of wealth and the force of public opinion. These are the giant steeds, though the reins of the horses may be in the hands of Kings and Kaisers. In Napoleon's day antagonism grew out of the natural hatred of autocracy for democracy, of German imperialism for French radicalism. Today Germany is not even interested in France's republican form of Government, nor is France concerned with Germany's imperial autocrat. But all Europe is intensely concerned with the question of economic supremacy or financial subordination.

Ever since Oliver Cromwell's day England has been the mistress of the seas, and Germany is envious and believes that she has a right to supplant England in this naval leadership. France has long

been the banker of Europe, and Germany covets financial leadership. From whence come wars? Come they not from men's lusts? Now that long time has passed, it is quite certain that neither Napoleon nor Bismarck nor William II. understood the future. It is a proverb that yesterday is a seed, today the stalk, and tomorrow is the full corn in the ear. Napoleon was a practical man, but he could not see the shock in the seed. When Napoleon said, "One hundred years from now Europe will be all republican or all Cossack"—Napoleon was quite wrong. Forty years ago Bismarck said that he had reduced France to the level of a fourth-class nation, and that henceforth France did not count; while as for the Balkan States, "the whole Eastern question is not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier"—Bismarck was quite wrong. The present Kaiser has no imagination. A man of any prevision of the future might have foreseen that any attack upon England would settle the Irish question; that any treaty with Turkey would force Italy, as Turkey's enemy in the late Italian-Turkish war, to break with Germany; any man with the least instinct for diplomacy might have known that the twentieth century man is so incensed by an enemy's trespass upon his property, that Belgium would have resisted encroachment, and so cost Germany the best three weeks of the entire war. If the history of great wars tells us anything, it tells us that the first qualification of the statesman and diplomat is an intuitive knowledge of a future that is the certain outcome of the present. There has been no foresight on the part of the makers and advisers of

this war. Years ago, when the Austrian Emperor visited Innsbruck, the Burgo-master ordered foresters to go up on the mountain sides and cut certain swaths of brush. At the moment the man with his axe did not know what he was doing, but when the night fell, and the torch was lifted on the boughs, the people in the city below read these words written in letters of fire, "Welcome to our Emperor." Today the demon of war has been writing with blazing letters certain lessons upon the hills and valleys of Europe, and fortunate is that youth who can read the writing and interpret aright the lessons of the times.

The people of the republic now realize for the first time what are the inevitable fruits of imperialism and militarism. One of the perils of America's distance from the scenes of autocracy is that our people have come to think that the forms of government are of little importance. We hear it said that climate determines government and that one nation likes autocracy and another limited monarchy, that we like democracy, self-government, and that the people are about as happy under one form of control as another. This misconception is based upon a failure to understand foreign imperialism. Superficially, the fruits of autocracy are efficiency, industrial wealth, and military power. But now, after nearly five months of constant discussion, our people understand thoroughly the other side of imperialism. The 6,000,000 of German-Americans living in this country, with their high type of character, millions who have left their native land to escape service in the army, the burdens of taxation involved in militarism, and the law of *lèse majesté*, should have opened our eyes long ago. During the last five years I have lectured in more than one hundred cities on the New Germany and the lessons derived from her industrial efficiency, with the application of science to the production of wealth, but I did not appreciate fully the far-off harvest of militarism. And, lest an American overstate the meaning of militarism, let me condense Treitschke's view. He holds

that the nation should be looked upon as a vast military engine; that its ruler should be the commander of the army; that his Cabinet should be under Generals; that the whole nation should march with the force of an armed regiment; that the real "sin against the Holy Ghost was the sin of military impotence; that such an army should take all it wants and the territory it needs and explain afterward." Manufacturers are essentially inventors of cannons and guns and dreadnoughts, incidentally self-supporting men. Bankers are here to finance the army and incidentally to make money. Physicians are here to heal the wounded soldiers. Gymnasiums are founded to train soldiers. Women are here to breed soldiers, and militarism is the path that will bring Germany to her place in the sun. The youth is first of all to be a soldier and incidentally to be a man. No one has indicted Germany's militarism in stronger language than the distinguished German-American, Carl Schurz. In words that burn the great statesman expressed his hatred of the imperialism and militarism against which he helped to organize a revolution that led to his flight to this country. Of late Americans have been asking themselves certain questions.

The American Ideal vs. the German.

What will be the result if Germany is allowed to seize any smaller State whose territory and property she covets? Is all Europe to become an armed camp? What is the meaning of this German professor's article in *The North American Review*, written two or three years ago, in which he says that once she is victorious the Monroe Doctrine will go and the United States will receive the "thrashing she so richly deserves"? Must we then go over to the military ideal? If Germany supports 8,000,000 soldiers out of 66,000,000, must we withdraw from productive industry 12,000,000 men for at least two or three of the best years of their young life? Must we start in on a programme of ten dreadnoughts a year instead of building ten colleges and universities for the same

sum of money? Of late Americans who love their country have been searching their own hearts. Merchants hitherto busied with commerce are asking themselves whither this country is drifting. Is Germany to compel us to become a vast military machine? This military question is a subject of discussion on the street cars and in the stores, at the dining room table. No articles in paper and magazine are so eagerly read and analyzed. The American ideal is not a military machine, but a high quality of manhood. To make men free, with the gift of self-expression; to make men wise through the public school and the free press; to make men self-sufficing and happy in their homes, through freedom of industrial contracts; to make men sound of their manhood through religious liberty for Jew and Gentile and Catholic and Protestant—these are our national ideals. America stands at the other pole of the universe from imperialism and militarism. So far from being willing to desert the political faith of the fathers, this war has confirmed our confidence in self-government. Liberty to grow, freedom to climb as high as industry and ability will permit, liberty to analyze and discuss the views of President, Congress, Governor—these are our rights. In a military autocracy there can be no liberty of the printing press. If a man criticises the Kaiser, he goes to jail; in this republic, if Horace Greeley criticises Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln does not send the great editor to jail, but writes the latter, "My paramount object is to save the Union," and vindicates himself at the bar of the nation. An American editor or citizen would choke to death in Germany. He could not breathe because of the mephitic gases of imperialism and militarism. For a long time some of us did not realize what was involved, but now we do realize the difference between the fruits of democratic self-government and the fruits of military imperialism.

The last five months have brought a new realization to American citizens as to the rights and liberties of small States. In the republic the sin of trespass is one of the blackest of sins. Here we hold to

the sanctity of property. A man's home is his castle, a citadel that cannot be invaded even by the power of the State. So deep is the American hatred of trespass against property rights that imperialism finds it impossible to understand this. Here the individual is a king of kings in his native right, and takes out an injunction against the city that wishes to trespass upon his property. This antagonism manifests itself in the laws that safeguard the small shopkeeper against the big firm, and the small manufacturer against any company with its billion dollars of capital. This antagonism to the sin of trespass has lent a peculiar sanctity to treaties between Canada and the United States. We have one hundred millions of people, and Canada nine millions. We need many things that Canada has, but it is intellectually unthinkable that "we should take what we want and explain afterward," or that we should violate our treaty guaranteeing neutrality to Canada. Our frontier line is three thousand miles long. There is not a fort from Maine to Victoria. If we adopted Germany's position we would have to build one thousand forts, withdraw two million young men from the farm, factory, store and bank, and load the working people with taxes to support them. In a free land, and in God's world, there should be a place for the poor man and for the small nation. In the olden time there was a king who had herds and flocks, and a poor man who had one pet lamb. It came to pass that a stranger claimed the right of hospitality at the rich man's palace, and the king sent out and took the poor man's one lamb and gave it for food to the stranger. And, soon or late, the time will come when history will tell the story of Germany's taking little Belgium, and conscience, like a prophet, will indict the militarism that seized the one lamb that belonged to the poor man. This episode is not closed. The German representative who says that Belgium is a part of Germany may be right in terms of future government and war, but the incident has just begun in the memory of the soldiers who never can forget that they first broke their sacred treaty, and then, when the Bel-

gian defended his home as his castle, butchered the man, who died with a sacred treaty in his hand. Why, all over this land, teachers, fathers, editors, authors, have found it necessary to say to the young men and women of the republic, "Do not sign your name to an obligation unless you intend to keep it." Keep your faith. Remember that your word given should be as good as your bond. "Swear to your own hurt, and change not." All this is inevitable, as the result of Germany's trespass upon the property and the homes of Belgium. In some European lands the State is everything and the individual nothing. In this republic the individual is first, and the State is here to safeguard his rights and see to it that no one trespasses upon his property. The time will come when the nation that breaks its treaties and sows to the wind shall of that wind reap the whirlwind. It is an awful thing for a nation to make it inevitable that hereafter when other people sign a treaty with that country, that our representatives shall say: "Before we sign this treaty with you, we wish to ask one question. Later, if it is to your interest to break this treaty, is this document to be sneered at as a scrap of paper? Or does this treaty mean the faith of a nation that will die rather than break its word, given before the tribunal of civilized States?"

The Death of the Tribal God Idea.

This great war and one or two of the leaders thereof have killed the old tribal idea of God. In the twentieth century it seems almost ludicrous to find that the conception of the ancient Hebrews is still held by some rulers. Be the reasons what they may, of late there has been a strange recrudescence of the tribal God idea. This is the twentieth century, not the tenth! Think of a man sending his soldiers into Belgium, saying, "Make yourselves as terrible as the Huns of Attila, and the Lord our God will give you victory." Just as if God were not the God of the whole earth, a disinterested God, a God who makes His sun to shine and His rain to fall upon all His children, without regard to race or clime

or color. Why, it is as artless as the way the old Hebrew peasant called on God to blast his enemy's field, and drown his children with floods, and smite his herds with the plague. The tribal idea of God belongs with the ox cart, the medicine man, the cave dweller. This is an era of science. Whatever is true is universal, not racial. If the heart beats and the blood circulates in a German soldier's veins, the blood flows in the veins of the people of England and France. If the earth goes around the sun in Berlin, the earth goes around the sun in Petrograd and Edinburgh. If there are seven rays in the sunbeam, why, the discussion is closed, and it is a universal fact. And if Jesus was right when He said, "God is our Father, and all the races are our brothers, and the world has been fitted up by God as an Eden garden for His children," then no man or ruler should ever adopt the view of the peasant and the cave man, and try to make the Eternal God a tribal God. The unconscious humor in the statements of one or two men as to their tribal God idea has added to the gayety of nations. But when any view is laughed at, it is doomed. From the very moment that the doctrine of election, that made God love a few aristocrats and pass the non-elect by, became a matter of joke in the comic papers, that theory was dead. Not otherwise is it with this idea of a tribal God. When Barry Paine begins to say,

Led by William, as you tell,
God has done extremely well,

the tribal idea has been relegated to the theological scrap-heap. The peasant's view must go. In this age men must be citizens of all countries and of the universe. God is a sun Who shines for the poor man's hut as truly as for the rich man's palace. The Judge of all the earth is also the Father of all the races, and He will do men good and not evil.

In view of the events of the last few months, all Americans now realize as never before the futility of war as means of settling disputes. Indeed, it may be doubted even whether any war has ever settled any question. Defeat did not convince the South that they were wrong in their idea of State rights or

slavery. If the South has given up both ideas today it is because time, events, and social progress have changed their view, not because the sword convinced them. Bismarck's victory at Versailles and von Moltke's at Sedan did not settle the dispute with France. To keep one billion dollars of indemnity Germany must have spent five billions on forts and armies in the government of Alsace and Lorraine. Germany's apparent victory simply put Germany's trouble with France out at compound interest, and left the next generation of Germans to pay several billions of dollars of accrued debt through hatred. Plainly it is folly not to reconstitute the map of Europe. The frontier lines of the geographer should exactly coincide with the racial lines. The German race, with their peculiar ideals, ought not to try to govern the French race. It is an expensive experiment. It is an impossible experiment. The plan is doomed to failure in advance. And when the day of payment comes it is quite certain that the questions at issue will not have been settled by regiments of soldiers. They must finally be settled by an appeal to some court of arbitration that will do justice and love mercy; that will insist upon the rights of the smaller States, and make it impossible for the great ones of the earth to trespass upon the property and the liberties of brave little peoples.

Imperialism Confuses Men's Judgments.

Out of the smoke of battle another lesson is written for all who have eyes to read. In view of the mistakes made by men who have absolute power it is now certain that exemption from criticism is a bad thing for any man, and that endless adoration destroys the ruler's power to think in straight lines. There never lived a man who was not injured by perpetual compliments. Strong men are willing to pay cash for criticism. Flattery will conceal the weakness, and they know that pitiless criticism will expose the danger and perhaps save them. No man is so unfortunate as the man who is put on a throne lifted up beyond the reach of plain truth telling. It is doubtful if so many blunders were ever made

by statesmen and diplomats as were made at the beginning of this war. Just think of one Government being wrong in all these particulars at the same time! Lincoln said, "You can't fool all of the people all of the time." Yes, that may be true in a republic, but you certainly can fool all the diplomats and Generals and do it all the time—during July and August, in any event. Call the roll of the diplomatic blunders, and the list is long. First, England will be neutral and Ireland will keep her from going to war; second, Italy will be our ally; third, Belgium will be neutral and allow us to trespass upon her property and her homes; fourth, France is unprepared and Paris will fall within three weeks; fifth, an alliance with Turkey, despite her polygamy and butcheries in Armenia and the civilized world's hatred for her cruelties, will help us; sixth, Japan will hold Russia in check; seventh, the Czar will be attacked by Bulgaria, Italy, and China. It seems incredible that any ruler and group of diplomats could be so entirely wrong, all the time, on every question, for a whole Summer! Was there no man as diplomat who had the wisdom to see that an attack upon England would end the disputes in Ireland? And bind together Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India into a new United States of Great Britain? Was there no statesman with enough prevision of the future, and with courage to tell the people in Wilhelmstrasse that the certain result would be the United States of Balkany, to stand henceforth as a barrier between Germany and the Bosphorus? Was there no one to remind Berlin that Italy had just completed a war with Turkey and that any treaty with Turkey meant inevitably the breaking of friendship with Italy? Alas! for the man who is elevated to a throne, in whose presence men burn incense, pour forth flattery that he may breathe its perfume, sing songs of praise that he may slumber!

In concluding our survey of the nations and the stake of each country in the war, there is one reflection that must be obvious to all thinking men. This little fire of last August has become a world conflagration.

gration. The nation that first sent out her armies was Germany. There is a high-water mark of battle in every war, and after that, the invading waves begin their retreat. The high-water mark of Napoleon's was Austerlitz and the waves ebbed away at Waterloo. The high-water mark of the civil war was at Gettysburg, and the tide ebbed out at Appomattox.

Belgium's defense cost Germany the three most important weeks of the war, and her high-water mark was when she was within twenty miles of Paris. Occasional eddies and returns of the tide there may be, but nothing is more certain than that there are ten nations and six hundred millions of men that had rather die than have militarism imposed upon themselves and their children. Americans who admire German efficiency, the German people, and want to see German science preserved, and feel an immeasurable debt to Martin Luther, do not want Germany destroyed. But Germany will not listen to England, nor France, nor America. There is only one voice that can reach Germany—it is the voice of the German-Americans in this country. They are six million strong. They are among the most honored and esteemed folk in American life. Their achievements are beyond all praise. The Germans have built Milwaukee and have done much for St. Louis. The Germans have been great forces in Cincinnati and Chicago and New York. What wealth among their bankers! What prosperity among German manufacturers! What solidity of manhood in these German Lutherans! Was there ever a finer body of farming folk than the German land-owners of the Middle West? The republic owes the German-American a great debt as to liberty through men like Carl Schurz. Take Martin Luther and German liberty of thought out of the republic and this land would suffer an immeasurable loss. Many of these German-Americans own great estates and have investments in the Fatherland. Today these six million German-Americans have the centre of the world's stage. This war is a conflagration that will probably burn itself out. But if the

six million German-Americans organize themselves and hold great meetings of protest in New York and Brooklyn and Chicago and Milwaukee, in St. Louis and Cincinnati; if German-American editors and bankers and business men united their voice, they would be heard.

German-American Man of the Hour.

And do they not owe something to this Republic? Having come to the kingdom for such a crisis as this, should they not use their influence with the Fatherland? Having escaped conscription and years of military service, with heavy taxation and enjoyed the liberty of the press; having become convinced that militarism does not promote the prosperity and manhood of the people, why should they not as one man ask the Fatherland now to present their cause to arbitrators? To no body of American citizens has there ever come a more strategic opportunity, or a responsibility so heavy. Some of the most thoughtful men in this land believe that the destiny of Germany rests now largely with the leaders of the 6,000,000 German-Americans in our country. But no matter what the outcome, let no man think that God and justice are not fully equal to this emergency. The great vine of Liberty was planted by Divine hands in the Eden garden. Just now men are feeding the blossoms of the tree of life to their war horses and splitting the boughs of that tree into shafts for their spears. The storm roars through the branches, but the storm will die out. Better days are coming. It may be that the convulsion of war will do for Europe what the earthquake did for the rude folk of Greece—cracked the solid rock and exposed the silver veins that gave the wealth with which rude men built Athens, with its art, its literature, its law and its liberty. Take no counsel of crouching fear, God is abroad in the world. With Him a thousand years are as one day. When a long time has passed let us believe that self-government will be found to be the most stable form of government, and that these golden words, Liberty, Opportunity, Intelligence, and Integrity, will be the watchwords not only of the republic, but of all the nations of the earth.

Dr. Hillis Answers His Critics

A FRANK declaration that he was opposed to Germany in the present great war was the answer returned Dec. 21, 1914, by the Rev. Dr. Newell Dwight Hillis to the protests against his sermon at Plymouth Church, in which he scored militarism and the Kaiser.

Not only did Dr. Hillis come out with the statement that he had said and meant all to which exception was taken in his sermon, but, in an interview in his study, in the Arbuckle Institute, he asserted as well that he had told but little of what he had come to believe about Germany. This position, he said, was that America and all the world must hope for German defeat, and must see that Germany was in the wrong.

"I was for Germany five months ago," said Dr. Hillis. "I have been lecturing for five years about the lessons we might learn from Germany. Five months ago, it may be remembered, I gave an interview, in which I praised Germany and in which I took the part of the German people in the dreadful war that had come.

"But I have changed my mind. I have seen that I was mistaken. Several months ago I gave instructions to my lecture bureau to withdraw my lecture, 'The New Germany,' from my list. That was about the middle of September, and it was only then that I realized what a German success would mean to the world—how there could be nothing else but a world of armed camps, how we in this country, too, would have to adopt militarism in order to live.

"Just prior to that time, in the first of my Sunday evening sermons in this course, I had praised the Kaiser. I believed in the German ideals, I believed in German progress, German inventions, German principles. But I was wrong. I have now become convinced of what I never imagined before—that in the German viewpoint the only sin against the

Holy Ghost is military impotency, and, to use Treitschke's words again, the only virtue is militarism."

The pastor of Plymouth uttered this attack upon Germany with a scornfulness which the printed word can hardly indicate. He was as strongly against Germany—more strongly against Germany now than he had before been in favor of Germany, he said. It was a position, he said, to which everybody in the United States was turning, and it was inevitable that Germany should find the world against her.

In his frank avowal of his position regarding Germany and the Kaiser, Dr. Hillis admitted, too, that his sermon had contained more than appeared on the surface. When he stated in the sermon that no man or ruler should ever adopt the view of the peasant and the cave man, and try to make the Eternal God a tribal God, he had the Kaiser in mind, said Dr. Hillis.

In addition, Dr. Hillis said that while he believed that his sermon could not be considered in any way a violation of President Wilson's appeal for neutrality, yet, indirectly, the passages to which exception had been taken could be rightly construed as an attack upon Germany and the Kaiser.

"You believe that it is right for a minister to use the pulpit to express his own views upon a subject like this?" was asked.

"I do not believe that it is right for a minister to air his peculiar political views upon any subject—personal, social, or economic," answered Dr. Hillis, emphatically. "The church is a conservatory where a warm, genial atmosphere should be created. My conception of the work of a minister is that he is to create an atmosphere in the church on Sunday so that the Republican with the tariff, the Democrat who believes in free trade,

and the Single Taxer can all grow and express their judgment during the week.

"The sun and the Summer shine for all kinds of seeds and roots, and the minister and the church should create an atmosphere in which all temperaments and races and faiths can grow. It is quite true that there were some of my German friends and members who rather protested against my view. But they had the same right and liberty to protest that I have. A German physician told me plainly that he thought that within six months I would change my view, and with the new light go over to the position of his native land, and even thought that I might retract all my studies that are apparently prejudiced in favor of the republic and self-government and the liberty of the press. Well, if I do change my views and am converted to his viewpoint, I certainly will retract my statements. But I think this improbable. The task of converting me should be let out as a Government contract—in piecemeal."

Dr. Hillis was reminded here that a number of people were said to have left the church in the course of his sermon as a sign of protest against the expression of his views. Asked if it were true, Dr. Hillis answered:

"I did not see many leave," and then declared that it was impossible to imagine that war should not be discussed in the churches as it was being discussed everywhere else. He continued with the assertion that he believed it was his duty as the minister of Plymouth Church to say what he had, and then made this assertion with a vehemence that was almost startling:

"Whenever the time comes that I have to add God and the devil together and divide by two in the name of neutrality, I'll withdraw. I'm not going to sacrifice my manhood for what some people call neutrality."

It was on this score that Dr. Hillis came out with his unequivocal declaration that he was against Germany and against the Kaiser. He asserted that the viewpoint of the German people would have to be changed if they were to

take the place in the world he had thought their due, five months ago, and he stated there could be no doubt but that the war was occasioned by Germany's lust for power—political, industrial, economic.

"I believe that the real issue of this war is largely industrial," continued Dr. Hillis. "It is an industrial war and not a political war. Some days ago I said that the real fight between Germany and the nations opposed to her was a fight for the possession of the iron fields recently discovered in Northern France. That statement regarding Germany's iron deposits and the whole economic situation has been challenged.

"Instead of modifying my position, I wish to reaffirm it. This is an age of steel. Without hematite iron deposits Germany cannot build her steamships, her cannon, her railways, her factories. German engineers have been saying for five years that another five years will exhaust her present iron supply. On Page 221 of the volume 'Problems of Power,' the author says that within a generation 20,000,000 of Germany's people will have to leave their native land. The pressure of iron and the call of steel led to Germany's development of the Morocco situation, where there are valuable iron mines. A short time ago French engineers discovered the largest and richest body of iron ore in Europe. Fullerton, in his book on the subject, expresses the judgment that one province has enough hematite iron ore to last Europe for the next 150 years.

"This diplomat and author said plainly two years ago, in one of his review articles, that Germany would go to war to obtain the iron deposits in Northern France, and that if she loses the war, she will fall behind in the manufacturing race, and that the French bankers and French engineers will make France the great manufacturing force and the richest people in Europe. The Napoleonic wars were wars between political ideas. The collision was between autocracy and bureaucracy and French democracy and radicalism. The new antagonism grows out of economic conditions. Germany

wants to supersede England upon the seas, and Germany wants the iron mines of France, and this is the whole situation in a nutshell.

"No, I am not sinning against the law of neutrality. I am trying to freshen the old American ideals of self-government for the young men and women in Plymouth Church. If the whole-hearted support of America's free institutions involves indirectly a dissent from imperialism and militarism, I am not responsible. I admit there is a necessary condemnation of autocracy involved in the mere publication of the Declaration of Independence. Ours is a Government of laws and not of men, and I have been discussing the principles of self-govern-

ment and not rulers who represent imperialism.

"Neutrality does not mean the wiping out of conviction. There are some men who think that neutrality means adding God and the devil together and dividing by two. And there are some statesmen who seem to think that neutrality means adding together autocracy and democracy, and halving the result. I do not share that view. I believe it is the first duty of the German-American and the native-born American to uphold the fundamental principles of self-government, and of an industrial civilization as opposed to a military machine, and if this means protest and criticism, then that protest must be accepted."

TIPPERARY

By JOHN B. KENNEDY

(At the other end of the long, long road.)

WHO is it stands at the full o' the door?
Mary O'Fay, Mother O'Fay.
An' what is she watching an' waiting
for?

Och, none but her soul can say.

There's a list in the Post Office long an'
black,

With tidings bad, and woeful sad;
The names of the boys who'll ne'er come
back,
An' one is her darling lad.

We showed her the list; but she cannot read,
So we told her true, yes, we told her true.
Her old eyes stared till they'd almost bleed,
An' she swore that none of us knew.

She's waiting now for Father O'Toole,
Till he goes her way at the noon of day.
She's simperin' white—the poor old fool,
For she knows what the priest'll say.

* * * * *

Who is it sprawls upon the sod
At the break o' day? It's Mickey O'Fay;
His eyes glare up to the walls of God,
And half of his head is blown away.

What is he doing in that strange place,
Torn and shred, and murdered dead?
He's singin' the psalm of the fighting race
As his soul soars wide o'erhead.

He killed three foemen before he fell
(Och, the toll he'd take and the skulls he'd
break!)

And he shrieked like a soul escaped from
Hell
As he died for the Sassenach's sake.

Who shall we blame for the awful thing—
For the blood that flows and the heart-
wringing throes?
Kaiser or Czar; statesman or King?
Och, leave it to Him Who Knows!

As America Sees the War

By Harold Begbie

American Correspondent of The London Chronicle

I.

EVERY day of my sojourn in this country deepens the desire in my mind to see an increasing unity of understanding between America and England. I feel that the audacity of America, its passion for the Right Thing, and its impatience with the spirit of muddling through are the finest incentives for modern England, England at this dawn of her political renaissance. I feel, too, as Americans themselves most willingly acknowledge, that Great Britain has something to give to America out of the ancient treasury of her domestic experience. Finally, I like Americans so heartily that I want to be the best of friends with them.

But it was only recently in this old and mighty City of Philadelphia that the greatest of reasons for an alliance was brought sharply home to my mind. I had thought, loosely enough, that since we speak the same language, share many of the same traditions, and equally desire peace for the prosperity of our trade, surely some alliance between us was natural, and with a little effort might be made inevitable. The deeper, more political, and far grander reason for this comradeship between the two nations had never definitely shaped itself to my consciousness.

Enlightenment came to me in the course of conversation with two thoughtful Philadelphians whose minds are centred on something which transcends patriotism and who work with fine courage and remarkable ability for the triumph of their idea.

One of these men said to me: "You speak of an alliance between England

and America; do you mind telling us what you mean by that term alliance?"

I explained that I had no thought in my mind of treaties and tariffs; that the word "alliance" meant nothing more to me than conscious friendship, and that such a disposition between two nations thinking in the same language, speaking and writing the same language, must result, I thought, in an ever-multiplying volume of trade, to the great advantage of both parties.

Thinks Little of Blood Ties.

Out of this explanation came the following statement, made by the second Philadelphian: "I am as desirous as you are for such an understanding. I desire it so greatly that I venture to offer you a warning on the subject. It would be a mistake on your part, I am convinced, to advocate any such friendship, any such understanding, any such alliance, if you prefer that word, on the score of blood ties or a common speech. Believe me, the American, to speak generally, thinks very little of such matters. When America was far more English in its population than it is now scarcely any country was more unpopular with us than your country.

"I can remember when hatred for England was a kind of gospel with Americans. The Irish fanned that hatred. Your country had behaved badly toward us, war had left its scar on our memories, we rejoiced that we had thrown off a yoke which we felt to be definitely tyrannous. What, then, has produced the change in America—America, whose population is now made up from nearly all the nations of the

earth? Have your people thought why we are on their side in this present war? Have they asked themselves that question? If so, and they have answered it with such a phrase as 'blood is thicker than water,' I can assure you they give not only a false answer but an answer which betrays amazing ignorance, if you will forgive the word, of this country's population. Blood thicker than water! Why, look at our names; our blood is world's blood.

"We're a nation of all the nations. The English element is only one element. Our ancestors were French, Dutch, German, Spanish, Norwegian, Russian, Danish, Irish, Greek, and Italian. The modern American citizen is no more English than the Boers of South Africa are English. And yet in overwhelming figures the American population is on the side of the Allies, and particularly on the side of England. Why?

England Stands for Democracy.

"It is," he continued, "because England of all the nations on the earth stands for the democratic ideals which are the very breath of life to America. Modern England is for us the greatest of democracies. You lead the way to the rest of the world, if not in science and art, at any rate here in the great business of humanity's social existence. We see that the old England of privilege and obstinate prerogatives and bull-headed conservatism is dead. All your best qualities, straight dealing, honesty, fearless justice, and faith in the goodness of human nature are devoted now to the only ideals which can save progress from rot and decay. Your democracy is master. It has no overlords. And, from what we can gather since this war broke out, it would seem that your aristocracy is coming more and more into line with the democracy, making great sacrifices, showing a deeper appreciation of the democracy and shedding the worst of its prejudices in the common love of liberty and right.

"We hope that your aristocracy may render as great a service to the extravagant plutocracy of this country as your democracy has rendered to our democ-

racy. To make life better, that's the work of all intelligent people. That's what our democracy is after, and, because your democracy is after the same thing, that's why we are on your side in this war. Under all the sentiment on the subject this is the bedrock fact. We're for England because we're for the ideals of democracy. That we speak the same language is only an accident. It's your spirit we desire to share, the spirit which desires to make life kinder, sweeter, better, more beautiful, and more righteous. America believes in civilization. It doesn't want culture in bearskin and top boots. It wants civilization, and civilization means a culture that takes in the whole of a man's being—his body, his mind, his spirit. Well, we think you're after the same ideal; we believe that you're as conscious of humanity as we are, and we begin to realize pretty acutely that in a world rather barbarous on the whole, come to think of it, we can't afford to lose England."

The other man added: "Germany stands for nearly everything we Americans are opposed to, tooth and nail. We just loathe militarism. Conscription's a thing we abominate. And feudalism is more dead over here than in any country in the world."

"But bear in mind," said the first, "we have few people in America better than the Germans. The Germans are almost the most efficient of our immigrants. They've taught us a lot. We owe them a mighty big debt. Before their coming we were prodigals. We used up our natural resources with a ruthless disregard for the future. We leveled our forests for timber, and just scratched the top soil of the land for corn. Now we're learning to farm scientifically and to conserve our wealth. And this is due in no small degree to the Germans. The German, emancipated from feudalism and Kaiserism, is a pretty good citizen. In fact, among the men who have most helped modern America we reckon Germans and Irishmen."

I told them this story: A man in New York was speaking the other day to Count von Bernstorff, the German

Ambassador. Count von Bernstorff was endeavoring to prove to this important personage that England had forced the war upon Germany out of jealousy of her trade competition. "Sir," said the American, "you really must not tell me that, and I advise you not to tell such a tale to other Americans. For we know very well that we are greater trade rivals of England than you are, and that, in spite of that fact, here on this continent of America we have got 3,000 miles of British frontier without a fort or a gun." He then said to the Ambassador: "No, Sir; your mistake all through has been in making an enemy of England when your best interest was to make friends with her. If you had made friends with England, you would have got all you wanted." To this accusation, I understand, the Ambassador made answer that Germany had endeavored to make friends with England, but had been repulsed. We have a different record in England. The American quietly reminded the Ambassador of the fact that England admits German goods free of tariff charges.

Germany Represents Autocracy.

The two Philadelphians perfectly agreed with the justice of this accusation, and declared again that it was because Germany represented all the perils and slavishness of autocracy, and because England represented the freedom, the justice, and the passion for social welfare which inspire all living democracies, that America was so absolutely on the English side.

They spoke of Ireland, and expressed the hope that the Conservative Party would do nothing to hinder that great settlement which has done so much to increase American respect for England.

"We recognize over here," said one, "that the Liberal Party, in going to the rescue of Belgium, sacrificed some of its greatest ideals on the altar of national righteousness. War must have been a bitter draught for Lloyd George.

Your social programme will be checked for many years. But if the Conservatives attempt to spoil the Irish settlement, that will be worse than anything else. It will mean confusion for you at home and loss of reputation abroad."

I spoke of what I had heard on this subject from Irish-Americans, and they confirmed everything recorded in my former article. The three great things, outside of increasing opportunities for intercourse, which have drawn modern America toward England, they told me, are the social legislation of the Liberal Party, the triumph of home rule, and England's keeping her word to Belgium. By these three things, I was assured, the old animosities against England have been destroyed, and a spirit of enthusiasm for English ideals has been born among Americans.

I should like to say that, while many American women love England for the beauty and repose of her social life, and most eloquently base their affection on the assertion that blood is thicker than water, the men of America are sometimes inclined, and not unnaturally, to disapprove of this pleasing sentimentalism. I now begin to perceive that the men of America are not jealous of England's social life, but anxious to put their friendship on a more substantial foundation.

Liberalism not only uplifts democracy; it establishes England in the affection of all vital democracies. If the Conservatives, so liberal and charming in their private lives, combine with the Liberals after this hideous war to reconstruct our national life and to consolidate the empire, how great will be the harvest reaped by our children!

It is in the high and lofty name of civilization that the American people are anxious to make friends with the people of Great Britain. We have both got something to live for greater than patriotism and imperialism, greater because it includes them both.

II.

Attitude of Irish-Americans

UNTIL I came to America I had not the least idea of the depth of hatred which has existed among Irish-Americans toward England. Nothing that I ever encountered in Ireland itself is comparable with this transatlantic fury of unforgetting hate.

An Irishman who had held very high office in America, a well-educated, a kindly, and a judicious man, told me that when war with Germany was in the air he could not prevent himself from hailing this opportunity for declaring his hatred, his undying hatred, of England. His father had suffered frightfully in the great famine; every story he ever heard at his mother's knee was a story of English tyranny, English brutality, English rapacity; England, for him, stood at the rack centre, the lustful and bestial slave driver, the cruel and merciless extortioner.

This man's good judgment, however, would not suffer him to approve of German militarism, and as events moved forward he gave his support more and more to the cause of the Allies.

"But I want you to know," he told me, striking the table with his hand and watching me carefully, "that I was dead against John Redmond for saying that Ireland must go to the aid of England. Ireland's call was to go to the aid of civilization. If Germany had stood for civilization, I should have been on Germany's side and dead against England.

"I tell you, at the beginning of this business I longed to see England defeated, humiliated, broken to the dust. But civilization is of such enormous consequence that I put my natural hatred of England on one side. The violation of Belgium made me an anti-German. And with the vast majority of Irishmen in America it was the same thing. The menace of German militarism forced us into your camp.

"I am perfectly certain that but for the violation of Belgium there would have been in this country among Irish-Americans an open movement publicly proclaimed in favor of Germany. That is my fixed opinion. And I happen to know what I am talking about."

No Hatred of England

I gathered in the course of his conversation that Irish friendliness toward England is a final manifestation of a change in the feeling of all America toward England. It was not very long ago that President Cleveland wanted war with England. Hatred of England was at one time as fiercely handed down from generation to generation by Americans as by Irish-Americans. We have to thank our English stars that America has outgrown this historic hate and that Irish-Americans now show the new and happier feeling of their compatriots.

I asked this Irishman, no one better able throughout America to express a just opinion on the subject, what difference had been made in the feeling toward England by the passing of the Home Rule bill.

"It was the passing of that bill," he replied, "which finished the work begun by German militarism. Home rule has softened our feelings toward England, particularly among the thousands of Irish-Americans who are born over here and whose fathers have become too Americanized to remember the sufferings of their ancestors.

"There is still some hatred of England, but not very much. It is a sentimental, a poetic hatred, not a political hatred. One finds it among a few individuals. What agitation is now going on is secret and underground, a sure proof that it is unrepresentative. We ignore it. It means nothing. No; the passing of the Home Rule bill has given balance to the Irish mind.

"It has helped Irish-Americans to realize that the dreadful sins of England

are sins of a dead and gone England, and it has helped them to see that the present England, so far as its democracy is concerned, sincerely desires to make reparation for the past. In fact, the war and the Home Rule bill together have produced such a transformation in the Irish-American nature as I, for one, never expected and never hoped to see."

He then warned me that this great change might suffer a dangerous reaction if England allows the religious bigotry of Ulster to split Ireland into two camps. To the Irish-American Ireland is a country, a home, and a shrine, one and indivisible.

"Such a surrender," said my friend, "would not only be fatal to Ireland but fatal to something even greater than Ireland, and that is the cause of religion in an age of increasing paganism. For the world can only be saved from the ruin of paganism, as we are beginning to see very clearly in America, by a union of religious forces.

"I am a Catholic, but I say that any man who says 'Only through my door can you enter into heaven' is a bad Christian. There are many doors into heaven. What we have all got to do, Catholics and non-Catholics, is to insist together that there is a heaven, that there is a life after death, that there is a God. The more doors the better. No one has a monopoly of heaven.

"And to Ireland is offered the opportunity, greater than politicians appear to perceive, of presenting to the world an example of tolerance and compromise in the supreme interests of religion which may have incalculable results for the whole world. But what will happen if England bows before the worst and the stupidest bigotry the modern world can show? Not only will you strike a blow at Ireland and a blow at Irish-American sympathy, but a blow at the vitals of religion.

"For it is only by sinking religious differences and making a common advance against this universal paganism that religion can save the soul of civilization. If you do not see the truth of that fact in England I think you must

be blind. The fullness of civilization hangs upon religious union; religious dissension is the enemy."

Change in Ulster.

Another Irish-American who was present on this occasion, an accomplished man of letters and a traveler, asked me what England felt about Ulster's share in the responsibility for the present war.

"I myself have seen two letters from Ulster," he said, "in which the phrase occurs, 'Rather the Kaiser than the Pope.' These letters were written before the war. Ulster, no doubt, has now changed her tune. But it was that spirit, surely, and the reports sent to Berlin by German officers who visited Ulster and inquired into the military character of Carsonism which persuaded Germany that England would not fight."

Irish-Americans are persuaded that Sir Edward Carson is in very great measure responsible for all the ruin and death and bitter suffering of the enormous catastrophe. He boasted that he would make civil war, and such were his preparations that in any other country in the world civil war would have been inevitable.

Germany counted on that civil war. The British Army was said to be completely under the influence of Carsonism. The real catastrophe for the diplomacy of Berlin was not India's loyalty and the vigorous uprising of the young dominions, but the dying down of Ulster mutiny.

These Irish-American have hated the ruling classes in England, not only for sins of the past but for the unworthy and most cruel opposition offered by those ruling classes, in the name of religious intolerance, to the ideals of the Irish Nation.

When Unionist politicians sneer at the subscriptions sent by Irish servant girls in America to help the cause of Ireland they should reflect that not only do they fail to make a good joke, not only do they exhibit a horribly bad taste, but they spread hatred of England through the thousands and thousands of people. For it is the loyalty of the poorest of

these Irish-Americans, the sacrifices perpetually made by the humblest of them, which should move us to see, as it has certainly moved the American people to see, that the cause of Irish liberty is noble and undying.

Religious Education.

With all my heart I would beg Unionists in England to reflect conscientiously upon this very significant state of affairs in America:

A non-Catholic Bible used to be read in the public schools of America down to the year 1838. A Catholic agitation against this Bible reading was begun in 1885, and in 1888 the custom was finally abolished. From that date to this there has been no religious instruction of any kind in the public schools of America.

Bigotry and intolerance won that victory. The Catholic Church, in its folly, destroyed religious teaching in the schools of the country. Catholics themselves are now looking back on that agitation with religious repentance and political regret.

The result of this abolition is that Catholics and non-Catholics who believe in the importance of religious instruction, and who see the pagan effect of purely secular instruction, do not send their children to the public schools.

These schools, for which Christians are heavily taxed, are in the possession of the Hebrews. If nothing is done to alter the existing state of things Americans themselves assure me that in five-and-twenty years America will be a pagan country. But a fight is to be made to avert this disaster at the Constitutional Convention to be held next month.

"What we have to do," my Irish friend told me, "Catholics and non-Catholics alike, is to appeal for schools representing Catholic and non-Catholic teaching. Instead of the various churches fighting against each other they must fight together, helping one another to get the schools they demand. Only in this way can we save civilization."

This is how the Irishman, breathing the free air of America, and in America rising to positions of extraordinary power and responsibility, views the foundational question of religion; while England allows herself to be dragged at the heels of the frothing fanatic who has actually dared to raise the unholy battle cry of "Rather the Kaiser than the Pope."

Let the Unionist Party hesitate before it seeks to revive this hideous, utterly irrational and most unchristianlike spirit at the very heart of the British Empire. The sower of hate is the reaper of death.

TO MELOS, POMEGRANATE ISLE

By GRACE HARRIET MACURDY

(Destroyed by Athens, 416 B. C., because of her refusal to break neutrality.—Thucydides V., 84-116; Euripides, "Trojan Women.")

O THOU Pomegranate of the Sea,
 Sweet Melian isle, across the years
 Thy Belgian sister calls to thee
 In anguished sweat of blood and tears.

Her fate like thine—a ruthless band
 Hath ravaged all her loveliness.
 How Athens spoiled thy prosperous land
 Athenian lips with shame confess.

Thou, too, a land of lovely arts,
 Of potter's and of sculptor's skill—
 Thy folk of high undaunted hearts
 As those that throb in Belgium still.

Within thy harbor's circling rim
 The warships long, with banners bright,
 Sailed bearing Athens' message grim—
 "God hates the weak. Respect our Might."

The flame within thy fanes grew cold,
 Stilled by the foeman's swarming hordes.
 Thy sons were slain, thy daughters sold
 To serve the lusts of stranger lords.

For Attic might thou didst defy
 Thy folk the foeman slew as sheep,
 Across the years hear Belgium's cry—
 "O Sister, of the Wine-Dark Deep.

"Whose cliffs gleam seaward roseate.
 Not one of all my martyr roll
 But keeps his faith inviolate,
 Man kills our body, not our soul."

What America Can Do

By Lord Channing of Wellingborough

Lord Channing was born in the United States of the well-known Channings of Boston. His father was the Rev. W. H. Channing, Chaplain of the House of Representatives during the civil war. Lord Channing has been for twenty-five years a member of the British Parliament, and for the last three years a member of the House of Lords, having been created first Baron of Wellingborough in 1912. He is President of the British National Peace Congress.

AS a member of the British Legislature for a generation, and a lifelong Liberal, and having also the closest ties of blood with America, and a proud reverence for her ideals, I would wish, with the utmost respect, to offer some comments on one specific aspect of present affairs, as they affect America, which does not seem to have been marked off with the distinctness its importance calls for.

This is the greatest crisis in the history of the world, and attention concentrates itself on the attitude of the greatest neutral State.

It is unthinkable that America can divest herself of responsibility for the final outcome. This seems as clearly recognized in America as in Europe.

To us in England this war is a life or death struggle between two principles—Pan-Germanism on the one side, with its avowed purpose to impose its hegemony and its rigid system of ideas and organization on the rest of the world, not by consent, but by irresistible military force; on the other side the claim of the other nations, large and small, to maintain inviolate their freedom and individuality, and to think and work out for themselves their own political and economic future in their own way.

The one principle would seem the flat contradiction of all that America stands for, the other principle would seem to be precisely the essential idea of free self-government and democratic evolution, in which are rooted the very life and being of America.

For this reason there is instinctive and profound sympathy on the part of the great majority of native Americans with the cause of England and her allies.

This sympathy is not merely the tie of blood or the unity of ideals. Reason has convinced Americans that the supreme principles and highest interests of America will be best safeguarded if the Allies win.

They dread instinctively what might happen if Pan-Germanism absorbed the smaller nationalities, crushed the great free countries like France and England, and dominated the whole world with the "mailed fist," not only Europe and the Far East, but South America and the Pacific. Perhaps the hint of Count Bernstorff that Canada may be treated like Belgium, and the Monroe Doctrine like other "scraps of paper," may also have thrown some light for Americans on a "Germanized" future! And a cast-iron system of commercial and industrial monopoly dictated by German needs cannot attract.

America Can't Stand Apart.

That is one side that American statesmen have to consider. There is, of course, another.

The United States visibly form the greatest force the world has yet seen to bring together, to unite, to assimilate, in the development of their vast territories, measureless resources, and complicated industries, all that is best from all the other great nations, welding slowly but surely, through free institutions, these new elements into instruments for the fuller realization of the generous and noble ideals for which America stands. Perhaps an eighteenth or even fifteenth part of the population is of German origin, a percentage not far from equal to that contributed by the United Kingdom and Canada.

There is thus not only the broad ques-

tion of avoiding war with Germany, whose people have so large a share in the life of America, a war doubly unwelcome at all times because of the innumerable links of science, invention, professional training, of commerce, and of personal friendship; but there is also the local question of peace and goodwill in the daily work of America as between huge sections of her population. These visible facts not unnaturally give great weight to the argument for neutrality. No wise man on this side of the Atlantic will try to ignore them, or take exception to the dignity and correctness with which the American Executive has dealt with the grave problem before it.

Neutrality has, of course, its limits and conditions, logical and moral. Those limits and conditions, the possibility of their infringement in such a way as to make some change of policy imperative, are matters solely for the United States.

The point the present writer wishes to press is on a different plane, and is precisely this:

America does not and can not stand wholly apart from supreme European decisions.

America is as responsible as Europe for the great extensions, definitions, the strengthening and modification of international law. America stands forth as the apostle of arbitration, to widen the area within which disputed points may be determined amicably. America stands also as the chief signatory of the great world conventions which have settled new rules for the conduct of war, to mitigate its horrors, especially for non-combatants.

America has taken a noble part in framing machinery for securing peace and justice, and in moving forward the landmarks of civilization as against savagery, and of human mercy as against cruel terrorism.

Can America safely or wisely divest herself of the duty thus placed upon her, logically and morally, by her participation in this, the noblest work of our age?

And is it wise or is it safe to in-

definitely postpone the discharge of this duty?

By the events of the last three months the whole of this new charter of humanity has been challenged and is at stake.

Is it not sound policy as well as an imperative duty to take some step here and now to "stop the rot" and to make good here and now as much as we can of what we have won and wish to keep?

Belgium's Wrongs.

Admittedly a "guiltless and unoffending nation,"* whose neutrality and independence had been solemnly guaranteed by treaty, to which the powers concerned in the war were parties, has had her treaty rights violated by one of these powers on the cynical plea that there is no right or wrong as against national interest, that necessity obeys no law, and treaties are "scraps of paper." This is not matter for inquiry or judicial decision at some later date. It has been frankly avowed by the German Government from the outset of this war.

Again, this admitted wrong is not the sudden and unavoidable outcome of events unforeseen and uncontrollable. It had been deliberately planned years ahead, with elaborate preparation of railway and other facilities, and with every invention and contrivance, to rush in irresistible forces; to subvert and destroy the independent State that Germany was herself pledged to defend.

Thirdly, this policy of absolute annihilation of Belgium, of its right to live its own life, its right even to preserve those monuments of its noble and beautiful history which had become treasured heirlooms of the whole world, has been carried out with a ruthless barbarity to the people, and especially the noncombatants, for which it is hard to find a parallel in the worst incidents of the Thirty Years' War or of the devastation of the Palatinate. To bring the actual guilt home to those who actually did or ordered these deeds to be done in individual cases is one thing. The broad fact that these barbarous deeds were done stands manifest and insistent, and de-

*Theodore Roosevelt.

mands such instant action as can be taken by a great and responsible people.

And, lastly, there is the undisguised adoption of the policy of terrorizing noncombatants to submission by such acts as forcing women and children to walk before the advancing enemy, the wholesale burning of houses, shooting of hostages and other noncombatants, and the dropping of bombs from aeroplanes not on forts or troops, but on places where women and children can be killed or injured.

And all this tragic sweeping away of such good things as had been won with worldwide consent, at the instance of the Czar in initiating The Hague policy, has gone on, so far as it could go on, with equal terror, throughout Northern France. Rheims and Senlis have suffered the fate of Louvain and Termonde and Malines, and Paris has had her quota of women and children wantonly slain by bombs, exactly like Antwerp.

The Threat to England.

And America knows, as we here in England know, from the open menace of the German press, writing of England as the *one supreme enemy*, that it is the full intention of Germany, if they can, to carry through England, too, even more ruthlessly, the same policy.

We are fighting here, and are confident that we shall fight with success, not only to protect our English homes and to guard the historic buildings of this land but to make an end of this Prussian terrorism of the world; to secure no national aggrandizement, but to secure a permanent and solid peace, based on guaranteed liberties, and a rational settlement of the question of armaments.

These questions touch us all the more because many of us have been the most persistent friends of international peace and have specially labored to promote happy and friendly relations with the German people. The present writer, who was honored by election as President of this year's National Peace Congress, has been associated with the work of men like Lord Brassey, Sir John Lubbock, (later Lord Avebury,) as a member of

the Anglo-German Friendship League, and has repeatedly in Parliament argued against any hostile or provocative attitude toward Germany. This war is our answer and our reward!

America in the Settlement.

So far as can be judged from authoritative words of President Wilson and ex-President Roosevelt, America does and will claim a right to share in the final settlement of the terms of a permanent and stable peace.

If that claim is sound, if the efforts of America to create better machinery for securing peace and for generously and humanely vindicating the liberties and happiness of nations and of the individuals who make them up do entitle America to a voice, and a potent voice, in the work of mending and remaking the world after this terrific catastrophe, then I would submit with all respect that it is really idle to wait till all the recognized principles of what has been held to be right or wrong as between nations and what has been held to be right or wrong in the methods of conducting war have gone overboard, without one word of protest; we must save the world first, if we are to have a real chance of remaking it on lines which are worth having.

Nothing but good could come from immediate action by the American Executive to assert as they, best of all nations, could assert, now and at once in terms uncompromising, unanswerable, that the ground taken up by international consent in the past generation must be held now and hereafter, and accepted as an essential basis of the final settlement.

Such a pronouncement now by America would make a landmark in history—would render a measureless service to the whole world in emancipation from the persistent degradation of the twin doctrines that might makes right, and that necessity knows no law, and would bring to America herself imperishable honor and glory in the fearless assertion and eternal consecration of her own noblest ideals.

I would submit further that such a

national declaration by America involves no violation of neutrality, and is in no sense inconsistent with the spirit of official utterances already made.

To take the latter first—we have had notable utterances from the President and from the ex-President.

President Wilson seems to have given a sympathetic hearing to the mission which laid the case of Belgium before him, both as to the violation of Belgium's neutrality and as to the cruel treatment of the noncombatant population and the wanton destruction of towns and villages and of precious historical monuments. He is understood to have promised an investigation, and it is gathered from the *Indépendance Belge* this week that this investigation has been, and is being, carried out by American Military Attachés in Belgium, and also at the London Embassy of the United States.

Again, President Wilson's recent letter to the Kaiser, while confirming neutrality in precise terms, went on to intimate that there must be a "day of settlement" and that "where injustices have found a place results are sure to follow, and all those who have been found at fault will have to answer for them." If the "general settlement" does not sufficiently determine this, there is the ultimate sanction of "the opinion of mankind" which will "in such cases interfere." He would apparently reserve judgment until the end of the war, but in no way disclaims or surrenders American responsibility.

Mr. Roosevelt is not tied by official responsibility, and can speak with less restraint and more freedom. In *The Outlook* he has substantially accepted and indorsed all that is material in the Belgian case.

America should help in securing a peace which will not mean the "crushing the liberty and life of just and inoffending peoples or consecrate the rule of militarism," but which "will, by international agreement, minimize the chances of the recurrence of such worldwide disaster," and "will, in the interests of civilization, create conditions which will make such action" as the violation of

Belgian treaty rights "impossible in the future."

Like President Wilson, he seems to think that the time for judicial pronouncement on acts presumably guilty and wrongful will come at the conclusion of the war. At the same time he surrenders no part of America's responsibility, but reaffirms it with all the force of his trenchant style.

But elsewhere, and later, he has insisted on the "helplessness"—the "humiliating impotence created by the fact that our neutrality can only be preserved by failure to help to right what is wrong."

Mr. Roosevelt's Remedy.

And he has gone on to adumbrate his practical remedy—"a world league" with "an amplified Hague Court," made strong by joint agreement of the powers, to secure "peace and righteousness," and to vindicate the just decisions of such a court by "a union of forces to enforce the decree." He adds that this might help to obtain a "limitation of armaments that would be real and effective."

That so happy a plan may be capable of realization would be the hope of all wise men.

But where I take exception with Col. Roosevelt is as to America's present "impotence"—that nothing effectual can be done by America without breaking her own neutrality.

That view I wholly traverse. It might conceivably be felt by America, under certain grave eventualities, that neutrality must be broken.

But it is clear that the articles of The Hague Convention of 1907 amply provide for the type of action here and now by the United States which I have ventured to lay before American statesmen in this paper. And, in my opinion, it is conceivable that more good might be achieved by America taking that action, while maintaining her neutrality.

It goes without saying, it really needs no demonstration, that nearly every international agreement embodied in The Hague Convention has been broken, wholly or in part, in the letter and in

the spirit, in the proceedings of this unhappy year.

The violation of the territory of a neutral State by the transit of belligerent troops and other acts of war is forbidden, (Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, &c.) It is the duty of the neutral State not to tolerate, (Article 5,) but to resist such acts, and her forcible resistance is not to be regarded as an act of war, (Article 10.)

Interference with Neutrals.

That, of course, covers the case of Belgium completely and establishes absolutely that there is, and need be, no breach of neutrality in resistance thus legally sanctioned to illegal interference with neutral rights.

It is hardly necessary to recapitulate the articles that have been torn up. To refer to the most striking, there is the repeated bombardment of undefended towns, pillage incessant throughout Belgium and Northern France, (Articles 28 and 47;) the levying of illegal contributions, (Articles 49 and 52;) the seizure of cash and securities belonging to private persons, banks, and local authorities, (Articles 52 and 56;) collective penalties for individual acts for which the community as a whole are not responsible, (Article 50.) Articles 50 and 43 should have made impossible the punitive destruction of Visé, Aerschot, Dinant, and Louvain, and numberless villages; Article 56 should have preserved from destruction institutions and buildings dedicated to religion, education, charity, hospitals, &c. All these wrongful acts, committed everywhere, have been prohibited by these articles.

The gradual introduction of the policy of terrorism has been ably traced by perhaps the highest French authority on international law, Prof. Edouard Clunet, formerly President of the Institute of International Law, in a recent address.

"Bombardment par intimidation" was adopted by the Germans in 1870 and used at Strassburg, Paris, Péronne, &c., shells being directed and conflagrations spread in the inhabited parts of towns apart from the fortifications. Germany herself assented to serious mitigations of

this practice at the Conference of Brussels in 1874 and at The Hague in 1907.

The worst evolution of the policy of terrorism has been in the throwing from aeroplanes of bombs, explosive or incendiary. M. Clunet lays down that, by the most recent decision of the institute, bomb throwing from aeroplanes must follow the rules of bombardment by artillery. This would prohibit such bombs without formal notice. But in Antwerp bombs were dropped without notice over the Royal Palace, to the peril of the Queen and her young children, and the number of peaceable inhabitants killed or injured was thirty-eight, three children being mutilated in their beds. In Paris, besides the bombs dropped on Notre Dame, bombs were deliberately dropped in the public streets and a number of peaceable victims killed or wounded. The dropping of bombs as an act of war on fortresses, ammunition depots, Zeppelin sheds, &c., is, of course, legal. But the bomb dropping adopted in Belgium and France, and threatened in England, if the opportunity arises, is undisguised terrorism, and not war.

It is important to note also that at Brussels in 1874 Antwerp addressed a petition to the conference praying that any bombardment should be limited to fortifications only. The commission of the conference, which included three well-known German Generals and two professors, recognized the justice of this plea and recommended Generals to conform to it.

But the one point that should appeal most strongly to the patriotism as well as the idealism of America is the fact that the instructions of 1863 for armies in campaign, drawn up by the United States Government in the height of the civil war, first codified the laws for the conduct of war, and have been the source and starting point of all these later international agreements.

And it should be remembered that both Germany and America signed the Fourth Convention of The Hague with its annexed regulations as to sieges and bombardments (Articles 22 to 28) and the further provision which may even yet be applied punitively to the proceed-

ings of the present war. "The bel-ligerent who shall have violated the provisions of the said regulation shall be held liable for an indemnity."

And if it be thought that America can render no help in such a position as the present without violating her neutrality, the answer is that by Article 3 of Convention 1 of The Hague, 1907, neutral powers have the right to offer their suggestions (bons offices) or their mediation, even during the course of hostilities. And further: "The exercise of this right must never be considered by one or the other of the parties to the conflict as an unfriendly act."

With all submission, I earnestly urge on the leaders of American thought to support this attempted interpretation of the supreme duty and the noble oppor-

tunity the present position places before their country.

One more word. I referred to the possible benefit of neutrality being maintained while this protest against wrong and appeal for right is at the same time advanced.

Is it not more than probable that there is an immense section of moderate though patriotic opinion in the great German people which, at heart, deprecates the extreme doctrines of conquest and world supremacy in pursuit of which the great, the wonderful achievements of the German race in science, in industry, in the extension of commerce, are being rashly risked?

CHANNING OF WELLINGBOROUGH.
40 Eaton Place, London S. W., Oct.
29, 1914.

TO A COUSIN GERMAN

By ADELINE ADAMS

MY Hans, you say, with self-applausive
jest,
"When Albert gave his Belgians Cae-
sar's name—
'Bravest of all the Gauls'—surely 'twere
shame
The King, unthorough man, forgot the rest:
"
"Bravest because most far from all the
best
Provincial culture.'"
"Friend, if now your
aim
Be that fine thoroughness your people
claim,
Read on: "Such culture's wares, it stands
confest,
Oft weaken minds." And Caesar's word
was just.
If men, bedeviled under culture's star,
Have left Louvain a void where flames
still hiss,
Spear'd babes, and stamped the world's own
Rose to dust,
God grant that Belgium's soul may dwell
afar
Forever, from a culture such as this!

* "Propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate
provinciate longissime absunt."

What the Economic Effects May Be

By Dr. Irving Fisher

Professor of Political Economy at Yale University.

WHEN the future historian chronicles the facts of the present great world struggle and attempts to analyze its causes and effects the economic losses, gains, shiftings, and dislocations will form an important part of the story. It is, of course, quite impossible at this time to know, in any detail, what all the economic results will be. Much will depend on how long the war lasts, how many people and how much property are destroyed, what financial devices are resorted to in order to finance it, and which side is finally victorious.

The most palpable and the most fundamental effects will be a partial stoppage of earnings in the nations directly concerned, i. e., a reduction in the "real income," which consists of enjoyable goods. All the other important results follow from this.

The cost, however reckoned, is sure to be stupendous. Prof. Richet is quoted as reckoning it at \$50,000,000 a day. This is probably more than half the total income of all the inhabitants of the warring countries. The highest estimates of the total income of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, estimates of Bowley, Laverge, and Buchel, respectively, total up less than \$70,000,000 a day. Russia and Austria are poor countries per capita, and would scarcely bring the grand total to \$100,000,000 a day. Moreover, the loss of real income to Europe is, I imagine, in reality much greater than Richet's estimate, chiefly because he takes little account of the indirect costs, which may well be the greatest of all. The cost to the fiscal departments of Government is probably only a small part of the total cost which

the people will have to bear. The killing and disabling of the men engaged will cut off the financial support of European families to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars per year. The physical destruction of capital through the devastation of crops, the burning and demolishing of merchant ships and buildings, the crippling of industry through the sudden withdrawal of labor and raw materials, the introduction of new trade risks, and the cutting off of transportation, both internal and foreign, make up a sum of items which cannot be measured, but which may exceed those which can. Last, but not least, is the impairment of that subtle but vital basis of business, commercial credit.

In short, the central effect is a vast impairment of Europe's current income and of the capital from which her future income will flow. It means a veritable impoverishment of vast populations. The great burden will bear heaviest, of course, on the poor. It will impinge very unequally and will cause a great redistribution of wealth. As always happens, some people, mostly lucky speculators, will come out of the *mêlée* wealthier than before. This fact will not serve to lessen the discontent of the masses, which their impoverishment is sure to create. Food prices will be high, the earnings of labor will be low, and after the war unemployment will be great, due to the impossibility of quick absorption into the industrial system of returned soldiers, as well as other maladjustments which the war is sure to bring.

The victor may secure indemnity for part of the loss, but not for all; he will, in spite of himself, be a net loser. Taxes

will be a crushing burden, merely to secure funds with which to pay high interest on vast new war debts, to say nothing of funds with which to purchase new armaments—if again the nations are forced, by lack of international control, to resume the stupendous folly of racing each other in military equipments.

Bankruptcy and Revolution.

It may well be that among the economic consequences of the war there will be some national bankruptcies, and that among the political consequences will be revolutions. High prices, high taxes, low wages, and unemployment make an ominous combination. We may be sure that discontent will be profound and widespread. This discontent is pretty sure to lead, especially in the defeated nations where there is no compensating "glory," to strong revolutionary movements just as was the case in Russia after her defeat by Japan. Whether or to what extent these movements, in which "Socialism" in the various meanings of that word is sure to play a part, will succeed, depends on the relative strength of opposing tendencies which cannot yet be measured. One possible if not probable result may be, as I suggested in *THE TIMES* two weeks ago, some international device to secure disarmament and to safeguard peace.

Though part of the losses to Europe will be permanent, her chief loss will be coterminous with the war. She will, therefore, seek ways and means to fill in this immediate hole in her income in order to "get by." To do this she must borrow; that is, she must secure her present bread and butter from us and other nations and arrange to repay later out of the fruits of peace. She can stint herself, but not enough to meet the situation. She must borrow. And in one way and another she will satisfy this necessity by borrowing in the United States.

Most of the strange and unprecedented phenomena which we have witnessed in the last month, in rapid succession, are due to this pressing necessity of the belligerent peoples to cash in now and trust to good fortune to pay later. As soon

as the war became even probable Europe tried to cash in on our securities. The pressure for our gold pushed it toward Europe faster than it could move. Exchange jumped to the gold-shipping point of \$4.89 per pound sterling, and did not stop. In some cases it reached \$7. This was partly due to the desire to get our gold and bolster up a credit structure, tottering before the deadly blow of war; but it was also partly due to the need of ready money for supplies of all kinds. This need applies not only to the Governments, but to the individual people. To obtain this ready money they threw back on us the securities they had purchased of us in former years. They wanted us to take back these titles to future income and give them instead titles to present income. Had they secured our gold their next step would have been to spend part of it for supplies, and this would have caused any foreign dealers to whom they applied to place orders with us. The gold then might have turned the exchanges and have been brought back to us in return for our wheat and other products.

This double transaction is in essence one—a barter of present income in the form of our wheat to Europe for future income in the form of investment securities. It was interfered with by the refusal of the insurance companies to insure the gold and by the closing of Stock Exchanges against the inundating flood of securities. The first difficulty, as to transporting gold, has been largely removed by arranging for drafts against stocks of it kept on both sides of the Atlantic. This will save the need of sending it on risky voyages back and forth, and any final net balances can be liquidated after the war. The second obstacle, the closure of the Stock Exchanges, is more formidable, but cannot completely or permanently prevent the transactions which so many people on both sides are anxious to consummate. Curb markets and limited cash sales on the Exchanges themselves are doing some of this business, and, sooner or later, much more will be done, whether the Exchanges are open or not. Europe needs our wheat

and cannot pay for it except with securities, partly because her own industry is paralyzed, partly because ocean transportation is difficult.

What Dumping Securities Means

Few people seem to realize that the dumping of securities on our shores and the efforts of foreign Governments, such as France and Switzerland, to borrow money in our markets are at the bottom very much the same thing. They are simply two forms of securing present supplies from America in return for future supplies, the dividends and interest on securities from Europe.

It does not much matter whether we buy Government bonds or other securities. If we buy of French capitalists their holdings in American railway securities we simply provide them with the wherewithal to take the French Government loans themselves. They virtually become, without our knowledge, the go-between through which we lend, as it were, to the French Government, in spite of ourselves. It is doubtless well, as a matter of policy, to refuse to loan directly to France, but we must not for a moment conclude that France or any other nation will have to finance the war without our aid. We shall not be consciously helping any particular nation, but we shall be actually helping any nation which can trade with us. Evidently England will get more of our help than any other nation because her shores are more accessible. Germany is more isolated. Unless she possesses a larger food stock than commercial statistics indicate she will be pressing for our food supplies, which may reach her indirectly, we selling to Holland and Holland to Germany; also reversely, via Holland or via Austria and Italy, Germany may sell a stream of securities the other end of which we receive. Whether directly or by devious routes there will inevitably be, so far as I can see, a vast exchange of commodities passing to Europe for securities coming from Europe. In this interchange will be found the dominant economic effect of the war on the United States.

Foreign nations will get their much-needed loans on better terms, even if less

promptly, by the circuitous process mentioned than if they could borrow directly in our markets; for their own citizens will pay higher prices than we would, even if, to get the money, they have to sell their other investment securities to us at a considerable sacrifice. England has sold Treasury bills for seventy-five millions of dollars on as low a "basis" as $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.

In this virtual trade of this year's crops for titles to future years' crops we shall get a high price for the former and pay a low price (in present valuation) for the latter. Investment securities are, and will be, a drug on the market. In other words, the rate of return to the investor will be high; the rate of interest on long-time loans will be high and stay high, that on short-time loans may fluctuate greatly. The rise in the rate of interest on long-time investments is one of the most vital and far-reaching effects of the war. At bottom, interest always arises from the exchange of present and future goods. The rate of interest, as I have tried to show in my book of that title, is simply the crystallization, in a market rate, of the impatience of the human race for its bread and butter. War has now produced such impatience in populations of hundreds of millions. It is this impatience which dumps the securities upon us, sends down their price, and sends up the rate of interest. As Byron W. Holt has said, there is no moratorium for hunger. The fall of securities in Europe produces the like fall in this and other countries.

One of the consequences to America of being forced to play the rôle of money lender and one of the consequences of the rise in the rate of interest here, or what amounts to the same thing, the fall in the prices of bonds, will be an increased difficulty of financing our own enterprises. Only the most promising enterprises will be able to sell their securities. This means that we shall be neglecting, to some extent, our own enterprises, to finance the European war instead.

This general depreciation of investment securities will doubtless lead to

many bankruptcies, if not to a genuine crisis. It will also give tempting opportunities to investors. The likelihood of a genuine panic is lessened by the fact that every one recognizes the real cause of the disturbance and that insolvency is not suspected. According to the best commercial observers, the previous liquidation had been fairly well completed. Unless they are mistaken, disaster will not be likely to follow.

We repeat that, since the necessities of Europe have forced her to buy our food in return for her investments, it is evident that during the war food prices will be high and security prices, especially bonds, will be low. These are the two facts of greatest economic significance to us. To the country as a whole they defer some of our pleasures till after the war. Uncle Sam will cut down for the present on his eating and drinking, his clothes, shelter, and amusements in order to share his rations with Europe. Instead of the pleasures foregone he will invest—not in new enterprises at home, but in old ones—American and possibly European also—purchased of Europe. We can never have our cake and eat it, too. In this case we shall let Europe eat some of it on condition that she in turn shares hers with us after the war. Moreover, we shall trade off a relatively small piece of our present cake for a relatively large piece of Europe's future cake. In other words, Europe will fill up the great breach in her income now impending by inducing us to make a small breach in ours. The result will be that the course of our real income, that is, economic satisfaction or enjoyable consumption, will imitate in some degree that of Europe. This is, reduced to its lowest terms, the chief economic result of the war.

But to many the question is, Do we gain or lose, as compared with what might have been the case if there had been no war? I do not think any one can answer that question with certainty. Europe is willing to mortgage its future to us on terms very advantageous to us; but when the future comes, the purchasing power of money will probably be so much lessened as to have absorbed all our advantage. Probably we shall lose

slightly on the whole. But it is not economically impossible that there will be a net gain. In either case the net effect will, I believe, be small.

Of more importance will be the various effects on various classes. Certain people will be greatly benefited by the rise in food prices and the fall in security prices. The farming classes will profit by the former; the investing classes by the latter. Those who have the good fortune to belong to both classes will grow rich. The farmer who is in a position to save money will both make more money to save and be able to invest it more advantageously after he has saved it. If he lends to his neighbors he will find the market rate of interest high. Even if he buys more land the purchase price will be restrained from the great rise we might expect from the prosperity of farming by the fact that the "number of years purchase," as the phrase is in England, will be small, or, in other words, that the interest basis, which enters into every land price, will be high.

Labor Will Not Suffer Much.

On the other hand, the general consumer of farm products will suffer from another advance in that part of his cost of living, while the debtor classes will suffer from the fall in bonds or rise in interest. Many speculators on the Stock Exchange, those who have speculated for a rise, are in effect undoubtedly ruined already, and many borrowers at banks on collateral security will feel the pinch from the depreciation of their property and the hard times of renewing their loans.

And the laboring man, who forms the majority, what of him? It seems improbable that he will be greatly affected, that is, on the average. He will have to pay more for his food, and food constitutes more than a third of his budget. But some articles he buys will probably fall and he may secure higher wages because of the withdrawal of competing laborers. Some labor may rise, especially in the industries benefited by the war, such as, for instance, farming and other food industries, canning, flour mills,

sugar, &c., the automobile industry, and perhaps ammunition and steel. In other industries thrown out of gear for lack of foreign markets or for lack of foreign raw material, the wage earner may lose in wages and employment. In other words, labor will be dislocated in spots, like the other parts of our industrial machinery.

Important dislocations will be felt in the fields of shipping and banking. One consequence is that American enterprise has now the golden opportunity to capture a good share of each. The outbreak of the war and the simultaneous opening of the Panama Canal will tend to divert the course of trade from Europe to South America. Probably our merchant marine can be developed more successfully for this South American trade than it could for the European trade. New York can largely take the place of London as the world's exchange centre for Pan-American trade. This opportunity is increased by the possibilities in the new Banking act for the establishment of branch banks abroad.

With these opportunities and the rise of interest in Europe, the United States will change to a great degree from a debtor to a creditor nation.

One of the dislocations of the war in the United States will be the cutting off of imports of a large part of our dutiable commodities, and therefore the loss of national revenue. There is an urgent need to compensate for this loss by some other form of tax.

But it is well not to lose perspective, to remember that dislocations are not necessarily losses, that, however loudly they are proclaimed in news columns, they are small in extent when considered in relation to our whole trade, that this country of ours is a vast one, and that the rank and file of Americans will be but slightly affected by the war—especially by contrast with our friends, now fighting each other, across the sea.

We are too nearly self-supporting to be prostrated. Our foreign trade is and always has been a trifling matter compared with our internal commerce. The internal commerce paid for by money

and checks annually in the United States amounts to nearly five hundred billions of dollars, which is more than a hundred times as much as our combined exports and imports.

Almost all of what has been said so far had grown out of the prospect that the prices of foods and other materials needed in Europe will be high, while the prices of securities which Europe does not need and cannot afford will be low. Other prices will rise or fall according to special circumstances. Like a bomb-shell, the effect of the war will be to disperse or scatter prices at all angles of rises and falls. The prices of luxuries will be lowered. The prices of chemicals will be raised. The same article will fall in price in one country and rise in another if the transportation from the former to the latter is interfered with. This is true today of cotton.

There has already been a speculative movement to anticipate these changes and arbitrarily to mark some prices up and some prices down. But as this is guesswork, and will be subject to frequent revision, one of the striking phenomena will doubtless be an increase in the variability of prices. The general level of prices will tend to rise. The rise will probably be greatest in little countries like Belgium, which are in the war zone and largely dependent on foreign trade. The rise will be less in England and in the United States than on the Continent. In fact, it is conceivable that in England the hoarding of money and the shock to credit, which is as predominant there as it is here, may actually lower the general level of prices during the war, especially if we could include in the index number the prices of securities, luxuries, and articles of English internal trade. If any nation tries the old experiment of paying its bills in irredeemable paper money, that desperate expedient will have the same result that it did with us during the civil war. Inflation of the currency will expel gold from that country and raise its price level higher than elsewhere.

After the war is over prices will probably not retreat, but will move upward

even faster than before. There may then come the familiar "boom" period, which may culminate in a commercial crisis in a few years after the close of the war, as was true after the Crimean war, the American civil war, and the Franco-Prussian war. The rebound will probably be fastest in England. Statistical price curves of many nations usually show an upward turn when war begins and another when it ends. The war will thus aggravate a rise of prices already in prospect.

It would take considerable space to give, completely, the reasons for these prognostications, but I have tried to justify them in a brief addendum to a book to be issued this week on "Why Is the Dollar Shrinking?"

The sudden lightning bolt of war produced as one of its first economic effects a general dislocation of credit machinery in Europe and to some extent in this country. We heard at once that letters of credit of travelers in Europe were uncashable. Gold was hoarded everywhere. It is estimated that about \$30,000,000 in gold was hoarded in New York in the first week in August. Runs on banks were frequent. Bank reserves were depleted.

The moratorium was resorted to to avoid a general cataclysm of bankruptcies which might have occurred—not from actual insolvency but from mere insufficiency of cash.

To me one of the most striking phenomena was the promptness and effectiveness of the co-operative actions by which, so far, any business cataclysm has been avoided. The closure of Stock Exchanges perhaps saved us from general financial panic. Most striking of all is the manner in which the Governments of the world have come to the rescue of business. Those of us who were brought up in the old *laissez-faire* school have to rub our eyes. Had the world been guided by *laissez-faire* ideas in this emergency we should in all probability have witnessed by this time the greatest collapse of credit the world has ever seen. Almost all the large and effective measures to meet the many emergencies

arising were taken by Governments. The moratorium must be counted among the Governmental acts which, so far at least, have saved the day for business credits. In England the Government permitted suspension of the Bank act, (not of the Bank, as many Americans seem to imagine.)

Improvised Accounting Methods.

The Bank of England has been enabled to rediscount a great mass of acceptances by the guarantee of the British Government against loss in so doing. These in the end will amount to several hundred millions of dollars. Emergency notes were issued by Governmental authority on both sides of the Atlantic, and in the arrangements made for special gold funds in Canada and in France the Governments of England and France played the important parts. Thus have been improvised methods of international accounting by which the transportation of gold balances may be deferred and largely dispensed with. Our own Government has co-operated in the currency exchange and credit situation in many ways. It made provision for sending gold to Europe for our stranded countrymen. It promptly revised the banking and shipping laws.

Whether further instability will be found to need such bolstering we cannot be sure. The present outlook is that business conditions are fairly sound and stable. In which direction across the Atlantic the title to gold will tend to change cannot as yet be foreseen. It will depend largely on how much Europe wants our products and how large a sacrifice she is willing to make in selling us her securities. It will also depend on possible issues of paper money. Fortunately, we are the happy possessors of over \$1,500,000,000 in gold, and it is inconceivable that any large part of this should flow out—unless we should be so insensate as to inflate the currency.

If we keep our heads we shall at the end of the war be in the proud position of being the only great nation whose economic resources have not even been strained.

Effects of War on America

By Dr. Roland G. Usher

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THE events of the last few days of July, 1914, showed the Americans the far-reaching effects of a state of war. There are now few who would say, as used to be so common, that a European war would make no difference to us. The closing of the New York Stock Exchange, the great shipments of gold and its consequent scarcity in the United States, the closing of the New England cotton mills, the cessation of export to Europe and of transatlantic communication with the Continent were instantaneous effects of a war 3,000 miles away obvious even to the apathetic and the heedless. With these we have not here to do; such are already past history. There is, however, a legitimate field for speculation as to the probable effects on the United States of the continuation of the state of war in Europe for months or years. The permanent results of a war naturally cannot be predicted in advance, but in the light of the history of the past, certain changes and developments in the United States appear so probable if the war continues as to reach almost the realm of certainty.

Needless to say, the European war will not involve the United States in actual hostilities. It is highly improbable that either our army or our navy will see service. We are too distant from the seat of war; too entirely devoid of interests the combatants might seriously injure which a resort to war could remedy; too completely incapable of aiding or abetting one or the other in arms to cause them to assail us. Even were we not a nation of a peaceable disposition, even had we not a President blessed with a singularly clear head and able to keep his

temper, we should still stand little chance of going to war. One eventuality alone might affect us—Japan might attempt some measures of aggression in the Far East which would interest us as possessors of the Philippines, but that is practically foreclosed by her official announcement that she will side with England. The effects of the war upon the United States will be indirect effects; they will be economic in character, though far-reaching and significant for every man, woman, and child in the country.

The economic structure of the United States rests today upon the assumption of the interdependence of international trade, upon an international division of labor, where England makes some things, Germany others, and we still more, all of which are exchanged. In a sense each country manufactures and produces for the whole world, and in turn expects the rest of the world to buy its products and to manufacture and produce things for its consumption. While something of this sort has always been true in international trade, the process reached during the nineteenth century an unprecedented development which actually made countries interdependent, or, if you will, actually dependent for the necessities of life upon each other's prosperity and continued activity. Hand in hand went the expansion of the international credit structure, based upon public confidence in the mutual honesty of merchants, until finally personal checks have begun to be exchanged (between the United States and England at least) at par and without investigation or previous indorsement by the banks on which they were drawn.

With the outbreak of war a striking and artificial change, a totally uneconomic and unnatural factor, came to transform the situation and leave the United States for all practical purposes in contact with only two of her really large customers. We have no merchant marine and cannot therefore avail ourselves of our neutral status to trade with the belligerents. We shall be compelled (for a time at least) to ship in English bottoms to such ports as English ships can make—which will practically be limited to England, France, Portugal, Spain, and the Mediterranean ports. The ordinary commercial roads to Russia through the Baltic are automatically closed by the location of the German fleet, and probably England and France, deprived of other outlets for their own trade, will nearly monopolize the trade with Russia through the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

On the other hand, the mobilization of armies and fleets in Europe will draw millions of men from the field and factories where they have been accustomed to make what we have usually bought. The war will vastly diminish and in many cases stop altogether the stream of imports to the United States. These millions of men in the field and on the sea will not possess most of the economic wants they had in time of peace and will become conscious of many which they usually did not feel. The war will diminish and in many cases entirely stop the stream of ordinary American exports to Europe. Because of the stoppage of the European supply of things we have usually bought of them, and the cessation of a European demand for things we have usually sold to them, the conditions of the home market, both in regard to what we must buy in it and to what we must sell in it, will be vitally changed. When our present supplies of European importations are exhausted, we shall be obliged to make for each other and buy from each other the things which we happen to be no longer able to import or export. A great readjustment of the economic fabric in the United States will take place if the war lasts longer than a comparatively short time.

How long a time that must be will depend entirely upon the sharpness of the break in the economic life of Europe, and the amount of supplies they have on hand, which, as they will not now need them at home, they will be anxious to sell in the United States. Indeed, it would not be surprising if there was for a short time a glut of English and French manufactured goods in the United States market.

Europe May Depend On Us.

Of late years the commercial relationship between the United States and Europe has changed very greatly. For centuries we were a debtor community, buying largely from Europe, possessed only of crude staple products for export, and scarcely able by a series of expedients and exchanges to pay for what we bought.

Tobacco for many decades, then cotton, were the only commodities of which much was exported direct to Europe. Then came, during the European famines of 1846, 1861, and 1862, an enormous demand for American grain. Yet only during the last few decades have we been able to export largely manufactured products or been able to deal with Europe on an equality of terms. We are no longer a debtor nation; we are no longer dependent upon Europe; the United States is an integral and essential part of the interdependent international economic fabric. Indeed, if the war continues ten years, Europe may be dependent upon us.

In a sense we are not ready to meet the crisis. During the last ten or fifteen years the exports of foodstuffs have fallen off greatly, and the supply in this country has actually declined in proportion to population. There has been also a most marked increase in the exports of manufactured goods and a decided increase in the importation of raw materials, including foodstuffs. Now will come an enormous demand from Europe for the very things of which we have not produced so much and exported little or nothing—bacon, eggs, butter, beef. The demand will also be greatly increased for woolen

cloth, raw leather, shoes, steel in all its forms, railroad equipment of all sorts, automobiles and machinery, and, in particular, coal and gasoline. To supply this demand old industries will be expanded and new ones created, and shift of capital and labor will inevitably take place to the industries for which a demand becomes clear in Europe, as soon as it seems reasonably certain that the war will last beyond the present year.

An American Merchant Marine.

Above all, an American merchant marine is likely to be seen again upon the seas. There will be German ships in plenty for sale, in all probability, unless Germany wins an immediate victory on the sea, and the advantage of an unquestioned neutral status, easily obtained by a bona-fide purchase, will be so great that American capital will probably invest largely in freight steamers and ocean liners. It seems entirely unlikely that England, while she remains mistress of the seas, should recognize as valid the registration in the United States of vessels actually owned by belligerents or regard as anything more than masquerading their appearance under the American flag. England has never recognized any one's "right" to do anything at sea in time of war which did not accrue directly to her own benefit. It is scarcely necessary to say that she will not allow trade with Germany or Austria while she can prevent it. The only refuge will be the sale of the ship by the foreign owner to Americans who will trade with England, her allies, and strictly neutral nations. As always in time of war, privateering and smuggling will be profitable, and trade with Germany, unless she is immediately victorious at sea, will offer to the adventurous plenty of risk and the certainty of huge profits. During the Napoleonic wars the flats and bars of the German coast along the North Sea offered light vessels a great opportunity and the pursuing warships great obstacles. A modern motor-driven light craft will now have an enormous advantage over destroyers or cruisers. Here, as a century ago, many an American will find an opportunity to make a fortune.

The preoccupation of Europe with the war and the opening of the Panama Canal will afford the United States an unrivaled opportunity to develop trade with Canada, South America, Australia, New Zealand, India, China, and the Far East in general. We have never bulked large in the eyes of these countries and there has been much speculation as to the reasons why the German succeeded so well in South America and why the Englishman did so much business in China. Whether from sentiment or from a national habit that prefers English goods, the English colonies have bought more largely of the mother country than they have of us. But now that the war has closed the German factories, called German commercial agents home, and sent German ships racing to neutral harbors; now that the Panama Canal brings us some thousands of miles nearer to Australia and New Zealand than they are to London via Suez; now that England will be busy manufacturing for Europe and will have less to sell her colonies, these particular parts of the world will probably be compelled to look for their manufactured goods to the United States. Indeed, if one were not afraid of being accused of gross exaggeration, he might take heart and proclaim his conviction that a long and really inclusive European war would give the United States a practical monopoly of the South American and Pacific trade, provided always that the United States acquire by purchase a merchant marine and that the Panama Canal becomes feasible in January for large ships.

Foreigners Leaving America.

One other effect of the war has already begun to reveal itself in the emigration from America of thousands of Servians, Austrians, Russians, Germans, Frenchmen, going home to take their places in the ranks. While many of these men are brave and honorable citizens, the fact that they respond to such a call proves them not yet Americans. The war will tend to remove a goodly part of the distinctly foreign element in the country, the part not yet amalgamated, and therefore the part most alien to our in-

stitutions and the most difficult to place in our social structure. If the war continues, Europe will draw every able-bodied man who can be influenced to go. Far more important, immigration will probably become negligible not only during the war, but for some time after it. Usually the reason for leaving home lies in the crowded population of European States and the lack of opportunity for advancement, plus the glib tongue of some agent of a contractor or of a steamship company. In recent years those who have come have not been desirable additions to our population because they came from nations alien in blood, language, religion and institutions, and were not therefore easily knit into our national structure and absorbed. There will be little, if any, further immigration. The men are wanted for the army and will not be allowed to leave during the war. After peace is restored, they will be imperatively needed in the fields and factories and every effort will be made to retain them. In fact, it does not take any wild stretch of the imagination for one acquainted with the results of the Thirty Years' War and of the Napoleonic wars to conceive that, from the view of economic opportunity and rewards, Europe might become a more favorable scene for the truly capable and ambitious than America is today. The tendency of a war is to absorb the best of a nation and to leave the dregs. For the power of organization and the fire of initiative Europe will at no distant date be ready to pay well.

The Effect of Economic Readjustment.

Unquestionably the economic readjustment which the war will force upon the United States will have an immediate and serious effect on individuals. Some will profit largely and promptly. All who at present possess large stocks of food, leather, oil, woolen cloth will be able to dispose of them at enormous profits. From the greater volume of freight the railroads will benefit directly. But while the farmers and cattlemen, the steel and oil kings are rejoicing in the opportunity, all industries which depend chiefly upon exportation or which

manufacture an amount beyond the normal American demand, will be closing the factories or curtailing the output. For a time certain individuals, perhaps a relatively large number of individuals, will suffer inconvenience, loss, anxiety, and even privation. But the vast demand for labor in other industries and the almost certain extensive demand for relatively unskilled labor ought not to make the period of transition long or the amount of suffering considerable. After all, the vast majority of the people of the United States are connected with farming, with the manufacture or production of the very things for which there will most likely be a great demand, or with the transportation and distribution of both imports and exports to the rest of the community. In certain industries, like the manufacture of cotton cloth, which is localized in New England to such an extent that whole districts are dependent upon it for a livelihood, the distress will be great, for the factories closed upon the declaration of war and the workers are a long distance from the Western fields, where laborers are only too scarce. The cheapening of transportation, the rapidity of communication, the superior mobility of the population today over ten years ago, make it probable that these people will soon find new places.

Concomitant with the war came a rise of prices. Foodstuffs especially advanced sharply and will certainly continue to rise until some material increase of the supply is assured beyond a peradventure. The tendency in England and above all on the Continent for the cities to buy great supplies to guard against possible want will increase this tendency. But, without question, should the war last, a rise in the whole level of prices of everything, including labor, will take place in the United States. It will affect some individuals adversely, but for most will be in the long run almost negligible. For those who actually produce or handle goods which advance in price the result will be a profit, because the price of the commodity they have to sell will almost certainly ad-

vance sooner and faster than the prices of the commodities they themselves are compelled to buy. In time the two will equalize and they will be precisely where they were before the war; they will pay out with one hand what they take in with the other. In nearly all cases where the individual produces or shares in the production of an actual commodity a general rise in prices, even to the extent which this war threatens to produce, will be to him only a temporary advantage or disadvantage. True, wages and salaries in industrial pursuits will not quite keep pace with the rise in food-stuffs, and factory workers and clerks will not benefit to the same extent nor as soon as the farmers will. People whose incomes are derived from stocks in the businesses which prosper will probably receive much more than they pay by reason of the increased prices of other commodities, and certainly cannot be worse off than before.

America's Real Sufferers.

The real sufferers in America will be those who hold stock in the enterprises which fail or cease to operate, and that far larger class who are dependent on a fixed salary. Professors and teachers of all sorts and grades; people living on annuities or small incomes derived from bonds or real estate; those dependent on the rent derived from leases for a term of years of dwelling houses, office buildings and the like, these will lose a material amount, exactly in proportion to the rise in prices. To that extent, the purchasing power of the stated number of dollars they receive will depreciate and that much they will lose beyond a peradventure. In time, some relief will be afforded by a tardy rise in salaries, by the expiration of leases and the payment of bonds, but the actual losses of the intervening years have never been in any way refunded in like cases in the past.

For some individuals, then, the European war will spell strict economy; for a comparatively few, let us hope, ruin. For the country as a whole, considered as a social and economic unit, a long war will introduce an era of astounding prosperity. Never before has the country had, and certainly it will never again have, almost a monopoly of the world's trade thrust into its hands. The United States will have only one real competitor, England, and, should the English Navy prove itself less capable than is expected, or should England and her colonies be forced to order a general mobilization of their armies, the United States might conceivably remain the only great mercantile community to which the world could look for supplies. No such eventuality need be predicated to prove that the continuation of this war or a series of wars will create a demand for manufactured goods such as our merchants have never dreamed of. And they will command war prices. It means employment with rich reward for capital and labor alike—a vastly increased foreign market, a much greater domestic market, high prices, and a steadily voracious demand for the entire output. The result will be the rapid diversification of industry in the United States, the creation of industries never before possible because of European competition, the invention of machines to meet new needs. The normal economic development will be accelerated decades.

After the close of the European war, when manufacturing and production are resumed, America will find herself overproducing and face to face with another economic readjustment necessary to meet the new situation. Then will ensue a commercial crisis with all its attendant suffering and trouble such as the United States has probably never seen and which will be violent and serious in proportion to the length of the war.

The Germany of the Future

An Interview With M. De Lapredelle

Exchange Professor from the University of Paris at Columbia University.

IN the American press French views of the great war's significance have been less common than British views and far less frequent than German views. Therefore, this talk with M. de Lapredelle, Exchange Professor from the University of Paris at Columbia, will have especial interest.

This very distinguished Frenchman, although but 43 years old, has won high eminence in his native land, especially in the domain of international law, which is his branch at the University of Paris. Also he is Director de Recueil des Arbitrages Internacioneaux, he is the editor of The International Law Review in Paris, he is a member of the Committee on International Law for the French Department of Justice, he is a member of the French Committee on Aerial Navigation, he is General Secretary of the French Society of International Law, and he occupies other important posts and bears other important scholastic honors.

He is a cautious conversationalist, as might be expected of one who has so deeply delved into the most cautious of all professions, but in the mind of the thoughtful reader this should add to the value of his utterances, which, as expressed in the following columns, were carefully revised by him before going into type.

I asked M. de Lapredelle to estimate the great war's probable effect upon education.

"Of course it is too early to guess intelligently," he replied, "for the effect of the war will be dependent entirely upon the results of the war, and, while we of the Allies have no doubt of our

ultimate victory, it is the fact that victory has not been won as yet by either side.

"In talking with you my impulse is to assume what I feel in my heart—the certainty of German defeat, but I must not do that, although all the letters which I get from the front and from Paris express a growing confidence in the victory of the Allies.

"But it is too early to attempt intelligent detailed prophecy as to the effect of the great struggle upon the world's philosophy, or upon any other phase of its intellectual development.

"Almost certainly, however, a reaction against certain Germanic influences will be apparent after the war ends, for the world will not want ever to risk repetition of the horrors of this struggle, and it will be plain that they were the inevitable fruit of Germany's attempt at intellectual domination.

"This German assumption was due, largely, to their victory in 1870, but it went far beyond the bounds of reason, far beyond the fields in which German achievement really had established legitimate supremacy.

"The momentum of victory often has led humanity into excess. It led Germany into excessive claims of social superiority and into an excessive assumption of intellectual supremacy. Even in the eyes of others it gave Germany an unwarranted intellectual prestige.

"Really, the German is not a big thinker; he is an immensely careful thinker.

"Above everything, the German is an observer—a very diligent observer—and his mental eyes are likely to be so close

to the wall that he sees only a single brick in it, wholly failing to get a comprehensive view of the whole structure.

"Germans are very careful students. They attach a vast importance to detail. I think it is not unfair to say that, with the German, the smaller, the more minute the detail, the more it interests him. The German loves to write a big book on a small subject, and, loving it, he does it well.

"But there are more exalted tasks, as, for example, the writing of big books upon big subjects, giving the world fresh visions of new and far-flung vistas. The German loves to catalogue and catalogues almost with genius; he loves to deliver long lectures upon microcosms.

"Cataloguing and the near-sightedness which may arise from intense study of the atom, to the exclusion of the collective organism, whether that collective organism be the human individual or the social mass, may render immense service to the world, but it never will be the only service necessary, and, if pursued to the exclusion of all other investigations, such study is likely to produce an aggravated narrowness of vision. Narrow vision is certain to eventuate in selfishness.

"The Germans became selfish after this fashion. The present struggle is the war of selfishness against world advance.

"Innumerable, or at least many, individuals have furnished smaller parallels to the course which Germany has taken as a nation. The individual with the truly and exclusively scientific mind is likely to go too far into abstractions, built from a possible misinterpretation of minutiae.

"The ideal national intellectual development will combine both fact and theory, will join rationalism to idealism, and will be far more like that of certain nations which I shall not name than it will be like that of Germany. These nations which I shall not name have both.

"In other words, it seems to be the fixed idea of the German that the German civilization is the only civilization; but it is not the thought of France or

England that their civilizations are the only ones.

"This very lack of what may be defined as national egotism in France and England enables these nations to work, as Germany does not, for world science and world development—the growth of civilization as a whole.

"Germany's scientific work is for German science, she thinks of civilization only as German civilization. The world's other great nations—and may I say the world's great Latin nations especially?—internationalize their science and their civilization.

Why the Philosopher Is Important.

"One must be struck by the fact that Germany's critical philosophy formed the basis of her educational system and, therefore, the basis of her social system, and that it had in it the basis of the war.

"It cannot be denied, I think, that her education, as well as her politics and militarism, directly pointed to this great conflict. Indeed, the industrialism, the politics, the philosophy of Germany all find their logical expression in present events.

"Hegel was the first, in the beginning of the last century, to insist upon the ideas which, already being paramount in him, quickly became paramount in his followers, serving as the basis for the development of Prussia. To him this represented all and everything; to him divinity on earth was incarcerated in the State, and, therefore, the development of the State, not justice, was, in his mind, the object of all law.

"Since this beginning that has been the consistent German viewpoint, and increasingly so. The glorification of the State has included, of necessity, the sacrifice of the individual, and this has been conducted ruthlessly in Germany itself.

"Of course the State which considers it right to sacrifice the individuals of its own citizenship will be sure to consider it right to sacrifice the individuals of other nations' citizenships.

"That explains why international law never has been considered binding by the German; it explains why interna-

tional law was not considered binding when Belgium stood in the path of Germany's march toward Paris.

"International law never has bound the German; it never will bind him until he changes his national psychology.

"Ihering, one of Germany's greatest theoretical jurists and a scholar in the matter of Roman law, declared, 'Right is the child of might.' He did not say exactly that right is might, but he defined it as 'the child of might.'

"That may be taken as the German keynote, for this man is of such great influence in Germany that his utterances must have an enormous effect.

"Treitschke, the historian, in his teaching in Berlin, naturally drew some of his inspiration from these two men. For him the State need consider no law save that which will promote its own expansion.

"Moral law, he holds, need not and must not stand in the way of the prosperity and growth of States, as it frequently must obstruct the prosperity and growth of individuals.

"Under this theory the State has two functions—these are, inside the country, to make law; outside the country, to make war. Germany denies the right of an extraneous law to decide upon the details of right and wrong within a country, and that is why Germany defies and even denies international law.

"If it happens that a treaty which the State has entered into later proves to be obstructive to some expansion which is thought to be a necessity of the State's destiny, that treaty may be disregarded with the full approval of Germany's national morality, although similar conduct on the part of an individual in Germany would be considered highly reprehensible.

"The State may bind itself to secure advantage, but, also, it may unbind itself to secure advantage, and this without consultation with, or the approval of, the other party or parties to the contract.

"This theory becomes confusing to the student reared in other nations under different educational influences. It indicates beyond contradiction that Germany feels no sense of duty toward

other nations, but only an obligation to further her own interests.

"Germany has immense patriotism but no humanitarianism. Her only duty is to herself. Her national egotism can be characterized by no other word than selfishness.

"It is a curious phenomenon that at a time when humanitarianism in its broadest sense has become the keynote of all other of the great nations it has not become at all the keynote of German civilization.

Teutonic Superexcitation.

"It is impossible that such pride, such a sense of arrogant national superiority as that which marks Germany, should maintain among a democratic people; it is possible only to a very aristocratic country. What has happened is its logical outgrowth in the country which it has infected.

"In Germany this sense of national pride, of intolerance of others, even of contempt for others, has been developed until it amounts to superexcitation. It not only affects Germany's relations to other peoples, but it affects the relations of Germans to one another.

"Different classes of the German population continually exhibit it in their dealings with one another.

"It is continually illustrated in those events which have been the wonder of visiting foreigners—episodes of the contemptuous ill-treatment of subordinate German soldiers by their superiors. It goes beyond that, manifesting itself in the treatment of all civilians by the lowest soldier, and, further still, in the attitude even of the lowest civilian to all foreigners, even the highest.

"The German individual may not consider himself superior to all individuals of other nationalities, but he will be sure to consider his nation so far superior to every other that there can be no comparison between it and them. His is a peculiar arrogance. It is not at all personal; it is purely national; but none the less it is arrogance, and all arrogance is dangerous.

"A hierarchy always exists in aristocratic countries; the hierarchical idea

has been developed further in Germany than elsewhere.

"This has given Germany an unfortunate impulse. If to this impulse we add that other born of all her various victories since 1866, especially those which were won while Germany was realizing Bismarck's dream of triumph 'through fire and blood'—her industrial victories, her scientific advance, her social progress—and consider the Germanic tendency toward egotism, we do not find ourselves surprised when we find, examine, and appraise exactly what we have today in Germany.

"The perversion of national sentiment into national arrogance has been the definite, although, perhaps, unrealized and unintended, aim of every educational influence which has been at work in Germany since 1870. It has amounted to an unparalleled perversion of a nation's sentiment toward all the outside world.

"This war marks the crisis of this German pride.

"Germany's course throughout has borne all the earmarks of a national ego-mania. The whole German people, as a nation, not always, perhaps, as individuals, have fallen victim to the most colossal attack of ego-mania which the world ever has known.

"Combine this ego-mania with another delusion—the entirely unjustified conclusion that Germany was the object of a worldwide persecution—and it is unnecessary to search further for the causes of the war, just as it is unnecessary to search further for reasons for the combination of practically all other Europe against Germany.

"What would German victory mean to the world, if German victory came, save the worldwide dominance of German egotism, imposed at the expense of every other people? France would not escape, England would not escape, and, I assure you, you, America, would not escape. German victory would be far more than a European disaster—it would be a world disaster.

"Of all the nations in the world perhaps the United States and France have stood most notably for the ideas of in-

ternational justice. This really makes your interest in the outcome of the present war indirectly as great as ours.

"I cannot see how the people of the United States can feel otherwise than that not only their hearts but their reason demands victory for the Allies, not because of any wish for the destruction of Germany, but because of the wish for the preservation of the world.

"Indeed, it is inconceivable that victory for the Allies can mean destruction for Germany. It can mean only the destruction of German militarism, which has brought about the perversion of the German mind.

"No abler mind exists. Its release from the thralldom which has fettered it would be a vast world service, would, indeed, be a vast benefit to Germany herself. It is curious, but true, that I believe Germany's own salvation depends upon her absolute defeat in this great war.

"A few weeks before the war began Prof. Schucking expressed regret that Germany—that is, the German Government—should be so antagonistic to international spirit. The fact that he made this expression shows that, in spite of and beyond military Germany, the intellectual élite, the cream of the élite in Germany, has remained faithful to the traditions of the great philosopher, Kant.

"The intellectual élite—the cream of the élite—therefore may be absolved from all responsibility. Loyalty to the teachings of Kant will make it possible for the friends of humanity in all nations to join with Germany for human advancement on the basis of universal justice.

"After the victory of the Allies a new Germany will appear; it will be a liberal Germany, willing to renounce the narrow Prussian ideals, finding again the old German ideal in its disinterested form, a Germany which will be able to join hands with other nations, to help them in taking up again the works of international civilization, which Prussian Germany herself brutally brought to an end, with insolent scorn of right—an act for which she is now paying and must pay the penalty."

Germany the Aggressor

By Prof. Albert Sauveur

Professor of Metallurgy at Harvard University.

GERMAN professors and editors and other German sympathizers in the present struggle of nations have attempted the difficult task of convincing the American public, first, that Germany was not the aggressor, and, second, that she is conducting a war of civilization directed primarily against Russia, that Europe may not fall under Muscovite domination. The German Chancellor has made similar claims, while in the German "White Paper," published in full in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Aug. 24, it is likewise attempted to fasten the responsibility for this war on Germany's opponents.

A close and impartial study of both the English and German "White Papers" must suffice to convince the reader that Germany clearly was the aggressor and that England made every possible effort first to prevent a war between Austria and Servia and later to localize the conflict. Germany, on the contrary, by insisting from the start that there should be no intervention in the settlement of the dispute between Servia and her ally, Austria, made a European war inevitable. The sophistry, inaccuracies, and unwarranted conclusions of the German professors and editors have not helped their cause. The irrefutable facts remain, first, that Austria with the knowledge and approval of Germany presented to Servia an ultimatum so worded that she knew that the conditions imposed could not be complied with by any nation retaining a spark of self-respect; second, that after Servia had accepted Austria's ultimatum with the single exception of the most offensive clause, which she proposed to submit to arbitration, Austria, with Germany's consent, proclaimed herself unsatisfied and immediately declared war on Servia; third, that Germany and Austria knew that a war with

Servia meant a war with Russia, and that a war with Russia meant a general European conflagration; fourth, that Germany declared war on Russia, started the invasion of France before declaring war, and, by refusing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, to which she was solemnly pledged, forced both Belgium and England into the war. In the face of so flagrant a violation of all sentiments making for peace no sophistry will avail in attempting to protect Germany from the odium of being responsible for the greatest calamity the civilized world has ever seen.

We are told that Germany is conducting this war in the interest of civilization, that her chief purpose is to protect Europe from all domination of the Slav. And to ward off this Muscovite danger Germany is at present making desperate efforts to crush England and France, the standard bearers of democracy in Europe! In her war for civilization she is employing the methods of barbarian tribes, methods condemned by civilized nations and which have already horrified the world. It is hardly conceivable that Russia, which the German Chancellor describes as a semi-Asiatic, slightly cultured barbaric nation, could have committed in Belgium the atrocities imputed to the Germans had she conquered that country in similar circumstances.

It is manifest that Germany's supreme desire is to fasten Teutonic rule on Europe, to crush Russia, to be sure, but also to crush France and French civilization and to reduce England to the rank of a second-class nation. It is obvious that this is a struggle between militarism and its evils as represented by the Hohenzollern dynasty and democracy as represented by England and France.

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.,
Sept. 5, 1914.

Militarism and Christianity

By Dr. Lyman Abbott

Late Pastor of Plymouth Church; Editor in Chief of The Outlook.

WHAT is the cause of the explosion of a powder magazine? The gases stored in the powder. The lighted match is the occasion, not the cause of the explosion. The cause of the European war is the spirit of envy, jealousy, selfishness and suspicion in the so-called Christian nations. The assassination by a Servian of the Crown Prince of Austria was only the lighted match which set the European combustibles in flame.

In the United States we recognize the truth that the interests of each State are identical with the interests of the Union, and that no State can permanently prosper by reason of the misfortune of its neighbor. In the German Empire since its unification each principality similarly recognizes that the interests of the German Empire and the interests of the several principalities are essentially identical. But there is no such recognition of the common interest binding the warring nations of Europe together.

Each nation looks with envy on the prosperity of its neighbor and acts upon the assumption that its neighbor is a rival, and that its own commerce and wealth can be built up only at the expense of its rival. New York is quite willing that the harbor of Boston should be improved. Bremen is quite willing that the harbor of Hamburg should be improved. The west coast of England does not object to harbor facilities on the east coast of England. But Germany envies England's harbor facilities, and England and Germany are both resolved to prevent if possible Russia from getting harbor facilities on the Mediterranean Sea. Not every individual German, Austrian, Frenchman, and Englishman holds this opinion, but the policies of these nations are governed by this spirit of international rivalry.

A striking illustration of this spirit, perhaps the most striking illustration in modern international life, is furnished by the military party in Prussia. Gen. Bernhardi, in a volume entitled "Germany and the Next War," has given what may be regarded as a semi-official interpretation of German militarism. He holds that life is a struggle for existence, with a survival of the finest, and the strongest is the fittest; that a military organization constitutes the true strength of a nation; that there is no higher power in human life, certainly none in international life, than the power of physical force; that only the strong nation has a right to exist, and he objects to international arbitration because it recognizes the right to life of a small nation. In this volume he calls on Germany to establish a "world sovereignty" by force of arms, and he indicates what should be the twofold purpose of Germany in the next war, namely, to crush France and to establish such world sovereignty of Germany.

Militarism to Blame.

It was this spirit which led Germany into the present war; this spirit which denied that Belgium had any rights which Germany was bound to respect; this spirit which inspired the military party in Germany to regard its treaty with France and England guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium as only a "scrap of paper," and this spirit which could not and apparently still does not comprehend why Belgium should be bound in honor to defend her neutrality, or why England, with no very direct and immediate interests to protect, should feel herself bound to come to the defense of her weaker neighbor.

The delay of the German Army, which is likely to prove disastrous to her de-

signs, has demonstrated in her own chosen field that there is a force in national honor and national conscience which can put up a very efficient resistance to Krupp guns.

It is a great mistake to suppose that all Germany is actuated by this spirit of militarism. Frederick William Wile, for over seven years the chief German correspondent of *The London Daily Mail*, in an article in *The Outlook* recently said: "There are 66,000,000 Germans; 65,000,000 of them did not want war; the other million are the war party." But he adds that now Germany is absolutely united and that the Germans will not stack arms "till the last among them capable of shouldering a rifle is incapacitated, till the last copper pfennig capable of purchasing ammunition of war has vanished from their impoverished grasp."

There is in this nothing extraordinary. Whoever is responsible for bringing on the war, the interests, the welfare, and in some sense the honor of Germany are apparently involved in it. And yet it may be true, and I believe it is true, that the defeat of Germany will be its salvation, for it will be the overthrow of the spirit of militarism inherited from Frederick the Great, and this has been the bane of the German Empire.

In our civil war there was at first only a minority in most of the Southern States in favor of secession, but when the national troops invaded Virginia the South was as united for State independence as the North was for national union, and yet today it will be difficult to find anywhere in the South an intelligent man who does not recognize the truth that the defeat of secession and the emancipation of the slave have been of inestimable benefit to the Southern States.

I make no attempt here to apportion the responsibility for this war between the several powers engaged in it. However this responsibility must be shared among them, I can see but one meaning in the awful campaign. The victory of Germany would mean the victory of Prussian militarism. The defeat of Germany will mean the defeat of Prussian militarism, the rehabilitation of Germany

as a great industrial and educational power in the world, and probably the practical overthrow of military autocracy in all Western Europe.

Divine Right of Kings Obsolete.

The campaigns of Napoleon ended for Western Europe the Divine right of Kings. The campaigns of the Allies will end for Western Europe the Divine right of the armed man. The Russo-Japanese war gave to Russia its first representative assembly, the Duma. It is not unreasonable to hope that the present European war will result in greatly enlarging the powers of the Duma and establishing true constitutional government in Germany, a government in which the Ministry will be responsible not to the Emperor but to the Reichstag; and the power both of the purse and the sword will not be in the hands of an aristocratic oligarchy but in the hands of the common people.

It is not strange that men should point to this, perhaps the greatest war of history, as an evidence that Christianity is a failure. If Christianity professed to be able by a miracle to transform human nature at once, such a war would be fatal to its claim. But no such claim can be made for Christianity. It is a great human movement, a phase of the gradual evolution of man, governed by conscience and reason, out of the brute, governed by appetite and passion.

Man as he is seen in the world today is an unfinished product. He is in the making. The best that can be said of a Christian is that he is further along toward the goal of humanity than the barbarian. Theological doctrines such as the Trinity, the Atonement and the like are not the essential doctrines of Christianity. The essential doctrine is that life is a struggle for others as well as for self; that in this struggle every one owes a duty to his neighbor, and the stronger he is and the greater the need of his neighbor the more imperative is his duty; that as the father and the mother care for, educate and govern their child until he grows able to care for, educate and govern himself, so always the strong men and women

owe the duty of protection, education, and, in some measure, government to the weaker of the human race until they have outgrown the need of it.

In so far as autocracy is the rule of the few for the benefit of the few it is paganism. In so far as democracy is the rule of the many for the benefit of the many it is Christianity. He who believes this will perhaps believe with me that in a true sense this is a religious war, the war of conscience, honor, the moral sense against the rule of the bayonet and the bullet.

The cynic who thinks this war demonstrates the failure of Christianity should

not forget such facts as the heroic struggle of Belgium to maintain her neutrality, the resolve of England at every cost to maintain her pledges to Belgium, the Red Cross following the armies in the field and ministering to the sick, the wounded and the suffering, regardless of their nationality, the general kind treatment to prisoners, accentuated by some very horrible exceptions, and all this contrasted with the enslaving, torturing, the crucifying, the flaying alive of prisoners captured in war by barbaric nations before the dawn of Christianity.

LYMAN ABBOTT.

Cornwall-on-Hudson, Sept. 17, 1914.

VIGIL

By HORTENSE FLEXNER.

I HAVE waited with my mothers down the
dim, uncertain ages,
I have waited in the cave and hut and
tower,
From the first dawn's nameless fear
To the death-list posted here
I have slain my soul in waiting, hour by hour.

Under pelt of beast, trap-taken, or the leaves
by chance winds blow,
Under tunic, peasant hemp, or cloth of gold,
By the fire, in low flame burning,
I have crouched in silence, yearning,
And as now, my helpless heart has waited
cold.

Ancient is the part I play—like a cloak of
heavy mourning,
I take it, bending, from a million women's
hands.
They have worn it, they have torn it,
Agonizing, they have borne it,
And its folds are dark with heart-break of
all lands.

Oh, the woman figure standing, with the
face toward the horizon,
Oh, the hand above the eyes to ease the
strain!
Gaunt and barren, stricken, lonely,
With the empty memories only,
We have stood, the dry-eyed sentries of our
pain.

Nothing we can do to stop them, nothing we
can say to hold them;
Taking sunlight, laughter, youth, they swing
away,
And the things they leave grow strange,
House and street and voices change,
But the women and the burdened hours stay.

I have waited with my mothers down the
dim, uncertain ages,
While my children die, I pray the centuries
through,
And I wonder in my fear
At the death-list posted here
If God has left the women waiting, too!

Nietzsche and German Culture

By Abraham Solomon

THOSE who trace the German militaristic doctrines to Nietzsche's influence commit Pastor Mander's sin when he told Mrs. Alving to bar from her library a book which he had never read. Nietzsche was an inveterate enemy of efficiency, astigmatic with regard to practical life, and he never worked out a philosophy in the accepted sense of the term. He was a lyric poet who wrote psychology when he failed to sustain the poetic mood. In the Engadine and at Sils-Maria, brooding in a rocky void wherein he touched the sharp edge of infinity, he sang a Dionysian hymn to life against the melancholy products of German learning and against those nihilistic snares which he thought lurked in Christian doctrine. There he worked out the mystic idea of "Eternal Recurrence" and his song of Zarathustra with the bell strokes of noon.

What he knew of history he used for an analysis of values, and not for State polity. He shrank from the irritations of reality, and he had little patience with the national mania cultivated after Sedan, warning his country that their victory was not one of a superior culture, that Germany had no style but a barbaric mixture of many styles; and he pointed out the essential difference between culture and erudition.

His unfinished work, "The Will to Power," was an attempt to house his lyric passions in an architectural frame. The façade of the structure, as posthumously revealed to us, is an indication that he was really engaged in building a Tower of Babel. Power, Affirmation, Yea-Saying he considered the attributes of life, and he found in them recompense for his weakness and his lack of capacity for happiness. He was a master of the exquisite nuances of vision, but since he

touched real life at the circumference, and not at the centre, his philosophical valuations are bizarre, and have only a literary value.

It is superficial to make Treitschke and Bernhardi his disciples, as some American writers have made Roosevelt his disciple. Treitschke is a heavy-footed historian who raised the axiom of self-preservation into a philosophy of force. Von Bernhardi's book, though extreme in its expression, is based on the fundamental truth that if Germany desired a just proportion of oversea territories (a proportion denied her by England) she would have to gain it by force of arms. In the development of this idea he makes many generalizations calculated to dazzle the multitude and to imbue it with the courage to expansion. Treitschke would have rested in obscurity but for the war; Bernhardi does not pretend to talents as a philosopher.

The real origin of Germany's policy in the last forty years may be derived from the eminently practical and direct mind of Bismarck. From reading of history he learned that chicane and force had been utilized as the roads to power, of which fact he found ample demonstration in the histories of England and Russia. He proved himself a true adept by using chicane and force to achieve German unity, after the theorists had failed.

Those who glibly condemn a lyric philosopher in order to make out a case against Germany reveal the weakness of their position. It is strange that these lantern-eyed critics haven't cited Heine as an enemy of democracy because he adored Napoleon. Was it because Heine lived for years in Paris on the adulation of advanced feminines?

New York, Oct. 13, 1914.

Belgium's Bitter Need

By Sir Gilbert Parker

Sir Gilbert Parker, M. P., went to Holland at the request of the American Committee for the Relief of Belgium to inquire into the work of the committee and the needs of the Belgians.

Sir Gilbert visited frontier towns and the camps of the refugees for the purpose of making a personal investigation into the conditions.

SINCE the beginning of the war the hearts of all humane people have been tortured by the sufferings of Belgium. For myself the martyrdom of Belgium had been a nightmare since the fall of Liège. Whoever or whatever country is to blame for this war, Belgium is innocent. Her hands are free from stain. She has kept the faith. She saw it with the eyes of duty and honor. Her Government is carried on in another land. Her King is in the trenches. Her army is decimated, but the last decimals fight on.

Her people wander in foreign lands, the highest and lowest looking for work and bread; they cannot look for homes. Those left behind huddle near the ruins of their shattered villages or take refuge in towns which cannot feed their own citizens.

Abyss of Want and Woe.

Many cities and towns have been completely destroyed; others, reduced or shattered, struggle in vain to feed their poor and broken populations. Stones and ashes mark the places where small communities lived their peaceful lives before the invasion. The Belgian people live now in the abyss of want and woe.

All this I knew in England, but knew it from the reports of others. I did not, could not, know what the destitution, the desolation of Belgium was, what were the imperative needs of this people,

until I got to Holland and to the borders of Belgian territory. Inside that territory I could not pass because I was a Britisher, but there I could see German soldiers, the Landwehr, keeping guard over what they call their new German province. Belgium a German province!

There at Maastricht I saw fugitives crossing the frontier into Holland with all their worldly goods on their shoulders or in their hands, or with nothing at all, seeking hospitality of a little land which itself feels, though it is neutral, the painful stress and cost of the war. There, on the frontier, I was standing between Dutch soldiers and German soldiers, so near the Germans that I could almost have touched them, so near three German officers that their conversation as they saluted me reached my ears.

I begin to understand what the sufferings and needs of Belgium are. They are such that the horror of it almost paralyzes expression. I met at Maastricht Belgians, representatives of municipalities, who said that they had food for only a fortnight longer. And what was the food they had? No meat, no vegetables, but only one-third of a soldier's rations of bread for each person per day. At Liège, as I write, there is food for only three days.

What is it the people of Belgium ask for? They ask for bread and salt, no more, and it is not forthcoming. They do not ask for meat; they cannot get it. They have no fires for cooking, and they do not beg for petrol. Money is of little use to them, because there is no food to be bought with money.

Belgium under ordinary circumstances imports five-sixths of the food she eats. The ordinary channels of sale and pur-

chase are closed. They cannot buy and sell if they would. Representatives of Belgian communities told me at Maas-tricht yesterday that the crops were taken from their fields—the wheat and potatoes—and were sent into Germany.

No Work, but Taxes Continue.

There is no work. The factories are closed because they have not raw material, coal, or petrol, because they have no markets.

And yet war taxes are falling with hideous pressure upon a people whose hands are empty, whose workshops are closed, whose fields are idle, whose cattle have been taken, or compulsorily purchased without value received.

In Belgium itself the misery of the populace is greater than the misery of the Belgian fugitives in other countries, such as Holland, where there have come since the fall of Liège one and a half million of fugitives. To gauge what that misery in Belgium is, think of what even the fugitives suffer. I have seen in a room without fire, the walls damp, the floor without covering, not even straw, a family of nine women and eight children, one on an improvised bunk seriously ill. Their home in Belgium was leveled with the ground, the father killed in battle.

Their food is coffee and bread for breakfast, potatoes for dinner, with salt—and in having the salt they were lucky—bread and coffee for supper. Insufficiently clothed, there by the North Sea, they watched the bleak hours pass, with nothing to do except cling together in a vain attempt to keep warm.

Multiply this case by hundreds of thousands and you will have some hint of the people's sufferings.

In a lighter on the River Maas at Rotterdam, without windows, without doors, with only an open hatchway from which a ladder descends, several hundred fugitives spend their nights and the best parts of their days in the iron hold, forever covered with moisture, leaky when rain comes, with the floor never dry, and pervasive with a perpetual smell like the smell of a cave which never gets the light of day. Here men, women, and children

were huddled together in a promiscuous communion of misery, made infinitely more pathetic and heartrending because none complained.

At Rosendaal, at Scheveningen, Eysden, and Flushing, at a dozen other places, these ghastly things are repeated in one form or another. Holland has sheltered hundred of thousands, but she could not in a moment organize even adequate shelter, much less comforts.

In Bergen-op-Zoom, when I write these words, there have come since the fall of Antwerp 300,000 hungry marchers, with no resources except what they carry with them. This little town of 15,000 people did its best to meet the terrible pressure, and its citizens went without bread themselves to feed the refugees. How can a small municipality suddenly deal with so vast a catastrophe? Yet slowly some sort of order was organized out of chaos, and when the Government was able to establish refugee camps through the military the worst conditions were moderated, and now, in tents and in vans on a fortunately situated piece of land, over 3,000 people live, so far as comforts are concerned, like Kaffirs in Karoo or aborigines in a camp in the back blocks of Australia. The tents are crammed with people, and life is reduced to its barest elements. Straw, boards, and a few blankets and dishes for rations—that constitutes the *ménage*.

Children are born in the hugger mugger of such conditions, but the good Holland citizens see that the children are cared for and that the babies have milk. Devoted priests teach the children, and the value of military organization illuminates the whole panoply of misery. Yet the best of the refugee camps would seem to American citizens like the dark and dreadful life of an underworld, in which is neither work, purpose, nor opportunity. It is a sight repugnant to civilization.

The saddest, most heartrending thing I have ever seen has been the patience of every Belgian, whatever his state, I have met. Among the thousands of refugees I have seen in Holland, in the long stream that crossed the frontier

at Maastricht and besieged the doors of the Belgian Consul while I was there, no man, no woman railed or declaimed against the horror of their situation. The pathos of lonely, staring, apathetic endurance is tragic beyond words. So grateful, so simply grateful, are they, every one, for whatever is done for them.

None of the Refugees Begs.

None begs, none asks for money, and yet on the faces of these frontier refugees I saw stark hunger, the weakness come of long weeks of famine. One man, one fortunate man from Verviers, told me he could purchase as much as 2s. 8d. worth of food for himself, his wife, and child for a week.

Think of it, American citizens! Sixty-six cents' worth of food for a man, his wife, and child for a whole week, if he were permitted to purchase that much! Sixty-six cents! That is what an average American citizen pays for his dinner in his own home. He cannot get breakfast, he can only get half a breakfast, for that at the Waldorf or the Plaza in New York.

This man was only allowed to purchase that much food if he could, because if he purchased more he would be taking from some one else, and they were living on rations for the week which would represent the food of an ordinary man for a day. A rich man can have no more than a poor man. It is a democracy of famine.

There is enough food wasted in the average American household in one day to keep a Belgian for a fortnight in health and strength. They want in Belgium 300,000 tons of food a month. That is their normal requirement. The American Relief Committee is asking for 8,000 tons a month, one-quarter of the normal requirements, one-half of a soldier's rations for each Belgian. The American Committee needs \$5,000,000 a month until next harvest. It is a huge sum, but it must be forthcoming.

Of all the great powers of the world the United States is the only one not at war or in peril of war. Of all the foremost nations of the world the United

States is the only one that can save Belgium from starvation if she will. She was the only nation that Germany would allow a foothold for humanity's and for Christ's sake in Belgium. Such an opportunity, such responsibility, no nation ever had before in the history of the world. Spain and Italy join with her, but the initiative and resources and organization are hers.

Around Belgium is a ring of steel. Within that ring of steel are a disappearing and forever disappearing population. Towns like Dendermonde, that were of 10,000 people, have now 4,000, and in Dendermonde 1,200 houses have fallen under the iron and fire of war. Into that vast graveyard and camp of the desolate only the United States enters with an adequate and responsible organization upon the mission of humanity.

No such opportunity was ever given to a people, no such test ever came to a Christian people in all the records of time. Will the American Nation rise to the chance given to it to prove that its civilization is a real thing and that its acts measure up with its inherent and professed Christianity?

I am a profound believer in the great-heartedness of the United States, and there is not an American of German origin who ought not gladly and freely give to the relief of people who, unless the world feeds them, must be the remnant of a nation; and the world in this case is the United States. She can give most.

The price of one good meal a week for a family in an American home will keep a Belgian alive for a fortnight.

Probably the United States has 18,000,000 homes. How many of them will deny themselves a meal for martyred Belgium? The mass of the American people do not need to deny themselves anything to give to Belgium. The whole standard of living on the American Continent, in the United States and Canada, is so much higher than the European standard that if they lowered the scale by one-tenth just for one six months the Belgian problem would be solved.

I say to the American people that they cannot conceive what this strain upon

the populations of Europe is at this moment, and, in the cruel grip of Winter, hundreds of thousands will agonize till death or relief comes. In Australia in drought times vast flocks of sheep go traveling with shepherds looking for food and water, and no flock ever comes back as it went forth. Not in flocks guided by shepherds, but lonely, hopeless units, the Belgian people take flight, looking for food and shelter, or remain paralyzed by the tragedy fallen upon them in their own land.

Their sufferings are majestic in simple heroism and uncomplaining endurance. So majestic in proportion ought the relief to be. The Belgian people are wards of the world. In the circumstances the Belgian people are special wards of the one

great country that is secure in its peace and that by its natural instincts of human sympathy and love of freedom is best suited to do the work that should be done for Belgium. If every millionaire would give a thousand, if every man with \$100 a month would give \$10, the American Committee for the Relief of Belgium, with its splendid organization, its unrivaled efficiency, through which flows a tide of human sympathy, would be able to report at the end of the war that a small nation in misfortune had been saved from famine and despair by a great people far away, who had responded to the call, "Come over and help us!"

GILBERT PARKER.

Dec. 5, 1914.



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WITHDRAWN



